

*NEW EAST-BLOC EVIDENCE ON*

*The Cold War in the Third World  
and the  
Collapse of Détente in the 1970s*

In January 1976, during several days of negotiations in Moscow with Kremlin leaders, U.S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger pleaded for a Soviet gesture to ease the superpower confrontation in Angola, where the USSR's airlift of military equipment and Cuban troops had allowed the leftist government in Luanda to withstand an assault by guerrilla forces backed by South Africa. The action could do "irreparable damage" to detente, Kissinger warned, undermining supporters of that policy (above all Kissinger himself) in the United States. And that would be a "tragedy" since neither Moscow nor Washington had any significant interests in Angola, and "Five years from now it will make no difference."

According to recently declassified transcripts of the talks, obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by the National Security Archive, Soviet Communist Party General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko rebuffed the American's increasingly plaintive entreaties with the curt response that any complaints should be taken up with Havana, since the Cuban intervention was the result of decisions made between two sovereign states, Angola and Cuba, and the USSR could not speak for them. At a Friday morning session with Gromyko at the Foreign Ministry's Tolstoi House, Kissinger finally gave up, wistfully calling it "a pity that this has come to pass when many opportunities existed for two great powers to settle this in a far-sighted way."

"It wouldn't be the first time in history," he rued, "that events that no one can explain afterwards give rise to consequences out of proportion to their intrinsic significance."

Five years later, détente had indeed collapsed, in large measure due to a series of superpower conflicts in the Third World—over Angola, the Horn of Africa, Cuba, and Afghanistan, among other locations—and another U.S. Secretary of State, Alexander M. Haig, Jr., confronted another communist interlocutor in an even more

secretive setting. This time, in the fall of 1981, at the height of the public hostility between the Reagan Administration and Fidel Castro's Cuba, Haig was clandestinely meeting the Cuban Vice President, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, in a Mexico City suburb. And one key subject for debate was a review of recent history: How had Cuba become involved in Africa, and why did U.S.-Cuban relations begin to "go very poorly" in 1975-76 and continue to deteriorate thereafter? (The record of that meeting remains classified in U.S. and Cuban archives, but the *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* in this issue publishes a translated transcript obtained from the Russian archives.)

While Haig, repeating charges made during the Carter Administration, insisted that Cuba had acted as a Soviet proxy or puppet by intervening in Angola and the Horn of Africa, Rodriguez maintained just as stoutly that Havana had acted independently, out of its own interests, albeit (especially in the latter case) in coordination with Moscow; if anything, he declared, far from Moscow pulling the strings, it had been Castro, not Brezhnev, who had been the most ardent advocate of sending military support to revolutionary leaders in Africa.

"The outward geopolitical character of these events is completely at odds with the essence of the true facts . . . History will bring all of this to light," Rodriguez is quoted as telling Haig, adding: "One fine day, all of this will come to light. You can believe me or not, but some day this will be common knowledge."

That "fine day" has not quite arrived—much remains classified or hidden in archives and memories on all sides of the events—but with this issue of the *CWHP Bulletin*, it has come palpably closer.

*continued on page 4*

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# *The Cold War International History Project*

The Cold War International History Project was established at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C., in 1991 with the help of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and receives major support from the MacArthur Foundation and the Smith Richardson Foundation. The Project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War, and seeks to disseminate new information and perspectives on Cold War history emerging from previously inaccessible sources on “the other side”—the former Communist bloc—through publications, fellowships, and scholarly meetings and conferences. Within the Wilson Center, CWIHP is under the Division of International Studies, headed by Dr. Robert S. Litwak. The Outgoing Director of the Cold War International History Project and Outgoing Editor of the *Bulletin* is Dr. James G. Hershberg; the Incoming Director is Prof. David Wolff (Princeton University), and the Incoming Associate Director is Christian F. Ostermann. The project is overseen by an advisory committee chaired by Prof. William Taubman (Amherst College) and consisting of Michael Beschloss; Dr. James Billington (Librarian of Congress); Prof. Warren I. Cohen (University of Maryland-Baltimore); Prof. John Lewis Gaddis (Ohio University-Athens); Dr. Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (Deputy Director, Woodrow Wilson Center); and Prof. Sharon Wolchik (George Washington University). Readers are invited to submit articles, documents, letters, and Update items to the *Bulletin*. Publication of articles does not constitute CWIHP’s endorsement of authors’ views. Copies are available free upon request.

Cold War International History Project *Bulletin*  
Issues 8-9 (Winter 1996/1997)  
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars  
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In this issue, the *Bulletin* presents evidence from communist world archives—Russian, East German, Cuban—on many of the same issues that so bedeviled U.S.-Soviet relations in the 1970s: Angola, the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, Cuba, et al.

In large measure, the evidence presented here stems from the labors of the “Carter-Brezhnev Project”: a multi-year, multi-archival, international academic effort to explore the causes, consequences, and legacies of the collapse of superpower detente in the 1970s. The project was spearheaded by Drs. James G. Blight and Janet Lang of the Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University (organizer of similar conferences on the Cuban Missile Crisis), with the active participation of an informal consortium of scholarly partners, including the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository located at George Washington University; CWIHP; the Norwegian Nobel Institute; the Institute for Universal History, the Foreign Ministry archives, and the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation in Moscow. (A report on some of the Project’s early findings, on U.S.-Soviet relations at the outset of the Carter Administration, appeared in *CWIHP Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995), 140-154.)

Many of the documents in this *Bulletin* were obtained and translated by the Carter-Brezhnev Project in preparation for a series of conferences on the breakdown in U.S.-Soviet relations in the late 1970s, held in Georgia in May 1994 (on the SALT II process), in Ft. Lauderdale in March 1995 (on superpower rivalry in the Third World), and in Lysebu, Norway in September 1995 (on the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan); other translations, as well as accompanying articles and commentaries, were solicited by the *Bulletin*. (All documents obtained by the Carter-Brezhnev Project are available for research at the National Security Archive.)

Readers interested in these topics will also wish to obtain the first book to emerge from the Carter-Brezhnev Project: Odd Arne Westad, ed., *The Fall of Detente: Soviet-American Relations in the Carter Years* (see box), which contains interpretive essays by noted scholars as well as recently declassified U.S. and East-bloc materials; other volumes are planned.

This *Bulletin* double issue also contains several other major chunks of important new evidence from communist archives:

\* **More New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia**, following up on the previous *Bulletin* (no. 6-7, Winter 1995/1996, 294

pp.) and a major conference organized by CWIHP and hosted by Hong Kong University in January 1996;

\* **More Russian Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis**, providing another selection of declassified documents from the Russian Foreign Ministry archives and other materials to supplement those printed in *Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995);

\* **New Evidence on Soviet Decision-Making on the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises**, featuring an authoritative translation and annotation of the so-called “Malin Notes” of key Kremlin meetings during the crises, along with an introductory essay, by Mark Kramer of Harvard University—a remarkable window into how the Soviet leadership responded to a challenge to the communist empire that in many ways foreshadowed the terminal crisis of 1989; and finally

\* **Research Reports on Soviet Nuclear History**: documents on the origins of the USSR’s atomic project and on Nikita Khrushchev’s 1960 troop cut.

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This *Bulletin* marks my final issue as Editor and as Director of the Cold War International History Project; beginning in January 1997 I took up a position as Assistant Professor of Diplomatic History and International Affairs at George Washington University. I am pleased to report that the Project is passing into able, enthusiastic, more linguistically-gifted, and perhaps more organized hands: David Wolff, formerly of Princeton University, the author of a major forthcoming study of Northeast Asian history, and fluent in Russian, Chinese, Japanese, German, and French, becomes CWIHP’s new Director; and Christian F. Ostermann, research fellow at the National Security Archive, a frequent contributor to the *Bulletin* of reports on new evidence from the East German archives, and the author of a forthcoming study on relations between the German Democratic Republic and the United States, becomes Associate Director. I am also glad to say that I plan to remain closely associated with CWIHP, collaborating with my successors on transitional activities, contributing to future endeavors, editing CWIHP’s Book Series, and perhaps even finding time after five years of administration to do more of my own research and writing on Cold War history. So this is not good-bye.

Nevertheless, I would like to express my gratitude to CWIHP’s creators, supporters, friends, and collaborators for the chance to participate in the thrilling experience of peering behind (and trying to rip down entirely) the curtain of the last half-century of world history, and to work with an extraor-

dinary group of people from around the world. Even more than the historical information it has gathered and disseminated, CWIHP’s greatest achievement, I think, has been the creation of an international community of Cold War scholars, especially those who, on a daily and sometimes hourly basis, 24/7, constitute the CWIHP “network”: Tom Blanton, Malcolm Byrne, Vlad Zubok, Mark Kramer, Jim Blight/janet Lang, Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, David Wolff, Christian Ostermann, Kathryn Weathersby, Hope Harrison, John Gaddis, Bill Taubman, Warren Cohen, Aleksandr Chubarian, Mikhail Narinsky, and the “group” in Moscow, Bill Burr, Ilya Gaiduk, Leo Gluchowski, Csaba Bekes, Norman Naimark, Priscilla Roberts, Sven Holtsmark, Bob Brigham, Ray Garthoff, Vojtech Mastny, Kostia Pleshakov, Allen Greb, Maxim Korobochkin, Mark Doctoroff, Piero Gleijeses, Daniel Rozas, Peter Kornbluh, and many others who have made the last five-and-a-half years such fun that the exasperation paled by comparison. And above all, thanks to Annie for putting up with everything and coming along for the ride.

—Jim Hershberg

### THE FALL OF DETENTE: SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE CARTER YEARS

Readers interested in the materials on the Cold War in the Third World and the Collapse of Detente in the 1970s should also consult a newly published volume which also emerges from the work of the Carter-Brezhnev Project: Odd Arne Westad, ed., *The Fall of Detente: Soviet-American Relations in the Carter Years* (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997).

The volume includes interpretive essays as well as key U.S., Russian, East German and other documents on SALT and Bilateral Relations, Regional Conflicts, and Afghanistan and After. For ordering information within North America, contact the Scandinavian University Press North America, 875 Mass. Ave., Ste. 84, Cambridge, MA 02139, USA; tel: 617/497-6515; toll-free: 800/498-2877; fax: 617/354-6875; e-mail: 75201.571@compuserve.com; e-mail orders outside North America: books@scup.no

Essays in the book include: Odd Arne Westad, “The Fall of Detente and the Turning Tides of History”; Olav Njolstad, “Keys of Keys? SALT II and the Breakdown of Detente”; Carol R. Saivetz, “Superpower Competition in the Middle East and the Collapse of Detente”; Dan Caldwell, “The Demise of Detente and US Domestic Politics”; Odd Arne Westad, “The Road to Kabul: Soviet Policy on Afghanistan, 1978-1979”; John Lewis Gaddis, “Why Did the Cold War Last as Long as It Did?”

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# Havana's Policy in Africa, 1959-76: New Evidence from Cuban Archives

by Piero Gleijeses<sup>1</sup>

The dearth of documents and historical context has hampered rigorous analysis of Cuba's intervention in Angola in 1975. Despite the interest scholars have shown in the episode, the lack of Cuban documents and the closed nature of Cuban society have prevented them from being able to accurately describe Cuba's actions. I have gone to Havana six times, for a total of six months, since 1993 to research Cuban policy toward Africa, and I have gained access to the archives of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba (CC CPC), the *Instituto de Historia de Cuba*, the *Centro de Información de la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias*, and the *Ministerio para la Inversión Extranjera y la Colaboración Económica*. Armed with documents from these closed and never before used archives, supplemented with interviews, a close reading of the press, and U.S. documents, I can shed new light on the Angola affair.

The new documents clarify the evolution of Cuba's involvement in Angola and answer the critical question of whether the Cubans sent troops before or after the South African intervention. They also address the vexing question of Havana's motivation, particularly whether or not it was acting as a Soviet proxy. They document Cuba's longstanding relationship with the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), and they place the Angolan crisis in the broad context of Cuban policy toward Africa. From 1959 to 1974 the Cubans intervened in Algeria, Congo Leopoldville, Congo Brazzaville and Guinea-Bissau. More Cubans fought in Africa during these years than in Latin America, and Cuban policy was far more successful in the former than in the latter. The story of these fifteen years challenges the image of Cuban foreign policy—cyni-

cal ploys of a client state—that prevails in the United States. Yet it has attracted virtually no attention. It is a significant lacuna. As a Cuban official told me, “Cuba's intervention in Angola cannot be understood without looking at our past.”<sup>2</sup>

Whereas those who publish in the *Bulletin* generally use archives that have been opened, the Cuban archives I have used are still closed. This requires, then, an explanation of my *modus operandi*.

There was no established declassification process in Cuba when I began my research. Mindful of the fact that the documents I cited would not be readily accessible to my readers, I decided that I would never use a document unless I was given a photocopy of the original. I badgered Cuban officials relentlessly, arguing that in the United States their word has no credibility, that their testimonies are only valid if supported by documents, and that while one document would suffice to criticize Cuba, five would be necessary to say anything positive. Jorge Risquet, a member of the Central Committee, understood. I owe a great debt to his intelligence and sensitivity. We have come a long way since the day in 1994 when I asked him for all the reports written by the Chief of the Cuban Military Mission in Angola between August and October 1975 only to be told, “You aren't writing his biography. One will be enough.” Two years later, I received all the others. The Cubans established a procedure of which I could only approve: any document they expected to be declassified they allowed me to read in its entirety, whether in Risquet's office or in the archives themselves. Then the waiting would begin. It could take less than a hour or more than a year. As I write, there are several hundred pages of documents that I have been allowed to read but have not yet been given.

About 80 of the more than 3,000 pages of documents that I have received were sanitized after I had read them.

Frequently the edited lines contained the remarks of a foreign leader criticizing his own political allies; thus, to explain why half a page had been sanitized [Doc. 5], Risquet wrote, “the conversation that followed was about internal MPLA matters that [Angolan President Agostinho] Neto discussed with [Cuban official Díaz] Argüelles. It would be unethical to make them public.”<sup>3</sup> In the case of three intelligence documents, the sanitized paragraphs would have revealed sources. In other cases the lines (or words) sanitized included comments about African or Asian countries that, the censors believed, would unnecessarily complicate Cuba's foreign relations.

I have also interviewed 63 Cuban protagonists, many of them repeatedly and in relaxed settings. While interviews without documents would be of little use, interviews with documents can be extremely helpful. Furthermore, many of the interviewees gave me letters and journals from their own personal collections, and they alerted me to documents in the government archives, which made it possible to be very specific in my requests to Risquet. The Cuban authorities were well aware of my freewheeling interviews and to the best of my knowledge they did nothing to hinder me. Currently I am complementing my research in Cuba with research in the United States, Europe (particularly Moscow, Berlin, and Lisbon), and, of course, Africa.

Cuba's pre-1975 Africa policy can be divided into three major phases: pre-1964, when the focus was Algeria; 1964-66, when Cuba's attention was suddenly riveted by sub-Saharan Africa—a heady time characterized by Che Guevara's three-month trip through the continent and the dispatch of Cuban columns to Zaire and Congo Brazzaville; and post-1966, a period of growing maturity, highlighted by the long and successful Cuban involvement in Guinea-Bissau (1966-74). Before

discussing Cuba's role in Angola in 1975-76, I will briefly touch on each of these phases.

Cuban leaders saw similarities between the Algerian revolution against French rule and their own struggle against both Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista and the United States. In December 1961, a Cuban ship unloaded a cargo of weapons at Casablanca for the Algerian rebels. It returned to Havana with 76 wounded Algerian fighters and 20 children from refugee camps.<sup>4</sup>

The aid continued after Algeria gained its independence. In May 1963, a 55-person Cuban medical mission arrived in Algeria. And, as would be the case for all the missions that followed (until 1978), the aid was free. "It was like a beggar offering his help, but we knew that the Algerian people needed it even more than we did, and that they deserved it," said the then-Minister of Public Health, José Ramón Machado Ventura.<sup>5</sup> And in October 1963, when Algeria was threatened by Morocco, the Cubans rushed a special force of 686 men with heavy weapons to the Algerians' aid, even though Morocco had just signed a contract to buy one million tons of Cuban sugar for \$184 million, a considerable amount of hard currency at a time when the United States was trying to cripple Cuba's economy.

Cuba's interest in sub-Saharan Africa quickened in late 1964. This was the moment of the great illusion, when the Cubans, and many others, believed that revolution beckoned in Africa. Guerrillas were fighting the Portuguese in Angola; armed struggle was accelerating in Portuguese Guinea and beginning in Mozambique. In Congo Brazzaville, a new government was loudly proclaiming its revolutionary sympathies. And, above all, there was Congo Leopoldville (later called Zaire), where armed revolt had been spreading with stunning speed since the spring of 1964, threatening the survival of the corrupt pro-American regime that Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy had laboriously put in place. "The struggle has just begun, these are its first flames," wrote the Cuban weekly *Verde Olivo*. "It will, no doubt, be a long struggle, in Angola and Portuguese

Guinea as well, but what matters is that a powerful guerrilla movement has taken hold in the Congo."<sup>6</sup> (To avoid confusion, Congo Leopoldville will be referred to in this essay as the Congo, and its neighbor as Congo Brazzaville.)

To save the Congolese regime, the Johnson Administration raised an army of more than 1,000 white mercenaries in a major covert operation that was obvious to all but the U.S. press and provoked a wave of revulsion even among African leaders friendly to the United States.<sup>7</sup> The Cubans saw the conflict as more than an African problem: "Our view was that the situation in the Congo was a problem that concerned all mankind," Che Guevara wrote.<sup>8</sup>

In December 1964, Guevara went to Africa on a three-month trip that signalled Cuba's growing interest in the region. In February 1965 he was in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania, which was then, as the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency pointed out, "a haven for exiles from the rest of Africa . . . plotting the overthrow of African governments, both black and white."<sup>9</sup> After a general meeting with the liberation movements [see Doc. 2], Che met separately with each, and three times with the Congolese rebel leaders Laurent Kabila and Gaston Soumialot.<sup>10</sup>

"[Kabila] impressed me," wrote Che. "I offered him, on behalf of our government, about thirty instructors and all the weapons we could spare, and he accepted with delight; he urged us to hurry, as did Soumialot, in the course of another conversation. Soumialot also asked that the instructors be black." Cuba had "offered aid on condition that Tanzania approve," Guevara explained. "It did, so we went ahead. The aid was given unconditionally and with no time limit." Che left Dar-es-Salaam with "the joy of having found people ready to fight to the finish. Our next task was to select a group of black Cubans—all volunteers—and send them to help in the struggle in the Congo."<sup>11</sup>

In April 1965, a Cuban column of some 120 men under Guevara began entering eastern Congo through Tanzania. A few weeks later a second Cuban column under Jorge Risquet arrived in neighboring Congo Brazzaville at the

request of that country's government, which lived "in fear" of an attack by the Congo's mercenaries; the column could also, perhaps, assist Che in the Congo. "It constituted . . . a reserve force for Che's column, which it would join if necessary, at the right time."<sup>12</sup> Overall, 400 Cuban volunteers were in Central Africa in the summer of 1965.

But Central Africa was not ready for revolution. By the time the Cubans arrived in the Congo, the rebels' strength had been broken. The story of Che's column is not one of great battles, but of 120 people thrust into an impossible situation, in a totally alien world, who retained their humanity until the end. Their experience is recorded in several documents: the manuscript that Che wrote in the Cuban embassy in Dar-es-Salaam (and which, he said, would not be published "for a long time"<sup>13</sup>); the journal of his right-hand-man, Víctor Dreke; and the diaries of several of his men. Guevara could only preside over the agony of the rebellion until the rebels' collapse left him no choice but to withdraw in November 1965.

In Congo Brazzaville, meanwhile, Risquet's column saved the host government from a military coup in June 1966 through bluster and diplomacy, without having to shed blood.<sup>14</sup> Then it withdrew, against the wishes of their hosts. Risquet understood, and made Havana understand, that there was no revolution in Congo Brazzaville. "He was able to get us out at the right moment," observes his second-in-command. "He was flexible."<sup>15</sup> Although the Cubans withdrew in 1967, they left "something useful in their wake":<sup>16</sup> the doctors attached to the column conducted the first vaccination campaign in the country against polio,<sup>17</sup> and 254 young Congolese had gone to Cuba to study, all expenses paid.<sup>18</sup>

The late 1960s were a period of deepening maturity in Cuba's relationship with Africa. No longer deluded that revolution was around the corner, the Cubans were learning about sub-Saharan Africa. In those years—indeed, through 1974—the main focus of Havana's attention in Africa was Guinea-Bissau, where the rebels of the Partido Africano da Independência da

Guiné e Cabo Verde (PAIGC) were fighting for independence from Portugal. The PAIGC was "the most effective of the liberation organizations in the Portuguese African territories," U.S. reports stressed time and again.<sup>19</sup> At the PAIGC's request, Cuban military instructors arrived in Guinea-Bissau in 1966, and they remained there through the end of the war in 1974. This was the longest Cuban intervention in Africa before the dispatch of troops to Angola in 1975. It was also the most successful. In the words of Guinea-Bissau's first president,

we were able to fight and triumph because other countries and people helped us ... with weapons, with medicine, with supplies ... But there is one nation that in addition to material, political and diplomatic support, even sent its children to fight by our side, to shed their blood in our land together with that of the best children of our country.

This great people, this heroic people, we all know that it is the heroic people of Cuba; the Cuba of Fidel Castro; the Cuba of the Sierra Maestra, the Cuba of Moncada ... Cuba sent its best children here so that they could help us in the technical aspects of our war, so that they could help us to wage this great struggle ... against Portuguese colonialism.<sup>20</sup>

Some 40-50 Cubans fought in Guinea-Bissau each year from 1966 until independence in 1974. They helped in military planning and they were in charge of the artillery. Their contribution was, as President Nino, who had been the senior military commander of the PAIGC, said, "of the utmost importance."<sup>21</sup>

Just as the only foreigners who fought with the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau were Cubans, so too the only foreign doctors were Cubans (with one brief exception), and there were no native doctors until 1968. From 1966 to 1974 there were, on average, seven Cuban doctors in Guinea Bissau. "They really performed a miracle," observes Francisca Pereira, a senior PAIGC official. "I am eternally grateful to them: not only did they save lives, but they also put their own lives at risk. They were truly selfless."<sup>22</sup>

The men who went to Algeria,

Zaire, Congo Brazzaville, and Guinea-Bissau were volunteers. They were captivated by the mystique of guerrilla war. "We dreamt of revolution," one muses. "We wanted to be part of it, to feel that we were fighting for it. We were young, and the children of a revolution." Fighting abroad, they would defend the revolution at home. "In all those years we believed that at any moment they [the United States] were going to strike us; and for us it was better to wage the war abroad than in our own country."<sup>23</sup>

The volunteers received no public praise in Cuba. They left "knowing that their story would remain a secret."<sup>24</sup> They won neither medals nor material rewards. Once back they could not boast about their deeds, because they were bound to secrecy.

This secrecy notwithstanding, through all these years U.S. officials knew that Cubans were in Africa—in Algeria, then in Zaire, in Congo Brazzaville, and finally in Guinea-Bissau. And yet they paid little attention to it. As Robinson McIlvaine, the U.S. ambassador in Conakry, Guinea, from October 1966 through August 1969, remarked, "The State Department was not particularly concerned with the Cuban presence. It was not a big worry for us." This complacency, which contrasts starkly with Washington's reaction to even the rumor of Cuban combatants in Latin America, is explained by the fact that U.S. officials were confident that a handful of Cubans could not be effective in distant, alien African countries. In discussing Communist subversion in Africa, the CIA barely mentioned Cuba.<sup>25</sup>

This helps explain why the United States was stunned by the Cuban intervention in Angola in 1975. "In the 1960s there was no sense of a Cuban danger in Africa; their intervention in Angola was a real surprise," observes former State Department official Paul O'Neil.

During my tenure as Director of Southern Africa Office [of the State Department from July 1973 to June 1975] we were aware that there was some Soviet/East European support for the MPLA, but I don't recall any discussion of a Cuban role before I left. Aside from the Soviet Union, we would discuss the pos-

sible role of East Germany. I don't recall any concern about a Cuban role. Before I left, when people in the Africa Bureau [of the State Department] talked of the Soviet bloc role in Angola, they thought of the Soviets, the East Germans, not of Cuba. I don't recall that we knew of Cuba's ties with the MPLA, but even if we knew it didn't worry us.<sup>26</sup>

These ties had begun in 1965, when Che Guevara had met Agostinho Neto, Lucio Lara, and other MPLA leaders in Brazzaville in a "historical encounter," as Raúl Castro called it.<sup>27</sup> "We spoke, we discussed," related Lara. "We wanted only one thing from the Cubans: instructors. The war was becoming difficult and we were inexperienced ... Guevara promised that he would speak with his Party and his government so that they would send us instructors."<sup>28</sup>

Risquet's column trained MPLA guerrillas in Congo Brazzaville in 1966-67 and several of its members joined the MPLA in the Angolan enclave of Cabinda as advisers, instructors, and combatants.<sup>29</sup> There were moments of frustration for the instructors who had learned their trade in the exacting school of Fidel Castro's Rebel Army and who found themselves in a completely alien culture with a very different concept of discipline, and there were also warm moments of humanity in that inhospitable forest. "I looked at them all," wrote the Cuban Rafael Moracén after delivering a particularly severe scolding in which he had given vent to all his frustrations, "and I was moved, I felt love for them. . . . They had such dignity that I felt it was worth dying with them if I had to."<sup>30</sup> Bonds were forged that would never be forgotten, and which explain why, ten years later, in late 1975, Moracén pestered Raúl Castro to be allowed to return to Angola. "I am an Angolan," he pleaded.<sup>31</sup>

In 1966, the MPLA withdrew its forces from Cabinda and opened a new front in eastern Angola along the Zambian border. This meant that there was no reason for the Cubans to remain in the Congo, and they were unable to send instructors to eastern Angola, as the MPLA requested, because of Zambian opposition. Over the next few years, until the end of 1974, relations between

Cuba and the MPLA were friendly but less close, and Cuba's support for the movement was limited to training a handful of MPLA fighters in Cuba and, as the MPLA was convulsed by internal strife, to giving unwavering support to the group around Agostinho Neto.<sup>32</sup>

Lack of space precludes an in-depth discussion of the 1975 Cuban intervention in Angola. I will focus instead on two particularly controversial issues: when Cuba sent its military instructors and when it sent its troops. I will also comment briefly on some of the points raised in Odd Arne Westad's article about the Soviet role in Angola in this issue of the *Bulletin*.

The basic outline of the story is well known. Upon the collapse of the Portuguese dictatorship on 25 April 1974, there were three rival independence movements in Angola: Agostinho Neto's MPLA, Holden Roberto's National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA), and Jonas Savimbi's National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). On 15 January 1975, Portugal and these three movements agreed that a transitional government, under a Portuguese High Commissioner, would rule the country until independence on 11 November 1975. Before independence would come elections for a Constituent Assembly which would elect Angola's first president.

The first high-level contact between the MPLA and Cuba following the coup in Portugal was in late December 1974, when two senior Cubans arrived in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania: Carlos Cadelo, the Communist party official whose portfolio included Angola, and Major Alfonso Pérez Morales (Pina), who had served, with great distinction, with the PAIGC guerrilla fighters in Guinea-Bissau. They met Neto and other MPLA leaders in Dar-es-Salaam and asked permission to travel to Angola. Neto approved: "He asked us to verify everything he had told us so that we could get an objective view of the real situation in Angola."<sup>33</sup>

After two weeks in Angola, Cadelo and Pina met Neto again. Their subsequent report was lengthy (42 pages) and optimistic: the elections would take place; while the FNLA was militarily

stronger than the MPLA in the short term, the MPLA was building for the long haul, and this would bear fruit. "This movement," they wrote, "is the best structured politically and militarily, [and] as a result it enjoys extraordinary popular support."<sup>34</sup> Time favored the MPLA.

The report also included a letter from Neto specifying the aid he sought from Cuba [see doc. 4]. But Neto was, in fact, uncertain about what he wanted from Cuba. He told Pina and Cadelo that "once we know what weapons the Soviets are going to give us, we will have to adjust our military plans; exactly what we ask from Cuba will be contingent on this."<sup>35</sup> A recurring idea of military instructors floated in the air but was not precise. As Cadelo noted, "Even though Neto gave us a letter with some concrete demands, it was not really clear what the best form of cooperation with Cuba would be, or how and when it should be implemented."<sup>36</sup> On one point, however, Neto was definite: he wanted Cuba to provide the funds to ship the weapons the MPLA had in Dar-es-Salaam, its major arsenal, to Angola. Neto "said that he was confident that they would receive Soviet aid, but that it would not arrive for five months and that it was therefore imperative to move their material and equipment from Dar-es-Salaam to Angola."<sup>37</sup> Neto told Cadelo and Pina that he would need \$100,000 for the task.<sup>38</sup>

But Cuba did not send the money, and nothing happened beyond the arrival of ten to twelve Angolans in Cuba for special training in March and April.<sup>39</sup> There is no indication in the Cuban documents I have seen that the MPLA renewed its requests until May, when Neto met Cuban Deputy Prime Minister Flavio Bravo in Brazzaville, "and asked [Cuba's] help to transport some weapons, and also asked about the possibility of a broader and more specific aid program." In late June, Neto met with Cadelo in Maputo, Mozambique, and renewed his request.<sup>40</sup>

Three weeks later the United States decided to greatly expand the CIA's covert operation in Angola (increasing aid to the FNLA and initiating support

## FIDEL CASTRO'S 1977 SOUTHERN AFRICA TOUR: A REPORT TO HONECKER

*Editor's Note: In early 1977, Cuban President Fidel Castro took an extensive tour of Africa and then continued on to Europe and the USSR. During a stop in East Berlin, Castro recounted his experiences to East German Communist leader Erich Honecker. The record of those discussions was located in the archives of the former ruling Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) by Christian F. Ostermann (CWIHP/National Security Archive).*

*The following excerpt—from a discussion on 3 April 1977 at the House of the SED Central Committee in East Berlin—contains Castro's impressions of the situations in several southern African countries, (e.g., Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique, People's Republic of the Congo), and several guerrilla or liberation groups in the region, such as the African National Congress (ANC), then struggling for power in South Africa, and two groups fighting to rule Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwe African Political Union (ZAPU). Also included are Castro's assessments of individual political leaders, remarks about coordination with Moscow, and an overall conclusion that Africa was the place to inflict a major blow against world imperialism. (For Castro's remarks at this meeting on the situation in the Horn of Africa, see the excerpts printed later in this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin.)*

### Transcript of Honecker-Castro, Meeting, 3 April 1977 (excerpts)

Minutes of the conversation between Comrade Erich Honecker and Comrade Fidel Castro, Sunday, 3 April 1977 between 11:00 and 13:30 and 15:45 and 18:00, House of the Central Committee, Berlin.

Participants: Comrades Hermann Axen, Werner Lamberz, Paul Verner, Paul Markowski (with Comrades Edgar Fries and Karlheinz Mobus as interpreters), Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Osmany Cien-  
*continued on page 18*

for UNITA), but there is no evidence that Cuba and the MPLA knew about it. What they knew—and indeed it was public knowledge—was that the pro-American Zairean government of Mobuto Sese Seko had sent troops into northern Angola on Roberto's side. By May, Portugal was no longer making any attempt to police even the main crossing points with Zaire and it was reported that over one thousand Zairean soldiers were in northern Angola.<sup>41</sup> Angola, warned Neto, "was being subjected to a silent invasion by soldiers from Zaire."<sup>42</sup>

By late July, Angola was in the throes of civil war and Havana finally geared into action. From August 3-8, a seven-man Cuban delegation, led by a very senior military officer, Raúl Díaz Argüelles, was in Angola. "Their mission was to pin down on the ground with the leaders of the MPLA exactly what aid they wanted, the objectives they expected to achieve with this aid, and the stages in which the aid should be given."<sup>43</sup> They also brought Neto the \$100,000 he had requested six months earlier. [See doc. 5]

Neto wanted Cuban military instructors. He did not have a precise figure in mind, but he was thinking of no more than a hundred men who would be spread out among many small training centers. He also wanted Cuba to send weapons, clothing, and food for the recruits. On the basis of this request, Díaz Argüelles drafted a proposal for a military mission "that would include 65 officers and 29 noncommissioned officers and soldiers for a grand total of 94 compañeros."<sup>44</sup>

This plan was reworked in Havana after Díaz Argüelles returned. The revised plan contemplated the dispatch of 480 men who would create and staff four training centers (Centros de Instrucción Revolucionaria or CIRs). Some 5,300 Angolans would be trained in these CIRs within three to six months. Cuba would send the weapons for the instructors and for the recruits in the CIRs, as well as enough food, clothing, camping gear, toiletries, medicine, cots, and bedclothes for 5,300 men for six months. The CIRs would begin operating in mid-October.<sup>45</sup> In other words,

Cuba decided to offer Neto almost five times more instructors than he had requested. In Risquet's words, "If we were going to send our men, we had to send enough to fulfill the mission and to defend themselves, because too small a group would simply have been overwhelmed."<sup>46</sup>

Contrary to the widespread image of the Cuban intervention in Angola, Havana had been slow to get involved. The documents that I have seen do not explain this delay, and I have not been able to interview those protagonists who could provide an answer, notably Fidel and Raúl Castro. Perhaps there was, on Cuba's part, a reluctance to be drawn into what could become an open-ended conflict. Perhaps there was reluctance to jeopardize relations with the West when, after a long period of isolation and hostility, they were markedly improving: for the first time, the United States was interested in a *modus vivendi* with Cuba;<sup>47</sup> the Organization of American States was preparing to lift its sanctions; and West European governments were offering low interest loans. Perhaps Cuba had feared that the dispatch of military instructors would offend even friendly African countries like Tanzania; or perhaps the attention of the Cuban leaders was distracted by the preparations for the first Congress of the Cuban Communist party that would be held in December. "The revolution was institutionalized in 1975," remarks Risquet. "It was a year of never-ending work. This may have played a role. And the situation in Angola was quite confused. In the first months of 1975 there was very little discussion in the sessions of the Political Bureau about Angola. Our focus was on domestic matters."<sup>48</sup>

None of these explanations is very persuasive. By preparing to host a conference for the independence of Puerto Rico, Cuba was signalling that there were limits to the price it would pay for improved ties with Washington.<sup>49</sup> By sending troops to Syria in October 1973—troops that might well have become involved in a major clash with the Israelis—Cuba had demonstrated its continued willingness to take risks for a cause it believed just.<sup>50</sup> Some may

claim that Cuba did not move sooner to help the MPLA because the Soviet Union did not want it to. But can one seriously argue that Cuba needed Soviet permission to send \$100,000 to Neto? Others may repeat the canard that Cuba sent 200 military instructors to Angola in the spring of 1975,<sup>51</sup> but the evidence flatly contradicts this. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one can only note that the Cuban leaders were focusing on domestic matters and that relations with the MPLA since 1967 had not been intense. In July Cuba finally shifted gears. It was as if the music had suddenly changed; Cuba had made its choice, and Operation Carlota was born.

On August 21, Díaz Argüelles was back in Luanda as the head of the fledgling Cuban Military Mission in Angola (MMCA). He reported to Abelardo (Furry) Colomé, the first deputy minister of the Armed Forces. His reports from late August through October (all handwritten) are kept in the archives of the *Centro de Información de la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias* and are a very important source on the evolution of the Cuban presence.<sup>52</sup>

Díaz Argüelles' first order of business was to obtain Neto's approval for the 480-man military mission and four large CIRs. "Comrade Neto accepted our offer with great emotion," he informed Colomé in late August. "He was moved. He asked me to tell Fidel that they accept everything."<sup>53</sup>

The members of the MMCA began arriving in late August, and they kept coming through September, all on commercial flights. There were slightly over 100 by early October. The others came aboard three Cuban ships that had left Havana on September 16-20: the *Vietnam Heroico* and the *Coral Island* docked at a beach near Puerto Amboim "where no one lives" on October 5 and 8 respectively; the *La Plata* reached Punta Negra (Congo Brazzaville) on the 11th. Díaz Argüelles described their arrival in a lengthy report to Colomé.<sup>54</sup>

The three ships brought the weapons and equipment for the CIRs, including 12,000 Czech rifles for the Angolans. (They could not give them

Soviet weapons because in 1965 Moscow and Havana had signed an agreement that Cuba would seek the Soviets' permission before sending weapons it had received from them to a third party.) They also brought the trucks to transport the men and materiel to the CIRs. (The Cubans had correctly surmised that the MPLA would be unable to provide sufficient transportation.) There were problems, however, with the trucks that came aboard the *Vietnam Heroico* and the *Coral Island*, which "arrived in poor condition," Díaz Argüelles told Colomé,

and we had to repair a great many of them. . . . When I told you how important it was that the equipment arrive in good condition I was thinking about this kind of problem, because I knew that we would have to transport most of the men and material in our own trucks. The distances here are very great . . . and there are neither mechanics nor spare parts . . . Comandante, this is the largest operation we have ever undertaken and we are doing it in the worst conditions and circumstances. With little time for planning and with almost no knowledge of and experience in the country . . . we have had to improvise as we go along . . . It is a task of enormous magnitude . . . I have taken the steps necessary to start the training on October 15 . . . so that the troops will be ready on November 5.<sup>55</sup>

By October 18-20, almost on schedule, the instructors, recruits and equipment were in place and the four CIRs were ready to start operations. On paper, the MMCA had 480 men, 390 of whom were instructors in the four CIRs and seventeen of whom were a medical brigade. (There were 284 officers.) Actually, there were almost 500, because a few civilian pilots had been sent at Díaz Argüelles' request to fly the small civilian planes that the MPLA had acquired and some specialists in air traffic control and handling cargo at ports were also attached to the MMCA.<sup>56</sup>

Meanwhile, the civil war continued. The FNLA controlled Angola's two northern provinces bordering on Zaire, where it had its supply line in men and material (which included, beginning in August, equipment sent by the

CIA). "Well armed, the army of the FNLA has but one obsession: Luanda," reported *Le Monde* in late August. One of Roberto's lieutenants boasted, "We have tanks. There is no force that can stop us from entering Luanda . . . We will take Luanda and it will be a bloodbath."<sup>57</sup> In mid-September, the head of the CIA Task Force on Angola wrote, "Mobutu committed his elite Seventh and Fourth Commando Battalions . . . and the tide swung back in favor of the FNLA north of Luanda."<sup>58</sup> The MPLA stopped their advance on September 26, just north of the village of Quifangondo—at Morro do Cal, 26 kilometers north of Luanda. As independence day (November 11) approached, Roberto's impatience grew. "The troops of the FNLA . . . will be in the capital on Tuesday," he declared on Friday, October 17. Over the next few days, he kept repeating that his troops would enter Luanda "within 24 hours."<sup>59</sup>

On October 23, Roberto's forces—about 3,500 men, including some 1,200 Zairian troops<sup>60</sup>—attacked Morro do Cal. But the 1,100 defenders, which included about 40 Cubans, held firm. This was the first time that Cubans participated in the fighting. Five days later, a group of Cuban instructors fought again, with the MPLA, east of Quifangondo to recover the village of Quiangombe.<sup>61</sup>

The MPLA had been gaining ground on the other fronts. "The present military situation favors the MPLA," wrote Díaz Argüelles on October 1.<sup>62</sup> U.S. intelligence agreed. In a lengthy September 22 report, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the State Department warned: "Since the outbreak of fighting in Angola in March, the MPLA has achieved an almost unbroken series of military successes . . . It is in complete control of Luanda and the surrounding areas . . . In the past two months it has won virtually complete control of the coast from Luanda south to the Namibian border and thereby has gained unimpeded access to five major ports." It was also in control of Cabinda, from which it could not be dislodged "without strong outside backing—i.e., direct Zairian military inter-

vention." It held key areas in eastern Angola (including virtually all the diamond-rich Lunda district). From its positions along the southern coast it was extending its control "well into the interior," threatening UNITA's core areas. Finally, the report pointed out, "Of major political significance is the fact that the MPLA controls 9 of Angola's 16 district capitals and is contesting a 10th at Luso in eastern Angola."<sup>63</sup>

By mid-October, with the MPLA continuing to gain ground, a conservative British newspaper observed, "FNLA and UNITA know that they must improve their positions by November 11 or risk being left out in the cold," while the *Rand Daily Mail* reported that the MPLA was "making a vigorous fourpronged drive on Nova Lisboa," Savimbi's capital in the central highlands, and the South African military instructors attached to UNITA mused disconsolately "that the UNITA forces . . . are not in a position to offer the necessary resistance to the FAPLA [the MPLA armed forces] without help."<sup>64</sup> Meanwhile the Portuguese military was pulling its units back toward Luanda in preparation for withdrawal by November 11.

It has been said that the MPLA was winning because of the Cuban troops. But there were no Cuban troops, only instructors, and none had participated in any fighting until the handful fought at Morro do Cal on October 23. The real explanation for the MPLA's success is perhaps provided by the *Zambia Daily Mail*, which was unsympathetic to the movement. After noting that the MPLA was "almost certain to emerge as the dominant force" once the Portuguese departed, it stated: "There is a sense of purpose and a spirit of belonging among MPLA members and sympathizers which the two other movements cannot match."<sup>65</sup>

The imminent victory of the MPLA forced South Africa, which had been providing weapons and military instructors to the FNLA and UNITA since late August, to make a decision. "The choice lay between active South African military participation on the one hand and—in effect—acceptance of an MPLA victory on the other," writes a South Afri-

can military historian. Prodded by UNITA, the FNLA, Mobutu and the United States, Pretoria decided to escalate. "The go-ahead was given on October 14."<sup>66</sup>

That day, a South African column crossed into Angola from northeastern Namibia (South-West Africa). For the first few days the column moved west just north of the border. Then it veered north-west deep into Angola.<sup>67</sup> The South Africans advanced at full speed, sixty or seventy kilometers a day, meeting scant and ineffectual resistance. Sa da Bandeira (Lubango) fell on October 24; Moçamedes, the major port of southern Angola, on the 28th.

At first Díaz Argüelles underestimated the gravity of the threat. There were no Cubans in the area, and he had no clear idea of the strength of the enemy. "The MPLA still has the advantage, only ten days before independence," he concluded at the end of October. "The enemy, ill-prepared and dispirited, including the Zairian army units ... is giving us the breathing space to train the [MPLA] battalions."<sup>68</sup>

On November 2 and 3, Cubans participated in the fighting for the first time since the battles for Morro do Cal and Quiangombe on October 23 and 28. This time, the military instructors joined in the fight to defend Benguela from the advancing South Africans. "We were facing the best organised and heaviest FAPLA opposition to date," wrote a South African, Cdr. Jan Breytenbach, who led one of the invading units.<sup>69</sup>

Outgunned and outnumbered, the defenders of Benguela withdrew. Savimbi crowed: "Some time ago I promised you that there would be military surprises in Angola," he told the press in Kinshasa. "We are now witnessing the disintegration of Neto's troops on Angolan territory. Today I promise you even greater surprises before November 11, because we know that there are only nine days left."<sup>70</sup> On November 6, Benguela was in South African hands. The next day Lobito, twenty miles north of Benguela and Angola's major commercial port, fell. "We were, evidently, on our way to Luanda," writes Breytenbach. "Fresh troops were being deployed from South

Africa and the whole campaign was beginning to look more South African than Angolan."<sup>71</sup>

The South Africans, however, echoed by the entire Western press, absolutely denied that their troops were fighting in Angola and attributed the victories to a revived FNLA and UNITA. The MPLA, on the other hand, denounced the South African invasion as early as October 22.<sup>72</sup>

As the South Africans were closing in on Benguela, the MPLA's Political Bureau "met in an emergency session" and listened to Neto's proposal: to ask Cuba for troops. "There was unanimous agreement," states a well-informed account. Central Committee member Henrique Santos, who had studied and trained in Cuba in the 1960s, immediately flew to Havana bearing the MPLA's request.<sup>73</sup> The Cubans' response "was, I can say, immediate," writes an MPLA leader.<sup>74</sup> On November 4, Cuba decided to send troops to Angola. "That same day the head of the MMCA was instructed to make arrangements with the MPLA for our planes to land in Luanda."<sup>75</sup>

The first Cuban troops—158 men from the elite Special Forces of the Ministry of Interior—left aboard two Cuban planes on November 7, arriving in Luanda two days later.<sup>76</sup> Through the rest of November and December the Cubans succeeded in holding a line less than two hundred miles south of Luanda even though the South Africans enjoyed superiority in numbers and material. (North of Luanda, the Cubans swiftly defeated Roberto's motley horde.) There were numerous skirmishes and two small battles as the South Africans attempted to break through: at Ebo, on November 23—"Black Sunday," according to a South African historian—the Cubans scored a significant victory;<sup>77</sup> and on December 12, at Bridge 14, fourteen miles south of the strategic village of Catofe, the South Africans took their revenge, but the Cubans quickly regrouped and stopped them before they could reach Catofe. The South Africans were impressed: the *Cape Times* reported on November 21 that "FNLA and UNITA commanders [maintaining the fiction that South Af-

rican troops had nothing to do with it] greatly admired the courage of what they said were mercenaries from Cuba fighting with the MPLA." The official South African historian of the war writes, "The Cubans rarely surrendered and simply cheerfully fought until death."<sup>78</sup> By late December, the Cubans finally reached rough numerical parity with the South Africans and prepared to go on the offensive. [doc. 6]

According to Westad, "After the creation of the MPLA regime [on November 11] the [Soviet] Politburo authorized the Soviet General Staff to take direct control of the trans-Atlantic deployment of additional Cuban troops, as well as the supplying of these troops with advanced military hardware."<sup>79</sup> The Cuban evidence, however, tells a different story. Until January 1976, the it indicates, all Cuban troops and weapons were transported to Angola on Cuban ships and Cuban planes (Britannias and IL-18s) without any Soviet involvement. It was the Cubans' inability to find friendly places in which to refuel their planes that led them to seek Soviet help in late December. The Britannias and the IL-18s needed to refuel twice en route to Luanda. The second stop presented no problem: Guinea-Bissau was steadfast in its support. The problem was with the first stop. Initially, Barbados agreed, but under U.S. pressure it withdrew its permission on December 17; thereafter the Cubans used, in quick succession, Guyana and the Azores.<sup>80</sup> In early January, the Soviet Union agreed to provide its IL-62s, which could fly directly from Cuba to Bissau. The first IL-62 left Havana on January 9 with Cuban troops and Soviet pilots. (The Cubans had not yet been trained to fly the plane.)<sup>81</sup>

Risquet states that on 16 January 1976, Cuba and the USSR signed a military protocol in which the Soviets agreed to transport weapons for the Cuban troops in Angola.<sup>82</sup> I have not seen the protocol. I have, however, two documents that support Risquet's statement: a January 29 letter from Risquet to Castro [doc. 7] and a January 30 note stating that two Soviet ships had left for Angola with the first shipment of weapons for the Cuban troops there.<sup>83</sup>

It is important to put Westad's comments in context. He writes that "... the Soviet General Staff ordered about sixty of their own officers to join the Cuban forces from Congo. These men started arriving in Luanda on the evening of November 12." In the Cuban documents in my possession there are only six references to Soviet officers in Angola, and all of them are related to the dispatch of Soviet weapons to Angola [for one, see doc. 7]; none mentions any Soviet input into military strategy. Furthermore, I have seen an additional file of documents that would prove conclusively how little Soviet officials had to do with Cuban military strategy and tactics. These are cables from Fidel Castro to the Cuban commanders in Angola. They demonstrate the extraordinary degree of control that Castro exerted over the conduct of the war. In February 1996 I was allowed to read these cables, but, unfortunately, they may never be released—not because they contain controversial material (even the most ornery Cuban censor would be hard put to find much to sanitize in them), but because only Fidel Castro can declassify them and he is busy with other matters.

My failure to obtain copies of these cables is all the more frustrating since many, particularly Americans, may read this story of the early relationship between Cuba and Africa and reflexively ask, what about the Soviet Union? Wasn't Cuba acting as a Soviet proxy?

It is a frustrating question, for it requires one to prove a negative on the basis of incomplete information. Since no available documents bear directly on the question, I can only offer an informed opinion. There are two ways to address it. One is to look broadly at Cuba's Africa policy and its overall relationship to Soviet policy. The second is to analyze Cuban motivations in Africa.

During the period under consideration, Cuban and Soviet policies ran along parallel tracks in Africa. This was not a given: they could have been at loggerheads, as they were in Latin America through the mid-1960s because of Cuba's support for armed struggle there. No such clash, however, occurred in

Africa. In Algeria, for example, the Soviets had no objection to Cuba's very close relations with Ahmed Ben Bella's regime and seem to have welcomed Cuba's decision, in October 1963, to send a military force to help Algeria rebuff Morocco's attack. Similarly, in Congo Leopoldville the Soviets must have welcomed Guevara's column, since they were themselves helping the rebels. These parallel and often mutually supporting tracks are even more evident in the case of Guinea-Bissau. The Soviets began giving aid to the PAIGC in 1962, well before Cuba did. From June 1966, the Cuban military presence complemented and enhanced the Soviet role, since the Cubans were in charge of the increasingly sophisticated weapons provided by the USSR.

It follows, some may say, that the Cubans were mere cannon fodder for Moscow. But the fact that their policies ran along parallel tracks during this period did not make Cuba a Soviet agent or proxy. In fact, Cuba was following its own policy, a policy that happened to dovetail with that of the USSR. The case of Algeria is illustrative. The Cubans, at their own initiative, began supporting the Algerian rebels in 1961. Havana's decision to send troops in 1963 was taken less than two hours after a direct appeal by Ben Bella, making it unlikely that Castro would have had time to consult the Soviets even if he had wanted to.<sup>84</sup> In the Congo, likewise, Cuban policy was evidently not coordinated with Soviet policy. The conclusion is suggested by the fact that Che, his men, and their weapons travelled to Tanzania via the cumbersome method of taking commercial flights even though they could presumably have arrived on the Soviet ships that at about the same moment were docking at Dar-es-Salaam.<sup>85</sup> A firmer indication of this lack of coordination appears in "Pasajes de la guerra revolucionaria (Congo)," the secret manuscript that Guevara wrote upon leaving the Congo. And certainly the Soviets played no role in the Cuban decision to withdraw. Castro left the decision to Guevara, his friend and commander-in-the field. [See doc. 3] The Soviet Union was not in the picture.

Cuba's policy in Africa was guided by Cuban national interest and ideology—a fact which U.S. analysts well understood. When Che went to Africa in December 1964, U.S. intelligence followed his trip closely. "Che Guevara's three-month African trip was part of an important new Cuban strategy," wrote Thomas Hughes, the director of Intelligence and Research at the State Department. This strategy, he argued, was based on Cuba's belief that a new revolutionary situation existed in Africa and that Cuba's own interest lay in the spreading of revolution there because in so doing it would gain new friends who would lessen her isolation and, at the same time, weaken U.S. influence. There was only one reference to the Soviet Union: "Cuba's African strategy," concluded Hughes, "is designed to provide new political leverage against the United States and the socialist bloc. . . . The Cubans doubtless hope that their African ties will increase Cuba's stature in the nonaligned world and help to force the major socialist powers to tolerate a considerable measure of Cuban independence and criticism."<sup>86</sup> This was a fair analysis of the pragmatic aspect of the policy, but it omitted the strong idealistic motive that also marked Cuban policy in Africa. Havana firmly believed that it had a duty to help those who were struggling for their freedom; it was this belief—not pragmatism—that led Cuba to help the Algerian rebels and risk the wrath of de Gaulle. As a PAIGC leader said, "The Cubans understood better than anyone that they had the duty to help their brothers to become free."<sup>87</sup>

This policy would not have been possible without the volunteers—men who freely chose to risk their lives and endure sacrifices in order to serve Cuba and help others. Just as Havana was not bowing to Soviet pressure by intervening in Africa, so too did individual Cubans volunteer of their own free will. In Angola as well, Havana was not acting on behalf of the Soviet Union, even though President Ford and Secretary Kissinger liked to speak of "the Soviet Union and their Cuban mercenaries."<sup>88</sup> Rather, as former Soviet ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin

writes, the Cubans sent their troops to Angola “on their own initiative and without consulting us.” His testimony is supported by other Soviet officials.<sup>89</sup>

To try to impose a Soviet dimension on the relationship between Cuba and Africa regarding the period and events examined in this article seems to me to warp reality to satisfy an ideological bias. Robert Pastor, the National Security staff member who oversaw Latin America during the Carter Administration, wrote much the same to his boss, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, in September 1979:

As we embark on another anti-Castro period, let me suggest that we try to use a different term to refer to the Cubans than that of “Soviet puppet.” My principal concern with that phrase is that it strains our credibility and gets people into debating the wrong issue. . . . The word “puppet” suggests that the Cubans are engaging in revolutionary activities because the Soviets have instructed them to do it. That, of course, is not the case. . . . I fear that if you or the President use the term “Soviet puppet” in the future, you might just open yourselves to unnecessary charges that our information or analysis is faulty.<sup>90</sup>

As former U.S. Undersecretary of State George Ball has written, “Myths are made to solace those who find reality distasteful and, if some find such fantasy comforting, so be it.”<sup>91</sup>

## DOCUMENTS

**DOCUMENT 1: Flavio Bravo, deputy commander of the Cuban forces in Algeria, to Raúl Castro, Algiers, 21 October 1963, pp. 2-3.**

My dear Raúl:

Yesterday, we found out that Efigenio [Ameijeiras] and 170 compañeros are going to arrive tomorrow at 3:00 in two planes and that today, finally!, the ship is going to arrive.<sup>92</sup> . . .<sup>93</sup>

The situation demands that the entire socialist camp send aid. Unfortunately, however, our friends here are not receiving this aid: promises and more promises, but the weapons never arrive. Meanwhile, [King] Hassan [of Morocco] has a battalion of Soviet tanks, MIGs and other Soviet

weapons. And so we are going to face the bizarre situation of having to go to war against Soviet weapons! Some of the Algerian officers are not only worried . . . but indignant. They ask, and rightly so, how can the Soviet comrades help feudal kings like Hassan and not understand that a real revolution, like Cuba's, is taking place here . . .

As for the socialist countries of eastern Europe, the less said the better. According to compañeros here, “They have behaved like greedy shopkeepers who want to be paid in dollars (and at higher prices than the Yankees) for the help the Algerian people need.” . . .

If you consider it useful, I think you should share these impressions of mine with our good friend Alejandro [Aleksandr Alekseyev, the Soviet ambassador to Cuba]. I know that this is not the first time that the Algerian problem has been raised. I believe that Fidel discussed it there [during his visit to the Soviet Union in spring 1963], but there is no harm in raising it again. Our Algerian friends have their own customs and their pride. They don't like asking for help, and they say that they would rather fight with knives than ask again. They say that they have already explained the problem, which in any case is not difficult to understand. . . .

Aldo [Santamaria, the head of the Cuban navy], who has left for Oran, and Papito [Serguera] send you greetings. I think that our “ebullient” ambassador [Sergio Serguera] has scored a great victory and has saved not our prestige—which was very high—but that of the entire socialist camp.

We will continue to keep you informed.

Flavio

[Source: *Centro de Información de la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (CID-FAR), Havana.*]

**DOCUMENT 2: Excerpt from Che Guevara's “Pasajes de la guerra revolucionaria (Congo)” on his meeting with African liberation movement leaders in Dar-es-Salaam in February 1965.**

I decided to try to get a sense of the “Freedom Fighters” state of mind; I had intended to do it in separate meetings, in friendly conversations, but because of a mistake at the embassy, there was instead a “monster” meeting with at least fifty people representing movements of at least ten countries, each divided into two or three factions. I addressed them, discussing the requests for financial aid or training that almost all of them had made to us; I explained the cost of training a man in Cuba—the amount of

money and time that it took—and the uncertainty that the resulting combatants would indeed prove useful to the movement. I explained our experience in the Sierra Maestra, where, for every five recruits we trained, we ended up, on average, with only one good soldier and for every five of these soldiers, only one was really good. I argued as vehemently as I could in front of the exasperated “Freedom Fighters” that the money invested in training would be largely wasted; one cannot make a soldier in an academy and much less a revolutionary soldier. This is done on the battlefield.

I proposed to them, therefore, that the training not take place in faraway Cuba, but in nearby Congo [Che is therefore proposing that the recruits of non-Congolese guerrilla movements fight in the Congo] . . . I explained to them why we considered the war for the liberation of the Congo to be of fundamental importance: victory there would have repercussions throughout the continent, as would defeat. Their reaction was more than cold; even though most refrained from making any comment, some bitterly reproached me. They stated that their people, ill-treated and abused by the imperialists, would object if they were to suffer losses to free not their own, but another country. I tried to make them understand that the real issue was not the liberation of any given state, but a common war against the common master, who was one and the same in Mozambique and in Malawi, in Rhodesia and in South Africa, in the Congo and in Angola, but not one of them agreed. Their goodbyes were polite and frosty.

[Source: Guevara, “Pasajes,” 13-14.]

**DOCUMENT 3: On 4 November 1965, Che Guevara, who was in the Congo, received a cable from Oscar Fernández Padilla, head of the Cuban intelligence station in Dar-es-Salaam. The cable said:**

I am sending you, via courier, a letter from Fidel. Its key points are:

“1. We must do everything except that which is foolhardy.

“2. If Tatu [Guevara] believes that our presence has become either unjustifiable or pointless, we have to consider withdrawing.

“3. If he thinks we should remain we will try to send as many men and as much material as he considers necessary.

“4. We are worried that you may wrongly fear that your decision might be considered defeatist or pessimistic.

“5. If Tatu decides to leave [the Congo], he can return here or go somewhere else [while waiting for a new internationalist

mission].

"6. We will support whatever decision [Tatu makes].

"7. Avoid annihilation."

[Source: Rafael [Fernández Padilla] to Tatu, 4 November 1965, Archives of the Cuban Communist Party CC, Havana. See also Guevara, "Pasajes," 118-19.]

**DOCUMENT 4: Letter from Neto to Cuban leadership, Dar-es-Salaam, 26 January 1975**

Dear Comrades,

Given the situation on the ground of our movement and our country, and taking into account the results of the exploratory trip of the official Cuban delegation [Cadelo and Pina], we are sending you a list of the urgent needs of our organization. We are confident that you will give it immediate consideration.

1. The establishment, organization, and maintenance of a military school for cadres. We urgently need to create a company of security personnel, and we need to prepare the members of our military staff.

2. We need to rent a ship to transport the war material that we have in Dar-es-Salaam to Angola. The delivery in Angola, if this were a Cuban ship, could take place outside of the territorial waters.

3. Weapons and means of transportation for the Brigada de Intervención that we are planning to organize, as well as light weapons for some infantry battalions.

4. Transmitters and receivers to solve the problem of communication among widely dispersed military units.

5. Uniforms and military equipment for 10,000 men.

6. Two pilots and one flight mechanic.

7. Assistance in training trade union leaders.

8. Cooperation in the organization of schools for the teaching of Marxism (to solve the problems of the party).

9. Publications dealing with political and military subjects, especially instruction manuals.

10. Financial assistance in this phase of establishing and organizing ourselves.

We also urge that the Communist Party of Cuba use its influence with other countries that are its friends and allies, especially from the Socialist camp, so that they grant useful and timely aid to our movement, which is the only guarantee of a democratic and progressive Angola in the future.

Comrades, accept our revolutionary greetings and convey the good wishes of the combatants of the MPLA and of the new

Angola to Prime Minister Fidel Castro.

[Source: Neto, "Necesidades urgentes. Lista dirigida al: Comité Central del Partido Comunista de Cuba," 26 January 1975, Anexo no. 3, pp. 22-23, in "Informe sobre la visita realizada por el mayor Rodobaldo Díaz Padraga a Angola en los días del 16.11.75 (Frente sur)," n.d., Centro de Información de la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, Havana.]

**DOCUMENT 5: Raúl Díaz Argüelles to the Armed Forces minister [Raúl Castro], 11 August 1975**

Report on the visit to Angola and on the conversations held with Agostinho Neto, president of the MPLA, and the Political Bureau of the MPLA, as well as with chiefs of the army staff of the FAPLA [the MPLA's armed forces]:

1. We arrived at Luanda, Angola, on Sunday, August 3 and established contact with the MPLA. They immediately took us to a hotel. When President Neto heard about [our arrival], he sent for us and put some of us up in his house and the rest of the delegation in another compañero's house.

In our first conversation with Neto we greeted him on behalf of the Commander-in-Chief [Fidel Castro] and the Minister of the Armed Forces [Raúl Castro], we gave him the present and the note from the Commander-in-Chief and then we explained the purpose of our visit.

We based our explanation on the following points:

a) The request made by the MPLA when it was visited by a delegation from our party and our government in January [Cadelo and Pina] and the request made later in Mozambique by Cheito, the chief of staff of the FAPLA.

b) These requests were somewhat contradictory: during the January visit they asked for aid and the training of cadres in Cuba and in Angola, and later in Mozambique they asked only for the training of cadres in Cuba.

c) We were coming to clarify the aid we should offer, given the FNLA's and Mobutu's aggression against the MPLA and the possible course of events before independence in November. We knew that the forces of reaction and imperialism would try with all their might to prevent the MPLA from taking power, because it would mean a progressive government in Angola. Therefore we were bringing Neto the militant solidarity of our Commander-in-Chief, our party and our government, and we gave him

the \$100,000.

In the course of this conversation, the Angolans complained about the paucity of aid from the socialist camp, and they pointed out that if the socialist camp does not help them, no one will, since they are the most progressive forces [in the country], whereas the imperialists, Mobutu and ... [one word SANITIZED] are helping the FNLA in every way possible. They also complained that the Soviet Union stopped aiding them in 1972 and that although it is now sending them weapons, the amount of assistance is paltry, given the enormity of the need. In general, he [Neto] wants to portray the situation in Angola as a crucial struggle between the two systems—Imperialism and Socialism—in order to receive the assistance of the entire socialist camp. We believe that he is right in this, because at this time the two camps in Angola are well defined, the FNLA and UNITA represent reaction and world imperialism and the Portuguese reactionaries, and the MPLA represents the progressive and nationalist forces.

We agreed that we would meet again the next day, because we needed to finalize the exact timetables, quantities and details etc. of the requests they had made.

[Half a page SANITIZED—trans.]

We believe that [the MPLA] enjoys the general support of the population; the population is organized and ready to fight, but lacks weapons, as well as food, clothing and basic gear. We believe that we must help them directly or indirectly to remedy this situation which is in essence the resistance of an entire people against the forces of reaction and imperialism.

Revolucionariamente,

[Source: CID-FAR.]

**DOCUMENT 6: Risquet to Fidel Castro, Luanda, 30 December 1975**

Commander-in-Chief,

I have just returned from a tour of Quibala, Catofe, Conde, Ebo, Gabela, Point Amboim. The morale of the [Cuban military] commanders with whom I spoke (Polo [Leopoldo Cintra Frías], [Manuel] Cervantes, [Armando] Saucedo etc. at the southern front headquarters; [Romérico] Sotomayor, Calixto Rodríguez Proenza and René [Hernández Gatorno]; [Jesús] Oviedo in Point Amboim) is very high: they are optimistic and full of ideas about how to strike the enemy. The morale of the soldiers and officers with whom we spoke was equally high. [Fernando] Vecino [Alegrét], [Luis Alfonso] Zayas and, for the first part, Furry [Abelardo Colomé Ibarra], accompa-

nied me.

This high morale, the large number of our troops and the large supply of material, the nature of the terrain, and the material and psychological condition of the enemy lead me to conclude that there are no big problems for our [defensive] line at Amboim-Ebo-Quibala-Cariango; that we have recovered the initiative in the south; that in the next few days our "active defense" will gain ground in the south. ...

Risquet.<sup>94</sup>

[Source: Archives of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee, Havana.]

#### **DOCUMENT 7: Risquet to Fidel Castro, Luanda, 29 January 1976**

Commander-in-Chief,

Regarding the Cuban weapons delivered by the USSR in Luanda:

We have explained the situation clearly to President Neto, who understood it perfectly without expressing any doubts.

1. "Furry [Colomé]<sup>95</sup> and I spoke with Neto alone the day after Furry's return [from Moscow where he had gone to report to Fidel Castro, who was attending the Twenty-fifth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union], and we informed him of your decision to send more troops, fully armed, in order to amass the forces necessary both fully to accomplish the goal of freeing the country from the South African and Zairian invasions and also to be in a position to counter any possible increases in their forces.

We told him [Neto] that some of the new Cuban troops will arrive by boat with their weapons and the rest will come to Luanda by plane, where they will pick up weapons that the Soviet Union is going to send for them.

We explained to him that this will allow us to avoid the unnecessary time, expense and risk of having the Soviets send these weapons to Cuba and then having to transport them to Angola with the troops.

Neto understood and approved without any qualm or hesitation.

2. Three days later, the Soviet general [head of the Soviet military mission in Angola] told us he too would like to inform [Neto], on behalf of the USSR, about the delivery of the Soviet weapons to the Cubans in Angola. We agreed that the most appropriate way would be that he, Furry, and I meet again with Neto alone. And so we did. The general explained in some detail what weapons were being sent.

Neto raised no objection whatsoever, wrote down the most important weapons,

said that he would inform the Political Bureau of this increase [of men and arms], and appeared very satisfied with it, as an additional guarantee to counter whatever the South Africans, the Zairians and the Imperialists might do.

In this meeting, Furry itemized some of the men and materiel that were coming aboard the Cuban ships. He spoke of a regiment.

3. Nevertheless, taking into account the concern you expressed in your cable of yesterday, in the meeting that Oramas<sup>96</sup> and I had today with the president to discuss other matters (SWAPO, Katangans, etc.), I returned as if in passing to this matter, and I gave him a list of the weapons that will be arriving on future Soviet ships and that are for the Cuban troops.

I added that all the weapons that had arrived in Soviet ships (the 73 tanks, the 21 BM-21s, etc.) so far, as well as the ten MIG-17s, belonged to the People's Republic of Angola.

[I stressed] that the MIG-21s that were coming in the AN-22 planes as well as the weapons that were arriving in the Soviet ships and that were enumerated in the list that I had given him were acquired by Cuba in the USSR and delivered to Cuba by the USSR in Luanda.

We told him that the Cuban troops, with all these weapons, would remain in Angola for as long as it took and for as long as he considered necessary, and that we would take care of the training of the Angolan personnel, so that they would be able to operate the tanks, the planes, Katyushas [rocket-propelled grenade launchers], mortars, cannons, etc. And that if the weapons delivered to the PRA [People's Republic of Angola] were to prove insufficient for the future Angolan army, the USSR would always be ready to provide what was required, etc., etc.

That is, our conversation was absolutely brotherly and without the smallest misunderstanding or reproach. However, we wanted to be absolutely clear—and we left the list as written evidence—so that there could be no misunderstandings, now or in the future.

We consider this matter to be totally clear and settled. Let me know whether you believe that this task has been accomplished or whether you think it is necessary to do something more about it.

Greetings,

Risquet

[Source: Archives of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee, Havana.]

<sup>1</sup> I would like to thank the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation for helping to support this research.

<sup>2</sup> Interview with Manuel Agramonte, Havana, 2 July 1994. The only two studies worth citing are William Durch "The Cuban Military in Africa and the Middle East: From Algeria to Angola," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, Spring/Summer 1978, 34-63 and Gisela García, *La misión internacionalista de Cuba en Argelia (1963-1964)* [The Internationalist Mission of Cuba in Algeria (1963-1964)] (Havana: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, 1990). A garbled account of Che Guevara's struggle in Zaire, based on his unpublished manuscript, is Paco Ignacio Taibo et al., *El año que estuvimos en ninguna parte* [The Year We Were Nowhere] (Mexico City: Planeta, 1994).

<sup>3</sup> Jorge Risquet, note to author, Havana, 13 July 1996.

<sup>4</sup> For full information on sources for Algeria, see Piero Gleijeses, "Cuba's First Venture in Africa: Algeria, 1961-1965," *Journal of Latin American Studies* (February 1996), 159-95.

<sup>5</sup> José Ramón Machado Ventura, note to author, Havana, 12 July 1995, 1.

<sup>6</sup> *Verde Olivo* (Havana), 28 June 1964, 51-52.

<sup>7</sup> See Piero Gleijeses, "'Flee! The White Giants Are Coming!' The United States, the Mercenaries, and the Congo, 1964-1965," *Diplomatic History*, Spring 1994, 207-37.

<sup>8</sup> Che Guevara, "Pasajes de la guerra revolucionaria (Congo)" [Episodes of the Revolutionary War], Dar-es-Salaam, late 1965, 13 (private collection, Havana).

<sup>9</sup> CIA Special Memorandum, "Implications of Growing Communist Influence in URTZ," 29 September 1964, 11, Freedom of Information Act request (hereafter FOIA) 1977/91F.

<sup>10</sup> Interviews with Godefroid Tschamlesso, an aide to Kabila (Havana, 30 June 1994) and Marcelino dos Santos, a Mozambican rebel leader (Havana, 27 June 1994).

<sup>11</sup> Guevara, "Pasajes," 12-13, 120, 14.

<sup>12</sup> Quotations from CIA, Office of Current Intelligence, "Brazzaville's Move to the Left," 30 October 1964, 5, National Security File Country File: Congo, box 83, Lyndon B. Johnson Library (hereafter LBJL), Austin, Texas; and "Discurso pronunciado por Raúl Castro Ruz en acto por el XX aniversario de la construcción de las columnas de combatientes internacionalistas cubanos que cumplieron misiones en el Congo Brazzaville y el Congo Leopoldville" [Speech by Raúl Castro Ruz on the 20th anniversary of the creation of the columns of internationalist Cuban fighters who went to Congo Brazzaville and Congo Leopoldville], 11 November 1965, 7, Archives of the Central Committee, Havana.

<sup>13</sup> Guevara, "Pasajes," 10.

<sup>14</sup> See Jorge Risquet, "Brizna de paja en la oreja" [Straw in the ear], Brazzaville, 12 July 1966, Archives of the Central Committee, Havana.

<sup>15</sup> Interview with Rolando Kindelán, Havana, 11 March 1996.

<sup>16</sup> Rodolfo Puente Ferro, head of the medical brigade attached to the column, in Luis Hernández and Félix López, "Africa mía," *Juventud Rebelde* (Havana), 3 December 1995, 8-9.

<sup>17</sup> Helenio Ferrer and Rodolfo Puente Ferro to Machado Ventura, 19 May 1966, Archives of the

Ministry of Public Health, Havana; Ferrer, "Informe sobre campaña de vacunación (Continuación)" [Report on the vaccination campaign (Continued)], 27 May 1966, *ibid.*; interviews with Jorge Risquet (Havana, 20 June 1994); with the Cuban doctors Rodolfo Puente Ferro (Havana, 21 June 1994) and Rodrigo Alvarez Cambra (Havana, 12 March 1996); and with Tirso Arcide Reyna (Havana, 5 March 1996), a Cuban soldier who helped in the campaign.

18 See Empresa Cubana de Navegación, [record of the *Luis Arcos Bergnes*], Manifiesto de pasajeros congoleños, Centro de Información de la Defensa de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, Havana (hereafter CID-FAR); J' Transporte U/M 1546 to J' Servicios U/M 1546, 15 February 1966, CID-FAR; Estado Mayor General de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias, "Relación de personal especial que se encuentra en El Cano," 24 February 1966, CID-FAR. Interviews with the Cubans doctors Rodolfo Puente Ferro and Julian Alvarez (Havana, 5 April 1994) and with two other Cubans who participated in the operation: Ulises Estrada (Havana, 30 March 1994) and Rafael Orlando Duany (Havana, 12 March 1996); *Granma* (Havana), 5 July 1966, 1. See also René Gauze, *The Politics of Congo-Brazzaville* (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1973), 205. and "Brazzaville — Cuba's new base?" *African Review*, August 1966, 10.

19 "Policy Planning Memorandum No. 1," 9, enclosed in Department of State to all African Diplomatic Posts, Lisbon, London, Paris, Rome, 2 December 1971, FOIA 1982/0426. See also Bennett (Lisbon) to Dept. of State, 3 April 1968, FOIA 1982/0392; Bennett (Lisbon) to SecState, 16 July 1969, FOIA 1983/0449; Dept. of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "Portuguese Guinea: Talks About Talks," 3 March 1970, FOIA 1982/1049; "Portuguese Guinea: Guidelines for Policy," enclosed in Irwin to U.S. Embassy Lisbon, 2 October 1970, FOIA 1982/1879.

20 President Luís Cabral, *Nô Pintcha* (Bissau), 22 January 1977, 4-6. On the Guinea-Bissau story, see Piero Gleijeses, "The First Ambassadors: Cuba's Contribution to Guinea-Bissau's War of Independence," *Journal of Latin American Studies* (forthcoming, February 1997).

21 Interview with João Bernardo Vieira (Nino), Bissau, 1 May 1996. The conclusions in this paragraph are based on: a) a great number of Cuban documents in my possession, the most important of which are "Ayuda brindada por la República de Cuba al Partido Africano por la Independencia de Guinea y las Islas de Cabo Verde (PAIGC)" [Help given by the Republic of Cuba to the African Independence Party of Guinea and Cape Verde], CID-FAR, and Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias (hereafter MINFAR), "Realización de la Operación 'Amílcar Cabral,'" (1974), CID-FAR; b) interviews in Havana with over 20 Cuban protagonists; c) interviews in Bissau (25 April-1 May 1996) with the following senior PAIGC officials: Nino, Leopoldo Alfama, António Borges, Fidelis Cabral, Arafam Mané, Joseph Turpin, Vasco Cabral.

22 Interview with Francisca Pereira, Bissau, 25 April 1996. The exception was the Panamanian doctor Hugo Spadafora from July 1966 to May 1967. In addition to the sources listed in the previous footnote, I rely on three major groups of

sources: a) Luís Cabral, *Crónica da Libertação* [History of the War of Liberation] (Lisbon: Edições O Jornal, 1984), 253-54 and *passim* and Hugo Spadafora, *Experiencias y pensamiento de un médico guerrillero* [Experiences and Thoughts of a Guerrilla Doctor] (Panama City: Centro de Impresión Educativa, 1980), 15-79; b) interviews in Bissau (29 April-2 May 1996) with the following Guinean doctors and physician's assistants who served in the war: Paulo Medina, Venancio Furtado, Gaudêncio de Sousa Carvahlo, Ernesto Lopes Moreira and Paulo Alves; c) interviews in Havana with the Cuban doctors Luis Peraza (5 July 1994), Milton Hechavarría (20 July 1995), Raúl Candebat (12 July 1995), Pablo Pérez Capdet and Rubén Pérez de León (both on 28 February 1996).

23 Interviews with Estrada (Havana, 7 December 1994) and Oscar Cárdenas (Havana, 5 December 1993).

24 Interview with Víctor Dreke (Havana, 26 June 1994).

25 Interview with Robinson McIlvaine, Washington, D.C., 5 February 1996. See also Gleijeses, "Flee!" 220-21; CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, "Cuban Meddling in Africa," 24 March 1967, 4, FOIA 1996/605; U.S. CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, "Some Aspects of Subversion in Africa," 19 October 1967, 9, National Security File Country File: Union of South Africa, box 78, LBJL; CIA, National Intelligence Estimate, "The Liberation Movements of Southern Africa," 24 November 1967, National Security File, NIE, box 8, LBJL; Knight (Lisbon) to Dept. of State, 19 October 1971, 2, FOIA 1982/1889; "Policy Planning Memorandum No. 1," enclosed in Dept. of State to all African Diplomatic Posts, Lisbon, London, Paris, Rome, 2 December 1971, FOIA 1982/0426; Knight (Lisbon) to Dept. of State, 7 January 1972, FOIA 1982/2672.

26 Interview with Paul O'Neil, Washington, D.C., 20 February 1992.

27 "Discurso pronunciado," 2.

28 Lucio Lara, "A história do MPLA" [A History of the MPLA], n.d., 100. I would like to thank Dr. Christine Messiant of the Centre d'Etudes Africaines of Paris for sharing this important, unpublished document with me.

29 Rafael Moracén, who fought in Cabinda, allowed me to photocopy his diary, "Diario de campaña de Humberto Vazquez Mancevo." In addition to Moracén (Havana, 21 June 1994), I also interviewed several other Cubans who fought in Cabinda: Osvaldo Fuente Veitía (Havana, 25 June 1994); Rafael Orlando Duany (Havana, 12 March 1996); Fernando Galindo (Havana, 12 March 1996); Tirso Arcide Reyna (Havana, 5 March 1996). See also: César Augusto Kiluanji, *Trajectória da vida de um guerrilheiro* [The Life of a Guerrilla] (Lisbon: Editorial Vanguardia, 1990), 29-34.

30 Moracén, "Diario de campaña," entry of September 1965.

31 Interview with Moracén.

32 Interviews with Carlos Cadelo, the Communist party official whose portfolio included Angola (Havana, 7 July 1995), and with Félix Véliz Hernández (Havana, 3 July 1995) and Luis Mario Burgos (Havana, 24 June 1994), who were preparing to leave for eastern Angola; MINFAR, "Síntesis histórica de la ayuda internacionalista

de Cuba a la R.P.A. [Summary of the history of the internationalist assistance given by Cuba to the P.R.A.], n.d., 3, Archives of the Instituto de Historia de Cuba, Havana. (Hereafter "Síntesis")

33 "Conversación con Agostinho Neto, día 31 de diciembre de 1974 [Conversation with Agostinho Neto, 31st of December 1974]," Appendix no. 6, enclosed in "Informe sobre la visita realizada a Angola" [Report on the Visit to Angola], 21 March 1975, 31, CID-FAR. (Hereafter "Informe sobre la visita")

34 "Informe sobre la visita," 1.

35 "Conversación con Agostinho Neto al finalizar la visita a Angola" [Conversation with Agostinho Neto at the conclusion of his visit to Angola], enclosed in "Informe sobre la visita," 32-33.

36 Cadelo, note to author, Havana 15 July 1995, 7.

37 Conversación con Agostinho Neto, día 31 de diciembre de 1974," enclosed in "Informe sobre la visita," quotation on p. 31; interviews with Cadelo and Alfonso Pérez Morales (Pina) (Havana, 28 February 1996).

38 "Conversación con Agostinho Neto al finalizar la visita a Angola," enclosed in "Informe sobre la visita," 33.

39 Interview with Cadelo.

40 Andrés González Ballester, "Estudio de la colaboración militar cubano-angolana, 1975-1976," Havana, Instituto Superior de Relaciones Internacionales, 1989, quotation on p. 10; Cadelo, note to author, 10.

41 See *The Observer*, 20 April 1975, 11, and 18 May 1975, 5; *Le Monde*, 3 May 1975, 6.

42 *Zambia Daily Mail* (Lusaka), 21 April 1975, 1.

43 "Informe sobre las actividades ejecutadas por el Partido Comunista de Cuba y Gobierno Revolucionario para dar cumplimiento a la ayuda solicitada por el Movimiento Popular para la Liberación de Angola [Report on the actions taken by the Communist party of Cuba and the Revolutionary Government to deliver the aid requested by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola]," (hereafter "Informe sobre las actividades"), CID-FAR, 1 (quoted); "Síntesis," 5; interviews with Cadelo and Víctor Schueg Colás (Havana, 27 February 1996), who were members of the delegation.

44 "Síntesis," 6.

45 See "Síntesis," 6-7 and "Informe sobre las actividades," 1-2.

46 Interview with Risquet, Havana, 15 February 1996.

47 See the trailblazing article by Peter Kornbluh and James Blight, "Dialogue with Castro: A Hidden History," *The New York Review of Books*, 6 October 1994, 45-49.

48 Interview with Risquet. In his capacity as a member of the Secretariat of the PCC, Risquet attended the sessions of the Political Bureau.

49 The preparatory meeting for the conference was held in Havana in late March 1975. The Conferencia Internacional de Solidaridad con la Independencia de Puerto Rico was held in Havana on September 5-8. (See *Granma*, 1, 5, 15 April 1975, all 1; 5 September 1975, 1; 6 September 1975, 8; 9 September 1975, 2.)

50 The mission to Syria (October 1973-January 1975) is briefly described in MINFAR, "Las misiones internacionalistas desarrolladas por las

FAR en defensa de la independencia y la soberanía de los pueblos" [Internationalist missions of the FAR in defense of the independence and the sovereignty of other peoples], n.d., 26-34, Archives of the Instituto de Historia de Cuba, Havana.

51 *Le Monde*, 14 January 1976, 8; Kissinger's testimony of 29 January 1976 in U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on African Affairs, *Angola*, 94th Cong., 2d sess. (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1976), 17; *New York Times*, 5 February 1976, 12; *Sunday Telegraph* (London), 30 January 1977, 8; Fred Bridgland, "The Future of Angola," *South Africa International*, July 1988, 32; *Christian Science Monitor*, 22 January 1976, 9.

52 See Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, n.d. [late August 1975], 4; Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, 2 September 1975, 14; Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, 3 September 1975, 9 (signed by Díaz Argüelles but the handwriting is Cadelo's); Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, n.d. [late September 1975], 5; Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, 1 October 1975, 15; Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, 15 October 1975, 26; Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, 16 October 1975, 2; "Situación militar en Angola. Octubre/75" [Military Situation in Angola, October 1975], November (1?), 1975, 13. Díaz Argüelles also cabled specific requests. See MINFAR "Solicitud de Argüelles," 25 August 1975 through 26 September 1975, CID-FAR. After Cuba decided to send troops to Angola on November 4, a more senior officer, Leopoldo Cintra Frías, replaced Díaz Argüelles as head of the MMCA. He arrived in Angola on November 11.

53 Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, n.d. [late August 1975], 1, 4, CID-FAR.

54 Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, 15 October 1975, 2, CID-FAR.

55 Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, 15 October 1975, 5, 9-11, 12, CID-FAR. See also MINFAR, "Composición de fuerzas y medios de la unidad incluyendo el incremento del Punto 4," n.d. [late October 1975]. On the 1965 agreement: interview with Estrada, who was a senior intelligence officer at the time, Havana, 18 December 1994.

56 MINFAR, "Composición de fuerzas y medios de la unidad incluyendo el incremento del Punto 4," n.d. [late October 1975]; MINFAR "Solicitud de Argüelles," 25 August 1975 through 26 September 1975, CID-FAR; "Informe sobre las actividades," 3; "Síntesis," 11-12.

57 Quotations from *Le Monde*, 20 August 1975, 4 and 19 August 1975, 3. The best analysis of the US role in the Angolan civil war is Raymond L. Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (rev. ed., Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1994), 556-93.

58 John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story* (New York: Norton, 1978), 163.

59 Quotations from *Elima* (Kinshasa), 21 October 1975, 1, and 23 October 1975, 1.

60 See F.J. du Toit Spies, *Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976* (Pretoria: S.A. Weermag, 1989), 132 and Sophia du Preez, *Aventuur in Angola. Die verhaal van Suid-Afrika se soldate in Angola 1975-1976* [Adventure in Angola: The Story of South Africa's Soldiers in Angola 1975-1976] (Pretoria: J.L. van Schaik 1989), 113.

61 Díaz Argüelles, "Situación militar en Angola. Octubre / 75," November (1?) 1975, 3-5, CID-FAR; "Síntesis," 14-17.

62 Díaz Argüelles to Colomé, 1 October 1975, 11, CID-FAR.

63 Dept. of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "Angola: The MPLA Prepares for Independence," 22 September 1975, 4-5, FOIA Collection, National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.

64 Quotations from: *Daily Telegraph* (London), 10 October 1975, 16; *Rand Daily Mail* (Johannesburg), 23 October 1975, 1; Spies, *Operasie Savannah*, 82.

65 *Zambia Daily Mail* (Lusaka), 9 October 1975, 4.

66 Quotations from Helmoed-Römer Heitman, *South African War Machine* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1985), 170 and Dirk and Johanna de Villiers, *P.W. - A Biography of South Africa's President P.W. Botha* (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 1984), 251. On the controversial issue of Washington's role, a good starting point is Chester Crocker, *High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood* (New York: Norton, 1992), 49.

67 See Spies, *Operasie Savannah*, 87-95 and du Preez, *Aventuur*, 65-72. For the South African campaign, see Cdr. Jan Breytenbach, *Forged in Battle* (Cape Town: Saayman & Weber, 1986); idem, *They Live By the Sword* (Alberton, S.A.: Lemur, 1990), 18-66; Spies, *Operasie Savannah*; du Preez, *Aventuur*.

68 Díaz Argüelles, "Situación militar en Angola. Octubre/75," November (1?) 1975, 10, CID-FAR.

69 Breytenbach, *Forged in Battle*, 72.

70 *Elima*, 3 November 1975, 1.

71 Breytenbach, *Forged in Battle*, 108-09.

72 For the Western press, see *Rand Daily Mail*, 8 November 1975, 8; *Cape Times*, 13 November 1975, 1; *London Times*, 6 November 1975, 5; *Washington Post*, 7 November 1975, 7; *Guardian* (Manchester), 4 November 1975, 3; *New York Times*, 9 November 1975, 18. For the MPLA's denunciations, see *FBIS*, VIII, 23 October 1975, E2 and *Granma*, 25 October 1975, 8.

73 Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol, *Angola in the Frontline* (London: Zed Press, 1983), 30.

74 Paulo Jorge, "Resposta célere dos cubanos ao apelo de Agostinho Neto," *Jornal de Notícias* (Lisbon), 14 November 1995, 14.

75 "Informe sobre las actividades," 5.

76 MINFAR, "Batallón de Tropas Especiales," n.d. CID-FAR; Lucas Molina to Colomé ("Informe del cumplimiento de la misión en Luanda entre los días 4-18.11.75") [Report on the mission in Luanda on 4-18 November 1975], n.d., 7, CID-FAR; "Resumen de los cables recibidos. Noviembre 75" [Summary of the cables received], entry of 9 November 1975, CID-FAR. The Cuban planes, two aging Britannias, refuelled twice en route to Luanda.

77 Du Preez, *Aventuur*, 142.

78 Quotations from *Cape Times*, 21 November 1975, 1, and Spies, *Operasie Savannah*, 108.

79 See Westad article in this *Bulletin*.

80 See "Informe sobre la visita realizada por el mayor Rodobaldo Díaz Padraga a Angola en los días del 16.11.75 al 26.11.75 (Frente sur)" [Report on the visit to Angola by Major Rodobaldo Díaz Padraga on 16-26 November 1975 (Southern front)], n.d., CID-FAR; Lucas Molina to Colomé ("Informe del cumplimiento de la misión en Luanda entre los días 4-18.11.75 [Report on

the mission to Angola on November 4-18]"), n.d., CID-FAR; Raúl Pérez Millares and Eliseo Matos Andreu (representatives of Cubana de Aviación in Barbados) to Olivio, 17 December 1975, CID-FAR; González Bellester, "Estudio de la colaboración," 12-13. On the U.S. campaign to close airports for the Cuban airlift, see the following documents, all in FOIA collection, National Security Archive: U.S. Embassy Port of Spain to SecState, 19 December 1975; Kissinger to U.S. Embassy Georgetown, 20 December 1975; SecState to all American Republic Diplomatic Posts, 20 December 1975; Kissinger to U.S. Embassy Georgetown, 24 December 1975; Kissinger to U.S. Embassy Lisbon, 22 December 1975; and U.S. Embassy Lisbon to SecState, 8 January 1976, FOIA, MF 8904623 S.1. The fact that the Cubans were in charge was well reported in the Western press: see, e.g., *Economist*, 27 December 1975, 26; *Daily Telegraph*, 19 December 1975, 4; *Le Monde*, 18 January 1976, 1; *Christian Science Monitor*, 22 January 1976, 9; *Washington Post*, 10 March 1976, 15.

81 MINFAR "Conversación con el embajador soviético," 6 January 1976, CID-FAR; Gustavo Chui (deputy chief of the Puesto de Mando de Angola in the EMG) to Comandante de Brigada Rogelio Acevedo, 9 January 1976, CID-FAR; Raúl Castro to Severo Aguirre, 31 January 1976, CID-FAR.

82 Interview with Risquet.

83 See Chui (Subjefe del Puesto de Mando de Angola en el EMG) to Cde Juan Escalona (Jefe del Puesto de Mando), 30 January 1976, CID-FAR.

84 See Gleijeses, "Cuba's First Venture," 174.

85 See CIA, Directorate of Intelligence, weekly reports, "The Situation in the Congo," 10 March 1965, 5-6, 31 March 1965, 4, and 14 April 1965, 4, all in National Security File Country File: Congo, box 87, LBJL; CIA, Office of Current Intelligence, "Tanzanian Support for the Congo Rebels," 7 April 1965, 4, *ibid*.

86 Hughes to SecState, "Che Guevara's African Venture," 19 April 1965, 1-2, National Security File Country File: Cuba, box 20, LBJL.

87 Interview with Turpin.

88 Ford, quoted in *New York Times*, 11 February 1976, 1. According to press reports, Kissinger believed that the Cubans had intervened on their own initiative, but he chose the politically more rewarding course of claiming that Cuba "was acting merely as the 'client state' of the Soviet Union." (*New York Times*, 5 February 1976, 12.) See also Kissinger's 29 January 1976 testimony in US Senate, *Angola*, 6-55, quotation on 8.

89 *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents* (New York: Times Books, 1995), 362. See also Arkady Shevchenko, *Breaking With Moscow* (New York: Knopf, 1985), 271-72; Yuri Pavlov, *Soviet-Cuban Alliance: 1959-1991* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1994).

90 Pastor to Brzezinski, 21 September 1979, White House Central File, box CO-21, Jimmy Carter Library, Atlanta, Georgia. Carter called Castro "a Soviet puppet"; Brzezinski dismissed the Cubans as "proxy military forces" and CIA director Stansfield Turner blithely spoke of "Cuban mercenaries." See Carter, *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President* (New York: Bantam

Books, 1982), 479; Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977-1981* (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1983), 56, 146, 187; and Turner, *Secrecy and Democracy: The CIA in Transition* (Boston: Houghton & Mifflin, 1985), 86, 92.

<sup>91</sup> George Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs* (New York: Norton, 1982), 374. Cuba's role in Shaba and the Horn go beyond the scope of this essay. For Cuba and Shaba, see Piero Gleijeses, "Truth or Credibility: Castro, Carter and the Invasions of Shaba," *International History Review*, February 1996, 70-103.

<sup>92</sup> The 686 men of the Grupo Especial de Instrucción (GEI) arrived in Algeria aboard two special flights of *Cubana de aviación* that left Havana on October 21, and on two ships, the *Aracelio Iglesias* and the *Andrés González Lines*, which reached Oran on October 22 and 29 respectively. Efigenio Ameijeiras was the commander of the GEI.

<sup>93</sup> In this article the ellipsis is used to indicate author's editing. Any sanitized words or sentences are clearly indicated as such.

<sup>94</sup> On 3 December 1975, Risquet flew to Angola as head of the Cuban Mission in Luanda. As such, he was above the ambassador (Oscar Oramas) and at the same level as the chief of the MMCA.

<sup>95</sup> "Because of the growing scope of our help to the MPLA," on 25 November 1975 the first vice-minister of the armed forces, Abelardo Colomé Ibarra, had flown from Cuba to Angola to become the head of the MMCA. ("Síntesis," 23-24.)

<sup>96</sup> Oscar Oramas, a senior foreign ministry official and former ambassador to Guinea Conakry (1966-73), had arrived in December 1975 to serve as Cuba's first ambassador to Angola.

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#### CASTRO'S TRIP TO AFRICA

*continued from page 8*

fuegos, Raul Valdez Vivo, Jose Abrantes [Honecker welcomes Castro, invites him to take the floor—ed.]

Fidel Castro: [sections omitted—ed.]

We visited Tanzania because of an old commitment. We have built three schools there, sent a medical brigade, and given help in other ways. Nyerere had invited us to talk about economic matters above all. The rise in oil prices had affected Tanzania tremendously. Tanzania needs 800,000 tons of oil a year. The entire harvest of peanut, sisal and cotton crops has to be used for the purchase of oil. The Chinese are still present in Tanzania. They have built a few things there, in particular the railroad. The armed units of the ZANU are trained by the Chinese. Tanzania also carries some responsibility for the split of the liberation movement of Zimbabwe into ZANU and ZAPU. In South Africa armed fighting has begun.

The ANC fighters are trained in Angola. The Chinese had also offered training here. Tanzania considers the developments in Zimbabwe in terms of prestige. [Its involvement] allows it to negotiate with Great Britain and the United States over Zimbabwe and to define a role for itself.

The ZANU has 5000 men in fighting units trained by the Chinese. The liberation fighters in Namibia are also trained in Angola, however. Cuba and the Soviet Union have both set up training camps for this purpose. The ZAPU is supported by Angola.

We flew directly from Tanzania to Mozambique. There used to be differences between us and the FRELIMO, going back to the times when FRELIMO was in Tanzania and Che Guevara had spoken to [Mozambique Liberation Front head Eduardo] Mondlane there. At the time Mondlane did not agree with Che and said so publicly. Thereafter news articles against Mondlane were published in Cuba. Later Mondlane corrected himself, but only internally and things remained somewhat up in the air. FRELIMO took good positions during the liberation struggle in Angola. But in our opinion they were not sufficiently combative. For a time FRELIMO got close to [Tanzanian President Julius] Nyerere. [Cuban Vice President] Carlos Rafael [Rodríguez] had spoken to [Mozambican President] Samora Machel in Colombo, Sri

Lanka, at the Nonaligned Summit Conference in August 1976]. After that we sent a Cuban delegation to Mozambique and I was invited to visit. FRELIMO accepted all of our suggestions for the visit. It was kept discreet, which was convenient for me. Samora Machel was really a surprise for me. I learned to know him as an intelligent revolutionary who took clear positions and had a good relationship with the masses. He really impressed me. We spoke with each other for one and a half days. We support Mozambique. Machel asked us to send 300 technicians. He was interested in Cuba's experiences, especially economic ones. Before this we did not know for sure what influence the Chinese had on him. Now he is getting closer to the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. He got a loan from the Soviets for weapons of 100 million rubles. In particular, the Soviets deliver aircraft and anti-aircraft batteries. We were very pleased with our visit to Mozambique. I want to say that we consider this very important.

[Zambian President Kenneth] Kaunda also wanted me to visit him. I had been in Africa for a long time, however, and did not want to extend my stay. Besides which the imperialist penetration has advanced far in Zambia. In the Angola matter, Zambia took a very wrong position, in spite of the fact that she was not forced to do so. We had agreed with Angola not to visit Zambia. A few days before my visit to southern Africa the Katanga [Shaba] battles had begun and [People's Republic of the Congo President Marien] N'Gouabi was murdered. I had been invited to Madagascar, but did not want to stay in Africa any longer. During a press conference in Dar Es Salaam I had categorically denied that Cuba was in any way involved in the Katanga battles. I explained that the situation in Angola was different from those in Zimbabwe and Namibia. I had answered all questions in very general terms.

Things are going well in Angola. They achieved good progress in their first year of independence. There's been a lot of building and they are developing health facilities. In 1976 they produced 80,000 tons of coffee. Transportation means are also being developed. Currently between 200,000 and 400,000 tons of coffee are still in warehouses. In our talks with [Angolan President Agostinho] Neto we stressed the absolute necessity of achieving a level of economic development comparable to what had

existed under [Portuguese] colonialism. Over 300 Cubans are working in the health system. Fishing is recovering and the sugar plantations are almost all back in production. The reconstruction of the transport system is to be completed within 6 months. In education a lot is being done as well. The MPLA [Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola] is doing a good job with mass organizing. Women are politically very active. There are no grounds for dissatisfaction there. Angola has good hard currency earnings. Oil revenues are about 500 million dollars a year, without them having to do anything. They also generate about 300 million from coffee. Now they are setting up a Party in Angola. The fundamental decisions in domestic and foreign policy are correct. We are still concerned about one area: the development of the Army. The Defense Ministry is doing hardly anything to fight bandits in the north and south of the country. The bands are particularly active in the center of the country. With our help they could deliver heavy blows against them. The Soviet military advisors are active at the highest levels. Our advisers are active at the Brigade level and we are helping them with the training of military cadres and the fight against the bandits. The Angolan Defense Ministry underestimates the fight against the bandits [and] they are not deploying regular troops against the bandits. We understand that the Soviet military advisers are primarily requested to help them to organize the regular army and are not interested in helping in the fight against bandits. It is difficult for us to fight against the bandits on our own. Our comrades have had a lot of difficulties and have spent many bitter hours fighting them. The Cubans cannot do it alone. The state of the army unsettles us. In one region a brigade has been without a commander or chief of staff for a long time. Until now the Cuban units have been the only ones fighting the bandits. The major share must however be carried out by the Angolans themselves. The Cuban troops are above all concentrated in Cabinda and in the defense of the capital, Luanda. I spoke with Neto about the situation of the army and told him that things had to change. The Defense Minister [Cdr. Iko Teles Carreira—ed.] is a good old fighter with the MPLA, but that hasn't helped. An army general staff does not really exist. The country may have 70,000 men under arms but the army is prac-

tically not organized. The Soviet advisers are primarily concerned with planning. Neto wanted us to take the entire army in hand. In practical terms that might have been the best solution, but not politically. The Soviet Union is the chief weapons supplier and the Angolans must speak directly to the Soviets. Neto himself must solve these problems. We also cannot commit our troops to the fight against bandits because women and children are being killed in these battles and we cannot take on such a responsibility.

Neto made a very good impression. He is an outstanding personality, very clever and decisive. He is increasingly the leading figure in the Angolan leadership. There are also opportunists in Angola, however. Sometimes they try to approach us or the Soviets and to spread certain opinions. We are very clearly taking a line in favor of Agostinho Neto. There is also evidence of black racism in Angola. Some are using the hatred against the colonial masters for negative purposes. There are many mulattos and whites in Angola. Unfortunately, racist feelings are spreading very quickly. Neto has taken a balanced position here, naming both whites and mulattos as ministers. Neto is of course ready to contribute to this question decisively. He is open to suggestions and arguments. The Defense Minister is not as strong. He does not have high standards. Because of this a lot of cadres do not have the right attitudes. There are cases in which the military commanders have not visited their military district for five months. Many ministers were appointed because they were old war comrades of Neto's. A fact remains: the army and general staff are not working properly. Cadres overall are being developed well throughout Angola, but the Army is the most important. Things are going well, with the exception of the army.

We are giving Angola a great deal of military support. At the end of the liberation war, 36,000 Cuban troops and 300 tanks were deployed. The South African mercenaries were quickly demoralized. The USA talks about 12,000 Cuban soldiers. We are reducing our troop strength continuously. This year we plan to leave 15,000 men stationed there. By the end of 1978 there should be only 7,000, although it's probable that the reductions won't proceed quite as rapidly. The main force is stationed in the south. If the Cuban military were not deployed in Angola the situation would be a lot more

complicated.

The number of our civilian advisers and experts will rise to 4,000 this year. Until now this aid has been provided free of charge. Starting in 1977, however, Angola is committed to paying for the living expenses of our specialists, with an additional increase in financial responsibilities scheduled for 1978. Our military aid will remain free of charge. The Soviet Union has committed itself to supplying the entire material needs of the Angolan and our units.

While in Angola I also dealt with the question of the liberation movements in Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. Namibia's liberation fighters are good, they are also helping Angola with the anti-bandit battles. The South African ANC is a serious organization. Its president, Oliver Tambo, is a serious politician. Three quarters of the ANC Central Committee membership is communist. They have a very clear political position with regards to Angola, the Soviet Union, and other socialist countries. The people have taken up the struggle in South Africa, in time the ANC will be a serious power.

The situation is most complicated in Zimbabwe. The ZANU have 1,000 armed fighters. The Chinese and Nyerere are influential with the ZANU. The ZAPU, however, haven't had any military forces of their own. The best man in the ZAPU, General Secretary [Jason] Moyo, was murdered [in Zambia in January 1977]. During the Angolan war of liberation, the Angolan leadership could not give its support to the liberation movement in Zimbabwe. At the time Mozambique was leaning against Tanzania and supported the ZANU. Today things are different. Angola's influence is increasing and Mozambique is growing closer and closer to Angola. The Patriotic Front in Zimbabwe is made up of both the ZANU and the ZAPU, but this is only a formality. [ZAPU leader Joshua] Nkomo is supported by Angola, the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. [ZANU leader Robert] Mugabe is supported by Tanzania and the Chinese. Now there are possibilities for depriving the Chinese and the Tanzanians of their influence in Zimbabwe. Zambia is supporting the Zimbabwean liberation movement for the prestige factor that's involved and because it wants to counteract Angola's influence with Nkomo. With the positive development of Angola and Mozambique

the prospects of the liberation movement in Zimbabwe can only improve. It is possible that Angola, Mozambique and Zambia will move forward together. The ZAPU must establish its own armed forces as soon as possible. There are today 6,000 ZAPU men in Angola, and one could make an Army out of them. That would facilitate uniting the ZAPU and the ZANU. I told Neto about this and he agreed. Above all that would be a way to roll back China's influence. Nkomo also understands this. He is very intelligent and talks to Samora Machel a great deal. Unfortunately he is very fat, and so his health is not good.

I told him and others that the personal safety of all the liberation leaders was in danger. The imperialists would be moved to try and murder them all. They've already murdered N'Gouabi and Moyo. Because of this it is absolutely necessary to take steps to increase security measures for the leaders.

The liberation struggle in Africa has a great future. From a historical perspective the facts are that the imperialists cannot turn things back. The liberation struggle is the most moral thing in existence. If the socialist states take the right positions, they could gain a lot of influence. Here is where we can strike heavy blows against the imperialists. The liberation army in Katanga [Shaba] is led by a general. These people used to favor Katanga's secession from Zaire. Later they went to Angola, were trained by the Portuguese and fought against the MPLA, until they went over to Neto's side; now they could not fall out with Neto. They are good soldiers. Its military leader is a general in the gendarmerie who now wants to make a revolution in Zaire. These people are now saying that they are good Marxist-Leninists and that they no longer advocate the secession of Katanga. They went off in four different directions with four battalions. We didn't know about this, and we think that the Angolans didn't either. The frontline states were split 50/50 in favor of supporting the Katanga liberation movement. We gave them a categorical explanation that Cuba was in no way involved in this. The armed groups are marching forward. Their commander sends an open [public] daily telegram to the Angolan leadership and to the Soviet and Cuban embassies in Luanda describing his advances and asking for support. The Yankees are wavering.

They know very well that there are no Cuban units involved. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez is charged with speaking to the French and Belgian ambassadors to protest against their countries' involvement and to pressure them to stop. We want them to be worried, so when they are organizing their mercenaries, and to think that our troops are very near.

Angola has a certain moral duty, and a desire, to support the Katanga liberation movement. They also desire it because the Angolan leadership is angered by [Zairian leader] Mobutu [Sese Seko]'s behavior. Angola has asked us and the Soviets to give them weapons for delivery to the Katangans. We should wait for developments, however. Mobutu is an incompetent and weak politician. It's possible that he will not survive this crisis. The frontline states are now in favor of supporting Katanga, while Angola favors direct aid. We don't want to be involved in order not to give the USA an excuse to intervene. As I mentioned we will try to put pressure on Belgium and France.

It will be a great event if Mobutu falls.

In the People's Republic of the Congo there is a confusing situation following N'Gouabi's murder. The interior and defense ministers are competing for the leadership. There are also pro-Westerners in the military council. It is practically certain that the rightists murdered N'Gouabi. But the left wing was also dissatisfied with him as well. In other words there was a relatively uncertain situation there. We sent Comrade Almeyda to the funeral, and hope that the situation will stabilize. We were also asked to send a military unit to Brazzaville. The internal problems of the country must be solved by the Congolese themselves however. We have stationed a small military unit in Pointe Noire, and another one in Cabinda.

There were several requests for military aid from various sides: [Libyan leader Moammar] Qadaffi, Mengistu, and the Congolese leaders. During our stay in Africa we sent Carlos Rafael Rodriguez to Moscow to confer with our Soviet comrades and to Havana for consultations with our leadership. In order to find the best solution we must think through this question quietly and thoroughly and consider it in terms of the overall situation of the socialist camp. Above all we must do something for Mengistu...[section on Ethiopia printed in "Horn of Africa Crisis" section—ed.] ...With regard to military aid for the PR Congo and

the Libyans we have not yet come to a decision.

I had consultations with [Houari] Boumedienne in Algeria and asked for his opinion. He assured me that Algeria would never abandon Libya. Algeria is very concerned with the situation in the Mediterranean because of its security interests. It is in favor of supporting Libya, as long as military aid is confined to the socialist camp. That is not only a question between Cuba and Algeria. If we are to succeed in strengthening the revolution in Libya, Ethiopia, Mozambique, the PDRY [People's Democratic Republic of Yemen] and Angola we must have an integrated strategy for the whole African continent.

Angola is becoming closer to the socialist camp. It bought 1.5 billion rubles of weapons from the Soviets. Boumedienne thinks that [Egyptian President Anwar] Sadat is totally lost to us. In Syria there is also no leftist movement any more, especially after the Syrians defeated the progressive powers and the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] in Lebanon.

[Indian President] Indira Gandhi gambled away the elections.

In Africa we can inflict a severe defeat on the entire reactionary imperialist policy. We can free Africa from the influence of the USA and of the Chinese. The developments in Zaire are also very important. Libya and Algeria have large territories, Ethiopia has a great revolutionary potential. So there is a great counterweight to Sadat's betrayal in Egypt. It is even possible that Sadat will be turned around and that the imperialist influence in the Middle East can be turned back.

This must all be discussed with the Soviet Union. We follow its policies and its example.

We estimate that Libya's request is an expression of trust. One should not reject their request. Cuba cannot help it alone. [subsequent sections omitted—ed.]

[Source: *Stiftung "Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR im Bundesarchiv"* (Berlin), DY30 JIV 2/201/1292; document obtained by Christian F. Ostermann (National Security Archive); translated for Carter-Brezhnev Project by David Welch with revisions by Ostermann; copy on file at National Security Archive.]

# Moscow and the Angolan Crisis, 1974-1976:

## A New Pattern of Intervention

by Odd Arne Westad<sup>1</sup>

For a period of roughly twenty years—from the formation of the Cuban-Soviet alliance in the early 1960s until the Red Army got bogged down in the valleys of Afghanistan in the early 1980s—the Soviet Union was an interventionist power with global aspirations. The peak of Soviet interventionism outside Eastern Europe was in the mid- and late 1970s, and coincided roughly with the rise of detente and the effects of the American defeat in Vietnam. This period witnessed significant efforts by Moscow to expand its power abroad, especially in the Middle East, around the Indian Ocean, and in Southern Africa. But it was also a period in which the traditional cautiousness of Soviet Third World diplomacy was cast away at a peril: By the mid-1980s, many Russians had started to question the costs of the Kremlin's imperial ambitions.<sup>2</sup>

What was behind the new Soviet interventionism of the 1970s? Which perceptions and motives led Soviet leaders to involve themselves deeply into the affairs of countries outside Europe or their immediate border areas? As the doors to the archives of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) open, albeit slowly, we are getting new insights into the old problems of Moscow's foreign policy behavior through CPSU documents on a multitude of international crises. This article attempts to address some of the issues relating to Soviet interventions by revisiting one of the main African conflicts of the 1970s: the 1975-76 Angolan civil war.

In the dominant realist interpretation of international relations, the Soviet elite is seen primarily as pursuing a set of interests on the international arena. The primary interest of the elite is the preservation of the Soviet state—an interest which in foreign policy leads to caution at most times, and expansion when possible.<sup>3</sup>

Was it the *possibilities* for expansion within the world system of states which prompted Moscow's involvement in Africa and Asia? Some analysts, such as Francis Fukuyama, have argued that it was the U.S. foreign policy of detente and the defeat in Vietnam which more than anything else paved the way for Soviet expansionism. Recent memoirs and Moscow's own declassified documents lend support to this view by showing that the mid-70s was the high-point of a wave of optimism in Soviet foreign policy—"the world," according to one former senior official, "was turning in our direction."<sup>4</sup>

Other scholars have concentrated on the immense expansion of Soviet military and infrastructural capabilities during the late 1960s as a cause for Soviet involvement in the Third World. This instrumental explanation emphasizes in particular the growth of the Soviet navy, the development of a large fleet of long-distance transport planes, enlarged training facilities, and improvements in global communications.<sup>5</sup>

Analysts have also pointed to changes in leadership and political or institutional conflicts within the Soviet elite. Samuel Huntington suggests that each of the Soviet advances into new foreign policy arenas antedated the emergence of a new leader and became part of the new leader's claim to power. Brezhnev is the prototype for such a leader, and the Soviet policy changes in the 1970s must then be seen as part of Brezhnev's international agenda. Parallel with Brezhnev's rise to power, the International Department (*Mezhdunarodnyi otdel* or MO) of the CPSU Central Committee (CC) strengthened its position as a maker of Soviet foreign policy at the expense of the Foreign Ministry, and, while the Ministry was preoccupied with the traditional arenas for Soviet foreign policy—Europe and the United States—the MO increasingly emphasized the Third World.<sup>6</sup>

There are, in particular, two aspects of the Soviet materials on the Angolan civil war which point away from explanations generally offered by realist scholars. First, there is the issue of the nature and importance of ideology in Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet officials who designed the intervention in Southern Africa were driven by ideas of promoting their model of development abroad. Their early contacts with the Angolan left-wing rebels had shown them that the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola or MPLA) was a likely adherent to Soviet ideas of state and society. As the Angolan group came under pressure from its enemies, many Soviet officials used opportunity, capability, and strategic interest as rationalizations of a desire to uphold a regime willing to link up to the Soviet experience.

Second, there is the ability of Soviet allies—in this case the Angolans and the Cubans—to influence Moscow's actions. Luanda and especially Havana pushed successfully for Moscow's involvement in the civil war, both demonstrating leverage far in excess of their putative "power." In 1975, Fidel Castro initiated Cuban armed support for the MPLA without Moscow's agreement or knowledge, and thereby reduced the Soviet leaders' role for several crucial months to that of spectators to a war in which the Cubans and their Angolan allies gambled on prospective Soviet support to win. Although it certainly was the direction of Soviet foreign policy itself which poised Moscow for its Angolan adventure, it was Castro and MPLA President Agostinho Neto who conditioned and shaped the intervention.

The main foreign policy aim for Soviet involvement in Africa was to score a series of inexpensive victories in what was perceived as a global contest with Washington for influence and positions in the Third World. Political theory—Marxism-Leninism—did play

a role in selecting who should be the Soviet allies in the area, and the large deposits of mineral resources in Southern Africa also played a role (primarily in terms of denying these resources to the US and its allies), but these were subsidiary parts of the equation.

As the Moscow leadership developed its links with the liberation movements, it created African expectations of further support as well as a sense of commitment in its own ranks. This sense of commitment was particularly strong among the cadre of the CPSU CC International Department that handled most of the contacts with African organizations. In addition, the Cuban leadership—who had been involved in African affairs since the mid-1960s<sup>7</sup>—viewed the early Soviet involvement as a harbinger of a much wider East-bloc engagement on the continent.

Still, a larger Soviet operation in black Africa was slow in coming. Moscow's ideologically inspired attempts to influence the policies of the local revolutionary movements complicated the building of stable alliances with these groups, and often frustrated Soviet foreign policy aims. The links which the Soviets—often wrongly—assumed existed between many African militants and the People's Republic of China contributed to Moscow's caution. It was not until the Soviet and Cuban leaders agreed on their military

plans in Angola in late 1975 that the Soviet Union finally made a major investment in one of its Southern African alliances, and thereby made the MPLA a regional ally second in importance only to the African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa.

The "African strategy" was developed by the KGB and received the support of the Soviet leadership—and Brezhnev—in the summer and fall of 1970. The KGB reports emphasized that the regimes and liberation movements of Southern Africa were searching for international allies, and underlined the "simplistic" approach most African regimes had to world affairs, understanding neither the conflict between the two camps nor the nature of American imperialism. The black political leaders of Southern Africa felt that their efforts to gain aid from Washington had failed, and that the Soviet Union was the only major power which could assist them in reaching their political and social goals.<sup>8</sup>

The Portuguese colonies—Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, and Cape Verde—were particularly interesting from a Soviet point of view both for political and strategic reasons. The KGB noted the Nixon Administration's renewed alliance with Portugal, and the recent military setbacks for the colonial forces in their war against the liberation movements. KGB Deputy Chairman Viktor Chebrikov explained that

especially Angola and Guinea-Bissau had great potential strategic importance for the Soviet Union, and that both the United States and China were trying to increase their influence with the liberation movements in these countries.<sup>9</sup>

The intelligence organizations saw Soviet rivalry with Beijing over influence in Africa as a major element behind their policy recommendations. The main military intelligence bureau—the GRU—reported that China was targeting countries and movements which already received aid from the Soviet Union. China, the GRU stressed, would use its resources to the maximum to attract African supporters, and could, within a few years, build its position sufficiently to control large parts of Africa in a loose coalition with the United States.<sup>10</sup>

KGB chairman Yuri Andropov also had other reasons for recommending an increase in Soviet involvement in Southern Africa. Summarizing a report on Western estimates of Soviet policy in Africa, Andropov stressed that Western experts believe that although the Soviet Union will strive to strengthen its position in Africa, "in the coming years [it does] not plan a 'broad offensive'," limiting itself to "securing positions [already] achieved." These Western estimates, Andropov found, were by themselves good reasons why the Soviet Union should step up its African operations.<sup>11</sup>

The new emphasis on Africa in Soviet foreign policy was immediately put into practice in the case of Angola. After a number of unsuccessful MPLA appeals for increased support in the spring of 1970, Agostinho Neto was startled by the scale and scope of what the Soviets offered in mid-July. Soviet ambassador to Zambia D. Z. Belokolos proposed a series of plans for Moscow to assist the MPLA in terms of military hardware, logistical support, and political training. In addition, the Soviets were willing to send military advisers and offer political support for Neto's movement in its conflicts with the neighboring African states: Zambia, Zaire, and Congo.<sup>12</sup>

The MPLA leadership responded avidly to this Soviet largesse. In his

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meetings with Belokolos, Neto downplayed MPLA relations with “capitalist countries and social-democratic parties,” and stressed that the Soviet Union was the party’s main international ally. Neto especially wanted the Soviets to know that he saw no grounds for working closely with China. The Soviet ambassador, in his communications to Moscow, believed that the MPLA leadership’s positions reflected the general sentiment in the movement—that the Soviet Union was their only likely source of major military support.<sup>13</sup>

In spite of their new-found enthusiasm for African affairs, the Soviet leaders in the 1971–73 period found it increasingly difficult to work out effective ways of collaborating with their favored Southern African liberation movements, and particularly with the MPLA. The Soviets found that Neto’s movement had more than its fair share of the poor communications, bad organization, and widespread factionalism which, as seen from Moscow, characterized all the liberation movements in Southern Africa—with the possible exception of Moscow’s favorite partner, the ANC.<sup>14</sup>

By early 1974, the MPLA had split into three factions: the Tanzania-based leadership under Agostinho Neto, the Zambia-supported group of Daniel Chipenda (known as *Revolta do Leste* [Eastern Revolt]), and a Congo-based faction calling itself *Revolta Activa* (Active Revolt). As John Marcum points out, the discord was not so much due to doctrinal differences as “faulty communication, military reverses, and competing ambitions.” The MPLA had never, even at the best of times, been especially well-organized or cohesive, and pressure from Portuguese counter-offensives, ethnic tensions, and challenges to Neto’s leadership split the movement. Chipenda, typically, drew most of his support from his own Ovimbundu ethnic group in the central and eastern parts of Angola.<sup>15</sup>

The Soviet envoys spent much time and effort trying to restore unity to the MPLA and create some kind of liberation front between it and the main traditionalist independence movement,

Holden Roberto’s *Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola* (FNLA). The Soviets held on to Neto as their main Angolan connection, assuring a trickle of military and financial support for the besieged leadership. More importantly, Moscow invited an increasing number of Neto’s associates to the Soviet Union for military and political training. Still, the Soviets also gave some assistance to Chipenda’s group, and continued to invite Chipenda for “confidential” conversations at their Lusaka embassy up to 1974.<sup>16</sup>

As Soviet criticism of Neto’s lack of flexibility in the unity talks mounted, their support for his movement gradually declined. In March 1974, just a month before the Lisbon military coup suddenly threw the political situation in Angola wide open, the Soviet ambassador in Brazzaville drew a bleak picture of the situation in the MPLA. For all practical purposes the movement had stopped functioning, and there was little hope of Neto bringing it together again. The only bright spot was the existence within the MPLA of a number of “progressively oriented activists” who wanted close relations with the Soviet Union.<sup>17</sup>

The April 1974 overthrow of the Caetano regime by a group of radical Portuguese officers sent Soviet Africa policy into high gear. By May, Moscow was already convinced that the Portuguese colonial empire would soon collapse. Concerning Angola, the Soviet policy was to strengthen the MPLA under Neto’s leadership, thereby making the movement the dominant partner in a post-colonial coalition government. Disregarding previous reports on the situation in the MPLA, the CPSU International Department and the Moscow Foreign Ministry instructed Soviet embassies in Brazzaville, Lusaka, and Dar-es-Salaam to “repair” the damaged liberation movement.<sup>18</sup>

This salvage operation turned out to be exceedingly difficult. The MPLA factions’ views of each other did not change much with the waning of Portuguese power. The Soviet ambassadors tried their best in meetings with Neto, José Eduardo dos Santos, Chipenda, and other MPLA leaders—

promising substantial Soviet support to a united MPLA—but to little avail. The “unification congress,” held near Lusaka in mid-August, broke down when Neto’s supporters walked out of what they considered a staged attempt to remove the party leadership.<sup>19</sup>

In the meantime, the MPLA’s rivals had substantially strengthened their positions in Angola. Roberto’s FNLA, having received supplies, weapons, and instructors from China, moved its troops across the northern border from Zaire and started operations in the northern provinces. The youngest of the liberation movements, Jonas Savimbi’s *União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA), signed a ceasefire with the Portuguese in June and started recruiting large numbers of Angolans for military training in their base areas in the east. In spite of its diplomatic efforts, the Soviet Union seemed to be losing out in the battle for influence in post-colonial Angola.<sup>20</sup>

In October the Soviets decided to drop the idea of forcing the MPLA factions to unite, and threw their weight squarely behind Neto’s group. According to what ambassador Afanasenko told José Eduardo dos Santos, there were two main reasons behind this decision. First, Neto had in late September managed to convene a rump congress inside Angola, in which the main MPLA guerrilla commanders took part. The political manifesto passed by the congress was to the Soviets’ liking. Second, the new head of the Portuguese military administration in Angola, Admiral Rosa Coutinho, was a left-winger who openly sympathized with Neto’s views. But however Afanasenko presented the Soviet views, Neto’s people must have been aware that if Moscow wanted to maintain some influence in Angola, it had little choice but to support the “reconstructed” MPLA.<sup>21</sup>

The events of the two last months of 1974 seemed to indicate that Moscow had made the right move. On October 21, the MPLA signed a cease-fire with Portugal, and on November 6, large crowds greeted the MPLA veteran Lucio Lara when he arrived to open an office in Luanda. About the same time, forces of the newly organized MPLA

military wing—the FAPLA (*Forças Armadas Popular para Libertação de Angola*)—took control of most of the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda in the north. In the main Angolan cities, MPLA organizers, now free to act, started setting up strong para-military groups in populous slum areas, drawing on the appeal of their message of social revolution.<sup>22</sup>

Moscow in early December 1974 drew up an elaborate plan for supplying the MPLA with heavy weapons and large amounts of ammunition, using Congo (Brazzaville) as the point of transit. Ambassador Afanasenko got the task of convincing the Congolese of their interest in cooperating. This was not an easy task. Congo had never been a close ally of the Soviet Union—in the ruling military junta were many who sympathized with the Chinese—and it had for some time sponsored both Neto's MPLA rivals and a Cabinda separatist group. The latter issue was particularly problematic, and Agostinho Neto had on several occasions criticized the Congolese leader Colonel Marien Nguabi for his support of Cabindan independence. Still, on December 4 Nguabi gave his go-ahead for the Soviet operation.<sup>23</sup>

Though noting the flexibility of the Congolese government, Afanasenko knew that the job of reinforcing the MPLA would not be easy. In a report to Moscow he underlined the problems the MPLA faced on the military side. Both the FNLA, now joined by Daniel Chipenda's MPLA rebels, and UNITA held strong positions and would be equipped further by the Americans and the Chinese. In the civil war which the ambassador predicted, the "reactionaries" would initially have the initiative, and the MPLA would depend on "material assistance from progressive countries all over the world" just to survive. Politically, however, Neto's group, as the "most progressive national-liberation organization of Angola," would enjoy considerable support. On the organizational side, one should not think of the MPLA as a vanguard party, or even as a party at all, but rather as a loose coalition of trade unionists, progressive intellectuals, Christian groups,

and large segments of the petty bourgeoisie.<sup>24</sup>

In spite of the skirmishes which had already begun between MPLA and FNLA forces in late 1974, African heads of state succeeded in convincing the three Angolan movements to join in negotiations with Portugal and thereby attempt an orderly transfer of power in Luanda. These negotiations led to the 15 January 1975 Alvor Agreement, in which 11 November 1975 was set as the date for the Portuguese handing over power to an Angolan coalition government. None of the parties took this last attempt at avoiding civil war too seriously, and sporadic fighting continued. The Alvor Agreement was also undermined both by the Soviet Union and the United States, who decided to expand their programs of military support for their Angolan allies.<sup>25</sup>

The Soviets were prodded in their widening commitment to the MPLA by the Cuban leaders. Cuba had supplied the MPLA with some material support since the mid-1960s, and Havana had increasingly come to regard Agostinho Neto as its favorite African liberation leader. The Cubans told Moscow that Neto would not, and should not, accept sharing power with the other movements. Cuba would itself concentrate more on Africa (i.e., Angola) in its foreign policy, and expected the Soviets to upgrade their support for the MPLA. Moscow would not be bettered by Havana. Afanasenko told the Cuban ambassador to Brazzaville that "the Central Committee of the CPSU is attentively watching the development of events in Angola and reiterates [its] unity with the progressive forces, in order to smash the cherished adventures of foreign and domestic reaction."<sup>26</sup>

The Soviet Union was also aware of the increase in the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency's covert support for the FNLA starting in late January 1975. The Soviet embassy in Brazzaville concluded that the American assistance would lead Holden Roberto to make an all-out bid for power very soon. The embassy experts realized that there was little the Soviet Union could do to assist the MPLA resist the initial attacks by Roberto's forces. Their hope was

that the further increase in Soviet "technical, military, and civilian assistance" which the Brazzaville ambassador promised José Eduardo dos Santos on January 30 would arrive in time. But in addition to their material assistance, the Soviets also tried to push the MPLA to mend its negotiation strategy. Moscow now hoped that a new alliance between the MPLA and Savimbi's UNITA could get their Angolan allies out of the difficult spot they were in.<sup>27</sup>

Moscow was joined in its wish for an anti-FNLA alliance by many of the independent states in southern Africa. Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere attempted to get the Soviets to increase the pressure on the MPLA leadership to make the necessary concessions to forge such an alliance. Nyerere, sympathetic to the MPLA's political aims, was exasperated by Neto's unbending demands in the negotiations. The Angolan leader was "a good poet and doctor," Nyerere told the East German ambassador, but "a bad politician." Nyerere also warned the Soviets against direct involvement in the Angolan conflict. African countries would react sharply against any form of foreign intervention, Nyerere said.<sup>28</sup>

By early summer, 1975, the FNLA troops had mounted limited offensives against the MPLA both along the coast and in the northern part of Angola. Then, in July, as another African-brokered attempt at negotiations broke down, the MPLA counterattacked. By the middle of the month, local FAPLA forces were in control of Luanda, and MPLA troops began attacking the FNLA strongholds in the north. The Soviets had not foreseen the MPLA military success, although the Brazzaville embassy already in April foresaw an improvement of FAPLA fighting capabilities because of the Soviet aid. However, it did not expect a full scale civil war to break out before Angola achieved its independence in November.<sup>29</sup>

Moscow now seemed to have the recipe for success in Angola. By a limited supply of military equipment, it had secured the MPLA the upper hand in the fighting. As the date for independence approached, Moscow expected

that the rival movements, or at least UNITA, would return to the negotiating table and become part of an MPLA-led coalition government. The Soviet experts did not believe that the United States would stage a massive intervention, nor did they give much credence to MPLA reports of direct South African or Zairean involvement. Their main worry was the Chinese, who had stepped up their FNLA assistance program from bases in Zaire. Moscow found particularly disturbing the fact that the Chinese were joined as instructors in these camps by military personnel from Romania and North Korea.<sup>30</sup>

The Ford Administration was, however, not willing to let Neto's MPLA force a solution to the nascent civil war in Angola. In mid-July 1975, the U.S. president authorized a large-scale covert operation in support of the FNLA and the UNITA. Over three months, the CIA was allocated almost \$50 million dollars to train, equip, and transport anti-MPLA troops. In early August, South African forces, at first in limited numbers, crossed the border into southern Angola, while regular Zairean troops joined FNLA forces fighting in the north. By mid-August the MPLA offensives in the north had been turned back, and Neto's forces were retreating toward Luanda.<sup>31</sup>

In addition to its flagging fortunes on the battlefield, the MPLA ran up against increasing problems in securing their Soviet lifeline through the Congo. The flamboyant and independent-minded Congolese leader, Colonel Nguabi, had been angered by Neto's persistent criticism of Brazzaville for sheltering Cabindan separatist groups. In an irate message to the Soviet ambassador, Nguabi informed Moscow that he would no longer accept that Neto, "on the one hand, demands assistance from Congo, [and] on the other makes accusations against us." By early August the Congolese had informed Afanassenko that they would not accept Soviet plans for large-scale support of the MPLA through Congolese territory.<sup>32</sup>

It was the threat to the "Congo connection" which, in early August, prompted Moscow to ask Fidel

Castro—who had close connections with the Congolese leaders—to act as a facilitator for assistance to the MPLA. The Soviet leaders got more than they bargained for. The Cubans had since early spring tried to get Moscow to support an armed strategy on behalf of the MPLA. Already in February, the Cuban ambassador to Dar-es-Salaam had told his Soviet colleague that "The choice of the socialist road in Angola must be made now. . . . In October it will be too late." In late summer, Castro used the new Soviet request as a stimulus for launching his own plan for the intervention of Cuban forces in Angola.<sup>33</sup>

Cuba had sent military instructors to work with the MPLA in its camps in Congo for several years before the collapse of the Portuguese colonial empire. By early summer 1975 these advisers numbered about 250, and—in spite of not participating in combat—they played an increasingly important role in planning MPLA operations. The Cuban officers functioned as a kind of general staff for Neto and the MPLA leaders. Through their operational training, Castro's instructors supplied the necessary know-how which the Angolan forces lacked, especially regarding communications, supply-lines, and coordinated operations.<sup>34</sup>

On August 15, Castro sent a message to Leonid Brezhnev arguing the need for increased support for the MPLA, including the introduction of Cuban special troops. The Cubans had already developed a fairly detailed plan for transporting their troops to Luanda (or Congo), for supplies, and for how the Cuban soldiers would be used on the ground in Angola. Castro wanted Soviet transport assistance, as well as the use of Soviet staff officers, both in Havana and Luanda, to help in planning the military operations. The Cubans underlined to the Soviets the political strength of the MPLA, and the threat which foreign assistance to the FNLA/UNITA alliance posed to socialism and independence in Angola.<sup>35</sup>

The Cuban initiative was coordinated with the MPLA leaders, who now in turn tried to put pressure on the Soviets to get involved with the Cuban

plan for a direct military intervention. Lucio Lara, the senior MPLA underground leader in Luanda, on August 17 appealed to Ambassador Afanassenko for the dispatch of Soviet staff officers to the MPLA General Command, which had just moved from Brazzaville to Luanda. "The MPLA Command needs qualified advice on military questions at the strategic level," Lara said. Afanassenko, however, could only promise technical experts, but agreed to invite MPLA's defense minister designate, Iko Carreira, to Moscow in late August for talks with the CPSU CC International Department, the Defense Ministry, and the Armed Forces General Staff.<sup>36</sup>

In spite of their policy to support Neto's MPLA, the Soviet leaders were not pleased with the content of the Cuban plan. First of all, they objected to the use of Soviet officers and even Soviet transport planes in Angola prior to independence. The Soviet leaders worried that such a move would damage the policy of detente with regard to the United States. They also knew that most African countries, including some close to the Soviet Union, would react against a direct Soviet involvement, as would some of their political friends in Portugal. Second, the Cubans were, in the Soviet view, not sufficiently aware of how even a Cuban intervention could upset great power relations, since the Ford Administration would see Cuban forces as proxies for Soviet interests. Third, Moscow was still not sure that the military situation in Angola warranted a troop intervention in support of the MPLA.<sup>37</sup>

In spite of their displeasure, the Soviet leaders found it difficult to make their objections known to Castro. Moscow knew that the Cuban leader was wary of the Soviet policy of detente, and their experience with Havana told them to tread carefully so as to avoid episodes like the 1968 near-break between the two allies. Still, Brezhnev flatly refused to transport the Cuban troops or to send Soviet officers to serve with the Cubans in Angola. The Soviet General Staff opposed any participation in the Cuban operation, and even the KGB, with whom the policy of paying increased

attention to Africa originated, in August 1975 warned against the effects of a direct Soviet intervention on US-Soviet relations.<sup>38</sup>

Havana would not be deterred by Soviet hesitation. The first Cuban combat troops arrived in Luanda in late September and early October onboard several Soviet aircraft and rebuilt pre-revolutionary Cuban cruise-ships. They immediately fanned out into FAPLA units in the Angolan countryside, and took charge of much of the fighting against the MPLA's enemies. But the infusion of Cuban troops was not enough to sustain the MPLA conquests from early summer against the new onslaught of its combined enemies.<sup>39</sup>

In September the MPLA continued its retreat, hard pressed by Zairean and mercenary-led FNLA troops in the north and UNITA forces, supported by advisors and material from South Africa, in the south. Savimbi's incongruous alliance with Pretoria had given his military units the equipment they badly needed, and they could now exploit their substantial ethnically-based support in central and eastern Angola. The MPLA, meanwhile, was by mid-October entirely dependent on its support in the western Luanda-Mbundu regions and in the cities. It controlled less than one-fourth of the country, and was losing ground, in spite of Cuban reinforcements.<sup>40</sup>

The foreign alliance policies of the MPLA, and thereby its possibilities for winning the struggle for power in Angola, were saved by Pretoria's October decision to launch an invasion. Moscow knew of the South African plans in advance of their implementation in mid-October, and the Kremlin leadership discussed how to respond. The CPSU CC International Department considered the new stage of the anti-MPLA operations in Angola a joint U.S.-South African effort, and believed the Soviet Union had to come to the aid of its ally. In the third week of October, Moscow decided to start assisting the Cuban operation in Angola immediately after the MPLA had made its declaration of independence on November 11. The Soviet aim was to infuse enough Cuban troops and Soviet advis-

ers into Angola by mid-December to defeat the South Africans and assist the MPLA leaders in building a socialist party and state.<sup>41</sup>

The Soviet perception of the widening role of the CIA in assisting FNLA forces from bases in Zaire also played a role in Moscow's reevaluation of its Angolan policy. The KGB station in Brazzaville supplied vital information on the dramatic increase in U.S. assistance, and Andropov believed that the Americans had a long-term strategy of equipping large groups of Angolan, Zairean, and Western mercenary troops to be sent into Angola. It was also likely, the KGB said, that U.S. "experts" would increase their own cross-border activities.<sup>42</sup>

The reaction of most African countries to the South African invasion led the Soviets to believe that it would be less dangerous than before to intervene in the Angolan conflict. Julius Nyerere, an African leader who Moscow respected in spite of his often blunt criticism of its Africa policies, told the Soviet ambassador on November 3 that in spite of deploring the war in Angola, Pretoria's intervention had made outside support for the MPLA necessary. He hoped that many African countries now would aid Neto's movement. Still, he warned against a too open Soviet support for the MPLA, and hoped that Moscow would channel the bulk of its aid through African governments. The Soviet ambassador, untruthfully, responded that such would be the case.<sup>43</sup>

The Soviet military preparations for the airlift of Cuban troops to Angola intensified in early November. The CPSU secretariat met on November 5 and decided to send Soviet naval units to areas off the Angolan coast. In Brazzaville, in a striking reversal of roles within less than two months, the Soviet ambassador now exhorted his Cuban colleague to "intensify" Havana's preparations for combat in Angola. "But a Cuban artillery regiment is already fighting in Luanda," the Cuban ambassador responded, somewhat incredulously.<sup>44</sup>

Agostinho Neto declared the independence of the People's Republic of Angola on November 11, just as the

MPLA was fighting for its very existence only a few miles north of Luanda. In the battle of Quifangondo valley the Cuban artillerymen proved to give FAPLA the crucial advantage over its FNLA-Zairean opponents. Soviet-supplied BM-21 122 millimeter rocket launchers devastated the attacking forces and sent them on a disorderly retreat toward the northern border, giving the MPLA and the Cubans a free hand to turn on the South African and UNITA forces approaching from the south.<sup>45</sup>

During the week before independence, large groups of Cuban soldiers had started arriving in Luanda onboard Soviet aircraft. The Soviets had organized and equipped these transports, although the operation was technically directed by the Cubans themselves. Moscow had made it clear that the primary objective of these forces was to contain the South Africans along the southern border and that they should not be used for general purposes in the civil war. For the same reason the Soviet General Staff ordered about 60 of their own officers to join the Cuban forces from Congo. These men started arriving in Luanda in the evening of November 12.<sup>46</sup>

The ensuing two weeks saw the rapid advance toward Luanda of the UNITA army led by about 6,000 regular South African troops. By late November, these forces had reconquered all the territory which Savimbi had lost to the MPLA over the preceding months. They had occupied every major port south of the capital except Porto Amboim, taken control of the Benguela railway, and were attempting to set up their own civilian administration in Huambo. Both the Soviets and the Cubans concluded that if the MPLA regime was to survive, the Cuban forces would have to attack in the south as soon as possible.<sup>47</sup>

After the creation of the MPLA regime the Politburo authorized the Soviet General Staff to take direct control of the trans-Atlantic deployment of additional Cuban troops, as well as the supplying of these troops with advanced military hardware. The massive operation—the first Soviet effort of its kind—

transported more than 12,000 soldiers by sea and air from Cuba to Africa between late October 1975 and mid-January 1976. In the same period it also provided FAPLA and the Cubans with hundreds of tons of heavy arms, as well as T-34 and T-54 tanks, SAM-7s, anti-tank missiles, and a number of MiG-21 fighter planes.<sup>48</sup>

It is still not possible to chart in any detail the logistics of the Soviet operation. What we do know is that the governments of several African countries agreed to assist with the enterprise. Congo was the main staging ground for personnel and arms arriving from Cuba and the Soviet Union (although in some cases An-22 transport planes flew directly from the southern USSR or from Cuba). Algeria, Guinea, Mali, and Tanzania cooperated with the efforts in different ways, even if the Soviets on some occasions had to push hard to get their cooperation. Moscow also had to push some of its East European allies to rush to the defense of "African liberation and global anti-imperialism" by supporting the MPLA.<sup>49</sup>

By the end of November the Cubans had stopped the South African-led advance on Luanda, and in two battles south of the Cuanza river in December the southern invaders suffered major setbacks. Pretoria then decided to withdraw towards the border, partly because of its military problems and partly because the U.S. Senate voted on December 19 to block all funding for covert operations in Angola. Pretoria would not accept being left in the lurch by Washington, with its own men held hostage to a conflict they no longer believed they could win.<sup>50</sup>

Just as it had opened the gates for African acceptance of Soviet-Cuban aid to the MPLA, the by now defunct South African intervention also paved the way for African diplomatic recognition of the new Angolan regime. By mid-February 1976, most African states had officially recognized Neto's government, as had the Organization of African Unity (OAU), in spite of attempts by its chairman, Ugandan President Idi Amin, to have the decision postponed. Soviet diplomatic efforts contributed significantly to this development, for

instance in the case of Zambia, where President Kenneth Kaunda switched over to the MPLA's side after substantial Soviet pressure.<sup>51</sup>

In terms of control of the central regions, the Angolan war was over by early March 1976. The capital of the anti-MPLA forces, Huambo, fell to FAPLA forces on February 11. Holden Roberto had already in January returned to exile in Zaire and the FNLA had given up its military activities. Jonas Savimbi had returned to the bush areas of southeastern Angola with about 2,000 guerillas and their U.S. and South African advisers, and although he was to fight his way back to international prominence by the early 1980s, in 1976 Savimbi himself realized that he could not effectively challenge FAPLA and the Cubans.<sup>52</sup>

In the spring of 1976 the Soviet leaders felt—with a high degree of certainty and self-congratulation—that they had won the Angolan war. The Kremlin was impressed that the logistics of the operation had worked so well: over 7,000 kilometers from Moscow the Soviet Union had conducted a campaign in support of its allies against the power of the United States and its strong regional supporters, and come out on top. For Brezhnev himself Angola became a benchmark for "active solidarity with the peoples of Africa and Asia" and evidence that the Soviet Union could advance socialism in the Third World during a period of detente with the United States.<sup>53</sup>

What did the Soviets believe they learned from the Angolan conflict? From the reports coming in to the CPSU CC International Department, the most important lesson at the time seems to have been that the United States could be defeated in local conflicts under certain circumstances. First, the Soviet armed forces must be capable of and ready to provide, at short notice, the logistics for the operation needed. These tasks were primarily assigned to the navy and the air-force, both of which were commended for their efforts in Angola. Second, the Soviet Union must be able to organize and control the anti-imperialist forces involved (unlike in Vietnam, where the Soviet leaders felt

that disaster had struck again and again because of the Vietnamese leaders' inability to follow Moscow's advice).<sup>54</sup>

The Soviet cadres in Angola were, by 1976, very satisfied with the way both Angolans and Cubans had respected Moscow's political primacy during the war. According to the embassy, Neto realized his dependence on Soviet assistance and, equally important, that it was Moscow, not Havana, who made the final decisions. Even though the embassy still did not trust Neto fully, they admitted that he had performed to their liking during these battles. In the spring of 1976 he continued to press for more Soviet military instructors, an attitude which the charge d'affaires in Luanda, G.A. Zverev, held up as a sign of the Angolan president's dedication to the new alliance, even if Neto had not yet consented to request permanent Soviet military bases.<sup>55</sup>

As to the Cubans, the Soviet representatives often expressed a certain degree of surprise to Moscow at how harmonious were relations with the small Caribbean ally. The Soviet-Cuban "close coordination in Angola during the war has had very positive results," Zverev told his superiors in March 1976. Soviet diplomats and officers lauded the Cubans for their bravery and for their ability to function as a link between Moscow and Luanda while at the same time "respecting" the paramount role of the CPSU leadership. The overall Cuban-Soviet relationship improved significantly in the wake of the Angolan operation, up to a point which had not been reached since the 1962 missile crisis.<sup>56</sup>

Moscow and Havana also agreed on strategy in Angola after the main battles had ended in the spring of 1976. Both countries wanted to wind down their military involvement as soon as possible, "avoid broad military clashes with South Africa, and attain their goal by means of political and diplomatic struggle." In May, Raul Castro told the Soviet General Staff that he wanted to start withdrawing Cuban troops right away, and that he expected almost 15,000 Cubans to have left by late October. The Cuban leaders asked Moscow to inform Pretoria of their inten-

tions, well knowing that such a demilitarization of the conflict—albeit with a MPLA government in place—was what the Soviets had wanted all along. Havana knew how to placate the great power, although, as we will see below, they exacted their price for doing so.<sup>57</sup>

The second lesson the Soviets believed they had learnt from the Angolan adventure was that the Soviet Union can and must rebuild and reform local anti-capitalist groups in crisis areas. The MPLA, local Soviet observers postulated in 1976, was saved from its own follies by advice and assistance from Moscow, which not only helped it win the war, but also laid the foundation for the building of a “vanguard party.” The Angolan movement had earlier been plagued by “careerists and fellow-travellers,” but, due to Soviet guidance, the “internationalists” were in ascendance. These new leaders—men like Lopo do Nascimento and Nito Alves—understood that the MPLA was part of an international revolutionary movement led by Moscow and that they therefore both then and in the future depended on Soviet support.<sup>58</sup>

It was these “internationalists” who Moscow wanted to assist in building a new MPLA, patterned on the experience of the CPSU. Noting the poor state of the MPLA organization in many areas, the Soviet party-building experts suggested that this was the field in which do Nascimento, Alves, and others should concentrate their activities. By taking the lead in constructing the party organization they would also be the future leaders of the Marxist-Leninist party in Angola.<sup>59</sup>

The Soviets supplied very large amounts of political propaganda to be disseminated among MPLA supporters and used in the training of cadre. The ordinary embassy staff sometimes found the amounts a bit difficult to handle—a plane-load of brochures with Brezhnev’s speech at the 25th CPSU congress, two plane-loads of anti-Maoist literature—but in general the embassy could put the materials to good use (or so they claimed in reports to Moscow). By summer 1976 they had run out of Lenin portraits, and had to request a new supply from the CPSU

Propaganda Department.<sup>60</sup>

The transformation of the MPLA turned out to be an infinitely more difficult task for the Soviets than the dissemination of Lenin busts. Neto’s independence of mind and his claim to be a Marxist theoretician in his own right rankled the Russians and made it increasingly difficult for them to control the MPLA as soon as the military situation stabilized. Some of the Angolan leaders whom Moscow disliked, for instance FAPLA veteran commander and defense minister Iko Carreira and MPLA general secretary Lucio Lara, who was strongly influenced by the European left, strengthened their positions after the war was over. According to the embassy, the influence of such people delayed both the necessary changes in the MPLA and the finalization of the development plans on which the Soviets and Cubans were advising.<sup>61</sup>

Differences between the Soviet and Cuban perceptions of the political situation in the MPLA did not make things easier for Moscow. Part of the price which Castro exacted for his general deference to the Soviets on the Angolan issue was the right to argue for Angolan political solutions which were to his liking. Preeminent in Castro’s political equation was the leadership of Agostinho Neto: whom he considered a brilliant man and a great African leader, as well as a personal friend. The Cubans therefore missed no opportunity to impress the Soviets with their view that the MPLA president was the only solution to Angola’s leadership problems, well knowing of Moscow’s suspicions of him. “We have the highest regard for President Neto,” Raúl Castro told Soviet Vice-Minister of Defense I.F. Ponomarenko. “Cuba wants to strengthen Neto’s authority,” the head of the Cuban party’s International Department, Raúl Valdés Vivó, told the Soviet chargé in May.<sup>62</sup>

The Cubans were, however, always clever at sweetening their tough position in support of Neto by underlining that the Soviet Union of course was Angola’s primary international ally. “Relations with the Soviet Union will become a more important aspect of

Angolan foreign policy in the future,” Raúl Castro told his Soviet colleagues. He instructed Risquet to “on all questions inform the USSR embassy in Angola and maintain close contact with the Soviet comrades.” Castro also castigated some of the Angolan leaders whom the Soviet distrusted; Lucio Lara “displays a certain restraint on questions [of] broadening the collaboration with the socialist countries. He is reserved and not frank . . . [and] has avoided us,” Castro told Ponomarenko.<sup>63</sup>

But even such measures could not always convince the Soviets of Cuban loyalty. Reporting on Neto’s visit to Havana in July 1976, the Soviet embassy noted with disapproval that Fidel Castro had told the Angolans that Cuban troops would remain in Africa “as long as they are needed,” and that Neto had asked for Cuba’s assistance in building a Marxist-Leninist party. Even worse, Castro had spoken of Angola, Cuba, and Vietnam as “the main anti-imperialist core” of the world. That the Cuban president had also mentioned the “central role” of the Soviet Union was not sufficient to please the Soviet observers, particularly since Castro coupled his statement with an endorsement of Neto’s own “paramount role” in the MPLA.<sup>64</sup>

As Philip Windsor has observed about the Brezhnev Doctrine, the relationship between the Soviet Union and its allies approximated the roles of a king and his vassals in medieval natural law. The Cubans and the Angolans could set their own agenda, so long as they subordinated themselves to the general purpose of Soviet foreign policy and used the proper code of address when reporting to Moscow’s representatives. For Soviet cadre at the local level the real character of the Moscow-Havana-Luanda relationship complicated their efforts at reforming the MPLA, as shown in excess by the spectacle of the May 1977 coup attempt against Neto, when Nito Alves—a Soviet favorite—found his bid to oust the president blocked by Cuban tanks.<sup>65</sup>

The belief of many Soviet leaders that they could control domestic political developments in Third World countries was a misperception with fateful

consequences for Soviet foreign policy in the late Brezhnev era. The Angolan intervention played an important part in upholding this misperception, as the reporting from Luanda shows. In hindsight, one of the main managers of Moscow's African and Asian policies in the late 1970s, Karen Brutents, has claimed that it was Angola which led to Ethiopia which led to Afghanistan, not in terms of the circumstances and structure of the interventions—which certainly varied—but in terms of the inflated pretensions of control over foreign left-wing movements which were stimulated by the Angolan affair. Brutents' point is a good one, although we should still be careful in generalizing about the direction of Soviet foreign policy during that period until we have more documentation on the discussions of the Politburo and General Staff.<sup>66</sup>

On the other hand, as I have argued elsewhere, what Morton Kaplan terms the "loose bipolar structure" of the Cold War international system often gave Third World revolutionary parties a chance to enter into alliances with one of the great powers, a chance which they may not have been offered in a more complex global constellation of states. As the aspiring, anti-systemic power, the Soviet Union was particularly likely to be the candidate for such alliances from a Third World perspective. The leaders of some African movements, including the MPLA, knew of these possibilities and sometimes knew how to exploit them. In addition to its social and economic message, this potential for a powerful ally was one of the assets of African communism during the 1970s, an asset which increased in importance as their revolutions highlighted the idea of a socialist victory in the Third World in Soviet foreign policy ideology.<sup>67</sup>

There is enough evidence in the materials on Angola, and elsewhere, to indicate that the Soviet leadership was very much aware of the strategic opportunities which the post-Vietnam anti-interventionist mood in the United States afforded Moscow for activism in regional conflicts. It is likely that the Politburo would have been much less inclined to interventions like the one in

Angola if they had been convinced that Washington would respond in force. The conventional realist approach to interventions provides adequate explanation for this side of Soviet interventionism: the Brezhnev leadership saw an opportunity for unchecked expansion and made use of it.<sup>68</sup>

On local factors, which were crucial in the case of Angola, some scholars have argued that great power interventions are grounded not so much in misperceptions—the "slippery slope" theory of growing commitment—as in what Charles Kupchan calls the "reputational and intrinsic interest," of the intervening power.<sup>69</sup> This is an attempt to rescue the case for an interest-driven decision-making process in cases where there is a significant discrepancy between the prior expectations of an intervening power and the outcome of its action—an argument which of course can only be tested through the evidence.

In the case presented here, would a clearer perception of the conditions inside the MPLA—and of Soviet inability to change these conditions—have prevented an intervention? Possibly, not least since much of Moscow's historical experience pointed away from such an adventure. Soviet diplomacy was at most times very cautious outside its own core area, preferring mutually advantageous links with established regimes rather than with revolutionary movements. Up to the Angolan intervention, the Soviet Union never gave decisive support to a revolutionary movement outside its neighboring countries. One can indeed argue that the United States has supported more successful revolutionary movements, even since the mid-1970s, for instance in Nicaragua and in Afghanistan.<sup>70</sup>

What prevented a "clear view" of the obstacles to long-term successful intervention was primarily Soviet foreign policy ideology. Its mix of Russian exceptionalism, Marxist-Leninist theory, and the Soviet experience of economic and political development, created a fertile ground for believing that difficulties associated with the character of the movements and societies targeted for intervention could be over-

come, in spite of much contrary information. In the case of Angola, this belief contributed significantly to the intervention and sustained the decision to commit additional men, money, and material to the country in subsequent years. It even led Moscow's local representatives to sum up Angola as a success, thereby over time encouraging further Soviet "limited interventions" in Africa and Asia, culminating in the Afghanistan disaster.<sup>71</sup>

We need much more evidence from Russian and foreign sources in order to generalize about the nature of Soviet Cold War involvement in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. From what we see so far, the two faces of Soviet association with Third World radicals—revolutionary patronage and distrustful caution—correspond closely with two faces of Russian culture and history. One is the elite tradition which has sought to bring Russia into a Europeanized society of states. The other is the tradition of defiance of the West, a radical and, in European terms, sectarian approach to Russia's international role. Both are visible during the last phase of the Soviet experiment: CPSU officials seem to have felt as uncomfortable at meetings in the White House as when visiting PLO training camps in Syria. Both for historians and political scientists, the opening of Russian archives offers opportunities to revisit these motives of Soviet foreign policy and to expand our understanding of their role in the international history of the Cold War.

<sup>1</sup> I am grateful to Ilya Gaiduk and Maxim Korobochkin for their assistance in locating materials in Moscow. My thanks also to the former head of the State Archives Service of the Russian Federation, Dr. Rudolf G. Pikhoia, and to the staff of the *Tsentr khraneniia sovremennoi dokumentatsii* (Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documentation; hereafter TsKhSD) in Moscow for their help during my archival research. Piero Gleijeses, Geir Lundestad, and Iver B. Neumann offered helpful comments on a draft version.

<sup>2</sup> See Eduard Shevardnadze, *The Future Belongs to Freedom* (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1991); Valentin Falin, *Politische Erinnerungen* (Munich: Droemer Knaur, 1993); Francis Fukuyama, *Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the Third World*. RAND report no. 3337-USDP (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1986); Andrei Kolosov, "Pereosmysleniie politiki v 'tretem

mire” [Rethinking Policy in the Third World], *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* 4 (April 1990).

<sup>3</sup> A classic summary is Hans J. Morgenthau, “To Intervene or Not to Intervene,” *Foreign Affairs* 45 (April 1967). George W. Breslauer has an excellent survey of recent literature on Soviet interventions in “Ideology and Learning in Soviet Third World Policy,” *World Politics* 44: 3 (July 1987), 429-448.

<sup>4</sup> Karen N. Brutents, former first deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee's International Department, interview with author, Moscow, 5 October 1993 (hereafter “Brutents interview”). For a discussion, see Steven R. David, “Soviet Involvement in Third World Coups,” *International Security* 11 (Summer 1986), 3-36.

<sup>5</sup> Celeste A. Wallander, “Third World Conflict in Soviet Military Thought,” *World Politics* 42:1 (October 1989), 31-37; Bruce D. Porter, *The USSR in Third World Conflicts: Soviet Arms and Diplomacy in Local Wars 1945-1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 36-59. See also Samuel P. Huntington, “Patterns of Intervention: Americans and Soviets in the Third World,” *The National Interest* (Spring 1987), 39-47.

<sup>6</sup> Huntington, “Patterns of Intervention,” 43; on Soviet interest groups, see Jan S. Adams, “Incremental Activism in Soviet Third World Policy: The Role of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee,” *Slavic Review* 48: 4 (Winter 1989), 614-30 and, for an insider's view of one of the institutions, former head of the KGB First Chief Directorate Leonid V. Shebarshin, *Ruka Moskvy: Zapiski nachalnika sovetskoi razvedki* (Moscow: Tsentr-100, 1992). This article is in part based on the archives of the International Department, now kept in TsKhSD. The International Department archives contain a large collection of materials important to understanding Soviet foreign policy history—among them embassy reports, documents created for the Politburo or the party Secretariat, intelligence summaries, and records of conversations with foreign leaders. A small portion of this material—documents which the Politburo or the heads of the MO wanted to have available for reference purposes—is held in so-called *osobyie papki* or “special files,” most of which are still unavailable to scholars.

<sup>7</sup> See the article by Piero Gleijeses elsewhere in this issue of the *CWIHP Bulletin*.

<sup>8</sup> KGB to MO [International Department of the CPSU CC], 13 April 1970, TsKhSD, fond (f.) 5, opis' (op.) 62 delo (d.) 535, listy (ll.) 7-9. This report, primarily an analysis of the preparations for the third summit conference of non-aligned nations in Lusaka, also notes that this conference will mean a step forward for Soviet diplomacy, that China's influence within the group is receding, and that the United States is increasingly isolated in the Third World. See also KGB (Andropov) to MO, 6 May 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, ll. 32-35. On the KGB's influence on Brezhnev's thinking: author's interview with Oleg Troianovskii, former Soviet UN ambassador, Moscow, 14 September 1992.

<sup>9</sup> KGB to MO, 4 June 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 536, ll. 73-76; KGB (Chebrikov) to MO, 26 November 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, ll. 115-118. The latter report is based on an evaluation of European policies toward Portugal, originating with an analysis of materials from the Brit-

ish Conservative Party. The GRU, in a major report on U.S. strategies in Africa, noted that the continent had become more important for the Americans both strategically and in terms of its natural resources. “Capitalist states,” said the GRU, “are putting pressure on African countries to enter into base agreements and military assistance plans.” TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, ll. 71-90, 80.

<sup>10</sup> General'nyi shtab voorushennykh sil SSSR [General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR] (Glavnoe razvedivatel'noe upravlenie [Main intelligence directorate]; hereafter GRU) to MO, 15 September 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, ll. 63-68; GRU to MO, “Po meropriiatiiam, napravlenym na oslablenie pozitsii KNR v Afrike [On Measures (and) Directions to Weaken the Positions of the PRC in Africa],” TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, ll. 96-101.

<sup>11</sup> KGB (Andropov) to MO, 6 May 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, ll. 32-35, 35.

<sup>12</sup> V.N. Bezukladnikov (counsellor, Lusaka) to MO and attached letter from Neto to CPSU CC concerning request for receiving MPLA members for military training, 24 June 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 535, ll. 99-102; D.Z. Belokolos to MO, 14 July 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 536, ll. 195-200.

<sup>13</sup> Belokolos to MO, 25 July 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 536, ll. 215-218; Embassy, Lusaka to MO, political letter: “Perspektivy razvitiia borby naroda Angoli protiv portugalskikh kolonizatorov [Perspectives on the Development of the Angolan People's Struggle Against the Portuguese Colonizers],” n.d. (October 1970), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 536, ll. 219-228, 224. The Soviet intelligence services still suspected that Neto kept the China option in reserve. See KGB to MO, 8 October 1970, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 62, d. 536, l. 212.

<sup>14</sup> Soviet embassy, Kinshasa to MO, 16 January 1973, “K voprosu o primireнии mezhdru FNLA i MPLA [On the question of reconciliation between the FNLA and the MPLA],” TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, d. 843, ll. 4-9; Belokolos to MO, 10 October 1973, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, d. 844, ll. 121-123. The CPSU CC archives hold large amounts of documents on Soviet relations with all liberation movements in Southern Africa, especially the ANC and the Zimbabwe African People's Union in addition to the MPLA (see footnote 6).

<sup>15</sup> John Marcum, *The Angolan Revolution. Volume 2: Exile Politics and Guerilla Warfare, 1962-1976* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1978), 199.

<sup>16</sup> MPLA (Pedro Van Dunem) to CC CPSU, 11 December 1972, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, d. 844, l. 22; Soviet embassy, Kinshasa to MO, 16 January 1973, “K voprosu o primireнии mezhdru FNLA i MPLA [On the question of reconciliation between the FNLA and the MPLA],” TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, d. 843, ll. 4-9; Soviet embassy, Kinshasa to MO, 12 April 1973, “K voprosu ob otnosheniakh mezhdru MPLA i FNLA [On the question of relations between the MPLA and the FNLA],” TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, d. 843, ll. 54-57; Neto to CC CPSU, 23 June 1973, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, d. 844, ll. 91; Belokolos to MO, 7 February 1974 (Conversation with Daniel Chipenda), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 67, d. 758, ll. 5-8.

<sup>17</sup> Belokolos to MO, 25 October 1973, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 66, d. 844, ll. 118-120; E.I. Afanasenko

(ambassador, Brazzaville) to MO, 30 March 1974, political letter: “O polozhenii v ‘Narodnom dvizhenii za osvobodzhenie Angoli’ (MPLA) [On the situation in ‘The People's Movement for the Liberator of Angola’ (MPLA)],” TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 67, d. 758, ll. 37-45, 40.

<sup>18</sup> Iu.A. Iukalov (chargé d'affaires, Dar-es-Salaam) to MO, 22 May 1974, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 67, d. 758, ll. 70-71; E.I. Afanasenko to MO, 8 June 1974, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 67, d. 758, ll. 78-81.

<sup>19</sup> Marcum, *Angolan Revolution*, vol. 2, 245-48.

<sup>20</sup> Marcum, *Angolan Revolution*, vol. 2, 249-50; George Wright, *U.S. Policy Towards Angola: The Kissinger Years, 1974-1976* (Leeds: University of Leeds, 1990), 18-23.

<sup>21</sup> Afanasenko to MO, 10 October 1974, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 67, d. 758, ll. 121-122; see also Marcum, *Angolan Revolution*, vol. 2, 251-253.

<sup>22</sup> Marcum, *Angolan Revolution*, vol. 2, 253; Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol, *Angola in the Frontline* (London: Zed, 1983), 109-122, presents the MPLA view of events.

<sup>23</sup> Afanasenko to MO, 4 December 1974, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, ll. 11-12. Raymond Garthoff correctly concludes that the Soviet decision “preceded the American funding in January 1975, although it probably followed the military efforts of the FNLA in November.” *Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985), 507.

<sup>24</sup> Embassy, Brazzaville to MO, 25 December 1974, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, ll. 10-21, 21, 17.

<sup>25</sup> Marcum, *Angolan Revolution*, vol. 2, 257-58; Garthoff, *Détente and Confrontation*, 533-34.

<sup>26</sup> S.A. Slipchenko (Soviet ambassador, Dar-es-Salaam) to MO, 30 December 1974 (Conversation with Oscar Oramas, Cuban Foreign Ministry; later ambassador to Luanda), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982, ll. 3-7; Afanasenko to MO, 10 January 1975 (Conversation with Cuban ambassador A. Columbio Alvarez), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, ll. 17-18, 18. See also Jorge I. Domínguez, *To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 130-137; William M. LeoGrande, “Cuban-Soviet Relations and Cuban Policy in Africa,” *Cuban Studies* 10:1 (January 1980), 1-48.

<sup>27</sup> B. Putilin (first secretary, embassy Brazzaville) to MO, n.d. (late January, 1975), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, ll. 10-21; Afanasenko to MO, 30 January 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, ll. 26. U.S. support for Holden Roberto—with whom the CIA for several years had had “an intelligence gathering relationship”—was limited to “non-lethal equipment” up to July 1975; see “Talking points for secretary Kissinger. NSC meeting on Angola, Friday, June 27, 1975.” National Security Archive (NSArchive Angola collection of documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act (hereafter “National Security Archive Angola FOIA collection”). The Archive, a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository, is located on the 7th floor of the Gelman Library at George Washington University in Washington, D.C.; Robert E. Gates,

*From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 65-69, has a useful account of CIA initiatives on Angola.

<sup>28</sup> Slipchenko to MO, 6 February 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982, ll. 48-54, 51; Slipchenko to MO, 24 August 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982, ll. 238-246.

<sup>29</sup> Embassy, Brazzaville to MO, 14 April 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, ll. 50-53, 53. For the relationship among the Angolan groups, see Franz-Wilhelm Heimer, *The Decolonization Conflict in Angola, 1974-76: An Essay in Political Sociology* (Geneva: Institut universitaire de hautes études internationales, 1979).

<sup>30</sup> V.V. Aldoshin (chargé d'affaires, embassy, Dar-es-Salaam) to MO, 20 April 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982, ll. 153-156; Institut Afriki Akademiia Nauk SSSR (Africa Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences) to MO, 19 June 1975, "Protsess dekolonizatsii v Angole i politika imperialisticheskikh derzhav [The Decolonization Process in Angola and the Policies of the Imperialist Powers]," TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, ll. 87-110; Embassy, Brazzaville to MO, 14 April 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, ll. 50-53.

<sup>31</sup> Nina D. Howland, "The United States and Angola, 1974-88: A Chronology," in *Department of State Bulletin* 89:2143 (February 1989), 16-19; John Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1978), 40-57; Paul L. Moorcraft, *African Nemesis: War and Revolution in Southern Africa 1945-2010* (London: Brassey's, 1990), 76-81. See also Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Nathaniel Davis to Under Secretary Joseph J. Sisco, 12 July 1975, and Sisco to Deputy to the National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft, 15 July 1975, both in National Security Archive Angola FOIA collection. The American covert military aid was in addition to U.S. civilian assistance and military and financial aid procured by the United States from U.S. allies in the region, notably Zaire. (See Hearing before the Subcommittee on Africa of the Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives, 95th Congress, Second Session, 25 May 1978; also Raymond L. Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, rev.ed.; (Washington, DC: Brookings, 1994), 560-70).

<sup>32</sup> Afanasenko to MO, 14 June 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, l. 137; Afanasenko to MO, *ibid.*, ll. 180-82.

<sup>33</sup> Afanasenko to MO, 4 July 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 8, d. 1962, ll. 136-38; Slipchenko to MO, 10 February 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982, ll. 44-47, 46. (For an alternate view based on Cuban sources, see the article by Piero Gleijeses elsewhere in this issue of the *CWIHP Bulletin*.)

<sup>34</sup> Iu. K. Naumov, (councillor, Dar-es-Salaam) to MO, 2 August 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982, ll. 226-27; record of conversation, Afanasenko-Congolese Prime Minister Henri Lopez, 17 June 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, ll. 113-14. On the Cuban role, see also Putilin to MO, 14 April 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, ll. 50-53. See also Klinghoffer and Edward Gonzalez, "Cuba, the Soviet Union, and Africa," in David E. Albright, ed. *Communism in Africa* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University

Press, 1980), and the aforementioned Gleijeses article.

<sup>35</sup> M.A. Manasov (chargé d'affaires, embassy, Havana) to MO, 15 August 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, l. 122. This document is a record of the conversation between Manasov and Oscar Cienfuegos, an assistant to Fidel Castro, who brought the Cuban leader's message to the Soviet embassy. No copy of the message itself has been found in the MO records. Georgi M. Kornienko, former first vice-foreign minister, interview with author, Moscow, 5 October 1993 (hereafter "Kornienko interview"); Brutents interview; Brutents in Odd Arne Westad, ed., *Workshop on US-Soviet Relations and Soviet Foreign Policy Toward the Middle East and Africa in the 1970s*, Oral history transcript, Lysebu, 1-3 October 1994 (Oslo: Norwegian Nobel Institute, 1994, hereafter "Lysebu transcript"), 68-69.

<sup>36</sup> Afanasenko to MO, 17 August 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, ll. 196-203, 196.

<sup>37</sup> Kornienko interview; Brutents interview.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.* On the 1968 tensions in Soviet-Cuban relations, see Philip Brenner and James G. Blight, "Cuba, 1962: The Crisis and Cuban-Soviet Relations: Fidel Castro's Secret 1968 Speech," *CWIHP Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995), 1, 81-85.

<sup>39</sup> Georgi Kornienko, the deputy foreign minister, later recalled that the Soviet leadership tried to stop the Cubans: "I read a cable from our ambassador in Conakry [Guinea] which said, among many other things, that the Cuban ambassador had told him that the next day some planes with Cuban troops will land in Conakry for refueling on the way to Angola. I asked [Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei] Gromyko, do you know anything? He called Andropov, he called Grechko. Nobody knew anything. All of them were against it and reported it immediately to the Politburo and suggested that we stop Castro. It took some hours to write the report, to get the decision, and to send the message to Castro. By this time the planes were in the air. You could rightly ask: How could it be—Soviet planes, stationed on Cuba, but it was Soviet planes and we had quite a few military people there. . . I checked. Well, technically, our people were involved, our planes were there for Cuban use, our advisers were involved, but they were completely convinced that a political decision had been taken [in Moscow]" (Kornienko interview). See also Gabriel García Márquez, "Operation Carlota: Cuba's Role in Angolan Victory," *Venceremos* 4:5 (February 1977), 1-8; Arthur Jay Klinghoffer, *The Angolan War: A Study in Soviet Policy in the Third World* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1980), 109-20.

<sup>40</sup> Embassy, Brazzaville to MO, 15 September 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, ll. 118-121; see Moorcraft, *African Nemesis*, 83-84. The military situation in Angola at the time of the Cuban intervention is still under dispute. Piero Gleijeses, who has studied the Angolan war based on Cuban documents, believes that through the first half of October the MPLA was winning the war (Gleijeses, personal communication to author). The MPLA reports to Moscow (and presumably also to Havana) are much less optimistic (see Naumov to MO, 3 and 20 October 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982, ll. 268-270, 280-81).

<sup>41</sup> Kornienko interview; Brutents interview; Slipchenko to MO, 30 October 1975 TsKhSD, f.

5, op. 68, d. 1982, ll. 313-320; Iu.K. Naumov to MO, 20 October 1975 TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1982, ll. 280-281. See also comments by Kornienko, Brutents and others in Lysebu transcript; and Jiri Valenta, "Soviet Decision-Making on the Intervention in Angola," in Albright, ed., *Communism in Africa*. Several of the MO documents dealing with this issue are not yet declassified.

<sup>42</sup> Embassy, Brazzaville to MO, 15 September 1975 TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1941, l. 118 (the Brazzaville station also underlined that the FNLA as late as August 1975 was still receiving assistance from Romania and North Korea); Kornienko interview.

<sup>43</sup> Slipchenko to MO, 3 November 1975 (conversation with J. Nyerere), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, ll. 305-307.

<sup>44</sup> Secretariat card index, 192 meeting, 5 November 1975, TsKhSD; Afanasenko to MO, 4 November 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, ll. 230-231.

<sup>45</sup> Klinghoffer, *Angolan War*, 26-27; Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation*, 512.

<sup>46</sup> G.A. Zverev (chargé d'affaires, Luanda) to MO, 1 March 1976, political report: "Nekotorye voprosy voenno-politicheskoi i ekonomicheskoi obstanovki v Angole" [On Some Questions Concerning the Military-Political and Economic Situation in Angola], TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 9, d. 2513 (hereafter "Zverev report"), appendix. In looking at Cuban documents, Piero Gleijeses finds no trace of Soviet support for the airlift before January 1976.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*; Moorcraft, *African Nemesis*, 87-91.

<sup>48</sup> Zverev report, appendix; Moorcraft, *African Nemesis*, 90.

<sup>49</sup> Zverev report, pp. 13-23; V.N. Rykov (ambassador, Algiers) to MO, 20 December 1975, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, ll. 1-4; CPSU CC Secretariat card index, 197 meeting, 23 December 1975, TsKhSD. See also Moorcraft, *African Nemesis*, 90. The archive of the Soviet General Staff is still not open for scholarly research.

<sup>50</sup> Donald Rothchild and Caroline Hartzell, "The Case of Angola: Four Power Intervention and Disengagement," in Ariel E. Levite, Bruce W. Jentleson and Larry Berman, eds., *Foreign Military Intervention: The Dynamics of Protracted Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 163-208.

<sup>51</sup> B. Putilin (first secretary, Luanda) to MO, 27 March 1976, report: "O polozhenii v MPLA [On the Situation in the MPLA]," TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, ll. 29-34; Klinghoffer, *Angolan War*, 61-71.

<sup>52</sup> Stockwell, *In Search of Enemies*, 227-248; Fred Bridgland, *Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa* (London: Coronet Books, 1988), 174-181.

<sup>53</sup> Brutents in Lysebu transcript, pp. 76-77.

<sup>54</sup> Soviet embassy, Luanda, to MO, 15 May 1976, report on discussions during meeting between Raul Castro and Jorge Risquet (Cuba) and I.F. Ponomarenko and A.I. Dubenko (USSR Ministry of Defense), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513 (hereafter "Castro discussions"), ll. 42-48; on Vietnam, Mikhail Kapitsa, former vice-foreign minister, author's interview, Moscow, 7 September 1992. See also Galia Golan, *The Soviet Union and National Liberation Movements in the Third World* (New York: Unwin Hyman, 1988); Mark

Katz, *The Third World in Soviet Military Thought* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982); Neil Matheson, *The "Rules of the Game" of Superpower Military Intervention in the Third World, 1975-1980* (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1982).

<sup>55</sup> G.A. Zverev to MO, 1 March 1976, political report: "Nekotorye voprosy voenno-politicheskoi i ekonomicheskoi obstanovki v Angole" [On Some Questions Concerning the Military-Political and Economic Situation in Angola], TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 9, d. 2513, ll. 13-23, 15-16.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 23; Castro discussions, ll. 42-48. For the history of the Cuban-Soviet relationship, see Dominguez, *To Make a World Safe for Revolution*, 78-84.

<sup>57</sup> G.A. Zverev to MO, 1 March 1976, political report: "Nekotorye voprosy voenno-politicheskoi i ekonomicheskoi obstanovki v Angole" [On Some Questions Concerning the Military-Political and Economic Situation in Angola], TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 9, d. 2513, ll. 13-14; G.A. Zverev to MO, report on conversation, Raúl Valdés Vivó (Head, General Department for International Relations, Cuban Communist Party) - Zverev, 28 May 1976, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, ll. 53-54; Castro discussion, l. 45.

<sup>58</sup> B. Putilin (first secretary, Luanda) to MO, 27 March 1976, report: "O polozhenii v MPLA [On the Situation in the MPLA]," TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, ll. 29-34.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Soviet embassy, Luanda, to MO, 21 June 1976, Report: "Ob informatsionno-propagandistskoi rabote za II kvartal 1976 g." [On Information and Propaganda Work in the Second Quarter of 1976], TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, ll. 60-62. The embassy did, however, find it difficult to dispose of "several" sets of Lenin's collected works in French—not surprisingly, since more than 90 percent of all Angolans were illiterate and those who were able to read mostly did so in Portuguese.

<sup>61</sup> Castro discussions; F.D. Kudashkin (counsellor, Luanda) to MO, 30 July 1976, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, ll. 82-83. By the end of 1976 Soviet authorities were hard-pressed to find the Marxist-Leninist avant-garde in Angola. See N.P. Tolubeev (Soviet ambassador, Havana) to MO, 10 December 1976, memorandum of conversation Jorge Risquet - Tolubeev, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, ll. 121-123.

<sup>62</sup> On Fidel Castro: Marquez, "Operation Carlota," 1-2; Castro discussions, l. 46; G.A. Zverev to MO, 28 May 1976, memorandum of conversation, Raúl Valdés Vivó - Zverev, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513, ll. 49-54.

<sup>63</sup> Castro discussions, ll. 43, 47.

<sup>64</sup> Soviet embassy, Luanda, to MO, 15 August 1976, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 69, d. 2513.

<sup>65</sup> Philip Windsor, "Superpower Intervention," in Hedley Bull, ed., *Intervention in World Politics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 54. Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol, *Angola in the Front Line* (London: Zed, 1983), 85-99, is a generally reliable account of the Alves coup.

<sup>66</sup> George W. Breslauer, "Ideology and Learning in Soviet Third World Policy," *World Politics* 39 (April 1987), 429-48; Richard F. Herrmann, "Soviet Behavior In Regional Conflicts: Old Questions, New Strategies, and Important Lessons," *World Politics* 44: 3 (April 1992), 432-65;

Brutents in Lysebu transcript, p. 77.

<sup>67</sup> Morton Kaplan, "Intervention in Internal War," in James N. Rosenau, ed. *International Aspects of Civil Strife* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 110-11; Odd Arne Westad, "Rethinking Revolutions: The Cold War in the Third World," *Journal of Peace Research* 29:4 (1992), 455-64. See also Edward Kick and David Kiefer, "The Influence of the World System on War in the Third World," *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy* 7 (1987), 34-48; and Kick, "World System Properties and Military Intervention-Internal War Linkages," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 11 (1983), 185-208; Oran R. Young, "Intervention and International Systems," *Journal of International Affairs* 22:2 (1968).

<sup>68</sup> For other examples, see Alexei Vassiliev, *Russian Policy in the Middle East: From Messianism to Pragmatism* (Reading: Ithaca, 1993), and Margot Light, ed., *Troubled Friendships: Moscow's Third World Ventures* (London: British Academic Press, 1993).

<sup>69</sup> Charles Kupchan, "Getting In: The Initial Stage of Military Intervention," in Levite et al., eds., *Foreign Military Intervention*, 259. For Afghanistan, see Odd Arne Westad, "Prelude to Invasion: The Soviet Union and the Afghan Communists, 1978-1979," *International History Review* 1:1 (February 1994), 49-69.

<sup>70</sup> The possible exception is of course Vietnam, but even there it is unlikely that Soviet aid was decisive for the outcome (see Marilyn Young, *The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990* (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 232-253). On perceptions, see Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

<sup>71</sup> On Soviet foreign policy ideology, see Stephen Shenfield in *Ideology and Soviet Politics*, edited by Stephen White and Alex Pravda (London: Macmillan, 1988), 203-24.

## CWHP FELLOWSHIPS

The Cold War International History Project awards a limited number of fellowship for scholars from countries on "the other side" of the Cold War to conduct up to one year of archival research in the United States. Recipients are based at the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies, George Washington University, Washington, D.C. Applications should include: CV; letter of nomination and three letters of recommendation; research proposal, indicating topic to be investigated and sources to be utilized; writing samples in English welcomed, though not required. Applicants should have a working ability in English. Preference will be given to scholars who have not previously had an opportunity to do research in the United States. Applications may be sent or faxed to: David Wolff, Director; Cold War International History Project; Woodrow Wilson Center; 1000 Jefferson Dr. SW; Washington, D.C. 20560 USA; fax: (202) 357-4439.

## SOVIET DOCUMENTS ON ANGOLA AND SOUTHERN AFRICA, 1975-79

*Ed. note: Following are illustrations of Russian archival documents on Soviet policy toward Angola and Southern Africa in the 1970s. Most were culled from the files of the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation in Moscow (TsKhSD; the repository for records of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CC CPSU] from 1952 thru 1991) and declassified in early 1995 in connection with the "Carter-Brezhnev Project."*

*This international project, led by the the Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, organized a series of conferences bringing together former U.S. and Soviet officials, scholars, and newly-declassified documents to explore the reasons behind the collapse of superpower detente in the 1970s and its possible lessons for current and future Russian-American relations. (These documents were among a much larger collection specifically declassified by Russian authorities in preparation for a conference on superpower rivalry in the Third World held in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, in March 1995.)*

*The Cold War International History Project and the National Security Archive—a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository located at George Washington University—cooperated with the Carter-Brezhnev Project and played a major role in obtaining the release of these Russian documents and supporting the translation of some of them into English. The full set of photocopies of Russian, American, and East German documents obtained by the Project may be examined by interested researchers at the National Security Archive, which is located on the 7th floor of the Gelman Library, George Washington University, 2130 H St. NW, Washington, DC 20037; tel. (202) 994-7000; fax: (202) 994-7005.*

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**Soviet Ambassador to the People's Republic of Angola E.I. Afanasenko, Memorandum of Conversation with President of the Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola Agostinho Neto, 4 July 1975**

From the diary of  
E.I. Afanasenko

SECRET  
Copy No. 2  
Ser. No. 181  
21 July 1975

Record of Conference with  
President of MPLA Agostinho NETO  
4 July 1975

We received a visit from President of the MPLA Agostinho Neto. I informed him that the Central Committee of the CPSU was closely following the development of circumstances in Angola. The Soviet people are interested in the victory of democratic forces in Angola. In 1975, significant aid has been provided to the MPLA. Pursuant to instructions from the Central Committee of the CPSU, we had a conference with the President of the PRC [People's Republic of the Congo] M. Nguabi, in which the issue of rendering aid to the MPLA was discussed.

Neto thanked the Central Committee of the CPSU for the rendering of assistance. He stated that the leadership of the MPLA had recently expanded its contacts with governments of the African countries. In the course of these discussions, the MPLA is attempting to increase the number of its supporters in Africa. One of the immediate objectives of the MPLA is to prevent the discussion of the issue of Cabinda at the upcoming assembly concerned about the fact that this year [Ugandan leader] Idi Amin, who collaborates closely with [Zairian leader] Mobutu [Sese Seko], will become the Chairman of the OAU [Organization of African Unity]. We anticipate, said Neto, that the president of Uganda will come forward at the OAU assembly with a proposal to discuss the issue of Cabinda. Our meetings in Nigeria and our ongoing negotiations in the Congo with president M. Nguabi, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the KPT [the Russian acronym for the Congolese Workers' Party] A. Lopez, member of the Central Committee of the KPT Obami-Itu, and Foreign Minister [Charles-David] Ganao, said Neto, are directed to this very question.

Negotiations between the MPLA and the KPT are proceeding successfully. An agreement has been reached to maintain ongoing consultations between the MPLA and KPT with the aim of developing a common policy and the conduct of joint efforts in Africa and Angola. In order to enhance

propaganda efforts prior to the establishment of radio broadcasting facilities in the country, broadcast of the radio program "Struggle of Angola" will be resumed in Brazzaville.

The president of the MPLA stated that one of the main points in the negotiations with the KPT was the issue of Cabinda. The PRC made the decision not to support the demand of autonomy for Cabinda at the OAU assembly which had been advanced by the Congo and Zaire last February. As to the change of their position on the Cabinda question, the Congolese assured the MPLA delegation that they would terminate assistance to the nationalist Cabindi organization FLEC. Inasmuch as the parties had reached an agreement on the Cabinda issue, the PRC allowed the MPLA to use its territory for the transport of arms, military equipment and other cargo supplied to the Movement by the Soviet Union and other friendly countries. In addition, the Congolese confirmed their decision to close their land border with Cabinda for the MPLA. In order to export supplies to Angola, they allotted the port and airfield at Pointe-Noire. Transportation of cargo is to be carried out by the land and sea forces of the MPLA. Neto was outspoken in his appraisal of the results of the negotiations with the Congolese. He emphasized that the refusal of the Congo to support the Cabindi demand for autonomy represented an important step forward in the normalization of relations between the MPLA and the KPT.

The president of the MPLA proceeded to characterize the domestic situation in Angola. He pointed out that the existence of three national liberation movements in the country was creating a favorable opportunity for reactionary forces in the country, which in turn was leading to a further intensification of political, social, and economic conflicts. Neto pointed to two groups of reactionary forces acting against Angola. The first group he attributed to domestic Portuguese reactionaries. This group is fomenting tensions in the country and provoking a mass emigration of the white population from Angola. The departure of large numbers of technical specialists has resulted in serious damage to the country's economy. The white reactionaries are capitalizing on the support of the present Supreme Commissar of Angola and a large portion of the Portuguese officers. The second group of reactionary forces consists of foreign reac-

tionaries. Neto also included the FNLA in that group.

The president of the MPLA said that the military conflict which took place last June demonstrated the strength of the MPLA's military detachments. Notwithstanding the numerical superiority of the FNLA's forces, the MPLA is no weaker than the FNLA in military terms. Neto declared that the MPLA commands great political influence in the country which is continuing to grow. At the same time, he acknowledged that two northwest provinces of Angola have been controlled by the FNLA since last June. In addition, UNITA commands major influence in Bie and the surrounding regions, where a large portion of the country's population lives.

Neto characterized UNITA as an organization representing the interests of white farmers with reactionary leanings. However, UNITA does not command significant military forces and is attempting to play a role as an intermediary between the MPLA and the FNLA. The president of the MPLA spoke in favor of a tactical alliance with UNITA. The desirability of such an alliance was advocated to the leadership of the MPLA by numerous heads of African governments, first and foremost, by the PRC.

The president of the MPLA expressed doubts about fulfillment of all the agreements signed in Nakuru (Kenya). One of the reasons for the likely breakdown of those agreements is the aggression of the FNLA, which is unlikely to give up its armed provocations. All of this, Neto emphasized, requires the MPLA to continue the development of its armed forces. In this connection it is counting on aid from the Soviet Union. The MPLA has decided to address the Central Committee of the CPSU with a request to furnish additional military and financial aid. At the end of this July, an MPLA delegation will be dispatched to the USSR, headed by member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the MPLA Iko Kareira (commander in chief of the MPLA).

Neto reported that last June, a delegation of the MPLA visited the PRC [People's Republic of China] at the invitation of the Chinese government. Zambia, Tanzania, and the PRC [People's Republic of the Congo] also took part in the organization of that trip. In the course of negotiations in the PRC, the Chinese assured their delegation that they would terminate all forms of

military aid to all three Angolan national liberation movements until the granting of independence to Angola.

I thanked the president of the MPLA for the interesting information. I promised to communicate to the Central Committee of the CPSU the request of the MPLA to furnish additional military and financial aid.

The conference was attended by members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the MPLA Lucio Lara and Jose Eduardo, member of the governing council of the MPLA Pedro Van-Dunen, as well as the first Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in the PRC Comrade B. G. Putilin.

Ambassador of the USSR to the  
People's Republic of the Congo  
/s/ E. Afanasenko

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 68, d. 1962, ll. 157-159.]

**Soviet Ambassador to the People's  
Republic of Angola B.S. Vorobiev,  
Memorandum of Conversation with  
President A. Neto, 4 September 1976**

From the diary of                      SECRET  
B.S. VOROBIEV                      Copy No. 1  
   Ser. No. 286

Record of Conversation with  
President of PRAA. NETO

4 September 1976

On 4 September 1976, I visited President A. Neto at his invitation.

Neto inquired as to whether any information had been received from Moscow regarding the Soviet position on issues relating to the national liberation movement in southern Africa, and whether that information could be imparted to him, if possible, in connection with the upcoming meeting of the presidents from five countries (Angola, Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, and Botswana), scheduled for September 15.

I said to him in general that no information had yet been received. Based on materials received from the center [Moscow], I told him about the ongoing conference in Moscow of delegations from three national liberation movements from southern Africa.

For my part, I asked the president to

share his thoughts in connection with the upcoming meeting and requested his assessment of conditions in the national liberation movement and of the position of other African countries. Neto reported that it had been determined to hold the meeting of the five presidents ahead of schedule (that is, not on September 15 as referenced above), and that in just two hours he was flying to Dar-es-Salaam. The principal theme of the meeting would be the meeting between [U.S. Secretary of State Henry A.] Kissinger and [South African Prime Minister John] Vorster and its implications for Africa. He, Neto, still did not know exactly what position to propose at the meeting, what policy to adopt. This being his first opportunity for participation in this sort of a conference (Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique and Botswana have already met repeatedly on these issues), it is apparent that Neto needs to hear the opinions of his colleagues at the meeting, and only after that will he be in a position to formulate his position. For example, it is not entirely clear to Neto why the participation and assistance of Kissinger is necessary. He also does not understand the inconsistency of [Zambian] President [Kenneth] Kaunda on the issue of the intermediating role of Kissinger in contacts with Vorster.

Neto indicated further that, lacking a full understanding of the positions held by Tanzania and the other participants in the conference, he is presently having difficulty articulating any concepts on these issues, although after his return from the meeting, these issues will be clearer to him, and he expects to be able to inform us about them, so they can be communicated to Moscow.

In the course of our discussion I informed the president about the response received from Moscow regarding the attitude of the Angolan side toward the issue of the situation in the South Atlantic, conveyed through the Soviet Ambassador by [Angolan] Prime Minister Lopo do Nascimento.

President Neto expressed his appreciation for the speedy response. He declared his full agreement with all of the positions held by the Soviet side and emphasized that, in the recent past, new facts had emerged indicating an increased interest by the USA in the ROZM [Republic of Cape Verde] and by France in the DRSTP [Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe].

The president further stated that the Politburo of the MPLA, by special dispensation, had empowered Politburo member and Prime Minister Lopo do Nascimento, with responsibility for all important issues of foreign policy, to prepare additional proposals on the issue over further development of contacts by the PRA with Sao-Tome and Principe. He requested the Soviet Ambassador to provide him with detailed positions of the Soviet side on the issue over the situation in the South Atlantic and relations of Lopo do Nascimento with the ROZM and the DRSTP.

Neto stated his desire for a continual exchange of information between the PRA and the USSR on international questions, in particular those concerning the situation in Africa and the South Atlantic. He stated that he intended to address these questions in his conferences in Moscow.

USSR AMBASSADOR TO THE  
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA  
/s/ B. VOROBIEV

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 65, d. 2513, ll. 100-101.]

**Soviet Ambassador to Angola,  
V.P. Loginov, Memorandum of  
Conversation with candidate-member  
of the Politburo Secretary of the CC  
MPLA-PT for international issues  
P. Luvualu, 27 June 1978**

From the journal of                      SECRET  
V.P. Loginov                      Copy no. 2 re: no. 222  
   20 July 1978

RECORD OF CONVERSATION  
with candidate-member of the Politburo  
Secretary of the CC of the MPLA-PT for  
international issues  
P. LUVUALU

27 June 1978

[I] visited candidate-member of the Politburo, Secretary of the CC of the MPLA-PT [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola—Partido Trabalho] for international issues, P. Luvualu at his invitation.

P. Luvualu informed me that at the current time the leadership of the People's Republic of Angola has sent several delegations to various African countries in order

to explain the Angolan position with regard to Zaire and to gather information on the real nature of the events in the Zairian province of Shaba. The delegations should once again underscore that neither Angola, nor the Soviet Union, nor Cuba bear any relation to the events in the province of Shaba, and that these events are an internal Zairian problem.

The Secretary of the CC MPLA-PT declared that there are objective factors which facilitate the continual occurrence of conflicts and tension in this region. The colonizers, when they drew the borders between states, did not take into account the ethnic make-up of the population. As a result, the significant nationality of the Lunda was broken up and in the current time lives in three countries — Zaire, Angola and Zambia. Moreover, at the current time there are over 250,000 Zairian refugees in Angola, who are mainly of the Lunda nationality and among them from 20,000 to 30,000 are former soldiers, the so-called Katanga gendarmes. After the war of independence, the central authorities in Zaire began to persecute members of the Lunda nationality who lived in the province of Shaba. Unlawful arrests took place as well as the execution of Zairian soldiers of the Lunda nationality.

It is necessary to take into account the fact that the province of Shaba is the richest of all Zairian provinces and provides a significant part of the hard-currency goods which enter the country, and that some of the largest foreign monopolies have invested capital in the exploitation of the natural resources of the province.

The catastrophic condition of the Zairian economy, the dizzying rise of prices, the corruption which has enveloped the whole machinery of state, including the army, the unbearably serious condition of the population, particularly of national minorities and the greater part of the military, aggravates the conflict between the Kinshasa government and the Lunda nationality, and lead to the revolts which occur from time to time among the soldiers of Lunda nationality in the Zairian army. During moments of acute conflict the Lunda refugees in Angola seek to assist their fellow-tribesmen in the province of Shaba. Moreover, all of the refugees in Angola, it goes without saying, would like to return to their homeland in Zaire. It is practically impossible to control the movement of

groups of Lunda nationality from Angola into Zaire and back, since the border between Angola and Zaire stretches out for approximately two thousand kilometers.

P. Luvualu underscored that Mobutu, in every instance when an internal conflict arises, strives by using false pretexts, to internationalize it. The Secretary of the CC MPLA-PT [referred to] the interference of Western powers—the members of NATO in the previous conflict in the province of Shaba and their proposal to create an inter-African armed force which would be used not only to resolve the current tasks of putting down the revolt of the Lunda nationality, [but also for] the preservation of the Mobutu regime, and the possibility for foreign monopolies to continue to exploit the resources of the province of Shaba.

The fact, declared P. Luvualu, that the Republic of South Africa has expressed a desire to take part in the inter-African forces confirms our evaluation of the neo-colonial nature of these forces. This evaluation is also confirmed by the fact that China has sent military instructors to Zaire and has offered equipment for arming the inter-African forces.

In the estimation of P. Luvualu, this issue concerns armed forces of international imperialism which are being created by NATO with the aim of supporting reactionary, unpopular regimes in Africa as well as supporting the struggle against progressive African countries and national liberation movements.

The long term goals of the Western countries consist of strengthening the position of NATO in the central part of Africa in order to break through to the Indian Ocean, i.e. for the neo-colonial conquest of Africa.

The Secretary of the CC MPLA-PT declared that the evaluation by the Angolan leadership of the events in Zaire is confirmed likewise by the resolution of the Western countries to offer Kinshasa economic assistance. The Western countries, as is well known, as a condition for granting such assistance demanded, first, a reform of the management of the Zairian economy and finances according to which representatives of the USA, France, Belgium, and the Federal Republic of Germany would have full control over the economy, finances, and the actions of the administrative apparatus from top to bottom. Secondly, they put forward a demand for the recon-

ciliation of the central Kinshasa authorities with the Lunda nationality in order that foreign monopolies might without resistance exploit the wealth of the province of Shaba. And, finally, the Western countries persist in seeking the reconciliation of Zaire with Angola in order to renew the transport of natural resources from the province of Shaba along the Benguela railroad.

P. Luvualu remarked in this connection that the president of the People's Republic of Angola, A. Neto, in his declaration of July 9, announced that the Zairian refugees will be led from the Zairian borders into the interior of Angola, that Angola will disarm the detachments of the FNLC [Front for the National Liberation of the Congo] which retreat from the province of Shaba into Angola, and that the Angolan government proposes that Zaire, in turn, draw off the UNITA, FNLA, and FLEC bases away from the Angolan border. The President of the People's Republic of Angola in this announcement also underscored that the refugees may live in any country according to their choice. This position, said P. Luvualu, is in complete accordance with the charter of the Organization of African Unity and international law.

Then the Secretary of the CC MPLA-PT raised the problem of Namibia. He informed us that, in appraising the aggression of the Republic of South Africa toward Angola at Cassinga, immediately following the important victory of SWAPO [Southwest African People's Organization] in the UN, the Angolan leadership came to the conclusion that the aggressive actions of the Republic of South Africa were made in pursuit of the following goals: to weaken SWAPO and force it to accept the plan of the 5 Western powers for Namibia; to gain time, in order to create in Namibia a puppet political force which would be able to counter SWAPO; to scare the People's Republic of Angola and weaken Angolan support for SWAPO.

P. Luvualu remarked that events had fully confirmed the correctness of this appraisal of the Angolan leadership. For example, in the present time in Namibia, the Republic of South Africa has created the so-called democratic party with the help of the renegade [Andrea] Chipanga and the so-called National Front of Namibia. Vorster feverishly attempts to prepare elections, which are falsified from the very beginning,

and to achieve an internal settlement on the model of the internal settlement of Rhodesia with the aid of puppets like Chipanga.

The Secretary of the CC MPLA-PT declared that the People's Republic of Angola will continue to support SWAPO. The Angolan leadership, he said, considers that for the peaceful resolution of the Namibian problem the Republic of South Africa should: officially define a deadline for the transfer of Walvis Bay to the authorities of Namibia, after declaring the independence of that country; for a period of transition draw off its troops, which are now concentrated on the border with Angola, to bases in the South of Namibia; immediately liberate all political prisoners in Namibia. P. Luvualu likewise remarked that Angola concurs with the proposed role of the UN in the transitional period in Namibia.

In conclusion P. Luvualu underscored that the maneuvers of Western countries around Angola will not succeed in forcing the MPLA-PT to turn from the path it has chosen. We, he declared, have made a firm and final choice of friends. This is the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other socialist countries. With the assistance and support of socialist states, and first and foremost of the Soviet Union and Cuba, Angola will follow its chosen path.

[I] thanked the Secretary of the CC MPLA-PT for this information. From my side I handed him the text of the Declaration of the Soviet Government on Africa (in Portuguese). I underscored that this is an important political action in defense of the independence of African governments, in the solidarity of the USSR in the struggle of the peoples of the continent against the imperialist interference in their affairs. I noted that the appraisal contained in it of the situation in Africa coincides with the position of the People's Republic of Angola. Then I gave him a translation into Portuguese of the Pravda article regarding the external policies of the USA.

I handed [him] a film on the first congress of the MPLA-PT and the sojourn in the People's Republic of Angola of the Soviet party delegation headed by Comrade A.P. Kirilenko.

P. Luvualu expressed his gratitude to the Soviet government for its unflagging support of progressive forces in Africa. He said that he would immediately bring the text of the Declaration to the attention of

the leadership of the People's Republic of Angola. He likewise expressed his gratitude for the gift of the CC CPSU.

In the course of our exchange of opinions on international problems P. Luvualu asked that I give information about the situation in South Yemen after the unsuccessful government coup.

Embassy advisor S. S. Romanov was present during this discussion.

USSR AMBASSADOR TO THE  
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA  
/s/ V. LOGINOV

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 75, d. 1148, ll. 71-75; translated by Sally Kux; copy on file at National Security Archive.]

**Memorandum of Conversation between  
Minister-counselor of the Soviet  
Embassy in Havana M. Manasov and  
Cuban Communist Party CC member  
Raul Valdes Vivo, 7 May 1979**

From the journal of SECRET  
M.A. Manasov copy no. 3  
re: no 265  
"24" May 1979

RECORD OF DISCUSSION  
with member of the CC  
Com[munist]Party of Cuba  
comr. Raul Valdes Vivo

7 May 1979

I met with R.V. Vivo in the CC of the Party and, referring to the instructions of the Soviet ambassador, informed him of the discussion in the International Section of the CC CPSU with the members of the Executive Committee of the Jamaican People's National Party (PNP).

R.V. Vivo, having thanked me for the information, noted the significance of this meeting, which will enable the development of the connection between the CPSU and the PNP and, first and foremost, opens the possibility for the preparation of PNP cadres in the Soviet Union.

Then, in the course of the discussion, R.V. Vivo spoke about his recent trip to several African countries, which was carried out on the orders of F. Castro. This trip was undertaken, continued my interlocutor, because of the fact that the information which

we had received from our embassies in a number of African countries is of a subjective nature. In this connection I [Valdes Vivo] was given the task of becoming acquainted with the situation on location, to have discussions with the leaders of Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Nigeria, and likewise with the Soviet ambassadors in these countries, in order to receive more complete and more objective information about the state of affairs in southern Africa.

I was tasked, he said, to convey to J[oshua]. Nkomo [leader of the Zimbabwe African Political Union, ZAPU] and R. Mugabe [leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union, ZANU], that Cuba is unable to satisfy their request to send pilots for the repulsion of air attacks on the training camps for the Patriotic Front armed forces; to clarify the possibility of unified action between ZAPU and ZANU; to lay out before their leaders and the leadership of the front-line governments the Cuban plan for the creation of a provisional government in Zimbabwe.

R.V. Vivo meanwhile remarked that in Angola at first there had not been clear cooperation between Cuba and the USSR, whereas in Ethiopia our countries have achieved the full coordination of our joint actions. The policy of Cuba and the Soviet Union with regard to southern Africa should likewise be coordinated, he underscored.

My interlocutor laid out the essence of the Cuban plan, which is summarized as follows. The declaration of a provisional government in Zimbabwe is realized not in exile, but in a part of the liberated territory of the country; J. Nkomo is proposed for the post of president of the country, R. Mugabe for prime minister; the program platform of the provisional government provides for the realization of a series of social-economic transformations, secures the interests of those countries which recognize its government; the rights of the white part of the population are guaranteed, elections are planned for the legislative organs of the country; constitutional guarantees are proclaimed, etc.

According to the words of R.V. Vivo, J. Nkomo and R. Mugabe have agreed with this plan, as have the leaders of the front-line states. The provisional government, in the estimation of the Cuban side, would possibly be recognized at first by 30 coun-

tries.

The active interference of England in the affairs of Zambia may ensure the victory of the puppet government, which would possibly lead to a conflict between ZANU and ZAPU if the unity of their actions are not achieved, noted my interlocutor.

He reported that the armed forces of the ZANU and the ZAPU include in total 24 thousand people (12 thousand in each organization), but unfortunately, these forces are as yet inactive. In the ranks of mercenaries there are 3 thousand blacks and 2 thousand whites.

R.V. Vivo briefly set forth the content of his discussion with the Soviet ambassador in Mozambique. According to his words, during the discussion of the situation in southern Africa, our ambassador noted that according to the theory of Marxism-Leninism, it is impossible to accelerate events in a country where there is not a revolutionary situation and where there is not civilization. "To that I responded in jest to the Soviet ambassador," said R.V. Vivo, "that if comrades L.I. Brezhnev and F. Castro decide that our countries will take part in the operations in Rhodesia, then we will participate in them."

By my request R.V. Vivo briefly informed me about the work of the last plenum of the CC Company of Cuba. He reported that the plenum summed up the fulfillment of the resolutions of the First Party Congress, revealed the deficiencies in the development of the national economy of the country, and set its course to overcome them. In view of the fact that the project for the resolution of the plenum on the given question did not reflect all aspects of the economic situation, the corresponding section of the CC of the Party was tasked with its reworking and with its publication.

With regard to the resolution of the plenum of the CC concerning the appointment of Lionel Soto [Prieto] as a member of the Secretariat of the CC of the Party, R.V. Vivo spoke very highly of him ("He is no Garcia Pelaes," he said) and reported, that L. Soto will be occupied with the issues of the party leadership of the country's economy; along the party line he is tasked with responsibility for Khuseplan, the National Bank, GKES [State Committee for Economic Cooperation], and other central organs of the national economy.

COUNSELLOR-MINISTER OF THE  
EMBASSY OF THE USSR  
IN THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA  
/s/ M. MANASOV

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 76, d. 834, ll. 82-84.]

**Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo  
Meeting, 18 October 1979 (excerpt)**

[...]

9. Telegram from Havana Spec[ial]. #  
741 and 744

SUSLOV. Comrades, you have read these telegrams. In one of them a question is raised that in a conversation with our ambassador, Raul Castro told about difficulties that had emerged with regard to replacement of the Cuban troops in Ethiopia. In the second conversation Raul Castro said the Angolans in all probability would appeal [probably to us] with a request to take over the maintainance [i.e., costs—trans.] of the Cuban troops in Angola. Secondly, he said that the Angolans treat the Cuban representatives rather tactlessly.

The next question concerned the assistance with arms to SWAPO. He remarked, that Soviet comrades assist SWAPO with arms but the SWAPO men absolutely do not fight and do not want to fight. Then one wonders, why we should help them with weapons[?] In one word, there are a number of very important principled questions which we should consider. I think that we should order the Defense Ministry and the International Department of the CC to consider these questions advanced in these telegrams, taking into account the exchange of opinions that took place at the meeting of the Politburo, [and] the proposals will be introduced to the CC.

ALL. Agreed.

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 25, dok. 6, ll. 1-1; copy obtained by David Wolff; translation by Vladislav M. Zubok.]

**ZUBOK, PLESHAKOV  
WIN GELBER PRIZE**

The Cold War International History Project congratulates Vladislav M. Zubok and Constantine M. Pleshakov, two Russian historians who have been associated with the Project since its inception, for receiving the 1996 Lionel Gelber Prize for their book, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev*, published by Harvard University Press. Zubok is currently based at the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository located at George Washington University; Pleshakov lives in Moscow, where he until recently worked as a researcher at the USA/Canada Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences.

Established in 1989, the \$50,000 Lionel Gelber Prize, given by a Foundation named for the late Canadian diplomat, historian, and writer, is awarded annually to the winning author of a non-fiction book in the field of foreign relations. It was presented to Zubok and Pleshakov in Toronto on 7 October 1996. The jury citation read:

"Zubok and Pleshakov, two members of the young generation of Russian historians, have mined recently available documents to provide new insights into the inner workings of the Kremlin during the critical postwar period. Theirs is a significant contribution to the literature: a fresh and superbly researched appraisal of the ideological, strategic and human foundations of the Cold War, from the Soviet side. This is a praiseworthy book in the best traditions of what Lionel Gelber sought to encourage on behalf of readers everywhere: impressive without being intimidating; learned without being impenetrable; engaging without being superficial."

# ANATOMY OF A THIRD WORLD COLD WAR CRISIS: NEW EAST-BLOC EVIDENCE ON THE HORN OF AFRICA, 1977-1978

*Editor's Note: The Russian and East German documents presented below illuminate the "other side"—other sides, really—of one of the key events that hastened the collapse of U.S.-Soviet detente in the mid-1970s: the Horn of Africa Crisis of 1977-78, in which a regional rivalry between Ethiopia and Somalia, as well as domestic political instability in both countries, became entangled with super-power rivalry and competition for influence in the Third World. While Ethiopia and Somalia had a long-standing dispute over their borders, the immediate causes of the crisis dated to 1974, when a leftist revolution overthrew Ethiopian leader Emperor Haile Selassie, who had been a pillar of Western influence for decades, and to early February 1977, when the Ethiopian revolution took a more militant course when Haile Mengistu Mariam seized control of the ruling "Derg" and eliminated his chief rivals for power, including Teferi Bante, the revolution's erstwhile leader.*

*The Ethiopian Revolution opened up new possibilities for the Soviet Union to expand its influence in the region, where its chiefly had been Somalia, with whom it had concluded a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. As the documents show, the Soviet Union and its allies, notably Cuban leader Fidel Castro, attempted persistently to keep both Ethiopia and Somalia within the socialist camp. This, in practice, meant trying to damp down Ethiopian-Somali hostility and, in particular, the territorial ambitions of Somali leader Mohammed Siad Barre, who claimed that ethnic Somalis were being persecuted in the Ogaden region of eastern Ethiopia and deserved liberation and incorporation into Somalia proper. In the course of trying to mediate the dispute, Moscow and Havana found that appeals to socialist international solidarity could only go so far in overcoming deep-seated national and even tribal disagreements.*

*Still—as demonstrated by a relatively cordial discussion between U.S. and Soviet diplomats in Addis Ababa in early 1977—the simmering regional hot-spot did not erupt into a full-blown superpower clash until the late summer, when Somalia launched an offensive to capture the Ogaden from Ethiopia. By then, sensing that the Ethiopian leadership was tilting toward Moscow, both the Siad Barre regime in Mogadishu and the Carter Administration in Washington were exploring the possibility of improving U.S.-Somali ties to the detriment of the Soviet Union, and Siad Barre evidently believed that Washington had flashed him at least a dim green light to attack Ethiopia (a claim which U.S. officials denied).*

*The Somali attacks of July-August 1977, shattering a Soviet mediation effort then taking place in Moscow, quickly achieved major success at thrusting into Ethiopian territory; by September-October, Somali or Somali-backed forces had captured most of the Ogaden. The Somali advances prompted desperate pleas from Mengistu for Soviet-bloc military support, and at some point that fall the Soviet Union and Cuba, which had already been providing some weapons to the Derg, decided that it would be unacceptable to allow Ethiopia—a strategically significant country seemingly poised to become an important member of the socialist bloc—to suffer a military defeat at the hands of a country (Somalia) which despite protestations of socialist orientation seemed to be quickly shifting into the "imperialist" camp.*

*The decision by Moscow and Havana to come to Mengistu's rescue became evident between November 1977 and February 1978, as Soviet planes and ships transported roughly 15,000 Cuban troops and large supplies of Soviet weaponry, and a USSR military mission led by Gen. Vasilii I. Petrov helped direct Ethiopian-Cuban military activities. The massive Soviet-Cuban airlift spurred an Ethiopian counter-offensive which evicted Somali forces from the Ogaden and entrenched the Mengistu regime in power.*

*At the same time, these developments cemented both Somalia's defection from the Soviet-bloc (in November, Mogadishu abrogated a 1974 Somali-Soviet friendship treaty) and Ethiopia's dependence on that same Soviet-bloc for military aid, and elevated the conflict to a superpower crisis, as Washington charged Moscow with employing Cuban proxy forces to expand its influence in Africa. Moscow and Havana maintained that they had only helped Ethiopia defend itself from a U.S.-backed assault from Somalia (and various "reactionary" Arab countries supporting it), whereas Carter Administration hardliners (notably National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski) asserted that the Horn crisis, coming on the heels of the Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola, revealed a rising international assertiveness on the Kremlin's part, a danger requiring a tough American response—if not a direct military involvement to stem the Soviet-Cuban recapture of the Ogaden (or a perceived threat to Somalia), then in the form of a closer relationship with the People's Republic of China, the USSR's bitter communist foe.*

*This new dispute between the USSR and United States flared up in late 1977 just as it seemed that, after a rocky start, the Carter and Brezhnev leaderships were finally beginning to make some progress toward improving relations, and, most importantly, toward conclud-*

ing a SALT II treaty. Instead of finishing up the arms control treaty—which the Soviets had made a prerequisite for a Carter-Brezhnev summit meeting which the American leader eagerly desired—the Horn Crisis exacerbated superpower tensions and, just as important, seemed to tilt the balance of power within the Carter Administration away from Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance, who stressed reaching agreements with Moscow, and toward Brzezinski, who favored “linkage” between progress toward bilateral accords and Soviet behavior in the Third World. The charges and countercharges between Washington and Moscow, along with disagreements on other areas such as human rights, the Middle East (where the Kremlin accused Washington of backing off an agreed-approach in favor of backing a bilateral Egyptian-Israeli accord), and relations with China, helped stall progress in the SALT II negotiations and generally embitter U.S.-Soviet relations in the first half of 1978. Thus was it said that SALT, or more generally detente, “lies buried in the sands of Ogaden.”

Exploring why the U.S.-Soviet detente of the mid-1970s was side-tracked by such seemingly obscure and peripheral issues as the regional crisis in the Horn of Africa was one purpose of the “Carter-Brezhnev Project.” Spearheaded by Dr. James G. Blight of the Center for Foreign Policy Development at the Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University, the Carter-Brezhnev Project gathered scholars, former Soviet and American officials, and newly-released documentation for a series of oral history conferences to examine the reasons behind the collapse of detente, and whether those events suggested any lessons for current and future Russian-American relations. Among the scholarly organizations supporting the Project’s efforts to obtain fresh evidence from American, Russian, and other archives were the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository based at George Washington University, and the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), based at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C.

In this issue of the CWIHP Bulletin, we are pleased to present a sampling of the Russian and East German documents on the 1977-78 Horn of Africa Crisis that were gathered for the Carter-Brezhnev conference on U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the Third World, held in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, on 23-26 March 1995. (A much smaller selection was included in a briefing book assembled by the National Security Archive and CWIHP for use during the conference.)

Both the Russian and East German documents were obtained and translated via the collective efforts of the National Security Archive, CWIHP, and the CFPD. Most of the Russian documents printed below emanated from the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD in its Russian acronym), the repository for the post-1952 records of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU), located in the former Central Committee headquarters in Old Square in Moscow; some additional documents came from the Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF); all were specially declassified by Russian authorities for the Carter-Brezhnev Project. For their assistance in working out the details of locating and obtaining these materials, CWIHP would like to thank N.G. Tomilina, Director of TsKhSD, and her staff, and Vladislav M. Zubok and Malcolm Byrne of the National Security Archive.

The East German documents printed below are drawn from a larger collection obtained from the East Berlin-based archive of the former ruling party of the German Democratic Republic, the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), and translated from German, by Christian F. Ostermann, a researcher based at the National Security Archive and the incoming CWIHP Associate Director. These East German documents include reports of communications with Soviet and Cuban officials—including a lengthy excerpt from the transcript of an April 1977 conversation between East German leader Erich Honecker and visiting Cuban leader Fidel Castro, who had recently attempted a mediation effort between Somalia and Ethiopia—and accounts of an abortive East German effort in 1978 to mediate the ongoing dispute between the central Ethiopian government and the separatist Eritrean guerrilla movement. As with the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia, both contestants in the Ethiopia-Eritrea clash professed allegiance to socialism, and Moscow hoped to subsume their differences in order to consolidate an anti-Western bloc on the Horn of Africa.

All of the photocopied Russian and East German documents printed below, and many other, still-untranslated East-bloc documents (as well as declassified U.S. government documents) concerning the Horn Crisis, are on file and available for scholarly research at the National Security Archive. The Archive is located on the 7th floor of the Gelman Library, 2130 H St. NW, Washington, DC 20037, and can be reached at (202) 994-7000 (telephone); (202) 994-7005 (fax); and [nsarchiv@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu](mailto:nsarchiv@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu) (e-mail).

To assess the significance of these materials for understanding the Horn of Africa Crisis, the CWIHP Bulletin has solicited commentaries from three scholars: **Ermias Abebe**, an Ethiopian-born scholar who obtained his Master’s degree at Moscow State University and recently received his Ph.D. from the University of Maryland, has completed a dissertation on Soviet foreign policy in the Third World in the 1970s, using Russian, American, and Ethiopian sources; **Paul B. Henze**, author of *The Horn of Africa from War to Peace* (Macmillan, 1991) and during the Carter Administration a staff member of the National Security Council, and currently a researcher affiliated with the Washington, D.C.-office of the Rand Corporation; and **Christian F. Ostermann**, currently completing a dissertation for the University of Hamburg on U.S.-East German relations in the 1950s, is a researcher based at the National Security Archive and the incoming CWIHP Associate Director. Their commentaries begin below, preceding the section of translated East-bloc documents.

In the future, CWIHP hopes to organize additional activities, including a scholarly conference or workshop, to gather further sources and perspectives on the international history of the Horn of Africa Crisis. These would include still-missing pieces of the puzzle from the Russian and American archives, materials from the region such as Ethiopia and Somalia, and, if possible, Cuban records that could clarify Havana’s actions and motivations during the crisis.

—James G. Hershberg

# THE HORN, THE COLD WAR, AND DOCUMENTS FROM THE FORMER EAST-BLOC: AN ETHIOPIAN VIEW

by Ermias Abebe

The materials presented here as part of a collection of recently declassified documents from the former Eastern bloc *begin* to shed invaluable light on the intricacies and evolution of former Soviet, East German, and Cuban interpretations of and influence on the politics of the Horn of Africa between 1977-1978. The word *begin* is emphasized because, at the same time, these documents are far from comprehensive in that a number of very critical events and developments during this period find scant or no mention. Some of these issues will be mentioned in this commentary. Nevertheless, reviewing these documents, it will be difficult indeed to underplay the crucial significance of the East-West standoff which served as the context in which the former USSR and its allies comprehended and attempted to shape the politics of the region. Ultimately, this prism led to the gradual choice of cultivating close ties and rendering decisive support to the military government in Ethiopia beginning in 1976. In turn, this choice molded that regime and guaranteed its survival until 1991 when only the end of the Cold War and diminished Soviet support coupled with the Eritrean and Tigrean liberation front victories led to its collapse.

The publication of these documents should therefore serve as a valuable stimulus for international scholarship on superpower involvement in Africa during the Cold War and also arouse scholars on Ethiopia in particular to reexamine and enrich conventional wisdom about the political history of the Mengistu era. Furthermore, the fact that the country now has a completely different leadership which is not tainted with the atrocities of Mengistu and the Derg means, at least theoretically, that it will have nothing to lose by collaborating in international research efforts and releasing pertinent documents from Ethiopian archives (unlike Angola for example). On the contrary, such a col-

laboration would not only enable the new Ethiopia to take deserved credit from the international scholarly community, but also to reap the intellectual reward of a better understanding of a regime that it fought so gallantly and with immense sacrifice to topple.

My specific comments on these documents will focus on three major themes—Soviet influence on: (a) the military regime; (b) the Ethio-Somali war and; (c) the Eritrean secessionist movement.

## I. Soviet relations with the PMAC

Soviet interest in winning a position of strength on the Horn of Africa dates from the 1960s. Probably, the major explanations are related to the area's strategic value. First, two important international confrontations cut across the Horn: the Arab-Israeli conflict, and the Sino-Soviet rivalry, whose geographic expression involved the whole area stretching from the Western Pacific, to Southeast and South Asia, and into the Indian Ocean littoral. Also, the Horn's strategic location along East-West communication and transportation routes enables it to serve as a critical vantage point to command or interdict oil shipments from the Middle East and elsewhere. Furthermore, in the post-colonial setting, newly liberated African states had increasingly become targets for Marxist-Leninist ideological expansion to alienate "Western imperialist states." As Soviet leader Leonid I. Brezhnev had once remarked, "Africa [had become] a main field of battle for communism."<sup>1</sup> Moreover, in one of the documents published here, Cuba's Fidel Castro reinforces this idea in an April 1977 meeting with his East German counterpart, Erich Honecker, by stating that "in Africa we can inflict a severe defeat on the entire reactionary imperialist policy. We can free Africa from the influence of the USA and of the Chinese . . . Ethiopia has a great revolutionary potential . . . So there is a great counterweight to [Egyptian President Anwar] Sadat's betrayal in Egypt . . . We must have an integrated strategy for the whole African continent." Thus, the Soviet Union along with its

allies apparently hoped to anchor themselves firmly on the Horn in an attempt to position themselves to play important political and/or military roles in the whole volatile region.

Nevertheless, at the beginning of the Ethiopian Revolution in 1974, Moscow was slow to react to the overthrow of imperial rule and the military takeover in Addis Ababa led by the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) or Derg. This hesitancy might be explained by a legitimate Soviet reluctance to antagonize Somalia, especially in light of recent setbacks the Sudan and Egypt, where Moscow had lost influence in spite of massive economic and military aid to these countries. It must be remembered here that Somalia had a territorial dispute with Ethiopia over the Ogaden and that the USSR, at this time, had already cultivated a strong presence in Somalia. That presence was cemented with Gen. Mohammed Said Barre's successful military coup in October 1969 after which he turned his country's orientation sharply toward Moscow, signing a Soviet-Somali Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1974. Under the treaty, the Somali government was generously supplied with military aid and the Soviets acquired access to the strategic port of Berbera. With all this at stake, Moscow had reason to be prudent in assessing the PMAC's reliability before considering a new commitment.

The PMAC, on the other hand, had two serious problems of its own which inhibited it from seeking an immediate embrace from Moscow. One was that initially it was unclear about its ideological preference and international orientation. An illuminating account of this confusion is provided by Major Dawit Wolde Giorgis, a high ranking official of the military regime who later defected to the United States and wrote a book. In it he stated that the PMAC was so "ignorant in the realm of ideology that at one point in the early stage of the revolution delegations were sent to Tanzania, Yugoslavia, China, and India to shop for one for Ethiopia."<sup>2</sup> It is important to note that the Soviet Union was apparently not even considered as a possible source of ideological

inspiration by the military rulers at an early stage.

The other problem was that the Council engaged in three major successive rounds of bloody power struggles before Mengistu emerged as the uncontested leader. In providing a very short account of these struggles, an important point to underline at the outset is that unlike some of the contenders he ultimately managed to annihilate, Mengistu had neither educational exposure to nor interest in communist ideology and/or the Soviet Union prior to the PMAC's formation. As he admitted in one interview, his first encounter with Russians happened only after the revolution. Perhaps one of his phenomenal abilities lay in his capacity to understand quickly and adopt new ideas when they served a useful purpose in his quest for power.

The first round of weeding out opponents was carried out in November 1974 when Gen. Aman Andom, the first PMAC chairman, along with a few other members of the Council and more than 50 former high-ranking officials, were summarily executed, shocking both Ethiopians and the international community. The second round of executions occurred in July 1976. This time the victims were active educated officers within the PMAC, like Major Sisay Habte and Lieutenants Bewiketu Kassa and Sileshi Beyene, who maintained connections with radical elements among university students, teachers, and labor organizers and who were instrumental in initially steering the Council to the Left from its original nationalist orientation. A major restructuring of the PMAC in December 1976, when its members voted to strip Mengistu of power and institute "collective leadership," served as the prelude to the third and decisive round of killings. The architects of the restructuring included respected PMAC members like the nominal chairman who succeeded Aman Andom: Gen. Teferi Banti, Maj. Alemayehu Haile and Capt. Mogus Wolde Michael. Again, especially the last two, like those mentioned earlier, were important figures in introducing socialism to the Council. However, on 3 February 1977 Mengistu embarked on a sudden and swift retali-

ation. With the help of the chief of the palace security force commander, he essentially carried out a mafia-style coup by simply ambushing and executing the ringleaders of the restructuring who were unsuspectingly preparing for a regular Council meeting in the palace grounds. The following day he was "unanimously voted" chairman by the remaining PMAC members.

The documents from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and Socialist Unity Party of [East] Germany (SED) presented here begin with activities dating from early February 1977. Notably, the first two documents, the memorandum of conversation between Soviet Counselor-Minister in Ethiopia S. Sinitsin with the Political Counselor of the US Embassy in Ethiopia Herbert Malin as well as the CPSU's Third African Department Report on Somali-Ethiopian territorial disputes are both dated February 2, i.e., one day before Mengistu's bloody coup. It will be recalled that at the time it was widely reported that the USSR Ambassador to Ethiopia Anatolii Ratanov was the first person to congratulate Mengistu immediately after the carnage, leading to speculation by some Western authors that the Soviets might have had a hand in the affair by providing intelligence support or, at least, had prior information and might have provided tacit approval before the killings occurred.<sup>3</sup> If that were the case, certainly these documents shed no light. In fact, the first document distinctly mentions the visit of an Ethiopian delegation to Moscow in July 1976 and the resulting joint Soviet-Ethiopian communique as the prelude to closer ties between the two countries after the Ethiopian revolution. On the Ethiopian side, that delegation was led by Mogus, one of the casualties of Mengistu's coup. It seems the Soviets would have been unlikely to highlight this information had they known about the impending events. Of course, one can also argue that given that the Soviet Counselor-Minister was dealing with his American counterpart, disinformation would have been the order of the day.

It might be valuable to point out a possible Soviet displeasure with the

Ethiopian leadership prior to the coup which is implied between the lines of one of the discussions of the CPSU Third African Department Report. This refers to a late-1976 Cuban and South Yemeni initiative to provide mediation in the Ethio-Somali dispute. The report mentions that the Somali government, while not rejecting the proposal, had spoken out in favor of including direct Soviet participation in the negotiations. Ethiopia, on the other hand, the report notes, regarded the mediation initiative favorably, but "did not express an analogous wish" (about Soviet participation) and thus the Cubans and Yemenis (on their own) were taking diplomatic steps to organize mediation. Could this have been a factor causing Soviet apprehension about the Ethiopian leadership's reliability prior to Mengistu's consolidation of power? The answer at this point can only be conjecture.

The first head of state from the communist bloc to meet with Mengistu after his coup was Castro. He visited Addis Ababa on March 14-15, just a little more than a month later. On March 16 he then flew across the Red Sea to Aden, South Yemen, to co-chair a joint Cuban-Yemeni mediation effort to settle the Ethio-Somali dispute to which Somali's Barre as well as Mengistu were invited. It is not clear from the documents whether this meeting had been prearranged before the coup or whether it was hastily scheduled after it. Whatever the case, a few weeks later, on 3 April, Castro went to East Berlin to report about his African mission and consult with the East German leader Erich Honecker. The transcript of that meeting presented here records Castro's vivid first impressions about Mengistu, revealing the latter's apparent success in winning over both the heart and support of the Cuban leader in such a relatively short time. Castro spoke of Mengistu as a "quiet, honest, and convinced . . . revolutionary leader . . . an intellectual personality who showed his wisdom on February 3." His massacre is portrayed and condoned as "a turning point in the development of the Ethiopian revolution when . . . a consequential decision was made to meet the challenge by rightists" in the PMAC.

To the extent that the communist states shared information with each other and with Moscow to devise and coordinate policy, as it is assumed they did, Castro's account provided an excellent report card for Mengistu. Furthermore, as it is known from other sources that Castro later flew to Moscow to report on his trip, one may presume that he presented the same glowing assessment of Mengistu to the Soviet leadership.

Mengistu also indulges in a diplomatic contribution to widen the emerging rift between Somalia and the socialist states by discrediting the revolutionary potential of its leadership. In one record of conversation held on March 18, his head of foreign affairs, Maj. Berhanu Bayeh, quotes the Egyptian newspaper *Al-Ahram* to point out to Sinitin the possibility of Somalia joining Sudan, Egypt and Syria in a unified political command. He adds that Barre had been on record declaring that Somalia achieved its revolution independently and can acquire help from other countries besides the Soviet Union and its allies. Given the recent Soviet loss of Egypt and Sudan, this information was probably intended to arouse Moscow's apprehension.

Supporting his own professed commitment to Marxism-Leninism and the Soviet Union with practical deeds, at the end of the following April Mengistu ordered the closure of the U.S. communications station in Asmara, the U.S. Information Service (USIS) center, and the American military assistance advisory offices, and abrogated the Ethio-U.S. Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement—the official treaty of alliance with the United States dating from 1953. It is also remarkable how Mengistu was apparently successful in projecting himself to the Soviets as a genuine, pro-Soviet, revolutionary leader constantly challenged by nationalist elements within his own Council. In one May 1978 conversation report, Rotislav Ulianovskii, an influential senior Third World policy analyst in the CPSU, instructs his East German counterpart Friedel Trappen, arguing:

Mengistu deserves to be regarded by us as a man who represents internation-

alist positions. By contrast to him, Berhanu Bayeh and Fikre Selassie as well as Legesse Asfaw and others are marked by nationalism although they are faithful to him . . . I emphasize again, we have to apply maximum caution, circumspection and tactfulness toward Mengistu so that the nationalists will not grasp him by the throat.

According to the views of many Ethiopians, including former insiders in the Mengistu regime such as Dawit (cited above), nothing could be further from the truth except for the remark on loyalty. First of all, between February and November 1977 Mengistu had consolidated absolute power. Secondly, he was raised and trained in the traditional Amharised Ethiopian military tradition and therefore, by background, the most ardent nationalist of them all. After the revolution he had repeatedly and successfully maneuvered between dressing up as an ideologue and as a nationalist whenever each was politically expedient. Mengistu evidently fostered this misperception apparently to bolster his own image (as an internationalist) and, at the same time, to limit demands and pressures from the socialist community.

Interestingly, Mengistu's regime repeatedly employed the "China card" to attract Soviet support. In one document discussing Ethiopia's desire to acquire U.S.-manufactured arms from Vietnam with Soviet help, Berhanu emphasizes that "in contrast to the past the PMAC intends to consider this issue with the Vietnamese directly, rather than running to the People's Republic of China [PRC] for mediation." The reference to the past alluded to the leftist elements of the Military Council who were liquidated in the coup. In another conversation report, in July 1977, Cuba's military specialist in Addis Ababa, General Arnoldo Ochoa, conveys to Soviet Ambassador Ratanov that Mengistu had personally assured him about the decline in Ethiopian-Chinese relations following the PMAC's finding that the PRC was providing military assistance to the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF). Mengistu, according to Ochoa, had explained the decision to limit all relations

with Beijing to the minimum and to devise measures against Chinese ideological penetration in Ethiopia. That same month, yet another conversation record, this time between Mengistu and Ratanov, reveals Soviet apprehension about the dissemination of anti-Soviet (Maoist) literature in Addis Ababa. That September, the Ethiopian Foreign Minister Felleke Gedle Giorgis "especially dwelled on the Chinese position on the Ethiopian Revolution" in his talks with Ratanov. Admitting to PRC economic aid at the initial stage of the revolution, he noted the changing Chinese stand as the revolution deepened (perhaps alluding to the forging of closer ties with the USSR). China then began to render comprehensive assistance to Somalia during the military conflict. By February 1978, according to a joint report by the CPSU Third Africa Department and the Political Department of the GDR Embassy in Moscow, the Soviets noted (presumably with satisfaction) Beijing's hostile attitudes toward the Ethiopian leadership as well as the minimal popular support enjoyed by pro-Maoist groups in the country.

Another noteworthy issue discussed in three documents concerns "Operation Torch"—an alleged imperialist conspiracy spearheaded by the CIA to assassinate Ethiopian leaders and destabilize the revolution in September-October 1977 with the help of regional forces hostile to the country. Again allegedly, Ethiopian authorities received a letter revealing the pending plot from unknown sources in Africa and then conveyed this threat to the ambassadors of the socialist countries. A few days later, the Permanent Secretary of the Foreign Ministry, Dawit Wolde Giorgis, visited the Soviet embassy and provided a copy of the letter to Ratanov. Interestingly, Dawit mentions this incident in his book.<sup>4</sup> He notes an unsuccessful attempt by the Ethiopian government to verify the letter through follow-up inquiries and describes the great sense of panic and suspicion it had created in the Foreign Office. Moreover, while he alludes to the possibility that the letter may have been fabricated, he unfortunately does not state a likely source. The mysterious

letter provides the names of two American officials, alleged masterminds of the plot, with their ranks and positions at the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. If it is true, as Paul Henze asserts in this publication, that even the names are fictitious, it is odd that the Ethiopian authorities convened a socialist ambassadors' meeting in panic instead of easily verifying through elementary diplomatic inquiry and concluding that it had been a fabrication. The theory of a charade—a make-believe drama enacted on false information—will thus have to include the Ethiopians as well as Soviet authorities as actors if it is to be considered a plausible explanation.

In addition, a few other documents provide accounts of some early reservations the Soviet Union and its allies had about Mengistu's handling of certain issues. It should be noted that in earlier Western writings, some of these reservations were usually associated with a later period, after Gorbachev assumed power in Moscow in 1985. But as early as December 1977, a conversation between the East Germans and Ratanov points toward the need for Ethiopia to adopt a mixed economy along the lines of the Soviet NEP (New Economic Program) of the 1920s. The leadership's perception of the national bourgeoisie as an enemy of the revolution and the alienation and exclusion of this group as well as of the liberal-minded functionaries of the state apparatus from the economy and national life is criticized as a dangerous trend with negative consequences. In another conversation the following February, a central player in the CPSU's Africa policy group, Boris Ponomarev, expressed his concern over extremes in the Ethiopian Revolution—the mass executions of prisoners and the government's Red Terror—directing the transmittal of these concerns to Mengistu using various channels.

Finally in this section, the issue of Moscow's relentless prodding of Mengistu to set up a Marxist-Leninist vanguard party to institutionalize the revolution as well as to transform the country into a reliable Soviet ally is a subject addressed by many authors and the focus of my own study.<sup>5</sup> Primarily

because of Mengistu's resistance, and to the disappointment of the Soviets, the party didn't come into existence until 1984. Two documents presented here refer to Soviet anxiety about repeated delays from the Ethiopian side in accepting the arrival of "a specially selected group of experienced CPSU comrades" to help in the party formation process. One of them notes that "Mengistu apparently has no concept of the cooperation with the advisers [and that] it is necessary to convince him that they could be a real help and relief." Obviously, at this early stage in the revolution, the Soviets did not realize that Mengistu was intentionally preventing Moscow's infiltration into his power structure before completing a prolonged process of weeding out potential contenders and adversaries.

## II. Ethio-Somali War

A substantial number of the documents presented here address the Soviet bloc's involvement in the conflict. Indeed, for Moscow, Barre's aggression against Ethiopia, which began in early 1977 under the guise of a Western Somali Liberation Movement and which escalated into full-scale intervention the following July, was both a welcome event and a potentially dangerous development. On one hand, it provided the Soviets with the opportunity to rapidly penetrate Ethiopia, the prized state of the Horn, while, on the other hand, it entailed a potentially painful risk of losing another state where Moscow had already built a presence: Somalia. The documents help in tracing Moscow's policy in the region which began in 1976 as a strategy of courting "Socialist Ethiopia" without disturbing its longstanding friendship with Somalia. By 1978 it had gone through a complete somersault with the Soviet ejection from Mogadishu and its entrenchment in Addis Ababa after a massive supply of arms which decided the outcome of the conflict in favor of Ethiopia. My comments, however, will only briefly focus on three particular issues.

One is on the 16 March 1977 Cuban-Yemen effort at creating a Marxist-Leninist confederation consisting of

Ethiopia, Somalia, and South Yemen. In his meeting with Honecker the following month, Castro provides a detailed report about the attitudes of the two leaders, Mengistu and Barre, toward the proposal. Mengistu is referred to in glowing terms while Barre is described as a chauvinist whose principal idea is nationalism, not socialism. The report vividly shows Castro trapped as a victim of his own ideology. Having erroneously assumed an absolute connection between perceived global trends—depicting socialism as the world's dynamic force—and the local situation in the Horn, he had expected a successful outcome to his efforts. His sharp disappointment in Barre's personality, on which the report dwells, should have been subordinated to the more crucial realization that national and ethnic rivalries peculiar to the region had doomed the confederation from the outset. Also in this document, the Cuban leader, perhaps for the first time, forcefully raised the impending dilemma facing the Soviet bloc in the Horn of Africa. He tells Honecker, "I see a great danger . . . if the socialist countries help Ethiopia, they will lose Siad Barre's friendship. If they don't, the Ethiopian revolution will founder." Faced with an either/or situation within six-eight months, Moscow bet on Ethiopia at the risk of irretrievably losing Somalia.

Another issue warranting mention is a probable justification for the Kremlin's massive air- and sealift of military equipment (worth about one billion dollars), 12,000 Cuban combat troops, and about 1500 Soviet military advisers to Ethiopia in November-December 1977. This measure immediately followed Somalia's unilateral abrogation of the 1974 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR. Why was such an overwhelming show of force necessary? Moscow's apparent objective in this spectacular move was to guarantee the swift and decisive end of the Ethio-Somali war with a quick and unconditional withdrawal of Somali forces from Ethiopian territory. Two documents, the joint memorandum of the CPSU Third Africa Department and the Political Department of the GDR Embassy in Moscow, and the So-

viet Foreign Ministry/CPSU CC International Department report on the Somali-Ethiopian conflict, shed light on a probable motive: "to avoid a situation analogous to the one in the Middle East"—where Sadat was taking his own spectacular initiative in making an unprecedented visit to Jerusalem—from arising in the Horn.

According to the documents, the Soviet Union wanted to avert at all costs the internationalization of the conflict and the possible involvement of the UN Security Council which it believed would be in the interest of Western powers. Such an outcome, Moscow argued, would be possible if an armistice were reached without the withdrawal of Somali troops from occupied Ethiopian territory while Western powers simultaneously pushed for Security Council involvement. A takeover by the Security Council, moreover, would delay a resolution of the conflict in a similar fashion as in the Middle East, possibly increasing the danger for superpower confrontation as the West and other unfriendly states demanded Soviet exit from the region as a precondition and blame it for causing the conflict. The significance of this logic is better appreciated when recalling Sadat's dramatic announcement in early November that he would visit Israel. It was a move that crushed plans for multilateral talks on the Middle East at Geneva and suddenly removed the Soviets from a direct role in the Arab-Israeli peace talks. In the face of such a setback, Moscow apparently showed its determination to anchor just at the other end of the Red Sea from Saudi Arabia in a desperate attempt to balance, in some degree, the loss of influence in Egypt by consolidating a strong presence in the greater Middle East conflict zone.

The final issue of interest in this section addresses one of Mengistu's first reactions about the possible Soviet use of Ethiopian port facilities in the likely event of the Somalia's denying Moscow access to the port of Berbera. He addresses this issue with Ratanov in a conversation dated 29 July 1977. He, interestingly, doesn't provide a clear cut commitment to provide the USSR access to its ports. Instead he states an

understanding of the Soviet dilemma: rendering military assistance to Ethiopia at the risk of losing its opportunity in Somalia. He also articulates Ethiopia's revolutionary indebtedness and obligation to take Moscow's interest in the region into account. The document doesn't make clear whether he was responding to a Soviet request; but, particularly if he raised the issue on his own initiative, the fact he makes such an indirect commitment appears to have been subtle and timely maneuver to attract Moscow toward Ethiopia.

### III. The Eritrean Secessionists

An interesting paradox in the Ethiopian revolution can be noted. With the exception of the Ethiopian Democratic Union (EDU) (an entity associated with the remnants of the Selassie era), the other four major organizations which struggled to topple Mengistu's regime all ironically professed allegiance to Marxism-Leninism, just like their principal adversary. While two of them, the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and the All Ethiopian Workers' Movement (MEISON), all but perished during the violent confrontations of the late 1970s, the other two, the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) and the Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF) ultimately succeeded in coordinating their efforts to renounce Marxism after the late 1980s, dislodge Mengistu from power in 1991, and establish two independent states—Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia—by 1993-1994.

To what extent these various (previously?) revolutionary organizations had forged parallel relations with Moscow and other socialist countries remains an interesting question to explore. The EPRP claims to have established contacts with the CPSU as early as 1972.<sup>6</sup> MEISON had purportedly developed links through associations with European Communist parties in the 1970s.<sup>7</sup> Until the Ethiopian revolution, the EPLF had been openly assisted by countries like Cuba, possibly offering indirect ties to Moscow. The TPLF, as an organization founded after Ethiopia joined the Soviet orbit, probably didn't

have any relations with the USSR, but it went on record as advocating Albanian-style socialism, thus relations with Albania or China are not altogether inconceivable. The few documents presented here shed some light on Soviet and East German links with the EPLF and its much smaller rival organization in Eritrea—the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)—in the context of the two socialist countries' efforts at facilitating mediation with the Mengistu regime. In particular, in 1978 the East Germans had arranged two direct high-level talks between Mengistu's representative, Berhanu Bayeh, and EPLF leader Issaias Afewerki, the results of which were promptly communicated by Honecker to Brezhnev.

What is clear from these documents is the fact that the EPLF had apparently maintained well-established contacts with the SED and Issaias talked directly with Honecker as a leader of a revolutionary party. This level of contact may well not have been to Mengistu's liking. On the other hand, Moscow apparently exhibited sensitivity to the views in Addis Ababa in that the ELF and its leader Ahmed Mohammed Nasser were less closely linked with Moscow through the USSR's Solidarity Committee. Moreover, in one of the documents, Ulianovskii rejects an East German proposal that Issaias meet with him in Moscow so that the CPSU could exert pressure on the EPLF to compromise with Mengistu. Nevertheless, it is clear that both Berlin and Moscow had apparently coordinated a concerted effort at finding a political solution to the Eritrean problem by pressuring both the government of Mengistu as well as the rebel movements toward constructive dialogue. The results, however, had not been encouraging.

In conclusion, the documents presented here are indeed important contributions to the study of the politics of the Horn during 1977-1978 in the context of the Cold War. Their value is not so much in the amount of "new" information they present, although there is some. Rather, they are priceless in providing unique first-hand insight into the perceptions and attitudes of the major

actors involved in the decisions that shaped political outcomes.

Interestingly, the documents from the Russian archives appear to have been carefully selected to elide significant “blank spots” even on the issues and period covered. By contrast, the former East German materials, though limited in number, seem more insightful in the concentrated details they provide on one issue in particular: the Ethio-Eritrean high-level mediation.

Nevertheless, within the two-year period covered in these documents there are significant issues that find scant coverage. From the Soviet side these include materials pertaining to Moscow’s intelligence assessment and possible involvement during the Ethiopian power struggle; relations with organizations other than the PMAC; military reports from General Petrov and others in the Ogaden; and early military planning involvement in Eritrea. From the East German side, materials related to its assistance in restructuring the Ethiopian security services would be of high interest. Beyond 1978, Soviet and other socialist countries’ involvement in the Ethiopian vanguard party formation process would, of course, be of critical importance.

<sup>1</sup> Cited in P. Margushin, “Sovetskii Soyuz v Afrike,” *Novoe Russkoe Slovo*, 4 October 1979.

<sup>2</sup> Dawit Wolde Giorgis, *Red Tears: Famine, War, and Revolution in Ethiopia*, (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1989), 21.

<sup>3</sup> Robert Patman, *The Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 193; Rene Lefort, *Ethiopia: An Heretical Revolution?* (London: Zed Press, 1983), 206.

<sup>4</sup> Giorgis, *Red Tears*, 35-36.

<sup>5</sup> Ermias Abebe, “The Vanguard Party: Imperial Instrument of Soviet-Third World Policy (1976-1986),” Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Maryland (College Park), 1994.

<sup>6</sup> See EPRP founding member Kiflu Tadesse’s *The Generation*, (Silver Spring, MD: Independent Publishers, 1993), 98.

<sup>7</sup> Bereket Habte Selassie, “Political Leadership in Crisis: The Ethiopian Case” *Horn of Africa* 3:1 (Jan.-Mar. 1980), 7.

## MOSCOW, MENGISTU, AND THE HORN: DIFFICULT CHOICES FOR THE KREMLIN

by Paul B. Henze

The Russian and East German documents reproduced here constitute a useful contribution to the history of the Horn of Africa during the critical events of 1977-78. They provide insights into the Soviet relationship with the authoritarian leaders of Ethiopia and Somalia at that time, Chairman Mengistu Haile Mariam and President Mohammed Siad Barre, as well as into the motivations of these men and some of their associates.

Both Mengistu and Siad Barre were stubborn and ambitious leaders who confronted the Kremlin with difficult choices, which it tried to avoid for as long as possible. Siad comes across as a more blatant liar than Mengistu, who appears to have been more genuinely devoted to “socialism.” While Siad seems totally mendacious and devious in his manipulation of the Soviets, Mengistu is shown with his back to the wall. He was determined to win Soviet support by vigorously professing his loyalty to “socialism” and making clear his readiness to serve Soviet aims throughout the Horn and in the world at large. The documents occasionally reveal Soviet concern that Mengistu and his Derg associates were moving too fast, and these concerns were sometimes expressed to him. But as the Horn crisis developed, they became more concerned about preserving Mengistu’s power than Siad’s. The reason, undoubtedly, is that Ethiopia was a much more important country than Somalia. The Soviets originally established themselves in Somalia because they were unable to do so in Ethiopia.

To those knowledgeable of the details of Ethiopian history during this period, enthusiastic Soviet references to the “decisive action” Mengistu took on 3 February 1977 are noteworthy. In spite of repeated protestations of peaceful desires, these references show that Soviets had no reservations about approving violence as a means of settling differences. Though there are no ex-

PLICIT references to this action in these documents, Soviet Ambassador Anatolii P. Ratanov was reliably reported at the time to have been the first to congratulate Mengistu after the spectacular bloodbath in the Derg when several challengers of Mengistu, most notably Head of State Teferi Bante, were shot. As a result, Mengistu emerged into the open as the dominant figure as Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), i.e. the Derg.

The documents provide useful information on the activities of Cuba as junior partner to the Soviets in Ethiopia during this period. A long near-verbatim report from the archives of the former German Democratic Republic of a meeting between Fidel Castro and Erich Honecker on Castro’s return from Africa in early April 1977 gives us vivid detail that confirms what has long been generally known of Castro’s unsuccessful effort to mediate the developing Horn crisis in mid-March 1977. A subsequent briefing by Soviet Ambassador Ratanov of Cuban Gen. Arnaldo Ochoa provides a remarkably frank, and not entirely positive, appraisal of Ethiopia’s military and political predicament and performance as of mid-summer 1977.

The Soviet Union was remarkably uncreative in its efforts to deal with the situation provoked by Siad Barre’s attack on Ethiopia. Siad felt his way cautiously at first, operating behind a facade of what he claimed were only guerrilla operations. But by July 1977, Somalia was openly invading Ethiopia with regular military forces.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, Somali officials adhered to the pretense well into 1978 that the operation was entirely the initiative of guerrillas. Even though Soviet officials in both Somalia and Ethiopia had to be well aware of what was happening, Moscow—on the surface at least—persisted on the course adopted early in the year: trying to bring the Somalis and Ethiopians together to compose their differences. Long reports by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid Ilychev of almost four weeks of meetings with a Somali delegation in Moscow from late July through the third week of August chronicle an elaborate

charade of negotiations. Unfortunately the documents available to us here do not include parallel reports of dealings with the Ethiopian delegation that was in Moscow during the same period, but it appears that the Somalis and the Ethiopians never even engaged in preliminary face-to-face talks. The reason why is easy to see in written statements each delegation gave the Soviets of its country's position, for neither left any room for compromise or even discussion with the other.

While the independence of erstwhile French colony of Djibouti caused immediate worry, both Ethiopia and Somalia behaved with caution. Ratanov did not react to an offer by Mengistu to support intervention in Djibouti. Ethiopia lacked the strength to intervene alone.

The biggest problem looming in the background of the discussions reported in these documents is Eritrea. It was already the most intractable problem of all for Moscow in its relations with Mengistu. Ethiopian military performance in meeting the Somali invasion was inhibited by the predicament which Mengistu had got himself into in Eritrea. The Soviets were not impressed with the performance of Mengistu's army in Eritrea. An East German document from December 1977 reveals what appears to be Ambassador Ratanov's irritation at Mengistu's intransigence on Eritrea as well as the hope that somehow a basis for negotiation with the rebel movement there might be developed. This became a major Soviet aim during the next decade and led to repeated East German efforts (and some Italian Communist attempts) to bring Eritrean and Ethiopian Marxists together.

In response to Mengistu's urgent pleading, the Soviets agreed during July 1977 to send in urgently needed transport equipment to enable the Ethiopians to utilize some of the tanks and guns the Soviets had already provided as a result of agreements reached during Mengistu's December 1976 and May 1977 visits to Moscow, but the Kremlin was still apparently hoping to limit its commitment. Politburo minutes of 4 and 11 August 1977 confirm decisions

to provide Ethiopia support to defend itself against Somalia, but details have not been declassified. This, nevertheless, appears to be the point at which, de facto, Moscow finally made an irrevocable decision to opt for Ethiopia over Somalia.

Whether or not Ambassador Ratanov agreed with Moscow's continued insistence on further efforts to bring the Somalis and Ethiopians together in negotiations at "the expert level," he followed Moscow's orders and repeated this position as late as 23 August 1977 in a meeting with Cuban Ambassador to Ethiopia Perez Novoa. The Soviets were even more hesitant on the question of manpower, for the main purpose of this meeting with the Cuban envoy was to chastise him for permitting Cuban Gen. Ochoa to promise Mengistu that more Cuban technicians would be coming: "The decision to send Cuban personnel to Ethiopia does not depend on Havana, but on Moscow." Ratanov expressed the Soviet fear that a large-scale introduction of Cubans into Ethiopia could provoke the Eritreans or Somalis to call in troops from supportive Arab countries such as Egypt.

Taken as a whole, these Russian documents seem to have been made available to give a picture of a well-intentioned and relatively benign Soviet Union confronted with a situation it neither anticipated nor desired. The Soviets are shown to be surprised by the crisis, reluctant to choose between Ethiopia and Somalia, and trying to delay hard decisions as long as possible. This does not fit with the general atmosphere of Third World activism characteristic of the Soviet Union at this time. While there seems to be no reason to question the authenticity of the documents themselves, there are obviously large gaps in this documentation. We find nothing about differing views among Soviet officials or various elements in the Soviet bureaucracy, nor about different interpretations of developments between the Soviet establishments in Mogadishu<sup>2</sup> and Addis Ababa. We see no reflection of options and courses of action that must have been discussed in the Soviet embassies in the Horn and in Moscow as the crisis in-

tensified. We get no comparative evaluations of officials with whom the Soviets were dealing in Mogadishu and Addis Ababa.

The documents also lack any direct reference to intelligence. It is hard to believe that Soviet officials did not receive extensive KGB and GRU reporting from agents in both Somalia and Ethiopia. There is, in fact, good reason to believe that the Soviets were re-insuring themselves during this period by maintaining contacts with political groups opposed to Mengistu in Ethiopia as well as opponents of Siad Barre in Somalia. They, the East Germans, the Cubans, and perhaps other socialist countries must also have had contacts among Eritrean factions. We do find tantalizing references to opposition to the Derg and to the strain under which Mengistu found himself as a result. At times the Soviets seem to be more apprehensive of Mengistu's staying power than U.S. officials were at the time.

The final portion of Ratanov's 18 March 1977 meeting with Berhanu Bayeh sheds indirect light on attitudes among the Ethiopian public. Major Berhanu asks to have the Soviets arrange for a scholarship for his younger brother to study in Moscow and explains that the young man has been unable to complete his work at a prestigious Addis Ababa secondary school because, as the relative of a Derg member, he became the object of harassment by other students. Even at this relatively early stage of the Derg's history, its popularity with the student population seems to have been quite low.

Nevertheless, most of the basic questions about Soviet policies and calculations during 1977 which I identified as still needing clarification in my discussion of this period in a 1991 study<sup>3</sup> remain open so far as these documents go. The Russian documents stop, for the most part, at the point when hard Soviet decisions about action and implementation began to be made: at the end of September 1977. For example, they shed no light on how these decisions were arrived at and carried out, or how risks were assessed. The massive airlift and sealift of Cuban troops and equipment that startled the

world from November 1977 onward, or the decision to send General V. Petrov to Ethiopia to oversee operations against the Somali forces, get scant mention, as does Mengistu's "closed" or secret trip to Moscow in October 1977 at which the imminent Soviet-Cuban military effort was undoubtedly the chief topic of conversation. [Ed. note: Both are mentioned in passing in the 3 April 1978 Soviet Foreign Ministry background report on Soviet-Ethiopian relations printed below; a generally-worded Soviet report to the East German leadership on Mengistu's trip is also included.] Likewise these documents are devoid of reference to the decision to shore up Ethiopian forces by transferring South Yemeni armored units to Ethiopia in late summer 1977 to blunt the Somali advance.

The most curious aspect of this batch of documents concern three that deal with "Operation Torch"—an alleged American plot to assassinate Mengistu and attack Ethiopia from Sudan and Kenya. Ethiopian leaders presented what they described as documentation of the plot to Soviet-bloc diplomats in early September 1977, and claimed that it was planned to be launched on 1 October 1977. The text of the description of the plot, supposedly conceived and directed out of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, reads like a fourth-rate pulp thriller. Nothing in it, including the names of the American officers who were supposedly directing it, bears any relation to known or plausible facts. Perhaps the oddest feature of "Operation Torch" is its lack of direct connection with Somalia or with Eritrean rebels.

If the Soviets actually took this "report" seriously, why did they not challenge all the countries supposedly co-operating in mounting it—Kenya, Sudan, and the United States? It bears all the marks of a disinformation operation of the kind that the Soviets (often through Bulgaria or Czechoslovakia) frequently undertook during this period. Whatever specific purpose it was designed to serve is unclear. One possibility is that it may have been intended to heighten the paranoia of Mengistu and his Derg colleagues and

make them more amenable to Soviet manipulation. In its crudity, it is insulting to the intelligence of the Ethiopians. They did not take it seriously enough to bring it to the attention of the United States toward which they were showing some warmth at this very period in hopes of getting previously ordered military equipment and spare parts released. It is hard to believe that a seasoned and experienced officer such as Ratanov was not engaging in a charade in reporting this grotesque scheme and discussions of it with senior Ethiopian officials to Moscow.<sup>4</sup>

Limited as they are in what they reveal of the debates and actions of Soviet officials in Ethiopia, Somalia, and Moscow in 1977-78, these Soviet-bloc documents are worth more detailed examination and analysis, a task which I hope to undertake at greater length and also encourage others to do. More such documents may eventually become available, as well as a potentially rich collection of Ethiopian materials from this period that has been assembled in Addis Ababa for use in the trial of former Derg officials (the future status of these documents is unclear, but it is to be hoped that they will be made available to scholars). Access to these materials, as well as additional U.S. government documents still awaiting declassification and still-inaccessible Cuban and other sources, may enable a far better understanding of the Horn of Africa Crisis of 1977-78.

<sup>1</sup> Though Siad told me on meeting with him in Mogadishu in September 1977 that Somalia had no regular military personnel in Ethiopia, the United States never took his claims seriously. Neither, so far as we can tell, did the Soviets.

<sup>2</sup> Moscow had up to 4000 advisers in Somalia as of the beginning of 1977. There was also a sizable Cuban presence in Somalia.

<sup>3</sup> Chapter 5, "Crisis and Degeneration", pp. 133-167 in *The Horn of Africa from War to Peace* (London/New York: Macmillan, 1991).

<sup>4</sup> I served as the officer responsible for Horn affairs in the U.S. National Security Council during this period. No scheme remotely resembling "Operation Torch" was ever considered by the U.S. Government.

## EAST GERMANY AND THE HORN CRISIS: DOCUMENTS ON SED AFRIKAPOLITIK

By Christian F. Ostermann

The documents from the archives of the former Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED)—the *Stiftung "Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der SED" im Bundesarchiv*, Berlin—included in the selection of Russian and East German materials on the Horn of Africa crisis in 1977-78 demonstrate the usefulness of multiarchival research for an understanding of *Soviet* and *Cuban* policy. Given the difficulties with access to the Soviet and Cuban archives, the formerly top-secret documents from the East German Communist party archives, among them high-level discussions between CPSU, SED and Cuban party operatives, help to understand Moscow's and Havana's interests and actions, in ways that usefully supplement and go beyond what is currently available from those countries, in this regional flare-up that became a superpower crisis.

The documents also provide new insights into the East German role in the Cold War in Africa. By the mid-1970s, Africa had become an increasingly important arena for GDR foreign policy. Prior to the "wave of recognition" following the Basic Treaty between East and West Germany in 1972, East Berlin's primary interest in Africa was to enhance its international standing and prestige. The decolonization process seemed to offer plenty of opportunities for the regime of SED first secretary Walter Ulbricht to undermine and circumvent the "Hallstein doctrine," Bonn's post-1955 policy to consider the establishment of diplomatic relation with the GDR by any third country to be an "unfriendly act" towards the Federal Republic. Grounded in the belief that the West German government was the only government truly representative of the German nation, the "Hallstein doctrine" effectively managed to deny the GDR international legitimacy outside the Soviet bloc.

East German efforts to subvert the Hallstein doctrine in Africa by gaining

diplomatic recognition were only partially successful. In the wake of the 1956 Suez crisis, East Berlin managed to get its foot in the door in Egypt, largely because of its outspoken condemnation of West German support for Israel as well as its demonstrative solidarity with the Egyptian people in the form of large long-term loans. Such overt support did not go unnoticed in Cairo. In the months after Suez, Egyptian President Gamel Abdul Nasser agreed to the establishment of an Egyptian trade mission in East Berlin. Shortly afterwards, the East German trade mission in Cairo was upgraded to a consulate-general. Under special plenipotentiary Ernst Scholz, the mission soon developed into East Berlin's African headquarters for its quest for recognition.

Despite increased East German propaganda against the "imperialist" Federal Republic in the 1960s, however, Ulbricht's efforts continued to fall short of formal recognition, largely due to West German economic pressure and the threat of the Hallstein doctrine. Most African leaders, even the ones rated "progressive," were indifferent to complexities of the German question. *Les querelles allemandes*, however, persistently plagued East Berlin's relations with African countries. Although Willy Brandt's *Neue Ostpolitik* freed the GDR's interlocutors from the fear of West German political sanctions, any rapprochement with East Berlin still bore the risk of economic reprisals.<sup>1</sup>

Africa remained a field for competition with the Federal Republic following the diplomatic breakthrough of the early 1970s, but with recognition widely secured, other aspects of the GDR's African policy assumed greater importance. GDR political, ideological, and military support for liberation movements and countries with a socialist orientation demonstrated to Moscow and other East-bloc countries East Germany's growing importance and allowed the SED leadership to develop a more distinct international profile, enhancing both the regime's international and domestic legitimacy. Close cultural-ideological ties and economic-military cooperation with African states sup-

ported East Berlin's claim to a *Sonderrolle* (special role) within the socialist camp as Moscow's most trusted and perhaps most significant ally. At the same time, increased trade with African countries decreased the GDR's dependence on Soviet economic support and provided valuable foreign currencies and markets. Finally, the GDR's increased presence on the African continent reflected a growing East German *Sendungsbewusstsein* (missionary zeal) among many SED officials who perceived the export of Soviet-style socialism to Africa to be a crucial element in the growth and eventual success of world communism.

East German leaders seized the opportunity for increased involvement on the Horn of Africa when the end of imperial rule in Ethiopia in 1974 threw the region into turmoil. Despite the success of the New Democratic Revolution in Ethiopia in April 1976, Moscow's position in Addis Ababa remained deeply troubled. To the south, Somalia's putatively socialist leader, Mohammed Siad Barre, took advantage of Ethiopia's weakness and seized the Ogaden region from Ethiopia. Despite its interest in the strategically important Somalia harbor of Berbera, Moscow grew increasingly uncertain and wary of its close relations with Siad Barre. More significantly, Moscow's longstanding support of the Eritrean liberation movements against Addis Ababa now had to be balanced with its interest in the survival—and thus territorial integrity—of the Ethiopian Revolution, led, until early 1977, by a military junta of uncertain ideological convictions. Not until February 1977, when Lt.-Col. Mengistu Haile Mariam, the First Deputy Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council, seized the post of PMAC chairman, did Moscow throw its full weight behind the Ethiopian regime.

The GDR's embroilment in the crisis was to some extent the result of fortuitous circumstance. Walter Lamberz, SED politburo member and Erich Honecker's trouble shooter for Africa, happened to be in Addis Ababa on the eve of the coup which brought Mengistu to power and was immediately on hand

to reassure the new leader of the Soviet bloc's and, in particular, the GDR's, continued interest in close relations. Within weeks, a representative from the GDR Ministry for State Security was sent to Addis Ababa to negotiate military (and intelligence) support (including the sending of East German military cadres) for the Mengistu regime. As the documents show, East Berlin's high hopes for Mengistu were soon crushed by his reluctance fully to adopt the Soviet model and in particular his refusal to establish an avant-garde Marxist-Leninist party. Given its presence on the scene, and the missionary zeal and the long-standing ties of its emissaries, East Berlin was determined to change Mengistu's mind. Following several personal visits by Lamberz to Addis Ababa, the Ethiopian leader agreed to receive a SED Central Committee mission which would work towards the formation of a workers' party. East Berlin's efforts in socialist nation-building, however, proved futile. Fed up with Mengistu's intransigence, his all-encompassing preoccupation with the wars with Eritrea and Somalia, and the PMAC's suspicion against any rival organization, the East German mission left in November 1978 after a nine-month stint in the Ethiopian capital.<sup>2</sup>

The East German presence in the region - and East Berlin's longstanding ties with Siad Barre in particular - also proved advantageous when Soviet relations with Somalia plummeted in the course of the Somali-Ethiopian War (1977-1978). Soviet military support of the Mengistu regime and Moscow's increasing suspicions regarding Siad Barre's collusion with the West exacerbated tensions between the two countries, and in November 1977 Siad Barre expelled Soviet and Cuban advisers and abrogated the three-year old Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR. By contrast, Somali-East German relations initially remained stable, providing Moscow with an ongoing channel of communication. As Honecker explained to Castro in April 1977, "we are pursuing the goal of keeping up the dialogue with Siad Barre and tying him to us as much as possible." Nevertheless, GDR aid to Ethiopia soon

surpassed previous commitments to Somalia.

East Germany's increased stature on the Horn was also reflected in the SED's efforts to mediate between the PMAC and the Eritrean liberation movements. Preliminary talks with Mengistu, held in late 1977, and with Siassi Aforki, general secretary of the Revolutionary People's Party of Eritrea and deputy general secretary of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), in January 1978, led to three sets of secret negotiations between the warring parties in East Berlin in January/February, March, and June 1978. Eager to avoid further Eritrean-Ethiopian confrontation that would only serve Western interests, the SED sought to engineer a peaceful and comprehensive settlement that included Eritrean autonomy and Ethiopian territorial integrity.<sup>3</sup> The fact that the PMAC and EPLF agreed to negotiations at all—the first since the conflict had erupted 17 years earlier—was in itself a remarkable achievement. SED leaders spent much energy and personal leverage in swaying both sides to the negotiating table, at one point causing Berhanu Bayeh, a member of the PMAC Executive Committee to agree to meet Aforki “since he, as we can tell, appeals to you [the East Germans].”<sup>4</sup>

Getting both sides to negotiate in Berlin was one thing, substantive progress another. Despite a successful first round,<sup>5</sup> SED expectations soon sobered. Mengistu remained more interested in a military solution of the Eritrean problem and proved unresponsive to East Germans calls to conceptualize a political solution that would accommodate Eritrean interests. The Eritreans, for their part, remained steadfast in their desire for full independence, unacceptable to both East Berlin and Addis Ababa. Following the second round of talks in Berlin on 23 March 1978, “the opposing points of view remained unchanged,” the East German negotiators noted.<sup>6</sup>

East Berlin's efforts to mediate between the warring factions raised eyebrows, at least in Havana. As the Cuban ambassador in Ethiopia, Pepe, told Lamberz, the GDR's efforts would

prove futile. Mengistu had no confidence in the talks with the Eritreans, and the “Cuban comrades have doubts as well,” Lamberz reported to Berlin.<sup>7</sup>

Disaster struck in March 1978. Lamberz, whose personal relationship with Mengistu had made the talks possible, died in a helicopter crash in Libya. The negotiations in March proved ever more acrimonious. With the war with Somalia subsiding, the PMAC, by June, went on the offensive in Eritrea, routing the EPLF forces. The SED was, CPSU officials informed their SED counterparts, trying to “square the circle” in Ethiopia. Once the PMAC was on the offensive, the Soviets advised, “an attempt on our part to stop the Ethiopian leadership in its military course is a very delicate problem.”<sup>8</sup> With interest in a political settlement waning on all sides, the third round of talks (10 June 1978) in Berlin was doomed to fail. The SED had to acknowledge that “the meeting reflected a further hardening of the positions and mutually exclusive positions.”<sup>9</sup> More clearly than the second meeting, the self-appointed SED mediators had to acknowledge, “it was evident that the PMAC has the intention to seek a military solution.” According to an internal SED report, Berhanu now considered the “liberation of Eritrea, of course through force,” as the only option.<sup>10</sup> The East Berlin negotiations on Eritrea thus ended in failure. The “best result of the meeting[s] was that the SED comrades are starting to give up on their illusions,” one Cuban leader, somewhat gloatingly, related Berhanu's reaction to the break-down of the Berlin talks.<sup>11</sup>

Subsequent mediation efforts proved similarly futile, and the issue was not resolved until 1991—when the military defeat and overthrow of the Mengistu regime allowed the Eritrean rebel forces to triumph and achieve national independence, which was subsequently ratified by popular referendum.

<sup>2</sup> See the confidential “Memorandum of Conversation between Comrade Hermann Axen and the head of the SED Central Committee Working Group in Ethiopia, Comrade Herbert Graf, on 2 August 1978 in the CC Building,” *Stiftung “Archiv der Parteien und Massorganisationen der SED” im Bundesarchiv*, Berlin (SAPMO-BArch) DY 30 IV 2/2.035/127.

<sup>3</sup> East German drafts of the envisioned agreement can be found in SAPMO-BArch DY30 IV 2/2.035/127. See, e.g., Klaus Willerding (Dep. Foreign Minister) to Lambert, 30 January 1978, *ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> “Memorandum on the Conversation between the General Secretary of the CC of the SED, Erich Honnecker, and the Delegation of the Provisional Military Administrative Council of Ethiopia (PMAC), headed by Berhanu Bayeh on 31 January 1978, in the Residence of the Central Committee,” Berlin, 31 January 1978, *ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> Both parties agreed to seek a peaceful solution of the conflict. “Information on the Conversations between the Representatives of the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) of Socialist Ethiopia and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF) under participation of representatives of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) at the end of January/early February 1978 in Berlin,” Berlin, 6 February 1978, *ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> Memorandum, 23 March 1978, *ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> Memorandum of Conversation between Comrade Lamberz and the Cuban Ambassador in Ethiopia, Comrade Pepe, on 3 March 1978 (based on notes by Comrade Gen. Maj. Jaenicke), 4 March 1978, *ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> “Memorandum of Conversation between Comrade Friedel Trappen and Comrade R.A. Uljanowski on Thursday, May 11, 1978, 11:00 am to 1:30 pm in the CPSU Central Committee,” *ibid.*

<sup>9</sup> Information on the Third Meeting between the representatives of the PMAC of Socialist Ethiopia and the EPLF in Presence of the delegate of the SED Central Committee on 10 June 1978 in Berlin, *ibid.*; on 10 June 1978 in Berlin, *ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup> Memorandum by Hermann Graf on a 16 June 1978 Conversation with Valdez Vivo, 21 June 1978, *ibid.*

<sup>1</sup> For a good survey of the East-West German rivalry in Africa see John Winrow, *The Foreign Policy of the GDR in Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 54–120. See also Jude Howell, “The End of an Era: The Rise and Fall of G.D.R. Aid,” *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 32:2 (1994), 305–328.

# RUSSIAN & EAST GERMAN DOCUMENTS ON THE HORN OF AFRICA, 1977-78

## ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE DOCUMENTS

APRF—Archive of the President of the Russian Federation  
CC—Central Committee  
CPSU—Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
ELF-RC—Eritrean Liberation Front (Revolutionary Command)  
EPLF—Eritrean People's Liberation Front  
EPRP—Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party  
EDU—Ethiopian Democratic Union  
FTAI—French Territory of the Afars and Issas, i.e. Djibouti  
MEISON—All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement  
MFA—Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
OAU—Organization of African Unity  
PDRY—People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, i.e. South Yemen  
PMAC—Provisional Military Administrative Council (of Ethiopia); the Derg  
PRC—People's Republic of China  
SAPMO-BArchSA—*Stiftung "Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der SED" im Bundesarchiv*, Berlin  
SDR—Somali Democratic Republic  
SED—Socialist Unity Party of East Germany  
SRSP—Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party  
TsKhSD—Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation, Moscow  
UAR—United Arab Republic; Egypt  
UN—United Nations  
UNGA—United Nations General Assembly

### Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Counselor-Minister in Ethiopia S. Sinitsin with Political Counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Ethiopia Herbert Malin, 2 February 1977

From the diary of SECRET, Copy No. 2  
S.Y. Sinitsin 4 February 1977  
Ser. No. 41

NOTES OF CONFERENCE  
with Advisor for Political Issues

of USA Embassy in Ethiopia  
HERBERT MALIN

2 February 1977

I met today with Malin in the USA Embassy by preliminary arrangement. The following points of interest were discussed.

Concerning the situation in Ethiopia, Malin noted the tension of the situation caused by the activation of forces opposed to the Derg, especially in the northwestern region of the country which is siding with the Sudan. He directed attention to the "harsh pronouncements" of the Chairman of the PMAC, Teferi Banti, of January 29 and 30 of this year, addressed to the leaders of the Sudan and Somalia, who are pursuing an anti-Ethiopian policy, as well as to his call for a union of "all progressive and patriotic forces" for the defense of "the revolution and the fatherland," in this connection not mentioning the anti-government leftist organization "Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party" (EPRP). However, Malin feels that the EPRP will hardly agree to support the call of Teferi Banti, due to its disagreement with the policy of the Derg.

At the same time, he continued, the opposition forces are not united and their joint opposition to the existing regime has a temporary and tactical character. Even if the opposition forces should succeed in overthrowing this regime, a struggle for power will erupt between them, especially between the pro-monarchy "Ethiopian Democratic Union" and the "Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party" and other leftist groups. The PMAC, in his opinion, continues to be the only real common national power in contemporary Ethiopia, although its policy does not enjoy support among a significant portion of the population. It is further undoubted that, despite the declarations of the Sudanese and Somalis, present day Ethiopia does not harbor "aggressive designs" in relation to its neighbors, and in any event lacks the opportunity for the same in view of its complex internal problems.

Concerning circumstances in the Military Council itself, after the implementation

of its partial reorganization in the end of December [1976] with the aim of reinforcing "collective leadership" of the country, the opinion predominates in Addis Ababa that the policy of the PMAC will acquire a "more moderate" character. However, to judge by the declarations of Teferi Banti, that has not occurred.

In sum, according to Malin's opinion, circumstances in Ethiopia will continue to be complicated and tense for a long time to come.

For his part, he noted that the deterioration of existing circumstances in the country is tied in significant part to the open interference in the internal affairs of Ethiopia by the community of Arab countries and other forces, who are aligned in hostility to the policy of the PMAC and are supporting forces opposed to it. He noted further that, in the final analysis, what is at issue is not merely Ethiopia itself, but the situation in the region as a whole, the efforts of certain Arab circles to establish complete control over the Red Sea, which constitutes an important international maritime route, and the possible eruption here of a completely tense situation and even armed conflict. In this connection the opinion of Malin on the condition of American-Ethiopian relations and prospective development of circumstances in the given region was of interest.

Malin said that until now the American administration, owing to the presidential elections, had not had an opportunity to involve itself to the extent warranted in the development of its policy in this region. Since the change of regime in Ethiopia in 1974, American-Ethiopian relations have had a relatively complex and contentious character. The USA cannot ignore the periodic outbreaks of anti-American activity in the country. Thus, on 27-28 January of this year, in the course of anti-government demonstrations by young protesters in Addis Ababa, glass was broken and gas bombs were hurled at the department of the USIS [United States Information Service] building, in addition to which leaflets of the "Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party" were distributed. Similar bombs were hurled at the building of the MAAG [Ameri-

can Military Advisory Group]. In the course of a demonstration of by a group organized by the Military Council on 3 January in Addis Ababa in connection with the above-noted pronouncements of Teferi Banti, anti-American performances by an array of orators were also seen, along with anti-American placards and so forth, although official declarations, including those by Teferi Banti himself, contained no such direct anti-American missives.

At the same time, Malin continued, the Ethiopian government displays an interest in continuing to receive various forms of assistance from the USA, especially military assistance, and frequently talks about the timetable for the delivery of military supplies and so forth. Prior to the change of regime in Ethiopia, American military assistance was at an annual level of 10-12 million American dollars and was administered preferentially on an uncompensated basis (deliveries of arms, ammunition, spare parts, etc.). In recent years, owing to the new policy of the USA in the area of military cooperation with foreign governments, American military assistance to Ethiopia has been granted preferentially on commercial terms, and it includes several types of more advanced armaments, in connection with which the value of the assistance has grown. Thus, the signing of a multi-year contract in 1975 envisions the supply of armaments, spare parts and ammunition in the approximate sum of 250 million American dollars. Already in 1976 the USA supplied Ethiopia with part of those arms, including several "Phantom" fighter planes. This year a supply of several additional fighter planes is contemplated, as well as supplies for the Ethiopian navy, and radar defenses.

Malin noted further that the new Ethiopian administration is pursuing a policy of seeking methods of receiving military assistance from other sources as well, possibly on terms more advantageous to it, including from the USSR (he is aware of the visit by the Ethiopian military delegation to Moscow in December of 1976), as well as the PRC [People's Republic of China], although he doubts that the Chinese are capable of supplying Ethiopia with "serious armaments."

The USA, Malin emphasized, does not oppose the "socialist choice" of new Ethiopia and, as before, firmly supports the principal of respect for its territorial integrity,

and is against the partition of Ethiopia. The USA, it is understood, is interested in the guarantee of stability in that region and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea.

Responding to pertinent questions, he said that the American-Ethiopian agreement of 1953 "on mutual security guarantees" concerned the preferential supply of assistance by the USA to the armed forces of Ethiopia and the guarantee of "certain American interests," first and foremost of which was the operation of the "center of communications" in Asmara, which was of great importance at the time (that center has now been curtailed in significant part); but, as he understands it, [the agreement] does not call for the direct involvement of American armed forces in the defense of Ethiopia's security, for example, in the case of aggression against it or a threat to its territorial integrity.

Concerning the present deterioration in Ethiopian-Somali relations, as far as Malin knows, the USA has not undertaken any diplomatic steps toward its normalization or restraint of anti-Ethiopian actions by the Arab countries, and in fact the Ethiopian government itself has not raised the issue with the USA.

One of the potential sources for an eruption of a conflict in that region, in Malin's opinion, is the independence of Djibouti that has emerged this year, inasmuch as a serious disagreement exists between Somalia and Ethiopia regarding the future policy of Djibouti. In recent months, the Somalis have succeeded in reinforcing their political influence in Djibouti, and their ties with its present leaders, which has seriously worried the Ethiopians. It is evident, as well, that after its declaration of independence, Djibouti will enter the League of Arab Nations, both in political and economic respects, inasmuch as the position of Djibouti will be complicated following the departure of the French. An array of Arab nations has already established consulates there. The USA also intends to do this prior to the declaration of independence, having requested appropriate permission from the government of France.

In the course of the discussion, Malin expressed interest in the state of Soviet-Ethiopian relations, having come upon rumors concerning the upcoming visit to the USSR of First Deputy Chairman of the PMAC Mengistu Haile Mariam, and also

in connection with the negative, as he understands it, attitude of Somalia toward the prospective development of Soviet-Ethiopian cooperation.

I told Malin that our traditionally friendly relations with Ethiopia have a tendency to develop further, as evident from the joint Soviet-Ethiopian communique of 14 July 1976, resulting from the visit to Moscow of an Ethiopian state delegation; the growth of Soviet technical assistance to Ethiopia (teachers in the University, doctors, etc.); the work here during the second half of last year by Soviet economic experts, and so forth. It was pointed out that the continuation of contacts between the two countries at a high level would be the natural procedure under such conditions, although, however, that question had not come up in respect to a concrete plan. I said further that we are aware of the disagreements between Somalia and Ethiopia, and that our unwavering position in that connection is to serve as a motivation for both countries to move towards a peaceful resolution of these disagreements at the negotiating table, in order to prevent a deterioration of circumstances in this region. This relates as well to our position in connection with the current complication in Sudanese-Ethiopian relations. As concerns the future of developments in Soviet-Ethiopian cooperation, it is understood that this cannot be directed against Somalia, with whom we are also developing friendly relations, as the Somali leadership is well aware.

Malin asked, in my opinion, in what spheres would the interests of the USA in Ethiopia not be counter to the interests of the Soviet Union.

I replied, that in my view, these spheres would first and foremost encompass the conduct of a policy of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ethiopia; noninterference in its internal affairs; a realistic approach to the social-economic and political transformations taking place in the country by the will of the people; the building of peace and security and a halt to the growth of tensions and conflicts between the countries of that region; and adherence to the principle of unrestricted navigation in the Red Sea, in accordance with recognized standards of international law and the interests of peaceful relations in general.

Thanking me for the conference, Malin expressed a desire for continuation of fur-

ther contacts and exchanges of opinions regarding the questions discussed, as to which, for his part, he stated his agreement.

COUNSELOR-MINISTER TO THE  
USSR EMBASSY IN ETHIOPIA  
/s/ S. SINITSIN

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1638, ll. 28-33; translated by Bruce McDonald.]

**Third African Department, Soviet  
Foreign Ministry, Information Report  
on Somali-Ethiopian Territorial  
Disputes, 2 February 1977**

SOMALIA'S TERRITORIAL  
DISAGREEMENTS WITH ETHIOPIA  
AND THE POSITION OF THE USSR  
(Brief Information Sheet)

Somalia claims a significant part of Ethiopian territory (the Ogaden region) on the basis of the fact that a large number of Somalis live there (around 1 million people).

Ethiopia totally rejects the territorial claims of the SDR, basing its position on the fact that the borders with Somalia were set by international agreements, particularly the Agreement on the demilitarization of the Ethiopia-Somalia border, which was signed in 1908 between Ethiopia and Italy. They also refer to the resolution of the OAU which was accepted in Cairo in 1964, which says that all African states must recognize the borders which existed at the moment when they were granted independence.

The tension in relations with Somalia led imperial Ethiopia to draw close to Kenya (the Somalis did not decline either from demanding the unification with Somalia of the Northern border region of Kenya, which is populated by Somalis) on an anti-Somali basis. In 1963 there was a Treaty on joint defense signed between the two countries.

At the beginning of 1964 a direct military confrontation broke out between Ethiopia and Somalia, although the conflict was soon settled through the mediation of the OAU. The Soviet government also called on both sides with an appeal to quickly cease fire and to resolve all disputed issues in a peaceful way.

During 1970-71 a series of Ethiopia-Somalia negotiations were conducted which ended without result. At the end of 1972-beginning of 1973 a series of border inci-

dents broke out (in the regions of Washen, Bongol, Dolo, and others) which were smoothed over by peaceful means.

The tension in relations between Ethiopia and Somalia many times attracted the attention of the Organization of African Unity. However, efforts to find a mutually acceptable solution to the territorial argument between Ethiopia and Somalia within the framework of the OAU so far have yielded no result.

At the session of the OAU Assembly which took place in Addis Ababa in January 1976, two meetings took place, at Siad Barre's initiative, between him and the chairman of the PMAC of Ethiopia, during which the question of bilateral relations was raised. The leaders of both countries asserted that the exchange of opinions was productive, and expressed the intention to continue the dialogue. Practical steps in this direction, however, were not undertaken.

The Somali leaders, though they stress that the issue must be resolved by peaceful means, as in the past do not repudiate the demand about the unification of the Ogaden with Somalia. According to available information, the Somalis continue their activity in the Ogaden, throwing their armed detachments in there under the command of line officers.

The new Ethiopian leadership, refusing to discuss the territorial issue, expresses readiness to conduct negotiations on the demilitarization of the existing border and speaks out in favor of the development of economic, cultural, and other relations with the SDR.

Relations between the two countries are becoming more complex also because of Djibouti - a French territory of Afars and Issa (FTAI), to which France intends to grant independence this year. For Ethiopia this territory represents a vital interest in view of the fact that Djibouti is the terminus of the railway from Addis Ababa, by way of which the basic part of Ethiopia's foreign trade freight is carried. The Somalis, for their part, consider the FTAI, or, as they call that territory, "French Somalia," one of five parts of "Greater Somalia," in view of the fact that its population to a significant extent consists of tribes which are related to the Somalis.

At the XXX session of the UN GA, a resolution was accepted in which was asserted the unconditional right of the people

of Djibouti to quick and unconditional independence, and also contained an appeal to all states to "desist from any claims whatever on that territory and declare null and void any actions in support of such claims." Both Ethiopia and Somalia voted for that resolution.

At the same time the government of the SDR does not hide its hopes that once having become independent the population of Djibouti will come out in favor of unification with Somalia. This was displayed, in particular, at the XIII Assembly of the OAU (July 1976), where the Somali representatives did not support the demand of Ethiopia for a joint declaration to repudiate territorial claims, asserting that the sovereignty of Djibouti should not depend on "threats of police actions from the power-guarantors." In December 1976, President Siad, in a communication to the heads of African states, declared even more precisely that "if the goal of these guarantees will force Somalia to reject our blood ties, the common history and culture which tie us with the people of Djibouti, then we declare, that is impossible."

Nonetheless, Somalia, just like Ethiopia, voted for the resolution of the XXXI session of the UN GA of 23 November 1976, on Djibouti, which once again affirmed the right of the people of that territory to independence. Representatives of both countries to the UN declared that their governments will recognize, respect, and observe the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Djibouti after it receives independence.

However, in the course of the discussion at the UN General Assembly session, the speeches of the Somalia and Ethiopia delegations showed that, as in the past, serious disagreements remain between these countries about the ways to resolve the Djibouti problem. They showed particularly on the issue of the return to the territory of political refugees. The Ethiopians accused the Somalis of intending to send to Djibouti their own citizens, disguised as refugees, so as to ensure as a consequence its joining with the SDR.

The position of the Somali leadership regarding Eritrea also leaves a negative imprint on Somalia-Ethiopia relations. Providing support to Eritrean separatists, Somalia, to all appearances, is counting on the fact that the separation of Eritrea from Ethio-

pia will lead to a split of the multinational Ethiopian state, which will facilitate the unification of the Ogaden territory with Somalia.

The Somali government recently has activated its propaganda against Ethiopia and its activity in the international arena, with the goal of enlisting support for its position vis-a-vis the new Ethiopian regime, which, as it believes, is conducting in relation to Somalis the former imperial "colonial policy." This point of view was expressed by the vice president of the SDR [Gen. Mohamed Ali] Samantar during his visit last year to a number of European socialist countries and to Cuba. However, in no instance did it meet with understanding. Somalia is also taking certain steps in Arab countries so as to receive support for its claims to Ogaden and Djibouti. In this regard the Somalis point to the fact that the joining of Djibouti to the "Arab world" (SDR is a member of the Arab League) promises it not insignificant benefits in realizing plans to turn the Red Sea into an "Arab lake."

Arab reaction supports and heats up the aspirations of the Somalis, with the goal of putting pressure on the progressive Ethiopian leadership. President of Somalia Siad intends in the beginning of 1977 to complete a trip to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Sudan and several other Arab countries. As he left in January 1977 for Khartoum to prepare for this visit, Member of the Politburo of the CC of the Somali Revolutionary Socialist Party [Ahmed] Suleiman [Abdullah] public expressed himself in vulgar anti-Ethiopian thrusts. Suleiman openly spoke out in support of the Eritrean separatists, and also in favor of a proposal to move the headquarters of the OAU from Addis Ababa to another capital, a proposal for which Sudan and several African countries with a pro-Western orientation recently expressed support.

Beginning in the 1960s, in almost every instance of a serious aggravation of Ethiopia-Somalia relations, Ethiopia and Somalia have appealed to the Soviet government with a request to assert influence on the government of the other country with the goal of normalizing the situation. Recently, both Somalia and Ethiopia have repeatedly called for more active participation by the Soviet Union in settling their bilat-

eral relations. In this regard each of them is counting on the Soviet Union to support precisely their position, using for this its authority and friendly relations with the opposing side.

In January 1976, Siad Barre informed the Soviet government of [Somalia's] intention to enter into negotiations with the Ethiopian leadership about the creation of a Federation of Somalia and Ethiopia. In this regard the President requested the Soviet side to join the negotiations as a mediator. Insofar as the goal and character of a federation, as well as the possible position of Ethiopia, were not clear, it was decided to avoid defining our attitude to this initiative and mediation on this issue. In November 1976 Siad Barre expressed the wish that the Soviet side would report to the Ethiopian leadership about the wish of the SDR to begin a peaceful dialogue with Ethiopia on the disputed issues which they have. This wish was brought to the attention of the Chairman of the Committee of the PMAC for political and foreign affairs through the Soviet Embassy in Addis Ababa.

At the end of 1976 the Cubans and South Yemenis came out with an initiative to provide mediatory services towards a settlement of Somalia-Ethiopia relations. The Somali government, not rejecting this proposal, spoke out in favor of the Soviet Union as well participating directly in the mediation. The Ethiopian side, regarding the mediation initiative favorably, did not express an analogous wish. Cuba and the PDRY through diplomatic channels are taking certain steps to organize meetings between the leaders of Somalia and Ethiopia.

The position of the Soviet Union on the question of the Ethiopia-Somalia territorial dispute, which many times has been brought to the attention of the governments of both countries, is that Ethiopia and the SDR must take all possible measures to settle their disagreements by means of negotiations and to find a way to lessen the tension in Ethiopia-Somalia relations.

The friendly advice of the USSR government, aimed at a settlement of Ethiopia-Somalia relations, has been favorably accepted by the governments of both countries. In responses to our appeals both Ethiopia and Somalia have announced their readiness to resolve all disputed issues by means of negotiations and not to allow the unleashing of a new armed conflict.

Third African Department  
MFA USSR

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1632, ll. 39-44; translated by Mark H. Doctoroff; note revisions to this document added in late May-early June, printed below.]

**Memorandum of Conversation between  
Soviet Ambassador in Ethiopia  
A.P. Ratanov and Cuban Ambassador  
in Ethiopia Jose Peres Novoa,  
10 February 1977**

TOP SECRET, Copy No. 2  
From the diary of "30" March 1977  
RATANOV, A.P. Issue No. 129

**RECORD OF CONVERSATION  
With the Ambassador of Cuba in Ethiopia  
JOSE PERES NOVOA  
10 February 1977**

During a conversation which took place in the Soviet Embassy, Jose Peres Novoa reported that on 8 February he had visited Mengistu Haile Mariam at the latter's request.

Mengistu requested that the Ambassador pass on to Fidel Castro a verbal message in which the PMAC requests Cuba to provide assistance to the Ethiopian People's Militia via deliveries of small arms. In this regard Mengistu declared that the Americans had already refused to provide spare parts for tanks, [and] had suspended deliveries of spare parts for all kinds of weapons, and that the PMAC expects the USA, after the events of 3 February to apply even harsher sanctions against Ethiopia. At the same time the USA is providing military assistance to Sudan, [and] Kenya, and is encouraging officials of these and other countries to act against the Ethiopian regime.

The PMAC, reported Mengistu, intends to follow Cuba's example of creating in factories and agencies, and in villages, committees for defense of the revolution, which will act in close contact with detachments of the people's militia, which are formed under the supervision of urban and rural associations. However, the effectiveness of these measures will depend on whether the PMAC has available and at its disposal the necessary quantity of weapons.

USSR AMBASSADOR IN ETHIOPIA  
/s/ A. RATANOV

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1637, l. 85; translated by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

**Soviet Embassy in East Germany,  
Report for CPSU CC Summarizing  
Visit to Somalia on 31 January-1  
February 1977 by Delegation of the  
GDR Socialist Unity Party (SED) CC,  
18 February 1977**

USSR EMBASSY IN  
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC  
SECRET, Copy no. 1  
18 February 1977

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE  
CC CPSU comrade B. N. PONOMAREV

We send to your attention according to classified procedures this report concerning the trip to Somalia, Mozambique, and Ethiopia (January 31 - February 11 of this year) by a delegation from the German Democratic Republic, headed by Politburo member, Secretary of the CC SED, comrade W. Lamberz.

ATTACHMENT: above-mentioned document of 41 pages, secret.

USSR AMBASSADOR TO  
GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

/s/ P. ABRASIMOV

[attachment]

SECRET, Copy no. 1  
Attachment to no. 122  
18 February 1977  
Translated from German

**REPORT**

concerning a trip to the Democratic  
Republic of Somali by a delegation from  
the CC SED from  
31 January-1 February 1977

From 31 January to 1 February a delegation from the CC SED, headed by Politburo member, Secretary of the CC, Werner Lamberz visited Mogadishu at the invitation of the leadership of the Somali Revolu-

tionary Socialist Party (SRSP). The delegation comprised: CC Member Kurt Tidke, Candidate-Member of the CC Eberhard Heidrich, Deputy Chief of the CC Section Freidel Trappen.

In accordance with its instructions, the delegation conveyed from the Secretary General of the CC SED Erich Honecker to the Secretary General of the SRSP and to the President of the Democratic Republic of Somalia, Mohammed Siad Barre, a message in response to the letter from Barre dated 24 November 1976, and concluded an agreement on collaboration between the SED and the SRSP for 1977-78.

The delegation received Mohammed Siad Barre, with whom they engaged in a detailed discussion.

Werner Lamberz conveyed greetings from the Secretary General of the CC SED and Chairman of the State Council of the GDR, Eric Honecker, and conveyed some explanations regarding his message. At the same time he stated the SED position with regard to the progressive development in Somalia and reported on the decisions of our party leadership, which were made as a result of the discussions of comrade [GDR Vice President Willi] Stoph in Somalia with comrade Samantar in the GDR. It was declared that the SED will now and in the future, to the extent of its abilities, offer support to the Republic of Somalia. At the same time, particular attention was drawn to the concurrence of the party.

Mohammed Siad Barre expressed his thanks for the message from Eric Honecker and expressed his gratitude for the GDR's manifestation of solidarity with the anti-imperialist liberation struggle. Somalia considers the help, which has been offered by the SSNM brigade in the preparation of specialists, to be particularly useful. Siad Barre in detail elucidated the internal situation in Somalia and, at the same time, particularly underscored the difficulties in realizing the party program.

In connection with the statement by Werner Lamberz concerning relations between the SDR and Ethiopia, Barre first and foremost affirmed the necessity of reaching a peaceful settlement of the problem with Ethiopia. However, at the same time, it was notable that his position on this question was contradictory and not free of nationalist features. He expressed doubt about the revolutionary nature of development in Ethio-

pia and characterized the Ethiopian leaders as chauvinists, and as connected to Zionist forces. Progressive forces in Ethiopia, including Marxist-Leninists, are persecuted and destroyed.

In the course of further conversation, in particular after the statement setting forth our position regarding the necessity of reaching agreement between progressive forces in Somalia and Ethiopia, and of the inadmissibility of any possibility that the imperialists should profit from the discord between the two states, Barre declared that he was prepared to study seriously any proposition of the Ethiopian leadership, in particular, from Mengistu. (Attachment 1). [not printed—ed.] (During the meeting between members of the Somali party and state leadership and the delegation, at which ambassadors of the socialist countries were also present, the Soviet ambassador to Mogadishu informed me that at the end of January [1977] comrade Brezhnev had likewise sent a message to Siad Barre, containing an urgent request that Barre reconsider the Somali position with regard to Ethiopia and that they avoid any exacerbation of the conflict.)

During the discussion of the project for a party agreement proposed by the SED, at first clarity was achieved with regard to the notion that the central content of such an agreement should be cooperation in the political-ideological area and that cooperation between our parties comprises the nucleus of all relations between our states and peoples. However, the SRSP delegation, headed by Politburo Member Ahmed Suleiman Abdullah, came forward with a request which greatly exceeds the ability of the SED (to build five fully equipped regional Party schools, to equip 82 regional Party committees with radio technology and supply with typographical machines, to accept an exceedingly large number of students for study at SED institutes of higher education, etc.), with which it was not possible to agree. In spite of these unrealistic requests, we succeeded in concluding an agreement which is realistic and which represents significant assistance and support for the Somali Party (Attachment II). [not printed—ed.]

It was strikingly apparent that, both during the time when our delegation toured around the city and during the negotiations on a Party agreement, mention was made

repeatedly of the assistance and support which Somalia receives from China.

According to various [sources of] information, apart from a strongly progressive core in the Somali leadership, there is also a pro-China force which leans to the side of reactionary Arab states. (Last year Somalia was accepted into the Arab League as its youngest member.)

/s/ comr. R. A. Ulianovskii

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 77, d. 1618, ll. 1-5.]

**Memorandum of Conversation between  
Soviet Ambassador to Somalia G.V.  
Samsonov and Somali President Siad  
Barre, 23 February 1977**

EMBASSY OF THE USSR IN THE  
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF  
SOMALIA

From the journal of Secret. Copy No. 2  
G.V. SAMSONOV Orig. No. 101  
11 March 1977

NOTES FROM CONVERSATION  
with President of the Democratic Republic  
of Somalia  
MOHAMMED SIAD BARRE

23 February 1977

Today I was received by President Siad.

In accordance with my orders I informed him about the considerations of the Soviet leaders, and Comrade Brezhnev personally, concerning the situation developing around Ethiopia.

The President thanked me for the information. Then he pointed out that certain people in the SDR, encouraged from abroad, speculated that Soviet cooperation with Ethiopia was allegedly carried out to the detriment of Soviet-Somali relations. According to Siad, he had to condemn such a point of view in his speech at the Khalan Military School in particular, he had to say that such statements should be considered anti-Somali propaganda aimed at subversion of the Somali revolution. The President emphasized that the assistance that the Soviet Union and other socialist countries provide for the Ethiopian revolution was not only justified, but also necessary. The So-

viet Union, as we understand it, the President said, is trying to help Ethiopia stabilize on the road of socialist orientation, and those goals of the Soviet Union completely coincide with Somali interests. The SDR has an interest in having a socialist, not a capitalist, neighbor.

Characterizing Chairman of the PMAC H.M. Mengistu, President Siad called him a firm and consistent proponent of the progressive change in Ethiopia. However, according to Siad, Mengistu does not abide by Leninist principles in the nationality issue. He must give the nations living in Ogaden, including both the Eritreans and the Somalis, the right to self-determination. According to the President, it is important that Mengistu resolves the territorial problem right now, or at least gives assurances that he is ready to consider this question positively in the future. Siad alleged that the struggle for power in the Ethiopian leadership was still going on, and that there were no positive changes in the state apparatus of that country. The President thinks that Mengistu is unwilling to meet with him. He mentioned the fact that the Chairman of the PMAC did not give an immediate response to the [Tanzania President Julius] Nyerere letter, which was delivered to Addis Ababa by Vice President [Aboud] Jumbe of Tanzania, and in which, according to Siad, the idea of his meeting with Mengistu was put forth.

Responding to the Soviet remarks concerning statements of certain Somali statesmen in Sudan, President Siad alleged that member of the Politburo CC SRSP Suleiman had only expressed an opinion on the situation in Ethiopia, and that Minister of Public Health Rabile God was just giving his personal views, and that his statement was, allegedly, provoked by the Sudanese. The main threat to Ethiopia was arising from Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Kenya, not from the SDR, emphasized the President. According to a reliable source, Siad said, the internal reaction, represented by the Ethiopian Democratic Union headquartered in London and supported by the CIA, was carefully preparing a broad terrorist campaign against the leadership of the PMAC and against other progressive Ethiopian leaders. Siad denied the information that special units trained in the Somali territory, which also included Somali servicemen, were being transferred to the Ogaden. The

SDR was not going to start a war with Ethiopia over the Ogaden, stressed the President. Such a conflict would be detrimental to both countries. Only imperialists and the Arab reactionaries would win in such a case. We understand this very well, said Siad. However, we will support the struggle for unification with the Fatherland of the Somalis living in the Ogaden, emphasized the President. He said that the people living in the Ogaden were their brothers and sisters, and that his leadership could not reject them if they appeal to them for help. The people of Somalia would not understand its leaders if they were to suppress their struggle for liberation from the Ethiopian colonial yoke.

I explained to Siad the CPSU policy on the nationality issue.

Responding to my question concerning Somali-American contacts, the President told me about his meeting with USA representative at the UN [Andrew] Young in Zanzibar in early February 1977. He mentioned that the meeting was held at the American initiative. According to Siad, Young informed him about the "new approach" of the Carter Administration in their policy toward Africa, and stressed the USA readiness to cooperate with all African countries. Siad Barre said to Young that the peoples of Africa will judge the "new" American policy by the practical actions of the American administration. First of all, the United States must withdraw its support for the white minority regimes in South Africa. Responding to Young's question, why the SDR was always acting from an anti-American position, Siad said that it was the United States that was always conducting a vicious anti-Somali policy. The SDR decisively condemned the USA position on the Middle East, and also the support that the USA gave to various reactionary forces in their struggle against progressive regimes, and the fomenting of military conflicts in various regions of the globe.

The President told me that recently a representative of the USA State Department visited Mogadishu, arriving from Khartoum. He had a meeting with General Director Abdurrahman Jama Barre of the MFA of the SDR. The American requested to have meetings with several Somali state leaders of his choice, including First Vice President Samantar. His request was denied. According to the President, the American left the SDR dissatisfied.

Touching upon his initiative for cooperation between the USSR and the SDR, the President repeated the suggestion he made earlier (17 January 1977) that the Soviet Union take on the development of the lands of the Fanole project. According to the President, Somalia had neither the necessary experts, nor technology, nor resources, and that it would be incorrect to invite other countries to carry out those tasks. Siad said that the provision about development of those lands had not been included in the original agreement on Fanole project construction only because of the incompetence of the Somali representatives who signed that document.

The President also reminded me of his request concerning construction of a naval base in the region of Mogadishu, and also of docks in Berbera and Kismayu, which was stated in the memorandum delivered to Moscow by First Vice President Samantar. Those projects are still in force and the Somali leadership is expecting the Soviet government to examine them favorably.

Speaking about the military airfield in Berbera which had been opened recently, Siad said that it had been built without taking into account the prospects of its possible civilian utilization. This airfield should serve not only the interests of the USSR, but the interests of the SDR also. In order for this airfield to be used by civil aviation in the future, it would be necessary additionally to build a control tower for air traffic controllers, a room for transit passengers, other necessary services of a modern airport, and also a hotel for 200-300 rooms in the city, in which the Soviet air crews and naval crews could also stay. Those additional constructions would serve as a kind of cover for the military airfield.

Having given a high evaluation of the Soviet assistance in the organization of fishing cooperatives, President Siad made a request that the Soviet side provide resources in the form of commodity credits to cover the local expenses in those cooperatives, since the SDR was experiencing shortages not only of material, but also of financial resources for those projects. Specifically, the Somali leadership was asking the Soviet Union to take responsibility for providing the minimum living standard for the families of transfer workers in the cooperatives, and to apportion up to 10 shillings per worker per day, mentioned the President.

According to the President, he gave directives to certain Somali organizations to prepare official requests on the questions just mentioned.

President Siad expressed his warm gratitude to the CC CPSU for the decision to provide assistance in construction of the party school at the Central Committee of the SRSP. He said he considered that assistance a show of fraternal care from the CPSU for the SRSP which was undergoing a difficult formative period. He also thanked Moscow for the attention to the request for more Somali citizens, especially for people from Djibouti, to be given an opportunity to study in the Soviet Union, and for the decision to satisfy the request in the 1977-78 academic year.

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR  
IN THE SDR /G. SAMSONOV/

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1621, ll. 10-14; translation by S. Savranskaya.]

**Memorandum of Conversation between  
Soviet Acting Charge d'affaires in  
Ethiopia S. Sinitsin and Ethiopian  
official Maj. Berhanu Bayeh,  
18 March 1977**

TOP SECRET Copy No. 2  
From the journal of 30 March 1977  
SINIT SIN, S.Ia. Issue No. 124

RECORD OF CONVERSATION  
with the member of the Permanent  
Committee of the PMAC  
Major BERHANU BAYEH  
18 March 1977

This evening I visited Berhanu Bayeh in the office of the PMAC at his request.

Referring to an instruction of the leadership of the PMAC, he informed me for transmission to Moscow of the following.

I. The meeting in Aden which took place March 16 between Mengistu Haile Mariam and Siad Barre, with the participation of [Cuban President] Fidel Castro and [People's Democratic Republic of Yemen President] Rubayi [Ali], ended without result in view of the position which Siad Barre took at the meeting.

As Berhanu Bayeh said, the President of the SDR in arrogant terms expressed Somalia's territorial claims against Ethio-

pia, called Ethiopia a "colonial power," and declared that Somalia will continue its current policy in relation to Ethiopia, "while all Somalians have not received freedom." Siad Barre displayed disrespect to Mengistu Haile Mariam, crudely saying that that he allegedly is carrying out the same policy as had Haile Selassie. The Somali leader also declared that if Ethiopia considers itself a socialist state, then it must rapidly transfer the Ogaden to the SDR. As the basis of a settlement of the Ethiopian-Somali disagreement, Siad Barre suggested the creation of a confederation of the two countries on an "ethnic basis," i.e., with the preliminary transfer by Ethiopia of the Ogaden to Somalia's benefit. This proposal was rejected not only by Mengistu Haile Mariam, but Fidel Castro and Rubayi also expressed themselves against such an approach, which served as grounds for disrespectful statements to them by Siad Barre.

In the words of Berhanu Bayeh, in the course of the meeting Siad Barre declared that if the socialist countries want to split with Somalia, that is their affair: the Somali people carried out its revolution without outside help and "if the socialist countries will not help the Somalis, then reactionary countries can help them."

At the meeting Mengistu Haile Mariam stressed the necessity of a consolidation of progressive forces in this region so as to oppose jointly the maneuvers of reaction and imperialism. In this regard, he underlined that no genuine revolution can successfully develop without the support of other progressive, especially socialist, states.

Despite such results of the meeting, Berhanu Bayeh said, the Ethiopian leadership believes that the meeting brought an indisputable diplomatic success to Ethiopia, insofar as it visibly and in the presence of the leaders of Cuba and the PDRY revealed the true position of Somalia not only towards Ethiopia, but also in regard to the general tasks of the struggle with imperialism and reaction. In the opinion of Berhanu Bayeh, which, he said, is expressed also by the Cuban comrades, Siad Barre had taken such an uncompromising position at the meeting with Mengistu Haile Mariam, that he apparently had previously secured promises of support from reactionary Arab states.

2. In the evaluation of the leadership of the PMAC, Berhanu Bayeh continued, in light of the results of the Aden meeting it

is possible to assume a sharp activation of anti-Ethiopia activity by Somalia in close cooperation with reactionary Arab states. According to information which the PMAC received from Mogadishu, the President of Sudan [Ja'afar Mohammed al-]Nimeiry should arrive in Somalia in a few days. In this regard the PMAC pointed to a report in the Egyptian newspaper "Al Ahram" to the effect that in current conditions the possibility is created that Somalia will join the political command of Sudan, Egypt, and Syria. It is also well known, said Berhanu Bayeh, that Saudi Arabia is continuing to seek an end to Somalia's cooperation with the Soviet Union, including in the military area, promising in exchange to provide Somalia with the necessary assistance.

The leadership of the PMAC also is on guard about the intensified infiltration in the Ogaden by Somali armed groups, which moreover now include regular Somali troops disguised in civilian dress, armed with modern weapons. This, observed Berhanu Bayeh, has determined the extremely stubborn nature of recent armed conflict in the regions of Harar and Jijiga, as a result of which the Somalis managed to put out of action several armored vehicles of the Ethiopian Army. On 17 March, a Somali Air Force MiG fighter plane completed a provocative flight over Ethiopian territory in the region of Jijiga.

In light of all this, Berhanu Bayeh requested that a PMAC request be sent to the Soviet government to take all possible measures to restrain Somalia from anti-Ethiopia actions. The PMAC does not exclude the possibility that Somalia at the present time may be preparing a serious armed provocation against Ethiopia, and therefore would be grateful for any information about that which it could receive from the Soviet side.

From my own side I pointed out to Berhanu Bayeh the need in this situation for Ethiopia to display fortitude. Further, I underlined the principled line of the Soviet Union of all-round support for the Ethiopian revolution and our diplomatic steps in this regard which were taken recently in states which border on Ethiopia.

Berhanu Bayeh said that Ethiopia does not intend to aggravate its relations with Somalia or to toughen its own position. With satisfaction he noted the support of the Soviet Union for the Ethiopian revolution,

particularly underlining the significance of the early deliveries of Soviet arms.

In the words of Berhanu Bayeh, at the present time the PMAC is confronted with the critical issue of the uninterrupted supply to the Ethiopian Army of ammunition and spare parts for weapons which it possesses. The Americans are procrastinating on previously-agreed deliveries, and also deliveries of weapons on a commercial basis, referring in this regard to a required review of certain contracts in view of an increase in prices for these or some other types of weapons. The leadership of the PMAC, as in the past, is counting on the Soviet Union to provide Ethiopia with the necessary varied military assistance, but it understands that time will be required to master Soviet military equipment. Therefore, the PMAC is now urgently seeking out the possibility of receiving weapons, ammunition, and spare parts of American manufacture, insofar as the Ethiopian Army for now is armed by the USA.

To this end, said Berhanu Bayeh, the PMAC in the coming days will send its own delegation to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, which has at its disposal significant reserves of American trophy weapons. In this regard Berhanu Bayeh in the name of the PMAC leadership expressed a wish that the Soviet side will convince the Vietnamese comrades to provide, according to their capabilities, the necessary assistance in American arms, either on a grant basis or on a combined grant and commercial basis. In this regard he noted that in contrast to the past the PMAC intends to consider this issue with the Vietnamese directly, rather than running to the PRC for mediation. For my part, I promised to send through channels the wishes and requests which had been expressed by Berhanu Bayeh.

At the end of the conversation Berhanu Bayeh made a personal request that his brother Abraham Bayeh (19 years old) be accepted into one of the educational institutions of the Soviet Union. Counter-revolutionaries, including among the student population, threaten his brother with reprisal for familial relations with the "fascist junta," because of which Abraham cannot go to school and must hide at another brother's house (Fisseha Bayeh, jurist). In these circumstances it would be desirable if Abraham Bayeh could be sent to the USSR as soon as

possible. The level of his education — 12th (graduating) grade of high school[;] however, because he currently is not able to attend classes (he studies at home with a teacher) and take the examinations, he evidently will not manage to receive an official certificate for finishing high school (he studies in the Wingate school, where until recently instruction was led by teachers from England).

I told Berhanu Bayeh that I would bring his wish and thoughts regarding his brother to the attention of the Soviet ambassador. On a personal plane, I noted that resolving that issue would require consultation with the appropriate Soviet agencies.

MINISTER-COUNSELOR OF THE  
USSR EMBASSY IN ETHIOPIA  
/S. SINITSYN/

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1638, ll. 93-97; translated by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

**Report from CPSU CC to SED CC,  
Results of N.V. Podgorny's Visit to  
Africa, late March 1977 (excerpts)**

Strictly confidential

On the results of an official visit of N.V. PODGORNYY to Tanzania, Zambia, Mozambique, and also of an unofficial visit to Somalia and a meeting with the leaders of the national-liberation organizations of the South of Africa that took place in Lusaka on 28 March [1977]

[Received on 19 April 1977]

During the negotiations between N.V. Podgorny and the leaders of the mentioned countries they discussed issues of bilateral relations and relevant international issues. The main results of the visit were covered in published communiques, as well as in joint declarations. In addition, we would like to inform You in a confidential manner about the following....

During the talks they discussed the issues of the situation in the African Horn with regard to the aggravation of Ethiopian-Somali relations. The presidents, particularly Nyerere and [Mozambican President Samora] Machel, voiced their concern at the growing enmity between the two progressive countries and expressed regrets regard-

ing the unfriendly position of the Somali leadership towards the “revolutionary regime” in Ethiopia. In the opinion of Nyerere, for the foreseeable future one cannot expect the establishment of a friendly relationship between Somalia and Ethiopia. The maximum one can achieve is to avoid an open clash between Ethiopia and Somalia, by persuading both sides of the need to maintain mutual restraint. Nyerere and Machel said that satisfaction of the territorial demands of Somalia would automatically result in the collapse of the progressive regime in Ethiopia. All three leaders evaluated very highly the position of the Soviet Union and agreed with our opinion that progressive states must more actively come out in support of the Ethiopian revolution and advocate the normalization of Ethiopian-Somali relations....

The main topic of conversation [of Podgorny] with Siad Barre was the issue of the relationship between Somalia and Ethiopia, and also the situation emerging in this region of Africa in connection with activities of reactionary Arab forces. Exchange of opinions revealed that the Somali leadership adheres to its old positions regarding its territorial demands on Ethiopia. Siad Barre justified this stand [by referring] to the pressure of internal nationalistic circles of Somalia.

At the same time Siad Barre did not deny that there were progressive developments in Ethiopia. He distanced himself from reactionary leaders of Arab countries: Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, who sought to liquidate the progressive regime in Ethiopia. Siad called the President of the UAR [Anwar] Sadat a convinced adherent of capitalism, a reactionary, anti-Soviet schemer. In the opinion of Siad, Nimeiry is a man without principles who fell under the influence of Sadat [and] the leadership of Saudi Arabia, as well as the Americans and the British.

Siad declared that Somalia, now as before, seeks to expand cooperation with the USSR. He said that he deems it advisable to hold a meeting with Mengistu with the mediation of the USSR and underscored that only the Soviet Union which possesses great authority and experience could help Somalia and Ethiopia to work out “a formula of honor” that would allow both countries to find a road to reconciliation without losing face....

[Source: SAPMO, J IV 2/202 584; obtained

and translated from Russian by V. Zubok.]

**Transcript of Meeting between East  
German leader Erich Honecker and  
Cuban leader Fidel Castro, East Berlin,  
3 April 1977 (excerpts)**

Minutes of the conversation between Comrade Erich Honecker and Comrade Fidel Castro, Sunday, 3 April 1977 between 11:00 and 13:30 and 15:45 and 18:00, House of the Central Committee, Berlin.

Participants: Comrades Hermann Axen, Werner Lamberz, Paul Verner, Paul Markowski (with Comrades Edgar Fries and Karlheinz Mobus as interpreters), Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Osmany Cienfuegos, Raul Valdez Vivo, Jose Abrantes

Comrade Erich Honecker warmly welcomed Comrade Fidel Castro and the Cuban Comrades accompanying him to this internal conversation on behalf of the Central Committee.

We are very pleased about your visit to the GDR and the opportunity to exchange views about the result of your visit to several African and Arabian countries. On behalf of the Politburo I want to repeat that we consider your visit to these countries as important. I ask Comrade Fidel Castro to take the floor.

[first 16 pages omitted--ed.]

Statements by Comrade Fidel Castro:  
[...] Before my departure from Aden we discussed with the PDRY leadership the need to do everything possible to arrive at an understanding between Somalia and Ethiopia. I was well received in Somalia. I had asked them not to have any public demonstrations. Siad Barre was very friendly during our first dinner. Prior to my arrival, I had received his reply to a letter of mine regarding the question of relations between Somalia and Ethiopia. I had also sent an envoy to Somalia for discussions with Vice President Samantar and Interior Minister Suleiman. Samantar held to leftist positions, while Suleiman was a representative of the right wing. The discussion of our representative with him was very severe. I had already received considerable information in the PDRY regarding the situation in Somalia. The power and influence of the rightist group continue to increase. The Interior Minister, Suleiman, is doing everything possible to bring Somalia closer to Saudi Arabia

and the imperialist countries. Samantar is losing influence. Everything seems to indicate that he is being driven into a corner by the right.

My first evening I wanted to clarify my thoughts about Siad Barre and the Somali revolution. No serious political discussion took place at this dinner; [Siad] Barre explained to me the evolution of the Somali revolution. The next day, we had an extensive sight-seeing program. We went to a Cuban-built militia training center, an agricultural school, a school for nomad children, etc. We were taken around for hours, although we had not yet had a political discussion, and a mass demonstration had been scheduled at noon in the stadium. I understood that they wanted to avoid such a conversation prior to the demonstration. As the demonstration began, Siad Barre and I had still not had a private conversation, and because of this I was very careful. Siad Barre was very arrogant and severe; maybe he wanted to intimidate us.

In my speech to the mass meeting I talked about imperialist policy in the Middle East, the reactionary role of Saudi Arabia, and the actions of other reactionary powers. I did this even though I knew that there was a considerable trend in the country in favor of closer relations with these countries. I talked about the PLO's struggle, the Ethiopian revolution, and the Libyan revolution, and of progressive Algeria that they want to isolate. I talked about Mozambique, and only at the end about how imperialism is doing everything to reverse the progressive order in Somalia. Siad Barre introduced me to participants of the mass meeting without saying a political word.

Before the mass meeting they had played half of a soccer game. It is unknown whether the soccer game was simply an appendage to the demonstration or vice versa. My speech went against the right wing tendencies and supported the left wing. We observed that almost all of the Central Committee members applauded, with the exception of Suleiman and his people. Samantar was very satisfied, and even Siad Barre seemed content. Nevertheless, the mass meeting was not broadcast live on radio or TV.

Only that evening did we begin to discuss specific problems, at my residence. It was clear to me that we had to be careful because surely the interior minister had in-

stalled bugs. This same evening Siad Barre finally talked about Ethiopia. He compared it to the Tsarist Empire and said that Ethiopia was the only surviving colonial power. Thanks to Lenin's wisdom, the Tsarist Empire had disappeared, but it lived on in Ethiopia. He had proposed to the Ethiopians, some time ago, to establish a federation or even a unification of the two countries. Ethiopia had not reacted then, but was now itself proposing this solution. He spoke very enthusiastically about his efforts to reach a solution with Ethiopia. I used the occasion to tell Siad Barre that I would travel to Ethiopia the next day and asked him if he would be willing to meet with Mengistu. He agreed.

The next day I flew on to Ethiopia. We had earlier agreed that there would be no great reception for me, since at the time they were still fighting the civil war. Shots constantly rang out. Mengistu took me to the old Imperial Palace and the negotiations began on the spot. I found the information that I already had to be confirmed. We continued our negotiations on the following day. Naturally we had to take extensive security precautions. The Ethiopians had come up with a division, and I had brought a company of Cuban soldiers with me. The day of my arrival there were rumors of a coup. It did not happen.

I developed the impression that there was a real revolution taking place in Ethiopia. In this former feudal empire, lands were being distributed to the peasants. Each farmer got 10 hectares. There were also reforms in the cities. It was established that each citizen could only own one house. Plots were made available for housing construction.

There is also a strong mass movement. In the capital, 500,000 people can be rapidly mobilized. In February, our study delegation, after inspecting the army divisions, had determined that of the hundreds of generals, all but two should be chased out. The officers and NCOs have taken over the leadership of the country. Currently, the leadership is considering creating a Party. There is a harsh class struggle against the feudalists in the country. The petit bourgeois powers are mobilizing against the Revolution. A strong separatist movement exists in Eritrea. Threats are coming from the Sudan, while Somalia claims 50% of Ethiopia's territory. There have been border clashes in this area

for 500 years.

Mengistu strikes me as a quiet, serious, and sincere leader who is aware of the power of the masses. He is an intellectual personality who showed his wisdom on 3 February. The rightists wanted to do away with the leftists on 3 February. The prelude to this was an exuberant speech by the Ethiopian president in favor of nationalism. Mengistu preempted this coup. He called the meeting of the Revolutionary Council one hour early and had the rightist leaders arrested and shot. A very consequential decision was taken on 3 February in Ethiopia. The political landscape of the country changed, which has enabled them to take steps that were impossible before then. Before it was only possible to support the leftist forces indirectly, now we can do so without any constraints.

I asked Mengistu whether he was willing to meet with Siad Barre in Aden. We agreed. After concluding my talks I flew on to Aden.

Siad Barre had arrived in Aden that morning. Mengistu did not arrive until the afternoon. I had a conversation with Siad Barre in which he bared his claws. He told me that if Mengistu was a real revolutionary he should do as Lenin, and withdraw from his territory. Siad Barre took a very hard position. I asked him whether he felt that there had been no real revolution in Ethiopia and that Mengistu was not a real leftist leader. He told me that there had been no revolution in Ethiopia. While in Mogadishu he had shown me a map of Greater Somalia in which half of Ethiopia had been annexed.

After my talk with Siad Barre, I told Mengistu about Barre's attitude, and asked him to remain calm. I already felt bad about having invited Mengistu to Aden while there was still a powder keg situation back in his country and that in such a tense situation he was to hear out the Somalis' territorial demands.

With regards to my question about the situation of the Ethiopian army, Mengistu said that there were still difficulties but that he didn't think that there was an acute danger of a coup.

When the meeting started, Siad Barre immediately began speaking. Siad Barre is a general who was educated under colonialism. The revolution in Somalia is led by generals who all became powerful under colo-

nial times. I have made up my mind about Siad Barre, he is above all a chauvinist. Chauvinism is the most important factor in him. Socialism is just an outer shell that is supposed to make him more attractive. He has received weapons from the socialist countries and his socialist doctrine is [only] for the masses. The Party is there only to support his personal power.

In his case there is a bizarre symbiosis of rule by military men who went through the school of colonialism and social appearances. Something about socialism appeals to him, but overall there is still a lot of inequality and unfairness in the country. His principal ideas are nationalism and chauvinism, not socialism.

His goal is old fashioned politics: sweet, friendly words. Siad Barre speaks like a wise man; only he speaks. He is different from the many political leaders that I know. [Egyptian President Anwar] Sadat, [Algerian President Houari] Boumedienne, [Mozambique President Samora] Machel, [Angolan President Agostinho] Neto and many others are strong characters. They can also listen and do not take a dogmatic attitude. One can speak with them. Siad Barre really thinks that he is at the summit of wisdom. Until now everything has gone smoothly for him. The Italians and the British made him a general. The revolution was accomplished in a minute, with hardly a shot fired. He put on a socialist face and got economic aid and weapons from the Soviet Union. His country is important strategically, and he likes prestige. Barre is very convinced of himself. His socialist rhetoric is unbearable. He is the greatest socialist; he cannot say ten words without mentioning socialism.

With this tone he began to speak in the meeting with Mengistu. He began giving a lecture on Ethiopia and demanded from Mengistu to do as Lenin had done: do away with the Ethiopian Empire. Mengistu remained quiet; he said that Ethiopia was ready and willing to find a solution and that there needed to be the first concrete steps on both sides to achieve a rapprochement.

Siad Barre theatrically responded that he was disappointed with Mengistu and that he displayed the same attitude as the Ethiopian Emperor. The Ethiopian revolutionary leadership had the same mentality as Haile Selassie. The meeting had begun at 11 PM and a solution was not in sight.

[Cuban Vice President] Carlos Rafael Rodríguez then proposed the establishment of a standing commission with representatives from Ethiopia, Somalia and the PDRY to find ways to a solution. All the other participants drafted us against our will into this commission.

Siad Barre carried on with his great wise man act, as the great Socialist, the great Marxist. At the same time he spoke demagogically as only one member of the "collective leadership" with a mandate from the Politburo and the need to consult with them on all matters. After a brief recess for consultations with his delegation he proposed direct talks between Mengistu and himself.

Mengistu, who had already become more insulted and mistrustful during Siad Barre's previous statements, said that he was willing to do so, but not at this time. First the question of the commission had to be resolved.

We continued the meeting at 3.15 in the morning. Siad Barre had prepared the text of an agreement in which the idea of the commission was accepted but which directed that its main purpose should be to solve the outstanding territorial questions between Somalia and Ethiopia. The commission would thus take this approach from the start. How were the Ethiopians supposed to react to such a provocative proposal?

During the break I had spoken with Mengistu, who did not hide his rejection of Siad Barre. I also spoke with Siad Barre and asked him whether he was really interested in finding a solution. He said that Mengistu would have to answer that. He went on with his revolutionary rhetoric, about how real socialists, revolutionaries, and Marxists could not deny realities. He said that Mengistu was in fact a drastic man, one who has taken drastic measures: why could he not decide similarly drastically right here and now to resolve the question?

In this setting I was faced with the complicated question of either speaking my mind about Siad Barre's position or keeping it to myself. I concluded that I had to speak out for the following reasons:

1. Keeping quiet would have meant endorsing the chauvinistic policy of Somalia, and its consequences. It would also have meant supporting the rightists in Somalia.

2. Not responding to Siad Barre would mean that any subsequent aid from socialist countries to Ethiopia, no matter how

small, would be termed by Siad Barre as a betrayal.

3. In what kind of a situation would this put the PDRY, about to support Ethiopia with tanks, trucks and artillery with the help of a Soviet ship?

In addition, Siad Barre had not only been insulting, he was resorting to subtle threats. At a certain point he said that one could not know where all of this could lead.

Because of this, I spoke up. I explained that Siad Barre did not believe that there had been a real revolution in Ethiopia, that the events of 3 February had totally answered this question and that Mengistu was a revolutionary leader. I went on to say that we considered the events in Ethiopia as a revolution, that the events of 3 February were a turning point, and that Mengistu is the leader of a profound transformation. I declared that we could not possibly agree with Siad Barre's position. I said that Siad Barre's position represented a danger to the revolution in Somalia, endangered the revolution in Ethiopia, and that as a result there was a danger of isolating the PDRY. In particular I emphasized that Siad Barre's policies were aiding the right wing in Somalia itself in its efforts against socialism, and to deliver Somalia into the arms of Saudi Arabia and Imperialism.

I said that these policies were weakening Somalia's relations with the socialist countries and would have to lead to the collapse of the revolution in Somalia. I appealed to Siad Barre's and the entire Somali leadership's sense of historical responsibility. I said that I did not think that this would come to a war between Somalia and Ethiopia but that I was worried, since war would be a very serious thing. I do not believe that there are people who would provoke a war between the peoples.

Immediately after my speaking so frankly, Siad Barre took the floor. He said that he would never want war and that as a socialist and revolutionary he would never take this path. If the socialist camp wanted to cut itself off from Somalia then that was the affair of the socialist camp. I had put pressure on him, Siad Barre, but not demanded from Mengistu, to come to this meeting.

Now, I pointed out that I had supported the summit between Siad Barre and Mengistu but did not talk about Siad Barre's insults vis-a-vis Mengistu. I said that Cuba

had no intention of cutting itself off from the Somali Revolution, rather, we supported it. The whole meeting ended without any results.

If we now give our aid to Ethiopia, Siad Barre will have no moral right to accuse us of betrayal, etc. I told him very clearly that there was a revolution in Ethiopia and that we had to help it.

In any case I had detected during my meetings with Siad Barre a certain irritation on his part with the Soviet Union. He was agitated that the Soviet Union was not delivering spare parts or tractors and that oil came too late from the Soviet Union, in spite of repeated promises. The Soviet ambassador has explained the state of affairs to us. The Somalis were repeatedly changing their minds about their requests, which had delayed the matter. In addition, unfortunately the Soviet oil tanker had sunk on its way to Somalia.

As I told Siad Barre this, he called the Soviets liars. He said this was not the position of the Soviet politburo, but rather the result of sabotage by bureaucrats. His irritation and criticism of the Soviet Union also showed in other cases. He went on to say that there was not enough drinkable water in his country and that cattle were dying, the bananas were ripening too late, all because the pumps provided by the Soviets did not work.

Because of this attitude of Siad Barre I see a great danger. That is why I considered it appropriate to give you my impressions truthfully, without euphemisms.

I wanted to discuss my point of view frankly. The socialist countries are faced with a problem. If they help Ethiopia, they will lose Siad Barre's friendship. If they do not, the Ethiopian Revolution will founder. That was the most important thing about these matters.

[comments on southern Africa, omitted here, are printed earlier in this *Bulletin*--ed.]

There were several requests for military aid from various sides: [Libyan Leader Moammar] Qaddafi, Mengistu, and the Congolese leaders. During our stay in Africa we sent [Cuban Vice President] Carlos Rafael Rodríguez to Moscow to confer with our Soviet comrades and to Havana for consultations with our leadership. In order to find the best solution we must think through this question calmly and thoroughly and consider it in terms of the overall situation of

the socialist camp. Above all we must do something for Mengistu. Already we are collecting old weapons in Cuba for Ethiopia, principally French, Belgian and Czech hand-held weapons. About 45,000 men must be supplied with weapons. We are going to send military advisers to train the Ethiopian militia in weapons-use. There are many people in Ethiopia who are qualified for the army. We are supporting the training of the militia. Meanwhile the situation in Eritrea is difficult. There are also progressive people in the liberation movement, but, objectively, they are playing a reactionary role. The Eritrean separatist movement is being supported by the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. Ethiopia has good soldiers and a good military tradition, but they need time to organize their army. Mengistu asked us for 100 trainers for the militia, now he is also asking us for military advisers to build up regular units. Our military advisory group is active at the staff level. The Ethiopians have economic means and the personnel necessary to build up their army. Rumors have been spread lately that the reactionaries will conquer Asmara in two months. The revolution in Ethiopia is of great significance. With regard to military aid for the PR Congo and the Libyans we have not yet come to a decision.

I had consultations with Boumedienne in Algeria and asked for his opinion. He assured me that Algeria would never abandon Libya. Algeria is very concerned with the situation in the Mediterranean because of its security interests. It is in favor of supporting Libya, as long as military aid is confined to the socialist camp. That is not only a question between Cuba and Algeria. If we succeed in strengthening the revolution in Libya, Ethiopia, Mozambique, the PDRY, and Angola, we have an integrated strategy for the whole African continent.

Algeria would move closer to the socialist camp. It bought 1.5 billion rubles of weapons from the Soviets. Boumedienne thinks that Sadat is totally lost to us. In Syria there is also no leftist movement any more, either, especially after the Syrians defeated the progressive powers and the PLO in Lebanon.

[Indian President] Indira Gandhi gambled away the elections.

In Africa, however, we can inflict a severe defeat on the entire reactionary imperialist policy. One can free Africa from the

influence of the USA and of the Chinese. The developments in Zaire are also very important. Libya and Algeria have large national resources, Ethiopia has great revolutionary potential. So there is a great counterweight to Egypt's betrayal. It might even be possible that Sadat could be turned around and that the imperialist influence in the Middle East can be turned back.

This must all be discussed with the Soviet Union. We follow its policies and its example.

We estimate that Libya's request is an expression of trust. One should not reject their request. Cuba alone cannot help it. [remainder of conversation omitted--ed.]

[Source: Stiftung "Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR im Bundesarchiv" (Berlin), DY30 JIV 2/201/1292; document obtained by Christian F. Ostermann and translated by David Welch with revisions by Ostermann.]

**Memorandum of Conversation between  
Soviet Acting Charge d'affaires in  
Ethiopia S. Sinitsyn and Political  
Counselor of the U.S. Embassy in  
Ethiopia, Herbert Malin, 9 May 1977**

From the journal      SECRET, Copy No. 2  
of Sinitsyn, Ya.S.      26 May 1977  
Original No. 203

**RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION  
with the Political Counselor of the USA  
Embassy in Ethiopia, Herbert Malin  
9 May 1977**

Today at the reception at the Pakistani Embassy, Malin (acting Charge d'Affaires in connection with the recall of the latter to a meeting in Abidjan of USA ambassadors) characterized the state of Ethiopian-American relations in the following manner:

The decision of the PMAC about the closing in late April of a number of American organizations in Ethiopia (a group of military attaches, the strategic radio center in Asmara, a biological laboratory of the USA Navy, and an information center in Addis Abba), and also the abrogation beginning on 1 May of this year of the 1953 agreement "On the preservation of mutual security" (the Embassy received a verbal communication from the Foreign Ministry of Ethiopia about this) came at an unex-

pected time for the USA and raised the question of the formulation of a new USA policy towards Ethiopia in light of these conditions. This policy, Malin stated, was not yet formulated. Although the Ethiopian authorities exhibited the necessary correctness towards personnel assigned by American organizations, and with the exception of press campaigns, no hostile actions whatsoever against American citizens were observed here, nonetheless the Embassy of the USA is aware that the USA would find it difficult to institute stable business-like relations with the current Ethiopian regime. The closing of the USA economic assistance mission here [USAID] cannot be excluded. Obviously, relations in the military sphere will be broken off, although some Ethiopian military personnel continue to be trained in the USA (pilots, etc.). Under the present conditions, Washington probably will not hurry to name a new ambassador to Addis Ababa.

According to Malin, however, all this does not mean that the USA intends to "get out of Ethiopia," considering the significance of this country for the African continent and the strategically important Red Sea region. The USA, as before, is opposed to splitting off Eritrea from Ethiopia and in favor of the freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, and has made the Ethiopian government aware of this repeatedly. At the same time the USA is concerned about the possibility of the development of a crisis situation between Ethiopia and neighboring countries and about the obvious lack of trust by the Ethiopian government in American policy in this region.

Malin considered the visit [to Moscow] by Mengistu to be a "Soviet success" and a reflection of the transition by the current Ethiopian regime to an orientation primarily towards the Soviet Union, above all in the military sphere and with the specific aim of obtaining modern weaponry. In his view, however, the Ethiopian-Soviet rapprochement could complicate relations between the USSR and Somalia and some other Arab states, and, at the same time, enhance instability in the region.

For my part, I told Malin that our policy towards Ethiopia is principled, not directed against any third countries, and responds to the interests of strengthening peace and security in the region.

NOTES: In private conversations with

us, American representatives, relying on "various sources in Washington," do not hide the fact that they are irritated by the "Ethiopia's recent anti-American actions," and this country's lack of trust in the USA. At the same time, comments by Westerners reveal that in the back of their minds they are wondering whether the Soviet Union "could assume the entire burden of assistance to Ethiopia."

It is obvious that, pursuing a policy to the detriment of the Ethiopian revolution, the USA and other Western countries will still try to maintain certain spheres of influence in this country. Thus, during the sessions of the IBRD's [International Bank for Reconstruction and Development's] "International Development Association" a no-interest credit of \$40 million was extended to Ethiopia for the purpose of road building and irrigation.

ACTING CHARGE D'AFFAIRS  
OF THE USSR IN ETHIOPIA

/s/ S. Sinitsyn

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1638, ll. 142-144; translated by Elizabeth Wishnick.]

**CPSU CC to SED CC, Information on  
Visit of Mengistu Haile Mariam to  
Moscow, 13 May 1977**

Confidential

ON THE RESULTS OF THE OFFICIAL  
VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION OF  
THE ETHIOPIAN STATE DELEGA-  
TION LED BY THE CHAIRMAN OF  
THE PROVISIONAL MILITARY  
ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL (PMAC)  
OF SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA  
MENGISTU HAILE MARIAM

In the course of negotiations the Soviet leaders and Mengistu discussed the issues of bilateral relations and relevant international questions.

The main results of the visit were covered in the Declaration signed on the initiative of the Ethiopian side about the foundations of friendly relations and cooperation between the USSR and the Socialist Ethiopia, and in the joint communique, as well as in the published news releases on the course of the visit.

Beside the declaration about the founda-

tions of friendly relations and cooperation between the USSR and Ethiopia, [the two sides] also signed an agreement on cultural and scientific cooperation, a consular convention, a protocol on economic and technical cooperation which envisages assistance to Ethiopia in [construction] of a number of industrial and agricultural objects, provision of buying credit and the commission of Soviet experts.

According to the wishes of the Ethiopian side, an agreement was signed on some additional deliveries of armaments and military equipment to Ethiopia.

The visit of the Chairman of the PMAC Mengistu Haile Mariam to the USSR had an obvious goal - to establish direct personal contacts with the Soviet leaders and to ensure the support of the Soviet Union for the cause of the protection and development of the national-democratic revolution in Ethiopia.

On May 6 of this year Mengistu was received by General Secretary of the CC CPSU L.I. Brezhnev. At this talk he informed L.I. Brezhnev on the activities of the new Ethiopian leadership who took a course toward the socialist orientation of the country. On behalf of the Ethiopian people the Chairman of the PMAC expressed profound gratitude for the assistance the Soviet Union renders to Ethiopia in the defense of [its] revolutionary conquests.

L.I. Brezhnev underscored our principled position with regard to progressive transformations in Ethiopia and declared that the Soviet Union, which from the very beginning came out in favor of the Ethiopian revolution, intends to continue this course and to give, as much as it can, political, diplomatic, and other forms of assistance to the new leadership of Ethiopia. L.I. Brezhnev drew Mengistu's attention to the fact it was important, in order to advance the revolutionary process, to create a party of the working class, the intention that the leader of the Ethiopian state had voiced, and to the necessity to activate the international affairs of Ethiopia with the aim of foiling the encroachments of imperialist and other reactionary forces. L.I. Brezhnev expressed concern about the continuing deterioration of relations between the two progressive states that are friendly to us - Ethiopia and Somalia, and pointed to the urgent need to take measures for the improvement of these relations.

Mengistu voiced profound satisfaction with the meeting and the frank, comradely character of the talks.

During negotiations with N.V. Podgorny, A.A. Gromyko, and other Soviet comrades the head of the Ethiopian delegation informed them about the roots of the Ethiopian revolution and its course at the present stage, about internal and external difficulties the new leadership of the country experiences today. Mengistu said that the Ethiopian leadership stands on the platform of Marxism-Leninism and regards the Ethiopian revolution as part of the world revolutionary process. He stressed his intention to create a working class party in Ethiopia. However, he said, the Ethiopian revolution is going through a complicated, one can even say, critical phase. Rightist, as well as ultra-leftist elements, are rising, de facto, in a united front against the revolution. They unleashed a virtual civil war in some provinces of the country. These actions of domestic counterrevolution are linked to the activities of imperialism and other external reactionary forces directed against the new Ethiopia. Mengistu underlined that a special role in these coordinated activities belong to the anti-Communist regime of Numeiri, and behind its back lurk reactionary Arab countries, first of all Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

The head of the Ethiopian delegation said that Ethiopia will not overcome external and internal counterrevolution alone, and for that reason it relies on support on the part of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. He expressed a wish to develop all-faceted cooperation with the USSR.

Mengistu supplied detailed information on the policy of the Ethiopian leadership on the nationalities question, on his intention to resolve it on a democratic basis in the framework of the unified multinational state. The Ethiopian side judges that the separatist movement in Eritrea, which receives massive support from the Arab countries, acquired a reactionary character after the victory of the national-democratic revolution in Ethiopia.

Mengistu spoke with concern about the position that the Somali leadership took towards the Ethiopian revolution. He favored normalization of relations between Ethiopia and Somalia and the united efforts of the two progressive states in the struggle against imperialism and reaction.

The Soviet side expressed understanding of the difficulties the new Ethiopian leadership encounters inside the country and outside its frontiers. The Ethiopian delegation was informed about the measures the Soviet leadership undertakes in support of Ethiopia in the international arena, in particular in connection with the anti-Ethiopian position of the ruling circles of Sudan and to the arms supplies to the Eritrean separatists from a number of Arab states. The Soviet Union was said to continue henceforth to give assistance to the new Ethiopia.

[The Soviet side] explained our position on major international issues, including the relaxation of tensions, the situation in the South Africa, in the Middle East; in response to the Ethiopian side we informed her about Soviet-American and Soviet-Chinese relations. Mengistu spoke about common views between Ethiopia and the Soviet Union on the crucial issues of international affairs. He said that he shared the viewpoint of the Soviet side regarding the essence of differences between the USSR and China and, on his part, pointed out to the difference of positions between Ethiopia and China on a number of issues, including the situation in the African Horn.

Mengistu gave the impression of a serious figure who firmly believes in his cause, although he still lacks sufficient political and state experience. In particular, it seems that he and other Ethiopian leaders do not devote due attention to vigorous measures in the international arena in order to foil the attempts to drive Ethiopia into international isolation, [and] to win over world public opinion, first of all in the progressive states of Africa.

Mengistu and the members of the Ethiopian delegation estimated highly the results of the negotiations in Moscow and expressed thanks for the understanding with which the Soviet side addressed their needs. They expressed the opinion that the results of their visit will contribute to the further improvement of Soviet-Ethiopian relations.

We in the Soviet Union believe that the visit and talks with the Ethiopian state delegation was fruitful and useful.

The Ethiopian leadership, in our opinion, should be granted the support of the Socialist Commonwealth.

*[Source: SAPMO, JIV 2/202/583; obtained and translated from Russian by Vladislav*

*M. Zubok.]*

**Additions to 2 February 1977 Report by Third African Department, Soviet Foreign Ministry, on "Somalia's Territorial Disagreements with Ethiopia and the Position of the USSR," apparently in late May-early June 1977**

[...] On 16 March 1977, a meeting took place in Aden between President Siad and PMAC Chairman Mengistu with the participation of Fidel Castro and the Chairman of the Presidential Council of South Yemen, Rubayi-i-Ali.

Mengistu appealed to Siad for the coordination of actions to rebuff imperialist and reactionary forces which simultaneously threaten both Ethiopia and Somalia. Siad held to an intransigent position, putting forth the annexation of the Ogaden to Somalia as an immutable condition for normalizing Somali-Ethiopian relations. He demanded that the issue of the transfer of the Ogaden to Somalia be quickly resolved, with the subsequent formation of a federation between Somalia and Ethiopia. At the meeting Siad declared that if the socialist countries would not support Somalia on the territorial issue, then he would be required to appeal to Arab and Western states for assistance.

The representative of South Yemen put forward a proposal to create a committee made up of high-ranking representatives of Ethiopia, Somalia, South Yemen, and Cuba for resolution of disputed Somali-Ethiopian issues. Siad refused to work in that committee. However, until now that proposal remains in force.

[...]

At a meeting of the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, N.V. Podgorny, with Siad Barre which took place at the beginning of April of this year during his brief visit to Somalia, Siad expressed readiness to continue the search for a mutually acceptable formula for resolving the problems facing Ethiopia and Somalia and requested the Soviet Union to provide help in organizing a meeting with Mengistu.

At Soviet-Ethiopian negotiations which took place during the official visit to the Soviet Union of the official Ethiopian delegation headed by the Chairman of the PMAC Mengistu Haile Mariam during 4-8

May 1977, the Ethiopian side was informed of N.V. Podgorny's recent conversation with Siad Barre. In accord with the wish of President Siad, we proposed to Mengistu that through our good offices we organize and conduct in the Soviet Union a summit meeting for the establishment of good-neighborly relations between Somalia and Ethiopia. Mengistu accepted that suggestion with satisfaction and expressed agreement with the thoughts that had been expressed to him in this regard. However, in a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador on 17 May of this year, President Siad declared that he is not ready at the present time to sit at the negotiating table with Mengistu. [...]

*[Source: TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1619, ll. 61-68; translated by Paul Henze.]*

**Report from CPSU CC to SED CC, Information about the Visit to the Soviet Union of Somalia Vice President Samanta, late May-early June 1977**

Strictly Confidential

[notation: "EH 6.6.77"]

**I N F O R M A T I O N**

on the visit of the First Vice-President of Somalia Mohammad Ali Samantar to the Soviet Union in the end of May-early June

At first Samantar was in Moscow unofficially, then at joint agreement it was decided to publicize the fact of his presence in the Soviet Union.

Samantar held conversations with the CC CPSU Politburo member, Minister of Foreign Affairs A.A. Gromyko and the alternate member of the CC CPSU Politburo, CC CPSU Secretary B.N. Ponomarev. Upon conclusion of these talks Samantar was received by General Secretary of the CC CPSU L.I. Brezhnev. They discussed on a principled level the main directions of the Soviet-Somali relations and reaffirmed a political line of the USSR and the SDR, aimed at the development of cooperation between them in various fields.

In the course of conversations in Moscow, aside from the issues of the Soviet-Somalian relations, a major focus was on the issues connected to the situation in the area of the African Horn, on which [issues] our side laid out the position that is well known

also to the Ethiopian leadership. Soviet-Ethiopian relations, for understandable reasons, took a special place in the conversations.

Samantar concentrated his attention on the disagreements between Somalia and Ethiopia on the territorial question. In justifying the positions of the SDR he mentioned the well-known Somali arguments. Samantar did not dispute the revolutionary character of the regime of Ethiopia, as the Somalis have done before. Yet he hinted that not everything is normal in the domestic situation in Ethiopia, that the rights of the persons of Somali extraction who live in Ogaden are still allegedly impinged upon. Samantar said that the leadership of Ethiopia, instead of turning to persuasion as the main tool of bringing the population [of Ogaden] over to its side, all too often resorts to arms.

Our side repeatedly underscored the idea that the main thing now is to avoid military confrontation between Somalia and Ethiopia. We drew [his] attention to the perversity of a situation when two states - Somalia and Ethiopia - who set themselves on the path of revolutionary development are at loggerheads. Of course, we know about the differences of opinion between Somalia and Ethiopia, first of all on the territorial issue. But if a war breaks out between them, only imperialist forces would gain from this. Such a war not only would lead to grave consequences, it would also turn against Somalia and would allow reactionary forces to put a noose around its neck.

L.I. Brezhnev stressed in this regard that one should not allow a military confrontation to flare up between the two progressive states of Africa, and that all issues and disputes between them should be resolved in a peaceful way, at the negotiation table.

As to the domestic situation in Ethiopia, we declared it was not our business to discuss such issues. The Ethiopians themselves should resolve them.

In our opinion, there were two important points that surfaced in the course of the discussions.

First. If earlier we had the impression that the Somali leadership vacillated with regard to a meeting with the leadership of Ethiopia and to a mission of good-will on the part of the Soviet Union in the organization of such a meeting, now Samantar declared that the Somalis are ready for this.

In response to our direct question when and on which level the Somali side would expect to hold such a meeting, he said that any time would be good for them, but did not mention any dates. In Samantar's opinion, at first there could be a ministerial meeting, and a final stage could be held as a summit. At the same time, Samantar let us understand that before the organization of such a meeting we should define a range of issues for discussion, by emphasizing that for the Somalis in the focus is still the territorial issue. Concerning the participation of Soviet representatives in a meeting, Samantar did not define their level, did not say that it [the level] should be high.

Second. Of great importance is Samantar's declaration that the Somali leadership would not on its own initiative unleash an armed conflict with Ethiopia. He said it twice during his meetings with A.A. Gromyko and B.N. Ponomarev. He made a similar pronouncement in his conversation with L.I. Brezhnev.

True, Samantar spoke about a scenario of provocation of such a conflict on the part of external imperialist forces or their helpers. To this we reacted in the following way: if such forces were around, then both sides, Somalia and Ethiopia, should not respond to such a provocation, but should display state wisdom and vigilance.

On the whole, the visit of Samantar to Moscow was, in our opinion, useful. It shows that the leadership of Somalia does not drop the idea to begin, with assistance of the Soviet Union, a dialogue with the leaders of Ethiopia in order to normalize relations between the two countries.

*[Source: SAPMO, J IV 2/202 584; obtained and translated from Russian by V. Zubok.]*

**Memorandum of Conversation between  
Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia A.P.  
Ratanov and Mengistu, 29 June 1977**

SECRET, copy No. 2

From the journal of 18 July 1977  
Ratanov, A.P. Original No. 255

RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION  
with the President of the PMAC,  
MENGISTU HAILE MARIAM  
29 June 1977

Today I visited Mengistu Haile Mariam

and, as authorized by the Center [Moscow], outlined the Soviet position on Ethiopian-Somali relations, highlighting the threat that military conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia would pose to the revolutionary achievements in both countries.

Mengistu then thanked the Soviet leadership for its efforts in pursuit of the normalization of Ethiopia-Somali relations and stated the following:

The PMAC's position on Ethiopian-Somali relations remains unchanged - it supported and continues to support the improvement of relations with Somalia through negotiations and the restoration of cooperation with this country in the struggle against a common enemy - imperialism. In light of this, the PMAC assumes that, unlike Sudan, which completely went over to the side of imperialism, Somalia remains a country which claims to adhere to scientific socialism and has friendly relations with socialist states, a situation which would create favorable conditions for the restoration of friendly relations and cooperation between Somalia and Ethiopia, and also influences the study of Marxism-Leninism and the establishment of close cooperation with the Soviet Union and other socialist states.

In response to the appeal from the Soviet government, the PMAC would like to emphasize once more that Ethiopia does not have any aggressive intentions with respect to Somalia. The PMAC already informed the Soviet government that it has accepted the proposal by Siad Barre to organize a Somali-Ethiopian meeting on an expert level. Clearly, Ethiopia will not go to this meeting as a supplicant, but as an equal partner.

Ethiopia is prepared to contribute to the efforts of the Soviet Union to prevent Somalia from shifting to the right, as can be observed today. As far as Ethiopia is concerned, Somalia is already engaged in subversive activities against it in the guise of a Front for the Liberation of Western Somalia, the headquarters of which is located in Mogadishu. Armed units of this front have taken some villages in eastern Ethiopia. These units are even armed with Soviet-made anti-aircraft missiles. Naturally, Ethiopian forces must combat the units of this force.

In conclusion, Mengistu made a request to the Soviet government to lend its support to efforts to achieve a withdrawal of Somali forces from Ethiopian territory.

Responding to a question from the Soviet ambassador, Mengistu said that relations between Ethiopia and the Republic of Djibouti were not bad, but that the leadership of this Republic, fearing annexation by Ethiopia or Somalia, agreed to a French military presence. Under these conditions, said Mengistu, if it were possible to restore cooperation between Ethiopia and Somalia, then these countries could affirm that they guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Djibouti, which would facilitate the withdrawal of French forces from Djibouti and the development of this state along a progressive path.

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR  
IN SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA

/s/ A RATANOV

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1636, ll. 74-75; translated by Elizabeth Wishnick.]

**Memorandum of Conversation between  
Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia  
A.N. Ratanov and Cuban military  
official Arnaldo Ochoa, 17 July 1977**

TOP SECRET Copy No. 2

From the journal of 24 August 1977  
A.P. RATANOV Orig. No. 297

REPORT OF CONVERSATION  
with the head of the Cuban military  
specialists Division General  
ARNALDO OCHOA  
17 July 1977

During the discussion held at the Soviet Embassy, the Soviet Ambassador outlined the following considerations on the military and political situation in Ethiopia.

The capture of several strategically important objectives in Eritrea and in the eastern regions of Ethiopia by the separatists and by the Somalis has showed that the PMAC:

1. Underestimated the military capabilities of the Eritrean separatists, and thus did not take serious measures to strengthen the group of troops in Eritrea. At the same time the PMAC was hoping that it would be able to persuade the leadership of the Eritrean organizations to take part in negotiations on the political settlement of the Eritrean problem.

2. Did not expect that the units of the Somali regular army in Ogaden would par-

ticipate directly in the military actions. It is significant that the Ethiopian command did not take measures for building a defensive barrier in the regions adjacent to Somalia. Apparently, the PMAC was concerned that such measures could be perceived by Somalia as an Ethiopian refusal to settle their disagreements with Somalia peacefully.

3. Overestimated its own military capabilities. Did not take into account the fact that the old army practically did not go through the school of revolutionary struggle even though it took part in the revolution, since the main demands of the rank and file soldiers were for a raise in pay and for improvement of the retirement pensions, and a certain part of the officer corps was against the Revolution altogether.

It should be also mentioned that in relation to Eritrea, during the three years since the Revolution the Ethiopian command has never attempted any offensive military operations against the Eritrean armed forces, and that the troops of the Ethiopian regular army were practically dwelling in their quarters.

Only two or three months ago the PMAC, having received weapons from the socialist countries, hastily began to organize new units of the regular army, and the people's militia.

Currently the armed forces of Ethiopia consist of 6 divisions of the regular army (55 thousand people), 8 divisions of the people's militia (about 100 thousand people), and police formations (40 thousand people). However:

1. The Ethiopian army is inferior to the Somali army in the quality of armaments.

2. The members of the people's militia have not had a sufficient military training yet.

All this led to the situation where the separatists were able to establish control over 75-80% of the Eritrean territory, including the cities of Keren, Nacfa, Karora, Decamere, Tessenei. Their armed forces consist of 18 thousand people.

The Ethiopian command in Eritrea has 20 thousand soldiers of the regular army, and it is currently transferring there 5 divisions of the people's militia. This should give it the opportunity to establish control over Eritrea assuming that Sudan does not introduce its armed forces there.

If the military effort in Eritrea is successful, the PMAC hopes that the separat-

ists and the Arab countries who support them would have to agree to a political settlement and accept internal autonomy for Eritrea.

In the Ogaden the detachments of the Front of for the Liberation of Western Somalia (up to 5 thousand people), introduced mainly from Somalia, have recently established control over the most part of the territory. The front is engaged in combat near the cities of Harar, Jijiga, Gode, Dire Dawa.

The PMAC has up to 10 thousand people in the Ogaden. Currently detachments of the people's militia are being transferred there. The Ethiopian command considers the situation in the Ogaden most dangerous since Somalia continues to transfer its military personnel and heavy weaponry to that region.

Therefore, the PMAC has a opportunity to change favorably the military situation in Eritrea as well as in the Ogaden. However, it would need to solve the following problems.

1. To provide the armed forces with the means of transportation (helicopters, trucks, etc.) for a quick transfer of the reserves when and where they are needed.

2. To create fuel reserves and to obtain means of transportation for them.

3. To create reserves of food and medicines.

Also it is necessary to strengthen the political work in the armed forces, for which they would need cadres of political workers, which are currently insufficient.

In socio-political terms the forces of the revolution predominate over the forces of the counterrevolution. Still, even though the PMAC undertook certain measures for the organization of the peasant and urban population (peasant and urban associations have been created everywhere), the level of political consciousness of the broad masses of the population (mostly illiterate) remains very low.

Elements of confusion can be observed in the Defense Council. Mengistu Haile Mariam still remains the main leader of the Ethiopian revolution. The PMAC needs to solve the following political tasks:

1. To take additional measures to strengthen its social base. In order to achieve this it is necessary to make the socio-economic policy more concrete, so that it could assure the peasants that the land would remain in their possession, and that the regime would not rush with collectivization. In ad-

dition, some measures in order to, as a minimum, neutralize the national bourgeoisie, are necessary to assure it that the regime would not expropriate its property.

2. To develop the nationality policy and to make it more concrete (to create autonomous national regions), even though now it would not be an easy task because cadres from non-Amhara nationalities which were discriminated against before the revolution have not been prepared yet.

3. To create a political party and a broad people's front with participation of not just workers and peasants, but also with the national bourgeoisie.

4. To conduct a more active foreign policy, especially toward African countries, to provide support for Mengistu's statements at the OAU Assembly in Libreville [Gabon] that Ethiopia was not going to export its revolution, and that it would follow the course of nonalignment; to make the program for political settlement of the Ethiopian-Somali disagreements more concrete.

In the course of further discussion we came to common conclusions that the difficult situation dictated the necessity of creating in some form a state defense committee, which would be authorized to mobilize all forces of the country for the defense of the revolution; of organizing the highest military command, and at a minimum, of two fronts (Northern and Eastern) with corresponding command and headquarters structures.

We also agreed that the current structuring of the armed forces should be reorganized in the future according to modern military concepts applicable to Ethiopian realities. However, the military incompetence of the officer corps and conservatism of a certain part of it present obstacles to this restructuring. For example, the General Staff currently nurtures ideas of creating tank divisions and an anti-aircraft defense system of the country by removing those kinds of weapons (tanks, anti-aircraft launchers) from existing infantry divisions.

On July 16 the Cuban comrades found out that at the last moment before the group of [PMAC General Secretary] Fikre Selassie Wogderes was about to leave for Moscow it was decided to ask the Soviet Union to supply tanks, armored cars, and the like at a time when they have not yet prepared their cadres for work with the technology they were receiving from the Soviet Union ac-

cording to the agreements signed earlier. Arnaldo Ochoa told Mengistu that such a light-headed approach to serious business might undermine the prestige of the Military Council. Arnaldo Ochoa had the feeling that Mengistu understood what he meant.

Another example of such a light-headed, even irresponsible, approach to the military questions is the idea that somebody is suggesting to Mengistu about the necessity of preparation of a offensive on Hargeisa (Somalia), which would give Somalia a reason to start a more massive offensive in the Ogaden with tanks and aircraft, not to mention the catastrophic political consequences of such a step for Ethiopia.

Arnaldo Ochoa said that the military failures in Eritrea led to certain disagreements within the PMAC. A significant part of the Council proposes that they should now, before any military measures are taken, try once more to engage in negotiations with the Eritrean organizations. The majority of the Council, however, thinks that in the existing circumstances, when the separatists are on the offensive, they would not agree to negotiations, or they would present ultimatums demanding the separation of Eritrea. Therefore, the majority of the Council believes a combination of military and political measures should be undertaken, i.e. to propose negotiations to the Eritrean organizations only after having achieved some military successes.

Arnaldo Ochoa also informed me that in one of their recent conversations Mengistu said that Ethiopian-Chinese relations were becoming more and more complicated with every day. The PMAC found out that the PRC was providing military assistance to the People's Front of Eritrean Liberation. In relation to this, the PMAC made a decision to limit all relations with Beijing to the minimum without engaging in an open confrontation, and to devise measures against Chinese ideological penetration in Ethiopia.

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR  
IN SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA

[signature] /A RATANOV/

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1637, ll. 141-146; translated by S. Savranskaya.]

#### Record of Negotiations between Somali

#### and Soviet Officials in Moscow, 25-29 July 1977 (excerpts)

From the journal of Secret. Copy no. 10  
L.F. Ilichev 11 August 1977  
No. 2148/GS

Record of a Conversation  
with the Minister of Mineral and Water  
Resources of Somalia, Head of Delegation  
of Experts  
HUSSEIN ABDULKADIR KASIM  
(first level)

The Somali Delegation of Experts arrived in Moscow on 24 July 1977. Meetings took place at the residence of the Somali Delegation from 25-29 July 1977.

#### 25 July

In a one-on-one conversation which took place on the initiative of H. A. Kasim, before the beginning of the first meeting the Minister announced that the Somali delegation had arrived in Moscow with a feeling of good will and with absolute faith in the efforts of the Soviet Union to offer its good services toward the resolution of disputed issues between Somalia and Ethiopia. The Somali delegation, in the words of Kasim, experiences doubt, however, as to the candor and good intentions of the Ethiopian side, taking into account that Somalia had repeatedly proposed to Ethiopia to resolve the disputed issues within the framework of creating a federation of the two governments, to which Ethiopia reacted by publishing the protocols of secret negotiations between the two sides and by carrying out a campaign attacking Somalia in the press.

As is well known, other African and non-African countries attempted to play the role of mediator in the settlement of the disputed questions between the two countries, but these efforts were not crowned with success.

The Somali delegation considers that the object of discussion at the forthcoming meeting of experts, in addition to the substance of the disputed issues between the two countries, should include neither the tension in relations between the two countries, nor the questions of demarcation or of changing the borders, but rather the colonial situation which currently characterizes a part of the Somali territory and the popu-

lation living there, which is under the colonial government of Ethiopia. The Somali delegation considers that no country should call itself a socialist country, or a country which adheres to a socialist orientation, if this country continues the colonial oppression of a people and a part of the territory of another country. This colonial situation arose in the time of the existence of the Ethiopian Empire and up to Somali independence. In the opinion of the Somali side, the changing of the name Abyssinia to Ethiopia, and the Ethiopian Empire to Socialist Ethiopia did not change in the slightest degree the state of affairs. This is why the Somali delegation considers that the central question for discussion at the forthcoming meetings of the delegations of experts from the two countries is the question of granting self-determination and independence to the oppressed Somali minority, which lives within the borders of Ethiopia.

At the forthcoming negotiations, continued the Minister, there are two alternatives: either [his aforementioned proposed topic, or] to limit the discussion to a range of secondary problems, which would be tantamount to simply beating about the bush. Somalia considers, that the military actions currently being conducted are the actions of Somali patriots in the colonial territory who are struggling for their right to self-determination and independence, therefore the first question on the agenda of the forthcoming meeting of experts should be the question of decolonialization, and, only having resolved that question, will it be possible to move on to the discussion of other secondary questions, such as the lessening of tension in relations between the two countries.

H.A. Kasim noted that the currently existing situation is a result of the fact that Ethiopia, over the course of many years, violated the territorial integrity of Somalia, [and] oppressed and annihilated Somalis, living in the colonized territory.

In conclusion, H.A. Kasim underscored the readiness of the Somali delegation to assist the Soviet side in fulfilling its mission of offering its good services at the meeting of the delegations of experts from Somalia and Ethiopia.

For my part, I declared that the tension which has been created in the relations between two countries, with both of whom we are friendly, is the cause of great alarm and anxiety. I underscored the impossibility of

resolving the disputed questions by means of the application of force, particularly given the contemporary global situation. I took note of the real danger that such tension might be used by enemies of Africa, enemies of progressive transformations in Somalia as well as in Ethiopia. I remarked that there are no questions in the interrelations of socialist countries or countries of socialist orientation, which could not be resolved without the application of force, by peaceful means. The Soviet side, offering its good services, sees its task at the forthcoming meeting of the delegations of experts in the following:

- 1) To create an atmosphere of goodwill between the two countries;
- 2) to ensure an understanding of the fact that it is impossible to resolve disputed questions through force;
- 3) to undertake efforts to ensure that as a result of the meetings of experts there would be recommendations elaborated to the governments of both of these countries with the goal of creating a situation of friendship and good relations as a basis for resolving the disputed questions which exist between Somalia and Ethiopia.

I indicated that the Soviet side did not intend to impose any particular resolution of the disputed questions between the two countries.

After the conclusion of the one-on-one conversation a meeting of the Soviet representatives and the Somali delegation of experts took place.

I greeted the delegation of Somali experts and expressed satisfaction with the fact that the Somali and Ethiopian parties had decided to begin a dialogue toward the normalization of their relations in Moscow.

I announced that, having concurred with the request of President Siad that we offer our good services in organizing and leading the meetings between representatives of Somalia and Ethiopia in Moscow, the Soviet side was guided exclusively by its international obligations to offer assistance to countries with whom we are on friendly terms, by its interests in the development and strengthening of all-around cooperation with them.

I noted that we treat the parties without biases of any sort, in a friendly and candid manner.

I expressed the hope that the forthcom-

ing Somali-Ethiopian meeting would lead to positive results. I said, that it would not be candid for us not to say that the current situation in the region had grown complicated and that decisive and immediate measures were necessary. We would hope that the two delegations would strive from the very beginning to create a business-like atmosphere, to show their good will, [to take a] constructive approach and not to take categorical positions, which have the nature of ultimatums, and would rule out even the slightest possibility of conducting negotiations.

We are convinced that the normalization of the situation in the Horn of Africa and the establishment of friendly relations with Ethiopia is in the interest of Somalia. It is clear that a peaceful situation, and friendly ties with Ethiopia would create more favorable conditions for the successful resolution of complicated problems pertaining to the national economy, which confront this country, in its attempts to raise the well-being of the Somali workers.

I said that we would like hear the full opinion of the Somali delegation concerning the range of questions, which the delegation considers necessary to submit to a joint discussion, and likewise concerning the procedure for the meeting, in particular, with regard to its general duration, and other procedural questions. From our side, we have no intention of imposing any temporal limit on the meeting and are prepared to take into account, insofar as it is possible, the wishes of the two parties in this regard.

I noted further that, as we know, the Somali side proposes to discuss the issue of the Ethiopian government's concession of the right to self-determination of national groups. We are unable to predict beforehand what might be the position of the Ethiopian government, but we can surmise, that such a formulation of the question will most likely be interpreted by the Ethiopian government as interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign state.

We know, as you do, that the Ethiopian leadership in its programmatic documents announced its intention to resolve the nationalities question on a democratic basis. It goes without saying that the realization of such a program requires the appropriate conditions.

To our mind, the examination of the issue of normalizing relations between the

two countries at the meeting of experts, and precisely this, as we understand, is their first and foremost task, should not be made conditional upon the preliminary resolution of fundamentally disputed questions. This is a point of view which we have expressed more than once to the Somali leadership and it was not met with objections by their side.

The meeting of the delegation with the good services of our side would be genuinely successful if it was concluded by the elaboration by the experts of recommendations to their governments concerning the steps which would lead to the normalization of Somali-Ethiopian relations.

The Soviet side is prepared to cooperate and to offer all possible assistance to the experts of both sides in their elaboration of recommendations for their governments, but does not plan to insist on any particular position. We are prepared to assist actively in the search for a mutually acceptable resolution. If the desire should be expressed, the Somali and the Ethiopian delegations may meet without the participation of the Soviet representatives.

We would be prepared after the meeting with the Ethiopian delegation, if it should be deemed necessary, to engage in further discussion with the Somali experts with the objective of working out a unified approach, of identifying a range of questions, which would be appropriate to discuss, and likewise of identifying procedural questions.

The views which might be expressed in this connection by our delegation, may be reduced, in summary, to the following;

- 1) the acknowledgment that the continuation of tensions between the two countries is not consistent with the interest of the Ethiopian and Somali nations;
- 2) the renunciation by the two sides of the use of force in the resolution of disputed questions; the attempt to apply every effort to their settlement by peaceful means, by means of negotiations;
- 3) the obligation of the two sides to maintain peace and security on their borders, to abstain from every sort of hostile activity, from engaging in hostile propaganda against one another by means of the mass media and to foster, in every possible way, those efforts which will lead to the development of

friendly relations;

- 4) the efforts of the two countries to take measures which are directed at developing economic, trade, and cultural relations, at developing connections between voluntary organizations in the two countries, the exchange of experience, etc., and, in particular, the readiness of the two sides to conduct regular mutual consultations at all levels.

It goes without saying that first and foremost it is necessary to cease military activities on both sides.

The principled efforts of the Soviet Union toward the development of all-around cooperation with the Somali Democratic Republic are well known. Our country has never been guided in its policy by opportunistic considerations. The Soviet Union will continue in the future to strengthen its friendship and revolutionary solidarity with the nation of Somalia, to offer assistance and support in full accordance with the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between our countries.

#### July 26

[...] [I] Remarked for my part, that the interlocutor repeated all of those factors, which had been expressed by him during the previous discussion. Meanwhile, the situation in the Horn of Africa continues to become more complicated and explosive. We think that this situation dictates the necessity of introducing certain amendments to the considerations of the two parties.

From the declaration of the Somali delegation it follows that the delegation possesses the authority to discuss only territorial problems. We were told that the efforts of the Somali leadership, the efforts of the leaders of certain African countries, and likewise the efforts of Comrade F. Castro in the settlement of the disputed problems of Somali and Ethiopia did not meet with success. From this [fact] should the conclusion be drawn that, insofar as the efforts of third countries have not been successful, the disputed questions must be resolved with the assistance of arms, by means of open military actions? Our point of view is that all disputed questions should be resolved by peaceful means, by means of negotiations. For the sake of this objective no efforts of any sort should be begrudged.

The Soviet side regarded with satisfac-

tion the declaration of President Siad that Somalia would never, not under any circumstances, attempt to resolve disputed questions with the assistance of arms. This was discussed in the message to L.I. Brezhnev, and the same declaration was made by the Somali party-state delegation which visited the USSR in the previous year. In a word, we have been assured of this more than once and on various levels. We have treated this declaration with complete faith.

However, certain information we possess bears witness to the fact that open military actions have currently commenced. Regular military units in Somalia, using tanks and aviation, have crossed the Somali-Ethiopian border. I want to stress, that we are discussing concrete facts, not conjecture.

From our point of view, in order to resolve any sort of problem which has arisen between states, first and foremost it is necessary to have a favorable atmosphere. We, as the party which is offering its good services, consider that the central task should now comprise the cessation of military actions. This is the appeal we make to both the Somali and the Ethiopian sides.

It is our opinion that the issue currently stands as follows: either the Horn of Africa will become an arena where imperialist and reactionary intrigues are carried out, or by our common efforts we will succeed in turning the Horn of Africa into a region of friendly relations and peace.

We appeal to both delegations to take a seat at the negotiating table, to speak forth their own views and, correspondingly, to listen fully to each other's point of view, having devoted their full attention to the search for a path to the normalization of the relations between the two countries.

This is our point of view.

[...] Returning to the bilateral Somali-Ethiopian meeting, H.A. Kasim said, that if the question should be raised concerning the military actions of Somalia against Ethiopia, that the Somali delegation would have nothing further to discuss at the negotiating table. A war is going on between Ethiopia and the liberation movement of the Somali people who live in occupied territory. The struggle is being conducted precisely by this movement, and not by the Somali Democratic Republic.

What military actions should be ceased? After all we are discussing a struggle for liberation, and, as is well known,

from the moment of the Great October socialist revolution the Soviet Union has invariably supported liberation movements in all corners of the globe. The very activities of the Soviet Union in the United Nations are a testimony to this fact.

I would like to repeat once more that we are prepared to sit down at the negotiating table, if the Ethiopian side will discuss the territorial dispute as a fundamental issue, but if the Ethiopian side will only put forward the issue of the alleged Somali military actions, then there will not be any progress either in the work of this meeting, or in our bilateral relations.

I do not know, H.A. Kasim said in conclusion, whether the Soviet Union will be able to do anything under these circumstances. Unfortunately, we have the dismal example of the mediation of F. Castro, when Mengistu Haile Mariam declared the inexpedience of raising the territorial question, but was prepared to discuss any other questions of secondary importance.

Trust in our candor, we will regret it if the good services of the USSR do not lead to a positive result.

#### July 29

[...] Taking into account the separate exchanges of opinion taking place with the main Somali and Ethiopian delegations, the Soviet representative, by way of offering his good services, will introduce for consideration in the course of the work an idea of the first steps, which would lead toward the normalization of relations between Somalia and Ethiopia:

- 1) The renunciation of the application of force in the resolution of disputed questions. The assumption of immediate measures in the cessation of military and other hostile activities.
- 2) The assumption by both parties of the obligation to maintain peace and security on the borders.
- 3) To abstain from conducting hostile propaganda against one another by means of the mass media, to encourage efforts which would lead to the development of friendly relations.
- 4) The acknowledgment by both parties of the fact that maintaining tensions between Somalia and Ethiopia is not consistent with the interests of their peoples and impedes the unification of

their efforts in the struggle against the common enemy, imperialism.

5) The two parties express their agreement to establish and maintain contacts with each other at a variety of levels in the interests of reaching the above-mentioned goals.

[I] underscored the fact that we regard this as a working document which contains the recommendations of the Soviet side, which is fulfilling its mission to offer good services. It goes without saying that we are proceeding from the assumption that it will be brought to the attention of the Somali government.

H.A. Kasim declared that the Somali delegation had nothing to add to the considerations which the delegation had expressed earlier, and offered his assurance that the recommendations which were expressed by the Soviet side, would be brought to the attention of the Somali leadership.

[...] [I] thanked H.A. Kasim for his communication and said that I would like to make note again of certain elements, which were contained in the message of response from L.I. Brezhnev to Siad Barre's appeal to him in May of this year. "In agreeing to offer our good services," announced L.I. Brezhnev, "we approach this matter with seriousness and a sense of responsibility. We think that it should be possible to begin a dialogue on a broad basis with the goal of establishing good relations between Somalia and Ethiopia. We consider that the key which might open the road to cooperation in the search for a settlement to difficult disputed problems lies in neighborly relations in the Horn of Africa."

It is hardly necessary for me to comment on this text; it speaks for itself.

The Soviet Union offered its good services even before the exacerbation of relations between Somalia and Ethiopia. But even after this exacerbation we consider it necessary to continue our mission, in order to achieve the improvement of relations between the two countries, to create a favorable atmosphere for the successful discussion of all disputed issues.

Meanwhile, while our consultations are going on, the Soviet leaders have appealed twice with a personal message to President Siad. As recently as yesterday, L.I. Brezhnev sent President Siad a personal message, the substance of which, in brief, consisted of his desire that the Somali side

should take the appropriate steps and should stop the escalation of tension.

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1620, ll. 3-31; translation by Sally Kux.]

#### **Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia A.P. Ratanov and Mengistu, 29 July 1977**

TOP SECRET, Copy No. 2

From diary of

9 August 1977

A. P. RATANOV

Ser. No. 276

NOTES OF CONVERSATION  
with Chairman of PMAC of Ethiopia  
HAILE MARIAMOM MENGISTU  
29 July 1977

We received a visit from Mengistu and transmitted to him a message from Comrade L. I. Brezhnev in response to a communication from Mengistu, which was presented to Comrade Brezhnev for Comrade A. P. Kirilenko by the General Secretary of the PMAC, Fikre Selassie Wogderes.

Mengistu asked that we convey to Comrade Brezhnev his deep appreciation for the fraternal and candid message. We agreed, and conveyed to Mengistu the advice contained in the communication.

Mengistu placed great value on the fact that the Soviet Union is rendering support to Ethiopia, notwithstanding that this is leading to definite complications in Soviet-Somali relations. We understand, said Mengistu in this connection, that the Soviet Union is confronted with a complex dilemma: rendering military assistance to Ethiopia, it risks a loss of its opportunity in Somalia (e.g., Berbera). We are considering these questions, said Mengistu, and consider ourselves accountable to the revolutionary debt inhering in the obligation to take into account the interests of the Soviet Union in this region. Together with this, he observed, we hope that the victory of the Ethiopian anti-imperialist revolution will contribute to the common revolutionary cause.

In response to the representations of the Soviet Ambassador (the conference with Mengistu was one on one) that it is necessary to struggle not against Somalia, but in support of Somalia, Mengistu said that he agreed with this. So far, for example, the PMAC has not rendered support to the forces in Somalia which are operating

against Siad Barre and seeking assistance in Ethiopia. We are not organizing, said Mengistu, partisan movements in Somalia, although specific opportunities for that have presented themselves and continue to do so. At the same time, representations of Eritrean organizations have been established in Mogadishu, along with a people's revolutionary party, the Ethiopian Democratic Union, and Fronts for the Liberation of Tigray and Oromia, not to mention the headquarters of the "Revolutionary Front of Western Somalia."

In response to the representations of the Soviet Ambassador, following on the directives of communications from Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, concerning the need for preservation of a dialogue with Somalia, Mengistu proclaimed that he was in agreement with the concepts and representations of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. We accepted, he continued, the suggestions of the Soviet Union regarding the organization of a Somali-Ethiopian meeting in Moscow, when Somalia cut short its subversive activity in the Ogadan, and [we] are agreeable to continuing those discussions now, even as Somalia has stationed a portion of its regular troops on the territory of Ethiopia. Together with this, the PMAC will not grant territorial concessions to Somalia, although this is because in such a case the present Ethiopian government will fall. Already at this time, Mengistu noted in this connection, there is talk among the people, and even in right-wing circles, to the effect that the PMAC is not up to the task of defending either Ethiopia or the Ogadan, and that it should therefore be deposed. Berhanu Bayeh, Mengistu continued, has been summoned to Addis Ababa for consultation, and afterward he will return to Moscow without delay, inasmuch as the PMAC has engaged and continues to engage in friendly negotiations with the Somalis over questions relating to the establishment of multi-faceted Ethiopian-Somali cooperation. Mengistu promised to consider the form (for example, his interview with the Ethiopian news agency) for additional presentations of the PMAC program for peaceful resolution of Ethiopian-Somali disagreements, as well as the Eritrean problem.

The Soviet Ambassador directed Mengistu's attention to the anti-socialist and even anti-Soviet (Maoist) propaganda which is being disseminating by certain private

publishing houses.

Mengistu declared that implementation of the program of propaganda of Marxist-Leninist ideas has indeed been unsatisfactory. For this reason, the PMAC has reorganized the Provisional Bureau of Mass Organization Affairs [POMOA] and replaced its leadership.

Concerning the Chinese, Mengistu noted that they are not only disseminating literature, but are rendering direct support to Eritrean separatists and extremists.

In the course of the discussion, a number of questions were touched upon in connection with the structure of the Ethiopian armed forces.

In conclusion, Mengistu stated as follows: "We are attentive to the advice of our Soviet comrades in connection with the search for political solutions to both domestic and foreign problems. We will continue to strive for this in the future, and have already been required to execute many persons or place them in prison. At the present time I, for example, am restraining those who are proposing repressive measures, including those against errant organizations who proclaim their adherence to Marxism-Leninism but who are struggling against the PMAC. The main goal at the present time is to create a political party and a new worker-peasant army, inasmuch as the old army has displayed its weakness, and it turns out that in military terms the counter-revolution is stronger than the PMAC had supposed."

For his part, the Soviet Ambassador again laid emphasis on the need to preserve, no matter what, contacts with the leadership of the SDR.

The Soviet Ambassador additionally directed Mengistu's attention to the fact that the representations in his letter to Comrade Brezhnev concerning the supposed inadequacies of military supplies did not correspond to reality.

Mengistu responded to that by stating that, evidently, the translation of those remarks was inexact, inasmuch as he had in mind not the inadequacy of supplies of one or another sort of weapon, but rather a request to augment them with supplies of a different technical sort, in particular, that the supply of tanks be augmented with supplies of trailers for their transport from port, conveyance to their place of destination, etc.

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR TO  
SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA  
/s/ RATANOV

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1636, ll. 113-116; translated by Bruce McDonald.]

**Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo  
Meeting, 4 August 1977 (excerpt)**

Top Secret  
Single copy  
Minutes

MEETING OF THE  
CC CPSU POLITBURO

4 August 1977

Chaired by: Com. KIRILENKO, A.P.

Attended: Comrades Y.V. Andropov, F.D. Kulakov, K.T. Mazurov, A.Y. Pel'she, P.N. Demichev, B.N. Ponomarev, M.S. Solomentsev, M.V. Zimianin, Y.P. Ryabov, K.V. Rusakov.

8. About the address to the leadership of the  
progressive African states in relation to the  
sharpening of Somali-Ethiopian relations.

KUZNETSOV reports that the Ethiopians have sent a complaint to the Organization for African Unity, and that our address to the leadership of the progressive African states with an appeal to take steps toward the normalization of Somali-Ethiopian relations would be very timely.

PONOMAREV supports Kuznetsov's proposal.

KIRILENKO: The situation which we have here with these two countries is extremely complicated. We have no reasons to quarrel with either the Somali side or the Ethiopian side, but we have only limited capabilities to influence their mutual relations. We need to make a decision.

[Source: *APRF*, f. 3, op. 120, d. 37, ll. 44, 48; translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.]

**Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia A.P.  
Ratanov, Memorandum of Conversa-  
tion with Mengistu, 5 August 1977**

SECRET, copy No. 2  
From the journal of "11" August 1977

Ratanov, A.P.

Issue No. 284

RECORD OF CONVERSATION  
with Chairman of the PMAC of Ethiopia  
MENGISTU HAILE MARIAM  
5 August 1977

I visited Mengistu at his invitation (Berhanu Bayeh, a member of the Permanent Committee of the PMAC, also took part in the conversation).

After thanking the Soviet Union for rendering assistance to Ethiopia, including the decision about the delivery of trailers, helicopters, and vehicles, Mengistu asked me to convey the following to the Soviet leadership and to comrade Brezhnev in particular:

The PMAC has attentively studied the advice in comrade L.I. Brezhnev's reply, and will follow it, in particular: to aim for the political resolution of Ethiopian-Somali differences. On August 8, Berhanu Bayeh, as well as governmental advisers Mikael Imru and Getachew Kibret, will fly to Moscow to continue negotiations with the Somali delegation.

Despite this, Mengistu continued, Somalia is continuing its escalation of military actions against Ethiopia. At present it is conducting systematic bombing raids on cities in the Ogaden (Dollo - on the border with Kenya), and the PMAC is anticipating that Harar, Dire-Dawa, etc. will be bombed. As a consequence of these bombing raids, industrial and agricultural firms and infrastructure are being destroyed. Thus far Ethiopian air forces have limited their bombing raids to Somali tanks and artillery, and air battles with Somali planes, and has refrained from bombing Somali cities because this would create a major military conflagration in this region. We do not intend to attack Somalia, Mengistu emphasized.

In connection with his statement, Mengistu requested that the Soviet government consider taking additional measures to influence Somalia, even some type of economic sanctions, and at the same time convey to the Somali government that Ethiopia is prepared to hold talks with Somalia with the participation of the Soviet Union. What is important now is to bring about a halt in Somali air attacks because these attacks demoralize the army as well as the peaceful population and could cause a political crisis in the regime.

In conclusion Mengistu requested that he be kept informed of possible steps that the Soviet Union would take.

During the course of the negotiations, the Soviet ambassador informed Mengistu about the decision of the Soviet government to deliver trailers for the transport of tanks, helicopters, and vehicles, from the port of entry to their destinations.

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR  
TO SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA  
(signature) /A. RATANOV/

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1636, ll. 127-128; translated by Elizabeth Wishnick.]

**Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia A.P.  
Ratanov, Memorandum of Conversation  
with Mengistu, 7 August 1977**

From the journal of TOP SECRET  
A. P. RATANOV Copy no. 2  
16 August 1977  
re: no. 292

Record of Conversation  
with the Head of the PMAC  
MENGISTU HAILE MARIAM  
7 August 1977

I visited Mengistu Haile Mariam (Legesse Asfaw, member of the Permanent Committee of the PMAC, also took part in the conversation).

1. In accordance with my instructions from the Center [Moscow], I informed Mengistu about the measures taken by the Soviet leadership in support of Ethiopia.

Mengistu requested that I convey his deep gratitude to the Soviet leadership and personally to L.I. Brezhnev for the information about these measures. We deeply trust the Soviet Union, he said, and are relying on its future support, since the situation in the border regions of Ethiopia is becoming more and more complicated. Somalia continues daily to bomb the cities of Dolo and Barre [sic]. There are Somali troops in the western Ogaden and we are now observing the movement of Somali units into the northern part of this region. Ethiopian troops have seized arms which appear to be NATO arms. According to certain, as yet unverified information, the

French have begun use their aircraft to deliver French arms to Mogadishu. The Sudan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, under the cover of Eritrean separatist organizations, are transferring their detachments and arms into Eritrea. Sudan is supplying the separatists with American arms as well as arms they have recently received from the People's Republic of China.

Our struggle, Mengistu underscored, has the nature of a class struggle, and we are doing all we can to defend the revolution and to bring it to a victorious conclusion. At the same time, taking into account that the Ethiopian revolution is just a part of the larger revolutionary struggle, Mengistu continued, I feel a need to continue the consultations with Comrade L.I. Brezhnev which began in May of this year. I likewise appealed, he noted at the same time, with a letter to Comrades Fidel Castro and Erich Honecker in which I proposed that I meet with them in Berlin in the hope that together we might travel to Moscow to meet with Comrade L.I. Brezhnev in order to discuss in greater detail the situation in the interior and exterior of Ethiopia.

Mengistu did not answer the question of the Soviet Ambassador as to whether the current situation would allow him to leave the country. He confined himself to the remark that the old machinery of State required replacement[;] however, the PMAC was currently not yet in a position to do this due to the lack of revolutionary cadres, etc....

In the course of further conversation Mengistu asked [us] to examine the possibility of offering assistance likewise in fortifying the region of the Red Sea coast (supplying coastal batteries).

Mengistu likewise spoke out in favor of sending a Soviet military delegation to Ethiopia in the immediate future in order to strengthen contacts between the armed forces of the two countries in accordance with the previously approved plan of exchanges in the area of the military. In his opinion, an Ethiopian military delegation might visit the Soviet Union with the goal of familiarizing themselves later, when the military situation had been stabilized.

2. [I] carried out my instructions regarding the question of the Soviet-Ethiopian negotiations on opening a direct sea route between the ports of the Soviet Union and Ethiopia.

Mengistu spoke in favor of the open-

ing of such a route and of concluding an agreement on this issue as well as on the issue of an intergovernmental agreement on shipping.

3. [I] carried out my instructions regarding the question of the Republic of South Africa's impending nuclear arms testing. Mengistu welcomed the Soviet Government initiative on this issue (TASS announcement). At the same time he remarked that at the last OAU [meeting], Ethiopia had proposed to include on the agenda for the Assembly the issue of the threat of the creation of a nuclear arsenal in the Republic of South Africa with the assistance of Western powers; however, the bloc of the so-called Francophone countries rejected the Ethiopian proposal. At the current time, said Mengistu, it is imperative that the socialist and progressive African countries develop a campaign to prevent the fortification of the military power of the Republic of South Africa which threatens all of Africa.

In conclusion, Mengistu requested once again that we convey his gratitude to the Soviet leadership and to Comrade L.I. Brezhnev.

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR  
TO SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA  
/s/ A.RATANOV/

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1636, ll. 102-104.]

#### **Ethiopian Aide-Memoire to Soviet Officials in Moscow, 11 August 1977**

Delivered by the Ethiopian  
delegation to the Soviet  
delegation at the reception  
on 11 August 1977

Translated from English

#### AIDE-MEMOIRE

1. During the course of discussions between comrades Mengistu Haile Mariam and Nikolai Podgorny in April 1977 in Moscow, the Soviet Union first came up with the idea for a joint meeting of the leaders of Ethiopia and Somalia in an effort to diminish the possibility of conflict and create the preconditions which could lead to harmonious cooperation between the two states.

2. In mid-July 1977 the provisional

military government of socialist Ethiopia received a communication from the Soviet ambassador in Addis-Ababa that the meeting would take place in Moscow on an expert level from 26-28 July 1977. The same communication noted that prior to and during the course of the meeting both Ethiopia and Somalia should refrain from any steps that would complicate matters. Ethiopia also received assurances that Somalia would not begin military actions.

3. On 23 July 1977, three days before the beginning of the Moscow meeting, Somalia began open and direct aggressive action against Ethiopia, thereby repudiating those very conditions necessary for the success of the meeting.

4. The Ethiopian delegation, headed by Major Berhanu Bayeh, of the permanent committee of the Provisional Military Administrative Council, came to Moscow at the appointed time to explain to the Soviet government that the situation that had arisen at that time as a consequence of Somalia's actions involved a range of factors which would have a negative impact on the proposed meeting, and, accordingly, that there was no practical purpose in holding such a meeting.

5. The Ethiopian delegation noted its surprise at the fact that Somalia insisted on discussing what it called the "territorial question." Ethiopia has no territorial dispute with Somalia; moreover, Ethiopia considers it inappropriate to hold talks under duress.

6. The working document that the Soviet Union presented to the Ethiopian delegation was studied attentively and delivered to Addis-Ababa. It was also taken into account that the situation which led to aggressive actions by Somali had not changed. The OAU's offer of its good offices to Ethiopia and Somalia at the Committee session from 5-8 August 1977 in Libreville, Gabon, is very significant; at the session a series of recommendations were passed, which resolved the following:

"1) Affirms resolution 16(1) and resolutions 27(2), obligating member-states, in accordance with the OAU charter, to respect the borders existing at the time of independence, and also to respect the basic principles of the inviolability of sovereignty and territorial integrity of member-states.

2) Calls on the sides of the conflict,

Ethiopia and Somalia, in accordance with the provisions and principles of the Charter, to cease all military actions.

3) Affirms the non-agreement of the OAU with intervention by any foreign powers, and, in particular, by non-African powers, in the internal affairs of member-states of the OAU; calls for the rejection of any non-sanctioned intervention in accordance with the decision of the XIV assembly of the heads of states and governments.

4) Calls upon all states to refrain from any actions which could be detrimental to the achievement of understanding between the sides in the conflict, increase tension and conflict, and threaten the peace, security, and territorial integrity of the two neighboring states.

5) Recommends in connection with the serious proposal by the executive organs of the president of the Committee of the OAU to offer its good offices to enter into contact with the heads of state of Ethiopia and Somalia in an effort to achieve a cease-fire and create a situation that would be conducive to the peaceful resolution of the problem."

7. Taking the aforementioned into account, it was decided that the Ethiopian delegation should take part in the Moscow discussions on the basis of the recommendations of the OAU, made in Libreville, and the Soviet working document consisting of the following ideas about the first steps necessary for the normalization of relations between Ethiopia and Somalia:

1) The two sides should refrain from the use of force to resolve their disputes. Measures should be taken to end military and other hostile actions.

2) The two sides should take steps to preserve peace and security on their borders.

3) They should refrain from hostile propaganda in the mass media against one another and stimulate efforts which would lead to the development of friendly relations.

4) The two sides should recognize the fact that continued tension between Somalia and Ethiopia is not in the interest of their peoples, and presents an obstacle to their combining forces in

First: The Somali delegation had received an alarming communication about certain schemes concerning Ethiopia. As is well known, Somalia values the fact that Ethiopia maintains friendly relations with

the Soviet Union and that Ethiopia has proclaimed the principles of socialist orientation. In spite of the fact that Somali disagrees with Ethiopia's evaluation of these principles and that, in the Somali view, Ethiopia has not yet found the path of genuine anti-imperialism, nonetheless, one may hope that the steps which Ethiopia has taken at the present time will lead to constructive results.

Although the available information presents a picture which is far from complete, it is considered in Mogadishu that Ethiopia could "slip through our fingers" and go over to the other camp. It would be shameful for history if, at the very moment when efforts are being undertaken to organize negotiations between Somali and Ethiopia concerning significant issues, Ethiopia should return to the camp of its traditional allies in the West.

[My] Interlocutor said that as the Soviet side knows, Somalia hopes to create a strong government in East Africa, which would unite Ethiopia and Somalis on a socialist basis. This hope is expressed not with the intention of tossing about catchwords, but on the strength of the fact that these two countries are close in terms of ethnicity, geography, and, Somalia hopes as before, ideologically. If the creation of such a united government should be successful, it would represent a force and a buttress which is imperative for the socialist development of East Africa.

This is why in Somalia we are concerned by such communications and consider it imperative to bring them to the attention of the Soviet side.

Second: Ethiopia has come forward with rather resolute declarations in the press and on the radio to the effect that Ethiopia intends to teach Somalia a lesson which Somalia will never forget, and also to the effect that Ethiopia intends to lead an open war against Somalia, having received in the meantime, assistance from socialist countries, including, among others, the Soviet Union. The Somali delegation would like to ask the Soviet representatives, in their capacity as friends, if there is a measure of truth in this. The Somali side considers that a force is at work in Ethiopia, if not in government circles, then in other sorts of circles in Addis Ababa, which is creating a war hysteria. That is why the delegation considers it imperative to inform the Soviet side about

this.

[I] expressed thanks for the information. I noted that the initial communication of the Somali delegation was of an excessively general nature. The schemes of imperialist and reactionary Arab circles and their intentions are generally well known. Imperialism and reactionism intend to strike a blow not only at Ethiopia, but also at Somalia. They are not happy with the socialist course which has been proclaimed in both of these countries. Naturally, it is imperative to be vigilant.

The situation, which has developed in the relations between Somalia and Ethiopia, in the view of the Soviet side, is favorable to the realization of the goals of imperialism and reactionism. The path down which Somalia has started with the aim of creating, in your words, a "socialist monolith" in East Africa, is likely to undermine the goals you have placed before yourself. We are aware of the fact that in Ethiopia there are reactionary forces, that there is an internal counter-revolution, that there is a struggle going on in Ethiopia.

However, according to our information, the core leadership of Ethiopia is taking a progressive course. Here, unfortunately, we disagree with you in our evaluation.

As is well known, in a discussion with the Soviet ambassador, Siad Barre declared that the Somali government did not oppose the granting of assistance to Ethiopia by the Soviet Union within the framework of the agreement which exists between the two countries. We offer assistance to Ethiopia, just as we offered assistance to Somalia, but, as you are aware, this assistance is intended to serve the aim of defense, not aggression.

[I] said that I had not happened to see in the press declarations of the Ethiopian leadership to the effect that they intend to "teach Somalia a lesson." It is possible, that this matter is the work of the mass media. Unfortunately, the mass media in both countries has strayed too far in their mutual accusations. Therefore the Soviet Union has appealed not to give free rein to emotions, but rather to act with reason, proceeding not from national interests, but rather from international interests, from the interests of strengthening the position of progressive forces. A dangerous situation has now been created and if it is not gotten under control it may develop into a serious conflict, the

irreversibility of which would be fraught with serious consequences.

Therefore the Soviet leaders, as friends, advise your leaders to weigh all of the circumstances and to approach this matter from a broad public and international position. The Soviet Union hopes to avoid a conflict in the relations of two countries, with both of whom it has friendly relations. The most important task now is to stop the escalation of tension, to put an end to the bloodshed. It appears to us that there is no other basis for a settlement now than that one which was proposed by the Soviet side in the working document, which the Ethiopian side has accepted and which, unfortunately, the Somali side has refused to accept.

Up to this point the course of negotiations, as it appears to us, does not satisfy your two delegations, but the Soviet side is also not satisfied, although the Soviet side is taking all possible steps. Nonetheless, we consider it imperative to continue our efforts toward reaching a turning-point in the events which would be satisfactory to the interests of the forces of progress and socialism.

H.A. Kasim noted that Siad Barre, in a conversation with the Soviet ambassador, had indeed said that Somalia did not object to assistance, including military assistance, offered by the Soviet Union to Ethiopia. However, he also spoke of the necessity of maintaining proportions. My interlocutor declared that he would like to express his candid hope that the Soviet Union would approach with understanding the issue that, until the time has arrived when the question of the part of Somali territory has been resolved, the Somali revolution will be in danger. Moreover, this danger does not come from within, but rather from the very part of the Somali territory which is now under Ethiopian rule. A similar danger is caused by the enormous efforts to achieve national liberation made by Somalis, who are living on territory which does not form a part of Somalia. In order for Somalia to contribute to the building of socialism all over the world, all of the Somali nation must stand firmly on its legs.

At the meeting of Siad Barre with the former president of the PMAC of Ethiopia Tefere Bante, it was proposed that the latter should become the leader of a federation of Somalia and Ethiopia in order that this might resolve the national question. However,

Ethiopia responded negatively to this proposition and, as a result, the situation which has been created in Western Somalia is already getting out of control. H.A. Kasim expressed the hope that the Soviet side fully understands the meaning of these words.

[I] declared that I could only repeat what I had already said and that I hoped that its meaning was correctly understood by the Somali side. I added, that it is necessary to realize all of the responsibility which will lie on Somalia, if there is no cessation of military actions.

The following people were present at the discussions: on the Soviet side was the head of the DPO of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, O. N. Khlestov; the head of the Third African Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, V. A. Ustinov; on the Somali side was member of the CC SRSP, Director of the Somali Development Bank, Jama Mohammud; member of the CC SRSP, Head of the Department of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry of the CC SRSP Ahmed Mohammed Duale, the Ambassador of the Somali Democratic Republic to the USSR, Ali Ismail Warsma, the Military Attache of the Somali Democratic Republic to the USSR Salah Hadji.

The discussions were translated by the Third Secretary of the Translation Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, S. V. Berezhkov, and transcribed by the Third Secretary of the Third African Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, R. A. Ibragimov.

Deputy Minister  
USSR Foreign Affairs  
(signed and typed) L. Ilichev

[attachment]

Delivered by the Somali  
delegation to the Soviet  
delegation at the meeting of  
10 August 1977\*

Translated from English [into Russian]

Taking into account the fact that the Somali government has appealed to the government of the USSR to offer its good services toward the resolution of the territorial dispute between Somali and Ethiopia with the objective of reaching a fair, peaceful, and stable resolution of this territorial dispute;

Likewise taking into account the concurrence of the USSR in carrying out its international socialist obligations to undertake a similar mission of good services after receiving the full concurrence of the governments of Somalia and Ethiopia;

Taking into consideration that the government of the Somali Democratic Republic has empowered this high level delegation to represent itself in discussions and negotiations on the aforementioned question;

Taking into consideration likewise, the exchange of opinions between the Soviet and the Somali sides in the course of the last week of July and 8 August 1977;

Responding to the appeal of the Soviet representative, made to the Somali delegation on 8 August 1977 to present a working document which might serve as the basis for discussions;

Recognizing the fact that the colonialization by Ethiopia of a significant portion of Somali territory and its population represents the sole reason for the tension which has been created at the current moment in the Horn of Africa and that such tension without any doubt is not consistent with the interests of the people of the given region, but rather only serves the interests of their common enemy, international imperialism and neocolonialism;

Being firmly convinced that the primary cause of the lengthy dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia is the continuing colonialization and military occupation by Ethiopia of a significant portion of Somali territory and its population and that the decolonization of this territory takes absolute priority over all other questions;

Taking into consideration the fact that a discussion of the consequences of the colonial occupation, which is being carried out at the present time by Ethiopia, without a discussion of the central question of decolonization makes it impossible and futile to conduct constructive negotiations;

Proceeding from the Leninist principle of the inalienable right of all peoples to self-determination, human dignity, liberty and national sovereignty, a principle which is clearly fixed in the United Nations Charter and which was subsequently reflected in Resolution 1514 of the UN General Assembly, and likewise from the fact that any policy of Ethiopia, which is directed at the perpetuation of colonial rule over the aforementioned Somali territory and its popula-

tion, is in clear contradiction to this noble principle;

The Somali delegation proposes the following in the capacity of a basis for discussion:

“The decolonization of the Somali territory and its population, which finds itself under Ethiopian rule.”

\* When the head of the Somali delegation delivered the document, he called it a working message, laying out the views of the delegation regarding the principal question.-S.B.

Translated by S. Berezhkov

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1620, ll. 32-59; translated by Sally Kux.]

### **Record of Negotiations between Somali and Soviet Officials in Moscow, 15-19 August 1977 (excerpts)**

From the journal of      Secret. Copy No. 8  
L.F. Ilichev                      31 August 1977  
   No. 2325/GS

Record of Conversation  
with the Minister of Mineral and Water  
Resources of Somalia,  
Head of Delegation of Experts  
Hussein Abdulkadir Kasim  
(third level)

The head of the Somali delegation of experts returned to Moscow on 14 August 1977. Meetings took place at the residence of the Somali Delegation from 15-19 August 1977. On 20 August the delegation returned to Mogadishu.

#### 15 August

[...] Moreover, in confidence it had been said to the head of the Somali delegation, that the Soviet leaders and L.I. Brezhnev in person had appealed once again with a message to President Siad, in which was expressed the point of view of the Soviet side with regard to the events, which were taking place in the region of the Horn of Africa. This had been done before the publication of the TASS statement.

[...]

#### 17 August

[...] [I] underscored that the Soviet good services mission, as follows from the exchange of messages between L.I. Brezhnev and Siad Barre, is not charged with facilitating the discussion of any particular concrete question or questions which have arisen in relations between Somalia and Ethiopia, such as, for example, the territorial question, for the parties which are in conflict are more familiar with the substance of the matter. In the current situation it is difficult to imagine how it will be possible to resolve any sort of concrete question. After all, in order for that to happen it is necessary to create the appropriate conditions. Therefore the Soviet side sees its good services mission first and foremost in assisting in the creation of conditions, under which it would be possible to resolve all questions at the negotiating table.

#### 18 August

A tete-a-tete conversation took place at the request of the head of the Somali delegation.

H.A. Kasim reported that:

1. He was charged by the Somali government to inform the Soviet government that new factors had arisen in the development of the situation in East Africa, which bear witness to the attempts to expand internationally and to escalate the conflict and also to the interference of non-African governments in the conflict. Several days before President Siad in his declaration had spoken of the interference of a friendly country, part of the socialist community, whose leaders and policy enjoy great authority in Somalia. According to information received by Mogadishu, Cuban military officials are involved in the conflict between the Western Somali Liberation Front and Ethiopia. As President Siad declared further, Somalia does not intend to remain neutral in the face of this situation, when citizens of Somali nationality in the Ogaden are perishing at the hands of non-Africans.

2. He discussed the campaign of insinuations which was being carried out in the imperialist press and declared that Somalia will not become the victim of such a campaign, that, as before, Somalia will adhere to socialist principles and to the course of strengthening friendly relations with the Soviet Union, in spite of the ruses of impe-

rialist propaganda.

At the same time he expressed alarm at the "avalanche of declarations and commentary appearing in the Soviet press," beginning on 14 August, noting, that such declarations are pouring oil on the fire of imperialist propaganda at the very moment when the Soviet Union is conducting a good services mission, whose aim is to assist in finding a solution to the situation which has been created in East Africa. Such reports hardly further the fulfillment of the good services mission and they could not have been printed without the consent of the Soviet government. In his words, the campaign in the Soviet press does not promote the creation of a situation which would be favorable to reaching a peaceful resolution of the questions which have arisen between Somalia and Ethiopia. If this campaign does not cease, said my interlocutor, the Somali people will begin to ask why statements in the Soviet press contain accusations addressed at Somalia and why the Somali government does not react to them.

He assured me further, that Somalia would not be deceived by any such ruses of imperialist propaganda, but warned that others might swallow the bait.

[I] asked about the degree of trustworthiness of the intelligence which served as the basis for the declaration that, "Cuban military officials were involved in the military conflict." Is it possible that you are swallowing the bait of imperialist propaganda? Moreover, would it not be preferable to clarify this sort of question directly with our Cuban comrades?

H.A. Kasim. We are not speaking idly. Contacts have already been established with the Cubans as regards this question.

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1620, ll. 60-80; translated by Sally Kux.]

#### **Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia Ratanov and Cuban Ambassador to Ethiopia Jose Perez Novoa, 23 August 1977**

SECRET, Copy No. 2

From the journal of 6 September 1977  
Ratanov, A.P. Original No. 324

#### **MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION with the Cuban ambassador to Ethiopia JOSE PEREZ NOVOA**

23 August 1977

During the course of the conversation, which took place at the Soviet Embassy, Jose Perez Novoa, on his own initiative, opened the conversation with a question about sending Cuban military personnel to Ethiopia in accordance with Mengistu's request. After this he asked the following: "You had directed attention to the inappropriateness of the announcement by the leader of the Cuban military specialists in Ethiopia, Arnoldo Ochoa [to the effect that] 'you were right that the decision to send Cuban personnel to Ethiopia does not depend on Havana, but on Moscow.' This was the case, as the Cuban ambassador to Addis Ababa found out. Raul Castro, in the course of his recent consultations with Soviet leaders in Moscow, did not raise the issue of the possibility of sending Cuban military personnel to Ethiopia, and, consequently, A. Ochoa did not have any basis to make the aforementioned statement to Mengistu. We decided to tell you this because we would like our relations with Soviet comrades to be open and clear."

I thanked Jose Perez Novoa. Concerning the essence of the matter, I noted that the question of inviting Cuban military personnel is a difficult one not just for socialist states, but also for the leadership of the PMAC, in that the invitation of combat units from foreign powers, particularly non-African ones, could be used by Somalia and the Eritrean separatists to involve military personnel from the Arab states in military actions at much greater levels than is occurring now.

Jose Perez Novoa did not try to dispute the Soviet ambassador's statements. This time he also did not dispute the Soviet ambassador's statements about the necessity of working with the Ethiopian leadership to continue the Somali-Ethiopian negotiations in Moscow on an expert level.

In the course of the conversation Jose Perez Novoa assured that [he would convey] to all Cuban diplomats and specialists the instructions given to him about the necessity of clarifying the decisive importance of the assistance rendered by the Soviet Union to defend the revolutionary achievements of the Ethiopian people and the territorial integrity of the country.

USSR AMBASSADOR  
TO SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA

(signature) /A. Ratanov/

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1637, ll. 118-119; translated by Elizabeth Wishnick.]

**Memorandum of Conversation, Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia A.P. Ratanov with U.S. Charge d'Affaires A. Tienkin, 3 September 1977**

TOP SECRET, Copy No. 2  
From the journal of 6 September 1977  
Ratanov, A.P. Original No. 339

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION  
with USA charge d'affaires in Ethiopia  
A[RTHUR] TIENKIN  
3 September 1977

By previous agreement I met with A. Tienkin at the Soviet Embassy. During the discussion he made the following comments.

- American-Ethiopian relations. They are not as good as they could be. Nonetheless, there have been some signs of improvement in these relations recently, [which is] what the USA has been seeking. For example, the other day the USA announced its readiness to continue economic aid to Ethiopia. We raised the issue of maintaining staff at the embassy in Addis-Ababa, above all staff in the economic and trade sections (the PMAC, as is well-known, in May of this year liquidated a group of American military attaches and a military adviser, and demanded that the embassy staff be reduced by one half). This time, it seems to Tienkin, the Ethiopian government will be inclined to satisfy the American request.

The USA informed the Ethiopian government that it does not and would not interfere in the domestic affairs of Ethiopia, including in Eritrea. At the same time, said Tienkin, given Ethiopia's current socialist policy, the USA is not convinced that it (Ethiopia) is able to maintain normal relations with capitalist countries.

- In the American view, the PMAC "is going too fast" on questions of social transformation, and in Ethiopia there are forces which would like to go even faster than the PMAC along the path of turning Ethiopia into a socialist state. In particular, the greater radicalism of the leadership of the All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement [MEISON], as Tienkin suggests, was a reason for the "dis-

appearance" of that leadership, in comparison with the PMAC.

- Of all of Ethiopia's domestic problems, the most difficult is Eritrea; in comparison with this even the problem of the liberation of the Ogaden seems easy.

- Ethiopia, of course, will not be dismembered and will secure its border with Somalia, however, he (Tienkin) did not see any possibility for the normalization of Ethiopian-Somali differences, insofar as Somalia is unlikely to renounce its territorial pretensions to Ethiopia.

- American-Somali relations. They are improving. The USA even "agreed in principle" to the delivery of defensive weapons. The USA announced, however, that these deliveries cannot take place at present because of the military actions in the Ogaden. The USA also emphasized that their agreement to military deliveries does not mean that they do not recognize the territorial integrity of Somalia.

- Tienkin is aware of the rumours that Israel is supposedly rendering military aid to Ethiopia, but he did not see any clear indications that would confirm these rumors. However, even if Israel were doing something like this, said Tienkin, it would be doing this on its own initiative, i.e. without consultation with the USA on such questions.

For his part the Soviet ambassador emphasized that the Soviet Union supports Ethiopia, but at the same time aims to convince Somalia and Ethiopia of the need to seek peaceful regulation of the Somali-Ethiopian conflict and that the Soviet Union considers Ethiopia to be a non-aligned state, having the right, as all other states do, to have normal relations with socialist states as well as with the Western states. He added that the support of the Soviet Union for Ethiopia's socialist orientation is defined by the fact that it [this policy] was chosen by Ethiopia itself and answers to the needs of its socio-economic development. However, this policy of socialist orientation presupposes normal economic and trade ties with all countries, the existence of a private sector, mixed state-private firms, etc.

Tienkin remarked that he agreed with this, that the Ethiopians themselves chose the path of socialist orientation. In Tienkin's view, the Ethiopian leaders have really begun to emphasize their non-aligned course more than they had in previous statements.

During the discussion, Tienkin did not try to reproach the Soviet Union and did not even show any interest in Soviet military aid to Ethiopia. He was most interested in the issue of Soviet-Somali relations (the results of Siad Barre's trip to Moscow, etc...)

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR TO  
SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA /s/ A. Ratanov

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1637, ll. 136-138; translated by Elizabeth Wishnick.]

**Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia Ratanov and Mengistu, 5 September 1977**

From diary of SECRET  
A. P. Ratanov Copy No. 2  
6 September 1977

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION  
with Chairman of PMAC of Ethiopia  
HAILE MARIAMOM MENGISTU  
5 September 1977

I received a visit from Haile Mariam Mengistu (Berhanu Bayeh, a member of the Permanent Committee of the PMAC, took part in the discussion) and, pursuant to instructions, informed him about the results of the visit of President Siad Barre of the SDR to Moscow.

1. Having listened, Mengistu asked to convey his appreciation to the Soviet leadership, and personally to Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, for the correct line followed in discussions with Siad Barre, and for the comprehensive assistance rendered to Ethiopia. In this connection, Mengistu noted that at the present time, especially in regard to Soviet supplies of trailers for the transport of tanks, the balance of forces between Ethiopia and Somali was beginning to move in favor of Ethiopia.

Assessing the demarche of Siad Barre as a political maneuver (departing for Moscow, Siad Barre issued an order for an attack on Jijiga), Mengistu announced that an essential condition for Ethiopian-Somali negotiations would be the complete withdrawal of Somali forces from Ethiopian territory. Siad Barre is now attempting to lead astray not only the Soviet Union, but also the PDRY, the intermediation of which he had only recently requested, as well as Madagascar. However, said Mengistu, al-

though the Soviet comrades and comrades from PDRY are taking a principled line in the Somali-Ethiopian conflict, friends in the Republic of Madagascar do not understand everything in the conflict and are inclined to believe the demagogic pronouncements of Siad Barre.

2. Mengistu, who returned on 4 September from Jijiga, told about the battle outside that population center ("the most powerful tank forces in Africa"). On Somalia's side, four motorized mechanical brigades (5, 8, 9 and 10) took part in the fighting. After the Somali attack on Jijiga, which was repelled, Ethiopian forces counter-attacked and repelled the Somalis, completely destroying one tank battalion. The fighting in that region is continuing. It is possible, Mengistu noted in this connection, that Siad Barre counted on a victory outside of Jijiga for the purpose of forcing the Ethiopians into negotiations from a position of strength, and in the event of a defeat, to "demonstrate good will in the eyes of the Soviet Union."

3. Responding to a question from the Soviet Ambassador (a "good question"), Mengistu stated that up until recently the government of the Republic of Djibouti had taken an unfriendly position toward Ethiopia in respect to the Somali-Ethiopian conflict, by prohibiting the landing of Ethiopian aircraft in Djibouti, rendering medical assistance to wounded Somali soldiers, and so forth. Now, however, that the Republic of Djibouti is suffering a serious economic crisis as a result of Somali aggression and, in particular, now that Somali saboteurs stopped the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railroad from operating, its government has expressed a readiness to enter into a trade relationship with Ethiopia. Mengistu is certain that this positive development in the policy of the Government of the Republic of Djibouti will gain strength.

In Djibouti, Mengistu continued, at the present time there are three groups of political forces: (1) the party of the People's Independence Movement (Marxist-Leninist), advocating independence and creation of a progressive government; (2) the party of the National Union for Independence, advocating nationalist positions for independence; and (3) the right-wing party of the African People's League, advocating, in the final analysis, if not annexation to Somalia, then at least the establishment of special relations with it.

Ethiopia is supporting the People's Independence Movement and advising that party to unite with the National Union for Independence for the establishment of an independent existence for the Republic of Djibouti. The People's Independence Movement does not exclude the possibility that in the future that party will be required to resort to armed methods of conflict against the present government, which is persecuting it.

In the opinion of Mengistu, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries could, with the help of Ethiopia, if necessary, establish contact with the People's Independence Movement and render support to that party. Toward this end the Soviet Committee for Solidarity of the Countries of Asian and Africa could dispatch a delegation to Addis-Ababa or receive in Moscow a delegation of that party. It would be worthwhile to join forces for this purpose, Mengistu stated, in order to prevent the return of Djibouti to the imperialist bloc.

4. In response to related representations of the Soviet Ambassador, Mengistu announced his readiness to meet with the Soviet Chief Military Advisor and asked to be excused for the fact that, being occupied with the leadership of military operations, he had not been able to do this sooner.

5. As concerns the All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement, Mengistu stated that the movement had now split into two groups, one of which was inclined toward cooperation with the PMAC. The PMAC will continue its advocacy of the merger of all Marxist-Leninist organizations and groups into a single party and of the creation of a national front.

6. Responding to a question of the Soviet Ambassador, Mengistu stated that the PMAC was preparing to reexamine the ranks of the All-Ethiopian Committee on Peace, Friendship and Solidarity. Subsequently the PMAC will inform the Embassy as to the manner in which it would be most productive for the Soviet Committee on Solidarity of the Countries of Asia and Africa to render cooperation to that Committee. In this connection, as relates to assistance which the Soviet Committee intends to render to Ethiopia, it would be possible to direct this assistance to the address of the Ethiopian Committee on Peace, Friendship and Solidarity, simultaneously apprising the PMAC about this.

## AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR TO SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA

/s/ A. RATANOV

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1636, ll. 95-9; translated by Bruce McDonald.]

### Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia A.P. Ratanov, Memorandum of Meeting with Mengistu, 10 September 1977

TOP SECRET, Copy No. 2

From the journal 29" September 1977  
RATANOV, A.P. Issue No. 350

### RECORD OF CONVERSATION with the Chairman of the PMAC MENGISTU HAILE MARIAM 10 September 1977

On September 10, together with the heads of the diplomatic missions of Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, PDRY, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, PDRK [People's Democratic Republic of Korea; North Korea], Cuba, and Yugoslavia, I was invited to visit Mengistu Haile Mariam. From the Ethiopian side, Atnafu Abate and Berhanu Bayeh, Deputy Chairman of the PMAC and member of its Permanent Committee, respectively, took part in the meeting, along with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Felleke Gedle-Giorgis.

Mengistu said that the goal of this meeting was to inform the governments of the socialist countries and the PDRY, through their representatives in Addis-Ababa, about the discovery by the PMAC of an imperialist plot against the Ethiopian revolution, in which to some extent or another are participating the USA (the initiator of the plot), Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Kenya, and Somalia.

According to the document, which fell into the hands of the PMAC "from trusted sources," CIA official E. Kelly from the USA Embassy in Nairobi has worked out a coordinated plan of action of domestic Ethiopian counterrevolutionary forces and the countries which support them, which envisages a range of acts at the end of September - beginning of October of this year, which have as their goal the overthrow of the PMAC and the creation of a pro-Western, reactionary government. Terrorist acts

in Addis-Ababa against members of the PMAC leadership and the organization of a combined attack of military formations prepared on the territories of Sudan and Kenya, and also a continuation of Somali aggression, are parts of the plan.

In this regard Mengistu Haile Mariam said that in the aforementioned document there are listed various types of military sub-units and their specific tasks are set forth. The attack would begin simultaneously from the north-west, west, and south in the direction of Addis-Ababa. In fact, as far as Somalia is concerned, its forces which are located on the territory of Ethiopia, on 10 September of this year again attacked Jijiga, in the event of the capture of which they are planning an attack on the administrative center of that region, Harar, and the great industrial center Dire Dawa. Battles for Jijiga are continuing.

Among the number of parties and organizations which are participating in the plot, Mengistu named the Eritrean separatist organization, the Ethiopian Democratic Union, [and] the Movement for the Liberation of the Afars (detachments of this movement would attack Assab).

In conclusion, having declared that the PMAC is taking measures now to explode the schemes of the participants in the plot, Mengistu expressed the hope that the socialist countries, whose assistance is decisive for Ethiopia, will provide it at this critical moment the necessary political and military support. In this regard he noted that one of the most serious problems for Ethiopia may be the problem of fuel, since the Arab countries intend to apply an embargo on deliveries of fuel to Ethiopia (which are realized through the company Mobil).

The heads of the diplomatic missions promised to bring the information which Mengistu had provided to the attention of their governments.

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR  
IN SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA  
/s/ A. RATANOV

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1636, ll. 139-40; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

**Memorandum of Conversation between  
Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia A.P.  
Ratanov and Ethiopian Foreign  
Minister Felleke Gedle Giorgis,**

**14 September 1977**

TOP SECRET, Copy No. 2  
From the journal of 29 September 1977  
Ratanov, A.P. Original No. 354

Memorandum of Conversation with the  
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia,  
FELLEKE GEDLE GIORGIS  
14 September 1977

On 14 September of this year, the Soviet delegation taking part in the celebrations of the occasion of the third anniversary of the Ethiopian revolution (comrade Yezhov, I.M.) had a meeting with Felleke Gedle-Giorgis.

During the course of a detailed conversation, after expressing his deep recognition to the Soviet Union for its comprehensive support and assistance to Ethiopia, the minister made the following statements:

Considering the extremely difficult situation in Ethiopia, particularly in connection with the military intervention by Somalia, the Ethiopian government is taking and will take measures which will aim to strengthen cooperation with states that support Ethiopia, to receive support from conservative regimes, and even to divide those states, including Arab states, which are openly hostile to the Ethiopian revolution. As a long-term goal, Ethiopia will even aim to restore contacts with Syria, Iraq, Sudan, et al.

As a whole, the positions of the overwhelming majority of the member-states of the OAU are favorable to Ethiopia as far as maintaining its territorial integrity is concerned, although many African states are not reconciled to the Ethiopian revolution and its socialist orientation. The OAU and the Committee created to provide good offices for the resolution of the Somali-Ethiopian military conflict continue their efforts to end it and come out on the side of Ethiopia. However, Sudan blocks their activities.

The position of Sudan is very duplicitous now: on the one hand, Sudan actively supports Eritrean separatism, on the other hand, it fears that in case of some form of secession by Eritrea, this would create a dangerous precedent which could encourage separatism in southern Sudan. Therefore Sudan appears to vacillate and Ethiopia intends to use this. Under these conditions Egypt encourages intervention by

Sudan in Eritrean affairs and has sent 40,000 men to Sudan to exert influence on the Sudanese leadership and to show its (Egyptian) support in the event of the activation of the separatists in southern Sudan. This has enabled Sudan to send 4,000 of its own soldiers to Eritrea.

Ethiopia intends to activate its ties with the West European states, particularly with the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Finland, et al.), which haven't always formed a bloc with the main imperialist powers and, for example, took a position favorable to Vietnam during the period of American aggression. To this end, a mission to the aforementioned states is contemplated.

About the USA—the USA and other imperialist states aim to overthrow the Ethiopian regime (the minister claims that the USA has prepared a plot to do this). Despite this, the minister said, Ethiopia aims to use the contradictions among the Westerners in the interests of the Ethiopian revolution, and also the fact that officially the USA and other Western states have come out in support of the territorial integrity of Ethiopia and [express] the desire to have normal relations with it.

At the same time, the diplomatic activity of the PMAC will develop cooperation with communist and socialist parties of the USA and Western Europe (to this end the PMAC invited representatives of the communist parties of the USA, Italy, and Portugal to take part in the celebrations), and also with the international democratic, labour, women's and youth organizations (World Peace Council, Movement of Afro-Asian Solidarity, etc.).

The minister especially dwelled on the Chinese position on the Ethiopian revolution. At the beginning of the revolution, the PRC provided economic assistance to Ethiopia, and sent its economic experts. However, as the Ethiopian revolution deepened, the Chinese began to change their position, practically rendered comprehensive assistance to Somalia during the Somali-Ethiopian military conflict, and, it seems, intends to give it (Somalia) conventional battlefield weapons.

Recognizing the great significance of the diplomatic activity of the Soviet Union in support of Ethiopia, the minister expressed the hope that the Soviet Union would continue it in the future, and, in particular, would use its own friendly relations

with Algeria and influence in the Arab world and with African states, and also with the communist and progressive organizations in Western, African, and Arab countries.

Felleke Gedle-Giorgis expressed his gratitude for the clear position of the USSR in the Somali-Ethiopian military conflict. In light of this, the minister emphasized that Ethiopia does not aim to dismember Somalia and does not intend to interfere in its internal affairs. The minister also said that Ethiopia supports the improvement of cooperation with Somalia. This being said, the Ethiopian government proceeds from the fact that Somalia has progressive forces, which are also striving for the restoration of neighborly relations and peaceful cooperation with Ethiopia.

For his part, comrade Yezhov, I.M. and the Soviet ambassador reaffirmed the position of the Soviet Union on the problem of the Somali-Ethiopian conflict and directed attention to the necessity of activating Ethiopia's diplomatic efforts in various countries. They reminded the minister of the diplomatic steps taken by the Soviet Union in support of Ethiopia (demarches towards the leaders of Somalia, a range of Arab states, et al.).

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR  
TO SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA

/s/ A. Ratanov

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1636, ll. 135-138; translated by Elizabeth Wishnick.]

**Memorandum of Conversation with  
Ethiopian Foreign Secretary Dawit  
Wolde Giorgis, 17 September 1977,  
with Attached Memorandum on  
Operation "Fakel" (Torch)**

TOP SECRET, Copy No. 2

From diary of 29 September 1977  
A. P. Ratanov Ser. No. 352

Memorandum of Conversation with  
Permanent Secretary of the Foreign  
Ministry DAWIT WOLDE GIORGIS  
17 September 1977

We received a visit from Dawit at his request. Pursuant to instructions from the Chairman of the PMAC [Mengistu], he furnished a document concerning an imperialist conspiracy against Ethiopia designated

by the code name "Fakel" [Torch], which was brought to the attention of the ambassadors of the Socialist Bloc Countries at a meeting with Haile Mariam Mengistu that took place on 10 September 1977. This document consists of a summary presentation of instructions and telegrams, sent during the period of 12 February through 4 June of this year by the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi (under the signature of D. Wardner, and later E. Kelly), to the American Embassies in Khartoum and Dar-es-Salam.

According to the document, the aim of perpetrating "intervention and destabilization of circumstances in Ethiopia" is to be carried out by three groups: (1) *Nuba* (2) *Anyanya*, to be carried out in the southwestern region of Ethiopia (in the territory of the Sudan); and the third group consisting of "hostile elements in southeastern Ethiopia" (in Kenyan territory). The training and arming of these groups, primarily with American weapons, is to be carried out by 16 September of this year. Commencement of operation "Fakel" is planned for 1 October 1977.

The starting point for all operations is to be the assassination, on 1 October of this year, of the Chairman of the PMAC, as well as that of his Deputy, to be followed by an attack by Groups 1 and 2 from Sudanese territory. Two weeks thereafter, an attack by the third group from Kenyan territory is planned. The establishment of a third front of military operations, as contemplated by the instigators of the plan, will lead to an "automatic attack by Ethiopia on Sudan." In the event of a retaliatory attack on Kenya, it is contemplated that the marines (the document does not specify of what nationality) and forces of "other moderate countries" will be used.

Attachment: see four-page list appended hereto.

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR  
TO SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA

/s/ A. RATANOV

cc: 3 AFO  
Defense Ministry, CC CPSU  
UOMP  
UPVM  
9/26/77

[Stamp]

Attachment to Doc. No. 352  
dated 9/29/77

Translated from English [into Russian]

OPERATION "FAKEL"

Preparation of the creation of a paramilitary unit for the execution of intervention in Ethiopia and destabilization of circumstances there shall commence on 14 April 1977. According to information available to us, all preparations, including the delivery of materials necessary for military operations, and training of a reserve contingent, shall be completed by 16 September 1977. The operation, which shall commence on 1 October 1977, is designated by the code name "FAKEL."

The forces to be implemented in the said operation shall consist of three separate groups:

Force No. 1 - Nuba group.

Force No. 2 - Anyanya group.

Force No. 3 - Hostile elements from the southeastern region of Ethiopia.

Forces No. 1 and 2 will operate in the southeastern region of Ethiopia and, according to the plan, shall direct their attention toward adaptation to conditions in the given location.

In the preparatory period, Group No. 3 will operate mainly in Kenya, but after the commencement of military operations, responsibility for it shall be transferred to Somalia.

The above information constitutes the essence of telegrams and instructions of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi to the American Ambassador in Dar-es-Salaam during the period between 12-26 February 1977, sent by Dixon Werdner, an employee of the political section of that embassy, who is believed to be a CIA agent.

Subsequent communications, sent from the American Embassy in Nairobi to the U.S. Ambassador in Khartoum and Dar-es-Salaam under the signature of Major Eddy Kelly, describe the make-up of the staff, the preparation, and the objectives of the said operation. It is known that Major Eddy Kelly, who apparently has replaced Dixon Werdner, leader of operation "Fakel," is none other than Edmund Kelly, the third secretary of the political section of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi.

The first communication from Kelly, dated 4 May 1977, indicates that military fortifications are located en route to Mombasa (Kenya) and that the dispatch of

materials to designated points shall be implemented at night and by separate parties in order to prevent the leak of information. Fortifications shall be delivered to the northwestern region of Kenya, i.e., to the location of the prospective conflict, within 20-30 days from day "X".

His second communication, dated 18 May 1977, indicates that the materials necessary for military operations were dispatched from the northwestern region of Kenya to the designated point in the Sudan. Recognizing that fortifications of the principal strike force are undergoing intensive preparation, Kelly emphasizes the need for absolute secrecy and the paramount concentration of attention on the principal objective (Ethiopia) and rapid preparations.

On 23 June 1977, Kelly dispatched a telegram to the American Embassy in Khartoum, demanding the completion of the following four specific assignments:

- assessment of the strength of enemy forces;
- determination of the actual disposition of military forces in conformance with communist military doctrine, as well as the quantity, methods and means for the transfer of reinforcements;
- confirmation of the receipt of materials as soon as they are delivered; and
- completion of all preparations by 16 September 1977, in order to avoid any alteration of the plan.

On 2 July 1977, Kelly sent two telegrams to the U.S. Embassies in Khartoum and Dar-es-Salaam.

In the first telegram, the objective and plan of action, projected for day "X", are set forth as follows:

Objective: Carry out the assassination of the head of the Ethiopian government with the aim of creating a panic situation in the country. Following that will be the coordination of an attack by forces hostile to Ethiopia, from the southwest and east.

Plan of action: Forces No. 1 and 2 will commence operations on 1 October 1977. Force No. 3 will commence military action two weeks thereafter.

Rear section and fortification: support for the southwestern group shall be provided from "Point No. 1." Force No. 3 will receive support from the side of a friendly country on the southeast of the country.

A command and support group for the forces of No. 1 and 2 will be located in the

region of Juba and Lyuan [sic], and, for the forces of No. 3, in a friendly country.

Timetable for operation: Hour "X" and the signal for commencement of operations will be communicated later.

The second telegram describes the conduct of operations envisioned in the first telegram:

- Assassination of the head of government will lead to chaos and disorder in Ethiopia. Following that the advancement of Forces 1 and 2 into the southwest will ensue.

- Establishment of this second front will prevent the Ethiopian forces from focusing attention on the other front. This will create a desirable opportunity for an attack from the southeast and will result in a two-pronged conflict.

- Ethiopia will automatically attack the Sudan, and the intensification of activity in the southeast will, within two weeks, lead to a similar situation in Somalia.

- The center of the rear forces and material fortification in Mendera will provide for support to Forces 1 and 2.

- If Kenya suffers an attack, then subdivisions of the marines and forces of other moderate governments will be deployed to this region.

On 4 July 1977, Kelly sent four telegrams to Khartoum and Dar-es-Salaam.

Two of these telegrams contain a detailed enumeration of the military fortifications which are already delivered or are located en route from the USA and a "Country of apple juice." In sum, this includes 16,000 rifles, 559,000 rounds of ammunition, as well as an undisclosed quantity of tear gas canisters, tracer bullets, bombs, mines, and propaganda materials. This equipment will be stored for transport and will be delivered to "Point One" by "friendly hands." Transportation will begin on 27 August and the equipment will arrive at "Point One" on 30 August 1977.

Two other telegrams are addressed to that portion of the operation which relates to elimination of the head of the government. The assassin, as they refer to him, from the Nuba group (Force No. 1), will liquidate the head of the government (Bomen) on 1 October 1977, during his trip to southwestern Ethiopia, scheduled for September. The second participant (referred to in the text as the "third"), to be selected for completion of this assignment, will be offered by the

Nuba group (Force No. 1). In the event that the trip to the southwest is cancelled, the means must be found to send all groups to Addis Ababa for execution of the operation. In the event that the assassination of the head of the government (Bomen) is unsuccessful, then his deputy is to be killed. N.B. - Kelly has repeatedly warned that all preparations must be completed by 16 September 1977, that the date for execution of the operation - Day "X" - is set for 1 October that it is necessary to maintain this timetable, and that it is essential to do everything in order to ensure the success of this operation.

At the end of all his telegrams, Kelly also instructs those who receive them to direct their responses to the Division of Covert Operations for Eastern and Central Africa of the State Department.

Transmitted by: /s/ V. Mishachev  
/s/ V. Mikhailov

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 73, d. 1636, ll. 129-134; translated by Bruce McDonald.]

**CPSU CC to SED CC, Information on  
30-31 October 1977 Closed Visit of  
Mengistu Haile Mariam to Moscow,  
8 November 1977**

Confidential

With regard to the request of the chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) of Ethiopia Mengistu Haile Mariam, he was received in Moscow on 30-31 October, this year, on a closed [*zakritii*] visit. On 31 October he had a conversation with L.I. Brezhnev, A.N. Kosygin and A.A. Gromyko.

Mengistu informed in detail about the domestic political situation in Ethiopia, about the grave situation on the northern, eastern and southeastern fronts, where the battle is raging against the Eritrean separatists, [and] counterrevolutionary formations and regular units of the Somali army. The separatists succeeded in seizing the main cities of Eritrea, except for Asmara and the port of Massawa. Somali troops occupied in effect the whole Ogaden, with exception of Harar and Dire Dawa.

Mengistu spoke about the hostile activity of Sudan and other reactionary Arab states who plan in connection to the unification of

the three separatist states in Eritrea to set up an Eritrean "government" and to proclaim "an independent state." Mengistu confirmed the aspiration of Ethiopia to settle Ethiopian-Somali relations in a peaceful way. He declared that Ethiopian armed forces set the goal of the liberation of Ethiopian territory and do not intend to cross the frontiers of their country.

Mengistu pointed out that an inauspicious situation on the battlefields and the threat of partition that [hangs over] the Ethiopian state has wrought a negative influence on the economic and domestic political situation of the country, undermine faith in the victory of the Ethiopian revolution, [and] encourage activities of internal reactionary forces.

Revolutionary Ethiopia, in Mengistu's words, finds itself now in the enemy's encirclement and aspires to support of first of all the socialist states. By referring to the need to improve Ethiopia's defense under these circumstances, Mengistu made a request to broaden Soviet military assistance.

Expanding on all this, Mengistu spoke about his confidence in a final victory of the revolution, stressing that the masses of people firmly support the revolution and its achievements that are being accomplished in the interests of the people.

On our side we confirmed the principled line of the Soviet Union to give all-sided support to the Ethiopian revolution and to continue the further expansion of Soviet-Ethiopian relations. Mengistu also received an agreement to supply during this year an additional amount of Soviet armaments and military equipment. He also received the principled assurances of the Soviet side to grant the PMAC assistance in working out plans of social-economic development of Ethiopia, including the dispatch to Addis Ababa of certain specialists.

As a comradely advice, [the Soviet side] shared with Mengistu ideas in favor of the accelerated creation in Ethiopia of a party based on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, which would further the mobilization of masses to defend revolutionary conquests and to promote the revolution. It was stressed to be important for the PMAC to adopt practical measures to resolve the nationalities question in Ethiopia in order to ensure the support of the progressive regime on the part of national minorities.

For the moment, we are left with the defi-

nite impression that in the existing situation in Ethiopia and around it, the PMAC urgently needs further assistance of our fraternal countries through the mechanism of bilateral relations, as well as on the international arena.

*[Source: SAPMO, J IV 2/202/583; obtained and translated from Russian by Vladislav M. Zubok.]*

**Conversation between East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) official F. Trappen and CPSU CC official K. Brutents, 7 November 1977 (excerpt)**

Memorandum of Conversation  
between Comrade Friedel Trappen and  
Comrade Karen Brutents, Deputy Head of  
the International Relations Department of  
the Central Committee of the CPSU,  
7 November 1977

[Names of other participants]

Comrade Brutents thanked [Trappen] for the interesting information. The Soviet comrades completely agree with our policy. The information they just received [from the SED] contains several new aspects. There has been only little information on the developments within the Eritrean Liberation Movement, in particular concerning the Marxist forces within this movement. It would be of extraordinary importance if these contacts would make possible contacts between the Eritrean movement and the Ethiopian leadership which could lead to an armistice and pave the way for a peaceful political solution.

So far the Ethiopian leadership has not exhausted all possibilities for such a solution. It is necessary to support them in this, and in this sense the contacts facilitated by the SED are of great importance.

It now is important to utilize actively these contacts for fruitful political work in favor of a peaceful and political solution.

In the talks between the comrades of the CPSU and the Ethiopian delegation it was repeatedly emphasized that national problems cannot be solved militarily.

*[Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/126; obtained and translated by Christian F. Ostermann.]*

**Memorandum of Conversation, East**

**German official with Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia Ratanov, Addis Ababa, 6 December 1977 (dated 7 December)**

Comrade Ratanov gave the following information:

Militarily, the Eastern front is presently the most difficult problem for the Ethiopian side. Due to the correlation of forces the initiative is with the Somali side. The Ethiopian troops are forced onto the defense. The Ethiopian side is making all-out efforts to mobilize around 60,000 to 70,000 men. About 20,000 men will already be available within the next few weeks. They will be trained in short training courses. The Ethiopian side will be able to go on the offensive in about 1 1/2 to 2 months.

The technical superiority of the Somali troops is most prominent in heavy artillery. Although the Ethiopian side has - due to Soviet deliveries - at its disposal over 510 heavy guns while Somalia only has 126, there is a lack of soldiers who can handle the heavy artillery. The training is still taking time.

300 Cuban military experts (artillery, tank drivers, pilots) are expected to arrive soon.

The Ethiopian side currently has about 137 tanks on the Eastern front. The Somali side has about 140.

40 Ethiopian tanks cannot be used in battle due to minor repairs. Though these repairs would normally be done by the tank drivers themselves, they are not capable of doing so. On the Somali side such repairs are possible because the Soviet Union had established the necessary repair station.

In recent days, the Ethiopian side has for the first time launched air attacks on mobile objects using the MiG 21. The negative opinion about the MiGs has meanwhile improved (the [U.S.] F-5 is a much improved model with a wider operational range).

Comrade Ratanov gave the following explanation of the Eritrean problem:

If it were possible to give the Ethiopian side a breathing-spell in Eritrea, it could focus its efforts on the Eastern front. A dialogue has to be initiated. This has not been done so far. In this regard, it would not be advantageous to show all our cards right away.

It is of critical importance that the Ethiopian side is not willing to grant the

Eritrean population autonomy within the bounds of its old territories. They assume that other peoples still reside in Eritrea (e.g. Tigre and Afars). This has to be taken into consideration. Therefore they want to trim Eritrean territory. The area of the Afars around the port of Assab as well as the Tigre are to be separated. This would be almost half of Eritrean territory.

Should the Ethiopian leadership stick with this point of view, it will be difficult to find a common ground for negotiations. (Various peoples live, for example, in Dagestan and Georgia. There are autonomous territories within the individual republics of the [Soviet] Union.) The most important thing is to get both parties to the negotiating table.

The first point of the 9-point program on Eritrea states autonomy with respect to tribes/peoples but not with respect to territories. Mengistu has stated in a previous speech that Ethiopia would be willing to grant more autonomy to Eritrea than it had had before. But he has not yet stated what he meant by this.

On the correlation of forces within the PMAC:

Mengistu has further consolidated his position since the elimination of [Co-chairman of the Coordinating Committee of the Armed forces (DERG) Lt. Col.] Atnafu Abate. He has further gained stature as a revolutionary statesman. One senses in speaking with him that he views things realistically. At the same time one has to reckon with his complicated character.

On the establishment of the Party:

One has to convince the Ethiopian side that it is an illusion to be able to create a monolithic party from the start. The party can only be created in the fight against the various currents. It has to develop on the basis of social conditions. [...]

There will be risks involved in the establishment of the party which have to be taken into consideration. During the establishment of the party one has to deliberate the question of co-option.

The PMAC presently has about 80 members. 30 of them are a burden. These members hardly have any education and can easily become victims of the counter-revolution. Mengistu intends to send them to the USSR, Cuba, and the GDR to turn them into revolutionaries. Only 25 to 20 men belong to the active inner circle. It is therefore nec-

essary upon the establishment of the party to add to the leadership other capable forces from outside. There will be a fight about the leadership positions within the central committee of the party. If the forces around Mengistu do not succeed in this fight, then the CC will not be an improvement in quality over the present PMAC. The Ethiopian leadership has lately devoted much attention to the establishment of the party. There still exists great confusion with respect to ideological questions as well as strategy and tactics. For example, they have only diffuse ideas about the class basis.

The workers, the peasants, the left wing of the petit-bourgeoisie as well as anti-feudal and anti-imperialist elements belong to the forces which support the Revolution. There is no talk about a national bourgeoisie. From the start it has been perceived as an enemy. There are also a great number of honest people among the state apparatus and the officers corps. The minister for agriculture has stated that they would probably some day appoint him ambassador in order to get rid of him. Many people have gone abroad out of fear. Not all of them were counterrevolutionaries.

On the question of non-capitalist development with Socialist orientation: Within the leadership there is nobody who knows what this state of development really means. It is presented as a Socialist revolution. For example, the development of kulaks is rejected. 75% of the rural population is still involved in a produce-based economy. Who should develop agricultural production? There are no social statistics on which the development of the Ethiopian village could be based. There are regulations for private investments but they are not propagated. The bourgeoisie has money but is afraid to invest because it fears nationalization. One should follow the example of the USSR and develop a NEP [New Economic Policy], thus providing a prospect for all social classes.

Atnafu was criticized for problems which he rightfully brought up. He favored the development to a mixed society. It was another thing that he opposed socialism altogether. Now nobody dares to say anything anymore. The mood of the workers and peasants is extremely leftist. It will take great persuasion to convince them of the necessity of a NEP. On the other hand there is the danger that the PMAC will become too dis-

tant from the people.

On the national question:

One has to try — through political work and by a intelligent policy towards the nationalities — to make all members of individual ethnic groups to feel as Ethiopians first. Members of all ethnic groups should be represented in ministries and other institutions on an equal basis. The various individual nationalities have not even been represented in the PMAC. Its composition came about by accident. The popular mood is directed in particular against Amharen. Therefore Mengistu was elected chairman. He evolved as the strongman. The Soviet military experts have come to realize that no decision is made without his agreement.

[Source: SAPO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/126; document obtained and translated by Christian F. Ostermann.]

**Memorandum of a Conversation  
between East German leader Erich  
Honecker and Siassi Aforki, General  
Secretary of the Revolutionary Party of  
Eritrea, in Berlin, 31 January 1978  
(dated 3 February 1978)**

Honecker: [Welcoming remarks]

Aforki: We are very proud and very happy about this meeting. It is a historical meeting. The first visit of our comrades in the GDR already brought very positive results. [...] We highly appreciate the good offices of your country and your party. What we have achieved so far is already a turning-point in our fight. The results of the meeting with the Ethiopians are still uncertain, but in any case it will be a historic meeting. In the past 17 years a fierce battle has been waged. Not one meeting took place between Eritreans and Ethiopians. If something developed from this first meeting, this will not only be good for our two countries but for the peoples of the entire world. The only pre-condition for it is goodwill on the Ethiopian and on our side.

[Short review of the Eritrean-Ethiopian conflict.]

Comrade Erich Honecker: For the first dialogue with the Ethiopians it will be decisive to consider in which direction one has to become active in the interest of the Revolution. We are deeply interested in the success of the Ethiopian Revolution and in the objectives of the Eritrean People's Libera-

tion Movement. Both sides have the goal to repel the imperialist intervention and build a new humane social order. It is very painful that comrades who are ideologically close are involved in such a conflict. We welcome the fact that Comrade Aforki has the determination and mandate to come to Berlin to find out together with the representatives of the DERG how the problems can be solved. We have used our influence as much as possible to make sure that you will be heard. Now much depends on the dialogue which - after 17 years - can lead to a turning-point. As I understand Comrade Aforki, he is moving in this direction. In his conversation with Comrade Werner Lamberz, Comrade Mengistu indicated his readiness to grant the people of Eritrea full autonomy within the Ethiopian state. What form this should take is a matter to be dealt with by both sides. The national question has immense importance for the whole Ethiopian Revolution. Its solution is also hindered by Somalia's aggression. Somalia currently receives the support of all imperialist governments. Concerning the Eritrean question, one has to see the opportunity given by [the similarity of] the contents of the Eritrean Liberation Movement and the Ethiopian Revolution. I agree with Comrade Aforki that a solution would be of great significance not only for the peoples of Ethiopia and Africa but also for all peoples. We accord great significance to the currently arranged contact and the incipient dialogue. We hope it will lead to agreement. The revolutionary streams belong together. Comrade Aforki has rightly stated that one can then proceed together against the imperialists. From my point of view, the full autonomy within the Ethiopian state is the correct solution in order to pursue together the common task of economic build-up and the creation of a progressive social order in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Your forthcoming meeting can be successful. It is a historic meeting. I am interested in the question if you, Comrade Aforki, in the case one might come to an agreement, will have the strength to implement it. Besides you, there are two other movements in Eritrea. In case of an agreement one would have to carefully plan all steps.

Comrade S. Aforki: The main problem is in how far Ethiopia is willing to meet our demands. It is clear from the start that if Ethiopia is not bringing along new propos-

als, a solution will not be possible. There is no point in discussing the possibility of unifying both revolutions. What we need are guarantees that the fight against imperialism and reaction will continue. Only one principal question is of importance. Everything depends on the capabilities and tactics of our organization. We won't be picky in minor questions. It is totally clear to us that in the case of an actual agreement its implementation is the important thing. Then we will check the details and implement them patiently. Eritrea has many enemies within and without. If they all find out about it, we will have many difficulties. But we are preparing for it. It is true that we are not the only organization. That, however, does not worry us. Because of our great influence and military strength we can succeed. The other two organizations in Eritrea have allied themselves with the imperialists and the reaction in the Arabic region.

We have to expect that the imperialists will take advantage of the situation in case of a solution of the Eritrean problem and escalate the situation and heighten the conflict. Therefore it is necessary that the Socialist countries will guarantee a peaceful solution. In the case of an agreement prudent tactics are necessary not to allow the reactionaries to exert their influence. In Ethiopia as well there are forces which are powerfully fighting against a just solution. The current regime cannot proceed against these forces by itself. This is an important question.

Honecker: [Report on GDR domestic and foreign policy]

[Concluding remarks]

[Source: *SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/127; document obtained and translated by Christian F. Ostermann.*]

**Memorandum of Conversation between  
East German official Paul Markovski  
and CPSU CC International Department  
head Boris N. Ponomarev in  
Moscow, 10 February 1978  
(dated 13 February 1978)**

[Markovski informs Ponomarev on talks between PMAC (Ethiopia) and EPLF (Eritrea)]

Comrade B.N. Ponomarev thanked M. for the valuable information, said that they appreciated the GDR initiative and ex-

plained the attitude of the CPSU in this question: the CPSU is also of the opinion that Ethiopia's position in the Eritrean question is different one from its relationship with Somalia. Somalia is an aggressor who attacked Ethiopia. The Soviet and Cuban comrades have declared together with the Ethiopian leadership that no Somali territory will be entered in the course of the Ethiopian counter-offensive. This information was also given to the USA.

In his talk with Comrade Ponomarev, President Carter emphasized the situation on the Horn of Africa and pretended to be concerned about Soviet arms deliveries to Ethiopia. In response Ponomarev pointed to the much larger US arms deliveries to Iran, a country neighboring on the USSR. He repudiated Carter's insinuations that Cuban and Soviet troops were fighting in Ethiopia. The Soviet military were advisers who had been sent at the request of the Ethiopian government. Carter said he favored a speedy settlement of the conflict. He explained that the USA would neither now nor in the future deliver arms to Somalia. It was pointed out to Carter and [U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus R.] Vance that the Soviet Union had tried over a longer period of time to convince Siad Barre, Samantar and other Somali leaders not to begin a war. Their efforts, however, proved to be in vain.

With respect to the situation in Eritrea, Comrade Ponomarev mentioned the conversations between the Soviet leadership and Mengistu Haile Mariam in the course of which it was recommended to Mengistu to seek to a political solution to the problem and to grant autonomy to the Eritreans. Since then no new discussions between the Soviet side and the Ethiopians have taken place. Mengistu has been silent. Up to now he has not done anything to follow our advice. The Cuban comrades have unequivocally told the Ethiopian leadership that Cuba would not intervene in the Eritrean conflict, in a domestic Ethiopian conflict. The best thing would be a peaceful solution. Both sides need to take the right attitude towards the problem. Mengistu is, however, wavering according to the military situation. As the military pressure the rebels were exerting on Massawa and Asmara was increasing, he was ready for a compromise. Now that this situation has become a bit more stable, he is silent or makes pungent statements. We have to continue to work on him.

Any solution has to be found within the framework of the Ethiopian state although this is uncomfortable for the Eritrean movements. Comrade Ponomarev read a telegram from Belgrade on an information [report] by the head of the bureau of the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] in Baghdad, Abu Nidal (he belongs to the left wing of the Fatah). Abu Nidal has traveled through Eritrea. According to his information, all regions except for Massawa and Asmara are in the hands of the Eritreans. The coastal area is controlled by EPLF under the leadership of Aforki while Western Eritrea is under the control of the ELF (Mohammed Ahmed Nasser). The Eritreans want full autonomy but are also willing to accept an Ethiopian corridor to the sea. The majority of Aforki's organizations consist of Marxist-Leninist elements. Abu Nidal was informed that Aforki was at a meeting in Berlin. He was willing to meet with representatives of the CPSU. Abu Nidal emphasizes that it would be necessary to quickly find a solution since Saudi Arabia and other reactionary forces were exerting strong pressure upon the Eritrean movements.

Comrade Ponomarev stated that the CPSU did not think a meeting with Aforki was necessary after a meeting between him and the SED had just taken place. The SED was to continue its conversations with the Eritreans.

Comrade Ponomarev informed me that the Ethiopian leadership recently approached the CPSU with a request for support in the build-up of the party. A group of experienced comrades of the CPSU has been selected. Its head is a member of the CC. Later, however, Mengistu requested to hold off the sending of these comrades since military questions were the top priority. Comrade Ponomarev favored close cooperation between the Soviet comrades, the Cuban comrades, and the SED group in order to assure maximum efficiency and coordinated strategy.

Comrade Ponomarev expressed his concern over the extremes in the Ethiopian Revolution. In talks with Mengistu, [Cuban] comrade Raul Valdes Vivo has already stated that such events as the mass executions of prisoners led by the "Red Terror," which would not be advantageous to the Revolution, are incomprehensible.

Much now depends on what attitude Mengistu himself will take towards the

Eritrean problem. It has to be expected that - as L. I. Brezhnev told Mengistu - the national question cannot be solved militarily.

Comrade Ponomarev agreed with the proposal communicated by Comrade Markovski to consult on the burning African questions among the six close friends at the forthcoming conference of the CC Secretaries in Budapest.

Comrade Ponomarev reported on his recent visit to the USA as the head of a delegation of parliament members. In his report to the politburo, he proposed to continue to work with the USA Congress. Congress nowadays has greater importance since the prestige of the USA administration is lower than ever before due to Watergate and Vietnam and since Carter has not shown enough stature [*profil*]. There are realistic forces in Congress, but also the "hawks", the obstinate defenders of the neutron bomb (Strand [sic; perhaps a reference to conservative Democratic Sen. John C. Stennis or Sen. Richard Stone], [Democratic Sen. Henry] Jackson et al.). He, Comrade Ponomarev, made a total of 25 speeches. There were useful talks with Carter and Vance. The visit showed that there are possibilities for a dialogue. They have to be utilized by the common efforts of the Socialist countries. In this respect, Comrade Ponomarev pointed to two problems:

1. The forthcoming (May) UN Special Meeting of the UN Plenum should be used by the active appearance of all 9 friendly Socialist countries for the fight against the neutron bomb and for effective disarmament measures. The level of participation should be cleared in time. In these questions one can count on the Non-Alignment Movement. At the same time it offers the possibility to effectively expose and isolate Chinese policy.

2. In Europe, especially in the FRG, the fight against the neutron bomb needs further strengthening. In the Low Countries, Denmark, and Norway there already exist broad movements whereas France has so far kept out. If a broad movement which would exert influence on the government could be brought about in the FRG, this could be a great success. We all should contribute to this, including the DKP [West German Communist Party]. It is important to use all possibilities and to also work with personalities like [former West German Chancellor and Social Democratic Party (SPD) official

Willy] Brandt or [prominent SPD figure Herbert] Wehner.

There has been no response to the respective notes by Comrade Brezhnev to Carter and other Western chiefs of state.

[Concluding remarks]

[Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/127; document obtained and translated by Christian F. Ostermann.]

**SED CC, Department of International Relations, 16 February 1978, Report on Conversation with [Vice-president] Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Member of the Politburo of the CP Cuba, in Havana, 13 February 1978**

[Participants: Comrade Polanco, Deputy Head of CC Department for International Relations CP Cuba; Comrade Heinz Langer, Extraordinary Plenipotentiary and Ambassador in Cuba]

[Welcoming remarks]

Rodriguez: The initiative and the efforts of the SED merit the highest recognition. The [Ethiopian-Eritrean] meeting in Berlin was of great historical importance. We fully agree with the strategy of the SED; this fully conforms with our common concept of efforts towards a peaceful solution of the Eritrean problem as agreed between us. I would like to emphasize that there is complete agreement among us and that the politburo of our party completely approves of the strategy, the estimate, the arguments and the conclusion in this matter.

The leadership of our party has for some time expected a declaration by Mengistu on the Eritrean problem. This had been agreed up between him and comrade Valdez Vivo in the 5-point program at the end of last year.

Comrade Werner Lamberz had detailed this still more in his talk with Mengistu and there was, as you know, the affirmation that this declaration would still come in December. Obviously the Ethiopian comrades have not been sufficiently ready for it and still have numerous reservations against a decisive step towards the solution of the Eritrean problem.

We also completely agree with the view that the Ethiopian leadership apparently does not have a clear concept, either on a general solution of the national prob-

lem in Ethiopia nor on the specific problems in Eritrea. They have until now not really seriously believed in it and have not seriously concerned themselves with it but instead only considered the demand for a peaceful solution as [in itself] a kind of political solution.

They probably still have the thought in the back of their minds that a peaceful solution of the Eritrean problem will mean a capitulation by the Eritrean movements, which means that the military solution would be the preparation for a further peaceful strategy.

One can certainly not neglect the military measures in this matter, but the Ethiopian comrades still do not have the deep recognition of the necessity of a political, i.e. peaceful solution of the Eritrean problem. Thus just as much as one can certainly argue that the leadership of the EPLF does not have an understanding of the historic importance of the Ethiopian Revolution, one can also argue that the awareness of the responsibility for the Revolutionary development in the entire region is not deeply rooted in the Ethiopian leadership.

[...]It is necessary that we continue our intense efforts on this common line in order to have all participants make a common effort. In this respect the written agreement that was achieved is of enormous significance. The further strategy in the Ogaden will be decisive and of utmost importance for the question of how things will continue, probably also for the solution of the Eritrean problem. Comrade Mengistu certainly did not want to make any concessions on this question as long as he seemed close to being defeated on all fronts. It will be important not to have a growing feeling of capitulation. From this point of view his reservations and hesitation with the promised declaration are understandable.

Now we are rapidly approaching another situation which will lead to certain decisions. There are two possibilities which might be expected after the success against Somalia on the eastern front. On the one hand [there could be] a generous, calm, objective, and thought-out approach to a peaceful solution of the Eritrean problem, an approach which is not caused by coercion, [but] which is based on the authority of victory and which therefore can take advantage of a vastly new possibilities for a peaceful solution. This would be a strategy in con-

formity with a remark by Aforki which relates to the generosity which they - the Eritreans - had expected from the Ethiopians. We would encourage this way of proceeding which would be in conformity with our views. On the other hand, however, a worsening of the situation is possible.

Based on the success at the eastern front and carried by the euphoria of victory and given the possibility to withdraw strong and experienced Ethiopian units, the Ethiopian leadership could aspire to a decisive and quick military solution in Eritrea. Unfortunately there are significant forces within the PMAC calling for such a solution.

Comrade Mengistu has now asked the leadership of the CP Cuba for the second time not only to give military support in Ogaden but also to deploy Cuban units in Eritrea.

Towards the end of last year he dramatically called on us, arguing that Cuban troops should immediately intervene in Eritrea since otherwise the final loss of this area was imminent and hence would have incalculable consequences for the Ethiopian Revolution. In close consultation with the Soviet comrades, Comrade Fidel Castro favored a massive intervention in the Ogaden against the Somali invasion. He emphasized that this now was clearly a domestic Ethiopian matter and that we would have the OAU, the African states, international laws and conventions, as well as the UN on our side. Comrade Castro refused to intervene in Eritrea. We have promised every kind of aid except for military units to our Ethiopian comrades. We have based this on the view that this was a justified national cause of the Eritrean people which could not be solved militarily. Now, a few days ago, Comrade Mengistu has asked again and spoke of a dramatic and dangerous development in the situation; again he demanded to have Cuban units deployed at the Eritrean front.

Comrade Fidel Castro and all the members of our politburo are of the opinion that we cannot afford to make any mistakes in our handling of the Eritrean question. A wrong move now could endanger our entire policy and important positions in Africa. We would be confronted by the majority of African states, the Arabs, international organs, probably also the countries of the Non-Alignment Movement, and others.

Therefore we continue to oppose a military intervention in Eritrea. In coordination with our Soviet comrades we have agreed to occupy the entrance to the Mits'iwa Islands from where a certain degree of control can be exerted and from where in an extreme emergency a limited military intervention would be possible.

In this connection it is very important that we immediately think about Aforki's demand for a guarantee by the Socialist countries. It might be necessary to work out a common basic view with the Soviet Union before the next meeting because it is to be expected that Aforki will not only present concrete proposals but will also expect from the representatives of the Socialist countries a concrete response. Our view is based on the fact that we have and will take on a moral obligation towards the Eritreans when we urge upon them the political and peaceful solution according to the concept agreed among us. They could certainly then not withhold the pressure of the enemy on their own. There is the danger here too that the Ethiopian comrades may not pay attention to the changed situation and are looking for an easy success which would be costly for us in political and moral terms with other countries.

Comrade Rodriguez also informed us about some other questions:

- [Iraq]

- A few days ago, Comrade Nagere, member of the politburo of the Meison group [All-Ethiopian Socialist Movement, defeated by Mengistu] (supposedly in the second rank of this organization behind Prof. Haile Fidda) has asked the Cuban comrades for consultation. The Cubans have consulted with Mengistu who did not oppose such a meeting but characterized Negere as a traitor. He will come in the next few days to Havana, and our Cuban comrades will inform us immediately about these talks via our ambassador.

- On the situation in the Ogaden, Comrade Rodriguez informed us that a large counter-offensive had been in preparation since 25 December 1977. There have been two major campaigns in recent days which caused losses of more than 3000 men on the other side. It is a serious problem that the Ethiopian comrades do not want to take prisoners of war and thus act very cruelly. These blows have caused the enemy large material losses as well while our own have been

very small. In the last movement in the Northeast there was a smaller loss of human life but the material losses have been very great. The Somalis have over 40 tanks, numerous medium-weight and heavy weapons, flack artillery, armored cars and a great amount of weapons and munitions. In part, they have left behind NATO war material which was not even unwrapped. In the fights around Dire Dawa, the Somalis had to pull back, leaving almost their entire armament.

Up to now, there have been only preparatory blows. Most of the units marked for action have not been deployed yet, and the main blow has not even yet begun. The enemy is fleeing and giving up positions faster than had been expected. We are therefore in a situation where we have to undertake a series of fast actions so that the enemy will not have time to rebuild his forces. It is our plan to complete the main actions by the end of February 1978. This means that by early March we can expect a great victory at this front. This is, as is well known, the time for the next meeting. This will have a great effect. As agreed upon with our Soviet comrades, in no case will we transgress Somali borders.

[Final remarks.]

[Source: *SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/127*; obtained and translated by Christian F. Ostermann.]

**Embassy of the GDR in the USSR,  
Political Department, 17 February  
1978, Memorandum of Conversation  
with the Dep. Head of the MFA Third  
Department (Africa), Comrade S. J.  
Sinitsin, 16 February 1978**

[...] Comrade Sinitsin gave his estimate of the situation in Ethiopia and on the Horn of Africa.

1. The counteroffensive of the Ethiopian armed forces against the Somali troops in the Ogaden is considered positive. We are currently not dealing with a general offensive but the recovery of important strategic points which will then allow for the complete expulsion of Somali military from Ethiopian territory. So far, a 30 km to 70 km deep zone has been recovered. The air superiority of the Ethiopian forces has a great impact. Comrade Sinitsin considered the prospect for a successful conclusion of the fighting for the Ethiopians rather good;

he also emphasized, however, that military encounters will intensify. Such factors as the general mobilization in Somalia and increased arms deliveries by the West will have some effect. Also, one cannot forget the fact that significant parts of the Ethiopian armed forces have to be kept in the North and are involved in fighting counter-revolutionary groups in Eritrea. Another part of the army is necessary to guarantee security towards the Sudan. The Ethiopian army can still not be considered a homogeneous unit. Large parts of the cadres, in particular the officer corps, were taken over from the imperial government. Sabotage, insubordination, even withdrawal without fighting are serious occurrences. Great attention is therefore paid to the reorganization of the army and the concerted build-up of a popular militia. The biggest problem here is once again the cadres and their training. One should also not underestimate the problems caused by the change-over in the army from Western to Socialist weapons systems which have to be managed and deployed efficiently.

Finally, a number of problems with regard to the revolutionary development in Ethiopia need to be solved. The situation in the countryside is characterized by a heightening of class warfare. In contrast to other developing countries with a Socialist orientation, there is a strong social differentiation in Ethiopia and the implementation of class principle requires permanent relentless struggle. Although the necessity of an avant-garde party has evolved, there are currently no grounds for such a party. [...] Although there have evolved political groups at a local level which in the future could lay the foundations for a party, there exist a number of sectarian groups which at times exert large influence.

Simultaneously with the problem of building up a unified political organization with a broad popular basis, the question arises with regard to a state apparatus which is loyal to the new leadership. Army and state apparatus - both taken over from imperial times - still are divided in two camps. Many decisions taken by the revolutionary military leadership are already sabotaged within the government, even in the defense and foreign ministry. The enemies of the people's forces enjoy the full support of Western countries. Since there is a lack of trained progressive cadres, no radical solution can be pursued. All these factors point

to the conclusion that a long developmental stage will be necessary to solve the basic problems in favor of a Socialist Revolution in Ethiopia.

2. The international situation of the conflict at the Horn of Africa is characterized by the efforts of the imperialist countries to keep a crisis atmosphere on the African continent in order to achieve their long-term objectives. These plans are bound to fail with the increasing progress towards a military solution of the conflict in favor of Ethiopia. Western counter-efforts can clearly be recognized. Although the Barre regime is embarrassing to the Western powers, they are using it as a tool in their attempt to pursue their interests.

They use the lie of alleged aggressive designs on Ethiopia's part in order to conceal their direct activities in support of Somalia. The declaration of Western powers that they would not make weapons available to Somalia is refuted by arms deliveries via third, in particular reactionary Arab countries and via "private" firms. Simultaneously, the Western countries are increasing their politico-diplomatic pressure for the "independence" of the Ogaden to at least achieve a partial success which would improve the prospects for the realization of their long-term goals.

From this point of view we have to understand the willingness of the Western powers to attain an armistice without the withdrawal of Somali troops from Ethiopian territory. It is their goal to give Somalia the opportunity to consolidate its position on Ethiopian territory and to achieve, through protracted negotiations, a situation like the one in the Middle East. Therefore the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries fully support the basic Ethiopian position: armistice, withdrawal of Somali troops, and political negotiations.

The direct and indirect [Western] support for Somalia illustrates the demagogic character of the declarations of the Western governments, which shows itself in the comparison of Somalia with Ethiopia, the comparison of an aggressor with its victim, and the attempt to blame the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries for the heightening of the conflict and thus to keep them from further supporting Ethiopia. The Ethiopian leadership is carefully observing the attitude and actions of the imperialist states and differentiates between them. In this respect one

has to view Mengistu's declaration announcing to the United States, Great Britain, and the FRG that he would break diplomatic relations if they continued their direct support of Somalia. Hence he is clearly considering with subtle difference states such as Italy, which as a former colonial power is currently taking on a flexible position in Ethiopia, and France, which is above all interested in the consolidation of its position in Djibouti.

3. The conflict in the Horn of Africa has led to a strong polarization and differentiation among the African and the Middle Eastern countries. The situation in Ethiopia is made more difficult by the encirclement by reactionary regimes of states which depend upon them. While South Yemen is altogether taking a positive position on Ethiopia, the other, even many progressive, Arab nations, have considerable reservations about supporting Ethiopia. In particular, the Arab nations differ in their attitude towards Eritrea which ranges from open solidarity to direct support of the separatists in Eritrea. Reservations are also held against Libya and Algiers who do not even support the revolutionary development in Ethiopia to a full measure. Differences of opinion also exist between Syria and Iraq on the one hand, and Ethiopia on the other hand.

While the OAU has continued to defend, in the framework of its own decisions and in full agreement with Ethiopia, the integrity of Ethiopian borders, one has to differentiate the attitude of individual African countries toward the conflict.

The countries of Black Africa fully support the Ethiopian position. But the unanimous condemnation of Somalia as an aggressor was not achieved. Thus, just as a number of member states of the OAU repudiated the clear condemnation of the aggression against Angola, they also differ in their position in the evaluation of the situation on the Horn of Africa. One can also not overlook such influences as that exerted by Nigeria which favors the independence of the Ogaden.

In general, the Soviet comrades acknowledge the positive fact that the OAU will continue its activities for a settlement of the conflict. This fact is also especially important because some powers continue to pursue attempts for a settlement of the conflict by the UN Security Council. Like Ethiopia, the Soviet Union is against an interven-

tion by the Security Council since this would promote the internationalization of the conflict as intended by the Western countries. One should also remember that a takeover by the Security Council would delay a resolution of the conflict - in a similar fashion as the Middle East conflict - to an uncertain point in the future. Furthermore, a UN involvement would lead to a great power confrontation [and] would aggravate the situation within the UN which would have a negative effect upon the main problems now confronting the UN.

Although a treatment of the conflict has so far not been put before the Security Council by the Western powers, it cannot be precluded that such attempts will be undertaken. One thing is clear, they would have an anti-Soviet impetus.

With regard to Beijing's attitude towards the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia, one can detect - as has been exposed in Soviet publications and mass media - a clearly hostile attitude against the Ethiopian leadership. Beijing supports, as all over the world, reactionary regimes inasmuch as this serves anti-Sovietism. Although China openly shares Somalia's point of view, its direct material support is altogether rather moderate. Besides direct arms deliveries, Beijing is supporting Somalia in the construction of roads and irrigation systems and delivers medical aid.

Existing pro-Maoist groups in Ethiopia exert very little influence and have no broad popular basis.

4. With regard to the demand by Somalia to recall its students in the USSR, Comrade Sinitsin informed us about the following: Upon request of the Somali government, the Somali embassy in Moscow delivered a note to the MFA in Moscow communicating the intention to recall all Somalis residing in the USSR. The Soviet Union was asked to help with the return of the students which is to be carried out on special planes. The MFA of the USSR responded by arguing that the recall of students in ongoing training programs would be a violation of existing agreements and thus the financial burden had to be carried by Somalia.

The students' return aboard special planes itself was not refused. [...]

[Signed: Vogel]

[Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/127; obtained and translated by Christian F. Ostermann.]

**Memorandum of Conversation of SED  
Comrade Lamberz with Cuban  
Ambassador to Ethiopia, Comrade  
Pepe, Addis Ababa, 3 March 1978  
(dated 4 March 1978)**

(Based on notes of Comrade General Major Jaenicke.)

[Introductory remarks]

Comrade Pepe's estimate of the situation.

There is a good development in the East. There are still Somali troops in the area of Jijiga, Dire Dawa, and Harar have been liberated. Currently [there is] a concentration on the Ethiopian side against Jijiga.

Regular Somali troops are withdrawing to the border; [they] intend to leave guerrilla fighters in Jijiga as a bridgehead. The problem of the Ethiopian troops not taking any prisoners was discussed with Mengistu; it was Mengistu's concept to take prisoners but it had not yet achieved complete awareness among the troops.

A train route was opened in the East, inhabitants return [to their homes]. The Issar and Afars were displaying good behavior; Issar in part fought on the side of the Ethiopians.

On the trip of the envoy [U.S. deputy national security advisor David Aaron] of USA President Carter to Addis Ababa: The American desire to keep the trip secret was not accepted. The USA was concerned that Ethiopia would break off diplomatic relations. The USA would be ready to respect the revolutionary development in Ethiopia and grant aid to Ethiopia if its neutrality was guaranteed. They would perhaps be willing to deliver money and spare parts.

Problems in the Ethiopia-USA relationship were not the fault of the Carter Administration but of its predecessor (for example non-compliance with weapons and material deliveries).

The United States' main concern was the Soviet and Cuban presence. The United States would not support Somalia as long as Ethiopia was operating on its own territory.

Mengistu explained to the USA envoy: It was his right to ask for advisers to come

to Ethiopia, and they would stay as long as necessary. The Carter administration was to blame for the strained Ethiopian-USA relationship (role of the CIA etc.). He emphasized the neutrality of Ethiopia which would develop toward socialism. He would not be ready to switch allies.

Mengistu's response was so good that the USA envoy immediately withdrew the demand for the immediate removal of Soviet and Cuban advisers; he demanded the withdrawal of the Cubans after the end of the Somali aggression; then the withdrawal would be necessary since otherwise this would result in a threat to USA strategic interests.

The United States attempts to get an economic foothold in Ethiopia. Possibly deliveries of arms, equipment etc. would follow to "further confuse the situation."

Comrade Pepe pointed to the fact that after the situation in the East would clear up some forces could try to perform an change of course in Ethiopia. (Something similar to [pro-Soviet and anti-American MPLA faction leader Nito] Alves in Angola.)

At the request of the Cuban comrades, Mengistu spoke publicly about the presence of Soviet and Cuban advisers. Nevertheless, the press continually claims that Ethiopia is still fighting by itself. The reason for this [is] unclear.

With respect to the "Red terror," Comrade Vivo mentioned this to Mengistu. Now there is a certain positive change. There is talk of "revolutionary legality."

[Mengistu and MEISON]

With regard to Eritrea it was attempted to convince Mengistu that a program for Eritrea had to be worked out. It would be necessary to create foundations and goals for which one could fight in Eritrea in order to be able to influence the lines of division among the various [Eritrean liberation] movements. Mengistu is not very convinced in this question. He fears other split-offs which would result in the destruction of the Ethiopian state.

Mengistu has little confidence in the talks with the Eritreans. Cuban comrades have doubts as well. Nevertheless the talks begun by the SED were very important. Perhaps they would create pre-conditions for a necessary program.

Territorial integrity and central authority had to be guaranteed. Danger of an in-

ternationalization of the conflict existed in the North, in particular in Massawa.

There are doubts about the Aforki's role.

If Massawa finally falls, one could expect that USA ships would show up in the port and Soviet ships would have to leave.

The enemy's main blow can be expected in the North. Mengistu's attitude makes it easier for the enemy. Mengistu should not be confronted with the possibility of Eritrean independence. One has to pay attention to ensure that the Eritrean problem will not lead to a worsening of relations with the Socialist countries. Comrade Raul Castro has made it clear to Mengistu that the Cubans would not participate in the fights in the North.

Even in case of an internationalization of the conflict Cuban troops could not intervene, given the lack of any program.

[Concluding remarks]

[Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/127; document obtained and translated by Christian F. Ostermann.]

#### **Minutes of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting, 9 March 1978 (excerpt)**

Top Secret

Only copy

Working Transcript

#### **MEETING OF THE CC CPSU POLITBURO 9 March 1978**

Chaired by Com. BREZHNEV, L.I.

Attended by Coms. Grishin, V.V., Kirilenko, A.P., Kosygin, A.N., Kulakov, F.D., Mazurov, K.T., Pel'she, A.Ya., Demichev, P.N., Kuznetsov, V.V., Ponomarev, B.N., Solomentsev, M.S., Dolgikh, V.I., Zimianin, M.V., Riabov, Ia.P., Rusakov, K.V.

#### **[...] 12. About Measures to Settle the Ethiopia-Somalia military conflict**

BREZHNEV. All comrades, evidently, have read the last telegrams from Ethiopia and Somalia in relation to Siad Barre's request concerning our mediation. At first, Mengistu's reaction to the thoughts we expressed about that issue was basically positive. But he has promised to give a final response only after he will consult with his

colleagues in the leadership. Thus far that response has not been received.

Siad Barre's reaction to the thoughts which we expressed to him in regarding his request suggests that he, as in the past, is playing a dishonest game. He obviously would like to leave some part of the forces in the Ogaden disguised as "patriotic detachments" and not to accept as a starting point for negotiations the principle of mutual respect, sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-violation of borders, and non-interference in the internal affairs of one another. He declares that these principles should be the subject of the subsequent negotiations.

On the other hand, Siad Barre's response in no way rejects the possibility of organizing a Somali-Ethiopian meeting, if Ethiopia will agree to it. Therefore, if Mengistu will give his consent to this meeting, then it seems expedient to continue our work aimed at organizing it. Simultaneously, it will of course be necessary to confirm to Siad Barre our principled approach regarding the withdrawal from Ethiopia of all Somali sub-detachments and about the principles of a settlement which are mentioned above.

I believe that it is necessary for us to continue working in this direction.

MFA USSR, the Committee of State Security, the Ministry of Defense and the International Department of the CC CPSU are assigned to continue working in the direction of a settlement of the military conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia and to submit possible proposals to the CC CPSU.

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 120, d. 39, ll. 97, 114; translated by Mark Doctorff.]

#### **SED Memorandum of a Conversation with Comrade [Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia Anatoly P.] Ratanov in Addis Ababa, 13 March 1978**

On 13 March 1978, [GDR diplomat] Eberhard Heinrich met with the Soviet Ambassador to Ethiopia, Comrade Ratanov, for an two-hour conversation.

[Other participants; opening remarks]

On the attitude towards Somalia, Comrade Ratanov explained that they had informed Mengistu on 7 March about Siad Barre's offer of negotiations. Mengistu promised to have this immediately discussed within the PMAC. He said that it would not

be bad if Somalia could be brought back into the Socialist camp regardless of the government in that country.

One had to make efforts to tear Somalia away from the imperialists and certainly there were positive forces influencing Siad Barre. Perhaps he has also acknowledged some mistakes.

The discussion within the PMAC was apparently difficult, and there was no response the next day. On 9 March, the Cuban comrades approached Mengistu with a message from Fidel Castro which contained similar recommendations. On 13 March, Ratanov met again with Mengistu and then received the written response of the Ethiopian leadership. (For a translation see appendix [not printed--ed.]). Comrade Ratanov said, in the conversation in which [Maj.] Berhanu Bayeh [Chairman of the legal and administrative affairs committee and of the special commission on Eritrea] participated, that it was right to demand guarantees from Somalia and that it had to refrain from its territorial demands. At the same time it was necessary to employ the correct political tactics. We lose nothing if we agree to negotiations. One cannot demand everything in advance. This would practically mean to call for political suicide. After all Siad Barre wants to save his skin. Moreover, the Ethiopian positions could not well be presented as logical before world public opinion. At first Ethiopia declares that it would be willing to negotiate if Somalia withdraws its troops. Now that they [the Somalis] are willing to do so, the Ethiopians are retreating from their position. This attitude could well be a gift for the imperialists because Siad Barre can claim that Ethiopia was not willing to negotiate and instead was preparing for new attacks in pursuit of its goals. After consultation with Mengistu, the Soviet Union responded to Siad Barre in the following way: Ethiopia is willing to enter into negotiations with Somalia with the Soviet Union participating. It will be expected from Somalia to declare its readiness in the course of the negotiations to abandon its anti-Soviet, anti-Cuban, and anti-Ethiopian position. Somalia had to prove by its actions before domestic and world public opinion that it is indeed assuming a really new position. Under such conditions Ethiopia is willing to develop comprehensive cooperation between both countries.

On the Eritrean question, Comrade Ratanov stated that the development in Somalia was not the only thing complicating the situation. There are people within the Ethiopian leadership who, based on different positions, act in immature, arrogant, and nationalistic ways.

In a conversation, Comrade Mengistu indicated that the Socialist countries, to his mind, did not really understand the Eritrean problem. It was not a national but a class problem. He referred especially to an interview given by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, a member of the politburo of the CP Cuba, to an English journalist on 12 February. In this interview, Rodriguez indicated in response to a corresponding question that the Eritrean problem had to be dealt with differently than the other questions in Ethiopia. It was concluded that the Eritrean problem was a domestic Eritrean [sic-Ethiopian?--ed.] problem.

Mengistu thought that this statement had practically given the separatists a guarantee.

The Cuban comrades have declared that Comrade Rodriguez should not be interpreted in this way.

The movements in Eritrea which are directed against the Ethiopian Revolution are objectively counter-revolutionary. There are, however, national factors which have to be acknowledged. The Arab countries are trying to separate Eritrea from Ethiopia and to make it a member of the Arab League. This would mean that Ethiopia would be cut off from the Red Sea. Mengistu has to understand that we fully understand this and also the dangers evolving from the nationalist and separatist Eritrean movements. One has to anticipate the plans of the imperialists and the reaction. It is correct that the movements have lost much of their national character but there remain genuinely national forces. It is correct that Eritrea is not a nation but this also applies to other African countries. In proceeding towards a solution in the Eritrean problem, we should distance ourselves from the separatists.

Mengistu is so far not willing to call for progressive action in Eritrea and to work together with the progressive forces. To him, Eritrea is exclusively an Ethiopian matter. He favors a continuation of military actions in order to bring under his control in particular the centers and the road to Massawa.

Currently there is a process of differ-

entiation taking place among the Eritrean movements and forces are appearing which are interested in a unification with the revolutionary Ethiopian forces.

The Ethiopian troops in Eritrea are now tired of fighting, and even the victory of the Ogaden has not changed much. Despite the success, no significant units can be withdrawn from there and a fast change in the military situation in Eritrea is not to be expected.

On the development of the Party, Mengistu has promised that a group of Soviet advisers could arrive at any time. There have been a number of delays in this question. Mengistu apparently has no concept of the cooperation with the advisers. It is necessary to convince him that the advisers could be a real help and relief. [...]

[Source: SAPMO-BA, DY30 IV 2/2.035/127; document obtained and translated by Christian F. Ostermann.]

#### **Soviet Foreign Ministry, Background Report on Soviet-Ethiopian Relations, 3 April 1978**

Secret. Single copy  
orig. No. 167/3 ag  
03.IV.78

#### **SOVIET-ETHIOPIAN RELATIONS (Reference)**

Diplomatic relations between the USSR and Ethiopia were established on 21 April 1943.

Soviet-Ethiopian political cooperation before the Ethiopian revolution in 1974 developed on the basis of the historical ties between the peoples of the USSR and Ethiopia, both countries' participation in the struggle against Fascism during World War Two, and also taking into account the positive position that Ethiopia held in the struggle against colonialism and racism, in the questions of strengthening global peace and international security.

Former Emperor Haile Selassie I visited the Soviet Union in 1959, 1967, 1970, and in 1973.

The Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) announced its course for a Socialist orientation and its intention to develop comprehensive cooperation with the USSR after it came to power on 12 Sep-

tember 1974.

The Ethiopian leadership emphasized the fact that it saw the Soviet Union as the main source of their support internationally. The positions of the PMAC on the majority of major international problems coincide with or are close to those of the USSR.

In January 1975 the PMAC leadership raised in principle the question of developing Soviet-Ethiopian relations. It was announced by our side that the Soviet Union regarded sympathetically the measures taken by the PMAC for building a new society on progressive principles, and that we shared their opinion about the need to develop comprehensive contacts between Ethiopia and the Soviet Union.

Political relations. On 6-11 July 1976 an Ethiopian state delegation led by former Chairman Mogus Wolde Michael of the PMAC Committee of Ethiopia came to the Soviet Union on an official visit. The Soviet delegation at the negotiations was led by Comrade A.A. Gromyko. Members of the Ethiopian delegation were received by Comrade A.N. Kosygin.

On 4-8 May 1977 a state delegation of Ethiopia led by Chairman Lieutenant-Colonel Mengistu Haile Mariam of the PMAC came to the Soviet Union on an official friendly visit. Mengistu Haile Mariam was received by Comrade Brezhnev.

Soviet-Ethiopian negotiations in which the sides considered the status and the prospects for further development of Soviet-Ethiopian relations, the situation in Africa, and other international problems of mutual interest were held.

The sides adopted a Declaration of the Basis for Friendly Relations and Cooperation between the USSR and Ethiopia in the name of further strengthening of Soviet-Ethiopian relations. A joint Soviet-Ethiopian communique was published on the results of the visit of the state delegation of Ethiopia to the USSR. During the visit the sides signed an Agreement on Cultural and Scientific Cooperation, a Consular Convention, and the Protocol on Economic and Technological Cooperation of 6 May 1977.

On 30-31 October 1977 Chairman Mengistu Haile Mariam of the PMAC of Ethiopia came to the USSR on a closed visit. During the conversation that Comrades L.I. Brezhnev, A.N. Kosygin, and A.A. Gromyko had with him, it was emphasized that the USSR was going to continue to pro-

vide comprehensive assistance and support for the Ethiopian revolution in the future.

Comrades L.I. Brezhnev and Mengistu Haile Mariam repeatedly exchanged personal letters, which also contributed to a strengthening of bilateral relations.

An Ethiopian delegation led by member of the Permanent Committee of the PMAC Berhanu Bayeh attended the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution [in November 1977].

In the difficult situation which emerged around revolutionary Ethiopia and in the country itself the Soviet Union has provided Ethiopia with constant political and diplomatic support, for which the leadership of Ethiopia has repeatedly expressed its deep gratitude.

Responding to the PMAC request to provide support for the peaceful settlement of the Eritrean problem the Soviet Union addressed several leaders of Arab countries and of Somalia on that issue. The Soviet Union has also made a presentation to the Iraqi government concerning the small transfers of Soviet-made weapons to the Eritrean separatists from Iraq through Sudan.

In the situation of the war unleashed by Somalia against Ethiopia and the occupation of a significant portion of its territory the Soviet Union took the position of decisive support of Ethiopia, and provided it with all kinds of assistance, including the assistance in strengthening its capability to defend itself. In our official statements and addresses to a number of African and Arab countries, and also in our contacts with the Western countries, we consistently advocated the necessity of an immediate cessation of the conflict by, first and foremost, an unconditional withdrawal of the Somali troops from the territory of Ethiopia.

In July-August 1977 the Soviet Union provided its good offices for the settlement of the Somali-Ethiopian conflict. However, during separate meetings with the representatives of both countries who came to Moscow it became clear that the two sides held uncompromising mutually exclusive positions. In those circumstances both delegations left for their countries, and the mission of good offices was suspended.

Party Contacts. At the request of the PMAC, 120 active members of the PMAC took courses on party building, organization

of labor unions, women's and youth movements, solving nationality and other issues at the CC CPSU in the Soviet Union. In 1977, 50 people were accepted to those courses. In March 1978, a group of four Soviet party officials went to Ethiopia to assist the PMAC in creating a vanguard party of the working class.

Military Cooperation. In December 1976 in Moscow Ethiopia and the Soviet Union signed an agreement on the transfer of some defensive weapons and military equipment from the Soviet Union to Ethiopia in 1977-1980. Upon request from the Ethiopian side part of the weapons was delivered immediately; and in February 1977 some rifles were supplied for the Ethiopian people's militia in form of gratuitous assistance. We also gave our consent to the governments of CzSSR [Czechoslovakia], VNR [Hungary], PNR [Poland], and Cuba to supply Ethiopia with rifles produced under Soviet licenses, and to the government of the PDRY [People's Democratic Republic of Yemen] to transfer Soviet-made tanks and armored personnel vehicles to Ethiopia.

Later, after a new request from Ethiopia, the Soviet side made a decision additionally to supply Ethiopia with weapons and military equipment, and also with rifles for the People's militia in 1977-1980. In addition, we supply Ethiopia with technology for general civilian use, and Ethiopian servicemen have been accepted for study in the Soviet Union.

During the closed visit of Mengistu Haile Mariam to Moscow in October 1977, the Soviet side agreed to provide urgently additional supplies of weapons and military equipment to strengthen the capability of Ethiopia to defend itself in the situation of the Somali aggression.

A group of Soviet military advisers and specialists currently works in Ethiopia.

A state delegation led by Army General V.I. Petrov has been staying in Ethiopia since November 1977 on a closed visit. The tasks of the delegation include devising measures jointly with the Ethiopian side to assist the PMAC in building the Ethiopian armed forces, for faster mastering of the Soviet military equipment by the Ethiopian army, and in the planning of military operations in the Ogaden and Eritrea.

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 75, d. 1175, ll. 24-32; translation by Svetlana Savran-

skaya.]

**Soviet Foreign Ministry and CPSU CC  
International Department, Background  
Report on the Somali-Ethiopian  
Conflict, 3 April 1978**

Secret, Copy No. 3  
Issue 164/3afo  
IV.03.78

**ABOUT THE SOMALIA-ETHIOPIA  
CONFLICT**  
(Information Sheet)

Since the time of the formation of an independent Somalian state in 1960, there has been tension in inter-state relations on the Horn of Africa. Its source is the aspiration of the leadership of Somalia to unite the lands populated by Somali tribes in a single state and the claims it has made in that regard to certain regions of Ethiopia (Ogaden), Kenya, and the territory of the Republic of Djibouti.

Relations are particularly sharp between Somalia and Ethiopia. On multiple occasions border incidents and military conflict have broken out between them.

The revolution in Ethiopia in 1974 did not lead to an improvement in Somalia-Ethiopia relations. More to the point, President Siad and other Somali leaders, using as a cover demagogic declarations about the right of nations to self-determination, right up to secession, have intensified their pressure on Ethiopia. The Somalis in essence have demanded the partition of the multinational Ethiopian state on the basis of ethnicity. These demands were obviously aimed against the interests of the Ethiopian revolution and poured grist on the mill of internal and external reaction.

In these conditions the USSR and other socialist states undertook efforts to normalize relations between Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of Somalia (SDR). In March 1977, at the initiative of Fidel Castro with the participation of the chairman of the Presidential Council of the PDRY S. Rubayi Ali, a meeting took place in Aden between the Chairman of the PMAC Mengistu Haile Mariam and the President of the SDR Siad, which due to the unconstructive position of the latter ended without result.

The Soviet Union more than once appealed to the leadership of Somalia and

Ethiopia with a call to normalize their relations and proposed a constructive program which would lead to a settlement, and indicated its readiness to make available its good offices. In July-August 1977, in the course of separate meetings with representative of Somalia and Ethiopia who were visiting Moscow, it was found that the sides were occupying mutually-exclusive positions; moreover the Somalis were continuing to insist on wresting the Ogaden away from Ethiopia.

Insofar as plans to obtain the Ogaden without the application of force did not come to fruition, the Somali leadership, in which chauvinistic moods came to dominate, set about the practical realization of its expansionist plans, counting on achieving success in relation to the domestic political situation in Ethiopia, which was aggravated at that time. The Arab reaction also pushed them to this, and also imperialist states, in particular the USA, which, according to Siad's own admission, had promised to provide military assistance to Somalia.

On 23 July 1977, Somalia unleashed on the African Horn an armed conflict. Under cover of the Front for the Liberation of Western Somalia (FLWS)—which had been created by the Somali leadership itself—it sent its own forces into the Ogaden, and they occupied a significant part of the Ethiopian provinces of Harar, Bale, and Sidamo, and only through the bitter fights which unfolded in October-December 1977 were they stopped at the approaches to the important centers of Harar and Dire Dawa.

After appropriate preparation, the Ethiopian armed forces went on the counter-attack in February of this year. In the beginning of March of this year the strategically important city of Jijiga was liberated, and a major grouping of Somali forces was shattered. Cuban military personnel took part in the military actions, while Soviet military advisors participated in working out the plan of military operations. To the present, the liberation of all territory has in fact been completed, and Ethiopian troops have reached the border with Somalia. When the Somalis were on the edge of a military catastrophe, the leadership of the SDR made the decision to withdraw its forces from the Ogaden front. At the same time the representatives of the FLWS announced that they would not stop military actions on the territory of the Ogaden.

Confronted with the decisive refusal of the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist commonwealth to support the territorial claims on Ethiopia, the Somali leadership on 13 November 1977 unilaterally announced the annulment of the 1974 Soviet-Somali Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and demanded the recall from Somalia of all Soviet military and civilian advisors. In Somalia an anti-Soviet campaign was unfolded. Diplomatic relations with Cuba were cut off.

At the same time the Somali leadership began actively to search for support from Muslim states, winning from them assistance which included arms deliveries and the sending of forces for participation in combat actions against Ethiopia under the banner of "Islamic Solidarity." The visit of the President of Somalia, Said Barre, to Iran, Pakistan, Egypt, Sudan, Oman, and also Iraq and Syria, at the end of December 1977-beginning of January 1978, served just such goals.

As the conflict went on, the Somali leaders many times called out to the USA and other Western powers with persistent appeals to provide assistance to Somalia and to interfere in events on the African Horn aimed at a "peace" settlement to the conflict and the "defense" of Somalia from aggression which allegedly was being prepared against it from the direction of Ethiopia.

Following the collapse of its adventure in Ogaden, Somalia has not retracted its territorial claims against Ethiopia, and putting forth various conditions it continues to seek these same goals by other means. The Somali leadership called on the great powers with an appeal to secure recognition and the realization of self-determination for the population of the Ogaden. In this regard it called on the great powers to undertake urgent measure to settle the conflict through negotiations, and by securing the withdrawal of "all foreign forces" from the African Horn, having in mind the Cuban military personnel and Soviet military advisors which had been invited by the Ethiopian government as a means to strengthen the defense capability of the country. Somalia also spoke out for sending "neutral forces" to the Ogaden.

The Ethiopian leadership evaluated the actions of Somalia as an act of armed aggression and in relation to this on 8 Sep-

tember 1977 broke off diplomatic relations with the SDR.

During the armed conflict, the PMAC expressed readiness to settle the conflict peacefully within the framework of the OAU, putting forth as an absolute condition the beginning of negotiations with the Somalis on the withdrawal of their forces from Ethiopian territory. Simultaneously the Ethiopian leaders declared many times in public speeches that Ethiopia did not intend, after the liberation of the Ogaden territory, to carry military actions beyond the limits of their own borders.

After the destruction of the Somali troops, the Ethiopia MFA asserted in its declaration on 12 March of this year the aspiration of the Ethiopian government to establish peace and stability on the African Horn in accord with the Charters and decisions of the U.N. and the OAU, on the basis of observation of the principles of non-use of force as a means of solving international arguments, and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states. In the declaration it was further pointed out that the establishment of peace on the African Horn is possible only in the event of Somali retraction of its claims for part of the territory of Ethiopia and Kenya, and also Djibouti, [and] observation by it of international agreements. In it are rejected the attempts of the USA government and its allies to tie the withdrawal of Somali forces to a resolution of issues which fall under the sovereignty of Ethiopia (the presence on its territory of foreign military personnel invited there by the Ethiopian government, the proposal to send foreign observers to the Ogaden).

Regarding Somalia's demand that the population of the Ogaden be presented with the right of self-determination, the Ethiopian leadership declares that a resolution of that issue is a domestic affair of Ethiopia and that therefore it cannot be a condition for a settlement of the Somalia-Ethiopia conflict. The Ethiopian side also raises the issue of compensation from Somalia for the losses caused by the military actions in the Ogaden.

Somalia's position in the conflict with Ethiopia does not meet, as a rule, with support from the members of the OAU, who support the preservation of existing state borders in Africa.

The special committee of the OAU for settlement of Somalia-Ethiopia relations

(under the chairmanship of Nigeria), which met in session in Libreville [Gabon] in August 1977, refused to accept the Front for the Liberation of Western Somalia as a national-liberation movement, [and] called on the governments of both countries to stop hostile actions and to settle their disagreements by peaceful means, on the basis of the principle of the inviolability of the borders of African countries. In a resolution accepted by the the committee there was contained a call on everyone, particularly non-African countries, to refrain from interference in the conflict.

Efforts which have until now been undertaken by several African countries and the OAU to mediate an end to the conflict have not led to any positive results in view of the contradictory positions taken by the sides.

Over the course of the conflict, the reactionary Muslim regimes have taken a position in support of Somalia. However, according to information which we have, at the time of the conduct of military actions in the Ogaden, President Siad was not successful in getting their agreement to send their forces to that region, although Saudi Arabia, Iran, Pakistan, and Egypt did covertly send arms to Somalia.

On the other hand, such Arab countries as the PDRY, Algeria, and, to an extent, Libya, provided support to Ethiopia. In this regard the PDRY sent weapons and military personnel to Ethiopia.

Over the course of the conflict, Sudan's position underwent change. For a variety of reasons it refused to take an extreme anti-Ethiopian course.

Leading Western countries, while verbally supporting a political settlement to the Somalia-Ethiopia conflict and stressing their own neutrality, in fact have tried to use the conflict to undermine the revolutionary regime in Ethiopia and to rout the progressive forces in Somalia, and also to weaken the presence of the USSR in that region of the world. In fact, the Westerners have conducted a policy of veiled assistance to Somalia. Nonetheless, for a variety of reasons they have not set out to provide Somalia with direct military assistance. Primarily they did not want to decisively push Ethiopia away from them, counting on reestablishing their positions here in the future. They also could not but take into account that the actions of Somalia had not met with support from Af-

rican states, but [in fact] Kenya, which has tight contacts with the West, sharply condemned them.

At the present time, from the side of the Westerners, particularly the USA, efforts are being undertaken to take into their own hands the initiative for a settlement of the conflict in the interests of strengthening their own positions on the African Horn. Under conditions of the occupation of the Ogaden by Somali forces they put forth proposals for a quick beginning to negotiations, so that the Somali side could speak at them from a position of strength. Another of their ideas which they put forth was to pass consideration of the issue of the conflict to the UN Security Council, where the Westerners counted on putting pressure on Ethiopia.

The decision of the SDR to withdraw Somali forces from the Ogaden was quickly used by the USA leadership for a declaration about the need for the quick withdrawal from Ethiopia of Soviet and Cuban military personnel. The Western powers also spoke in favor of the idea of sending to the Ogaden foreign "neutral observers" to supervise the withdrawal of troops from that regions and to ensure the security of its population.

The Chinese leadership has expressed itself from an anti-Soviet position in relation to the conflict, trying to heap all the responsibility for the ongoing events on the Soviet Union. While not openly expressing its attitude to the conflict, at the same time it has essentially supported the position of Somalia. There is information that the PRC has delivered small arms to Somalia.

The countries of the socialist commonwealth have in relation to the conflict taken a position of censuring the aggressive actions of Somalia and providing Ethiopia with internationalist assistance and support.

Cuba acted particularly actively in this direction, sending, in response to a request from the government of Ethiopia and as officially announced by F. Castro on 16 March of this year, its own tank operators, artillery specialists, pilots, and also sub-units of mechanized infantry, to provide assistance to the armed forces of that country while the Ogaden was under conditions of occupation by Somali forces. During the Ethiopian counter-attack, Cuban soldiers were used in the main lines of attack. The Soviet Union and Cuba are in constant contact aimed at coordination of their actions in

support of the Ethiopian revolution.

The attitude of the Soviet Union toward the Somali-Ethiopia conflict is determined by the fact that that conflict contradicts the interests of progressive forces in that region, and creates a danger of turning the African Horn into a hotbed of serious international tension.

After the outbreak of armed conflict on the African Horn, the Soviet Union came out in favor of its quick cessation, for the peaceful settlement of relations between Somalia and Ethiopia by means of negotiations on the basis of mutual respect by the sides of sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of borders and non-interference in each other's domestic affairs, noting that an absolute condition of such a settlement must be a cessation of military actions and a quick and unconditional withdrawal of Somali forces from the territory of Ethiopia, and that otherwise a situation analogous to the one in the Middle East might arise on the African Horn.

Our principled line in relation to the situation on the Horn of Africa was precisely expressed in the speeches of comrades L.I. Brezhnev of 28 September 1977 on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of the President of the People's Republic of Angola A. Neto, and A.N. Kosygin of 12 January 1978 on the occasion of the visit to the USSR of the President of the APDR [Algerian People's Democratic Republic] H. Boumedienne, and also in the TASS Declaration of 18 January 1978.

The Soviet Union spoke out against efforts of the Western states to submit the issue of the situation on the African Horn for consideration by the UN Security Council, which they could use in particular to unleash a hostile campaign against the USSR and Cuba. At the same time the Soviet Union believes that the Organization of African Unity should continue its efforts to provide assistance on a settlement of the Somali-Ethiopia conflict, insofar as it has not exhausted its possibilities in this area.

The position of the Soviet Union towards the Somali-Ethiopia conflict has many times been brought to the attention of the leadership of progressive African and Arab states, and also to a range of Western powers.

The Soviet Union consistently follows a firm line in providing the utmost assistance and support to the revolutionary Ethio-

pian regime. During the conflict, supplementary, urgent measures were undertaken to strengthen the defense capability of Ethiopia, which had become a victim of aggression. We brought deliveries of combat materiel, weapons, and ammunition to Somalia to a halt. After the Somali side undertook unfriendly actions in November 1977, the Soviet Union stopped economic and trade cooperation and ended military cooperation with Somalia.

In the beginning of March of this year President Said appealed to the Soviet Union with a request to provide mediatory services to settle the Somali-Ethiopia conflict and expressed readiness to establish friendly relations between Somalia and the USSR.

From our side agreement was given to implement mediatory efforts if the leadership of Ethiopia would view that favorably and in the event that Somalia took a realistic position on a settlement of the conflict. In this regard Siad's attention was drawn to the fact that the various preconditions put forth by the Somali side (giving self-determination to the population of Ogaden) only delay the possibility of holding negotiations to bring an end to the conflict, insofar as they cannot be acceptable to any sovereign state and complicate the realization by us of mediatory efforts.

As far as the establishment of friendly relations with Somalia is concerned, from our side there was expressed readiness for that in principle and under the clear understanding of the fact that Somalia will take specific steps to establish a genuine peace on the African Horn.

In response to our information about Siad's proposal, the Ethiopian government, having expressed doubt about the sincerity of the intentions of the Somali leadership, at the same time expressed readiness to begin negotiations with Somalia in Moscow with the participation of the Soviet Union, on the condition that the Somali representatives are prepared to declare in due course the rejection of their anti-Ethiopian, anti-Soviet, and anti-Cuban positions; to declare respect for the territorial integrity of Ethiopia and to give agreement to the demarcation of the Ethiopia-Somalia border on the basis of existing international agreements; to stop their support of underground movements directed against the territorial integrity and unity of Ethiopia; and lastly, in some way or another to inform public opinion of

their own country and world public opinion about Somalia's new position.

So far the Somali leadership rejects these proposals and continues to insist on its own conditions.

The outcome of the war in the Ogaden essentially was reflected in the domestic political situation of its participants. The situation in Somalia was sharply exacerbated. On the grounds of a worsening of the economic situation and a decline in the standard of living, dissatisfaction with the current leadership grew among various strata of the population, including the army. This dissatisfaction, which has assumed open forms, is being suppressed by Said with the help of executions and repressions. In Ethiopia the military victory facilitated, on the one hand, the consolidation of the patriotic, progressive forces, and the strengthening of the position of Mengistu and his supporters, and, on the other hand, enlivened nationalistic elements, including in the leadership of the country, which are putting forth the idea that the Somali threat should be "done away with" once and for all.

Overall, the situation on the African Horn remains complex and tense. The cessation of military actions on the ground has not yet been ratified in any way, and the continuing Somali claims to the Ogaden, and [to] part of the territory of Kenya and the Republic of Djibouti, create a situation fraught with the outbreak of a new armed confrontation. Such a situation creates an opportunity for maneuvers of imperialist and reactionary Arab circles in this region of Africa, and therefore the establishment there of peace and the achievement of an agreement between Somalia and Ethiopia on stopping the conflict corresponds to our interests.

Third African Department  
MFA USSR

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 75, d. 1175, ll. 13-23; translated by Mark Doctoroff.]

**SED Archives, Memorandum on Soviet Reaction to Libyan Proposal on Somali-Ethiopian Conflict, 4 April 1978**

The Soviet Ambassador in Tripoli received instruction to communicate the following to [Libyan Prime Minister Abdul

Salam] Jalloud:

The proposals of the Libyan leadership on the settlement of the Somali-Ethiopian conflict have been carefully examined in Moscow. We have communicated to the Ethiopians the recent Libyan desire to receive in Tripoli the chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), based on the fact that only the Ethiopian side itself can make a decision in this respect. The Ethiopian side had previously communicated to us that Mengistu could not come to Libya at the end of February for negotiations with Siad Barre, for reasons which the PMAC chairman told you personally.

The Libyan side is aware of the Soviet position with respect to the procedure for a political settlement in the area of the Horn of Africa. We have fully explained our point of view during your recent visit to Moscow. There is only one just basis for the settlement of the conflict - this is the mutual respect of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and non-interference in domestic matters of the other side. All attempts to achieve a political settlement on any other basis were bound to destabilize such a solution and burden it with new difficulties.

The withdrawal of Somali troops from the Ogaden is only a step in the right direction, conditioned by the existing situation. The conditions for a settlement as officially announced by the Somali leadership, in our opinion, only served to postpone the start of negotiations. These conditions, as is known, touch upon the sovereign rights of Ethiopia and upon problems which lie in its domestic realm. The solution of the national question in the Ogaden belongs to this.

One cannot disregard the fact that the USA and other Western powers, which verbally favor a settlement of the conflict at the Horn of Africa, in fact seek to make such a settlement more difficult in order to strengthen their position in this area.

In our opinion the main task now is to put the settlement of the conflict at the Horn of Africa on the tracks of peaceful negotiations. The solution of this problem can not depend on whether Ethiopia and Somalia can achieve agreement on all other problems in their relationship. It is now especially important to influence the Somali leadership to assume a constructive position and to avoid giving the imperialist and other reactionary forces the opportunity to exploit

Somalia for their designs.

With respect to the situation in Eritrea, the Soviet Union has viewed and still views this in conformity with the UN and OAU resolutions as an internal Ethiopian matter. We favor a political solution of this question by negotiations between the central government and the Eritrean organizations. It is our strong conviction that the current attitude of the Eritrean organizations which favor the separation of Eritrea from Ethiopia contradicts the interests of the Ethiopian Revolution and the progressive forces in this area and is only of advantage to the imperialists and the reaction.

Libya and other progressive Arab states can use their authority and influence to convince the Eritrean organizations to terminate the fighting and go the way of a peaceful solution of the Eritrean problem in the framework of a unified Ethiopian state.

*[Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/127; document obtained and translated by Christian F. Ostermann.]*

**SED official Hermann Axen to E.  
Honecker, 18 April 1978, enclosing  
Draft Letter from Honecker to  
Brezhnev on Ethiopian-Eritrean Talks,  
19 April 1978**

Enclosure: Honecker to Brezhnev, 19 April 1978

Esteemed Comrade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev!

On 23 March 1978, the second meeting between the representatives to the Provisional Military Administrative Council of Socialist Ethiopia and the Eritrean Liberation Front took place. Upon request by the Politburo of the CC of the SED, Comrade Hermann Axen, member of the Politburo and CC secretary, participated in the talks.

[Berhanu Bayeh and Aforki declared again their desire to terminate the bloodshed and to do everything to solve the Eritrean problem by peaceful means.]

Despite this declaration made by both negotiators, the political negotiations showed that the positions on both sides had become stiffer.

The representative of the Provisional Military Administrative Council was inclined to favor a predominantly military solution of the Eritrean problem. They did not make any concrete or constructive pro-

posals for a peaceful and political solution although Comrade Werner Lamberz had agreed with Mengistu Haile Mariam on working papers in December 1977.

The attitude of the representatives of the Eritrean Liberation Movement illustrated, on the other hand that, under the pressure by the leadership of the Sudan and the Arab reaction, there has been a strengthening of nationalist, openly separatist forces within the Eritrean movements, especially by means of the coordination between the Eritrean People's Liberation Front and the Eritrean Liberation Front (Revolutionary Council).

The leader of the Eritrean People's Liberation Front, Aforki, presented the demand for a separate Eritrean state in even harsher terms. Only after long sharp discussion was he willing to agree to this second meeting and to the further examination of the proposals made by the SED. Thus it was possible to hold the second meeting. In the course of the meeting, the representatives of the Ethiopian leadership and the EPLF reiterated their known positions. They accepted the SED proposal - this proposal was, as is well known, agreed to by the CC of the CPSU - to put the following four points before the Provisional Military Administrative Council and the Central Committee of the EPLF as recommendations for a settlement:

1. Both sides confirm their resolve to stop the bloodshed immediately and bring about a political solution.

2. The Provisional Military Administrative Council of Ethiopia will make a public declaration expressing its concrete proposals for the implementation of regional autonomy for Eritrea in the framework of the Ethiopian state and under inclusion of all willing positive forces in Eritrea.

The Central Committee of the EPLF recognizes the achievements of the Ethiopian Revolution and declares itself ready for cooperation in the interest of implementation of regional autonomy.

3. Revolutionary Ethiopia's secure access to the Red Sea must be guaranteed by its uninterrupted access lines and its control over Asmara and the ports of Massawa and Assab.

4. Both sides form a common commission for the purpose of implementing the above points and all other steps for the security of the Revolution in Ethiopia and re-

gional autonomy in Eritrea.

It was agreed to inform the leadership organizations of Ethiopia and of the EPLF and have them communicate their positions on the results of the second meeting and the proposals of the SED at a third meeting in the GDR in mid-May.

Thus the second meeting undermined all attempts by the representatives of the EPLF to break off all political contacts and negotiations with the Provisional Military Administrative Council of Ethiopia [as they had previously intended to do].

But the situation involves the acute danger that the fighting over Eritrea will escalate and that the Arab reaction and the imperialists will intervene even further and attempt to internationalize the conflict. This would severely endanger the revolutionary developments in Ethiopia.

The Politburo of the CC of the SED is of the opinion that everything has to be done to achieve a political solution of the Eritrean question. The safeguarding of the revolutionary process in Ethiopia and its territorial as well as political integrity is a necessary precondition for this. The Provisional Military Administrative Council must doubtless have reliable control over its free access to the Red Sea. This, however, must be safeguarded by political and military means. It is our impression following the recent meeting that the Provisional Military Administrative Council is only oriented towards the military tasks in this matter and, despite repeated verbal assurances, has not made any concrete political steps in winning over the Eritrean population for the implementation of regional autonomy.

We therefore think that the Provisional Military Administrative Council should without further delay address an appeal to all willing forces in Eritrea for the peaceful political solution of the Eritrean problem. It would have to render more precisely the proposals it has made so far by concrete suggestions on the implementation of the right for self-determination of the different nations within Ethiopia in order to speed up the process of differentiation within the Eritrean population and to isolate the reactionary, separatist forces in Eritrea.

Based on the results of the last meeting, the Politburo of our Party proposes therefore that the Soviet comrades, in conjunction with representatives of our Party, work out internally possible solutions to the

regional autonomy of Eritrea in the framework of the Ethiopian state in order to communicate them at the appropriate time to the Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council, Mengistu Haile Mariam.

[Closing remarks]

[Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/127; document obtained and translated by Christian F. Ostermann.]

**Memorandum of Conversation between  
[SED] Comrade Friedel Trappen and  
Soviet Comrade R. A. Ulyanovsky in  
the CC of the CPSU, 11 May 1978**

[Other participants]

Ulyanovsky:

As Comrade B.N. Ponomarev has already pointed out in the last conversation with the comrades of the SED, the CC of the CPSU considers the talks of the SED with the Eritrean movements and the Ethiopian side very useful and positive. We can still say this today. On this basis one should approach the next meeting in June as well as other meetings. We consider the four points agreed on at the last meeting as positive. If both sides really take the four points as a starting point, this would be positive for further development. We are of the opinion that the following main points should be emphasized:

- a) The political solution of the problem and an end to the bloodshed.
- b) The granting of regional autonomy for Eritrea, but, however, no separate national independence.
- c) The unconditional use of Ethiopia's communications with the ports on the Red Sea.
- d) The increased unification of the progressive forces on both sides.

This would be a deeply satisfying platform which could be developed further.

The points agreed upon in the March meeting are contained in these proposals and hence could be developed further at the June meeting. This would create a real foundation for the rapprochement of both sides. The main question is, how honestly, how genuinely, and how deeply both sides will comply with these points. If one could say today that the four points are fulfilled by both sides or will soon be fulfilled, this would be a great relief for us.

The CPSU also works in this direction. It agreed to receive an ELF-RC delegation led by Ahmed Mohammed Nasser at the level of the USSR Solidarity Committee on a confidential internal basis around 20 May 1978. We will use these contacts in order to induce the representatives of the ELF-RC to have direct contact with the Provisional Military Administrative Council. The objective is to find an appropriate solution for Eritrea within the framework of the Ethiopian state. We do not have the intention to hide from Ahmed Nasser our policy toward a unified Ethiopia. The policy of the CPSU is aimed at the unity of Ethiopia. We will try to convince Ahmed Nasser that the future development of the Eritrean people can only evolve in a unified Ethiopian state. In the discussions we will continue to pursue the line of emphasizing the unity between the Marxist-Leninist forces and national-democratic forces in Ethiopia and Eritrea.

We would like to stress that we have to be extremely tactful in our relations with Mengistu Haile Mariam and the PMAC, in particular with respect to the Eritrean question.

Mengistu Haile Mariam does not have an easy stand within the PMAC in this regard. In connection with the well-known Dr. Negede [Gobeze] affair tensions have heightened within the PMAC and this has not made Mengistu's task any easier.

We would like to emphasize that all concrete initiatives on the Eritrean questions have to originate from Ethiopia. This does not mean that the Eritrean side is free of any initiatives. If we put the entire weight on the Mengistu Haile Mariam's shoulders and free Ahmed Nasser or respectively Aforki of any responsibility, this would be one-sided. The Ethiopian side is watching with great jealousy the actions of the CPSU and the SED. Here as well one has to see the connection between Mengistu Haile Mariam's position and the people around him. Mengistu Haile Mariam deserves to be regarded by us as a man who represents internationalist positions. By contrast to him, Berhanu Bayeh and Fikre Selassie as well as Legesse Asfaw and others, for example, are marked by nationalism although they are faithful to Mengistu Haile Mariam.

All steps and initiatives on the part of the CPSU, the CP Cuba, and the SED must be put forward extremely tactfully and carefully not to cause any protests. Frankly, the

problem lies to a certain degree in the fact that we all attempt to square the circle. The one side of the problem is - and we are both working on this - to solve the problem on an internationalist basis. On the other hand there are efforts to solve it on a nationalist basis. This is precisely why, I emphasize again, we have to apply maximum caution, circumspection, and tactfulness towards Mengistu Haile Mariam so that the nationalists will not grasp him by the throat.

In our contacts and talks with Ahmed Nasser we intend to make it unmistakably clear to him that it is necessary that all revolutionary forces join together and that the Eritrean problem is not only a national but above all a class problem which has to be solved by the common fight against the imperialists and the Arab reaction.

Efforts to split up Ethiopia and create a separate Eritrean state, to refuse to give Ethiopia access to the ports on the Red Sea, to drive the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries out of this region, are not simply a national problem but a problem of international class warfare, not to speak of the fact that such a separate state would be manipulated by the Sudan and Saudi Arabia and their petrol dollars.

We will therefore point out to Ahmed Nasser, who claims to be a Marxist, the national and international dimension of the Eritrean problem.

Concerning the questions put forward by Comrade Trappen I would like to add the following consideration:

The basic difficulty is the fact that separatist ideas have been rooted in Eritrea for a long time. These ideas are very popular among the population, especially among the workers. This factor, the factor of the erring of the masses based on nationalism, is a given one. The main difficulty therefore is that the mass of the Eritrean population does not understand the difference between the imperial regime of Haile Selassie and the policy of the PMAC.

The fight continues as in earlier times under the imperial regime. This creates the great necessity for intensified political work by the PMAC and above all by Mengistu Haile Mariam towards the Eritrean population. It was particularly this point that Comrade Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev discussed with Mengistu Haile Mariam during his trip to Moscow.

The PMAC is confronting a decisive,

great, and huge task to get the people of Eritrea on the side of the Ethiopian Revolution. Preparations have been made but no concrete steps and measures. The Soviet comrades have told Mengistu Haile Mariam and Legesse that it was now important to show the Eritrean people that the PMAC is not identical with the regime of Emperor Haile Selassie and the interests of the Ethiopian Revolution are in harmony with the interests of the progressive forces in Eritrea. Unfortunately, forces in the PMAC and Mengistu Haile Mariam himself have caused a slow-down of this necessary political work towards the people of Eritrea. Mengistu Haile Mariam is passive.

We completely agree with the estimate that military actions for the solution of the Eritrean question alone are pointless and, moreover, dangerous. They would widen the gap between the Eritrean people and the Ethiopian Revolution and create new intensified hatred. This does not mean that the PMAC should completely abandon military activities. We think that it is necessary to exert military pressure on the Eritrean separatist forces. This especially since in regard to military matters the current situation in Eritrea is not favorable for the PMAC. It is therefore necessary to talk but at the same time to act militarily on the part of the PMAC. This applies in particular to the safeguarding of important military strategic positions and especially of the communications with the ports of Massawa and Assab as well as the capital Asmara, the cities Akordat, Keren, and Barentu. These military actions have to serve political measures.

It was emphasized in the talk between Comrade L.I. Brezhnev and Mengistu Haile Mariam that it is necessary for the PMAC to address itself to the Eritrean people. This political initiative is extremely acute today as never before. We deem it necessary that both the CPSU and the SED together exert influence on Mengistu Haile Mariam in this respect. We have to take into consideration that the position of the Eritrean movements has not become any less obstinate, because they still demand the separation of Eritrea. This shows that there are no honest efforts for a political solution on the part of the Eritrean representatives. Therefore it is correct to work for a change in the current position of the Eritrean movements. It is especially necessary to receive from them a declaration pledging that self-determination for

the Eritrean people will be achieved within the framework of a Ethiopian state. We received an information [report] in early May according to which direct contacts had been established between the PMAC and the EPLF. We do not know anything about the substance of these contacts. With respect to the concrete question whether it makes sense to continue the negotiations or to await military actions, Comrade Ulyanovsky stated that both sides had to be induced to [take part in] further negotiations and that at the same time a certain limited military pressure was quite useful, meaning that even with the continuation of the negotiation efforts certain military actions could not be precluded.

Concerning the question on the concrete coordination between the CPSU, the SED, and the Cuban CP, Comrade Ulyanovsky emphasized that all bilateral contacts with the Cuban CP are excellent and that the same applied to the SED. There has been no exchange of opinion with the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen on the part of the CPSU. They have, as is well known, pulled their troops out of Ethiopia. One has to take into consideration that the situation in the PDR Yemen is difficult. The PDR Yemen has to be protected.

Comrade Ulyanovsky agreed to put the proposal for the creation of a mechanism for consultation and coordination before the leadership of the CPSU. Concerning the question of a possible later public announcement of our parties on the Eritrean question (in some form), it is expedient to examine this in the light of the Moscow talks with Ahmed Nasser and the planned third meeting of the Ethiopian and Eritrean sides with the SED.

With respect to the question of expert consultations on variants of a solution, it is possible at any time for GDR scientists [specialists] to consult with Soviet comrades about concrete questions. Comrade Ulyanovsky thinks that at this point these contacts should be limited to the level of the International Relations Departments of the Central Committees. With respect to the involvement of CPSU experts in the consultation and negotiations at the third meeting, Comrade Ulyanovsky stated that he would put this question before the party leadership for decision. Concerning the guarantees called for by the Eritrean side, one can only get more precise on this point

after concrete results have been achieved on the question of what, who, and to whom in some matter guarantees might be given.

Finally, Comrade Ulyanovsky pointed out that the attempt to keep the Ethiopian leadership from its military advance through us was a very delicate matter. The PMAC was predominantly of the opinion that even a political solution of the Eritrean question was not possible without a strengthening of Ethiopia's military positions in Eritrea and that the liberation of above-mentioned ports and cities can only be achieved by military means. The PMAC assumed that only then [would] actual and basic conditions exist for negotiations with the separatists.[...]

[Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/127; document obtained and translated by Christian F. Ostermann.]

**SED Department of International Relations, Information on talks of Ahmed Nasser (ELF-RC) in the USSR Solidarity Committee, 7- 8 June 1978**

We received the following information from the CC of the CPSU:

The representatives of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity explained the USSR position which is based on the assumption that the solution of the Eritrean question has to be achieved within the framework of a unified Ethiopian state by means of negotiations.

In effect, the three talks which were held with Ahmed Nasser proved that the Eritrean friends are not yet willing to approach the question by giving up the slogan of independence for Eritrea. Their argumentation is that neither side should coerce the other one into negotiations and a solution could only be a result of unconditional negotiations.

In the first conversation on 7 June, A. Nasser indicated that the ELF-RC would possibly consent to a federation. In the following talks it was not mentioned again, and by the time the third talk took place on 8 June, the position of the Eritrean friends had even hardened.

Generally they were at pains to prove that the ELF was the best, the [most] Marxist-Leninist of the Eritrean movements. They pointed out their advantages as follows:

1. The ELF recognizes the progressive

character of the Ethiopian Revolution.

2. It acknowledges the importance of the Soviet-Cuban support.

3. It does not demand preconditions.

4. It is willing to negotiate.

5. It favors the unification on a common democratic basis.

The Soviet comrades estimate that the attitude of the ELF appears to be slightly more flexible as those of the other Eritrean movements but this is, however, only an appearance.

[Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/127; obtained and translated by Christian F. Ostermann.]

**Winkelmann, SED CC Department of International Relations, to Hermann Axen, 9 June 1978**

[Introductory remarks]

Comrade Ponomarev is sending cordial greetings to you. In his opinion, Mengistu's recent speech does not allow for any [new] conclusions with respect to the [Ethiopian-Eritrean] talks in Berlin. Everything should be done as agreed upon. Even after this speech there is no reason for any nervousness.

Comrade Ponomarev had a long talk with Comrade Valdez Vivo on 9 June in which he also had an exchange of views about Mengistu's recent speech. The speech is considered as mostly positive. It corresponds for the most part with the recommendations of the Soviet and Cuban comrades with respect to the current situation and the necessary measures. It is in harmony with the agreements which have been made with Mengistu.

Mengistu's speech, which contains the necessary elements for a peaceful solution of the problem, is the basis for the further work. Mengistu will travel in the next days to Asmara. It is planned to hold a meeting with the population in which Mengistu will explain his program for a peaceful solution. His recent speech is the prelude to this action.

[Concluding remarks.]

[Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/127; document obtained and translated by Christian F. Ostermann.]

**GDR Embassy in Moscow, 19 June**

**1978, Memorandum of a Conversation between [SED] Comrade Grabowski and the Head of the Third African Department of the [Soviet] MFA, [CPSU] Comrade Sinitsin**

On Mengistu's speech of 14 June

The speech contains statements which can hardly be read without concern. One still has to assume that the military actions of the separatists have to be energetically opposed, that full and effective control by the PMAC and the Ethiopian armed forces over the cities in the north of the country and their access lines has to be assured. But obviously this was not everything that the speech meant to convey. Intentions for a complete military solution of the Eritrean problem shine through. One cannot recognize any new constructive or concrete suggestions on how to proceed politically. But this is exactly what would be necessary in the current situation and in the context of corresponding necessary military actions.

Obviously those forces within the Ethiopian leadership which have always favored a one-sided military solution have gained ground. It also seems important that there is heightened concern about the possibility of a new delay of a solution of the problem contributing to a renewed destabilization of the revolutionary regime.

On Ethiopia's international situation

The predominant majority of Arab states is increasingly moving against Ethiopia. One should under no circumstances underestimate the danger involved in the clash between the positions of the reactionary and progressive Arab regimes in the Eritrean question which is heightened by the present policy of the Ethiopian leadership. Basically, only the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen is granting real support for the Ethiopian Revolution. Algeria is acting in a very reserved way: while acknowledging the achievements of the Ethiopian Revolution, it does hardly anything concrete in support. Syria and Iraq have clearly expressed once more in recent days that they intend to give support to the [Eritrean] separatists, including military supplies. The Iraqi leadership is also interested in strengthening in every way the pro-Baathistic elements in Eritrea. The Libyan position is quite unclear. Even though they rhetorically recognize the achievements of the Ethiopian Revolution, they, however, less and less ex-

PLICITLY oppose the separation of Eritrea. The impression that the Libyan leadership basically favors the Arabization of Eritrea is not far off. In no case does it want to see relations among the Arab states, especially among the countries of the rejection front, be burdened by the Eritrean question. The pressure exerted by Saudi Arabia and Egypt can definitely be felt. It is difficult to say whether Arab countries will be willing to deploy troop contingents in Eritrea against Ethiopia. They will undoubtedly take into consideration that the predominant majority of African countries would oppose such a move. In their view, Eritrea is a part of Ethiopia. A separation of Eritrea would run counter to their national interest as strong separatist movements exert de-stabilizing influence in many African countries.

It is remarkable that similar considerations make even [Sudanese President Jafaar Al-] Numeiri waver. His attitude toward Ethiopia has become more careful, despite pressure from Saudi Arabia and Egypt. Besides the Southern problem, several other questions (refugees from Eritrea, interest in the use of the Nile) impel him to keep up somewhat normal relations with Ethiopia.

The African countries are in principle opposed to a change of borders. In this question the progressive [countries] and those countries which are largely dependent on the West coincide in their views, though the latter fear the revolutionary changes in Ethiopia. The common danger has even led to a rapprochement between Ethiopia and Kenya. Kenya appears more aggressive and positive [in this question] than some progressive African states. Tanzania's attitude has a very positive effect as it consistently and convincingly opposes the separation of Eritrea. Nigeria, which is under strong pressure by the USA and in which the OAU has, as is well known, much influence, already showed itself to be wavering during the aggression by Somalia. Guinea, which has recently repeatedly pointed out the war of national liberation by the Eritrean people, gives Ethiopia more headaches than support.

In sum it can be said that the OAU does not want to allow for a confrontation and is looking for ways to confirm the inviolability of borders and the territorial integrity. How little consistent and passive the OAU is, is proved by the fact that Ethiopia has received little support and that - due to the fear of a possible split - even Somalia's ag-

gression was not condemned.

Nevertheless, an intervention by the Arab countries in Eritrea should run into considerable opposition within the OAU. This is in part the effect of the still deeply rooted traditional fear and resistance of the African states against Arab expansionism. At the same time, none of the African countries seriously wants to endanger its relations with the Arab states. This altogether very passive and inconsistent attitude of many African countries and of the OAU was not an unimportant factor which led the Ethiopian leadership to recognize that in practice only the Socialist countries are Ethiopia's real and principal allies.

Among the imperialist countries, one has to pay particular attention to the efforts and activities of the USA, Italy, and France. Their situation in Ethiopia and also with respect to the Eritrean question is quite delicate. All imperialist countries, of course, are interested in the elimination of the Revolutionary achievements in Ethiopia and in the establishment of a pro-Western regime. They are putting all their efforts toward this goal. The NATO countries, led by the USA, base their efforts on the sober assumption that a frontal attack would hardly help to achieve their goals, would only foster the basic anti-imperialist mood of the Ethiopian people and its leadership and drive Ethiopia even closer into the hands of the Socialist community of states. The USA in no case wants to burn all its bridges to Ethiopia. To the best of their abilities, they want to destabilize the situation in Ethiopia and the revolutionary regime, and undermine and subvert the revolutionary development in Ethiopia. The imperialists aspire to take advantage of ethnic conflicts, exploit the social instability of the leadership, and encourage nationalist feelings in an effort to further stiffen the Ethiopian attitude in the Eritrean question and thereby aggravate the situation of the revolutionary regime. One also has to take quite seriously the skillful attempts, in particular by the USA, to launch such arguments as "why should the solution of the Eritrean problem be done only by way of cooperation with the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries," "a certain cooperation with the USA and the West could certainly be useful," "the USA after all have considerable possibilities in effectively influencing Saudi Arabia, Egypt and other Arab countries," "the West has to offer quite

constructive solutions." It is remarkable that Ahmed Nasser has pointed to this question during his talks with the Soviet comrades in Moscow. The Soviet comrades, however, have no indication that these advances are actually effective. One has to assume that the USA would prefer a unified, reactionary Ethiopia to a divided Ethiopia. By using the unity slogan, they are trying to activate those reactionary and nationalist forces, which no doubt still exist, against the revolutionary regime.

Considering all these aspects it is not surprising that the USA, Italy, and France have officially opposed Eritrean separatism. It is also symptomatic that the United States is making obtrusive efforts to prove that it was they who recommended to Siad Barre to withdraw his troops from Ethiopia. The cautious handling of aid to Somalia also shows that the USA on no account intend to keep their relations with Ethiopia - in the long run - strained. The USA and China are using Somalia and the provocative actions by Somalia against Ethiopia - which are above all intended to have a de-stabilizing effect—more for anti-Soviet than anti-Ethiopian purposes. They understand that support of the Eritrean separatists would also be directed against the reactionary forces in Ethiopia.

With respect to Somalis, the USA are intent on establishing a foothold and bringing the leadership of the country under their firm control. In this regard attention has to be paid to the fact that they also do not consider Barre a solid partner. They assume that he would deceive even the West. Nevertheless, it is to be expected that Barre will soon make a trip to the USA. He wants to gain military support in the amount of \$1 billion. There are indications that the USA is willing to give \$50 million.

With respect to similar "military abstention" by China, without doubt other motives play a role: the Chinese leadership does obviously not consider it opportune to display its military weakness in public - and especially in such a burning spot of international politics. Light arms are less revealing, yet they will not allow Somalia to wage a large war against Ethiopia. In addition, China does not want to strain its relations with Africa any further.

With respect to the domestic situation in Somalia, one has to first emphasize that Barre is continuing to exploit nationalist slo-

gans and considerable tribal feuds to eliminate progressive elements from the state and party apparatus and to replace them with people faithful to him. This is facilitated by the fact that the party is without a broad social basis and in practice was organized by Barre from above. Barre is careful not to expound a pro-Western course. He has to acknowledge that the progressive development in the past cannot simply be crossed out. The country still has sufficiently powerful progressive forces which for now are silent. He thus prefers to leave many things outwardly as they have been. Officially, the program and the organization of the party are retained. The party organization is even being activated.

[Signed] Grabowski.

[Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 IV 2/2.035/127; document obtained and translated by Christian F. Ostermann.]

**Minutes of Meeting of CPSU CC Politburo, 14 July 1978 (excerpt)**

MEETING OF THE  
CC CPSU POLITBURO  
14 July 1978

Chaired by Com. KIRILENKO, A.P.

Attended by Coms. Andropov, Iu.V., Kulakov, F.D., Mazurov, K.T., Demichev, P.N., Kuznetsov, V.V., Ponomarev, B.N., Solomentsev, M.S., Chernenko, K.Y., Dolgikh, V.I., Zimianin, M.V., Riabov, Ia.P., Rusakov, K.V

[...] 9. About Measures for the Future Strengthening of Soviet-Ethiopian Relations

KIRILENKO. Coms. Gromyko, Andropov, and Ponomarev have presented this issue.

MAL'TSEV says that the Ethiopians are behaving incorrectly in Eritrea. They are campaigning against providing autonomy to Eritrea. They have begun military actions there. There are not conducting an entirely correct policy in the Ogaden either. Military actions are taking place somewhere there against Somalia.

KIRILENKO. Mengistu is still not sufficiently experienced, but at the same time he is a very sensitive person, therefore it is just necessary to educate him, to teach

him.

ANDROPOV. It is in the same way important to show Mengistu that we are on his side.

PONOMAREV. Yesterday the Secretary of the CC of the Communist Party of Cuba, Vivo Valdez visited me. He had been in Ethiopia. In Cuba he received instructions. He is returning there. Vivo said that Cuba will not undertake to do anything in Ethiopia without the preliminary agreement with the Soviet Union.

In relation to the fact that our Ambassador in Ethiopia Com. Ratanov has taken ill, and has been in Moscow for three months already, it is apparently necessary to think about sending another comrade there.

ANDROPOV. Ambassador to Ethiopia Com. Ratanov has already gotten better, he can go. But overall it evidently makes sense for the MFA to think about a new ambassador.

KIRILENKO. I think that, you, Com. Mal'tsev, will take measures now to send there one of the comrades, say, an advisor, the most experienced, who could help Com. Ratanov.

The draft of the resolution is accepted.

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 120, d. 40, ll. 45, 10-12; translated by Mark Doctoroff.]

**CPSU CC Politburo Decision,  
14 July 1978**

Communist Party of the Soviet Union.  
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

No. P112/IX

To Comrades: Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Mazurov, Suslov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Arkhipov, Katushev, Baibakov, Martynov, Zolotukhin, Patolichev, Skachkov, Garbuzov, Smirtiukov.

Extract from protocol No. 112 of the CC CPSU Politburo session of 14 July 1978

About measures for the future strengthening of Soviet-Ethiopian relations

1. Agree with the thoughts contained in the note of the MFA USSR, the International department, CC CPSU, and KGB

USSR of 11 July 1978 (attached).

2. Affirm the draft of instructions to the Soviet ambassador in Addis-Ababa (attached)

3. Assign Gosplan USSR, Gossnab USSR, [Minzag] USSR, the Ministry of Foreign Trade, the KGB USSR, and the GKES to review the request of the Ethiopian side and within three weeks in the prescribed manner to submit corresponding proposals, including one about providing assistance to Ethiopia in relation to the drought and one about a delay in payment for the general civilian goods which were delivered for the Ethiopian army.

Assign the appropriate agencies and organizations to confirm the progress made in fulfilling the obligations of the Soviet side on agreements and contracts that were concluded. Accelerate the realization of achieved agreements with the government of Ethiopia regarding the creation of Soviet-Ethiopian commission on economic cooperation.

Assign the permanent Soviet representative at the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance to present ideas regarding the provision by the members of the CMEA of assistance to the economic development of Ethiopia on a multilateral basis.

CC CPSU SECRETARY

[attachment]

Re: Point IX Prot. No. 112

Secret

CC CPSU

According to the communication from the Soviet Ambassador in Addis-Ababa, and also according to the information from the Cuban friends, facts are taking place which bear witness to manifestations of nationalistic moods among certain parts of the Ethiopian leadership following the victory over Somalia in the Ogaden, which already is beginning to exert a negative influence on Ethiopia's relations with several countries of the Socialist community (spec. No. 695 of 6/30/78). From the Ethiopian side, in particular, a certain dissatisfaction is being expressed regarding the progress of cooperation with these countries above all in the economic area, complaints connected with the development of trade-economic relations, not always grounded in fact, are be-

ing put forth. This type of mood in one way or another shows up in the approach of the Ethiopian leadership to a resolution of the Eritrean issue.

The MFA USSR, the CC CPSU International Department, and the KGB USSR consider it expedient to implement a range of steps from our side in order to neutralize these types of moods in the Ethiopian leadership. It would make sense to assign the Soviet ambassador in Addis-Ababa to have a conversation with the chairman of the PMAC, during which in an open and friendly way opinions would be exchanged about the future development of Soviet-Ethiopian relations, stressing the immutability of the policy of the Soviet Union of multi-sided support and assistance to the Ethiopian revolution.

Taking into account the conversation with Mengistu it would be possible to review the issue of conducting a comradely exchange of opinions with the leadership of Cuba and the GDR about the current situation in Ethiopia.

Assign the corresponding Soviet agencies to carefully review the requests of the Ethiopian side vis-a-vis economic issues, and to submit proposals aimed at improving Soviet-Ethiopian economic cooperation.

Please review.

A. Gromyko Iu. Andropov B. Ponomarev

11 July 1978

[Source: *APRF*, f. 3, op. 91, d. 272, ll. 140-143; translated by Mark Doctoroff.]

**Soviet Embassy in Ethiopia, background report on "Ethiopia's Relations with Western Countries," August 1978**

USSR EMBASSY TO  
SOCIALIST ETHIOPIA

Re: no 275  
14 August 1978

ETHIOPIA'S RELATIONS WITH  
WESTERN COUNTRIES  
(Information)

Before the revolution, Ethiopia was primarily oriented toward the Western countries, first and foremost toward the USA and the countries of the "Common market" (Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, England,

France). This determined the external policies of the country, although formally Ethiopia belonged to the nonaligned countries.

The connection of Ethiopia's economy and trade as well as its defense to the capitalist governments was a key factor in the influence of the Western countries on Ethiopia. Until the revolution in 1974 developed capitalist countries occupied the predominant position in the external trade activity of Ethiopia. Thus, for example, in 1973, they represented approximately 70% of the volume of external trade (by comparison with 3% for the group of socialist countries).

Military supplies were completely dependent on the United States.

Meanwhile, the West took into consideration first and foremost the significant strategic position of Ethiopia in the region of the Red Sea, the Horn of Africa, and Africa as a whole in terms of a confrontation with the USSR, and likewise the visible situation of the country on the continent in political terms.

At the same time, even during the imperial regime, between various Western countries and, first and foremost, between the USA and the "Common market," there was a contradiction with regard to Ethiopia in the area of the economy and, to a certain degree, in the area of policy. The countries of the "Common market" were dissatisfied with the dominant position of the USA in Ethiopia. From a certain point Japan also entered the playing field as a competitor. Until the revolution, the sum total of foreign investments in the country's economy comprised 504 million rubles.

After 1974 the situation in the region concerning political and, particularly, ideological relations with the Western countries changed in a fundamental way in connection with the fact that Ethiopia set its course toward a socialist orientation and took on as a ruling ideology Marxism-Leninism, and likewise declared its intent to create a Marxist-Leninist party.

The external political course of the country also changed. Ethiopia began to conduct an anti-imperialist policy, with the support of the countries of the socialist camp and, first and foremost, of the USSR. The position of foreign capital in Ethiopia was seriously undermined in connection with the nationalization of the property of Western firms in the country and its transfer to the State sector. The capital of the industrial

enterprises which were nationalized in February 1975 (72 enterprises of the manufacturing industry), in which a foreign component was dominant, made up 41% of the general sum of paid capital in this branch of the national economy. In addition, the State gained a controlling package of the stocks of another 29 private companies. In questions of defense, Ethiopia practically cut off relations with the capitalist countries and set its course toward re-arming its army with Soviet weapons.

At the same time, it would be incorrect to consider that Ethiopia was fully liberated from its dependence on Western countries, particularly in the economic sphere. The state of Ethiopian debts to the West in May 1978 comprised 351 million rubles. Meanwhile, Ethiopia, as a rule, pays off its debts and credits in a timely fashion, as well as the interest on them, and allots annually approximately 13 million rubles to this end, which comprises approximately 5% of the annual export earnings and does not represent a burden for the country's finances. Such a policy makes it easier for Ethiopia to receive new means for the development of the country's economy. Ethiopia has an acute need for economic assistance, particularly since the socialist countries have not taken the place of and do not intend fully to take the place of the economic assistance and technical collaboration with the Western countries. From the general volume of foreign economic assistance, the assistance of the Western countries and international organizations which are under their control in the form of loans and credits comprised 75% (status as of May 1978).

It is precisely the economic factor that the Western countries are bearing in mind as they pursue a long-term struggle for Ethiopia. They will push Ethiopia toward economic collaboration with the West, which would enable them to use this factor in pursuit also of political goals, to encourage the Ethiopian leadership, if not to supplant, then to cut back on the influence of the USSR.

The other factor which the Western powers are counting on, is the inescapable, in their minds, growth of bourgeois nationalism, or at the very least, of revolutionary nationalism, which would be accompanied by a break with the socialist countries, an erosion of Marxism-Leninism, and the conduct of a policy of equal distance from the

East and the West.

The Westernizers are making use of the fact that certain of the socialist countries are conducting themselves with restraint with regard to the development of economic collaboration with Ethiopia. These countries include Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and also Romania, although this is for different reasons.

The leadership of the PMAC regards resentfully and with a lack of understanding the fact that the Council for Mutual Economic Aid [Comecon], to which Ethiopia appealed with a proposal for the development of collaboration not only on a bilateral, but on a multilateral basis in March 1977, has since that time not made any concrete resolutions, but has rather confined itself to a declaration of the desire for such collaboration.

The Western countries place serious hopes on the fact that the make-up of the State apparatus, as well as a significant part of the officer staff of the military forces of Ethiopia, remains as before. Many of the bureaucrats and officers received their education in the West, and are subject to the influence of bourgeois ideology, and as a consequence of this they regard unfavorably the course of the country toward a socialist orientation and the primary development of relations with socialist countries. The Ethiopian leadership, which understands this well, is unable to replace the State apparatus due to the lack of cadres which have received the appropriate preparation. The regime remains transitional in the country, new organs of authority have not yet been put into place. The country's leadership has only begun the work of creating a basis for this.

Drawing a general conclusion, one can say with certainty that a long-term course for the USA and the Western countries for the struggle for Ethiopia is being plotted. This is evident if only from the fact that, in spite of the Somali adventure, they do not intend to exchange Ethiopia for Somalia. While creating their position in Somalia, they are setting their strategic sights on Ethiopia. This can be seen both from the degree of patience with which the USA, England, and the Federal Republic of Germany are regarding the sharp anti-imperialist attacks in the speeches of the Ethiopian leaders and in the press.

The head of the government, Mengistu Haile Mariam, in a speech he delivered at a

ceremony in honor of the graduates of the capital's university, spoke about the imperialist plot headed by the USA in the presence of the new American ambassador. The People's Republic of China acts as an objective and actual ally of imperialism in the struggle against the countries of socialist collaboration with Ethiopia. The Westernizers attempt as much as possible to use this factor, and do not disdain even to use anti-Soviet propagandistic slogans, which are invented by the Chinese.

From the other side, in spite of the preservation of the anti-imperialist course, which was manifest in the speeches of the Ethiopian delegation at the Session of the Council of Ministers and the Assembly of the heads of government of the Organization of African States in Khartoum, and likewise at the conference of nonaligned countries in Belgrade, we cannot consider that the struggle is over in the ruling circles of the country about questions of the external political orientation and the essence of a policy of nonalignment. In this struggle a significant role is played by the petit-bourgeois influence, which is still quite strong in the officers' circles.

Before turning to the nature of Ethiopian relations with individual Western countries, it is worth noting that in the framework of the general anti-imperialist course, Ethiopia continues to distinguish between the USA and the countries of the Common Market.

The central flame of anti-imperialist propaganda is directed against the USA, England, the Federal Republic of Germany, and, to a lesser degree, against France, Italy, and the Scandinavian countries.

The relations of Ethiopia with the USA have undergone the greatest changes. [The Americans] have eliminated their military objects from the territory of the country, their propaganda apparatus, their military mission; they have cut by one half the staff of the American embassy. The Ethiopian government delayed the agreement for the new American ambassador by three months and gave it only after a serious discussion, in the course of which the Ethiopians warned that if the anti-Ethiopian campaign in the USA, connected, in part, with human rights issues, was not brought to an end, that they would seek to break off diplomatic relations. After this the United States was forced to reach a certain compromise.

In order to preserve whatever remained of their former position in Ethiopia, the USA is trying to use all of the factors enumerated above (economic pressure, Ethiopian nationalism, ties which remain to the state apparatus). To a large extent the condition of Ethiopian finance depends, in particular, upon whether or not the United States buys coffee, the income from which made up in 1977 approximately 75% of the general export earnings of the country. The USA persists in offering economic assistance to Ethiopia, in particular in answer to the circulated appeal from the Ethiopian commission on assistance to the population of the Ogaden and Wollo. At the same time, they underscore that America offers mainly humanitarian aid, while the USSR is generous only as regards military supplies. Meanwhile, in spite of the fact of the worsening governmental relations, economic assistance from the USA to Ethiopia is growing. Thus, according to information of an American Congressional commission, which visited the countries of the Horn of Africa with the aim of collecting information about the situation in the region, if in 1977 this assistance reached 11 million dollars, then in 1978 it reached 15 million dollars.

In July of this year the USA announced the delivery in September and October of this year of assistance at a level of 12.5 thousand tons of food products, valued in sum at 7 million Ethiopian birr. In accordance with information from the American Embassy, philanthropic assistance from the USA to Ethiopia for the period from 1975 reached 75 million Ethiopian birr.

The relations of Ethiopia with the countries of the Common Market is determined by their mutual interest in maintaining economic and commercial ties. Trying to keep Ethiopia in the sphere of their interests, the Western European countries have regarded the revolution with patience. As does the USA, they make declarations regarding their support for the territorial integrity of Ethiopia, both in the event of Somali aggression and with regard to Eritrea. The new French ambassador, upon conveying his letters of credentials to the Head of the PMAC, Mengistu Haile Mariam, even declared that France respects the path of development chosen by Ethiopia in the framework of a policy of socialist orientation. The Federal Republic of Germany did not un-

continued on page 422

# ***U.S.-Soviet Relations and the Turn Toward Confrontation, 1977-1980— New Russian & East German Documents***

*Editor's Note: U.S.-Soviet relations following the inauguration of U.S. President Jimmy Carter in January 1977 misfired by March, when Secretary of State Vance carried the new president's arms control initiative to Moscow, only to receive a harsh public lashing from the Soviet leadership. (For translations of Russian archival documents on this early period, including correspondence between Carter and Soviet leader L.I. Brezhnev, see CWIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 140-154, 160.) But ties seemed to be mending by the late summer of that year—as reflected by progress on talks toward signing a SALT II arms treaty, quiet cooperation in heading off a South African nuclear test, and (on 1 October 1977) the issuance of an unprecedented joint statement calling on Israel and its Arab enemies to return to the Geneva Conference co-chaired by Washington and Moscow to seek a “comprehensive peace” in the Middle East.*

*Yet, the fall of 1977 and the first half of 1978 witnessed another downturn in relations, caused by, among other disputes, the negation of the October 1 joint communique on the Middle East as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat startled the world by visiting Jerusalem in November 1977 and pursuing a separate peace with Israel; a massive Soviet-Cuban military airlift to Ethiopia that fall turned the tide of the Somali-Ethiopia conflict and irked Washington, which the following spring retaliated by accelerating ties with Beijing; talks on SALT II slowed to a crawl; Soviet human rights abuses (including the highly-publicized arrests and trials of well-known dissidents such as Anatoly Shcharansky and Yuri Orlov) fanned public anger in the United States; and within the Carter Administration, the faction (led by National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski) favoring a tougher line toward Moscow (including “linkage” of arms talks with other issues, such as Soviet behavior in Third World) began to get the upper hand in its incessant competition with those (such as Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance) adhering to a more conciliatory approach.*

*By mid-1978, it seemed evident that U.S.-USSR relations had reached a new crisis point, dimming the hopes that had existed at the outset of the Carter Administration. Over the next year, the two sides managed to patch things up somewhat, agree on final terms for a SALT II treaty, and hold the long-delayed Carter-Brezhnev Summit in Vienna to sign it in June 1979. But valuable time had been lost, and a store of mutual mistrust had accumulated. Even that interlude of relative concord in Vienna turned out to be short-lived, for in the fall of 1979, at a time when Carter had hoped to be triumphantly signing a SALT II treaty after winning Senate ratification, U.S.-Soviet relations again went sour—and in December 1979 came an event that shelved the treaty indefinitely (and permanently, it turned out) and also officially rang the death knell of “detente”: the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (see next section).*

*To illuminate the evolution in ties between Washington and Moscow during this stretch, the Bulletin presents a selection of ten documents (or excerpts) from the Russian and East German archives, including:*

*\* the transcript of a contentious yet cautiously optimistic 30 September 1977 Oval Office meeting between Carter and visiting Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, returning Vance's ill-starred trip to Moscow (translated records of Gromyko's discussions with Vance during this trip are also available, but not printed due to space limitations);*

*\* an extract from the minutes of a 27 April 1978 session of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee (CPSU CC) Politburo in which Brezhnev recounts his handling of a meeting with Vance, specifically his upbraiding of Carter's “inconsistent foreign policy line” and his “strong rebuff” of U.S. criticism of Soviet actions in Africa;*

*\* a testy encounter between Vance and Gromyko in New York on 31 May 1978, in which the Soviet Foreign Minister accused the Carter Administration of an anti-Soviet propaganda campaign that was on the verge of destroying detente and “bringing us back to the period of ‘cold war,’” and the two exchanged espionage accusations;*

*\* three excerpts from June 1978 CPSU CC Politburo sessions, including a general foreign policy survey by Brezhnev concluding that a “serious deterioration and exacerbation” of the international scene had taken place due to the Carter Administration's “growing aggression,” and discussions of controversial dissidents (Andrei Sakharov and Anatoly Shcharansky);*

*\* a lengthy July 1978 “political letter” from Soviet Ambassador to the Washington Anatoly F. Dobrynin assessing the evolution of US-USSR relations in the first year-and-a-half of the Carter Administration, and recommending “expedient” policies for the future;*

*\* two excerpts from East German archival records of conversations between Brezhnev and German Democratic Republic leader Erich Honecker, one in July 1978 and another a year later, in which they analyzed the international situation and U.S.-Soviet relations;*

*\* and finally, little more than a month after the invasion of Afghanistan, a February 1980 Politburo-approved telegram to the USSR Ambassador to West Germany (in preparation for a meeting with former Chancellor and head of the Socialist International Willy Brandt) defending Moscow's action and reviewing the downward spiral in U.S.-Soviet relations.*

*Most of these translated documents were obtained by the “Carter-Brezhnev Project” undertaken by the Center for Foreign Policy Development at Brown University in cooperation with the National Security Archive, the Cold War International History Project, and other scholarly and archival partners. To explore the reasons behind the collapse of superpower detente in the mid-1970s, the Project assembled veterans of the Carter and Brezhnev leaderships for a series of oral history conferences and promoted the declassification,*

*release, and translation of important new documents from the Russian archives, in particular from the Russian Foreign Ministry archives (known officially as the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, or AVPRF), and the former CPSU CC archives (the Center for the Study of Contemporary Documentation, or TsKhSD); additional East-bloc sources were obtained from the East German archives by Christian Ostermann of the National Security Archive. In addition, the Project and the National Security Archive sought the declassification of U.S. documents through the Freedom of Information Act.*

*All documents obtained by the Carter-Brezhnev Project and the CWIHP are available for research at the National Security Archive, which together with CWIHP has created (and houses) a Russian and East-bloc Archival Documents Database (READD) which is planned eventually to produce an internet-accessible listing of documents; in addition, beyond what is published in the Bulletin, CWIHP hopes to make additional translated materials available to scholars through the internet via the National Security Archive's home page on the World Wide Web (<http://www.nsarchive.com>). For further information, contact the National Security Archive, Gelman Library, 7th fl., 2130 H St. NW 20037, tel.: (202) 994-7000; fax: (202) 994-7005; and [nsarchiv@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu](mailto:nsarchiv@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu) (e-mail).—James G. Hershberg*

**Document 1: Record of Conversation  
between Soviet Foreign Minister  
Gromyko and President Carter, 23  
September 1977**

RECORD OF THE MAIN CONTENT  
OF A.A. GROMYKO'S  
CONVERSATION  
WITH USA PRESIDENT J. CARTER

23 September 1977, Washington

J. CARTER. I am very happy to greet you here in the White House. It is an honor to meet you.

A.A. GROMYKO. I am very happy to meet you, Mr. President, and to discuss the questions which are of interest to both sides. I want to use this opportunity to tell you that L.I. Brezhnev and the Soviet leadership send their greetings and best wishes to you.

J. CARTER. Thank you and upon your return home please give my warmest and most sincere regards and best wishes to L.I. Brezhnev.

At this meeting I would like to set forth in a general form my personal views on the questions of mutual relations between the USA and the Soviet Union. Then, you, if you like, could respond to my general statements, and after that we could discuss some concrete questions in more detail.

A.A. GROMYKO. I agree with such a procedure of our conversation.

J. CARTER. I would like to say right away that as President I attach special significance to good relations with the Soviet Union. I believe that friendly relations and close cooperation between the USA and the Soviet Union are of utmost importance and I will do everything necessary in order to guarantee the steady development of good mutual relations between our two countries.

Certainly, because of the differences between our social systems there will inevi-

tably be competition between our countries.

I do not think, however, that this is an unhealthy situation and I believe that we can conduct this competition to our mutual benefit in the spirit of respect for each other.

Like the Soviet Union, our country will support its own defenses on the high level necessary to guarantee the preservation of peace. I am sure that this will not prevent us from developing our mutual relations.

The USA has a highly developed technology. We have powerful economic potential, produce many food items, conduct large scale trade with other countries.

The Soviet Union has its own strong qualities and it too has an ability to offer many benefits to the international community.

Both of our countries still do not use in full the potential for the development of mutual trade, although we have some trade links. We successfully cooperate in a number of science-technical areas such as energy industry. These links and cooperation should be developed further.

We have different approaches to the question of human rights. And I know that some of our statements on this question provoked L.I. Brezhnev's displeasure. However, adhering to our position on this question, we do not want to interfere in the domestic affairs of any state or to put you in an awkward position. It is necessary, apparently, to recognize that we see differently these problems and that the human rights problem deeply troubles our people. Above all, the human rights problem in our hemisphere concerns us. But some facts in the Soviet Union also give rise to our concern, such as the imprisonment of some Soviet Jews, for instance [dissident Anatoly] Shcharansky.

You know, that our Congress, even before my coming to the White House, linked the development of trade with the

Soviet Union with the problem of the Jewish emigration from the USSR. I would like with your assistance to achieve some progress in overcoming of limitations established by the Congress in order to ameliorate this source of tension and misunderstanding.

Next month the question of human rights among others will be discussed at the Conference [on Security and Cooperation in Europe] in Belgrade. We approach this Conference in a constructive way and we will maintain constant consultations in Belgrade with the Soviet representative. We already consulted on the questions related to the Conference with our allies and we do not want this Conference to be an obstacle in our relations with the Soviet Union. But it is also true that it will be necessary to discuss all aspects of the Helsinki Agreement in Belgrade in order to verify how they are being observed. In other words, my approach to the Belgrade Conference is constructive and I do not want it to be conducted in the spirit of controversy.

The USA is actively involved in various international problems which we would like to solve in the conditions of cooperation with the Soviet Union. We, in particular, are trying to resolve the South African problems. We, like you, are very concerned about the situation that has developed there. We are worrying not only about the manifestation of racism in this part of the globe, but, like you, about the intention of the South African Republic to create its own nuclear weapon.

We would like to resolve the problems of Namibia and Zimbabwe. Together with Great Britain we put forth a concrete plan of solving the problem of Rhodesia. I am glad that in the UN the Soviet Union takes a constructive position on this question. I hope that in case of disagreement with our approach to the problems of the South of

Africa we could privately discuss these problems via our ambassadors in Moscow or Washington so that we could have a common approach in the public arena. We do not have any specific interest in that a specific government would come to power in this region. This question should be decided by the people themselves. And we do not want to sell weapons to the countries of this region.

Angola, with the presence of several thousand Cuban troops there, creates a problem for us. I think it would have been useful if you, or we together, had convinced Cubans to withdraw their troops from Angola, although I understand that we have a difference of opinions on this question.

We also are interested in achieving a settlement in the Middle East. Vance reported to me that judging from his conversation with you, the Soviet position on this question is close to ours. In the past the Soviet Union was close to the Arab states and the USA was close, mainly, to Israel. But even today we are interested in the preservation of peace in the Middle East, in guaranteeing the independence of Israel by peaceful methods. Over the last several years we won the respect and trust of a number of Arab countries. We are trying to conduct a just and evenhanded policy in this region and we hope that together with you we will be able to further a peaceful settlement. Sometimes the Soviet Union's approach to the problems of the Middle East, in our view, was not constructive enough. I only state the fact, however. I am not complaining.

We intend to keep you informed on the development of the situation in the Middle East, on the position of those countries with whom we have regular contact. And I hope that you too will keep us informed, in particular about the PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] position.

Another region that worries us is Korea. We hope that the South and North Korea will live in peace with each other. The USA intends to withdraw its troops from the South Korea in a 4-5 year period. However, we have to do something so that South Korea will be able to provide for its own defence.

The introduction by North Korea of the 50-mile zone of the sea borders concerns us. We hope that the Soviet Union will be able to persuade the North Korea to exer-

cise the required restraint in order to prevent unnecessary aggravation in this region.

A few words about relations between the USA and China. We are striving to normalize our relations with China not for the purpose of creating a kind of alliance with it against the Soviet Union but for strengthening peace, developing trade and other relations with that country. We hope that the problem of mutual relations between the PRC [People's Republic of China] and Taiwan will be resolved by peaceful means. But we do not want to abrogate our obligation to guarantee the peaceful life of Taiwan.

In the past few years we witnessed the improvement of the Soviet Union's relations with some Western European countries which are our allies. We too would like to improve our relations with the Warsaw Pact nations. Our alliance with our friends in Western Europe is solid, like your alliance with your friends. And we hope that this situation will last.

We conduct the negotiations with you on a number of questions of arms limitation. We would like to reach an agreement on demilitarization of the Indian ocean in the future. We also are counting on an agreement on a ban on chemical weapons. We would like to reach an agreement on advance notification of missile launch tests in order to avoid unnecessary misunderstandings. We hope that these and other negotiations which we conduct with you will be successful.

We hope to achieve an agreement on banning hostile actions against artificial satellites. We know about the Soviet program of the creation of the means intended for fighting the satellites of other countries. We also could develop such a program, but we would like to ban such actions. Both of us take similar positions on the question of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and we together live through disappointments when we witness attempts to violate this principle. Both our countries speak in favor of stricter limitations in regard to proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We worry about sales of arms to other countries. In the past the USA, unfortunately, have been selling too much arms, like the Soviet Union, by the way.

I hope that in the future we will not be doing this. We still supply the arms to some countries in accordance with our past con-

tracts, however, in the future we intend to exercise more restraint in this regard. We hope that the Western European countries and the Soviet Union will take the same position as well.

We would like to conclude a treaty on a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests. We would like to achieve a termination of all nuclear tests on the basis of signing, first, an agreement with the Soviet Union and England in the hope that it will impel France and China to join such an agreement. We think it is important to include in such a ban also so-called peaceful nuclear explosions, since it is difficult to make a distinction between an explosion for military purposes and for peaceful ones. In any case, the ability to conduct peaceful explosions gives the countries who conduct them the ability to use the nuclear energy also for military purposes.

Now a few words of a general character in regard to a conclusion of the new agreement on the limitation of strategic arms. I think we are very close of reaching an agreement. However, some new circumstances emerged which differ from the situation that existed during the meeting [between Brezhnev and U.S. President Gerald R. Ford in December 1974] in Vladivostok. For us, the measures taken by the Soviet Union regarding the equipping of heavy missiles with MIRV [Multiple, Independently-targeted Re-entry Vehicles--ed.] was unexpected and at the same time troubling. We did not expect that the Soviet heavy missiles SS-18 would be equipped with MIRV at such a quick pace. But this strengthens the ability of the Soviet Union to launch a first strike and it threatens the survivability of our missile silos. You, on the other hand, express concern in regard to American cruise missiles which were not mentioned in Vladivostok. However, the cruise missiles are not capable of a first strike because of their small velocity and also because they can be easily identified during their flight.

I talked with former President Ford and former Secretary of State [Henry A. Kissinger] in detail and thoroughly studied the reports on the negotiations in Vladivostok and I am convinced that the representatives of the USA were talking there only about ballistic missiles, not the cruise ones.

I understand that L.I. Brezhnev does not agree with such an interpretation of the

Vladivostok negotiations. If so, one has to recognize the disagreements between us on this question, the disagreements in interpretations.

Secretary of State Vance told me about your conversation with him on these matters yesterday and I intend to give you an account of our concrete proposals a little bit later.

So, I set forth my views on the questions of developing the relations with the Soviet Union and I would like to emphasize once again the great importance that I attach to our mutual relations with the Soviet Union. I would like to assure you that personally as well as as President of the USA that I will sincerely strive to overcome all existing disagreements between us. I hope that in the course of a few months we will be able to achieve such progress in our mutual relations, which would justify a meeting between myself and L.I. Brezhnev. I would very much like him to visit the USA where we would be able to discuss with him for two-three days here, in Washington, or, even better, in Camp David, all the questions which interest both of us.

Before that, however, I would like us together to have made such progress in solving the problems of particular importance to us, that would demonstrate to the whole world our mutual aspiration consistently to improve our relations. I spoke about it publicly and I use this opportunity to express my appreciation to L.I. Brezhnev for his public reaction to my speech in Charleston.

The American people sincerely strives for cooperation and friendship with the Soviet Union. I hope that I, as the political leader of our country, and L.I. Brezhnev, as the political leader of the Soviet Union, will not create obstacles on the path which our peoples so sincerely strive to follow. And I hope that our meeting today will be useful and constructive in this respect.

A.A. GROMYKO. I attentively listened to your statement in which a whole spectrum of questions between our countries has been touched upon. On my part I would like to express my opinion on the questions you have touched upon and maybe on some others.

First of all, I would like to emphasize that the entire Soviet leadership, L.I. Brezhnev personally, and all our people sincerely aspire to maintain good friendly relations with the USA, not just normal busi-

ness relations but precisely good friendly ones. I think, you, yourself, made such a conclusion from L.I. Brezhnev's speeches, in particular after your speech in Charleston.

Incidentally, I would like to linger a bit on some of your speeches, bearing in mind the importance of this question. You made some statements where you touched upon mutual relations with the Soviet Union. In some of these speeches you emphasized the importance of mutual understanding and cooperation with the Soviet Union. In some others you just mentioned the Soviet Union without definite statements. And yet in some others you criticized the Soviet Union, in your own way, but I repeat, criticized it. Sometimes you did it indirectly but it was not difficult to guess to whom you addressed these criticisms, whom you had in mind.

And so we ponder which of these statements reflect your true policy as the President of the USA, the policy of the USA as a state. We would like to think that it is those statements, in which the need of cooperation was emphasized, the necessity of maintaining good relations with the Soviet Union for the interests of both of our countries, for the interests of the whole world.

But this is our desire too[;] however, only you can interpret your own statements. And that is why we would like you to do it now. I would like to bring to Moscow a definite answer on the question of how you, yourself, imagine the prospects for development of relations with the Soviet Union.

There is hardly a need for a lengthy discussion about the significance of these relations for the peoples of our countries as well as for the whole world. It is self-evident that these relations have a great significance. If there are good relations and mutual understanding between us or, even better, friendly relations, then there will be peace in the world, there won't be another world war. If, however, these relations will go awry, if somebody will ruin these relations, then a world tragedy will occur.

The basic thing in this matter is the question of what will be the policy of the USA government toward the Soviet Union and, consequently, what will be the policy of the Soviet Union toward the USA. For ourselves, for the Soviet Union we have been giving and can give a clear answer right now. I am authorized to declare on behalf of all our leadership, on behalf of L.I.

Brezhnev, that our policy is directed to maintaining good and, even more than that, - as we already mentioned - friendly relations with the USA.

In your statement you touched upon some concrete problems. You pointed at the need to take into account the differences in social and economic systems of our countries. Actually, these differences exist, and they will exist. It is important, however, that despite the existing differences between us we should continue to develop our mutual relations. We again emphasize that it would be in the interests of both our peoples and of the whole world. Precisely all that we call the policy of peaceful co-existence, the policy of resolving controversial issues by peaceful means, regardless the differences in economic and social systems and the differences in ideology.

You correctly pointed out the importance of trade-economic relations. It is also true that they are essential for the development of political relations. It would be very good if all the obstacles on the path of the development trade-economic relations between our countries were removed. But it were not we who created these obstacles. They have been created on this side of the Atlantic ocean. All this is well known.

We, certainly, have noted some optimistic signals that appeared in the statements of some American politicians that the situation can change for the better in the near future. We would like for this to happen. We believe that it would be in the interests of both countries to establish normal trade-economic links, to remove all the obstacles on this path, especially because from the very beginning they were artificial. But in general, such relations are for our mutual benefits. We are convinced that it is both countries that will benefit from trade and the development of economic links between them.

You touched upon the issue of "human rights." We must say that when you or other American politicians begin to talk about "human rights," we, in the Soviet Union, in the Soviet leadership, have a kind of automatic conditional reflex: we expect that some shots will be made towards the Soviet Union, of course without any grounds. Why is it being done? We do not believe that one person in the world or even a group of people can claim the unique right to make judgments about "human rights." Each state

has to decide these questions independently. And so it is being done.

If we would like to make a list of all violations of human rights in the USA or, say in England, Italy, the FRG, and in many other countries, it would be a long and impressive list. We are not doing it, however, because we do not want to interfere in other people's affairs. But we will never allow others to interfere in our affairs.

You mentioned someone called Shcharansky. Nobody knows him at all except, maybe, doctors and some representatives of authorities who oversee the order in our country. Such questions have an infinitesimal significance. Certainly, you, Mr. President, have a right to act as you believe is needed, but speaking impartially such position of yours on this question can only harm the climate of our relations. Besides, we think that the gain you get, acting in a such a way, is enormously disproportionate to your political loss.

You touched upon the so-called Jewish question. The Soviet Union during the war saved millions of Jews. These are known facts. This is an open book. Right after the war we together, or to be more precise, at the same time as the USA we introduced in the UN the proposal on the creation of an independent Jewish state. Since then we have always supported the right of Israel to independent state existence. We are trying to convince the Arabs, including the most extremist groups, to recognize Israel as an independent state, i.e. to recognize the reality. But at the same time we are blamed that we act wrongly in regard to Jewish question. In general, the question of emigration from the Soviet Union of any nationality, whether the Russians, the Ukrainians, the Armenians, the Georgians, the Jews or others, is our domestic problem, which is to be resolved in accordance with the laws of our country. If you use the facts then you probably know that dozens of thousands of Jews have left the Soviet Union over the past several years.

With satisfaction I have heard your words that you expect positive results from the Belgrade Conference, the results in the spirit of the Helsinki agreement. It would be good if Belgrade would become a constructive forum instead of a place of mutual accusations, some kind of a box of complaints. The Soviet Union is ready to play in Belgrade its own constructive role and

hopes that other participants will do the same.

Now, about the situation in the South of Africa. Our policy for this region is simple. We do not have any military bases, and no military personnel in this region. If one feels the influence of our ideology there then who in the world can build the barriers against the dissemination of any ideology? The only thing we want there is that all the problems should be solved by the majority of population, by the peoples themselves. The majority of population there are Blacks, so the power belongs to them, not to the White racists. We are against any delays in the transition of power. Such is, in short, our position in regard to Namibia, Zimbabwe, South Africa. Incidentally, to the question of the SAR I will come back in connection with the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Now about Angola. We hailed the birth of this new independent African state. Not so long ago we met A[gostinho]. Neto in Moscow, on the highest level, with the participation of L.I. Brezhnev. We did not find that Angola took a hostile position in regard to the USA. As for the Cuban troops in Angola, it is the business of Angola and Cuba and I am not authorized to discuss this question. It would be right, however, to ask in this regard: whose personnel supports the anti-Angolan movement, the troops that are based in Zaire and invade Angola? Whose foreign troops acted in Angola even before the arrival there of the Cuban troops. The answers to these questions are clear.

Now about the Middle East. This is a large topic. I do not think we should spend a lot of time at your place discussing it. More so since we already had an exchange of opinions on this question with the Secretary Vance. And we have found out that there are some identical elements in our positions. We also handed over some information to the American side which was not known to you.

We are strongly convinced that if Israel had taken a more sober position and had accepted the idea of a small state for the Palestinian Arabs, the PLO would have been ready to officially declare its recognition of Israel as an independent sovereign state in the Middle East. In other words, it would have recognized the reality. But this is exactly what Israel is striving for. Now it has more chances than ever to achieve it. Of

course I am saying this not on behalf of Palestinians. They did not authorize us to make any statements. But we are saying this on the basis of knowing their position, and on the basis of our recent conversations with [PLO chairman Yasser] Arafat in Moscow.

So, is it really not possible to find a solution of the issue who must be the first to take a step forward, Israel or the Palestinians? This is exactly what the diplomacy is for: to solve such problems. It is possible, for example, to find a solution under which such a recognition of the Palestinian state by Israel and Israel by the Palestinians would be declared by both sides simultaneously.

We share the opinion of Secretary Vance that peace in the Middle East should mean not only an armistice but also the establishment of normal relations between two sides.

So let us together strive for the convocation of the Geneva Conference on the Middle East already this year. An all Arab delegation could take part in this Conference, if the Arabs themselves would agree with that. But in any case the Palestinians, the PLO must be represented in Geneva. Let us try to do it. We are ready to make every effort possible in this direction.

Whether you want it or not, the lack of a settlement in the Middle East throws a shadow on our mutual relations. We think that removing this shadow would serve the interests of both of us.

Maybe you supply arms to the Middle East with happiness, we know to whom these arms go, and to many other countries. We do it without any particular joy. If a really stable peace would be established in the Middle East we would not supply the arms there, if, of course, the others would not do it. It would be the ideal situation for which one should strive.

A few words about Korea. You said that you would be ready to cut the American troops deployed in the South Korea. But as it is known the USA intends to keep its bases there at the same time. I think you, yourself, do not believe that we are going to applaud such a decision, although, certainly, such a step has some significance. All the same, this seat of tension would continue to exist among many others.

Now about China. From the point of view of the international situation and also of the broad interests of the USA and, of

course, the Soviet Union, we believe it is correct to emphasize that it would have been a great mistake if a dirty game had been played here, the open or secret collusion against the Soviet Union, against its interests. Because sooner or later it would have become known and the appropriate consequences would follow, including those in the area of the US-Soviet relations. We would like to hope that the USA does not intend to play the Chinese card against the Soviet Union. In the past under other American administrations we have been assured many times that the USA does not have such intentions. We will see what the reality turn out to be.

Presently relations between China and the USA are normal and, possibly, even friendly, whereas our relations with China are tense. We do not object to the existence of normal relations between China and the USA. But be on guard so that they do not pull you into games dirty and dangerous for our both countries. We too once had good relations with China. If the Chinese would be able to embroil the USA with the Soviet Union they would gladly use it for their own advantage. Would this be good for the USA? We do not have a crystal ball so that we could see the future, however, the history teaches historians a lot. It have taught us, in any case, and the USA, too, should have already learned.

You have mentioned the Indian Ocean. Certainly it would have been very good if an agreement would be reached between us on this question. Objectively, there are grounds for this. But it is strikingly evident, however, that you stubbornly cling to one rock in the Indian Ocean which is called Diego Garcia. In our view the USA has no real need for this, but at the same time this is being done with the intention of stepping on our toes. This is being done against the interests of our security. The American side should see this problem in a broader context. On our part we are ready to continue the exchange of opinions on this question that has already begun.

We conduct negotiations with the USA on a range of other questions, including the arms limitations at the expert level, working groups. We are ready to continue these negotiations and would like to believe that they reach positive results.

About the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Our interests in this issue are es-

entially identical. We both should expect a great danger if this problem will not be effectively resolved. This is a fact that the SAR [South African Republic] step by step is moving forward to the creation of its own nuclear weapon. There are also other states who are close to the creation of nuclear weapons. It would be good if the USA and the Soviet Union would work more vigorously in the direction of reliable prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation. We are ready for it.

You touched in general upon the question of arms sales to other countries. This question is certainly connected to the general climate that exists in the world, to the existence of hotbeds of tension. If the conditions for stopping the arms sales had been created, we would have been ready to make an appropriate agreement. We stated it many times. But first the hotbeds should be removed. One of these hotbeds is the Middle East.

I think that it was not accidental that you lingered on the question of stopping nuclear tests. We would like to hope that the Soviet-American agreement on some partial steps in this sphere, which have been concluded between us and which are being considered by the USA Congress, will be ratified as soon as possible. And we hope that the negotiations, that are being conducted between us on the broad treaty, will have also be successfully concluded.

You also touched upon the problem of problems, the signing of an agreement on strategic arms limitation. I would like to state our position on two major questions which are still unresolved. First, on the cruise missiles of the class "air-land" (i.e. ALCM [air-launched cruise missiles]) on the heavy bombers, and secondly, on the Soviet heavy missiles by which some people love to scare the American public.

I already stated our arguments to Secretary Vance which hardly need be repeated again. Apparently, you have been informed about this. I shall emphasize only that in regard to this questions "there is no land behind the Volga, there is no place to retreat," as we used to say during the war.

Just remember how many concessions we have already made to the Americans. Specifically, in May of this year in Geneva we agreed to cut back - bearing in mind the significance you personally give to this question - by 150 units the total number of

carriers of strategic nuclear arms in comparison to the total amount of them in the agreement that was reached in Vladivostok.

Even earlier we agreed on the principle of calculation of missiles equipped with MIRV, under which if the missile had been tested even once with MIRV, then all the missiles of this type should be included in the total amount of missiles equipped with MIRV.

We accepted the USA proposal regarding the structure of the future agreement which would include an agreement or a treaty for the duration until 1985, the protocol to it, and the mutual declaration on basic directions of future negotiations. We also agreed that the protocol should be valid only for three years rather than until 1985.

All these were big concessions to the USA. But all of them, it goes without saying, were made dependent upon the achievement of the general agreement on the whole complex of questions. In other words, we considered all the questions as a complex. All these components are interrelated. One cannot seriously pocket any our concession as self-evident, leaving, however, the rest of questions unresolved.

If the contentious questions that I mentioned would be resolved, then we could conclude the agreement and sign it. I would like you to see the situation from a more realistic perspective.

We understand that you get advice on this question from many different people. I, on my part, was trying to picture the decision which would have been the most correct from our point of view. If we would be able to resolve these two main questions, then the road to a new agreement would be cleared up.

You said that there are two different interpretations of the Vladivostok agreement in regard to the cruise missiles. But, in fact, in Vladivostok there was not made any exception for any types of missiles. Some components of the proposed new agreement were absent in the acting temporary agreement. Precisely, the aviation. The temporary agreement speaks about two components: intercontinental ballistic land-based missiles and the submarine-based ballistic missiles. In the new agreement a third component was added, that is the aviation.

Now we again decided to meet the USA half-way in order to reach the agreement. Secretary Vance, probably, has already

informed you. We are talking, in part, about the total number of land-based ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missiles] equipped with MIRV. Yesterday during my conversation with Vance I announced that we would be ready to limit the number of such missiles to 820 units under the condition that in the agreement our proposed limitation would be stipulated for the missiles [of] "air-land" class. I would like to get a definite reaction of the American side to our proposal before my departure from the USA.

Now, there is another thing. We would like you, here, in the USA, to stop scaring the people by the statements about an ability of making a first strike at America by the Soviet Union. Why is it being done? As we understand it, it is being done only to excite the atmosphere so that one could easily build up the military budget of the USA.

What first strike you are talking about? We are not going to make a first strike at anybody. Moreover, together with the other states of the Warsaw Pact we proposed to all countries signatory of the Final Act on Security and Cooperation in Europe to sign an agreement on the non-first-use of nuclear weapon against each other. So stop scaring the American people by this nonexistent Soviet threat. The Soviet Union did not have, does not have, and will not have such an intent.

And now I would like to read what L.I. Brezhnev, whom I met before my departure to the USA, asked me to tell you in person. Besides the greetings I extended to you in the beginning of our conversation, he asked me to tell you the following: "I and the whole Soviet people are struggling for peace and struggling for it conscientiously. But I am firmly convinced as well as all our leadership that this issue must be resolved not arithmetically but politically. We do not have any other alternative. No calculations will lead to anything good. I ask the President to think about it. Such an approach would only elevate the authority of our states. And the peoples of the world would take a sigh of relief."

Now a few words about your meeting with L.I. Brezhnev, which you have mentioned. L.I. Brezhnev, personally, and the Soviet leadership are not at all against such a meeting, in general. We believe that such a meeting would be an important threshold if it had been thoroughly prepared and concluded with a major political outcome. The

USA, we think, should also be interested in this. In addition, a meeting would not be in anyone's interests if it were a meeting just for the sake of meeting, or if such a meeting would push our relationship backwards.

This seems to coincide with what you said.

J. CARTER: Let me briefly comment on your statements. My attitude toward the Soviet Union is consistent. On my part, there were no words of criticism as such toward the Soviet Union or Brezhnev personally. At the same time, in the Soviet press there had been critical statements toward me personally. Recently such criticism significantly subsided, which I appreciate. The point is that such criticism gives concern to our people. And I hope that in the future there will be no more.

I would like to emphasize that I am deeply devoted to maintaining constructive friendly relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of solving all contentious questions in a peaceful atmosphere and without public polemics. I hope that in the future Soviet-American relations will constantly improve. I would suffer a complete political fiasco as a President if this does not happen. In other words, I would have betrayed the confidence in me of my people. Now I enjoy the support of the majority of the American people for my foreign policy. The goal of constant improvement of relations with the Soviet Union is a matter of first priority for me. There is no other more important problem for me.

(It should be noted that in regard to this important statement made by Carter, the President made it, apparently, bearing in mind the fact that recent public opinion polls in the USA show that the majority of population critically responded to the way the relations with the Soviet Union are handled by Carter.)

I, continued J. Carter, am aware of the need to improve the Soviet-American trade. I inherited the law, about which you know, which links the questions of trade with other questions. I would like to see this problem solved. I hope that together we will be able to influence our common "friend," Senator [Henry] Jackson, to annul the Soviet-American trade limitations that were adopted on his initiative. I hope that you, as far as you can, will help me in this matter.

When in the near future the Minister of External Trade, Patolichev, will come to

Washington, I would like to meet him in order to discuss the practical steps which could facilitate the settlement of the issue of the trade-economic relations between our countries.

We do not believe that the Shcharansky affair lacks significance. I did not blow it up. It concerns broad segments of the American public.

I think that the concern that you expressed about human rights in our country, as well as our public concern over this question in the Soviet Union, could lead to broadening of human rights in both countries. But I hope that both sides will exert necessary restraint and that you will not allow openly expressed concern over these issues in the USA to spoil our relations. And, as I already said, I hope that the Belgrade Conference will be conducted in an atmosphere of harmony between our delegations.

About China. We will never allow that our relations with China would become an obstacle for the development of USA relations with the Soviet Union. We did not have and we will not have any secret or open collusion with China directed against the Soviet Union. I would rather stop my efforts to change for the better our relations with China than to allow something like that to happen.

As for Diego Garcia we have built there a small airstrip, but we do not want at all to use this island to damage the security of the Soviet Union.

About stopping all nuclear weapons tests. A full cessation of all nuclear weapons tests, at least for some time in the beginning, would be a significant achievement. We can achieve it together. In our opinion such a ban should include also so-called peaceful explosions. We are ready to give you some information about the results of our research on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. This research shows that the application of nuclear explosions for building canals or changing the flows of rivers is unadvisable.

Now on the problem of concluding a new agreement on strategic offensive weapons in more detail. We think - although we are aware that you do not accept this - the Vladivostok agreement took place in a different situation from the one that has developed today. And at that time we thought about a different perspective. As we understand it the issue of cruise missiles was not

mentioned in Vladivostok. I certainly understand why the current different interpretations arose. We do not intend to use for our advantage the fact that the question of the cruise missiles was not discussed in Vladivostok. And we do not want to use our current technological superiority in this regard. And in general, we do not want any advantages for ourselves in the area of strategic arms, since attempts to get such an advantage could upset the general balance and create disharmony.

In our country, however, even a unanimous agreement of the whole government is not enough for securing the ratification by the Congress of any signed agreement.

The Soviet side, apparently, does not give any significance to a question of its own heavy missiles, which are three times more destructive than any of our missiles. In this respect I am very worried by your statement that "there is no land behind the Volga" for you, i.e. that you are against any further discussion and concessions on the questions which interest us. I would like to hope that the Soviet side will display more flexibility.

The question of Soviet heavy missiles is a subject of concern for us as a question of our cruise missiles is a subject of concern for you. You said that you intend to strive for the achievement of the mutually acceptable agreement, however, my first impression is that the Soviet side does not display enough flexibility.

We already put forward many proposals directed to achieving an agreement, but the Soviet Union turned them down. We are ready, however, to show further flexibility - although there are limits to it - in the hope that the Soviet side will act the same way.

In the end, I hope, we will be able to totally eliminate nuclear weapons. If in the course of the third round of negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms we would be able to cut back the upper limits on this types of weapons by 50 percent then we would be ready in the course of the following round to go even further, under the condition, of course, that China and France will not start to build up their nuclear weapons on a large scale.

You said that you made concessions to us when you agreed on some decrease of the upper limit of the means of delivering the strategic nuclear weapons. But we do

not see it as a concession to us. We would find ourselves in the same situation. It would have been a mutual step leading to a conclusion of a better agreement than the one which we talked about earlier. And still we have the issue of the Soviet heavy missiles.

You said that you made concessions to us on the question of counting ICBMs with MIRV but this too is not unilateral concession, because otherwise it would be needed to check every single missile whether it is equipped with a MIRV device or not.

The consent of the Soviet Union in regard to the structure of the future agreement also is not just a concession since the achieved agreement does benefit both sides.

There are two important question right now, as you have said, which create many difficulties. But before I touch on them I would like to mention those less significant disagreements which exist on a number of other questions.

One of these concerns the overall total level of delivery vehicles of nuclear weapons which under the original agreement must be equal to 2,400 units. You proposed that in 5 years after the signing a new agreement this level would be cut back to 2,250 units. But we would like to lower the mentioned original number by 10 per cent, i.e. to 2,160 units which, in our opinion, would fully satisfy the needs of each side. Thus, the difference between our positions is only

90 units. This issue needs to be solved.

We agree to include into the protocol for a three year term a resolution on non-deployment of the land-based and submarine-based cruise missiles with a range of more than 600 km.

In regard to the Soviet aircraft "Backfire." The Soviet side, as I understand it, is ready to guarantee that its range will not exceed 2,200 km and that its current rate of production will not increase. It would be useful for us, however, to know what is its current rate of production.

A.A. GROMYKO: American experts have at their disposal the appropriate information.

J. CARTER: On the question of mobile inter-continental ballistic missiles we have some disagreements inside our own government whether we should develop them or reject its production altogether. We are ready to ban its production and deployment for the period of the protocol term. The Soviet side, as we understand, would like this ban to be in effect until 1985. It also proposes to ban testing of these missiles. I think, our positions are close and the only thing is to find a mutually accepted wording.

There are some disagreements on the question of new types of the inter-continental ballistic missiles. We would like agree on a ban on testing and deployment of all new types of the ICBM. But you prefer to ban testing and deployment of only new types of ICBM equipped with MIRV. I do not quite understand what is the essence of this disagreement.

A.A. GROMYKO: Speaking about our concessions I had in mind concessions to the American side. There should not be any misunderstanding here. This is related to the question of the methods of counting ICBMs equipped with MIRV which was appreciated at the time by the USA government.

Yesterday I informed Mr. Vance about our consent to the establishment of a separate level for ICBMs equipped with MIRV to the total of 820 units. This is almost the same number as was proposed by the USA (800).

We agreed to cut back during the term of the agreement the overall level for the number of delivery vehicles of strategic nuclear weapons from 2,400 to 2,250. You mentioned the figure 2,160. What we have

### CWIHP LAUNCHES STALIN PROJECT

The Cold War International History Project, in cooperation with U.S., European, and Russian partners, is launching a new international project to obtain, assess, and disseminate new evidence (particularly from newly opened East-bloc archives) on Josef Stalin and the Cold War. The project's highest priority to gather and share new evidence—such as correspondence and transcripts, notes, or memoranda of conversations—that directly sheds light on Stalin's personal role, actions, views, policies, and behavior from the final stages of World War II through the early Cold War years until his death in 1953. Project plans include a workshop in Moscow in late 1997 devoted to Russian evidence and scholarship on Stalin, and a major conference in Washington the following year. Scholars interested in participating, particularly if conducting research in East-bloc archives and able to contribute documents, should contact CWIHP.

proposed is a compromise figure leaning toward the American side.

As for the land-based and submarine-based cruise missiles for some reason you speak not about a full ban but actually about permitting them to be tested on an air platform. It attracted my attention even yesterday while listening to Mr. Vance's statements. It is clear that if a cruise missile intended for submarine or land basing is tested on the air platform then it is possible to produce them by the hundreds and thousands, like pancakes.

There are also other questions to which I can draw the attention of the USA Government. We will have another opportunity to talk about them with the State Secretary. However, those two questions which I have mentioned are the main obstacle to the agreement. These, I repeat, are the question of our heavy missiles and the issue of cruise missiles on heavy bombers. I would like to hear your opinion about how we can settle these issues.

(In order to exert pressure on Carter we specifically emphasized that if the American side wishes to stick to their previous unacceptable positions, then the concessions in other issues made by us to the USA become invalid.)

J. CARTER: I have spent many hours studying the history of the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the USA on the question of strategic arms limitation, and analyzing the fundamental interests of the Soviet Union and the USA in this area. We hope that you understand what and why is our concern.

On the basis of my understanding of what the main concerns of the Soviet Union are, we now are ready to leave aside the question of modern heavy Soviet ICBMs. In other words, their number could reach 308 units as it was stipulated by the interim agreement.

We also are ready to agree on the sublevel of 820 ICBMs equipped with MIRV (which also includes our heavy missiles).

We are ready to leave at the level established in Vladivostok the total level of carriers with MIRV in the amount of 1,320 units, including ICBMs with MIRV, submarine-based ballistic missiles with MIRV, and also heavy bombers equipped with cruise missiles with a range exceeding 600 km.

We propose, however, that in the limits of this level (1,320 units) a sublevel of

1,200 units for ICBM and submarine-based ballistic missiles with MIRV would be established.

This combination almost fully accords with the Soviet side's position except for the sublevel of ICBMs and submarine-based ballistic missiles with MIRV (1,200 units).

Under such a settlement the difference of 120 units between the total number of carriers with MIRV (1,320 units) and the number of ICBMs and submarine-based ballistic missiles with MIRV (1,200 units) could be used by both sides for heavy bombers equipped with "air-land" class cruise missiles. In the limits of the sublevel of 1,200 units both sides will have the freedom to arrange the composition of the carriers with MIRV taking into account, of course, the sublevel of 820 units for the land-based ICBMs and MIRV.

Then, the sublevel of 820 ICBMs with MIRV, as I understand, will have to include the Soviet launchers, deployed in the area of Derazhnia and Pervomaisk.

There are some other disagreements between us. For instance, you propose that the agreement on the maximum range of 2,500 km for the "air-land" cruise missiles on heavy bombers remain valid for the term of the basic agreement, until 1985. But we suggest to include this question into the protocol for the term of 3 years in order to discuss this question again.

I did not quite understand what you said regarding the rate of production of the "Backfire" aircraft. According to our information you produce 30 such aircraft a year.

A.A. GROMYKO: I did not mention any numbers and have no intention to do so since you know the facts. Yesterday I read a relevant text to Secretary Vance. Incidentally, I want also to recall that part of this text which deals with the range of this aircraft. What we are saying is that the range of this aircraft now is 2,200 km and we are not going to increase it to such an extent so it could hit targets on USA territory. We are not saying that the range of the "Backfire" will not exceed 2,200 km. This is what we said to Vance yesterday.

J. CARTER: We, certainly, would like to have more clarity in this regard. If, for example, you intend to increase the range of this aircraft up to 2,400 - 2,500 km we would like to get precise information about it so that not only you but also we could judge if that aircraft can reach the continen-

tal USA or not. I certainly trust L.I. Brezhnev and you but we would like to have more certainty.

A.A. GROMYKO: It is well known that the distance between the Soviet Union and the USA is at least 5,500 km and that was taken as a criterion for the definition of the ICBM.

J. CARTER: But the range is not the only criterion. An aircraft could fly the maximum distance only in one direction. That is why I would prefer that its maximum range were precisely expressed in kilometers so to avoid any misunderstanding in the future, especially because your statement which you were ready to make, in principle, is a very good one.

A.A. GROMYKO: This question has already been discussed between us. Just read more carefully our possible statement and you will see that it resolves all these issues.

As for your last proposals, we, certainly, will be ready to discuss them but judging from our first impression they are aimed at giving one-sided advantages to the USA. And this is not the way of resolving the problems we are facing.

J. CARTER: But any agreed upon limitation has an identical impact on the USA and the Soviet Union with the exception that the Soviet Union gets a possibility to deploy 308 modern heavy missiles, which the US cannot do. We are to agree on that since it was previously stipulated by the interim agreement.

A.A. GROMYKO: The solution to this question was found in Vladivostok. According to this solution the Soviet Union got the freedom to equip the heavy missiles with independently targetable warheads. The USA, in exchange, got the possibility not to stipulate in the agreement, that is now being developed, its concrete obligations for dismantling their mobile ground-based systems. That was the meaning of the solution of these two difficult questions which had long been an obstacle to an agreement. I did not talk about it before, believing that you knew it very well. Now, I thought I should remind you how it had been done. But since then nothing has changed in regard to the American mobile ground-based systems. What has changed is only the USA administration, but the situation with the mobile ground-based system is the same. So why anybody would ask us to change our

position on the heavy missiles?

**J. CARTER:** Perhaps you did not understand me correctly. We do not demand anymore that you change your position on the heavy missiles. We accept your position. I only said that this is the only aspect where there is some inequality to the Soviet Union's advantage. In the rest the obligations of both sides are identical: what is permitted to the Soviet Union is permitted to us. And only in the question on heavy missiles the Soviet Union has some advantages. I hope, however, that you do not take me for a fool who would put forward proposals damaging to the interests of the USA.

The Soviet side wanted to preserve the upper limit of carriers with MIRV to 1,320 units. We agreed to it.

You proposed to include the heavy bombers equipped with cruise missiles in that upper limit. And we agreed.

However, this is not at all a sign of USA weakness. I think such solutions should satisfy your strategic and political needs and that they are in accordance with the Vladivostok agreement reached by my predecessor President Ford and L.I. Brezhnev.

You will be able in the last part of the day to continue the discussion of these questions with Vance. If further difficulties should arise I will be ready directly or via Vance to make every effort possible to resolve them. In general, I think that solutions proposed by us should satisfy all your wishes as well as to satisfy modestly our special interests.

**A.A. GROMYKO:** We will be ready to discuss in more detail all these questions with Vance.

Let me thank you for this conversation. I would like to emphasize once more that the Soviet side would like to achieve, in the end, the conclusion of a new agreement on limitation of strategic arms. This would be a great success, but it depends, of course, on both sides.

The following people were present at the meeting: On the Soviet side: A.F. Dobrynin, G.M. Kornienko, N.N. Detinov, V.G. Makarov, B.G. Komplektov, V.M. Sukhodrev;

On the American side: Vice-President W. Mondale, Secretary of State C. Vance, the Special assistant to the President for National Security Z. Brzezinski, the USA Ambassador in the USSR [M.] Toon, the deputy assistant to the President [D.] Aaron, the

Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency P. Warnke, an official of the National Security Council W. Hyland, an interpreter Kramer.

Typed in 2 copies  
mb-05749/gs  
12 October 1977

*[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; obtained and translated by Carter-Brezhnev Project.]*

**Document 2: CPSU CC Politburo  
Transcript, 27 April 1978 (excerpt)**

Top Secret

Only copy

Working Transcript

MEETING OF THE  
CC CPSU POLITBURO  
27 April 1978

Chaired by Comrade BREZHNEV, L.I.  
Attended by Coms. Andropov, Iu. V., Grishin, V.V., Gromyko, A.A., Kirilenko, A.P., Kosygin, A.N., Kulakov, F.D., Mazurov, K.T., Pel'she, A. Ia., Suslov, M.A., Ustinov, D.F., Demichev, P.N., Solomentsev, M.S., Chernenko, K.Y., Kapitonov, I.V., Dolgikh, V.I., Zimianin, M.V., Riabov, Ia.P., Rusakov, K.V.

I. About the results of the negotiations with  
the Secretary of State of the USA, C. Vance

BREZHNEV. My conversation with Vance took place after his two-day negotiations with Comrades Gromyko, Ogarkov, and others had concluded. He, evidently, had picked out in advance several issues which he had not brought up in the course of the general negotiations. We can assume that he had an agreement with Carter on this. It is characteristic, that Vance did not take any of the members of his delegation in to the meeting with me. Only the ambassador came with him. But I, from my side, also did not presume to broaden the circle of our participants. Comrades Gromyko, Dobrynin, and Aleksandrov participated in the conversation.

Thinking over the plan of the conversation, we set ourselves some tasks:

1. Set forth our understanding of the main results of the negotiations which Vance

this time had conducted in Moscow, and from him receive confirmation of that understanding.

2. To openly express to him our evaluation of the contradictions of Carter's inconsistent foreign policy line, his constant swings between assurance that he is for an improvement of relations with the USSR and calls for a cranking up [*nakruchivanie*] of of the arms race; to remind Vance (and through him, Carter) that there are things which are more important than the foreign policy maneuvers of the moment, particularly: issues of war and peace.

3. To once again express our attitude about a possible meeting with Carter, about which he, as you know, continues to hint through all possible channels.

4. To make known to the USA administration in advance our steps in response to Carter's decision to defer the production of the neutron bomb.

5. To give a rebuff to several political maneuvers which, as we assumed and as was confirmed, Vance could take. We are talking, primarily, about the attempt to put forth an accusation to the address of the USSR and Cuba in regard to events in Africa.

I will not dwell in detail on the course of the conversation. A transcript of it was just distributed. All the comrades, probably, have familiarized themselves with it. I will say only that the mentioned program was entirely fulfilled. Vance agreed with our evaluation of the negotiations on strategic weapons. He accepted with due attention the criticism of the foreign policy zigzags of the Carter government, and will, of course, pass them on to the President.

The attempt to deliver a reproach for Africa and African affairs which are linked with the development of relations between the USA and the USSR, received such a strong rebuff that Vance, excuse me, was not glad that he had raised that issue. He found it necessary to take a defensive position, and to justify himself.

Overall, I think, the conversation was useful. It will help Carter to see several things in a more realistic light. The tone of the conversation was correct and friendly. Vance behaved well, and even cordially.

SUSLOV. Carter has a great desire to meet with Leonid Il'ich.

Members of the Politburo, Candidate members of the Politburo, and Secretaries of the CC say that they have read the tran-

script of the conversation. The conversation was very good, substantive, sharp in its tone, as was appropriate. It has an aggressive character.

KOSYGIN. The conversation really forced Vance to think over many issues, and he will of course pass all the content on to Carter.

USTINOV. Leonid Il'ich spoke very well about offensive strategic weapons. They should know our position on that issue.

SUSLOV. Leonid Il'ich did very well in conducting the conversation with Vance.

KOSYGIN. The main thing is that they now know perfectly our position on all the issues.

SUSLOV. We have to take a decision to approve Leonid Il'ich's conversation with Vance and the negotiations of Comrades Gromyko, Ogarkov, and others on issues related to the limitation of strategic weapons.

ALL. Correct.

[Source: *Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF)*, f. 3, op. 120, d. 39, ll. 187-189; trans. by M. Doctoroff.]

**Document 3: Memorandum of Conversation between Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and U.S. Secretary of State Vance, 31 May 1978 (excerpts)**

Secret, Copy No. 1

RECORD OF MAIN CONTENT OF  
CONVERSATION BETWEEN  
A.A. GROMYKO AND  
U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE C. VANCE

31 May 1978, New York

Our final meeting with the USA Secretary of State C. Vance took place on May 31. First I met with Vance "eye to eye" (only interpreters from both sides were present).

A.A. Gromyko. Taking advantage of this opportunity to talk to you in private, I want to ask how the explosion of propaganda hostile to the USSR, which we have observed in the USA for some time already, can be explained? Until now we have observed various declarations made by representatives of the American administration, and evaluated them in different ways accord-

ing to their orientation. Yet we have always tried to stress constructive aspects of those declarations which were put forward by the President, and by you and by other leading American authorities who deal with foreign policy.

But most recently our attention has been more and more attracted to the fact that, beginning with the President (and Brzezinski has already surpassed himself in this), American officials are constantly making statements which are aimed, or so it seems to us more and more, at nearly bringing us back to the period of "cold war."

In Washington, D.C. the other day, I could not but come to the conclusion that the orientation of President Carter's statements is to a great extent determined by the character of the false information which he receives. This can be illustrated by his declarations on the situation in Africa, which are obviously based on wrong, distorted information.

Now I see that the matter is even more serious. Evidently somebody in the United States, some circles, consciously are creating myths, and are then referring to those same myths, and dumping all this on the laps of the President, the Secretary of State, and other American leaders.

So what is the real policy of the USA, and towards what is it directed: to the creation of relations based on mutual respect, on non-interference in internal affairs, and on building relations; or towards aggravating of tension in our relations[?] This is the question, which I would like you to answer.

On returning to Moscow I will report to L.I. Brezhnev and to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party about the general political situation in the United States today and about the USA's policy towards the USSR. I presume that you, in turn, will inform the President about this conversation.

C. Vance. I will certainly inform the President about our conversation. Actually you have just asked me two questions. First, you asked me to explain the reasons for that which you have called an explosion of hostile propaganda toward the USSR in the United States. Let me try to answer this question with the utmost openness.

There are several facts which provoke concern in regard to the Soviet Union in the United States. These are reflected, naturally, in newspaper articles, materials, TV pro-

grams etc. I would like to point out three main areas, in which this concern reveals itself.

Very many people in the USA and in other countries, especially in the West, reveal serious concern in connection with the increase by the USSR of its military forces, especially in Europe, and the fact that the dimensions of this increase significantly exceed the dimensions needed for defense. Looking at the Soviet Union's spending for conventional arms, people picture a dramatically rising curve, at the same time keeping in mind the stable level (of spending) for arms by the USA and other western countries.

The intentions of the Soviet Union sincerely concern many people. A natural question arises: if the intentions of the USSR are to preserve the existing military balance, why does it increase its military forces and weapons on such a scale[?] Doesn't it mean that the Soviet Union, rather than trying to reduce military rivalry in Europe by cutting down the level of weapons and military forces in the region, has more aggressive intentions[?]

As for strategic weapons, we made definite progress in the past: we concluded the ABM Treaty, signed the Temporary Agreement on limitation of strategic offensive weapons and have moved forward on working out a new agreement on SALT. All these can be considered positive elements in the relations between our two countries.

On the other hand, the constant growth by the Soviet Union of its armed forces and modern conventional weapons by the USSR provokes serious concern in many people.

Another major issue which alarms us is Africa, which President Carter and I have already discussed with you in detail. I think we all recognize that elements of rivalry will remain between us in the future. But at the same time there will be areas, in which we will be able to achieve mutual understanding and find a common language. If you look at the situation in Africa today, it seems that the areas of rivalry have developed beyond the limits of normal competition and led to military conflicts, fed by Soviet weapons and equipment and by armed combat detachments provided by Cuba.

I am acquainted with your explanation of the factors which stimulated certain military actions in Africa, and I will not repeat what was already said by both sides. How-

ever, in answering your question, I want to set forth the evaluation of the actions of the Soviet Union in Africa which is being formed in the USA and many other countries (not only European). Many people now presume that the Soviet Union sets fires in various regions of Africa instead of preventing those fires in a peaceful way.

The third issue which provokes serious concern is connected with the question of human rights, which has become particularly urgent recently because of actions like [Soviet dissident Yuri] Orlov's trial.

These are the three main issues, which provoke what you call the explosion of emotions directed against the Soviet Union.

The second part of your question referred to what the USA actually wants: to build good relations with the Soviet Union or to return to the "cold war" period, accompanied by permanent confrontation and arguments between us.

I can answer that question quite simply and clearly. The United States does not want to return to the period of tension and confrontation between our two countries. We want to return our relations to their correct path, we want to return to better, tighter, closer relations between the Soviet Union and the USA. We want to reduce tension in the military and other spheres, to find as many more grounds as we can for a common language between us.

There are several means by which it would be possible to move forward in this direction and, maybe, the main way lies in making progress in the negotiations on limitation of strategic weapons. Yet, besides this there is a lot more which we can do. Most importantly, we must come to a deep mutual understanding of the fact that detente is a two-way street; we have to develop broader links in commerce, cooperation, culture and other spheres. We made some progress in these areas in the past, but unfortunately we have lately backtracked significantly.

I would like to mention some concrete steps, which in our opinion, could make it possible to achieve our aims. First, progress during the negotiations on limitation of strategic weapons. Second, progress in the Vienna negotiations on reduction of armed forces and weapons in Central Europe. Third, progress on a range of other arms control issues in the discussion of which we and you participate. Fourth, a better mu-

tual understanding of the character of detente, and about how to turn this process into a two-way street. Fifth, to come to agreement on other steps which could be undertaken in order to provide broader exchanges between our peoples in the spheres of cultural, scientific, and other activity, as well as in the area of commerce.

In conclusion I must point out that, relating to the fact that detente should be a two-way street, and in the context of the situation in Africa, we must determine how we should act so that all these questions do not continue to be a constant source of confrontation between us.

I tried as I could to set forth more simply some fundamental problems and to express my opinion about those steps which could be undertaken in order to develop our relations in a correct direction and to improve them.

A.A. Gromyko. I will try to react to your statements as briefly as I can. Thus I will be able to avoid repeating what I already said in Washington, D.C.

I listened with positive feelings to your words to the effect that USA is trying to conduct its affairs so as to allow us to find solutions to the problems that confront us, avoiding tension in Soviet-American relations and not returning to the period of the "cold war." I am sure that all my colleagues in the Soviet leadership, including L.I. Brezhnev personally, will also react to your words positively. This is my response to the constructive part of your statements. It would have been good if the actions of the American government had corresponded with your words, but that is not the case now.

You went on to say that one of the reasons for the explosion in the United States of propaganda hostile to the USSR was that the Soviet Union lately had, apparently, greatly increased its military potential, and that this fact worries the United States and other Western countries.

I must categorically deny this statement. Moreover, it has already been repeatedly denied at the highest level by L.I. Brezhnev. It is not true. It is a myth, thought up in the West with a definite goal in mind — to camouflage the Western program of arms increases. And the facts completely support this.

Our military forces are certainly at their required level. But we do not want to spend on defense any more than is necessary to

preserve the security of the Soviet Union in the face of the constant—I repeat, constant—growth of NATO's, and especially of the USA's, armed forces and weapons.

If we had other intentions, why should we, in the U.N. and in other forums, insist every year, every month, every day, on the necessity of disarmament, up to general and complete disarmament? Recall the proposals which were put forward by L.I. Brezhnev at the recent Komsomol Congress. They were devoted to a total ban on the production of nuclear arms, and the subsequent destruction of these weapons and the complete switchover of nuclear energy to purely peaceful uses. Remember the program, adopted at the 25th CPSU Congress, of additional actions in the sphere of the struggle for peace, which we try to bring to life literally every day, though you act in the opposite direction.

We would not have conducted such a policy if we had wanted to constantly increase our armaments. We carry out this policy of peace and detente firmly and consistently, despite the ring of American military bases around the Soviet Union. We are ready to disarm, even radically, but at the same time, it goes without saying that we will never agree to unilateral disarmament. Do not expect this. An equal degree of security must be observed, there must be no loss of security for any of the sides. This is an immutable law which must be observed.

C. Vance. Neither of us is speaking about unilateral disarmament. We believe that both sides are pragmatic enough to understand that unilateral disarmament is impossible. It can take place only within the mutual interests of the sides. The question, however, is whether we will manage to create a situation in which mutually advantageous arms control agreements, which will clearly show everyone that we are striving for disarmament rather than for an increase in arms, can be achieved.

A.A. Gromyko. I will respond to what you have just said later. Now I will continue to express ideas, which I started before. I will touch on the issue of military budgets.

Several times we have introduced proposals to reduce military budgets, naming in this regard concrete percentages, corrected our proposal in accordance with counterproposals of other states. Yet, the USA and its allies never expressed any posi-

tive attitude to our proposals. They met them with raised bayonets, every time rejecting them at once. We proposed to freeze military budgets at their present level, from which it might later have been possible to begin their reduction. But these proposals, too, were declined without consideration.

At the present special session of the United Nations General Assembly, devoted to questions of disarmament, we decided to propose a new approach to the issue. Earlier, when we had named a definite percent by which to reduce military budgets, Western states had referred to various difficulties related to the allegedly different structures of the military budgets of the Soviet Union and the countries of the West. We always acted from a belief that these complexities had an artificial character and must not serve as a barrier on in the way of reducing military spending. Now we decided to take another approach: to speak not about percents, but about absolute figures. These figures may not entirely coincide, although, it goes without saying that they must be, as they say, in the same ballpark. There must not be a situation when one great power would reduce its military budget by 1 bln. dollars a year, and the other - by 1 mln. Think over our new proposals. It seems to us that they could make it easier to achieve an agreement.

Both previously and now, American representatives have tried and are trying now to suggest that their military budget is not growing, although in fact USA military spending grows enormously every year. This truth is known to everyone.

C. Vance. Spending is growing, but not in real terms.

A.A. Gromyko. We are speaking about the real budget.

C. Vance. From the point of view of dollars our military budget is growing, but only because of inflation.

A.A. Gromyko. I am afraid that now you will start to throw blame at us for not having inflation in our country. In fact the USA military budget is growing both in real and in material terms. You can not cover this with inflation.

You spoke further on about the situation in Africa. I must say that in this case a total and crude distortion of the real situation is taking place. If I, discussing this topic, behaved like some of your high ranking officials, who let loose with simply in-

sulting declarations directed toward the Soviet Union, I would have been forced to use not those, but sharper expressions. By the way, those American officials who make such declarations should study how to communicate with people, especially with representatives of foreign states.

Who should know better than the USA, with its a far-reaching espionage network, that the Soviet Union had absolutely nothing to do with events in Zaire, Rhodesia, Namibia[?] As for the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia, when Somalia launched an attack against Ethiopia we, responding to a request from the latter, helped out by sending to Ethiopia a certain amount of weapons and a group of specialists to train them how to use the weapons. At the same time, as I already told you, we would at that time have welcomed any help of this kind from other countries, including the USA, if any such assistance had been requested of them.

But instead of this we face the fiction that Ethiopian troops acted under Soviet command, etc. Why is this done? Being realists, we started to look for reasons for such absurd assertions. We came to the conclusion that it is necessary to search for those reasons in the attempts of some definite forces, particularly in the United States, to create a screen through which it would be more difficult for people to understand the true situation, in order to justify [their] own actions in Africa, which appear as interference in the domestic affairs of the countries on that continent.

An illustration of this statement is the slaughter which took place in [the Shaba Province of] Zaire not long ago. In fact neither the USSR nor Cuba had anything to do with it. As you remember, I told President Carter about this. We were indignant at this slaughter and at the insinuations to our address. I have already said that there is not a single Soviet person in Namibia or in Rhodesia, and in Zaire we have only official diplomatic representatives.

Pass my words on to the President. Tell him that the assertions, which we confront in connection with events in Africa, in particular in Zaire, we can treat only as a pure and deliberate fiction.

As it happened, some individuals and governments themselves threw an explosive ball of lightening into the arena and now are saying: look, how terrible that looks. We

are not responsible for somebody else's sins and do not intend to be. Those who sin are responsible.

Touching on the question of so-called human rights, you raised a question of Soviet citizens, giving the concrete name Orlov, and noting that you could give some other names. I will say only that we will not discuss questions like this, neither with you, nor with anybody else, because these are questions in our internal competence, and only in our competence.

And now I respond to your statement that there are other questions on which we do not agree, but which we should discuss in order to find mutually acceptable decisions. You are right: there are such questions. I want, however, to draw your attention to the fact that the USA and some of its allies do not, as a rule, want to discuss the proposals which we put forward. It often happens that you decline our proposals on the basis only of some fragmentary reports in the press, even before you have received the official text. This was the case, for example, when the Warsaw Treaty states proposed that all countries which signed the Helsinki Final Act should agree not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other.

You turned this proposal down, but life itself did not reject it because of that. We suggested having a preparatory meeting, at which it would have been possible to consider this proposal, if necessary to sharpen it, to ask each other different questions, etc. You did not want to do this either. We also could follow this same approach, turning down at once any proposal of the Western states at once. But is this how serious people conduct their affairs[?] We would not like to conduct our affairs this way.

C. Vance. First of all I want to say that I fully agree that it is necessary to work out some sort of a mechanism for the discussion of those or other proposals put forward by the sides, which would allow us to hear each other out and to seriously consider those or any other questions. The thing is that sometimes we are faced with divergent interpretations of these or other problems, the consideration of which could have helped to eliminate differences of opinion. That is why it is very important to understand how each side pictures the existing situation. Let us think of the best way to conduct affairs which touch on relations

between the Soviet Union and the USA. Maybe it makes sense for the sides to meet more often both on our level and on the level of those who negotiate concrete questions, in order to clarify the positions of both sides? Maybe it follows that we should think of other methods? One thing is clear: something must be done to change the tendency, which has lately appeared in the relations between our two countries.

A.A. Gromyko. This is a very important question.

C. Vance. Let me now respond to your remarks regarding our information about the participation of Cubans in the events in Zaire. According to our intelligence data, Cubans took part in planning and preparation of the intrusion there. As for the sources of our information, it was the Commander of Katang armed forces, General Mbumba, and Cuban sources in East Germany. We considered these sources reliable.

A.A. Gromyko. Oh, then you are simply victims of disinformation. If we were not sure that our information was authentic, we would not have told you about it. We take great responsibility for what we are saying.

C. Vance. But how could we know that information provided to us by Mbumba and Cubans themselves does not correspond with reality? When this information came to us we assumed that it was based on solid evidence.

A.A. Gromyko. But who on Earth knows what kind of General this is? Who does he serve? Is he really the only one to tell the truth, like Jesus Christ of the Bible legend?

You have information from us — accept it. Your sources of information are bad if they present lies as truth. You yourself know from experience that you must not believe every report. Man was given his brain in order to analyze information, think, and make realistic conclusions.

Unfortunately, there are officials in the USA who easily, to put it mildly, present lies for truth. But a serious policy cannot be built on this.

C. Vance. I take into consideration what you have said. Yet I want to say that we have to take as serious the information, which we receive from people like the Commander of the Katang forces.

A.A. Gromyko. But maybe the General you mentioned is only saving his skin?

You do not know his reasons, who he works for, do you? Many questions arise here.

C. Vance. Evidently it does not make much sense to continue this argument. I mentioned these facts only to illustrate difficulties in receiving trustworthy information. Probably it is one more argument in support of the necessity of having more frequent meetings and exchange of opinions between us.

A.A. Gromyko. Perhaps. But if on the basis of this type of information, known to be false, a broad campaign, hostile to us, is developed in the USA, then it is another kettle of fish. And if, on top of everything, the government takes part in this process and heats up this campaign, then what conclusion should we draw? Really, this is not happening within the four walls of a working study. It is taking place on a national scale.

C. Vance. President Carter asked me to find out your opinion of the expediency of carrying out exchange visits of some senior military officers from the Soviet Union and the USA. I mean, for example, a meeting between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Head of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces. As for selecting questions for discussion, they can agree on them in advance.

A.A. Gromyko. We will discuss this question and inform you about our decision.

C. Vance. We start from a belief that such exchanges could demonstrate to the public our readiness to have contacts on all levels. This could even prove, in a way, that we do not aim at confrontation.

[sections omitted dealing with SALT II negotiations and Cyprus situation—ed.]

During the final meeting with the USA Secretary of State Vance the issue of two Soviet citizens, staff members of the United Nations Secretariat [Valdik] Enger and [Rudolf] Cherniaev, who are being held in a prison in New York City, was discussed. The record of the main contents of this conversation, which took place in the presence of two interpreters only, is given below.

A.A. Gromyko. During this meeting you promised to answer the question we raised about freeing the two Soviet citizens kept in prison by American authorities.

C. Vance. I can do that. At the present time we can not undertake any definite actions as far as these two people are concerned. I specially got acquainted with the

case and am afraid that this matter will have to take its normal course.

As for reducing the amount of bail, [State Department official] M[arshall D]. Shulman has already told a representative of the USSR Embassy in the USA that the lawyers of the two mentioned people know how to solve this problem in accordance with American legislation.

A.A. Gromyko. I listened your answer with the feeling of regret. What prospects do you see for solving this problem?

C. Vance. I think that a legal proceeding will take place, and when it's over we will see what we can do.

A.A. Gromyko. I will not repeat what I have already said on this account, not to waste time. You are familiar with everything I said about our attitude to such a development of events and about possible consequences.

I want to inform you that we found and confiscated more than 50 bugging devices which were functioning in different Soviet institutions in the USA — in Washington, D.C., in New York, in San Francisco. I will give you the materials connected with this issue now. We, naturally, have at our disposal many more photographs and, if we wanted, we could have released them long ago. But we have not done it yet, because we have a broader approach to Soviet-American relations. We also took into account the requests of the American side not to publish these materials.

I can tell you, by the way, that many of these devices were established under President Carter's Administration. I do not want to claim that this was sanctioned by him personally, but the fact is that they were put into practice after he came to power.

C. Vance. I do not know anything about these devices and have absolutely no information whether they were installed somewhere or not. I will consider materials given by you but I do not want you to treat my silence as agreement with the fact that we did install such devices somewhere.

A.A. Gromyko. It is necessary to say that here, in New York, there took place many approaches to our workers by staffers of American intelligence services who work for the United Nations Secretariat. According to our estimate, at least 200 agents of American intelligence work in this international Secretariat.

So we have at our disposal very many

quite interesting, and I would say, piquant photomaterials on this subject. They will make a very interesting exhibition, though a pretty big hall would be needed to accommodate it.

Our decision regarding these materials will to a great extent depend on the development of this matter on the whole. You have just said that after the trial you will see what you can do. We also will take a look at what you do.

C. Vance. We do not start a war of intelligence services with the Soviet Union. Yet we are very much concerned by the case of the two mentioned Soviet citizens, especially by the fact that they work for the United Nations Secretariat.

Besides, we are greatly concerned with the case, connected with our Embassy in Moscow. The investigation on this matter is still going on. But the fact that there is a tunnel under the building of the USA Embassy, more than 7 meters of which occupy the territory of the building, which belongs to the United States, disturbs us. We consider this as a rude intrusion into the building of our Embassy.

As far as the issue of two Soviet citizens arrested in the USA is concerned, I will contact you again after the trial is over, and tell you which measures we could undertake.

A.A. Gromyko. We will be waiting for such a report.

As for the incident with the USA Embassy in Moscow, according to the information, which I received, the case is totally different. What your representatives describe as an intrusion into the territory of the US Embassy, belongs, in fact, to the area of our normal economic activity. The goals of these measures actually had a purely protective character. In particular, there also were fire-prevention measures.

And in general it would have been primitive to rely on some sort of tunnels in our age of perfect technology. You and I do not live during the post-war period, when in the middle of the 50s we discovered a tunnel, several hundred meters long, which led from West to East Berlin. It was dug by Americans.

I will be expecting your reports about our two citizens who are detained in the USA, and we will plan our activity accordingly to your decision.

C. Vance. Good.

The conversation was translated and recorded by V. Sukhodrev.

Correct: (signature) [illegible]

2 June 1978.

Original # 1351/GS

[Source: AVPRF; trans. by M. Doctoroff.]

**Document 4: Speech by L.I. Brezhnev to CPSU CC Politburo, 8 June 1978**

*Proletariats of all countries, unite!*

Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

CENTRALCOMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

No. P107/III

To Comrades Brezhnev, Andropov, Grishin, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Kosygin, Kulakov, Kunaev, Mazurov, Pel'she, Romanov, Sluslov, Ustinov, Shcherbitskii, Aliev, Demichev, Kuznetsov, Masherov, Ponomarev, Rashidov, Solomentsev, Chernenko, Dolgikh, Zimianin, Kapitonov, Rusakov, Riabov, Zamiatin

Extract from protocol No. 107 of the session of the Politburo of the CC CPSU of 8 June 1978

Several issues of the international situation

1. To approve the proposal concerning this question, as stated in comrade L.I. Brezhnev's speech at the Politburo session of the CC (text of the speech affixed).

2. To charge the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] of the USSR, the KGB of the USSR, the International Department of the CC CPSU, the Department of Propaganda for Foreign Affairs of the CC CPSU to prepare the corresponding materials and projects of documents, with regard for the exchange of opinions, which took place at the Politburo session, and to submit them to the CC CPSU.

Politburo CC CPSU

[attachment]

Re: item III protocol No. 107

SPEECH OF Com. L.I. BREZHNEV  
AT THE POLITBURO SESSION OF

THE CC CPSU CONCERNING  
SEVERAL ISSUES OF THE  
INTERNATIONAL SITUATION

Comrades, it is apparent from what Andrei Andreevich [Gromyko] has now told us, that Com. Gromyko has performed considerable and useful work during his time in America both in terms of participation in the special session of the General Assembly of the UN, as well as in the course of his negotiations with Carter and Vance, and also at the time of bilateral meetings and discussions with representatives of many countries. I think that it is fitting to approve this work and to record this in our resolution.

But it would be, probably, incorrect to limit ourselves only to this. From the report of com. Gromyko, and likewise from the extensive information which has reached us recently through various channels, it is completely clearly apparent that we are experiencing a very complicated period in the development of international relations. A serious deterioration and exacerbation of the situation has occurred. And the primary source of this deterioration is the growing aggression of the foreign policy of the Carter government, the continually more sharply anti-Soviet character of the statements of the President himself and of his closest colleagues—in the first instance those of Brzezinski.

Judging from appearances, Carter is not simply falling under the usual influence of the most shameless anti-Soviet types and ringleaders of the military-industrial complex of the USA, but is intent upon struggling for his election to a new term as President of the USA under the banner of anti-Soviet policy and a return to the "cold war."

This line of the government of the USA is putting its stamp on the policy of the Western powers both in the NATO bloc, and in Africa, and in relation to China.

The question arises, how are we to react to all of this?

I think, that passivity here is inadmissible. We must fight actively and persistently for peace and detente. We must do all that is possible in order to hinder the policy, which is fraught with the threat of a new world war. Here we need energetic steps, noticeable for the whole world.

Concretely, if we are speaking of the immediate period, it would be possible, it seems to me, to do the following.

First. We should come forward in our press (simultaneously in all of the main newspapers) with a large and serious declaration, calling it, let's say, "Concerning the policy of the Carter government." We should publish this declaration without any sort of signature—this will even attract more attention to it. In it we should say directly, that in the policy of the USA changes are taking place which are dangerous for the affairs of peace. Under the curtain of lies and slander on the USSR and other socialist countries, concrete matters are being perpetrated, directed against peace and detente. The course of negotiations with the Soviet Union on the limitations of strategic arms is intentionally being retarded. Attempts at clumsy interference in our internal affairs are being perpetrated, in fact, the ties between both countries are being curtailed. New extensive plans for the arms race are being made, and for decades in advance, at the very time when the peoples hoped for disarmament. The current creators of American policy, it seems, have already found a common language with the aggressive anti-Soviet rulers of China, who, as it is known, declare peace and detente to be a fraud, and war to be the single realistic prospect.

The government of the USA has become the inspiration for a new colonialism in Africa — the policy of armed intervention and open interference in the affairs of African governments, the merciless suppression of revolutionary liberation processes.

It is all of these current tendencies in the foreign policy of the Carter government which have lent the central color to the work of the last session of the Council of NATO in Washington. Encouraging its adherents, dragging after itself those who waver and doubt, putting pressure on the dissenting participants of this bloc, the USA is attempting once again to push it onto the road of the "cold war" and of active preparation for a hot war.

So all of these dangerous sides of the current policies of Carter should be [described], without excessive dramatization, but clearly shown in such a document. It is necessary to show both to other countries and to communities in the USA itself, just how dangerous a game Carter, Brzezinski, and their likes are starting.

We should conclude this text with a calm and clear confirmation of our course

towards detente and towards the development of good, mutually beneficial relations with the United States.

Second. We should come forward with a collective declaration of governments—participants in the Warsaw Pact regarding the results of the session of the Council of NATO. This document, taking into consideration the necessity of its approval, among others by the Romanians, should be made less sharp, with emphasis on the constructive elements of our policy.

We should note with regret, that the work of the session of the Council of NATO and its resolutions do not serve detente or the consolidation of peace, but the exacerbation of the international situation and the intensification of military preparations, the arms race. Urgent calls for the increase of allotments, the agitation of the NATO representatives for neutron, chemical, bacteriological arms, the forcing through of long-term programs for the production of arms of all types—this is the real meaning of this session and of that which follows after it.

The countries of the Warsaw Pact condemn this policy and are certain that the peoples of other countries will condemn it. There is an attempt to impose on us a continually broader competition in arms. But we decisively come forward for keeping in check the arms race, for concrete agreements on these questions in all forums. The Soviet Union is doing all that is dependent on it for the successful completion of negotiations with the USA concerning SALT. The socialist countries occupy a flexible position and are developing concrete constructive initiatives at the Vienna talks. The countries of the Warsaw Pact are coming forward for the strict observance of the principles of peaceful coexistence, against interference in the internal affairs of other countries — whether in the form of armed intervention or subversive activities of another sort.

And we should conclude this document with a persistent call to return to the path of detente, to the path of mutual respect and mutually beneficial cooperation, which is clearly indicated in the document of the Helsinki Summit, in Soviet-American and other bilateral documents, and in numerous resolutions of the UN.

Third. We should come forward with a special Declaration of the Soviet government on African affairs. In this document we should categorically refute and expose

the imperialist intentions with regard to the policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries in Africa, among them the region of the Horn of Africa, in Zaire, etc. Briefly and in calm tones we should say how it is in reality. At the same time with all sharpness we should condemn the policy of armed intervention, subversive activity and other forms of interference in African affairs by the governments of NATO headed by the USA. We should show how the contemporary colonizers, operating with the hypocritical slogan, "African solidarity," enlist accomplices for themselves in Africa from the numbers of reactionary, anti-popular regimes, for carrying out their own policy. We should express our conviction that genuine African solidarity will take hold—the single will of independent countries and the free peoples of Africa, their resoluteness to assert the independence of their countries and the freedom of their internal development.

These are the three documents, it seems to me, that it would be possible to prepare in the immediate future and come forth with them. Of course, this is not to be done in one day, but somehow intelligently distributed over time.

Simultaneously it would be possible to prepare instructions for our ambassadors in progressive and other more or less independent governments in Africa for carrying out the corresponding work with their guidance.

In the spirit of the documents, about which I just spoke, it would be necessary, of course, to develop work through other channels as well—along the lines of connections with fraternal parties, in the framework of international social organizations, etc.

As far as the work of the special session of the General Assembly of the UN for disarmament is concerned, evidently, it is necessary to continue to illuminate this theme in our media of mass information from the point of view of the proposal of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, we should likewise support all that is healthy and constructive, which has appeared and should appear in the work of the Assembly, and should expose the maneuvers of the opponents to disarmament.

If the comrades are in agreement, then, probably, we could charge the preparation of the material, to which I referred, to the MFA and to the corresponding departments

of the CC (International Department, Department of the CC and the Department of Propaganda for Foreign Affairs).

[Source: *Center for Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD)*, Moscow, fond 89, per. 34, dok. 1; obtained by D. Wolff; trans. M. Doctoroff.]

**Document 5: Transcript of CPSU CC  
Politburo Meeting, 8 June 1978  
(excerpt)**

Top secret  
Only copy  
Working draft

SESSION OF THE POLITBURO OF  
THE CC CPSU  
8 June 1978

Chaired by Comrade Brezhnev, L.I.  
In attendance: Comrades Andropov Yu.V.; Grishin V.V.; Gromyko A.A.; Kulakov F.D.; Pelshe A.Y.; Suslov M.A.; Ustinov D.F.; Demichev P.N.; Kuznetsov V.V.; Ponomarev B. N.; Solomentsev M.S.; Chernenko K.Yu.; Dolgikh V.I.; Ryabov Y.P.; Rusakov K.V.

[. . .]II. About Sakharov.

BREZHNEV. The other day comrade Andropov Yu. V. informed me that Sakharov has really let himself go and is behaving like a mere hooligan. The situation deteriorated to the point where he and his wife started a fight with a militiaman near the court building while the Orlov case was being tried.

The reasons of our superpatient attitude to Sakharov are familiar to you. But there is a limit to everything. We must not leave his escapades without reaction.

There was a suggestion to discuss Sakharov's behavior at the Presidium of the Academy of Sciences. Perhaps, we should do this.

The members of the Politburo, candidates members of the Politburo and secretaries of the Central Committee support this proposal.

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 42, dok. 71; obtained by D. Wolff; trans. by M. Doctoroff.]

**Document 6: Transcript of CPSU CC**

**Politburo Meeting, 22 June 1978  
(excerpt)**

Top secret  
only copy  
Working paper

SESSION OF THE POLITBURO OF  
THE CC CPSU  
22 June 1978

Chaired by Comrade Brezhnev, L.I.  
In attendance: Comrades Andropov, Yu. V.; Grishin, V.V.; Gromyko, A.A.; Kulakov, F.D.; Pelshe, A.Y.; Suslov, M.A.; Ustinov, D.F.; Demichev, P.N.; Kuznetsov, V.V.; Ponomarev, B.N.; Solomentsev, M.S.; Chernenko, K.U.; Dolgikh, V.I.; Ryabov, Y.P.; Rusakov, K.V.

[...] 2. Information of comrade Andropov, Yu. V. on the Shcharansky matter

BREZHNEV. Comrade Andropov would like to inform the Politburo about the Shcharansky matter. Let's give him the floor.

ANDROPOV. I want to inform the Politburo that at the present time in the USSR 520 people are kept in prison, of these 110 people are held on charges that have political coloring. We will have to decide the question of Shcharansky's trial, the preparation of which is completed now. As is known, Carter made a speech to the effect that Shcharansky should not be brought to responsibility. But we can not satisfy such a request. Shcharansky committed crimes and has to take full responsibility for them. He will be put on trial. But what is the best time for the trial? Perhaps it should be started on July 10, this seems to be better. The USSR Ambassador to the United States comrade Dobrynin also recommends this time.

We discussed all questions of organization of Shcharansky's trial together with comrades Rudenko and Smirnov. Shcharansky admits his guilt, we uncovered his spy activity and can provide appropriate materials. He is charged under two articles: under article 64 for espionage and under article 70 of the Criminal Code for betrayal of the Motherland. His trial will take place in the same courthouse as Orlov's. It is a good place, a club, a small audience will be appropriately prepared. Shcharansky

refuses to take a lawyer. He can refuse the lawyer named by the court. If he names another lawyer, and he has right to do it in the trial, then we will have to take a break for 5 days. Besides, we meant to publish a short report about the beginning of Shcharansky's trial. I believe it is not expedient to allow any correspondents into the trial.

EVERYBODY. Right, don't let them in.

ANDROPOV. What will Shcharansky's sentence be? Everything will depend on how he will behave himself. For example, Orlov was to be sentenced for three years according to the article of the Criminal Code, but he behaved in such a rude way during the trial that the court was obliged to sentence him for seven more years with further exile for five years. Shcharansky, of course, will not receive, say, the death sentence, but the court will give him a stern sentence of, say, 15 years.

As our Ambassador comrade Dobrynin reports, Carter asked not to mention Shcharansky's connections with CIA. This, of course, is up to the court; we must not conceal the materials, but maybe we can give comrade Dobrynin certain directions to talk with Vance and express to him the idea that the trial will be a closed one, but the court possesses numerous materials about Shcharansky's connections with the CIA. The Soviet court is very democratic, but everything will depend on how the defendant will behave himself; that also counts.

Comrade Andropov's information was taken into consideration.

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 42, dok. 72; obtained by D. Wolff; trans. M. Doctoroff.]

**Document 7: Political Letter of Soviet  
Ambassador to the United States  
Anatoly F. Dobrynin, 11 July 1978**

SECRET, Copy No. 2  
USSR Embassy in USA 11 July 1978  
Washington Issue No. 667

TO THE USSR MINISTRY OF  
FOREIGN AFFAIRS

To Com. GROMYKO, A.A.

I am sending a political letter, prepared by

the Embassy, in which are reviewed the basic elements of contemporary Soviet-American relations.

Attachment: the letter mentioned above, Secret, on 8 pages, to the addressee and to the file.

USSR AMBASSADOR IN THE USA  
/s/ A. DOBRYNIN

[attachment]

USSR EMBASSY in the USA  
Washington

SECRET, Copy No. 2  
11 July 1978  
Attachment to Issue No. 667

# SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY ERA (Political Letter)

Almost eighteen months ago—20 January 1977—the new, 39th President of the USA, J. Carter, stepped across the threshold of the White House. Since that time, a definite policy has been conducted by his administration, the basic elements of which are the subject of the review in the present political letter.

I. As has already been noted by the Embassy, Soviet-American relations during the Carter Administration have been characterized by instability, major swings, which to a great extent are due to its calculations of the state of affairs in both its internal and external dimensions. In the middle of April of this year, Carter, as is well known, conducted in his country residence, Camp David, a meeting of the members of his cabinet and closest advisors, at which was taken a decision to carry out a regular reevaluation of Soviet-American relations. The initiative for this affair came from Brzezinski and several Presidential advisors on domestic affairs, who convinced Carter that he would succeed in stopping the process of worsening of his position in the country if he would openly initiate a harsher course vis a vis the Soviet Union.

Africa (events on the Horn of Africa, and then in the Shaba Province of Zaire) was chosen as the pretext around which the Administration would begin earnestly to create tension in Soviet-American relations. In fact, in connection to these African events

it was decided to attempt a review of the entire concept of the policy of detente, subordinating it to the needs of the Administration, not stopping even before publicly putting under threat the chances of concluding a new agreement on the limitation of offensive strategic weapons (by artificially linking it with other issues).

In the country, however, by the way pretty unexpectedly for Carter, this “harsh” course, which had been firmly and clearly rejected by the Soviet Union, caused a reaction in which was evident a clear apprehension among broad strata of the American population regarding the long-term condition and fate of Soviet-American relations. There was expressed the depth of the American mood in support of the policy of detente, which had developed in the course of the last few years and which in the minds of the unsophisticated residents of this country is associated with a simple thesis: detente mitigates the threat of confrontation with the Soviet Union, and thus, of nuclear war with it. Characteristically, there were such apprehensions even in the Congress, the representatives of which began to demand explanations of the Administration, where anyway the matter of relations with the Soviet Union is heading and wasn’t the Administration trying to bring about some sort of big changes in these relations without the consent of the Congress.

And so, Carter became convinced that detente is not a “faucet” which he can turn on and off whenever he feels so disposed. The Administration was obliged to quickly make some adjustments in its position (particularly in light of the speech of L.I. Brezhnev, and also our answer in Pravda to Carter’s speech in Annapolis, which he had found to be unexpectedly firm). The President, having let Vance go out front, decided to restrain Brzezinski a bit. Vance usually stresses the positive accomplishments in Soviet-American relations without leaving out, however, the negative things which are associated with Carter himself (for example, the notorious policy of “defense of human rights” or “dissidents”).

2. Consequently, insofar as it is possible to judge on the basis of information which the Embassy has at its disposal, the Carter Administration has come to its own variety of a selective, half-hearted conception of detente (of which Brzezinski himself first accused us). Detente in its current

concrete application by the White House is, as if, being partitioned. It is seen as important and necessary—in support of the national interests of the United States itself and the corresponding formation of public opinion—regarding problems associated with nuclear weapons, issues of war and peace (limitation of strategic weapons, a total ban on nuclear tests, certain other disarmament-related issues). As far as the majority of other questions is concerned, as in the past it is applied subject to the “behavior” of the Soviet Union in Africa, in the Middle East, in relation to “human rights,” and so on. The reaction of the Administration to the recently-begun Shcharansky process is in this regard sufficiently instructive.

The Carter Administration variously denies that it is supporting a return to the “Cold War.” It seems that it fears a decline of relations with the Soviet Union to a level when the threat of a serious, to say nothing of a military, conflict with us would be interpreted by the American people, and also in other countries of the world, as something real. Carter, evidently has come to realize that this would cause deep alarm among the population of the country and would for him be a political loss, and maybe would represent a catastrophe in the 1980 presidential elections. In this regard the choice—“cooperation or confrontation”—which he tried to pose for us in his speech in Annapolis, seemed in its essence directed in the USA itself to him personally; the heartland is expecting from Carter himself an answer to that choice, and he—thanks to the adherence to principle in our position—has turned out to have not quite as free a choice as he tried to present it.

Overall, having moved to an obvious lowering of the level of relations with the Soviet Union, the Carter Administration has shown lately a desire to smooth them out a little. This however, should so far be understood like this, that although it is not generally averse to improving them, the White House at the same time does not want to sacrifice such irritants to our relations as efforts to interfere in our internal affairs or actions like Carter’s planned visit to the “Berlin Wall.” In a word, the Administration itself has imposed a definite barrier to the possible improvement in our relations (which coincides with the tasks of strengthening NATO, the arms race, the game with China, and so forth).

A lot depends, of course, on how the President himself will behave in the future. His views on Soviet-American relations, as in the past, are inconsistent, they contain plenty of dribs of this and drabs of that. Flirting with the conservative moods in the country (the strength of which he at times clearly overestimates), Carter frequently resorts to anti-Soviet rhetoric in order to, as they say, win cheap applause. The danger is found in the fact that such rhetoric is picked up and amplified by the means of mass communication, in Congress, and so forth. Ultimately, as often happens in the USA, the rhetoric is transformed, influences policy, and sometimes itself becomes policy.

It would be incorrect, however, to speak about some sort of hopelessness or irreconcilability in our relations with the USA and, in particular, with the current Administration, personally with Carter, although this issue is extremely complex.

In the USA other things are also going on, which, together with the noted-above general attitudes in the country, require Carter and the Administration to maintain relations with the Soviet Union at a certain level, regardless of all the vacillation of the current President. The following are included among these things:

- A general recognition in the USA of the primacy of Soviet-American relations (in its early days, the Administration—this was Brzezinski's doing—tried to reduce their significance, but had to stop doing this when it collided with the realities of the international situation.)

- The firm and principled line of the Soviet leadership on relations with the USA, which is finding here a growing response.

- In the ruling circles of the USA there is not by any means a united negative approach to relations with the Soviet Union. Influential political and business circles continue to support a search for agreement with us in various areas, understanding from experience that the paths of confrontation with us are hopeless.

- The Administration cannot but take into account the fact that the main Western partners of the USA—to say nothing of the majority of developing countries—speak more or less consistently in support of a policy of detente.

- Carter has to realize the vulnerability of his position in the 1980 Presidential elections, if he goes into those elections as a

President who caused a strategic arms agreement with the Soviet Union to fail, and who led Soviet-American relations to the edge of Cold War. Under conditions of an erosion of Carter's mass base in comparison to his standing in 1976, the issue of relations with the Soviet Union really could be decisive for Carter in the next Presidential elections.

- Under conditions of the serious economic difficulties facing the USA, the possibility of decreasing military spending by limiting the arms race is proving more and more impressive to average American taxpayers. For the population of the USA (and for Carter), inflation has become problem number 1.

Among Americans, as in the past, a strong mood "not to allow another Vietnam," particularly in Africa, continues to hold. In the same way, the Administration's interference in African affairs is causing growing suspiciousness among the Negro population of the country, which is feeling a sense of solidarity with the Africans in their conflict with the racist regimes. For Carter, who defeated Ford with the support of a majority of Negro voters, the views towards him of this category of Americans subsequently may become critically important.

3. On a practical level, the Carter Administration, based on everything, intends to continue the search for an agreement with the Soviet Union on those issues which are perceived by the public to touch directly on the problem of the prevention of nuclear war. It goes without saying that it is necessary to use this in our interest. On other issues, so far no Administration desire to review its position or to cease the anti-Soviet rhetoric to which it resorts from time to time is visible. This applies particularly to the "defense of human rights" in the Soviet Union, NATO military preparations, opposition to the Soviet Union in Africa, in the Middle East, and in other regions of the world. In this regard, special attention has lately been assigned to the Administration's policy towards China, which according to all signs bears witness—if not formally, then in essence—to its yearning for a plot with China against the interests of the Soviet Union. The danger of this course to our interests is self-evident. Brzezinski, whom Gus Hall named "the Carter regime's Rasputin," continues to play a significant

role in all of this.

Our firm reaction to the recent blast of anti-Soviet rhetoric by the Carter Administration forced it to noticeably soften its tone. We have to assert that this type of action will be effective in the future too. However, it would not be in our interests to pass by specific positive aspects of Carter's approach to relations with the Soviet Union—in the first place his great personal interest in a meeting with L.I. Brezhnev, his support in principle for a treaty on SALT, and others. Appropriate positive reactions from our side, apart from anything else, would strengthen the positions of those individuals and circles which are trying to influence the President from the perspective of the need for the development of Soviet-American relations over the long term.

A.A. Gromyko's meetings with Vance and Carter, and also L.I. Brezhnev's reception of Vance, have great significance in this regard.

X                      X  
                                 X

We consider the following approach to be expedient along the most important lines of our relations with the Carter Administration.

Continue to energetically pursue the working out of agreements on SALT and a total ban on nuclear tests, having in mind to create by these steps the political prerequisites for a Soviet-American summit meeting which could have decisive significance for normalization and then for improvement of our relations.

Taking into account the importance of the European path for the deepening of the policy of detente and from the point of view of counteracting the opponents of that policy in the USA, it is very important to work even more actively toward making progress on the Vienna negotiations on the limitation on conventional forces and armaments in Central Europe on the basis of our last proposals. It is necessary to maximally activate this line, which was noted in the L.I. Brezhnev's recent speeches, particularly in Minsk. It would be extremely important to achieve via the Vienna negotiations such a psychological situation, when in the minds of broad masses of American they would become as real and as necessary to reach a decision as the current Soviet-American SALT negotiations. Here is a significant area

for our propaganda in the USA.

- Regarding a Middle East settlement: As the Americans try, with the assistance of "artificial respiration," to extend the life of the Sadat "initiative," it is expedient, along with the indisputable continuation of our principled course, which has demonstrated its correctness, to once again, at the proper moment, publicly raise the issue of a resumption of preparations for the Geneva Conference, and in the presence of the Americans as co-chairmen, of fulfilling the joint Soviet-American communique of 1 October 1977. By doing this we will soundly throw a wrench into the Administration's current game. We should continue to reveal the hypocrisy of the USA in trying to show that it is equally close to the interests of the Arabs and Israel. At the same time we must more actively use the contradiction between the American imperialistic interests in the Middle East (oil, investment in Saudi Arabia, etc.) and Israeli-Zionist interests (open territorial expansion at the Arabs' expense).

- On the Chinese issue, we should continue to actively, publicly advance to the USA our thesis, that the Carter Administration's formation of a bloc with Beijing on an anti-Soviet basis would preclude to it opportunities for cooperation with the Soviet Union in the matter of a decrease in the threat of nuclear war and of arms limitation, particularly as regards SALT. We should support the growing feeling among Americans of anxiety regarding the possible consequences of the current course of the Administration vis a vis China. This became, according to our observations, especially noticeable here after Com. L.I. Brezhnev's warning in Minsk, since it has begun to occur to many Americans that the Administration's playing of the "Chinese card" carries with it potentially dangerous elements of confrontation with the Soviet Union which, which are detrimental to the USA, but in China's interests. Without the constant support and nurturing among Americans of these feelings of anxiety and preoccupation, as is now taking place in the USA in relation to SALT, the Administration's current covert move toward a deal with China may assume an even more open and dangerous character.

The immediate future, in any case the next month or month and a half, will be an extremely complex period in Soviet-Ameri-

can relations, and it will be difficult to count on any sort of noticeable positive shifts. More possibly, we can expect regular anti-Soviet outbursts about Shcharansky, [Aleksandr] Ginsburg, and others.

Later, however, with the achievement of a SALT agreement, which in itself will be a significant event, and when the Administration will have to more actively try to justify that agreement in Congress and before the public, it is possible to expect an improvement in the political climate in our relations. About that time an election campaign will be going on here, with its usual outburst of chauvinistic demagoguery and anti-Soviet propaganda.

On this issue it is indicative that our expression of firmness in relation to the prosecution of renegades like Shcharansky played its own role. The Carter Administration, despite all its rhetoric, was forced to retreat and to announce its intention to continue the Soviet-American negotiations on SALT aimed at the achievement of concrete results, and to declare that that agreement meets the interests not only of the Soviet Union, but also the national interests of the USA. "The Russians won this mini-confrontation;" such is the conclusion of the local political observers.

Finally, a Soviet-American summit may become the most important landmark from the point of view of a turn in our relations with the USA, taking into account the great political charge which such meetings carry.

Overall, it is important, as always, to consistently adhere to our principled line on the development of relations with the USA, to the achievement of concrete decisions and agreements wherever it coincides with our interests, and at the same time to give a decisive rebuff to unacceptable manifestations in the policy of the Carter Administration.

[A. DOBRYNIN]

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 76, dok. 28, ll. 1-9; document obtained by Carter-Brezhnev Project; translated by Mark Doctoroff.]

**Document 8: Transcript, Meeting of East German leader Erich Honecker and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, Crimea, USSR, 25 July 1978 (excerpt)**

REPORT ON THE MEETING  
BETWEEN SED GENERAL  
SECRETARY E. HONECKER AND  
L. I. BREZHNEV IN THE CRIMEA,  
25 JULY 1978

BREZHNEV: [Welcoming remarks; report on domestic issues]

The defense of the country is important. The strengthening of the country's defensive capabilities still requires our continual attention. Unfortunately, it is not possible to reduce military expenses significantly for now. NATO, especially the USA, is heating up the arms race. We must take care of our security and the security of our allies. The production of modern weapons is a heavy burden on the economy. But we view the strengthening of our defenses as a national as well as an international duty.

Allow me, L.I. Brezhnev said, two words on the trials against Shcharansky and Ginzburg. As you know, in the West a true witch dance has been staged over these two traitors whose hostile activities were inspired by subversive imperialist centers. The matter went far beyond the importance of the miserable roles which these people actually played. Actually this was an attempt of reactionary circles to test our strength, and we have vigorously demonstrated that any attempts to intervene in our affairs, to blackmail us, and to drive the matter, under the pretext of protecting human rights, to the point of creating a legal opposition against the Socialist order, are doomed to fail. I think, he [Brezhnev] said, that this should teach them once and for all.

As always, we have many concerns with regard to international affairs. The situation in the world has not developed badly in the last one to two years. On the one hand important results have been achieved under the conditions of detente, on the other hand we are experiencing an open activation of imperialist forces in their attempts to roll back the position of socialism in the various regions.

Soviet-American relations illustrate this. Speaking frankly, Leonid Ilyich said, the state [of U.S.-Soviet relations] leaves a lot to be desired. Although Carter has moderated his tone after the decisive rebuff we gave him, for now there is no reason to assume that he is willing to eliminate the principal matter which has caused the turn for

the worse in our relations. I am speaking above all of the arms race heightened by Washington which is at the same time delaying the negotiations on arms control, and the continuing campaign for the so-called "human rights."

At the center of attention at the meeting which recently took place between A. A. Gromyko and C. Vance were questions relating to a new agreement on the limitation of strategic arms, especially the question of new types of ballistic missiles. Should there be any [agreement on limitations] or not, and if so, to which [weapons] should they apply? The Americans tried this time again to handle the matter in a way that would assure them the possibility of developing missiles in which they have an interest without regard for our interests. We, by contrast, were willing to renounce on a mutual basis the creation of new intercontinental ballistic missiles for the entire term of the agreement. Since the Americans, however, still did not agree to this, they were asked directly whether they would agree to mutually acceptable solutions on all other questions on the basis of our proposals if we met them with regard to the question of new ballistic missiles.

Vance could not respond immediately and promised to do this later. But he said our position with regard to the solution of the remaining questions was indeed "very interesting." Carter in his press conference with [West German Chancellor Helmut] Schmidt later characterized the meeting between A. A. Gromyko and C. Vance as "constructive and useful." For now it is, of course, difficult to say what the final American response will be. But it is clear that in any case we still are facing a battle.

On the whole one can say that a settlement in the relations between the USSR and the USA is not to be expected anytime soon. Carter is wavering and apparently is listening to the forces for which detente goes against the grain, although he seems to be aware that it is necessary to search for agreements with us on the cardinal question of war and peace.

Another tendency within the policy of the American administration has recently become more powerful. I am talking about their efforts to play the "Chinese card." The question now is not simply a normalization of relations between the USA and China, but actually attempts at a rapprochement on an

anti-Soviet, anti-Socialist basis. This coincides with the efforts of the Chinese to use the "American card" in the fight against the USSR and the other countries of the Socialist community.

The other day we carefully analyzed the policy of the Chinese leadership in the C[entral] C[ommittee] and arrived at the conclusion that it is increasingly reactionary and aggressive in all directions. I am talking above all about the frank statements by Beijing in support of the plans of the revanchist circles in the FRG on the unity of Germany which de facto means the incorporation of the GDR.

No less telling are the public contacts by both sides with [Franz Joseph] Strauss, [Helmut] Kohl, and other rightist West German politicians.

Since it became an impediment to the implementation of their great power ambitions in Southeast Asia, Vietnam is now under massive pressure by the Chinese leadership. We are taking measures in order to support energetically our Vietnamese friends. These include various measures, among them military ones. It is good, Erich, he said, that during your visit to Hanoi the treaty of friendship and cooperation between the GDR and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam [SRV] was signed. I can tell you confidentially that [deleted] was recently with us, and besides other questions we also dealt with the possibility of a Soviet-Vietnamese Treaty.

In one word: we cannot desert Vietnam. It is our internationalist duty to strengthen and express our solidarity with this Socialist brother country and grant it comprehensive help, among other things via the COMECON [Council on Mutual Economic Assistance], an equal member of which the SRV has just become.

One of the main methods developed by Washington as well as Beijing is the differentiated approach to the Socialist countries as well as the attempts to drive a wedge between them and to bring them into confrontation with the Soviet Union. For this purpose they are actively taking advantage of the nationalistic deviations of such politicians as [Romanian leader Nicolae] Ceaucescu and make various promises. It is difficult to say something about his behavior. Basically he is a traitor. The devil knows what else he might possibly do. In this connection L. I. mentioned a saying by Stalin

on the problem of treason. In one word: we, Erich, draw the conclusion that we have to stick together even more and coordinate even further in proceeding in the international arena. Our leadership is convinced, Erich, that the new course of the CC of the SED in international affairs, your actions in an effort to accomplish a common line of the Socialist community, are being implemented with continued vigor.

[Brezhnev then discussed questions related to bilateral USSR-GDR relations]

Honecker:[expressed agreement with Brezhnev on state of international affairs, bilateral relations]

Initialed: E [rich]H[onecker]

*[Source: Stiftung "Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR" im Bundesarchiv (SAPMO-BArch) Berlin, DY30 JIV 2/201/1495; document obtained and translated by C.F. Ostermann (CWIHP/National Security Archive), copy on file at Natinal Security Archive.]*

**Document 9: Transcript, Meeting of East German leader Erich Honecker and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, Crimea, USSR, 27 July 1979 (excerpt)**

Minutes of the Meeting between SED General Secretary E. Honecker and L. I. Brezhnev in the Crimea, 27 July 1979 (dated 28 July 1979)

BREZHNEV:

[Welcoming remarks; comments on domestic situation, FRG-GDR relations]

And now on international questions.

We have comprehensively informed you on the results of the recent meeting with President Carter. I would like to emphasize that our politburo appreciates the support which the GDR and the other brother countries have given to the results of Vienna. I would put it this way - at the meeting in Vienna we accomplished the reestablishment of the direct dialogue between the USSR and the USA at the highest level. And even more - we managed to give a positive impulse to the entire complex of Soviet-American relations. All this is, of course, very important.

We did not have any illusions: there are quite a few dark moments in our rela-

tions with the USA. The negotiations were, frankly speaking, very difficult and this not only because of their intensity. The largest difficulties were connected with the nature of the questions with which we dealt, with the differences, yes, even with direct contrasts between our views.

As you know, it is not our habit to avoid difficult questions. The Middle East, South-east Asia, the situation in Southern Africa, the relationship between the USA and China - on all these questions I explained our basic point of view. With great determination I conveyed to Carter our opinion on the wrong theses of American propaganda with respect to the "Soviet threat" as well as with respect to the "violation of human rights" in the Socialist countries. Carter's situation, as the recent rearrangement in Washington proved, is not easy. A bitter battle over the coming into force [ratification] of the SALT II-Treaty is now being waged. If the treaty failed in the Senate, this would be, I think, a political catastrophe for Carter. But it would also be an extremely severe blow to the international prestige of the USA.

You will of course understand that, by and large, the prospect of the failure of the treaty is not desirable for us. But even in such a case, we will probably not lose politically because then the entire world will recognize who is consistently seeking disarmament and who is working in the opposite direction. But we all should try - in the framework of our means - to make sure this important matter will have a different end.

And now to the European matters. Here obviously much depends on proceeding with our initiatives in the field of disarmament which we have taken at the meeting of the [Warsaw Pact] Political Consultative Committee in Moscow and later at the meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers in Budapest.

The reaction to our proposal has been a bit vague. The NATO countries seem to have acknowledged the positive direction of the efforts of the Warsaw Pact countries but an audible "yes" was not to be heard. It is good that currently the necessary link is being established at the level of foreign ministries between the European conference on military detente as proposed by us and the European meeting [of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)] in Madrid in 1980.

If our proposal on the conclusion of a

treaty on the non-first use of nuclear weapons as well as other kinds of arms is accepted, it would, I must say, constitute a tremendous advantage for the cause of detente. By the way, I have also talked about this with Carter. We have proposed to him a declaration to the effect that both sides would forego the first use of either nuclear or conventional arms against the other side or its allies. Initially Carter declared that he would agree and said that one could try to arrange for an agreeable formula. But later the Americans put on the reverse gear. But one has to understand that after all we wrestled six years over the conclusion of SALT II.

The Chinese problem still demands greatest attention.

The nature of Chinese foreign policy revealed itself in China's aggression against Vietnam. The Chinese are now negotiating with the Vietnamese comrades but they are conducting the negotiations in a way that it becomes obvious that they do not want a normalization of relations but Vietnam's capitulation. Moreover, there is a real danger of new Chinese provocations against Vietnam. One has to take that seriously. This obliges all of us, of course, not to weaken in the slightest manner our support and our help for the Vietnamese people as well as for the peoples of Laos and Cambodia. There are more than enough problems and extremely difficult problems. Let's take the "refugee" matter. The enemies of Vietnam have undertaken everything in order to make use of this problem to create a bad image of Vietnamese policy. To be sure, they did not manage to turn the Geneva conference into a trial of Vietnam. But obviously the matter cannot be put to rest. The Vietnamese friends are facing a great political and propagandistic job. We all have to support them in this task.

Now briefly on our imminent negotiations with the Chinese about which you have learned from the newspapers. One cannot expect quick progress in the Soviet-Chinese dialogue. The negotiations with China will require great patience, circumspection, and exact calculation of each of our steps.

That having been said, I think it is important for all of us not to relent in our opposition against China's policy which runs counter to the cause of peace and international security.

A few words on the Middle East. The fact that the question of prolonging the terms

for the presence of UN special forces on the Sinai Peninsula does not appear any more on the agenda of the Security Council undoubtedly constitutes a success for our common line. Hence the attempts to bless Israel's separate agreement with Egypt directly with the authority of the UN failed. And that was exactly what Cairo, Tel Aviv and Washington persistently tried to achieve. But now the UN special troops have to be withdrawn.

With respect to international questions, Erich, I would like to briefly touch upon the situation in Africa.

Recently we have had quite active contacts with representatives of the progressive African states. To generalize these talks and the observations made by our comrades, and our CC comrades as well, the task of politically strengthening the independent African countries is still in the forefront. But the problem of our economic relations with these states is already posed in its fullest extent. It is important and valuable that we vigorously oppose colonialism and racism. But the task which we have to meet together has larger dimensions. It is necessary to involve the African countries to a larger degree in cooperation with us in the economic field. This will be of advantage to us as well as the Africans. Your trip through a number of African countries, Erich, proved very useful. We highly appreciate your efforts in support of the progressive forces in Africa.

[concluding remarks]

Honecker: [report on domestic Issues]

[Source: SAPMO-BArch, DY30 JIV 2/201/1313; document obtained and translated by C.F. Ostermann (CWIHP/National Security Archive); copy on file at the Archive.]

**Document 10: CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 1 February 1980, with telegrams to Soviet Ambassador to West Germany (for Willy Brandt) and Finnish Social Democratic leader K. Sorsa (not printed)**

*Proletariats of all countries, unite!*  
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.  
CENTRALCOMMITTEE  
TOP SECRET

No. P182/2

To Comrades Brezhnev, Suslov, Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Pel'she, Ponomarev,

Zimianin, Zamiatin, Rusakov

Extract from protocol No. 182 of the session of the Politburo of the CC CPSU of 1 February 1980

Re: Information for the Chairman of the Sotzintern [Socialist International] W. Brandt and the Chairman of the Social-Democratic Party of Finland, K. Sorsa.

1. Confirm the text of a telegram to the Soviet Ambassador to the FRG (Attachment 1).

2. Confirm the text of information for transmittal to K. Sorsa (Attachment 2).

SECRETARY OF THE CENTRAL  
COMMITTEE  
Attachments to No. 300s

[attachment 1]

Re: Item 2, Protocol No. 182

SECRET  
Attachment 1

BONN

TO SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Meet personally with W. Brandt, tell him that you are authorized to communicate certain views on the international situation that has developed, and expound on the following text.

Recently, especially in connection with decisions of the December session of the NATO Council, events have transpired that have sharply complicated the international situation.

It is possible that we do not share the same views on everything. One way or another, under present circumstances, precise and first hand information about assessments and intentions becomes especially necessary. The important thing is to find a common language on the issue that has already been the topic of our mutual preoccupation for many years - how to support the aim of strengthening international security.

Our general assessment of, and our position on, the current international situation, are known to you from the responses of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev to questions put forward by the newspaper "Pravda," published on January 13 of this year. That document reflects the principled position of the Central Committee of the CPSU, from which

we shall proceed.

We would like to communicate to you our viewpoint on several concrete issues.

The "Carter Doctrine." The general assessment of it by the Soviet side is set forth in the leading article of the newspaper "Pravda" dated January 29 of this year. In our view, the platform articulated in the American President's speech, with which you are familiar, expresses in a concentrated form the course of the present American administration, which was not just adopted today, in connection with the events in Afghanistan. This course had already emerged a long time ago.

Fact No. One. At the May 1978 special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York, the urgent issues relating to disarmament were discussed, in connection with which the comprehensive program of actions proposed by the Soviet Union occupied the center of attention.

However, during the very same period of days, in Washington, a session of the NATO Council at the highest level adopted a "long term program" of acceleration in armaments, calculated over a period of ten to fifteen years. At the same time, President Carter proclaimed a doctrine of global actions by NATO, expanding the "sphere of responsibility" of that military bloc into widening regions, significantly exceeding the framework stipulated in the agreement that created the North Atlantic Bloc. In the application of this plan, NATO has appropriated to itself the right to interfere militarily, particularly in Africa (recalling the events of Zaire). Finally, at the same time, American official powers for the first time openly proclaimed a tie between their interests, the interests of NATO, and the interests of the Chinese Government, which, as is known, blatantly undermines the policy of detente.

Fact No. Two. A little more than half a year ago, Carter signed the SALT II Agreement and spoke of its great significance for the cause of peace and security. However, in the last year, the American administration has essentially ruined the chances for ratification of the agreement.

Fact No. Three. In the autumn of this year, the American government has undertaken active measures to organize a provocative outcry concerning "Soviet forces in Cuba." This Cuban "mini-crisis" has been

necessary in order to whip up military fears and further propagate the myth about a "Soviet threat," to complicate the process for ratification of SALT II and to justify new military measures aimed at the reinforcement of the hegemonic and imperialistic aspirations of the USA. This was a distinctive rehearsal for that which is presently being perpetrated in connection with the events in Afghanistan.

Fact No. Four. In October and November of last year, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev put forward a comprehensive program to advance the cause of military detente in Europe, called for immediate negotiations, and the Soviet Union also undertook unilateral steps, with which you are familiar, aimed at the lessening of military confrontation in Europe.

The USSR has adamantly called for the institution of negotiations for the reduction of intermediate range nuclear weapons in Europe prior to the adoption of a decision on new American missiles.

And what was the response of the USA? The American administration literally untied the hands of its confederates and set about in such a way that the December session of the NATO Council adopted a decision to produce and deploy in Western Europe new nuclear missile armaments, representing a substantial increase in the already existing American arms deployed at the frontline and aimed at the Soviet Union.

Fact No. Five. Immediately following the NATO session and despite the voices resonating there about intentions to strive for a reduction in the level of military confrontation in Europe, President Carter is pushing through Congress a five year program of automatic (that is, irrespective of any changes in the international situation) build-up in the arms race.

Fact No. Six. Already this year, citing the events in Afghanistan, President Carter is embarking upon full blown measures to curtail Soviet-American relations and even to apply so-called economic sanctions against the Soviet Union. The SALT II Agreement has been withdrawn from consideration and its ratification has been postponed for an indefinite period.

On the heels of this the "Carter Doctrine" is proclaimed.

In it is a summary of the measures undertaken by the American administration in recent time to escalate the arms race and in-

flame international tensions. We are talking about efforts to resurrect the doctrines from the days of the Cold War - "containment" and "rolling back" of Socialism, and "brinkmanship."

During meetings with the working group of the Sotzintern [Socialist International] in Moscow, the issue was discussed as to where the policy of President Carter is leading. Now, that is fully apparent. We are literally talking about the destruction of that which was achieved in the last ten years, accomplished by men of good will, including the Social Democrats.

Under these circumstances it is mandatory to reaffirm the policy of detente in international tensions. Great significance adheres in pronouncements to the effect that it is now important to "preserve cool heads and continue the process of negotiations," that "hysteria must not substitute for rational policy," and that "it is necessary to beware of ill-conceived and hypertrophied [sic] reactions which do not conform to the reality of events and which, in their entirety, could lead to an even worse situation."

Our position is to seriously, responsibly, and adamantly adhere to the principles of peaceful co-existence, and to everything positive in the development of normalized, mutually advantageous relations between governments that was achieved in the process of detente.

Events in Afghanistan. We would request you to examine them without the prejudice and hysteria characteristic of the Carter Administration.

We think it would be useful to bring the following information to your attention.

The facts establish that only a short time after the April revolution of 1978, an intense "undeclared war" was instigated against Afghanistan. Bands of mercenaries, financed with money from the CIA and Beijing, have literally terrorized the civilian population of that country. Pakistan has become the principal staging ground for this war. Here, more than twenty bases and fifty support points have been created, at which terrorist and military detachments are trained under the direction of American, Chinese, Pakistani and Egyptian instructors. In just the period between July 1978 until November 1979, the training of not less than 15,000 individuals was carried out there. They are equipped with American and Chinese weapons and then dispatched into the

territory of Afghanistan. Moreover, they do not conceal their aim - to liquidate the April revolution, to reinstate the previous anti-popular order, to convert Afghanistan into a staging ground for aggression against the USSR, with which that country has a 2,000 kilometer border.

These plans were carried out by the previous leader of Afghanistan, H. Amin, sustained, as the facts attest, in large part by the CIA. Having entered into a contract with emigre leaders, he prepared a counter-revolutionary coup and carried out acts of repression against genuine patriots on an unprecedented scale. After seizing power, Amin physically destroyed H. M. Taraki, president of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, a veteran soldier against Afghan despotism. The government of Afghanistan, led by B. Karmal, turned once again to the Soviet Union for help, as Taraki had done.

Responding to the request of the Afghan government for help in the struggle against interventionist activity directed by Washington and Beijing, we acted in accordance with Article 4 of the Soviet-Afghan Treaty on Friendship, Neighborly Relations and Cooperation, concluded in 1978. Our assistance is also fully in accord with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, providing for the right of any government to collective self-defense, that is, the right to appeal to any other country for help in defending against aggression. And in the case of Afghanistan - and we want to emphasize this once more - there was and continues to be external aggression, the form of which, as defined by the 29th Session of the U.N. General Assembly, consists of "the sending of armed bands, groups or regular forces or mercenaries by a government or in the name of a government, which carry out acts in the application of military force against another government."

In fulfillment of our treaty commitments, we were obligated to defend the national sovereignty of Afghanistan against external aggression. Moreover, we were unable to stand by idly, in view of the fact that the USA is attempting (with the assistance of China) to create a new and dangerous military-strategic staging ground on our southern border.

We would like to emphasize that our actions in no way affect the legitimate national interests of the United States or any

other government. We have never had and do not have any expansionist plans in relation to Afghanistan, Iran, or Pakistan. We reject as a malicious lie any talk that our goal is to expand into the "third world" or toward sources of oil. As soon as the reasons have dissipated which caused the Afghan government to address us with a request for the dispatch of Soviet forces, they will be withdrawn from Afghanistan.

At the present time, the military intervention by Washington and Beijing in the affairs of Afghanistan has by no means come to a halt. Washington is openly accelerating the delivery of arms to the so-called insurgents. As illustrated by the visit of the minister of foreign affairs for the PRC, Huang Hua, Beijing does not lag behind Washington. Huang Hua assured the ring-leader of the mercenaries that China will also henceforth render them assistance and support "without any limitations."

Washington and Beijing are also attempting to enlist several Arab states in their aggressive actions against Afghanistan (Egypt, Saudi Arabia and others). In this fashion, Washington and Beijing are specifically following a course designed to create a hotbed of international tension in the Middle East.

At the same time a profusion of unmitigated nonsense is being voiced about some kind of occupation by us in Afghanistan or about a usurpation of that country's sovereign rights by the Soviet Union. Every one who is in Afghanistan these days, including correspondents from the Western information services, acknowledges that circumstances are normalizing there. The new Afghan leadership, headed by Babrak Karmal, is pursuing a rational and sober policy, attempting to eliminate the remnants of the policies of H. Amin, and to reinstate democratic freedoms. All political detainees, representatives of the intelligentsia and the clergy have been released from prison. Relations are improving with the nomadic population, the Muslim clergy, although, speaking candidly, the situation in the south-east and eastern provinces, where terrorists are operating, remains tense.

The Afghan government has declared - and has confirmed by means of practical measures - its firm intention to pursue a policy of international peace and friendship and a policy of non-alignment. It is undertaking all measures toward the establishment

of normalized relations with neighboring states based on principles of peaceful coexistence and non-interference in the internal affairs of one another. Such is the truth about Afghanistan.

Our position on the decisions of the December session of the NATO Council. You are already aware of our principal assessment of its results. Here are several additional observations.

As you are aware, the Soviet Union has warned more than once, that if NATO in December implements its decision, then it will knock the ground out from underneath negotiations and destroy their basis. Our agreement to negotiations in the face of the NATO decision would mean conducting them as to the reduction only of Soviet defensive capacity at the same time as the United States is carrying out, in full stride, preparations for new nuclear missile systems.

In the communique from the session of the NATO Council, the condition was laid down in the harshest of terms that negotiations shall be conducted only in regard to American and Soviet tactical nuclear intermediate land based missile systems. Excluded from these proposed "negotiations," and to be preserved inviolable, are all of the other means of front line deployment belonging to the USA, and the nuclear arsenals of other Western European countries, that is to say, everything in respect to which the Soviet intermediate range forces serve as a counterbalance. They are demanding of the Soviet Union a sharp reduction in its existing defensive forces with a simultaneous preservation of the entire existing powerful NATO nuclear potential, aimed against the USSR and its allies.

Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, in his recent interview with the newspaper Pravda, stated that "the present position of the NATO countries renders negotiations on this question impossible." At the same time, Comrade Brezhnev emphasized that "we are for negotiations, but honest and co-equal ones which conform to the principal of parity in security."

#### Our long term intentions

It is apparent that Carter and Brzezinski are gambling on the prospect of intimidating the USSR, on the isolation of our country, and on the creation of difficulties wher-

ever possible. This policy is doomed to failure, because it is impossible to intimidate the USSR or to shake its determination.

In this complicated situation, the leadership of the CPSU does not intend to adopt a policy of "fighting fire with fire." We shall henceforth exhibit a maximum degree of cool-headedness and reasonable judgment. We shall do everything possible to prevent the Carter administration from drawing us into confrontation and undermining detente. We shall not engage, as the American administration is doing, in impulsive acts which can only intensify the situation and play into the hands of the proponents of the "Cold War."

The American side, forgetting the elementary principals of restraint and prudence, is conducting a policy leading to the destruction of all the inter-governmental ties which were constructed with such difficulty during the past years. Moreover, and this can no longer be doubted, the Carter administration is striving to spoil the relations of the West European countries with the Soviet Union, and is demanding support from them for its dangerous line, i.e., that they subject themselves to that policy which Washington considers necessary.

A great deal that is positive and constructive could be achieved in connection with the meetings that have taken place in Madrid by the conference on issues of European security and cooperation, as well as on the path to implementation of the proposal of the Warsaw Pact countries concerning the conduct of a conference on military detente and disarmament.

In a word, despite all the gravity of the developing international situation, we believe that there is a possibility of bringing to a halt the dangerous development toward which the present administration in Washington is pushing.

The entirety of these circumstances demands joint efforts from all who value the cause of peace and detente.

In Moscow, the meetings with you in the Soviet Union are fondly recalled, and it is believed that they were useful.

If Mr. Brandt should request a text, deliver it to him, translated into German. [a similar telegram was approved to be sent to Sorsa (not printed)—ed.]

[Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 34, dok. 4; obtained by D. Wolff; trans. M. Doctoroff.]

## EUROPE IN THE COLD WAR

Call for Contacts: from the European Project Group "Europe in the Cold War"

A group of European historians has recently taken an initiative in setting up a project to reappraise the Cold War in Europe from 1943-1989.

We believe that, now that the archives in Moscow and in several Eastern European countries are increasingly being opened to scholars, this is a timely and important opportunity to examine the realities of the Cold War and its impact on the countries of Western and Eastern Europe.

We have set up a long-term research project on the subject, which will involve at least seven Euro-international conferences. It is hoped that the proceedings of each conference will be edited and published as a series of books. The first conference, on "The Failure of Peace in Europe, 1943-1948," took place in Florence in June 1996. The second conference, on the period from the Berlin Crisis to the death of Stalin, is to be held in Paris in the autumn of 1998.

We are interested in building our contacts with historians of the Cold War in Europe and especially those from Russia and Eastern Europe. Those with inquiries, suggestions, or contributions may contact any of the following members of the Steering Committee:

#### ITALY (Co-ordinating Centre):

**Prof. Ennio Di Nolfo/Prof. Antonio Varsori**, Dipartimento Di Studi Sullo Stato, Università Degli Studio Di Firenze, fax: 0039-55-2345486

#### BRITAIN:

**Dr. Saki Dockrill/Dr. D.B.G. Heuser**, Department of War Studies, King's College, London, fax: 0044-171-873-2026.

#### FRANCE:

**Prof. Georges-Henri Soutou**, Ecole Doctorale Mondes contemporaines, Université de Paris, IV-Sorbonne, fax: 0033-1-404-62588.

#### GERMANY:

**Prof. Dr. Wilfried Loth**, Kulturwissenschaftliches Institut, Essen, fax: 0049-201-460674

**Prof. Dr. Klaus Schwabe**, Historisches Institut, RWTH, Aachen, fax: 0049-241-8888357.

#### USA:

**Prof. Vojtech Mastny**, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., fax: 001-49-357-4439

# *Concerning the situation in “A”:* New Russian Evidence on the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan

by Odd Arne Westad

In the winter of 1994-95, as Russian tanks and planes were pounding the Chechen capital of Grozny into rubble, I felt a painful, almost menacing, sense of *déjà vu*. I had just returned from Moscow where I had been conducting interviews and collecting documents for a book on Soviet-era interventions, and I was struck by how rhetorically and structurally similar the Chechen operation was to the invasions of Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Afghanistan (1979). At the heart of all of these interventions was an inability within the Soviet (or Russian) leadership to communicate effectively and to reach settlements once a conflict had reached a certain level. In terms of personalities, all of them were directed against former “allies”: Imre Nagy, Alexander Dubcek, Hafizullah Amin, and Dzhokar Dudaiev had little in common beyond having spent most of their lives serving a Communist party. In all four cases it seems like it was the broken trust, the sense of betrayal and ingratitude, which propelled the men in the Kremlin past initial doubts and hesitations up to the moment when someone said, “Go!”

From what we know, the Kremlin processes of decision-making on foreign policy crises have stayed remarkably intact since the Bolshevik revolution. Although the degree of absolute centralization on such issues has differed—from the one-man rule of Stalin, Gorbachev, and (when healthy, at least) Yeltsin to the small collectives of the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras—the number of people actually involved in preparing and making essential foreign policy decisions has remained extremely limited. As in most bureaucra-

cies, the men at the second level spend most of their time trying to second-guess what their bosses really want in terms of alternatives and conclusions. Add to this the paranoia and fear bred by an authoritarian political system, and the result is a distorted, dysfunctional decision-making process, in which essential commodities like time, information, and trust are even scarcer than in the West.

The most immediate parallel to the Chechen crisis was of course the intervention in Afghanistan. In both cases, the final decision to commit troops was made by an ailing and isolated leader; reports on conversations with Boris Yeltsin from late 1994 through late 1996 sounded remarkably similar to conversations with Leonid Brezhnev during the period surrounding the decision to invade Afghanistan fifteen years earlier. Their political attention span and field of vision much reduced, both tended to view decisions in strongly personalized terms. To Brezhnev, Amin was the “dirty fellow” who usurped power by killing President Nur Mohammed Taraki just days after the president had been embraced by Brezhnev in Moscow. To Yeltsin, Dudaiev was a “scoundrel” who tried to blackmail him and challenged his manly courage. Neither could be permitted to remain if the self-image of the ailing Kremlin leader was to stay intact.

Around the sickly heads of state, factional politics flourished, with institutional rivalries particularly strong. During both crises the heads of the military and security institutions drove events—in 1979 and 1994 it was the defense ministers, Dmitri Ustinov and Pavel Grachev, who made the final push for intervention. Because of departmental jealousies, in operational terms

both interventions consisted of two separate plans—one political and one military—which, at the last moment, were merged to form one operation, more substantial and therefore more difficult to manage. Since nobody in Moscow could define exactly who the enemy was, massive force became a useful drug against the painful search for political and military precision.

In the fall of 1995, a group of scholars and former Soviet and American officials with special knowledge of the Afghanistan intervention and its effect on Soviet-American relations gathered for a three-day meeting in the Norwegian village of Lysebu, outside Oslo.<sup>1</sup> Among the participants on the American side were Carter Administration veterans Stansfield Turner, then Director of Central Intelligence; William Odom and Gary Sick, assistants to National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski on Soviet and Near Eastern affairs, respectively; and Marshall Shulman, then Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance’s main adviser on the Soviet Union. On the Russian side sat several key survivors of the Brezhnev era, led by former ambassador to the United States Anatolii F. Dobrynin and Gen. Valentin Varennikov, then Commander of Soviet ground forces. There were also some lesser known faces: Gen. Leonid Shebarshin, former head of KGB foreign intelligence (and in the late 1970s head of the KGB station in Teheran), and Karen Brutents, former Deputy Head of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU).

The conference was the latest in a series of such gatherings of former Soviet and American officials to explore the reasons behind the collapse of su-

perpower detente in the mid-1970s, and whether those events suggested any lessons for current and future Russian-American relations. They were organized as part of the "Carter-Brezhnev Project," spearheaded by Dr. James G. Blight of the Thomas J. Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University. Among the scholarly organizations supporting the Project's efforts to obtain fresh evidence from American, Russian, and other archives were the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository based at George Washington University; the Cold War International History Project, at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington; the Norwegian Nobel Institute; and the Institute for General History, Russian Academy of Sciences.

Prior to the Afghanistan session, which took place in Lysebu on 17-20 September 1995, the Carter-Brezhnev Project had organized two other major oral history conferences on the events of the late 1970s: on SALT II and the growth of U.S.-Soviet distrust, held at the Musgrove Plantation, St. Simons Island, Georgia, on 6-9 May 1994; and on U.S.-Soviet rivalry in the Third World, held in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, on 23-26 March 1995. For each conference, a briefing book was prepared by the National Security Archive with support from CWIHP and other Project affiliates, containing declassified U.S. documents and English translations of documents obtained from Russian (and East German) archives, including those of the Russian Foreign Ministry and the former CC CPSU.<sup>2</sup> Many of these translations appear in this *Bulletin*.

In the case of the Afghanistan-related documents printed below, the translations include, for the most part, materials declassified by Russian authorities as part of Fond 89, a collection prepared for the Russian Constitutional Court trial of the CPSU in 1992 and now stored at the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD) in Moscow; translations of these documents—most of which were obtained and provided to CWIHP by Mark Kramer (Harvard Univer-

sity)—were commissioned by CWIHP. (CWIHP also expresses thanks to Raymond L. Garthoff and Selig Harrison for providing copies of Russian documents on Afghanistan.) Other materials were gathered and translated as a result of research by the present author and for the Lysebu conference. In addition to the documents published in this issue of the *Bulletin*, my summary of Soviet decision-making on Afghanistan from early October to mid-December 1979 is based on the transcript of the Nobel Symposium of Afghanistan and conversations with former senior Soviet officials at that meeting.

The Lysebu meeting's aim was to retrace the final steps of Soviet decision-making on the Afghanistan intervention and to investigate the U.S. response. The method is known as critical oral history: groups of former policymakers query each other on motives, issues, and actions, prodded by groups of scholars using newly declassified documents. As in previous meetings of this kind—for instance the series of conferences held in 1987-1992 on the Cuban Missile Crisis<sup>3</sup>—more than history was up for discussion. "Lessons" and relevance for today's leaders were on everybody's mind and the conversations were filled with "presentisms." In this conference, if someone had suddenly replaced "Afghanistan" with "Chechnya" or some possible site for future Russian interventions, I do not think that the core issues of the conversation would have changed much.

In retrospect, the Afghanistan intervention stands as an avoidable tragedy, a tragedy in which the final script was ordained by perceptions, personalities, and ideology far more than "interests" and "strategies." Although substantial resistance to the invasion plans emerged within the Soviet hierarchy, the real story is how easily this opposition could be overcome by a tiny group of people at the pinnacle of power.<sup>4</sup>

The documents published in this *Bulletin* show how the Soviet leaders gradually increased their commitment to the Afghan Communist party (the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, or PDPA) after the Communist

coup in April 1978 (the "Saur [April] Revolution"). In spite of their misgivings about the lapses and limitations of the Afghan Communist leaders, the members of the Soviet Politburo could not bring themselves to give up on the building of socialism in a neighboring country. As the political and military predicament of the Kabul regime deepened, Soviet advisers came to substitute for the "revolutionary masses" and the "Afghan Communists," keeping the regime going while the "progressive strata" had time to develop. In the process, institutional and personal links were forged between Soviets and Afghans, increasing the Kremlin's sense of commitment as well as the Kabul leadership's ability to avail themselves of Moscow's resources.<sup>5</sup>

As seen from Moscow, the developments in Iran in the winter of 1978-79 suddenly increased the importance of the Afghan revolution. The rise of the Islamic radicals in Teheran took the Soviets by surprise and created political instability in the region, forcing the Kremlin to devote more attention to the situation along the USSR's southern borders. The overthrow of the Shah presented both opportunities and dangers to the Soviet leadership: Many of those reporting to the Kremlin on Iranian and Afghan affairs expected the Iranian Communists to gradually strengthen their position. But at the same time, Washington's "loss" of Iran alerted the Politburo for the first time to the possibility—however remote—that the Americans would attempt to replace their lost positions there with fresh outposts in Afghanistan.<sup>6</sup>

When the introduction of Soviet troops was first discussed in March 1979, after a rebellion had broken out against the Communist regime in Western Afghanistan (and particularly in the major city of Herat), the Kremlin leaders hesitantly concluded that "in no case will we go forward with a deployment of troops in Afghanistan." Politburo members Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin and CC Secretary Andrei Kirilenko, who until the end opposed a Soviet invasion, argued that the Afghan Communists themselves were to blame for the rebellion. "We gave [them] ev-

everything,” Kirilenko told the Politburo. “And what has come of it? Nothing of any value. After all, it was they who executed innocent people for no reason and told us that we also executed people in Lenin’s time. You see what kind of Marxists we have found.”<sup>7</sup>

It was President Taraki’s murder by his second-in-command Hafizullah Amin in October 1979—shortly after he had stopped off in Moscow for a cordial meeting with Brezhnev on his way back from a non-aligned summit meeting in Havana—which set the Soviets on the course to intervention. In light of past Soviet support for Taraki, the KGB suspected Amin of planning what Shebarshin called “doing a Sadat on us”: a wholesale defection from the Soviet camp and an alignment with the United States—as Egyptian President Anwar Sadat had done earlier in the 1970s—which would allow the Americans to place “their control and intelligence centers close to our most sensitive borders.” The KGB closely monitored Amin’s meetings with U.S. officials in Kabul in late October, believing that Washington was eying a replacement for its lost electronic intelligence collection posts in northern Iran.<sup>8</sup>

Although no political orders had yet been issued concerning a possible intervention, the military chiefs of staff in late October 1979 began preparations and some training for such a mission. These orders reflected the increased concern of Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov over the Afghan issue, and his sense that proposing an intervention might soon become politically acceptable to his colleagues. In the not-too-subtle game of who would succeed Brezhnev—which by late 1979 was in full swing in the Politburo—a premium was being placed on both caution and enterprise: “Recklessness” or “being a Napoleon” were potentially deadly epithets to hurl at a politically ambitious Defense Minister, while “forcefulness” and “looking after our interests” could be used as arguments in his favor.

Ustinov’s colleague, collaborator, and sometime rival, KGB chief Yuri Andropov, also started leaning toward military intervention in late 1979. The KGB had overseen several Soviet bids

since the summer to remove Amin from the Afghan leadership, including two assassination attempts. None of these efforts had succeeded, a fact which cannot have pleased the ambitious Andropov and may have weakened his political position. In late November, after Amin had demanded the replacement of Soviet ambassador to Kabul A.M. Puzanov, Andropov and Ustinov decided that the only way to resolve the Afghan issue was the combination of a Soviet military intervention and the physical elimination of Hafizullah Amin. Amin’s persistent calls for increased USSR military aid, including Soviet troops, emboldened them and made it easier for them to present their suggestions to the Politburo.

The increasing strains in East-West relations—including in the essential field of arms control—over the last months of 1979 may also have influenced Andropov and Ustinov’s decision, and certainly made it easier for them to convince some of their colleagues. The long-awaited Carter-Brezhnev summit in Vienna in June 1979 had, despite the signing of a SALT II treaty, failed to generate much momentum toward an improvement in ties between Washington and Moscow. Moreover, the NATO decision that fall to deploy a new class of medium range nuclear missiles in Europe and the increasing reluctance of the US Senate to ratify the SALT II pact removed the concerns of some Politburo-members over the effects a Soviet intervention might have on detente. As one of the Soviet conference participants put it in Oslo, “by winter of 1979 detente was, for most purposes, already dead.” The bleak outlooks on the diplomatic front helped carry the day with Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, who at the best of times was a somewhat pusillanimous participant in Soviet high politics, opposing intervention in March only after being sure which way the wind was blowing in the Politburo discussions.

The KGB and Defense Ministry heads had two remaining obstacles to overcome in their determination to send Soviet troops to Afghanistan. First, they had to narrow the field of participants in the decision-making process to an

absolute minimum, to make sure that the decision was not delayed by the formal submission of reports from various departments and ministries to the Politburo. In this effort, they were assisted by ideology chief Mikhail Suslov and Brezhnev’s chief adviser on foreign policy, Andrei Aleksandrov-Agentov. Brutents, the deputy head of the CPSU CC International Department, told the Lysebu meeting that in early December 1979, as he was preparing a report on the issue of a potential Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, he got a telephone call from Alexandrov-Agentov. “First, he asked me what I was doing. When I told him, he asked, ‘And what exactly are you writing there?’ When I told him that I was going to write a negative opinion, he said: ‘So, do you suggest that we should give Afghanistan to the Americans?’ And he immediately ended the conversation.” Brutents’ report was not in the materials prepared for the Politburo members at the climactic meetings.

The last obstacle on the path to intervention was winning over, or at least neutralizing, those Politburo members, such as Kosygin and Kirilenko, who throughout the crisis had vocally opposed the idea of sending in Soviet troops. Ustinov and Andropov realized that the only way to ensure that a proposal for intervention would carry the day in the Politburo was to convince Brezhnev of the need to strike fast. The party head—by nature cautious and circumspect on international issues—was persuaded by arguments closely tied to his personal status on the world stage. Gen. Aleksandr Liakhovskii told the Lysebu meeting that after Amin’s coup, “Brezhnev’s attitude to the entire issue had changed. He could not forgive Amin, because Brezhnev had personally assured Taraki that he would be able to help him. And then they disregarded Brezhnev completely and murdered Taraki. Brezhnev used to say, ‘how should the world be able to believe what Brezhnev says, if his words do not count in Afghanistan?’”

Andropov’s remarkable personal and handwritten letter to Brezhnev in early December—read aloud by Dobrynin to the Lysebu conference

from notes he had taken in the Russian Presidential Archives—summed up the case for intervention. According to the KGB chief, Amin was conducting “behind-the-scenes activities which may mean his political reorientation to the West.” In addition, Andropov told the chronically ill and enfeebled leader, Amin “attacks Soviet policy and the activities of our specialists.” But Andropov dangled before Brezhnev a possible remedy for his Afghan troubles: A group of anti-Amin Afghan Communists, mostly belonging to the minority Parcham faction, who had been living under KGB tutelage in exile, had, “without changing their plans for an uprising, appealed to us for assistance, including military assistance if needed.” Although Andropov evidently still felt unwilling to ask Brezhnev directly and explicitly to support sending in Soviet troops, his letter made the case for such an intervention, the framework of which was already being discussed between the KGB head and the defense minister.

Although agreeing with Andropov concerning the political purpose of the use of Soviet troops, Defense Minister Ustinov was not willing to accept a limited operation along the lines recommended by the KGB head. Varennikov, who headed operational planning in the General Staff, told the Lysebu meeting that Ustinov wanted 75,000 troops for the operation for two main reasons: First, he wanted to make sure that the toppling of Amin’s regime could be carried out smoothly, even if some of the Afghan army groups in Kabul decided to resist. Second, he believed that Soviet forces should be used to guard Afghanistan’s borders with Pakistan and Iran, thereby preventing outside support for the Afghan Islamic guerrillas. On December 6, Andropov accepted Ustinov’s plan.

Around noon on December 8, the two met with Brezhnev and Gromyko in the general secretary’s office in the Kremlin. In addition to the concerns Andropov had raised with Brezhnev earlier, he and Ustinov now added the strategic situation. Meeting two days after West Germany had given its vital support for NATO’s two-track missile-

deployment decision, states one informed Russian account, “Ustinov and Andropov cited dangers to the southern borders of the Soviet Union and a possibility of American short-range missiles being deployed in Afghanistan and aimed at strategic objects in Kazakhstan, Siberia, and elsewhere.”<sup>9</sup> Brezhnev accepted the outlined plan for an intervention which the heads of the military and the KGB presented to him.

Right after seeing Brezhnev, Ustinov and Andropov met with the head of the General Staff, Marshal N.V. Ogarkov, in the Walnut Room, a small meeting room adjacent to the hall where the Politburo usually sat. The two informed Ogarkov of their conversation with Brezhnev. Ogarkov—who together with his deputies Gen. Varennikov and Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev had earlier warned Ustinov against an intervention—once again listed his reasons why Soviet troops should not be sent in. Ustinov overruled him, and in the evening called a meeting of the senior staff of the Defense Ministry and told them to implement preparations for the intervention. The decision to send in troops was certain to come, Ustinov said.

On December 12, the Politburo met and formally ratified the proposal to intervene. Gromyko chaired the meeting, after having co-signed the proposal together with Ustinov and Andropov. Konstantin Chernenko wrote out, by hand, a short protocol accepting the proposal—entitled “Concerning the Situation in ‘A’”—and had all Politburo members present sign their names diagonally across the text. Kosygin, who almost certainly would have opposed an intervention, was not present. Kirilenko signed after some hesitation. Brezhnev, who entered the room after the brief discussion was finished, added his name, in quivering handwriting, at the bottom of the page.<sup>10</sup>

Two days later, the General Staff operative team, headed by Marshal Akhromeyev, was in place in Termez, Uzbekistan (USSR), near the Afghan border. A group from the operational team arrived at Bagram airforce base outside Kabul on December 18.

The main operation started at 3 pm

sharp on Christmas Day: airborne troops from the 103rd and 105th air divisions landed in Kabul and in Shindand in western Afghanistan, and units from the 5th and 108th motorized rifle divisions crossed the border at Kushka and at Termez. Just before nightfall on December 27, Soviet paratroopers, assisted by two KGB special units, attacked Amin’s residence at Duraleman Palace, and, after overcoming stiff resistance from the Palace Guards, summarily executed the president and several of his closest aides. It was—we were told in Lysebu by the men who devised it—a well-organized and successful operation, in which all the “strategic objectives” were reached on time.

The intervention in Afghanistan was the start of a war of almost unlimited destruction, leaving more than one million Afghans dead or wounded and almost four million driven into exile. For the Soviets the war became a death-knell, signalling Moscow’s international isolation, its leadership’s inconstancy and fragmentation, and its public’s growing disbelief in the purpose and direction of Soviet rule. By the time its forces left in early 1989, the Soviet regime was crumbling; two years later it was gone. The Afghan War was not only the first war which the Soviet Union lost: It was the last war it fought.

The post-December 1979 documents included in the *Bulletin* show the slow and painful road which the Soviet leaders travelled toward realizing the failure of their Afghan venture. Already after Andropov’s visit to Kabul in late January 1980, the Politburo understood that the troops would have to stay in Afghanistan for the indefinite future. Almost immediately, Moscow started to seek a political settlement as an alternative to war. Gromyko and Andropov seem to have been at the forefront in this cautious and awkward examination of the possibilities for getting the Soviet troops out.

As the documents show, the Politburo members just could not make up their minds as to what constituted Soviet minimum demands for a troop withdrawal. Brezhnev’s letter to Fidel Castro on Afghanistan in March 1980 demonstrates that Soviet expectations

as to what kind of political deal was possible became increasingly unrealistic as Western attitudes hardened and the Red Army failed to quell the Afghan Islamic rebellion. In his address to a Central Committee plenum in June 1980, Brezhnev put the Afghanistan conflict into a standard Cold War context, implying that a settlement would not be possible before the overall Western approach to the Soviet Union changed.

In spite of his growing impatience with the Afghan leaders, Andropov, after taking over as General Secretary following Brezhnev's death in November 1982, changed little of his predecessor's basic approach. Indeed, the former KGB chief knew well that his standing within the party was connected to the validity of the December 1979 decision, in which he had been a prime mover.<sup>11</sup> Like Brezhnev, Andropov sought a way out of Afghanistan, and was willing to accept a UN role in international mediation of the conflict. His message to the Politburo, however, was that the USSR must negotiate from a position of strength: "We are fighting against American imperialism which well understands that in this part of international politics it has lost its positions. That is why we cannot back off."<sup>12</sup>

The Soviet approach to peacemaking in Afghanistan found no takers among the Afghan Islamic guerrillas, the military rulers of Pakistan, or in the Reagan Administration in Washington. Instead, starting in early 1984, American military supplies to the Afghan resistance through Pakistan increased dramatically. Reagan told the CIA in a Presidential Directive that the aim of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan had changed from increasing the costs to the USSR to trying to push the Soviets out. Moscow's hapless handling of its Afghan problem had led Reagan to aim for victory.<sup>13</sup>

Mikhail Gorbachev, who took over leadership of the CPSU in March 1985, at first had a dual approach to the Afghan war. On the one hand, he understood that the Politburo had to make a political decision to bring the troops home and that any negotiated settlement connected to the withdrawal would have

to be reached quickly. On the other hand, Gorbachev believed that stepping up military pressure on the resistance and their Pakistani backers was the way to achieve a deal within the timeframe set by Moscow for a withdrawal. The years 1985 and 1986 were therefore the worst years of the war, with massive Soviet attacks against the civilian population in areas held by the resistance.

Considering the cards he had been dealt, Gorbachev did well in the Afghan endgame. He got the troops out on time in spite of fierce opposition from his own ranks and the constant political maneuvering of the Reagan Administration. The bickering among opposition groups, the change of regime in Pakistan (after the death of Mohammed Zia ul-Haq in a June 1988 plane crash), and the massive Soviet supplies sent in in 1988 and early 1989, even gave the Najibullah regime in Kabul a real chance of survival, making the Soviet withdrawal seem less of a sell-out than it really was. In fact, the mistakes Najibullah made *after* the Soviets bailed out in February 1989 probably had so much to do with his eventual downfall that Gorbachev's attempts to wash his hands over the fate of his one-time ally have some basis in truth.

Boris Yeltsin's thinking on his Chechen imbroglio still seems far from the 1986 mark, in terms of a comparison with Afghanistan. In spite of the differences between the two conflicts, the only way out for the Russian government was the path which Gorbachev followed from 1986 to 1989, and which Gen. Aleksandr Lebed undertook (with Yeltsin's grudging acquiescence) in the summer of 1996: a negotiated withdrawal of Russian troops.

<sup>1</sup> The transcript of the Nobel Symposium at Lysebu will be published together with the transcripts of other Carter-Brezhnev Project conferences. A preliminary version, David Welch and Odd Arne Westad, eds., *The Intervention in Afghanistan: Record of an Oral History Conference* (Nobel Symposium 95), is available from the Norwegian Nobel Institute, Drammensvn. 19, 0255 Oslo, Norway, fax: (+47) 22 43 01 68.

<sup>2</sup> Researchers interested in examining the photocopied documents obtained by the Carter-Brezhnev Project should contact the National Security Archive, where they are kept on file; the Archive can be reached at (202) 994-7000 (telephone) or (202) 994-7005 (fax) and is located on

the 7th floor of the Gelman Library, 2130 H St. NW, Washington, DC 20037.

<sup>3</sup> See James G. Blight and David Welch, *On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd. ed. (New York: Noonday, 1990); and Blight et al., *Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse* (New York: Pantheon, 1993).

<sup>4</sup> The best surveys of the Soviet intervention to appear in print so far are Diego Cordovez and Selig S. Harrison, *Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995); Raymond L. Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1994), 977-1075; and Aleksandr Liakhovskii, *Tragediia i doblest' afgana* [Afghan Tragedy and Valour] (Moscow: Iskona, 1995); see also Odd Arne Westad, ed., *The Fall of Détente: Soviet-American Relations in the Carter Years* (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997).

<sup>5</sup> See Odd Arne Westad, "Prelude to Invasion: The Soviet Union and the Afghan Communists, 1978-1979," *International History Review* 16:1 (February 1994), 49-69, and "Nakanune vvoda sovetskikh voisk v Afganistan," *Novaia i noveishaia istoriia* 2 (1994), 19-35.

<sup>6</sup> KGB Gen. Leonid Shebarshin, author's interview, Moscow, 7 October 1993. Shebarshin was the KGB *resident* in Teheran in 1979. See also Shebarshin's comments in Welch and Westad, eds., *The Intervention in Afghanistan*.

<sup>7</sup> See transcript of CPSU Politburo meeting, 18 March 1979, in this issue of the *CWIIHP Bulletin*.

<sup>8</sup> [Ed. note: These stations were particularly important because they were used to monitor Soviet missile tests and other military activities in the USSR. According to various sources, rather than seeking replacements in Afghanistan the U.S. instead moved to replace the lost electronic spy posts in northern Iran by coming to an intelligence sharing arrangement with the People's Republic of China, allowing Washington to continue monitoring Soviet missile tests from new electronic intelligence joint U.S.-PRC stations in western China, with the Chinese also getting the data.]

<sup>9</sup> Liakhovskii, *Tragediia i doblest' afgana*, 109.

<sup>10</sup> For an English translation and facsimile of this document, see *CWIIHP Bulletin* 4 (Fall 1994), 76.

<sup>11</sup> Cordovez and Harrison find that Andropov's "objective was to minimize casualties and to scale down operations while seeking a negotiated settlement." (*Out of Afghanistan*, p. 147.) While there is little evidence for a scaling-down of military operations in Afghanistan during Andropov's short time in power (November 1982-February 1984), at least he did not authorize the same sharp increase in military activities which took place under his successor Konstantin Chernenko (February 1984-March 1985) and during Gorbachev's first year as CPSU general secretary (March 1985-March 1986).

<sup>12</sup> CPSU CC Politburo transcript, 10 March 1983; excerpt printed below.

<sup>13</sup> Former Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates' memoirs, *From the Shadows* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), provides the fullest overview we have so far of the CIA's covert war in Afghanistan, especially pp. 319-321.

# The Soviet Union and Afghanistan, 1978-1989:

## *Documents from the Russian and East German Archives*

### Frequently used abbreviations:

APRF = Archive of the President, Russian Federation  
 CC = Central Committee  
 Com. = Comrade  
 CPSU = Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
 DRA = Democratic Republic of Afghanistan  
 GKEHS = State Committee for Economic Cooperations  
 MFA = Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
 PDPA = People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan  
 SAPMO = Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (Berlin)  
 TsKhSD = Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation, Moscow

### Political Letter from USSR Ambassador to Afghanistan A. Puzanov to Soviet Foreign Ministry, "About the Domestic Political Situation in the DRA," 31 May 1978 (notes)

It is noted that the "basic preconditions" for the overthrow of [Mohammed] Daoud in April 1978 "flowed from the objective domestic political and economic development of the country after 1973." Daoud expressed the interests and class position of bourgeois landowners and rightist nationalist forces, and therefore was not capable of carrying out a reformation "in the interests of the broad laboring masses," primarily agricultural reform.

In conditions of a worsening economic situation in the country and Daoud's departure from the programmatic declaration of 1973, which led to "a constant growth in the dissatisfaction of broad strata of the population," Daoud huddled ever more closely with the "domestic reaction," which was supported by the "reactionary Islamic regimes" and by "American imperialism," and followed a course toward the "strengthening . . . of a regime of personal power."

This led to an "abrupt sharpening of

the contradictions between the Daoud regime and its class supporters and the fundamental interests of the working masses, the voice of which is the PDPA."

Daoud's order to arrest the PDPA facilitated the fall of his regime.

The Taraki government's program (declaration of 9 May 1978) is worked out on the basis of the PDPA program of 1966. The main task, is providing for the interests of the working population on the basis of fundamental *perestroika* of the social-economic structures of society, and "the liquidation of the influence of neocolonialism and imperialism."

In a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador on April 29, Taraki said that "Afghanistan, following Marxism-Leninism, will set off on the path of building socialism and will belong to the socialist camp," but it is necessary to conduct that line "carefully" and of his true goals the PDPA will inform the people "later."

In foreign policy the DRA is oriented toward the Non-Aligned movement, but it will give its priority to cooperation with the USSR.

About the reaction of the West: the overthrow of Daoud was "a total surprise," and in the press of the Western and "reactionary Moslem countries" a "campaign of falsehoods" was deployed against the new government.

At the same time, "according to information which we have" the embassies of the USA and other Western countries received instructions to search out all means to hold on in Afghanistan, including promises to provide economic assistance.

The Afghan leadership "is not showing haste" in concluding economic agreements with the West, "proceeding from an intention to reorient its foreign economic relations primarily towards the USSR and the socialist camp."

The measures which have been undertaken by the new government in the month it has been in power bear witness to its "firm intention" gradually to create the preconditions "for Afghanistan's transition to the socialist path of development."

The coming to power of the PDPA and its actions "were met with approval by the peoples' masses." At the same time the "internal reaction, while so far not deciding on an open demonstration," is activating "underground efforts" (propaganda, the dropping in of weapons, and diversionary groups which are being prepared in Pakistan).

The friction between the Khalq and Parcham factions is having a negative influence.

The main point of disagreement is government posts. The representatives of Khalq, especially in the army, are dissatisfied with the naming of Parcham representatives to a number of leadership posts. The leader of Parcham, B[abrar] Karmal, in his turn, objected to the widening of the Revolutionary Council for the benefit of military officers. The Ambassador and "advisors on Party relations" in conversations with the new leadership stressed the necessity of "overcoming the tensions" and "strengthening the unity" of the leadership and the party. As a result, on 24 May 1978 the Politburo of the CC PDPA made a decision to eliminate the names Khalq and Parcham and to affirm the unity of the PDPA.

The Afghans asked the USSR to send a "large group of advisors and consultants" to work in the state apparatus, and also to help in putting together a five year plan. The USSR has "favorably" resolved these issues.

This will facilitate "the growth of sympathy for the USSR, the further fortifying and strengthening of our positions in Afghanistan."

Conclusions: The situation in the country "overall is stabilizing more and more," the government is controlling all its regions and is taking measures "to cut off...the demonstrations of the domestic reaction."

The most important factor for the further strengthening of the new power will be the achievement of unity in the leadership of the PDPA and the government. But "the tension so far has not totally been cleared away." The embassy jointly with a group of Party advisors is undertaking measures to overcome the disagreements in the Af-

ghan leadership.

[Source: Based on notes taken by Odd Arne Westad on materials at the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), fond (f.) 5, opis (op.) 75, delo (d.) 1179, listy (ll.) 2-17.]

**Record of Conversation, Soviet Ambassador A.M. Puzanov and Taraki, 18 June 1978**

The meeting took place in connection with the arrival in Kabul of a group of [Soviet] Party advisors headed by V.I. Kharazov.

[The Ambassador] informed N.M. Taraki about the arrival in Kabul on July 27 of the first group of Soviet advisors for work in the Afghan ministries and departments.

[...] Further Taraki requested that only the Soviet Ambassador and V.I. Kharazov remain and said that B. Karmal had arrived, and wants to express a number of thoughts.

Coming into the office, B. Karmal said the following.

Recently more frequently it has been heard that there is no unity in the PDPA. This, without doubt, reflects negatively on the Party itself, on the state apparatus, the army, the revolution, on the prestige of the Soviet Union and might lead to difficult consequences. People are different, and this distinction might be used for provocative goals. Unfortunately, our position (the Parchams) in the Party, state apparatus, and army is subject to a number of provocations. But insofar as I am sure that the Party, state and army, under the leadership of N.M. Taraki and [First Deputy Prime Minister] H[afizullah]. Amin, with the great assistance of the Soviet Union, are building socialism in Afghanistan, then, feeling a debt to the revolution, I do not intend to create problems, so that neither a friend nor an enemy can take advantage of my situation. Regarding the June 17 decision of the CC PDPA Politburo to send a number of comrades to foreign countries as ambassadors, I and N.A. Noor . . . also consider it useful to go abroad as ambassadors or under the pretext of medical treatment, so as not to give grounds for provocations against noble and honest people. In such a way, N.M. Taraki and H. Amin may be able to fulfill the mentioned program. Unfortunately, said B. Karmal, I have no possibility either in the

Party or in the army to defend my thesis — it is difficult to fulfill the May 24 resolution of the Party on unity and the directives of the Politburo, they remain paper, nothing more.

[. . .] Further, B. Karmal in a condition of extreme excitement said the following.

In both the Party and in the government I occupy the second post after N.M. Taraki. Despite this, I do not know what is going on in the country — they have isolated me, I am not engaged in either domestic or foreign policy issues, I live as if in a gilded cage. For me, as a communist, this is a heavy tragedy. In the presence of N.M. Taraki, PDPA Politburo member H. Amin said that to provide unity it is necessary to carry out extremely decisive measures. N.M. Taraki really wants unity. However, for this to happen, thousands of honest communists in Afghanistan will be subject to terror, persecutions, their names will be slandered. I myself live under the threat that they will subject me to persecution. In conclusion, B. Karmal declared that the matter is moving towards a split in the Party, everything is moving into the hands of the government and army.

N.M. Taraki declared decisively that all issues in the ruling organs of the PDPA are decided on the basis of democratic centralism, and nobody threatens anyone. There is no split in the Party, unity is being strengthened, although certain people are demonstrating against it. If someone moves against the revolution and the unity of the Party, then there will be a purge of the Party. There is no terror, however, if it will be reckoned that this or some other person presents a danger for the revolution, then decisive measures of punishment may be applied to him, right up to capital punishment.

On this N.M. Taraki interrupted the conversation and let it be known that he does not wish to continue the discussion with B. Karmal. B. Karmal said good-bye and left.

Remaining with N.M. Taraki, [the Ambassador and Kharazov] once again noted the necessity of taking into account when making some or other appointments the political resonance and consequences which they might prompt. They stressed that enemies must not be given grounds for using similar issues for their own goals.

N.M. Taraki said that the Party is united and its unity is becoming ever stronger, but as to those who will demonstrate against

unity “we will crush them as if with a steam-roller [*proidemsia zheleznym katkom*]. Such measures will only strengthen the Party.”

Sent to Kozyrev, C.P., Ponomarev, B.N....

[Source: Notes of O.A. Westad, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 75, d. 1181, ll. 22-27.]

**Record of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan A.M. Puzanov and Taraki, 18 July 1978**

[The Ambassador] also said that the observations expressed by the leadership of the DRA about the necessity for effective defense of the airspace of the DRA had been attentively studied in the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, and the necessary measures had been worked out for use in the event that there should appear a danger to the DRA from the air. In addition, with this goal in mind the delivery of an additional quantity of anti-aircraft installations for the present and future years had been reviewed. The deliveries of weapons will be fixed in an agreement, for the signing of which, according to the agreement, a delegation headed by Major-General V.E. Kuznetsov is arriving today.

Taraki informed the Ambassador about the situation in the country and about his meeting on July 13-14 with the Deputy Secretary of State of the USA D[avid D]. Newsom.

In the conversation with me, said N.M. Taraki, the Deputy Secretary of State spoke about the USA government's concern about the one-sided orientation in the foreign policy of the DRA and the chill in Afghan-American relations.

D. Newsom asked a provocative question — what actions will the government of the DRA take in the event of an attack by the Soviet Union.

N.M. Taraki pointed out the inappropriateness of a question like that.

[Source: Notes of O.A. Westad, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 75, d. 1181, ll. 36-40.]

**Information from CC CPSU to GDR leader Erich Honecker, 13 October 1978**

Highly confidential

According to the instructions of CC

CPSU, candidate member of the Politburo CC CPSU secretary comr. B.N. Ponomarev was in Kabul from 25 to 27 September of this year, to meet with the leadership of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) to discuss certain pressing questions concerning the unfolding political situation in that country and questions regarding Soviet-Afghan relations. Meetings took place with the general secretary of CC PDPA, chairman of the Revolutionary Soviet, prime minister of DRA comr. Nur Taraki and member of the Politburo, secretary of CC PDPA, deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs of the DRA comrade Hafizullah Amin.

The main objective of the trip was to put a stop to the mass repressions which have taken on increasing proportions following the revolution in Afghanistan, including repressions against the "Parcham" faction, which took part in the overthrow of the despotic regime.

During the meetings special emphasis was placed by our side on questions concerning the unjustified repressions in the DRA. In addition, it was pointed out that we are doing this out of our brotherly concern for the fate of the Afghan revolution, especially since certain aspects of the unfolding events in Afghanistan directly affect the Soviet Union and CPSU.

First to recognize the new state of things in Afghanistan, the USSR demonstrated its solidarity with Afghanistan in front of the whole world. This position was again authoritatively affirmed in L.I. Brezhnev's speech in Baku. It is widely known that we are in every way assisting and supporting the new government. Under these conditions, hostile propaganda within Afghanistan itself as well as outside its borders is currently being aimed at showing that any events in Afghanistan - especially the negative aspects of these events - are connected to the direct or indirect participation by the Soviet Union.

The attention of the Afghan leadership was focused on the fact that in recent times repressions have taken on mass proportions, are being carried out without regard to law, and are directed not only at class enemies of the new regime ("Moslem Brothers," supporters of the monarchy, etc.), but also at persons who could be used for revolutionary interests; that brings out discontent

among the populace, undermines the authority of the revolutionary government and leads to the weakening of the new regime.

Our ideas were attentively heard out, but with visible tension. Without disputing them directly, the Afghan leaders tried to justify their policy by accusing Parchamists (members of the "Parcham" faction who, together with the "Khalq" faction, organized the unification of the PDPA in 1977) of anti-government activities.

Even before the revolution we did not trust "Parcham," said N. Taraki, and the union with the Parchamists was strictly a formality. They took almost no part in the armed uprising. But following the victory of the revolution the leader of the Parchamists B. Karmal demanded that the top ministerial and departmental positions be divided equally. He laid claim to playing the leading role in building the party, declaring: "You have the army; give us the party." In addition, when their demands were not met, they threatened to start an uprising. Under the given circumstances, said N. Taraki and A. Amin, there was but one choice: either them, or us.

Besides, N. Taraki was trying to show, the measures being taken against the leading activists of "Parcham" did not exhibit any negative influence on people's sentiments. The Afghan people support the new regime and the Khalqist leadership of the PDPA. The PDPA leadership, Revolutionary Council, and DRA government, said N. Taraki, understand completely the apprehensions of the CC CPSU, but assure [it] that the latest events in the country do not interfere with the advancement of the Afghan revolution and the strengthening of the people's democratic regime.

Considerable attention was paid by our side to questions of party expansion and improvement of the ability of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan to govern the nation and the populace. Emphasis was also placed on the importance of creating and strengthening the party throughout all of the country's territories, on the adoption of prompt measures to normalize the activities of party organs from top to bottom, on organizing agencies of the people's government, and on focusing increased attention on economic problems. The people must experience concrete results of the revolution in their own lives. That is why the improvement of people's lives should be the

primary focus of the new government.

From our side it was continuously stressed that right now the primary objective should be to strengthen the people's democratic regime, adopting a measured and flexible policy to isolate the counter-revolution from the people, to deprive it of the opportunity to take advantage of the backwardness of the masses. In the short time since the establishment of the new government, large enterprises have already been set up to serve the interests of the people. Along with this, enormous constructive opportunities opened up by the Afghan revolution are still waiting to be discovered and put to practical use.

During the meetings, the Afghan representatives also touched on the question of Afghan relations with imperialist countries. Imperialism, said N. Taraki, places in front of us every kind of obstacle, including the use of "soft" methods. Westerners and Americans are clearly trying to exploit aid in order to force us to steer away from the chosen path. At the present time we have no intention of spoiling our relations with the West, though we understand that their offers are not entirely unselfish. From our side it was emphasized that in dealing with the West one should not allow oneself to be lured into a trap.

Concerning the China question, N. Taraki unreservedly condemned the Maoist leadership and its actions, noting that the leaders of China have closed ranks with the enemies of communism. The PDPA has purged Maoist elements from the army and the state apparatus.

The meetings with N. Taraki and H. Amin left the impression that the persecution of Parchamists is primarily the result of factional infighting and personal hostilities. In addition, the Afghan leadership is clearly underestimating the negative influence that the repressions are having on the overall situation in the country and on sentiments within the army and the party.

The discussions were marked by an air of comradeship. All in all, [it was] a warm welcome by the Afghan leadership; their attentive attitude towards the opinions of the CC CPSU and readiness to discuss with us the most delicate questions is an indication of the importance they place on the friendship with Soviet Union and socialist countries. Taraki asked to relay to the CC CPSU that "Afghanistan will always stand next to

Soviet Union, aligned together with the other socialist countries.”

The CC CPSU submits that Afghanistan will heed our judgment in their continued activities, although, it seems, this will only be demonstrated by their actions in the future. Incoming information indicates an abatement in repressions in the country and the beginning of the process of partial rehabilitation of party functionaries from the “Parcham” faction.

CC CPSU

[Source: *Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMO), Berlin, J 2/202, A. 575; obtained by Vladislav M. Zubok (National Security Archive).*]

**CPSU CC Politburo Decision on  
Afghanistan, 7 January 1979**

*Proletariat of all countries, unite!*  
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.  
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET  
SPECIAL FILE

To Comrs. Brezhnev, Kosygin, Gromyko, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Ryabov, Skachkov, Serbin, and Smirnyukov.

Extract from protocol # 137 of the CC CPSU Politburo session from 7 January 1979

The question of the Ministry of defense and the State committee of the USSR on foreign economic ties.

1. Approve a draft of orders from the USSR Council of Ministers on this question (attached).

2. Ratify the attached draft of instructions for the Soviet ambassador to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

SECRETARY of CC

13-af

[attached] to article 27 protocol # 137

Top Secret  
SPECIAL FILE  
Draft

**USSR COUNCIL OF MINISTERS  
INSTRUCTIONS**

from January 1979

Moscow, Kremlin

1. In connection with the request of the Government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and with the partial changes of instructions from the USSR Council of Ministers from 20 November 1978, # 2473, give assent to the distribution of expenditures related to the dispatching of Soviet specialists, at the expense of the Soviet side, for work in the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

Instruct GKEhS to propose to the Afghan side that it provide, at its own expense, for Soviet specialists and interpreters dispatched to work in the armed forces of Afghanistan and furnish them with living quarters with necessary equipment, transport for official purposes, and medical service.

2. Expenditures related to the dispatching of Soviet specialists to Afghanistan in accordance with present instructions must be made: in Soviet rubles from the account appropriated by the state budget of the USSR for the rendering of free assistance to foreign governments, and in foreign currency from the account appropriated by the currency plan of GKEhS.

Chairman of the Council of Ministers  
A. Kosygin  
14-ri

[attached] to article 27 protocol # 137

Top Secret  
SPECIAL FILE

KABUL  
SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Spec. # 978. Visit H. Amin or another individual ordered to receive you, and, referring to the instructions, inform him that the request of the Afghan side concerning the realization of deliveries of goods for the general use of the armed forces, in accordance with the guidelines governing the shipment of special equipment through GKEhS, as well as the dispatching, at Soviet expense, of specialists for work in the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, has been carefully examined.

Say that the Government of the USSR, based on the friendly relations between our countries, is rendering assistance, with very favorable conditions, aimed at reinforcing

the Afghan military. Special equipment and extra parts are shipped to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan at 25 percent of cost on a 10-year loan with 2 percent yearly interest. It should be noted that the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is in a more favorable situation when compared to other friendly countries receiving aid.

Explain that according to our existing rules, the shipment of general civilian equipment, including auto-transport, and civilian airplanes and helicopters, is exclusively a matter of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and conditions governing commercial trade, irrespective of whether this equipment is used in the armed forces or other departments.

Further, say that the Soviet government has made the decision to grant the Afghan request that the dispatching of all specialists for work in the armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan be made at the expense of the Soviet side.

Telegraph the execution [of the orders].

[Source: *TsKhSD, f. 89, perechen (per.) 14, dokument (dok.) 24; document provided by Mark Kramer (Harvard University); translation by Daniel Rozas.*]

**Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo  
Discussions on Afghanistan,  
17-19 March 1979**

TOP SECRET  
ONLY COPY  
WORKING TRANSCRIPT

MEETING OF THE POLITBURO  
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE  
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE  
SOVIET UNION

17 March 1979

Comrade L. I. BREZHNEV, Presiding  
In attendance: Y. V. ANDROPOV, A. A. GROMYKO, A. N. KOSYGIN, A. Y. PELSHE, K. U. CHERNENKO, D. F. USTINOV, P. N. DEMICHEV, B. N. PONOMAREV, M. S. SOLOMENTZEV, N. A. TIKHONOV, I. V. KAPITONOV, V. I. DOLGIKH, M. V. ZIMYANIN, K. V. RUSAKOV, M. S. GORBACHEV

Re: Deterioration of Conditions in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and

Possible Responses From Our Side

KIRILENKO. Leonid Ilych [Brezhnev] has asked us to commence our Politburo session today at this unseasonable hour, and he will then join us tomorrow, in order to discuss the circumstances that have emerged in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. The situation is urgent. Comrades Gromyko, Andropov, and Ustinov today have put together some proposals which have been completed and are now in front of you. Let us consider this matter closely and determine what measures we ought to take, what actions should be undertaken. Perhaps we should hear first from Comrade Gromyko.

GROMYKO. Judging by the most recent communications that we have received from Afghanistan in the form of encrypted cables, as well as by telephone conferences with our chief military advisor Comrade [Lt.-Gen. L.N.] Gorelov and temporary charge d'affaires Comrade Alekseev, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated sharply, the center of the disturbance at this time being the town of Herat. There, as we know from previous cables, the 17th division of the Afghan army was stationed, and had restored order, but now we have received news that this division has essentially collapsed. An artillery regiment and one infantry regiment comprising that division have gone over to the side of the insurgents. Bands of saboteurs and terrorists, having infiltrated from the territory of Pakistan, trained and armed not only with the participation of Pakistani forces but also of China, the United States of America, and Iran, are committing atrocities in Herat. The insurgents infiltrating into the territory of Herat Province from Pakistan and Iran have joined forces with a domestic counter-revolution. The latter is especially comprised by religious fanatics. The leaders of the reactionary masses are also linked in large part with the religious figures.

The number of insurgents is difficult to determine, but our comrades tell us that they are thousands, literally thousands.

Significantly, it should be noted that I had a conversation this morning at 11:00 with Amin — Taraki's deputy who is the minister of foreign affairs — and he did not express the slightest alarm about the situation in Afghanistan, and on the contrary, with Olympian tranquility, he said that the situa-

tion was not all that complicated, that the army was in control of everything, and so forth. In a word, he expressed the opinion that their position was under control.

KIRILENKO. In short, judging from the report of Amin, the leadership of Afghanistan is not experiencing the slightest anxiety in connection with these events.

GROMYKO. Exactly. Amin even said that the situation in Afghanistan is just fine. He said that not a single incident of insubordination by a governor had been reported, that is, that all of the governors were on the side of the lawful government. Whereas in reality, according to the reports of our comrades, the situation in Herat and in a number of other places is alarming, and the insurgents are in control there.

As far as Kabul is concerned, the situation there is basically calm. The borders of Afghanistan with Pakistan and Iran are closed, or more accurately, semi-closed. A large number of Afghans, formerly working in Iran, have been expelled from Iran and, naturally, they are highly dissatisfied, and many of them have also joined up with the insurgents.

The measures that we have drawn out for the aid of Afghanistan are set forth in the proposals that you have in front of you. I should add that we have appropriated an additional 10 million rubles to Afghanistan in hard currency for the protection of the border.

Inasmuch as Pakistan, in essence, is the principal place from which the terrorists are infiltrating into Afghanistan, it would appear to follow that the leadership of Afghanistan should send a letter of protest to Pakistan or issue a declaration; in a word, to come out with some kind of written statement. However, the Afghan leadership has not done that. To be sure, it looks very strange.

I asked Amin, what kind of actions do you consider necessary from our side? I told him what kind of aid we might be able to render. But he had no other requests, he simply responded that he had a very optimistic appraisal of the circumstances in Afghanistan, that the help you have given will stand us in good stead, and that all of the provinces are safely under the control of lawful forces. I asked him, don't you expect any problems from neighboring governments or a domestic counter-revolution, and so forth? Amin answered firmly that no, there are no

threats to the regime. In conclusion, he conveyed his greetings to the members of the Politburo, and personally to L.I. Brezhnev. And thus was my discussion today with Amin.

After a short time, approximately two or three hours, we received news from our comrades that chaos had erupted in Herat. One regiment, as I already indicated an artillery one, fired on its own troops, and part of the second regiment went over to the insurgents. Consequently, only a portion of the 17th division, which is guarding Herat, remains loyal to the Government. Our comrades also tell us that tomorrow and the next day, new masses of insurgents, trained on the territory of Pakistan and Iran, may invade.

About a half hour later, we again received news from our comrades that Comrade Taraki had summoned the chief military advisor Comrade Gorelov and charge d'affaires Alekseev. And what did they discuss with Taraki? First of all, he appealed to the Soviet Union for help in the form of military equipment, ammunition, and rations, that which is envisioned in the documents which we have presented for consideration by the Politburo. As far as military equipment is concerned, Taraki said, almost in passing, that perhaps ground and air support would be required. This must be understood to mean that the deployment of our forces is required, both land and air forces.

In my opinion, we must proceed from a fundamental proposition in considering the question of aid to Afghanistan, namely: under no circumstances may we lose Afghanistan. For 60 years now we have lived with Afghanistan in peace and friendship. And if we lose Afghanistan now and it turns against the Soviet Union, this will result in a sharp setback to our foreign policy. Of course, it is one thing to apply extreme measures if the Afghan army is on the side of the people, and an entirely different matter, if the army does not support the lawful government. And finally, third, if the army is against the government and, as a result, against our forces, then the matter will be complicated indeed. As we understand from Comrades Gorelov and Alekseev, the mood among the leadership, including Comrade Taraki, is not particularly out of sorts.

USTINOV. Comrade Gorelov, our chief military advisor, was with Taraki along with Comrade Alekseev, our charge

d'affaires in Afghanistan. I just spoke with Comrade Gorelov by telephone, and he said that the leadership of Afghanistan is worried about the state of affairs, and that matters in the province of Herat are particularly bad, as well as in the province of Pakti. The bad part is that the division which is supposed to be guarding Herat has turned out to be ineffective, and the commander of the division at this time is located on the airstrip, more to the point, he is seeking refuge there and, obviously, he is no longer commanding the actions of any regiments remaining loyal to the government. Bear in mind that tomorrow (March 18), operational groups will be deployed into Herat.

We advised Comrade Taraki to redeploy several forces into the regions where the insurgency has erupted. He, in turn, responded that this would be difficult inasmuch as there is unrest in other places as well. In short, they are expecting a major response from the USSR, in the form of both land and air forces.

ANDROPOV. They are hoping that we will attack the insurgents.

KIRILENKO. The question arises, whom will our troops be fighting against if we send them there[?] Against the insurgents? Or have they been joined by a large number of religious fundamentalists, that is, Muslims, and among them large numbers of ordinary people? Thus, we will be required to wage war in significant part against the people.

KOSYGIN. What is the army like in Afghanistan—how many divisions are there?

USTINOV. The army in Afghanistan has 10 divisions, including more than 100 thousand soldiers.

ANDROPOV. Our operational data tells us that about three thousand insurgents are being directed into Afghanistan from Pakistan. These are, in main part, religious fanatics from among the people.

KIRILENKO. If there is a popular uprising, then, besides those persons coming from Pakistan and Iran, who for the most part consist of terrorists and insurgents, the masses against whom our troops are engaged will include ordinary people of Afghanistan. Although it is true that they are religious worshippers, followers of Islam.

GROMYKO. The relationship between the supporters of the government and the insurgents is still very unclear. Events

in Herat, judging from everything, have unfolded violently, because over a thousand people have been killed. But even there the situation is unclear enough.

ANDROPOV. Of course, the insurgents coming into the territory of Afghanistan will be joined first of all by those who would rebel and solicit the Afghan people to their own side.

KOSYGIN. In my view, the draft decision under consideration must be substantially amended. First of all, we must not delay the supply of armaments until April but must give everything now, without delay, in March. That is the first thing.

Secondly, we must somehow give moral support to the leadership of Afghanistan, and I would suggest implementation of the following measures: inform Taraki that we are raising the price of gas from 15 to 25 rubles per thousand cubic meters. That will make it possible to cover the expenses that they will incur in connection with the acquisition of arms and other materials by a rise in prices. It is necessary in my opinion to give Afghanistan these arms free of charge and not require any 25 percent assessment.

ALL. Agreed.

KOSYGIN. And third, we are slated to supply 75 thousand tons of bread. I think we should reexamine that and supply Afghanistan with 100 thousand tons. These are the measures that it seems to me ought to be added to the draft of the decision and, in that fashion, we would lend moral assistance to the Afghan leadership. We must put up a struggle for Afghanistan; after all, we have lived side by side for 60 years. Of course, while there is a difficult struggle with the Iranians, Pakistanis, and Chinese, nevertheless Iran will lend assistance to Afghanistan—it has the means to do so, all the more so since they are like-minded religiously. This must be borne in mind. Pakistan will also take such measures. There is nothing you can say about the Chinese. Consequently, I believe that we must adopt the fraternal decision seriously to assist the Afghan leadership. I have already spoken on the subject of payments, to talk more of that is unnecessary, and moreover, as here written, in freely convertible hard currency. Whatever freely convertible currency they may have, we are not going to receive any of it in any event.

USTINOV. Everything that is de-

scribed in the draft declaration in connection with the supply of arms to Afghanistan, all of that is being done, shipments and deliveries of this equipment are already taking place. Unfortunately, I do not know whether we will be able to supply everything before April; that is going to be very difficult. I would request that we adopt the decision in connection with the supply of arms that is set forth here. As far as concerns payment for the arms, I would delete that.

KOSYGIN. All the same, we must dispatch everything, literally beginning tomorrow.

USTINOV. Fine, we are doing that, and we will ensure that all of these things are shipped by tomorrow.

KIRILENKO. Let us authorize Comrade Kosygin to implement those amendments to the draft of the decision of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, which we have before us, as relates to those points which we have discussed. Tomorrow he will present the document to us in final draft.

KOSYGIN. Absolutely. I will come here tomorrow morning and do everything.

KIRILENKO. We must undertake measures to ensure that all of the military supplies are sent in March.

KOSYGIN. And if, as Comrade Ustinov has pointed out, it is impossible to ship everything completely in March, then perhaps, a second portion can remain for April, but let that portion be insignificantly small.

I also want to raise another question: whatever you may say, Amin and Taraki alike are concealing from us the true state of affairs. We still don't know exactly what is happening in Afghanistan. What is their assessment of the situation? After all, they continue to paint the picture in a cheerful light, whereas in reality, we can see what is happening there. They are good people, that is apparent, but all the same they are concealing a great deal from us. What is the reason for this, that is hard to say. In my view we must decide this question with the ambassador, Andrey Andreevich [Gromyko], as soon as possible. Although as a practical matter he is not authorized, and he doesn't do what is required of him.

In addition, I would consider it necessary to send an additional number of qualified military specialists, and let them find out what is happening with the army.

Moreover, I would consider it necessary to adopt a more comprehensive political decision. Perhaps the draft of such a political decision can be prepared by our comrades in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, or the Foreign Department of the KGB. It is clear that Iran, China, and Pakistan will come out against Afghanistan, and do everything within their power and means to contravene the lawful government and discredit its actions. It is exactly here that our political support of Taraki and his government is necessary. And of course, Carter will also come out against the leadership of Afghanistan.

With whom will it be necessary for us to fight in the event it becomes necessary to deploy troops - who will it be that rises against the present leadership of Afghanistan? They are all Mohammedans, people of one belief, and their faith is sufficiently strong that they can close ranks on that basis. It seems to me that we must speak to Taraki and Amin about the mistakes that they have permitted to occur during this time. In reality, even up to the present time, they have continued to execute people that do not agree with them; they have killed almost all of the leaders - not only the top leaders, but also those of the middle ranks - of the "Parcham" party. Of course, it will now be difficult to formulate a political document - to do that our comrades will be required to work, as I have already said, for a period of three days.

USTINOV. That is all correct, what Aleksey Nikolaevich [Kosygin] says, this must be done as soon as possible.

GROMYKO. The documents must be prepared immediately.

KOSYGIN. I don't think that we should pressure the Afghan government to request a deployment of forces from us. Let them create their own special units, which could be redeployed to the more difficult regions in order to quell the insurgents.

USTINOV. In my view we must not, under any circumstances, mix our forces with the Afghan forces, in the event that we send them there.

KOSYGIN. We must prepare our own military forces, work up a statement relating to them, and send it by special messenger.

USTINOV. We have prepared two options in respect to military action. Under the first one, we would, in the course of a

single day, deploy into Afghanistan the 105th airborne division and redeploy the infantry-motorized regiment into Kabul; toward the border we would place the 68th motorized division; and the 5th motor artillery division would be located at the border. Under this scenario, we would be ready for the deployment of forces within three days. But we must adopt the political decision that we have been talking about here.

KIRILENKO. Comrade Ustinov has correctly stated the issue; we must come out against the insurgents. And in the political document this must be clearly and pointedly stated.

In addition to that, we must bear upon Taraki; if we are already talking about the deployment of forces, then the question must be considered thoroughly. We cannot deploy troops without a request from the government of Afghanistan, and we must convey this to Comrade Taraki. And this must be directly stated in a conference between Comrade Kosygin and Taraki. In addition to this, Taraki must be instructed to change his tactics. Executions, torture and so forth cannot be applied on a massive scale. Religious questions, the relationship with religious communities, with religion generally and with religious leaders take on special meaning for them. This is a major policy issue. And here Taraki must ensure, with all decisiveness, that no illicit measures whatsoever are undertaken by them.

The documents must be prepared no later than tomorrow. We will consult with Leonid Ilych as to how we can best accomplish this.

USTINOV. We have a second option which has also been prepared. This one deals with the deployment of two divisions into Afghanistan.

ANDROPOV. We need to adopt the draft of the decision which we have examined today, accounting for those changes and amendments which have been discussed. As far as the political decision is concerned, that also must be immediately prepared, because bands are streaming in from Pakistan.

PONOMAREV. We should send around 500 persons into Afghanistan in the capacity as advisors and specialists. These comrades must all know what to do.

ANDROPOV. Around Herat there are 20 thousand civilians who have taken part in the rebellion. As far as negotiations with Taraki are concerned, we must get on with

it. But I think it is best for Comrade Kosygin to speak with Taraki.

ALL. Agreed. It is better for Comrade Kosygin to speak with him.

ANDROPOV. We must finalize the political statement, bearing in mind that we will be labeled as an aggressor, but that in spite of that, under no circumstances can we lose Afghanistan.

PONOMAREV. Unfortunately, there is much that we do not know about Afghanistan. It seems to me that, in the discussion with Taraki, all these questions must be raised, and in particular, let him explain the state of affairs with the army and in the country generally. After all, they have a 100,000-man army and with the assistance of our advisors, there is much that the army can do. Otherwise, 20 thousand insurgents are going to achieve a victory. Above all, it will be necessary to accomplish everything that is necessary with the forces of the Afghan army, and only later, if and when the necessity truly arises, to deploy our own forces.

KOSYGIN. In my view it is necessary to send arms, but only if we are convinced that they will not fall into the hands of the insurgents. If their army collapses, then it follows that those arms will be claimed by the insurgents. Then the question will arise as to how we will respond in the view of world public opinion. All this will have to be justified, that is, if we are really going to deploy our forces, then we must marshal all of the appropriate arguments and explain everything in detail. Perhaps one of our responsible comrades should travel to Afghanistan in order to understand the local conditions in greater detail. Perhaps Comrade Ustinov or Comrade Ogarkov.

USTINOV. The situation in Afghanistan is worsening. We ought to speak now, it seems to me, about political measures that we have not yet undertaken. And, on the other hand, we must fully exploit the capability of the Afghan army. It seems to me there is no point in me going to Afghanistan; I have doubts about that. Perhaps some member of the government should go.

KOSYGIN. You must go there nonetheless, Dmitri Fedorovich [Ustinov]. The point is that we are sending into Afghanistan a large volume of armaments, and it is necessary that they remain in the hands of the revolutionary masses. We have about 550 advisors in Afghanistan, and they must

be apprised of the state of affairs in the military.

USTINOV. Even if one of us goes to Afghanistan, still nobody is going to learn anything in just a couple of days.

GROMYKO. I think that negotiations with Taraki should be undertaken by A.N. Kosygin or D.F. Ustinov, and more likely, in the end, by Comrade Kosygin.

KOSYGIN. Before speaking with Taraki, it will be necessary for me to get approval from Leonid Ilych [Brezhnev]. I will speak with Leonid Ilych tomorrow and then talk to Taraki.

ANDROPOV. And the essence of our decisions here today must be communicated to Leonid Ilych in detail.

GROMYKO. We have to discuss what we will do if the situation gets worse. Today, the situation in Afghanistan for now is unclear to many of us. Only one thing is clear - we cannot surrender Afghanistan to the enemy. We have to think how to achieve this. Maybe we won't have to introduce troops.

KOSYGIN. All of us agree - we must not surrender Afghanistan. From this point, we have to work out first of all a political document, to use all political means in order to help the Afghan leadership to strengthen itself, to provide the support which we've already planned, and to leave as a last resort the use of force.

GROMYKO. I want to emphasize again the main thing, which we must consider thoroughly, and that is to come up with an answer as to how we will react in the event of a critical situation. Taraki is already speaking of alarm, whereas Amin to date has expressed an optimistic attitude. In a word, as you can see, the Afghan leadership, in my view, has incorrectly assessed the state of affairs in the army and in the country generally.

PONOMAREV. The Afghan army achieved a revolutionary coup d'état, and I would think that under skillful leadership from the government, it could hold to its own position in defense of the country.

KIRILENKO. The problem is that many of the commanders in the army have been imprisoned and executed. This has resulted in a major negative impact on the army.

GROMYKO. One of our principal tasks is to strengthen the army; that is the main link. Our entire orientation must fo-

cus on the political leadership of the country and the army. And all the same, we have to acknowledge that the Afghan leadership is concealing a great deal from us. For some reason they do not want to be open with us. This is very unfortunate.

ANDROPOV. It seems to me that we ought to inform the socialist countries of these measures.

KIRILENKO. We have spoken at length, Comrades, and our opinions are clear; let us come to a conclusion.

1. Comrade Kosygin shall be authorized to clarify the document which has been presented to us, to add to it the supply of 100 thousand tons of bread, an increase in the price of gas from 15 to 25 rubles, and to remove the language about a percentage, and hard currency, etc.

2. Comrade Kosygin shall be authorized to communicate with Comrade Taraki, to ascertain how they evaluate the situation in Afghanistan and what is necessary from us. In this discussion with Taraki, Comrade Kosygin shall be guided by the exchange of opinion that has taken place here in the Politburo.

3. The third point that we have discussed here consists of authorizing Comrades Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov and Ponomarev to prepare a political document dealing with an exchange of opinions regarding our policy in connection with Afghanistan.

4. We must appeal to Pakistan, through our channels in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that the Pakistani government not allow any interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

5. I think that we should accede to the proposal of Comrade Ustinov in connection with assistance to the Afghan army in overcoming the difficulties that it has encountered by means of the forces of our military units.

6. To send into Afghanistan our best military specialists, through our channels with the Ministry of Defense, as well as through the KGB, for a detailed explication of the circumstances prevailing in the Afghan army and in Afghanistan generally.

7. Our draft of the decision must contain a provision for the preparation of materials that expose the interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan on the part of Pakistan, Iran, the USA, and China, and for publication of those materials through third

countries.

8. Comrades Ponomarev and Zamyatin shall be authorized to prepare materials relating to the intervention of Pakistan, the USA, Iran, China and other countries in Afghanistan and to dispatch such material to the press as it becomes available.

9. We must think carefully about how we will respond to the accusations that will be leveled against the USSR by other countries, when we are charged with aggression and so forth.

10. The Ministry of Defense shall be permitted to deploy two divisions on the border between the USSR and Afghanistan.

And finally, as has been suggested here, it will be necessary for us to inform the socialist countries of those measures which we have adopted.

Are there any other proposals, Comrades?

ALL. It's all been covered.

KIRILENKO. I will now attempt to make contact with Comrade Chernenko and communicate our proposals to him.

ALL. Agreed. [Recess.]

KIRILENKO. I have just spoken with Comrade Chernenko. He believes that the proposals set forth here are correct, and he will attempt to inform Leonid Ilych about them.

Let us adjourn this session for today. [Session adjourned.]

[March 18 Session:]

KIRILENKO. Yesterday we agreed that Comrade A.N. Kosygin should communicate with Comrade Taraki. Let us listen to Comrade A.N. Kosygin.

KOSYGIN. As we agreed, yesterday I made contact with Comrade Taraki twice by telephone. [Ed. note: See transcript of Kosygin-Taraki telephone conversation below.] He informed me that on the streets of Herat, the insurgent soldiers were fraternizing with those who support the government. The situation in that town is very complex. If, in the words of Comrade Taraki, the Soviet Union does not lend its assistance at this time, we will not hold out.

Further, Comrade Taraki said that Iran and Pakistan are supplying arms to the insurgents, and that, at the time, Afghans were returning from Iran, but it turned out that they were not Afghans but rather soldiers of the Iranian army dressed in Afghan cloth-

ing. And they stirred up agitation and insurrection. Consequently, in a number of provinces of Afghanistan, and especially in the town of Herat, events have unfolded that bring with them a most serious danger. Comrade Taraki said further that the issue could be resolved in a single day. If Herat falls, then it is considered that the matter is finished.

I then put the question to him: in Afghanistan there is a 100 thousand man army, not all of which is situated in Herat; there is only the one 17th division there. Could it really be impossible to form several divisions and deploy them to Herat in order to assist the supporters of the government? Comrade Taraki responded that several divisions were being formed, but that until they were formed, there would be no garrisons loyal to the government in Herat.

In that connection they would like to receive reinforcements in the form of tanks and armored cars for the infantry. I then asked him, will you be able to muster enough tank crews to place the tanks into action? He responded that they have no tank crews, and therefore he requested that we dispatch Tajiks to serve as crews for tanks and armored cars, dressed in Afghan uniforms, and send them here. I then stated again, Comrade Taraki, there is no way you will conceal the fact that our military personnel are taking part in battle operations; this fact will be immediately uncovered, and press correspondents will broadcast to the whole world that Soviet tanks are engaged in a military conflict in Afghanistan.

I also asked Comrade Taraki what was the population of Kabul. In response he told me that the population was 1 million 200 thousand. I then asked him, would it really be impossible for you to form part of a division from the population of Kabul to assist the various provinces, to equip them and, in like fashion, to arm them? To that he responded that there was nobody to train them. I then said to him, how is it possible, given how many people were trained in the military academic academies in the Soviet Union, given how many of the old military cadres have come out on the side of the government, that there is now nobody to do the training? How then, I asked him, can we support you? Almost without realizing it, Comrade Taraki responded that almost nobody does support the government. In Kabul we have no workers, only craftsmen.

And the conversation again turned to Herat, and he said that if Herat falls, then the revolution is doomed. And on the contrary, if it holds out, then survival of the revolution is assured. In his opinion, the army is reliable, and they are depending on it. However, uprisings have emerged throughout the entire country, and the army is too small to be able to pacify the insurgents everywhere. Your assistance is required, Comrade Taraki again declared.

As far as Kabul is concerned, there, it is obvious from the telegrams we received today, the situation is basically the same as in Iran: manifestos are circulating, and crowds of people are massing. Large numbers of persons are flowing into Afghanistan from Pakistan and Iran, equipped with Iranian and Chinese armaments.

KIRILENKO. In Herat the 17th division numbers 9 thousand men. Can it really be that they are all in a state of inaction or have gone over to the side of the government's opponents?

KOSYGIN. According to our data, the artillery and one infantry regiment have gone over, although not entirely, and the rest continue to support the government.

USTINOV. As far as the Tajiks are concerned, we don't have separate [deleted]

KOSYGIN. An antiaircraft battalion located in Herat has also gone over to the side of the rebels.

USTINOV. Amin, when I talked to him, also requested the deployment of forces to Herat to quell the insurgents.

KOSYGIN. Comrade Taraki reports that half of the division located in Herat has gone over to the side of the rebels. The remaining portion, he thinks, also will not support the government.

USTINOV. The Afghan revolution has encountered major difficulties along its way, Amin said in his conversation with me, and its survival now depends totally on the Soviet Union.

What is the problem? Why is this happening? The problem is that the leadership of Afghanistan did not sufficiently appreciate the role of Islamic fundamentalists. It is under the banner of Islam that the soldiers are turning against the government, and an absolute majority, perhaps only with rare exceptions, are believers. There is your reason why they are asking us to help drive back the attacks of the insurgents in Herat. Amin said, albeit somewhat uncertainly, that

there is support for the army. And again, like Comrade Taraki, he appealed for assistance.

KIRILENKO. It follows that they have no guarantee in respect to their own army. They are depending on only one outcome, namely, on our tanks and armored cars.

KOSYGIN. We must, obviously, in adopting such a determination in respect to assistance, seriously think through the consequences that will flow from this. The matter is really very serious.

ANDROPOV. Comrades, I have considered all these issues in depth and arrived at the conclusion that we must consider very, very seriously, the question of whose cause we will be supporting if we deploy forces into Afghanistan. It's completely clear to us that Afghanistan is not ready at this time to resolve all of the issues it faces through socialism. The economy is backward, the Islamic religion predominates, and nearly all of the rural population is illiterate. We know Lenin's teaching about a revolutionary situation. Whatever situation we are talking about in Afghanistan, it is not that type of situation. Therefore, I believe that we can suppress a revolution in Afghanistan only with the aid of our bayonets, and that is for us entirely inadmissible. We cannot take such a risk.

KOSYGIN. Maybe we ought to instruct our ambassador, Comrade Vinogradov, to go to Prime Minister of Iran [Mehdi] Bazargan and inform him that interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan cannot be tolerated.

GROMYKO. I completely support Comrade Andropov's proposal to rule out such a measure as the deployment of our troops into Afghanistan. The army there is unreliable. Thus our army, when it arrives in Afghanistan, will be the aggressor. Against whom will it fight? Against the Afghan people first of all, and it will have to shoot at them. Comrade Andropov correctly noted that indeed the situation in Afghanistan is not ripe for a revolution. And all that we have done in recent years with such effort in terms of détente, arms reduction, and much more - all that would be thrown back. China, of course, would be given a nice present. All the nonaligned countries will be against us. In a word, serious consequences are to be expected from such an action. There will no longer be any question of a meeting of Leonid Ilych with

Carter, and the visit of [French President] Giscard d'Estang at the end of March will be placed in question. One must ask, and what would we gain? Afghanistan with its present government, with a backward economy, with inconsequential weight in international affairs. On the other side, we must keep in mind that from a legal point of view too we would not be justified in sending troops. According to the UN Charter a country can appeal for assistance, and we could send troops, in case it is subject to external aggression. Afghanistan has not been subject to any aggression. This is its internal affair, a revolutionary internal conflict, a battle of one group of the population against another. Incidentally, the Afghans haven't officially addressed us on bringing in troops.

In a word, we now find ourselves in a situation where the leadership of the country, as a result of the serious mistakes it has allowed to occur, has ended up not on the high ground, not in command of the necessary support from the people.

KIRILENKO. Yesterday in Afghanistan the situation was different, and we were inclined toward the conclusion that we ought, perhaps, to deploy some number of military detachments. Today the situation is different, and the discussion here quite correctly has already taken a somewhat different course, namely, we are all adhering to the position that there is no basis whatsoever for the deployment of forces.

ANDROPOV. Yesterday, when we discussed this issue, the Afghans were not talking about the deployment of troops; today the situation there has changed. In Herat, not just one regiment has gone over to the side of the rebellion but the whole division. As we can see from yesterday's discussion with Amin, the people do not support the government of Taraki. Would our troops really help them here? In such a situation, tanks and armored cars can't save anything. I think that we should say to Taraki bluntly that we support all their actions and will render the kind of support that we agreed upon yesterday and today, but that in no case will we go forward with a deployment of troops into Afghanistan.

KOSYGIN. Maybe we should invite him here and tell him that we will increase our assistance to you, but we cannot deploy troops, since they would be fighting not against the army, which in essence has gone

over to the adversary or is just sitting and waiting it out, but against the people. There would be huge minuses for us. A whole contingent of countries would quickly come out against us. And there are no pluses for us at all.

ANDROPOV. We should state directly to Comrade Taraki that we will support you with all measures and means except for the deployment of troops.

KOSYGIN. We should invite him here and tell him that we will support you with all means and measures but we will not deploy troops.

KIRILENKO. The government of Afghanistan itself has done nothing to secure the situation. And it has a 100 thousand man army at that. What has it done? What good has it accomplished? Essentially nothing. And after all, Comrades, we gave very, very good support to Afghanistan.

ALL. Agreed.

KIRILENKO. We gave it everything. And what has come of it? It has come to nothing of any value. After all, it was they who executed innocent people for no reason and even spoke to us of their own justification, as though we also executed people during the time of Lenin. So you see what kind of Marxists we have found.

The situation has changed since yesterday. Yesterday, as I already said, we were unanimous as to the rendering of military aid, but we carefully discussed the matter, considered various options, searched for different ways, other than the deployment of troops. I believe that we should present our point of view of Leonid Ilych, invite Comrade Taraki to Moscow and tell him about everything that we have agreed on.

Maybe it is true we should send special declarations to [Ayatollah Ruhollah] Khomeini and Bazargan in Iran and Pakistan?

ANDROPOV. We should invite Comrade Taraki here.

KOSYGIN. I think we should consult with Leonid Ilych and send a plane to Kabul today.

KIRILENKO. Comrade Kosygin needs to speak with Comrade Taraki. If he wants to come to Moscow and not remain in Tashkent, then perhaps Leonid Ilych will see him.

GROMYKO. I think it would be better for us to prepare a political document after the discussion with Comrade Taraki.

ANDROPOV. We have to begin publishing articles about Pakistan and its support for the insurgents.

USTINOV. I assume we will continue with the aid measures that we agreed on yesterday.

ALL. Agreed.

USTINOV. The only thing is that we must rule out the possibility of deploying troops.

KOSYGIN. In short, we are not changing anything in connection with aid to Afghanistan except the deployment of troops. They themselves will relate more responsibly to the determination of questions concerning the government's management of affairs. And if we do everything for them, defend their revolution, then what remains for them? Nothing. We have 24 advisors in Herat. We should pull them out.

ZAMYATIN. As far as the supply of propaganda is concerned in connection with this undertaking, we have articles prepared about Afghanistan. We also have articles prepared about Pakistan and the assistance rendered to the Afghan insurgents by China. We must get these articles to press today.

ALL. Agreed.

CHERNENKO. Comrades, we must decide who will invite Comrade Taraki.

KIRILENKO. This should be done by Comrade A.N. Kosygin. Let him make the call and invite him to come to Moscow or Tashkent, whichever he prefers.

[With this the session of March 18 was adjourned.]

[March 19 session:]

BREZHNEV. Comrades, since the beginning of the events that have unfolded in Afghanistan, I have been informed about them. I have been informed about the discussions of Comrade A. A. Gromyko with Amin, of Comrade D. F. Ustinov also with Amin, about the latest events that have taken place there in the course of yesterday, and in that connection about the discussion of Comrade A.N. Kosygin with Comrade Taraki.

I have signed documents authorizing the delivery of additional supplies of special materials, including military property and armaments, and also dealing with the issue of a number of measures having a political and organizational character, and authorizing Comrade A.N. Kosygin to com-

municate with Comrade Taraki, and to brief our press and other media outlets in connection with the events in Afghanistan. In a word, all of the measures that were set forth in the draft decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU submitted on Saturday, all of the measures that have been adopted in the course of Saturday and Sunday, in my view, are entirely correct.

The question was raised as to the immediate participation of our troops in the conflict that has arisen in Afghanistan. In my view the Politburo has correctly determined that the time is not right for us to become entangled in that war.

We must explain to Comrade Taraki and our other Afghan comrades, that we can help them with everything that is necessary for the conduct of all activities in the country. But the involvement of our forces in Afghanistan would harm not only us, but first of all them. Accordingly, it would appear that we ought now to hear the report of Comrades A.A. Gromyko, D.F. Ustinov, Y.V. Andropov and A.N. Kosygin, and with that conclude this phase of the adoption of measures which were necessary to implement in connection with the conflict in Afghanistan.

GROMYKO. We must discuss today the very acute question concerning the situation in Afghanistan. We have closely followed the developing events in that country and have given instructions to our embassy personnel, advisors and so forth. We have systematically, I would say, very regularly, in the course of the day, received comprehensive information from our representatives in Afghanistan.

What do we have as of today? In an array of provinces in Afghanistan, first and foremost in Herat, there has been an uprising of insurgents. Where did they come from? They were dispatched from the territory of Iran and Pakistan. These are all elements hostile to the government of Comrade Taraki. In order to conceal their deployment into Afghanistan, they were dressed in Afghan uniforms, and in numbers amounting to several tens of thousands they appeared in Herat, instigated this insurrection, and we unexpectedly began to receive reports about the events in Herat. There is one government division located there, which was supposed to maintain public order. But as a result of the fact that part of the government forces went over to the

side of the insurgents, shooting broke out and there were many casualties; more than a thousand were killed.

I discussed all aspects of the situation in Afghanistan with the Deputy Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs Amin. But I must say candidly that his assessment was somehow rather relaxed. We were under the impression conveyed by his assessment, and then suddenly the mood of Amin changed for the worse, and he himself began to speak about the fact that the entire division located in Herat had gone over to the side of the insurgents. At the height of the events in Herat, Dmitri Fedorovich [Ustinov] spoke with Amin, who bluntly expressed the view that the USSR should deploy troops in Herat. It begins to look like a detective novel, how superciliously the Afghan leadership posits such serious questions.

After that, Comrade A. N. Kosygin spoke with Comrade Taraki, who told him that the situation in Afghanistan was bad, and he also requested a deployment of troops to Herat. The border of Afghanistan, both with Iran and Pakistan, is open. Our advisors promptly articulated a series of proposals, but they didn't listen to them.

Today we have received reports indicating that the situation in Herat is not all that bad: two regiments remain loyal to the government after all. Where lies the truth, I can't say, but these are the reports we have gotten.

We may assume with full justification that all these events, not only in Afghanistan but in the neighboring governments, including those in China, are being directed by the hand of the USA. China, Pakistan, and Iran are playing a role here that is not at all far behind.

There are several heartening notes in the fact that in Kabul, yesterday, a massive demonstration took place in support of the government. But all the same the government position in Afghanistan is not in control as it ought to be.

Naturally, we cannot avoid the need to confront the questions relating to the situation in Afghanistan. But I believe that we will have to adhere to our line, our policy, and follow our course with a view to all of the peculiarities. If, for example, we take upon ourselves the risk of deploying troops, we will obtain not as many pluses as minuses. To this time we still don't know how

the Afghan army will behave. And if it does not support our measures or remains neutral, then it will turn out that we have used our forces to occupy Afghanistan. In doing this we will create for ourselves an incredibly difficult complication in our foreign policy. We would be largely throwing away everything we achieved with such difficulty, particularly détente, the SALT-II negotiations would fly by the wayside, there would be no signing of an agreement (and however you look at it that is for us the greatest political priority), there would be no meeting of Leonid Ilych with Carter, and it is very doubtful that Giscard d'Estang would come to visit us, and our relations with Western countries, particularly the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany], would be spoiled.

And so, despite the difficult situation in Afghanistan, we cannot embark on such an act as the deployment of troops (Parenthetically, it is entirely incomprehensible to us why Afghanistan has been so indulgent with Pakistan, which is obviously engaged in intervention against Afghanistan. Yesterday the government of Afghanistan published a proclamation, but it was not sufficiently strident.)

We are rendering major aid to Afghanistan. How the government of Afghanistan will conduct itself henceforth is difficult to predict; determining the situation there is also problematic. However, there is no basis whatsoever to conclude that all is lost there. I believe that if the Afghan government can find in itself the strength to coordinate its actions properly, then matters might turn out there for the best.

KOSYGIN. I had the opportunity to speak with Comrade Taraki yesterday on two occasions. He says that everything there is falling apart and that we must send troops, that the situation is the same in all of Afghanistan as it is in Herat. He says that if we lose Herat, then everything will fall. Pakistan, in his opinion, is sending a large number of men, dressed in Afghan uniforms. According to his data, 4,000 such persons have been dispatched. There are 500 men situated on the airfield in Herat at this time. I asked him, who in Herat is on your side? Comrade Taraki responded that in essence the entire population there has fallen under the influence of the religious fundamentalists. He said that there are 200-250 persons there who are organizing the entire thing. I asked him, are there any workers there? He

said, that there are about two thousand workers. I asked him what, in your opinion, are the prospects for Herat? He said to me bluntly that Herat will fall tomorrow, but that it is holding on for the time being.

They are talking about forming new units and sending them to Herat. In the opinion of Comrade Taraki, all who have gathered from the ranks of those dissatisfied with the new regime will then unite and set out for Kabul, and that will be the end of his government. Again he requested assistance from our troops. I said that I could not answer his request at this time. I said that we were intensively studying the question, and that we would deliberate and then respond.

As you can see, the discussion with Comrade Taraki yielded no constructive results whatsoever. He spoke of the fall of Herat and requested a deployment of our troops. I asked him what was required from our side in order to combine political measures with those of a military character. Taraki then said to me, you should place Afghan insignias on your planes and tanks, and let them move on Herat from across the border. I then said that this would be direct aggression on the part of the USSR against Afghanistan.

I asked him, can you muster soldiers and special drivers for tanks and armored cars from the ranks of the Afghans? He said that this could be done, but only a very few.

I told him of our decision to render comprehensive assistance to Afghanistan, to send an additional number of advisors and specialists.

Naturally, we must preserve Afghanistan as an allied government. In addition, it would appear that we must appeal to Pakistan with a warning that intervention against Afghanistan is intolerable. The same measure must be taken in respect to Iran. The message must be directed to Khomeini and to Bazargan. We must also come out with a similar document in respect to Iran.

It would be good if the borders with Pakistan and Iran could be closed.

It seems to me that it would make sense to take the further step of sending a good ambassador to Afghanistan. From the discussion with Comrade Taraki I learned that he doesn't even know to whom the government should turn. A great political task is necessary there, and only in that event can we save Afghanistan as an ally.

BREZHNEV. Letters to Pakistan and

Iran must be sent today.

USTINOV. Amin spoke with me yesterday morning. Having consulted beforehand with Leonid Ilych, I told him about the massive aid that we are turning out and will continue to render. Amin said that the Soviet Union is our closest and principal friend. He then started to lament about the fact that Pakistan and Iran are sending large numbers of saboteurs that are being trained on the territory of Pakistan by Chinese advisors, being equipped with Chinese arms, and are then being sent across the border into Afghanistan.

There is strong opposition in Afghanistan on the part of the feudal lords.

He then turned the discussion to Herat and, just like Taraki, asked us to send tanks. I told him about the aid that we had determined to give Afghanistan in the form of a supply of armaments. He said that such aid was helpful, but what they really need is for us to send tanks.

BREZHNEV. Their army is falling apart, and we are supposed to wage the war for them.

USTINOV. We have a large number of advisors in the Afghan army, as well as interpreters. I told Amin that we can send an additional number of interpreters.

Getting to the heart of the matter, in Afghanistan there is basically no information, no ties between Kabul and Herat. There is a single small electric power station there, and consequently the insurgent elements, having deserted the government, are heading into the mountains.

The situation in Herat today is somewhat better. It is calm in the city. Technical assistance, of course, will be necessary for us to send. We will send a great deal of it. We are forming two divisions in the Turkestan military district, and one division in the Central Asian military district. We have three regiments that could arrive in Afghanistan in literally three hours. But I am saying this, of course, only to emphasize our state of readiness. Like the rest of my Comrades, I do not support the idea of deploying troops to Afghanistan. I would request permission that we conduct tactical exercises on the border with Afghanistan and to form regiments and divisions.

I must say that the Afghan leadership is poorly handling very many matters, and that working under such conditions is very difficult for our advisors.

ANDROPOV. The first question that must be decided concerns the difficulty of the situation. In addition to that the situation is increasingly unreliable. Just what exactly is going on in Afghanistan? It has to do with the leadership. The leadership does not recognize the forces which support it, and on which it could depend. Today, for example, a rather substantial demonstration took place in Kabul and Herat, but the leadership did not exploit these massive measures to the necessary extent. Educational efforts have been poorly managed not only in the army but among the population generally. They execute their political opponents. Nobody listens to the radio because transmissions are very weak. It will be necessary for us to assist them with mobile telecommunications facilities.

Amin has essentially had all of the power in his hands, but only yesterday did they ratify a new director of government security and a chief of state. This is the way to achieve some broadening of the political base among the leadership.

On our part, we have advisors there under the direction of the chief advisor for party policy Comrade Veselov. In my opinion he is not up to the task and is coping badly with the situation. It might be better if we were to send there some comrade from the Central Committee apparatus. There are many advisors there. There are advisors in KGB channels, also in large numbers.

I think that as far as the deployment of troops is concerned, it would not behoove us to make such a determination. To deploy our troops would mean to wage war against the people, to crush the people, to shoot at the people. We will look like aggressors, and we cannot permit that to occur.

PONOMAREV. We have 460 Afghan military personnel in the Soviet Union. These are all prepared officer cadres; they could be sent into Afghanistan.

OGARKOV. The Afghans have appealed to us with a request to speed up the training of 160 officers.

USTINOV. We have to speak with Comrade Taraki about getting those people sent there and using them as officer cadres.

KAPITONOV. As far as our chief advisor on party policy Comrade Veselov is concerned, he is a good man. He served as the Central Committee inspector with us, and more recently worked as the second

secretary to the Bashkirskii general party committee. He is a young and energetic comrade.

USTINOV. Our party advisors are not sufficiently qualified and there are very few of them, in all, it seems to me, five men, but the work has to be done very quickly.

KAPITONOV. That's right, we really do have only five men there under the direction of Comrade Veselov. But we are right now selecting a number of additional comrades and will send them there.

BREZHNEV. I think that we should approve the measures that have been worked out in the course of these few days.

ALL. Agreed.

BREZHNEV. It follows that the appropriate comrades should be authorized to carry them out aggressively and if new questions arise in connection with Afghanistan, to submit them to the Politburo.

ALL. Agreed.

BREZHNEV. Accordingly, we are adopting the decision:

To bring Comrade Taraki here tomorrow, March 20.

Discussions will be conducted by Comrades A. N. Kosygin, A. A. Gromyko, and D. F. Ustinov, and then I will see him.

ALL. Very well.

With this the session was adjourned.

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 25 dok.1, ll. 1, 12-25; document provided by M. Kramer (Harvard University); translation by Carter-Brezhnev Project.]

#### CPSU CC Politburo Decisions on Afghanistan, 18 March 1979

Proletariats of all countries, unite!  
Subject to return within 3 days to the CC CPSU (General Department, 1st Sector)  
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.  
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET  
SPECIAL FILE

No.P147/II

To Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Zimianin, Zamiatin, Smirtiukov.

Extract from protocol No. 147 of the CC

CPSU Politburo session of  
18 March 1979

About certain measures of a political and organizational nature regarding the sharpening of the situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

1. Assign Com. Kosygin, A.N. to negotiate by telephone with Com. N.M. Taraki about the possibility of a meeting with him in Moscow or Tashkent.

CC SECRETARY

3-zm mk

[new document]

Proletariats of all countries, unite!  
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.  
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

No.P147/II

To Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Zimianin, Zamiatin, Smirtiukov.

Extract from protocol No. 147 of the CC CPSU Politburo session of 18 March 1979

About certain measures of a political and organizational nature regarding the sharpening of the situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

1. Special file.  
2. In relation to the sharpening of the situation in the DRA, consider expedient the acceptance of a political document which reveals the reasons for the sharpening of the situation in Afghanistan, and defines our possible steps in providing assistance to the leadership of the DRA in the stabilization of the situation in the country.

Assign Coms. Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, Ponomarev to prepare a draft resolution on that issue, taking into account the exchange of opinions which took place at the meeting the the CC Politburo.

3. Assign Coms. Ponomarev, Zimianin and Zamiatin to prepare materials for publication in the press, transmission by television and radio, which unmask the interfer-

ence of the USA, Pakistan, Iran, China in the internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. As soon as these materials are ready, send them to press.

4. Assign the MFA USSR and the CC CPSU International department to prepare a draft of an appeal to the governments of Iran and Pakistan about the inadmissibility of preparing diversionist and terroristic acts on the territories of Iran and Pakistan, sending diversionist groups onto the territory of Afghanistan, and intervention in the internal affairs of the DRA.

5. Assign the KGB USSR and the CC CPSU Department of foreign political propaganda to prepare and send to third countries materials about the interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan by the USA, Pakistan, Iran, China, and other countries.

SECRETARY CC

[Source: *Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF)*, f. 3 op. 82, d. 137, ll. 121-123; obtained by Carter-Brezhnev Project; translation by Mark H. Doctoroff.]

#### Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin and Afghan Prime Minister Nur Mohammed Tarki, 17 or 18 March 1979

Kosygin: Ask Comrade Taraki, perhaps he will outline the situation in Afghanistan.

Taraki: The situation is bad and getting worse.

Kosygin: Do you have support among the workers, city dwellers, the petty bourgeoisie, and the white collar workers in Herat? Is there still anyone on your side?

Taraki: There is no active support on the part of the population. It is almost wholly under the influence of Shiite slogans - follow not the heathens, but follow us. The propaganda is underpinned by this.

Kosygin: Are there many workers there?

Taraki: Very few—between 1,000 and 2,000 people in all.

Kosygin: What are the prospects?

Taraki: We are convinced that the enemy will form new units and will develop an offensive.

Kosygin: Do you not have the forces to rout them?

Taraki: I wish it were the case.

Kosygin: What, then, are your propos-

als on this issue?

Taraki: We ask that you extend practical and technical assistance, involving people and arms.

Kosygin: It is a very complex matter.

Taraki: Iran and Pakistan are working against us, according to the same plan. Hence, if you now launch a decisive attack on Herat, it will be possible to save the revolution.

Kosygin: The whole world will immediately get to know this. The rebels have portable radio transmitters and will report it directly.

Taraki: I ask that you extend assistance.

Kosygin: We must hold consultations on this issue. Do you not have connections with Iran's progressives? Can't you tell them that it is currently the United States that is your and their chief enemy? The Iranians are very hostile toward the United States and evidently this can be put to use as propaganda. What foreign policy activities or statements would you like to see coming from us? Do you have any ideas on this question, propaganda-wise?

Taraki: Propaganda help must be combined with practical assistance. I suggest that you place Afghan markings on your tanks and aircraft and no one will be any the wiser. Your troops could advance from the direction of Kushka and from the direction of Kabul. In our view, no one will be any the wiser. They will think these are Government troops.

Kosygin: I do not want to disappoint you, but it will not be possible to conceal this. Two hours later the whole world will know about this. Everyone will begin to shout that the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan has begun. If we quickly airlift tanks, the necessary ammunition and make mortars available to you, will you find specialists who can use these weapons?

Taraki: I am unable to answer this question. The Soviet advisers can answer that.

Kosygin: Hundreds of Afghan officers were trained in the Soviet Union. Where are they all now?

Taraki: Most of them are Moslem reactionaries. We are unable to rely on them, we have no confidence in them.

Kosygin: Can't you recruit a further 50,000 soldiers if we quickly airlift arms to you? How many people can you recruit?

Taraki: The core can only be formed by older secondary school pupils, students,

and a few workers. The working class in Afghanistan is very small, but it is a long affair to train them. But we will take any measures, if necessary.

Kosygin: We have decided to quickly deliver military equipment and property to you and to repair helicopters and aircraft. All this is for free. We have also decided to deliver to you 100,000 tons of grain and to raise gas prices from \$21 per cubic meter to \$37.

Taraki: That is very good, but let us talk of Herat. Why can't the Soviet Union send Uzbeks, Tajiks, and Turkmens in civilian clothing? No one will recognize them. We want you to send them. They could drive tanks, because we have all these nationalities in Afghanistan. Let them don Afghan costume and wear Afghan badges and no one will recognize them. It is very easy work, in our view. If Iran's and Pakistan's experience is anything to go by, it is clear that it is easy to do this work, they have already shown how it can be done.

Kosygin: You are, of course, oversimplifying the issue. It is a complex political and international issue, but, irrespective of this, we will hold consultations again and will get back to you.

Taraki: Send us infantry fighting vehicles by air.

Kosygin: Do you have anyone to drive them?

Taraki: We will find drivers for between 30 and 35 vehicles.

Kosygin: Are they reliable? Won't they flee to the enemy, together with their vehicles? After all, our drivers do not speak the language.

Taraki: Send vehicles together with drivers who speak our language—Tajiks and Uzbeks.

Kosygin: I expected this kind of reply from you. We are comrades and are waging a common struggle and that is why we should not stand on ceremony with each other. Everything must be subordinate to this.

[The first page has a hand-written footnote: At the Central Committee Politburo's sitting on 19 March, Comrade Kosygin read the transcript of these conversations in the presence of Central Committee secretaries.]

[Source: *Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian*, "Special File" program,

14 July 1992, as translated in *FBIS-SOV-92-138* (17 July 1992), pp. 30-31.]

**Meeting of Kosygin, Gromyko, Ustinov, and Ponomarev with Taraki in Moscow, 20 March 1979**

Top Secret  
SPECIAL FILE

**RECORD OF MEETING<sup>x</sup>**

of A.N.KOSYGIN, A.A.GROMYKO,  
D.F.USTINOV and B.N.PONOMAREV  
with N.M.TARAKI

20 March 1979

A.N.Kosygin. The Politburo has entrusted us with discussing with you all questions which you think necessitate an exchange of opinions. As I have already mentioned to you, your meeting with L.I.Brezhnev is scheduled for 18-18.30.

At first we proposed that the first word should be given to you, but since one important question from your side has already been raised, I would like to first set forth our opinion, and then we will attentively hear you out.

First of all, I would like to emphasize that the friendship between Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is not conditional, dictated by some temporary viewpoints, but calculated for ages. We have given and will continue to give you assistance in the fight against all enemies which act against you at the present time and against those enemies with which you may clash in the future.

We have carefully discussed the situation which has developed in your country, we looked for ways to assist you which would best serve the interests of our friendship and your relations with other countries. There may be various ways of solving the problems which have developed in your country, but the best way is that which would preserve the authority of your government in the eyes of the people, not spoil relations between Afghanistan and neighboring countries, and not injure the international prestige of your country. We must not allow the situation to seem as if you were not able to deal with your own problems and invited foreign troops to assist you. I would like to use the example of Vietnam. The Vietnamese people withstood a difficult war with the USA and are now fighting against Chinese

aggression, but no one can accuse the Vietnamese of using foreign troops. The Vietnamese are bravely defending by themselves their homeland against aggressive encroachments. We believe that there are enough forces in your country to stand up to counter-revolutionary raids. One only needs to unify them and create new military formations. During our telephone conversation with you we spoke of the need to begin creating new military groups, keeping in mind that a certain amount of time will be needed for their training and preparation. But even at this time you have at your disposal a sufficient force in order to deal with the current situation. One need only deal with it correctly. Let's take the example of Herat. It seemed that all would fall apart, that the enemy had firmly entrenched itself there, that the city had become a center of counter-revolution. But when you really took charge of the matter, you were able to seize control of the situation. We have just received word that today, at 11 o'clock in the morning, the military town in Herat, the location of the mutinous section of the 17th infantry division, has been taken by a battalion of paratroopers supported by tanks from Kandahar, following air-strikes. Troops loyal to the government are securing and further taking advantage of this success.

In our opinion, our assignment for the current time period is to defend you from various international complications. We will give you assistance with all available means - ship weapons, ammunition, send people who can be useful to you in managing military and domestic matters of the country, specialists to train your military personnel in the operation of the most modern types of weapons and military machinery which we are sending you. The deployment of our forces in the territory of Afghanistan would immediately arouse the international community and would invite sharply unfavorable multipronged consequences. This, in effect, would be a conflict not only with imperialist countries, but also a conflict with one's own people. Our mutual enemies are just waiting for the moment when Soviet forces appear on Afghan territory. This would give them an excuse to deploy on Afghan territory military formations hostile to you. I would again like to underline that the question of deploying our forces has been examined by us from every direction; we carefully studied all aspects of this ac-

tion and came to the conclusion that if our troops were introduced, the situation in your country would not only not improve, but would worsen. One cannot deny that our troops would have to fight not only with foreign aggressors, but also with a certain number of your people. And people do not forgive such things. Besides, as soon as our troops cross the border, China and all other aggressors will be vindicated.

We have come to the conclusion that in the given period, the most effective support that we could give you would be through methods of our political influence on neighboring countries and through the rendering of extensive and manifold assistance. This way would accomplish much more than through the deployment of our troops. We are deeply convinced that we can overcome the enemy using the political means being undertaken both by your side and by our side. We have already discussed with you that Afghanistan should work towards good relations with Iran, Pakistan and India by eliminating any pretexts they may have for meddling in your affairs. As for us, today we are sending two documents to the leaders of Iran and Pakistan, in which we tell them with all seriousness not to meddle in the affairs of Afghanistan. We are taking care of this matter ourselves, without drawing you into it. These are, in essence, the thoughts which we wanted to share with you openly, as comrades.

N.M.Taraki. I am very grateful to you for the detailed account of the position of the Soviet government on the question which I wanted to discuss. I also speak forthrightly and openly, as your friend. We in Afghanistan also believe that emerging problems should first be dealt with through political means, and that military actions must be auxiliary in nature. In the political arena, we have taken a number of steps and are convinced that the majority of the people remain on our side. Within a day after my appearance on the radio where I explained the nature of events in Herat, throughout the country there took place 102 demonstrations, the participants of which carried placards condemning Khomeini and his minions. This convinced us that our internal enemies are not so numerous. We were also happy to hear the news that a segment of our armed forces, taking part in the mutiny, had put down their arms.

On my part, I also want to emphasize

that the relations between our countries are more than just routine diplomatic exchanges. They are based on a class foundation and on mutual ideology and politics. In our country, as in yours, the government belongs to the working class and to the peasants, who wrested it from the hands of the aristocracy and the feudalists. Our revolution has provoked a malicious reaction from our class enemies. The revolutionary reorganization undertaken by us - liberation of peasants from dependency to landlords and feudalists resulting from debt, redistribution of land to landless peasants, and other measures - have secured the authority of our government among the people of Afghanistan, and have had a positive response from the people of Pakistan and Iran. This has driven fear into the reactionary forces of these countries, which have increased their subversive activities against our country, intensified slanderous propaganda, and begun to send terrorist gangs into our territory. They began their propaganda against us by proclaiming us apostates of Islam. Then they began to accuse us of all other mortal sins. The Pakistani propaganda perverted the measures undertaken by us towards social liberation of women, whom we gave a dignified position in society. When we set to work on land reform, the ruling circles in Pakistan, seeing its revolutionary influence on their people, crossed over to the politics of sabotage and subversive activities against us. The rulers of Pakistan were very frightened by the demonstrations that rolled across the country, protesting under banners "Long live the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan!" and "Long live Taraki!" Our country was not only being infiltrated by members of "the Moslem brotherhood" who had fled the country after the revolution, but also by entire subdivisions, dressed in Afghan military uniforms, which are involved in subversive activities and sabotage. After my visit to Soviet Union and the signing of a very important Treaty between our countries, the American imperialists and other reactionaries became strongly antagonistic against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. They understood that Afghanistan had been finally lost by the West. Through their means of mass information the USA, Pakistan, and Iran spread all sorts of slanderous material defaming us. It is in the close friendship of Afghanistan and the Soviet Union that one finds the main rea-

son for anti-Afghan activity of imperialists and reactionaries.

Today we spoke with you concerning the fact that Afghanistan should maintain good ties with Pakistan, Iran, and India. This will be difficult to achieve, as Iran, and especially Pakistan, don't want friendship with us.

A.N. Kosygin. A statement has just been received from [Pakistani leader] Zia-ul-Haq, in which he notes that events in Afghanistan are the internal matter of that state and that Pakistan will not interfere in them. This statement also notes that the government of Pakistan will only deliver humanitarian aid to the 35 thou. refugees from Afghanistan as long as their activities do not undermine relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

N.M. Taraki. They only speak of humanitarianism, but are themselves creating camps to train commandos against us.

A.N. Kosygin. We are not so naive as to believe every word of Zia-ul-Haq, but whatever the case may be, the statement has been made and it is binding.

B.N. Ponomarev. It seems that the statement of Zia-ul-Haq is Pakistan's reaction to the story in the newspaper "Pravda."

A.N. Kosygin. Clearly Pakistan has become worried. They have felt the pressure from not only your side, but also from ours.

N.M. Taraki. The article in "Pravda," analyzing the schemes against the DRA, was published exactly at the right time. This article has made a deep impression on our neighbors. I, of course, agree with you that it necessary to take active political steps, and that war is a very risky proposition. It would be superfluous to delve into the question of why the Pakistanis, the Iranians, the Americans, and the Chinese are undertaking such active steps to undermine us. I would only like to emphasize that we have been and will continue to remain friends, and that we shall never be as close to anyone as we are with you. We have learned and continue to learn from Lenin. We are well aware of Lenin's instructions on how to build relations with neighboring countries. We strive towards good relations with neighbors, but we are hindered by the Americans who are trying to increase tensions by undermining progressive governments. They have acted thus against the young Soviet republic in the past, and are now continuing to act thus against

Cuba, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and South Yemen. We are resisting these schemes, and are doing everything to rule the country not by the force of arms, but by winning the people's respect through revolutionary-democratic reforms in the interest of the working people. For this we have already spent 200 bln. afghani. The people can tell who is their friend and who is their enemy. Having seen that propaganda against our government has not found a broad response from the Afghan people, the spiritual leaders have changed tactics and have begun to shout that Afghanistan has become pro-Soviet, pro-communist, that there are now 10 thousand Soviet people in the country who are bossing everyone around.

To sum up, I would like to say that we are worried by the possibility of infiltrators being sent across from Iran and Pakistan, though, of course, your verbal confrontation with the leaders of Pakistan and Iran will be very useful, and will have a sobering effect on them.

A.N. Kosygin. Some more news. The Iranian government has issued a directive ordering all foreign workers to leave the country by April 21 and for foreign specialists to leave by June 21. As for specialists deemed highly important for the Iranian economy, their cases will be dealt with on an individual basis.

N.M. Taraki. This remark most likely is directed towards the Americans. We have information that the Iranian government has already returned to the country American specialists who have been working there on helicopter assembly.

A.N. Kosygin. Yes, we have heard about it as well, but it is possible that we may have more specialists in Iran than do the Americans. If there arises the question of our specialists leaving, then a large metallurgical factory as well as other important enterprises in Iran will be unable to function. And how many Afghans are working in Iran?

N.M. Taraki. No less than 200 thousand people. They moved to Iran 5-6 years ago, during the regime of Daoud and even earlier. If they are going to be expelled, then under the guise of Afghan workers there will be guerillas coming as well, since it is very difficult to determine who is Iranian and who is Afghan from one's appearance. I wanted to touch on the question of the needs of the Afghan army. We would like to re-

ceive armored helicopters, an additional number of armored transports and military infantry vehicles, as well as modern means of communication. Also, maintenance personnel would be of great help to us.

D.F. Ustinov. It seems that we are talking about MI-24 helicopters, which have bullet-proof armor. We will give you 6 such helicopters during June-July and 6 more in the fourth quarter of this year. Perhaps we will be able to move up the timetable for deliveries.

N.M. Taraki. We have great need for these helicopters, and it would be good if they arrived together with pilots.

A.N. Kosygin. We can send you maintenance specialists, which would take care of these helicopters at the airport, but, of course, not battle crews. We have already spoken about the matter.

D.F. Ustinov. You must prepare your own pilots. We are training your officers, and we can expedite their release.

N.M. Taraki. Perhaps we can get helicopter pilots from Hanoi or some other country, for example, Cuba?

A.N. Kosygin. As I have already said earlier, we have helped and are helping Vietnam a great deal, but they never asked us to send them our pilots. They only asked for technical specialists. We are training 400 Afghan officers. Choose the people you need, and we will expedite their training.

N.M. Taraki. We would very much like the delivery of helicopters to be expedited. We have a great need for them.

A.N. Kosygin. We will further examine your request, and, if possible, will expedite the shipment of helicopters.

D.F. Ustinov. But, at the same time, you must worry about pilots for these helicopters.

N.M. Taraki. Of course we will do that. If we cannot find them in our country, then we will look elsewhere. The world is big. If you do not agree with that, then we will search for pilots from among the Afghans studying in your country, but we need trustworthy people, and among the Afghan officers whom we sent to study in the Soviet Union earlier there are many "Muslim brothers" and Chinese sympathizers.

A.N. Kosygin. Of course, you need to sort this out with the people we are training. We can send the "Moslem brothers" back, and we can make early graduation of those people whom you trust.

D.F. Ustinov. This year 190 Afghan officers are finishing their training, among whom 16 are airplane pilots and 13 - helicopter pilots. We will send you, through the chief military advisor in Afghanistan general Gorelov, the list of graduates, by their specialization.

N.M. Taraki. Good. We will do that. However, the problem is that we don't know the people belonging to counter-revolutionary groups by name. We only know that, during Daoud's regime, members of the "Muslim Brotherhood" and the pro-Chinese "Shoal-i-Jawid" organizations were sent over to the Soviet Union. We will try to work this out.

A.N. Kosygin. You seem to raise questions about the deliveries of military machinery with regard to the resolution which we made known in Kabul yesterday evening. In this resolution we speak of large military deliveries, of the delivery of 100 thou. tons of wheat, and of the price increase of Afghan natural gas from 24 to 37 dollars per 1000 m<sup>3</sup>. Are you familiar with this document?

N.M. Taraki. No. It seems that they did not manage to brief me on it.

A.N. Kosygin. Most likely this document arrived in Kabul before your departure to Moscow. Here are the decisions that the document contains: in March of this year you will be sent additionally and without charge 33 pcs. of BMP-1, 5 pcs. of MI-25, 8 pcs. of MI-8T, as well as 50 pcs. of BTR-60pb, 25 pcs. of armored reconnaissance vehicles, 50 pcs. of mobile anti-aircraft units, and an anti-aircraft unit "Strela" [Arrow]. On March 18 we already sent 4 MI-8 helicopters, and on March 21 you will receive 4 more helicopters. All of this is delivered to you without charge.

N.M. Taraki. Thank you for such great help. In Kabul I will acquaint myself in greater depth with this document. Right now I would like to say that 100 thou. tons of wheat is not enough for us. This fall we will not be able to reap the entire harvest because the landlords whose land was confiscated did not sow it, and in a few places the crops were destroyed.

A.N. Kosygin. You will receive 100 thousand tons of wheat at the rate that you can transport it from the border to the country. It seems that you will have difficulties with the transport of wheat because, judging from what transport specialists told us,

your transfer stations can only handle 15 thousand tons of wheat per month. While the 100 thou. tons are processed, we will think about what to do in the future.

N.M. Taraki. Earlier, Pakistan promised to sell us 200 thou. tons, but then recanted on its promise. Turkey also declined to deliver 70 thou. tons. We need at least another 300 thou. tons of wheat.

A.N. Kosygin. Since you were ready to pay for Pakistani wheat, you must have money? We can buy wheat from the Americans and transfer it to Afghanistan. For example, 200 thou. tons of wheat would cost 25 mln. rubles (40 mln. dollars).

N.M. Taraki. It will be difficult for us to find such a sum.

A.N. Kosygin. Find as much as you can, and with that sum we will buy you wheat.

N.M. Taraki. If we are unable to find the means, then we will ask for your help with wheat. We would also like to receive a deferment of payment on your loans and on their interest. Our military budget is planned with the hope that such a deferment will be given.

A.N. Kosygin. With the free delivery of military technology we have already given you significant help for your military budget. We will further think about that so as to provide you certain deferral of payments on the credits. We will review the issue and will inform you of what can be done with regards to this question.

N.M. Taraki. We also need a large radio station, which would allow us to broadcast propaganda throughout the world. Our radio station is weak. While any slanderous declaration of some religious leader is spread throughout the world through foreign organs of mass propaganda, the voice of our radio station remains almost unheard.

B.N. Ponomarev. We are taking energetic measures to spread propaganda about the successes of the DRA. We already spoke about the article in "Pravda." Today's edition contains your speech. It will be broadcast by radio to Iran, Pakistan and other countries. In this way we are helping compensate for the weakness of your radio station.

N.M. Taraki. Your help with propaganda is very valuable to us, but we would like for the world to hear our own voice. That's why we ask you to help us build a 1000 [kilowatts] radio station.

A.N. Kosygin. We will study this question, but, as far as I know, building a radio station requires a considerable amount of time.

B.N. Ponomarev. We will send you a specialist in propaganda. You may relate to him your ideas on how to secure a large propaganda support through socialist countries.

D.F. Ustinov. Concerning additional shipments of military machinery, a need will arise for additional military specialists and advisors.

N.M. Taraki. If you believe that such a need exists, then, of course, we will accept them. But won't you allow us, after all, to use pilots and tank operators from other socialist countries?

A.N. Kosygin. When referring to our military specialists, we mean mechanics who service military machinery. I cannot understand why the question of pilots and tank operators keeps coming up. This is a completely unexpected question for us. And I believe that it is unlikely that socialist countries will agree to this. The question of sending people who would sit in your tanks and shoot at your people - this is a very a pointed political question.

N.M. Taraki. We will see how we can use those Afghan soldiers who were sent to study with you earlier. Perhaps we will ask you to accept for training those people who we will select ourselves.

D.F. Ustinov. We will, of course, accept them for training.

A.N. Kosygin. To sum up this conversation, we can ascertain that there remains the question of the construction of a powerful radio station. There remains also the question of expediting the deliveries of military technology. You, as we understand, will select helicopter pilots from the officers training with us. If you have any other requests or desires, you may inform us through the Soviet ambassador and the chief military advisor. We will carefully review them, and will react accordingly.

We have also agreed to take political measures in defense of DRA from imperialists and plots of the reactionaries. We will continue to exert political influence on them. Our press will also provide continuous support for the DRA.

We think it important that within your country you should work to widen the social support of your regime, draw people over to your side, insure that nothing will

alienate the people from the government. And finally, not as a matter of discussion but as a wish, I would like to express my ideas on the importance of a very careful and cautious approach towards your staff. One should take care of one's staff and have an individual approach towards it. Have a thorough and good understanding with each person before hanging any labels on them.

N.M. Taraki. Are we talking about officers and generals?

A.N. Kosygin. And about officers, and about generals, and about political figures. But I repeat, I am saying this not for discussion, I am only expressing our wish.

N.M. Taraki. We try to be solicitous of our cadres. However, the Herat events have shown that "Moslem brothers" have penetrated into our midst, but we don't hang labels on those who are truly with us.

A.N. Kosygin. We aren't making any kind of claims about you. We are simply saying that mistakes in cadre policy are very expensive. We have experienced this ourselves. In Stalin's time, many of our officers were put in jail. And when the war broke out, Stalin was forced to send them to the front. These people showed themselves to be true heroes. Many of them rose to high rank. We are not interfering in your internal affairs, but we want to express our opinion regarding the necessity of behaving solicitously toward cadres.

N.M. Taraki. As far as I have understood from this conversation, you are rendering and will render us assistance, but you are not giving us a guarantee against aggression.

A.N. Kosygin. We have not discussed the question with you from this angle. We have been speaking about what are now the most effective means for the political defense of your country. You should not understand us as saying that we will leave you to the winds of fate.

N.M. Taraki. There are three types of support - political, economic, and military. Two kinds of assistance you are already giving us, but how will you act if there is an attack on our territory from without[?]

A.N. Kosygin. If an armed invasion of your country takes place, then it will be a completely different situation. But right now we are doing everything to insure that such an invasion does not occur. And I think that we will be able to achieve this.

N.M. Taraki. I pose this question be-

cause China is persistently pushing Pakistan against us.

A.N. Kosygin. When aggression takes place, then a completely different situation arises. The Chinese became convinced of this through the example of Vietnam and are wringing their hands now, so to speak. As for Afghanistan, we have already taken measures to guard it from aggression. I have already said that we have sent corresponding messages to the president of Pakistan, Khomeini, and the prime-minister of Iran.

N.M. Taraki. The members of our Politburo are aware of my visit to Moscow. Upon arriving in Kabul I will have to inform them of the results of our meetings. Must I tell them that the Soviet Union will give the DRA only political support and other aid?

A.N. Kosygin. Yes, both political support and extensive assistance in the line of military and other shipments. This is the decision of our Politburo. L.I. Brezhnev will tell you about this during the meeting with you, which will start in 10 min. I think that you will return to Afghanistan confident of our support, confident of your own actions.

N.M. Taraki. Expresses great [appreciation] for the conversation that took place and thanks for the great assistance that is being provided to Afghanistan during this critical moment.

Interpreted by the graduate student of the Diplomatic Academy of MFA USSR, comrade Kozin V.P., transcribed by the adviser of the Middle East Department of MFA USSR comrade Gavrilov S.P.

21.III.79.

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[<sup>x</sup> This record has not been seen by the participants.]

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 14, dok. 26; provided by M. Kramer; translation by D. Rozas with assistance of K. Weathersby.]

[Ed. note: For a translation of the Russian transcript of the 20 March 1979 meeting in Moscow of Brezhnev with Taraki immediately after the above meeting, see *CWIHP Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994)*, pp. 73-74.]

## Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Session on Afghanistan, 22 March 1979

Top Secret

Only copy

Working transcript

### SESSION OF POLITBURO OF CC CPSU 22 March 1979

Chaired by Comrade Brezhnev, L.I.

In attendance: Comrades Andropov, Iu.V.; Gromyko, A.A.; Kosygin, A.N.; Pelshe, A.Ia.; Ustinov, D.F.; Chernenko, K.U.; Demichev, P.N.; Kuznetsov, V.V.; Ponomarev, B.N.; Solomentsev, M.S.; Tikhonov, N.A.; Kapitonov, I.V.; Dolgikh, V.I.; Zimianin, M.V.; Rusakov, K.V.; Gorbachev, M.S.

#### I. Regarding the issue of the situation in Afghanistan

BREZHNEV. We reviewed the fundamental issues about measures to assist Afghanistan at the last meeting of the Politburo on Monday, and the measures envisaged by our decision are being realized in practice.

The situation in Afghanistan is pretty complicated. Now the affair seems to have improved.

GROMYKO. But all the same the situation continues to remain complicated.

BREZHNEV. We will continue to proceed for our common position which we determined at the last meeting of the Politburo, and we will not change anything which we noted regarding assistance to Afghanistan. As we viewed it from the very beginning, our actions in relation to the situation in Afghanistan were entirely correct.

Comrade Taraki arrived in Moscow in a somewhat excited condition, but during the discussions he gradually cheered up and towards the end he behaved calmly and sensibly.

In my conversation with Comrade Taraki I said that the main thing now is political work among the masses and with particular stress I repeated this. I said that the Afghan leadership should pay its main attention to the broadening of the base among which it conducts revolutionary re-education. Here the activity of the People's Democratic Party and its ideo-political cohesion has primary significance.

Taking into account that the Afghan leadership has made not a few mistakes regarding repressions, in the conversation attention was paid to the fact that primarily political and economic means should play the main role in attracting broad strata of the population to support the current regime. I directly said to Comrade Taraki that repressions are a sharp weapon and it must be applied extremely and extremely cautiously, and only in the case when there are serious legal grounds for it.

Comrade Taraki was told about the decisions which we made in support of Afghanistan both in the international plane and in the area of bilateral cooperation. At the same time it was directly declared that we consider the introduction of Soviet military detachments inexpedient, insofar as in the current situation this would only play into the hands of our common enemy.

Comrade Taraki thanked us for receiving him in Moscow and accepted the thoughts which had been expressed to him with understanding. He assured me that the Afghan leadership is doing everything so as to continue the development of the country along a revolutionary path.

Overall I believe that the conversations were useful. Demonstrating solidarity with the Afghan revolution and our faith in the Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation, we at the same time warned the Afghan leadership about the danger of extremism and the underestimation of mass political work, and oriented him towards conducting a more well-considered and thought-out course.

As was reported to me, Comrade Taraki remained very satisfied with the discussions in Moscow and left in a good mood.

Perhaps, the participants in the discussion will add something to what was said above?

KOSYGIN. I accompanied Comrade Taraki to the airfield. He thanked the Politburo [and] Leonid Il'ich for the nice reception and for the favorable attitude towards Afghanistan. The new year, by the way, has begun by their calendar. They celebrated it here. Comrade Taraki said that he had not expected that over such a short time it would be possible to decide so many questions, to conduct such a broad consideration of all the problems which so greatly interest the Afghan leadership.

About equipment, Comrade Taraki expressed a request that measures be accepted

regarding an improvement in radio transmissions to Afghanistan, and in particular, asked for a more powerful transmitter.

CHERNENKO. Proposals about that have been received.

KOSYGIN. I said that we are reviewing that issue attentively.

ZAMIATIN. Yesterday that issue was reviewed by the Ministry of Communications and Gosteleradio [State Television and Radio]. Comrades Talyzin and Lapin submitted proposals which are entirely acceptable. The issue is how to redirect a booster transmitter with a strength of 1000 kilowatts which is located close to Dushanbe near the border with Afghanistan. This transmitter is sufficient for the entire territory of Afghanistan.

KOSYGIN. Herat for all intents and purposes is now in the hands of the government.

ZAMIATIN, CHERNENKO say that in Herat the situation is more normal now.

ZAMIATIN. The radio transmissions will be conducted, of course, in the Afghan language.

BREZHNEV. In conclusion, Comrade Taraki thanked us for the reception which was shown him and for the solutions to the issues which we announced to him. I think that it would be possible to:

1. Approve the conversations which we had with Comrade Taraki.

2. Agree with the proposals of Comrades Lapin and Talyzin regarding the organization of the radio relay to Afghanistan, and also to make a corresponding notation in the nature of an instruction regarding the creation of a more powerful transmitter.

ANDROPOV. That is a very good measure.

The proposal is accepted.

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 25, dok. 2; document provided by M. Kramer; translation by Carter-Brezhnev Project.]

#### **Record of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan A.M. Puzanov and Taraki, 22 March 1979**

Taraki informs [Puzanov] about his conversations on high-frequency radio with Brezhnev, Kosygin, Ustinov, Gromyko, and Ponomarev. The Soviet leadership has made a decision "to provide political and military assistance to the DRA in the event of ag-

gression from Iran, Pakistan," and other countries, to speed up the delivery of weapons by air, postpone the expiration of credits, present 100,000 tons of grain to the DRA, and raise the price of Afghan natural gas bought by the USSR. Taraki gives thanks for the USSR declaration to Iran and Pakistan with the condemnation of interference in the domestic affairs of the DRA.

[Source: Notes by O.A. Westad in *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 76, d. 1044, ll. 29-30.]

[Ed. note: For a translation of a report to the CPSU CC Politburo on the Afghan situation by Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov and Ponomarev, dated 1 April 1979 and approved by the Politburo on 12 April 1979, see *CWIHP Bulletin 3* (Fall 1993), 67-69.]

#### **Report of the chief of the Soviet military advisory group in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. L.N. Gorelov, with H. Amin, 14 April 1979 (excerpt)**

Moscow

Urgent. Secret

...I was invited to see Com. Amin, who, at the behest of N.M. Taraki, requested that we send to Kabul some 15-20 combat helicopters with ammunition and Soviet crews so that, if the situation in the outlying and central regions deteriorates, they can be used against bands of rebels and terrorists who are being infiltrated from Pakistan.

In this regard, assurance was provided that the arrival in Kabul and the use of Soviet crews will be kept secret....

L. Gorelov  
14 April 1979

INSTRUCTIONS: This should not be done. [Marshal and Chief of Staff] N. V. Ogarkov

[Source: B. V. Gromov, *Ogranichennyi kontingent* (Moscow: Progress/Kultura, 1994), p. 78; translated by Mark Kramer.]

[Ed. note: For a translation of a CPSU CC Politburo decision dated 21 April 1979 rejecting the above-mentioned request from Amin that Moscow send Soviet helicopter crews to participate in the fighting, see *CWIHP Bulletin 4* (Fall 1994), pp. 74-75.]

**CPSU CC Politburo Decision and  
Instruction to Soviet Ambassador in  
Afghanistan, 24 May 1979**

Communist Party of the Soviet Union.  
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

TOP SECRET

No.P152/159

To Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Baibakov, Patolichev, Skachkov, Serbin, Smirtiukov

Extract from protocol No. 152 of the CC CPSU Politburo session of 24 May 1979

About Providing Supplementary Military Assistance to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

1. Approve the draft instruction of the USSR Council of Ministers on this issue (attached).

2. Assign Gosplan USSR and the Ministry of Foreign Trade to review within weeks the request for the delivery to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan of 1500 automobiles and to submit a proposal on this issue.

3. Affirm the text of the instruction to the Soviet Ambassador in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on this issue (attached)

CC SECRETARY

[attachment:]

Re: Point 159 Prot. No. 152

Top Secret

SPECIAL FILE

To KABUL

TO THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Visit N.M. Taraki and, referring to the instruction, inform him that the Afghan leadership's request about the provision of supplementary military assistance to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan have been attentively reviewed.

Say that in Moscow they share the concern of the Afghan leadership in relation to the activation of counter-revolutionary activity by the reactionary forces in Afghanistan. The Soviet leadership, guided by a

strong desire to provide further internationalist assistance in order to stabilize the situation in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, has taken a decision to deliver to Afghanistan in the period 1979-1981, free-of-charge, special property in the sum of 53 million rubles, including 140 guns and mortars, 90 armored personnel carriers (of which 50 will represent an expedited delivery), 48 thousand machine guns, around 1000 grenade throwers, 680 aviation bombs, and also to send in the form of an expedited delivery in June-July 1979 medicines and medical equipment in the sum of 50 thousand rubles. In terms of immediate assistance in May of this year, 100 incendiary tanks and 160 single-use bomb cassettes. The delivery of gas bombs with a non-toxic poison gas is not considered possible.

As far as the request of the Afghan side for the dispatch to the DRA of helicopters and transport planes with Soviet crews and a possible landing of our parachute troops in Kabul is concerned, the question of using Soviet military units was considered in much detail and from all points of view during Comrade M. Taraki's visit to Moscow in March of this year. Such actions, we are deeply convinced, are fraught with great complexities not only in the domestic political, but also in the foreign policy sphere, which no doubt would be used by hostile forces first of all to the detriment of the interests of the DRA and the consolidation of the victory of the April revolution.

Telegraph upon execution.

*[Source: TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 14, dok. 30, ll. 1-3; provided by M. Kramer; translation by Carter-Brezhnev Project.]*

**Record of Conversation Between Soviet  
Ambassador A.M. Puzanov and Taraki,  
9 June 1979**

Puzanov reports the USSR's demarche to Islamabad about the inadmissibility of anti-Afghan activity from the territory of Pakistan, and about Zia-ul-Haq's response about the Pakistanis' readiness to clear away the tension and to meet with Taraki at any time.

Puzanov puts forth his observations, that during such a meeting, in exchange for the DRA's obligation to support Pakistan upon its entry into the Non-Aligned Movement, it might be possible to get from it a

written agreement on a ban on Afghan refugees engaging in political activities, and the ceasing of propaganda among the Pushtu tribes and an end to the sending of armed groups into Afghanistan.

*[Source: Notes by O.A. Westad at TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 76, d. 1044, ll. 47-51.]*

**Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov-  
Ponomarev Report to CPSU CC on the  
Situation in Afghanistan, 28 June 1979**

Top Secret  
Special File

To the CC CPSU

... Difficulties in the coming-into-being of the DRA have a primarily objective character. They are related to the economic backwardness, the small size of the working class, the weakness of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). These difficulties are becoming more intense, however, as the result of subjective reasons: In the Party and the government a collegial leadership is lacking, all power in fact is concentrated in the hands of N.M. Taraki and H. Amin, who none too rarely make mistakes and commit violations of legality. ...

The main support of the Afghan government in the struggle with counter-revolution continues to be the army. Recently, security forces, border troops, and newly-created self defense forces have begun to take a more active part in this struggle. However, broad strata of the population are involved in the struggle with reaction only insufficiently, the consequence of which is that the measures which the DRA government has taken to stabilize the situation have been not very effective ...

Regarding this information, the MFA USSR, KGB USSR, Ministry of Defense and International Department of the CC CPSU consider it expedient to:

... 3. To assist the main military advisor, send to Afghanistan an experienced general and a group of officers to work directly among the troops (in the divisions and regiments). ...

4. To provide security and defense for the Soviet air squadrons at the Bagram airfield, send to the DRA, with the agreement of the Afghan side, a parachute battalion

disguised in the uniform (overalls) of an aviation-technical maintenance team.

For the defense of the Soviet Embassy, send to Kabul a special detachment of the KGB USSR (125-150 men), disguised as Embassy service personnel. At the beginning of August, after preparations have been completed, send to the DRA (to the Bagram airfield) a special detachment of the GRU of the General Staff to be used in the event of a sharp aggravation of the situation for the security and defense of particularly important government installations.

A. Gromyko, Iu. Andropov, D. Ustinov,  
B. Ponomarev

[Source: A.A. Liakhovskii, *The Tragedy and Valour of the Afghani* (Moscow: GPI "Iskon", 1995), p. 76. Liakhovskii notes that this the recommendations made in this document were approved during the CC CPSU Politburo meeting of 28 June 1979, in Resolution No. P, 156/XI.]

**Record of Conversation Between Soviet Ambassador A.M. Puzanov and Taraki, 10 July 1979**

The conversation is about the negotiations with Pakistan. Puzanov "spoke approvingly" about the steps the Afghans had taken to open a dialogue with Pakistan. The Ambassador noted that "the Pakistanis must not be given grounds for breaking the dialogue."

Taraki warned that Pakistan "is leading things toward a break in the negotiations"...

Puzanov: "in any case the Afghan side must demonstrate reasonable restraint; if the Pakistanis set out to break off the negotiations, let the blame for that fall entirely on them."

About Iran: It is impossible to evaluate the situation in that country unidimensionally, "in the country leftist forces are operating." He advises that a friendly step should be taken in relation to Iran, analogous to the one made in relation to Pakistan.

Taraki "expressed satisfaction over the arrival and deployment in Bagram of the Soviet special group." He would like also to confer with the Soviet comrades about measures to strengthen the border defenses.

[Source: notes by O. A. Westad of document in TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 76, d.1044, ll. 47-51.]

**Boris Ponomarev, Reports from Kabul, 19-20 July 1979 (excerpts)**

Report From Kabul (Secret. Urgent)

. . . Taraki, and Amin as well, repeatedly returned to the issue of the widening of the Soviet military presence in the country. They put forth the issue of introducing approximately two [Soviet] divisions to the DRA in the event of emergency circumstances "at the request of the legal government of Afghanistan."

In regard to this pronouncement of the Afghan leadership it was declared that the Soviet Union cannot do that.

Ponomarev

7.19.1979

\* \* \* \* \*

Report From Kabul (Secret. Urgent)

On July 19 a second meeting with N.M. Taraki took place . . . Taraki once again returned to the issue of the strengthening of military support from the side of the Soviet Union, saying in that regard that in the event of the outbreak of an emergency situation the landing of a parachute division could play a decisive role in crushing the manifestation of counter-revolutionary forces.

In response, our position was put forth once again, emphasizing that the Soviet Union cannot take such measures.

Ponomarev

7.20.1979

[Source: A.A. Liakhovskii, *The Tragedy and Valour of the Afghani* (Moscow: GPI "Iskon", 1995), p. 87.]

**Record of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan A.M. Puzanov and H. Amin, 21 July 1979**

Amin transmitted a request to send to Afghanistan 8-10 helicopters with Soviet crews in connection with the decommissioning of the MI-24s which they have.

[The Soviet Ambassador] told H. Amin

that as the Soviet leaders had said repeatedly, and as B.N. Ponomarev had stressed during the most recent meetings in Kabul, the Soviet side cannot embark on the participation of Soviet personnel in combat operations.

Later on Amin provided information about the situation in the country. He lamented that he does not have the authority to run military affairs, and that Taraki, who is concentrating the leadership in his own hands, cannot to a sufficient extent control the execution of commands. The Soviet Ambassador responded that per the experience of the Great Patriotic War it would be possible to create for operational leadership an extraordinary group of 5-6 people, including Amin, the Minister of Defense, the Chief of the General Staff, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Chiefs of the Sarandoy and State Security. It is necessary to find a form which, on the one hand, preserves Taraki's authority, and from the other, facilitates an improvement in operational leadership. Amin agreed.

A ciphered telegram containing the contents of the conversation was sent to Ustinov and Ponomarev.

[Source: Notes by O.A. Westad at TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 76, d. 1045, ll. 94-97.]

**Conversation of the chief of the Soviet military advisory group in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. Gorelov, with H. Amin, 11 August 1979**

On August 11 a conversation with Amin took place at his request. During the meeting special attention was paid to the request for the arrival of Soviet sub-units in the DRA.

H. Amin convincingly asked me to inform the Soviet leadership about the necessity of quickly dispatching Soviet sub-units to Kabul. He repeated several times that "the arrival of Soviet troops will significantly raise our moral spirit, will inspire even greater confidence and calm."

Further he said, "It is possible that the Soviet leaders worry that their adversaries in the world will view that as interference in the domestic affairs of the DRA. But I assure you that we are a sovereign and independent state and solve all our problems independently. Your troops will not participate in combat actions. They will be used

only in moments that are critical for us. I think that we will need the Soviet sub-units until spring.”

08.12.79 Gorelov

[Source: As cited in Znamya, no. 4, 1991, from the Archives of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.]

**Report from Soviet Deputy Defense Minister Army Gen. Ivan Pavlovskii, during visit to Afghanistan, 25 August 1979**

On August 25, together with the main military advisor [Gorelov], I met with Amin.

Amin once again raised the issue of the introduction of our forces into Kabul, which, in his opinion, would free one of the two divisions of the Kabul garrison for the struggle with the rebels.

I responded to Amin that the introduction of our troops might lead to the complication of the military-political situation and the strengthening of American assistance to the rebels.

Pavlovskii

08.25.79

Resolution of USSR Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov: “Submit to the CC CPSU.”

[Source: As cited in Znamya, no. 4, 1991, from the Archives of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces.]

**CPSU CC Politburo Decisions on Afghanistan, 13 September 1979 (excerpts)**

CPSU CC Politburo meeting of 13 September 1979

Ratified the following directive to the ambassador in Kabul:

First. The ambassador has been commissioned to meet with Taraki and Amin and urgently express the hope that they will both demonstrate a sense of responsibility to the revolution. In the name of saving the revolution, they must come together and act in concord from a position of unanimity. A rift in the leadership would be fatal to the revolutionary cause and the Afghan people.

If Amin does not consent to a joint meeting with Taraki, then, with Taraki's agreement, visit Amin separately and convey to him the same message.

Second. Guide yourself by the fact that we cannot take it upon ourselves to arrest Amin with our own battalion force, since this would be a direct interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and would have far-reaching consequences. Indeed, this is practically unfeasible.

(Note: the second part of the telegram, in addition to ambassador [A.M.] Puzanov, was also sent to [Ivan] Pavlovski, [B.S.] Ivanov, and [L.N.] Gorelov.)

[Source: APRF, from notes taken by A. Dobrynin and provided to Norwegian Nobel Institute; provided to CWIHP by Odd Arne Westad, Norwegian Nobel Institute; translation for CWIHP by Daniel Rozas.]

**CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 13 September 1979, with report by Gromyko, Ustinov, and Tsvigun**

Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
Central Committee

Top Secret

No. P168/5

To: Coms. Brezhnev, Andropov, Grishin, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Kosygin, Kunaev, Pel'she, Romanov, Suslov, Ustinov, Chernenko, Shcherbitskii, Aliev, Demichev, Kuznetsov, Masharov, Ponomarev, Rashidov, Solomentsev, Tikhonov, Shevardnadze, Gorbachev, Dolgikh, Zimyanin, Kapitonov, Rusakov

Extract from Protocol No. 168 of the  
CPSU CC Politburo Session  
on 15 September 1979

On the Situation in Afghanistan

Agree with the recommendations expressed in the note from Coms. A. A. Gromyko, D. F. Ustinov, and S. K. Tsvigun on 15 September 1979, No. 793/gS (attached).

CC Secretary

Re: Point 6 of Prot. No. 168

Top Secret

CPSU CC

According to information coming in from all channels about the situation in the

leadership of Afghanistan, events in recent days have developed along the following lines.

Upon returning from Havana, Taraki was given an ultimatum by Amin demanding that the officials closest to Taraki—the minister of internal affairs, [Aslam] Watanjar, the minister of communications, [Syed] Gulabzoy, the minister of border affairs, [Sherjan] Mazdooryar, and the chief of the security organs, [Asadullah] Sarwari—be dismissed and punished on the pretext that these officials were involved in an “imperialist conspiracy” against Amin.

Taraki's attempts to persuade Amin to drop his demands and normalize the situation in the leadership were of no avail. All evidence indicates that Amin used Taraki's absence to lay the groundwork for ensuring that all real power, including supervision of the army and state security organs, was concentrated in Amin's own hands.

Having discerned this turn of events, Taraki evidently was about to remove Amin from the leadership, but he displayed indecisiveness and hesitation, and it is possible that he lacked sufficient forces to carry out his intention.

The CPSU CC Politburo's appeal calling on Taraki and Amin to join forces in the name of the revolution and to present an outwardly unified position was received positively by them and others, but even so, Amin continued actively preparing to achieve his aims and Taraki, as before, was indecisive and was clearly unable to put an end to Amin's activities. As a result, all the levers of real power by now are essentially in Amin's hands. He controls the leadership of the armed forces, the state security organs, and the internal affairs organs.

In the process, Amin has completely isolated Taraki through the use of force; there is no access to him at all, even for our representatives.

By having seized, in particular, on the episode involving an exchange of gunfire in Taraki's residence, which killed two people, including Amin's bodyguard, Amin has explicitly demanded that Taraki relinquish all his posts.

According to recent information, which was picked up by our representatives during a conversation with Amin, a plenum of the PDPA CC is supposed to be convened on 16 September. Taraki will be advised to give up all his posts voluntarily on the

grounds of ill health, and even if he does not agree, a decision to this effect will be adopted.

Amin has ignored the repeated appeals of our comrades warning him that such a step might have dire consequences both for the party and for the country.

In these circumstances, our position at this stage should be along the following lines.

First. Considering the real state of affairs as it has now developed, we must not refuse to deal with Amin and the leadership headed by him. At the same time, we must do everything we can to restrain him from carrying out repressions against Taraki's supporters. We should use our contacts with Amin to get a definitive clarification of his political outlook and intentions.

Second. Our military advisers assigned to the Afghan forces, and also our advisers to the state security organs and internal affairs ministry, should remain in place, carrying out their direct functions connected with the preparation and conduct of combat operations against rebel formations, but without taking any part, of course, in repressive measures against people who have fallen into Amin's disfavor in the event that army units are ordered to carry out such measures.

Third. Shipments of Soviet weapons and military equipment to Afghanistan should be curtailed somewhat, being limited mainly to supplies of spare parts and ammunition needed for combat operations against the rebels.

Fourth. We should appeal to Amin and express our view that if Taraki is removed from his posts, there is no need to exact repressive measures against him or to carry out any sort of trial.

Fifth. On the matter of how the Soviet press organs should treat the ongoing events in Kabul, it would be advisable to limit coverage in coming days to purely factual material, reporting it calmly without expressing any kind of assessments of the situation or commentaries.

We request consideration.

A. Gromyko D. Ustinov S. Tsvigun

15 September 1979

No. 793/gs

[Source: APRE, f. 3, op. 82, d. 173, ll. 72-

75; translated by Mark Kramer; first publication in Russian in *Novaya i Noveishaya Istoriia* 3 (May-June) 1996, pp. 91-99 (document on 95-97), intro. G.N. Sevastionov.]

### **Cable from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to Soviet Representatives in Kabul, 15 September 1979**

To Soviet Representatives in Kabul

1. It is acknowledged to be expedient, considering the real state of affairs as it is developing in Afghanistan, not to refuse to deal with H. Amin and the leadership which he heads. In this regard it is necessary to use all means to restrain H. Amin from repressions of supporters of N. Taraki and other people who are not pleasing to him, who are not enemies of the revolution. At the same time it is necessary to use contacts with H. Amin for further discerning his political personnel and intentions.

2. It is also acknowledged to be expedient for our military advisors who are attached to the Afghan forces, and also the advisors in the organs of security and internal affairs, to remain at their posts. They should fulfill their immediate functions connected with the preparation and conduct of military actions against rebel formations and other counter-revolutionary forces. They, it goes with saying, should not play any part in repressive measures against people who are not pleasing to H. Amin in the event that detachments and sub-units to which our advisors are attached are involved in these actions.

A. Gromyko

09.15.1979

[Source: A.A. Liakhovskii, *The Tragedy and Valour of the Afghani* (Moscow: GPI "Iskon", 1995), p. 98.]

### **Information from CC CPSU to GDR leader E. Honecker, 16 September 1979**

Highly Confidential

16.9.79

In connection with the well-known events in Afghanistan, we would like to inform our friends on several aspects of the development of events in that country.

Already for some time now, there has been conflict and disagreement in the party

and government leadership in Afghanistan, in connection with Amin's effort to remove all persons close to Taraki by concentrating in his hands all real power, including the command of the army.

In the last few days the situation among the leadership of Afghanistan has been sharply exacerbated and the conflict has taken on an open and highly charged character. Amin, alleging that during Taraki's trip to the conference in Havana a number of individuals in the Afghan leadership attempted to discredit him, Amin, demanded their dismissal and punishment.

Taraki's efforts to convince Amin to withdraw his demands and normalize the situation obviously were not successful. Amin, though he did verbally voice his support for Taraki, took a number of steps to isolate Taraki almost by use of force.

In connection with the latest events, a few days ago we urgently appealed to Taraki and Amin, in the name of the CC CPSU Politburo and L.I. Brezhnev personally, with an urgent call to unite and in the name of saving the revolution act in concord and with unity. We warned them directly that a split in the leadership would be disastrous and that it would be immediately taken advantage of by internal counter-revolution and foreign enemies of Afghanistan. We called on the leaders of Afghanistan to demonstrate a high degree of responsibility to the revolution.

Both Taraki and Amin at the time welcomed positively our appeal. However, in actuality, judging by incoming intelligence, Amin continued his activities to realize his plans, while Taraki demonstrated a high degree of indecisiveness in suppressing these activities. You know today's results. The near removal of Taraki from government is unlikely to have relieved tension, given that he continues to enjoy the support of a certain segment of members of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan. All in all, the situation continues to be highly tense, and right now it is difficult to say in which direction events will lead. We, on our part, continue to follow the situation carefully.

[Source: SAPMO, Berlin, J 2/202, A. 575 provided by V. Zubok (National Security Archive); translated from Russian by Carter-Brezhnev Project.]

**Excerpt from transcript, CPSU CC  
Politburo meeting, 20 September 1979**

Brezhnev reported on the situation in Afghanistan: "Events developed so swiftly that essentially there was little opportunity for us, here in Moscow, to somehow interfere in them... Right now our mission is to determine our further actions, so as to preserve our positions in Afghanistan and to secure our influence there.

"We should assume that the Soviet-Afghan relations will not sustain some sort of major changes, and, it seems, will continue in their previous course. Amin will be pushed toward this by the current situation and by the difficulties which the Afghan government will face for a long time to come. Afghanistan will continue to be interested in receiving from the USSR military, economic and other aid, and possibly even in increased amounts.

"Evidently, Amin will continue to follow at least outwardly the recommendations we gave earlier (under Taraki)... But [our] job will be difficult and delicate."

*[Source: APRE, from notes taken by A. Dobrynin and provided to Norwegian Nobel Institute; provided to CWIHP by O.A. Westad, Norwegian Nobel Institute; translation for CWIHP by Daniel Rozas.]*

**Excerpt from transcript, Meeting of  
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and  
Afghan Foreign Minister Shah-Valih,  
New York, 27 September 1979 (excerpt)**

A.A.Gromyko: What is the USA reaction to the latest developments in Afghanistan? We are under the impression that the Americans are still wavering and cannot come to a definite conclusion. Apparently, they have not worked out any specific evaluations. In our discussions with them—I already met once with Secretary of State [Cyrus R.] Vance—they have not touched upon this question.

*[Source: APRE, from notes taken by A. Dobrynin and provided to Norwegian Nobel Institute; provided to CWIHP by O.A. Westad, Nobel Institute; translation for CWIHP by D. Rozas.]*

**Information from the CC CPSU to  
GDR leader Honecker, 1 October 1979**

Highly Confidential

As we have informed you earlier, already for some time now there have been conflicts and disagreements in the party and government leadership in Afghanistan. These were not disagreements over major issues - the question is essentially in the rivalry and the struggle for power between supporters of Taraki and Amin.

After Taraki's return from his visit to Havana and Moscow, the situation of the Afghan government became even more difficult. Amin sharply increased his activities, trying to dismiss Taraki and those close to him and concentrate all real power in his hands, including the control of the army. Despite our persistent calls for both sides to act in concord, in the interests of defending and strengthening the revolution's achievements and not to exacerbate the situation, neither side took any appropriate measures to reinstate unity.

Taking advantage of Taraki's indecisiveness and his inability to take any swift and effective measures, Amin in the end dismissed him from government, replaced the chief administrators of the security and internal affairs organs, and commenced to purge the top ranks of the army. Of course, one cannot be uncritical of many of Amin's methods and activities, in particular his extreme lust for power, ruthlessness in his relations with former colleagues, forming opinions and making decisions singlehandedly. However, it is impossible to ignore the currently existing situation, and we must deal with the new leadership in Afghanistan.

Following his rise to power, Amin made a number of statements from which it follows that he intends to continue the course of expanding the revolution, on strengthening cooperation with the Soviet Union and socialist collaboration. Around him there are a number of honest people, real revolutionaries who support the tenets of Marxism-Leninism and are favorably inclined towards Soviet Union, having received their education in our country. We believe that Soviet-Afghan relations, just as Afghanistan's relations with other socialist countries, will not undergo some sort of momentous change. Amin will be pushed towards this by the current situation and difficulties which the Afghan regime will have

to confront for a long time to come. Afghanistan will continue as before to be interested in receiving economic and other types of material assistance from the USSR and other socialist countries.

We think that work will have to be done with Amin, and that this work will be substantial, rather difficult and delicate. As you know, we sent Amin a congratulatory telegram (though without unnecessary praises and overtures). In the future we will continue to examine positively requests from the Afghan government to render them this or that concrete assistance in developing the country and in its fight against counter-revolution. At the same time, our representatives on location will continue to try to influence Amin, in order to avert repressions against Taraki and his circle and in general to prevent various excesses on the part of Amin.

We will continue to follow carefully Amin's activities, observing whether he is keeping his promises and will act as events dictate.

*[Source: SAPMO, Berlin, J IV 2/202, A. 575; obtained by V. Zubok; translation from Russian by Carter-Brezhnev Project.]*

**Transcript of Brezhnev-Honecker  
summit in East Berlin, 4 October 1979  
(excerpt on Iran and Afghanistan)**

BREZHNEV: [...]

Now briefly on the situation in Iran and Afghanistan. - Tendencies of a not particularly positive character have lately surfaced in Iran. The Islamic leaders have begun to persecute the progressive forces. They ruthlessly suppress the activities of national minorities. In addition, they try to blame us for the instigation of activities.

Our initiatives with regard to the development of good neighborly relations with Iran are currently not gaining any practical results in Tehran. We know all that.

But we also understand something else: The Iranian Revolution has undercut the military alliance between Iran and the USA. With respect to a number of international problems, particularly with respect to the Middle East, Iran is now taking anti-imperialist positions. Imperialism tries to regain its influence in the region. We are trying to counter these efforts. We are patiently working with the current Iranian leadership and

moving them to develop cooperation on an equal and mutually beneficial basis.

We have recently briefed you on the latest events in Afghanistan. Supplementing this, I would like to say the following: We have given Afghanistan more than a little economic support. We have sent our advisers there, civilian as well as military, and have supplied them with significant amounts of weapons and military equipment.

The situation in the country has improved. In some provinces, however, military encounters continue with the hordes of rebels who receive direct and indirect support from Pakistan and direct support from Iran, from the USA, and from China. In addition, there are tensions within the Afghani leadership. Our efforts were directed to contribute to the unity of the Afghani leadership and not allow for divisions to happen. But Amin has taken advantage of Taraki's indecisiveness and, as you know, eliminated him; he has achieved the leadership. Amin did this even though he was held as Taraki's friend. You know that Taraki had a stopover in Moscow on his way from Havana where the Conference of the Non-Alignment Movement took place. I met him and advised him to take measures to stabilize the situation in his country and among other things begin with the work on a constitution and to keep up revolutionary lawfulness, etc. We now see that Amin is implementing what I told Taraki.

Frankly, we are not pleased by all of Amin's methods and actions. He is very power-driven. In the past he repeatedly revealed disproportionate harshness. But with regard to his basic political platform, he has decidedly confirmed to the course of further development of the Revolution, of furthering cooperation with the Soviet Union and other countries of the Socialist community.

It is a fact that many of Amin's followers and partisans are honorable people who are faithful to the ideas of Marxism-Leninism and take a good attitude towards us.

By taking into consideration the actual situation, we will continue to support Afghanistan and give it a variety of support and help it in its fight against foreign aggression and the domestic counterrevolution. [ . . . ]

[Source: SAPMO (Berlin), DY30 JIV 2/201/

1342; obtained and translated from German by C. Ostermann.]

**Information of KGB USSR to CC  
CPSU International Department,  
10 October 1979**

The Leadership of Iran on the External  
Security of the Country

According to KGB information, in August in Teheran a secret meeting was held with the participation of representatives of the Prime Minister, the Ministries of Foreign and Internal Affairs, the Intelligence and Operational Administrations of the General Staff, Gendarme and Police Administrations of the General Staff and the Staff of the "Corps of Defenders of the Revolution," with the goal of studying issues which touch on the security of Iran. It was noted that the USSR and the USA, which have their own interests in this region, are worried about the victory of the Islamic revolution in Iran. It is presumed that the USA might resort to a direct military threat and realization of a blockade. But in the event that Iran will not take sharp steps which hurt the USA, and will obstruct the penetration of the Soviets, this will ease the position of the USA.

Evaluating the policy of the USSR in relation to the Iranian regime, the participants in the meeting came to the conclusion that insofar as strengthening the Islamic republic will lead to a weakening of the position of the regime in Afghanistan, exert a certain influence on the Moslem republics in the USSR and will be "a brake in the path of penetration of Communism in the region," the Soviet Union "will not turn away from the ideological struggle and efforts to put into power in Iran a leftist government." It was stressed that with the aim of weakening the Islamic regime the USSR might organize "provocational" activity among Irani Kurds, Azeris, Turkmen, Baluchis, support leftist forces, create economic difficulties, resort to a military threat on the basis of the [Soviet-Iranian] agreement of 1921.

It was noted that Afghanistan is not in any condition to undertake military actions against Iran. However, border conflicts are not excluded. In addition, Afghanistan is in need of economic assistance from Iran, which might soften its position.

The positions of Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia were also analyzed.

[Source: Notes by O.A. Westad at TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 76, d. 1355, ll. 17-20.]

**Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov-  
Ponomarev Report to CPSU CC,  
29 October 1979**

Top Secret  
Special File

To the CC CPSU

The situation in Afghanistan following the events of September 13-16 of this year, as the result of which Taraki was removed from power and then physically destroyed, remains extremely complicated.

In the efforts to strengthen Amin in power, along with such superficial gestures like the beginning of the reworking of the draft of the constitution and the liberation of some of the people who had been arrested earlier, in fact the scale of repressions in the Party, army, state apparatus and civic organizations has widened. . . .

According to information which we have, at the present time the execution of a group of Politburo members (Zeray, Misak, Pandzhshiri) who are subject to fictitious accusations of "anti-Party and counter-revolutionary activity," is planned. At the plenum of the CC PDPA which took place recently, Amin introduced into the ruling organs of the Party people who are more devoted to him, including a number of his relatives. . . .

Recently there have been noted signs of the fact that the new leadership of Afghanistan intends to conduct a more "balanced policy" in relation to the Western powers. It is known, in particular, that representatives of the USA, on the basis of their contacts with the Afghans, are coming to a conclusion about the possibility of a change in the political line of Afghanistan in a direction which is pleasing to Washington.

Taking account of this and starting from the necessity of doing everything possible not to allow the victory of counter-revolution in Afghanistan or the political reorientation of H. Amin towards the West, it is considered expedient to hew to the following line:

1. Continue to work actively with Amin and overall with the current leadership of the the PDPA and the DRA, not giving Amin grounds to believe that we don't

trust him and don't wish to deal with him. Use the contacts with Amin to assert appropriate influence and simultaneously to further expose his true intentions....

Upon the availability of facts bearing witness to the beginning of a turn by H. Amin in an anti-Soviet direction, introduce supplemental proposals about measures from our side.

A. Gromyko, Iu. Andropov,  
D. Ustinov, B. Ponomarev

29 October 1979

[Source: As cited in A.A. Liakhovskii, *The Tragedy and Valour of the Afghani (Moscow: GPI "Iskon", 1995), p. 102.*]

**Record of Conversation Between Soviet Ambassador Puzanov and Amin, 3 November 1979**

The Soviet Ambassador reported the readiness of the Soviet leadership to receive Amin. He also informed [Amin] of Moscow's satisfaction about the measures of the Afghan leadership in the area of Party and State building. Further, Amin spoke about the situation in the country. The Soviet Ambassador in his turn informed [Amin] of the agreement of the Soviet leadership to send a Soviet specialist to Herat to take down the drilling installation.

[Source: Notes by O.A. Westad at TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 76, d. 1045.]

**Soviet Defense Minister Ustinov, Report to CPSU CC on Mission to Afghanistan of Deputy Defense Minister Army-Gen. I. G. Pavlovskii, 5 November 1979**

Top Secret

CPSU CC

On the Results of the Mission of the USSR Deputy Defense Minister, Army-General I. G. Pavlovskii, in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

In accordance with the CPSU CC's Decree No. P163/62 of 15 August 1979, the USSR deputy defense minister, Army-General I. G. Pavlovskii, and a group of generals and officers were in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan from 17 August to 22

October with the aim of [1] reviewing the state of the People's Armed Forces of Afghanistan and the organization and methods of their combat operations against the rebels, [2] providing on-site assistance to the Afghan commanders in dealing with these questions; and [3] preparing recommendations for the further strengthening of the combat capabilities of the People's Armed Forces of Afghanistan.

The work of Com. I. G. Pavlovskii's group in providing assistance to the Afghan military command was carried out in strict accordance with the CPSU CC's decision and with instructions issued by the USSR minister of defense, taking account of the military-political situation in the country and also the political and organizational measures implemented within the Afghan army by the DRA leadership.

On all matters that they studied, recommendations were devised and transmitted personally by Com. I. G. Pavlovskii to H. Amin, offering them as proposals for the further strengthening of the Afghan armed forces.

The provision of comprehensive practical assistance by our side to the People's Armed Forces of Afghanistan enabled them to make a transition between August and October. Rather than continuing to rely on a passive defense and faltering operations by small units against the rebels, they were able to launch coordinated and active operations by larger groupings. This allowed them to gain the initiative in combat and to destroy the most dangerous forces of counterrevolution in the provinces of Paktia, Ghazni, Parvan, Bamian, and several other areas.

To prepare the troops for these actions, tactical exercises with live fire were held, and combat operations were conducted to resolve specific tasks. Soviet generals and officers provided direct assistance in working out the plans for operations and in carrying them out. This experience in preparing and conducting operations taught the Afghan commanders, staffs, and political organs the methods and means of organization for undertaking active combat operations in mountainous regions. Help was provided to the Main Political Directorate in organizing party-political work among the troops according to the different categories of servicemen, so that they could be mobilized for the active pursuit of combat objec-

tives. Taking account of the combat operations, drafts were also prepared of documents providing basic guidelines for the organization of combat and operational preparations.

Despite these efforts to increase the combat capability of the People's Armed Forces of Afghanistan, a number of questions are still unresolved.

Military regulations that were codified with help from Soviet advisers have not been instilled in the People's Armed Forces, and they have no impact on the practical life of the troops. The commanders, staffs, political organs, and party organizations do not always coordinate their work in resolving tasks among the troops. Staffs at all levels, including the General Staff, have still not become a central, directing organ in the daily life of large and small units and in the troops' combat activity.

Political work in the Afghan army, especially with the officer corps, is still not conducted concretely or effectively enough. The combat morale and fighting elan of the troops, the state of military discipline, and the army's willingness to act are still low.

During the final conversation with H. Amin, M. Yakub, and M. Ekbal, Com. I. G. Pavlovskii once again directed their attention to the unresolved problems and our recommendations for solving them. At the end of the discussion, H. Amin said: "We are taking all measures to ensure that your recommendations are fulfilled, and we will always work in coordination with Soviet advisers and specialists. Our friendship is unwavering." Then he expressed the hope that Soviet military advisers would be assigned to every battalion of the Afghan armed forces. In conclusion, H. Amin thanked the delegation for providing help and requested that they transmit warm greetings and personal thanks to Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, and also to Comrades A.N. Kosygin, D.F. Ustinov, Yu.V. Andropov, and A.A. Gromyko, as well as all the other leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet government.

Overall, the group of generals and officers headed by the USSR deputy defense minister, Army-General I.G. Pavlovskii, fulfilled the tasks assigned to them.

Reported for informational purposes.

D. Ustinov

5 November 1979

No. 318/3/00945

[Source: *APRF*, f. 3, op. 82, d. 149, ll. 120-122; translated by Mark Kramer; first publication in Russian in *Novaya i Noveishaya Istoriia 3 (May-June) 1996*, pp. 91-99 (document on 97-98), intro. by G.N. Sevastionov.]

**Record of Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Afghanistan F.A. Tabeev and H. Amin, 6 December 1979**

The conversation concerned Amin's journey to Moscow. Amin made reference to the agreement of the Soviet leaders, transmitted by Puzanov, and expressed concern that he not be late. Further he spoke about the necessity of thinking about the agreement on issues of inter-Party cooperation for the upcoming 2-3 years in relation to the end of the term of action for the plan of inter-Party relations between the PDPA and the CPSU for 1979.

[Source: Notes by O.A. Westad at TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 76, d. 1045.]

**Extract from CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 6 December 1979**

Top Secret  
Special File

To Comrades Brezhnev, Andropov,  
Gromyko, Suslov, Ustionov

Extract From Protocol No. 176 of  
the Meeting of the CC CPSU Politburo of  
6 December 1979

About the dispatch of a special detachment to Afghanistan

Agree with the proposal on this issue set forth in the note of the KGB USSR and the Ministry of Defense of 4 December 1979. No. 312/2/0073 (attached).

CC SECRETARY L. BREZHNEV

[attachment]

Top Secret  
Special File

To the CC CPSU

The Chairman of the Revolutionary

Council, General Secretary of the CC PDPA, and Prime Minister of the DRA H. Amin recently has insistently been raising the issue of the necessity of sending to Kabul of a motorized rifle battalion for defense of his residence.

Taking account of the situation as it has developed and the request, H. Amin considers it expedient to send to Afghanistan the detachment of the GRU of the General Staff which has been prepared for these goals, with a complement of about 500 men, in a uniform which does not reveal its belonging to the the Armed Forces of the USSR. The possibility of sending this detachment to the DRA was envisioned by the decision of the CC CPSU Politburo of 06.29.79 No. P 156/IX.

Regarding the fact that issues related to the sending of the detachment to Kabul have been agreed with the Afghan side, we propose that it is possible to drop it in on airplanes of military transport aviation during the first half of December of this year. Com. Ustinov, D.F. is in agreement.

Iu. Andropov, N. Ogarkov

No. 312/2/0073  
4 December 1979

[Source: As cited in A.A. Liakhovskii, *The Tragedy and Valour of the Afghani (Moscow: GPI "Iskon", 1995)*, p. 107.]

**Personal memorandum, Andropov to Brezhnev, n.d. [early December 1979]**

1. After the coup and the murder of Taraki in September of this year, the situation in Afghanistan began to undertake an undesirable turn for us. The situation in the party, the army and the government apparatus has become more acute, as they were essentially destroyed as a result of the mass repressions carried out by Amin.

At the same time, alarming information started to arrive about Amin's secret activities, forewarning of a possible political shift to the West. [These included:] Contacts with an American agent about issues which are kept secret from us. Promises to tribal leaders to shift away from USSR and to adopt a "policy of neutrality." Closed meetings in which attacks were made against Soviet policy and the activities of our specialists. The practical removal of our head-

quarters in Kabul, etc. The diplomatic circles in Kabul are widely talking of Amin's differences with Moscow and his possible anti-Soviet steps.

All this has created, on the one hand, the danger of losing the gains made by the April [1978] revolution (the scale of insurgent attacks will increase by spring) within the country, while on the other hand - the threat to our positions in Afghanistan (right now there is no guarantee that Amin, in order to protect his personal power, will not shift to the West). [There has been] a growth of anti-Soviet sentiments within the population.

2. Recently we were contacted by group of Afghan communists abroad. In the course of our contact with Babrak [Karmal] and [Asadullah] Sarwari, it became clear (and they informed us of this) that they have worked out a plan for opposing Amin and creating new party and state organs. But Amin, as a preventive measure, has begun mass arrests of "suspect persons" (300 people have been shot).

In these conditions, Babrak and Sarwari, without changing their plans of opposition, have raised the question of possible assistance, in case of need, including military.

We have two battalions stationed in Kabul and there is the capability of rendering such assistance. It appears that this is entirely sufficient for a successful operation. But, as a precautionary measure in the event of unforeseen complications, it would be wise to have a military group close to the border. In case of the deployment of military forces we could at the same time decide various questions pertaining to the liquidation of gangs.

The implementation of the given operation would allow us to decide the question of defending the gains of the April revolution, establishing Leninist principals in the party and state leadership of Afghanistan, and securing our positions in this country.

[Source: *APRF*, from notes taken by A. F. Dobrynin and provided to Norwegian Nobel Institute; provided to CWIHP by Odd Arne Westad, Director of Research, Nobel Institute; trans. for CWIHP by Daniel Rozas.]

[Ed. note: For a translation and facsimile of the handwritten document (12 December 1979) entitled "On the Situation in 'A',"

*recording the Soviet decision to approve the military intervention in Afghanistan, see CWIHP Bulletin 4 (Fall 1994), p. 76.]*

**Andropov-Gromyko-Ustinov-  
Ponomarev Report on Events in  
Afghanistan on 27-28 December 1979,  
dated 31 December 1979**

Top Secret

CC CPSU

Regarding events in Afghanistan  
during 27-28 December 1979

After a coup-d'etat and the murder of the CC PDPA General Secretary and Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of Afghanistan N.M. Taraki, committed by Amin in September of this year, the situation in Afghanistan has been sharply exacerbated and taken on crisis proportions.

H. Amin has established a regime of personal dictatorship in the country, effectively reducing the CC PDPA and the Revolutionary Council to the status of entirely nominal organs. The top leadership positions within the party and the state were filled with appointees bearing family ties or maintaining personal loyalties to H. Amin. Many members from the ranks of the CC PDPA, the Revolutionary Council and the Afghan government were expelled and arrested. Repression and physical annihilation were for the most part directed towards active participants in the April revolution, persons openly sympathetic to the USSR, those defending the Leninist norms of intra-party life. H. Amin deceived the party and the people with his announcements that the Soviet Union had supposedly approved of Taraki's expulsion from party and government.

By direct order of H. Amin, fabricated rumors were deliberately spread throughout the DRA, smearing the Soviet Union and casting a shadow on the activities of Soviet personnel in Afghanistan, who had been restricted in their efforts to maintain contact with Afghan representatives.

At the same time, efforts were made to mend relations with America as a part of the "more balanced foreign policy strategy" adopted by H. Amin. H. Amin held a series of confidential meetings with the American charge d'affaires in Kabul. The DRA government began to create favorable condi-

tions for the operation of the American cultural center; under H. Amin's directive, the DRA special services have ceased operations against the American embassy.

H. Amin attempted to buttress his position by reaching a compromise with leaders of internal counter-revolution. Through trusted persons he engaged in contact with leaders of the Moslem fundamentalist opposition.

The scale of political repression was taking on increasingly mass proportions. Just during the period following the events of September, more than 600 members of the PDPA, military personnel and other persons suspected of anti-Amin sentiments were executed without trial or investigation. In effect, the objective was to liquidate the party.

All this, in conjunction with objective difficulties and conditions specific to Afghanistan, put the progress of the revolutionary process in extremely difficult circumstances and energized the counter-revolutionary forces which have effectively established their control in many of the country's provinces. Using external support, which has taken on increasingly far-reaching proportions under Amin, they strived to bring about radical change in the country's military-political situation and liquidate the revolutionary gains.

Dictatorial methods of running the country, repressions, mass executions, and disregard for legal norms have produced widespread discontent in the country. In the capital numerous leaflets began to appear, exposing the anti-people nature of the current regime and containing calls for unity in the struggle with "H. Amin's clique." Discontent also spread to the army. A significant number of officers have expressed dismay at the domination of H. Amin's incompetent henchmen. In essence, a broad anti-Amin front was formed in the country.

Expressing alarm over the fate of the revolution and the independence of the country, and reacting keenly to the rise of anti-Amin sentiments in Afghanistan, Karmal Babrak and Asadulla Sarwari, both living abroad as emigres, have undertaken to unite all anti-Amin groups in the country and abroad, in order to save the motherland and the revolution. In addition, the currently underground group "Parcham," under the leadership of an illegal CC, has carried out significant work to rally all progressive

forces, including Taraki supporters from the former "Khalq" group.

All earlier disagreements were eliminated and the previously existing schism in the PDPA has been liquidated. Khalqists (represented by Sarwari) and Parchamists (represented by Babrak) have announced the final unification of the party. Babrak was elected leader of the new party center, and Sarwari - his deputy.

In this extremely difficult situation, which has threatened the gains of the April revolution and the interests of maintaining our national security, it has become necessary to render additional military assistance to Afghanistan, especially since such requests had been made by the previous administration in DRA. In accordance with the provisions of the Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1978, a decision has been made to send the necessary contingent of the Soviet Army to Afghanistan.

Riding the wave of patriotic sentiments that have engaged fairly large numbers of the Afghan population in connection with the deployment of Soviet forces which was carried out in strict accordance with the provisions of the Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1978, the forces opposing H. Amin organized an armed operation which resulted in the overthrow of H. Amin's regime. This operation has received broad support from the working masses, the intelligentsia, significant sections of the Afghan army, and the state apparatus, all of which welcomed the formation of a new administration of the DRA and the PDPA.

The new government and Revolutionary Council have been formed on a broad and representative basis, with the inclusion of representatives from former "Parcham" and "Khalq" factions, military representatives, and non-party members.

In its program agenda announcements, the new leadership vowed to fight for the complete victory of the national-democratic, anti-feudalistic, anti-imperialistic revolution, and to defend Afghan independence and sovereignty. In matters of foreign policy, they pledged to strengthen in every possible way the friendship and cooperation with the USSR. Taking into account the mistakes of the previous regime, the new leadership, in the practical application of its policies, is intent on giving serious consideration to broad democratization of social life and ensuring a law-abiding society, wid-

ening the social base and strengthening the state throughout the country, and maintaining a flexible policy with regards to religion, tribes and ethnic minorities.

One of the first steps that has captured the attention of Afghan society was the release of a large number of political prisoners, which include prominent political and military activists. Many of them (Kadyr, Keshtmand, Rafi, and others) have actively and enthusiastically joined in the work of the new Revolutionary Council and the government.

Broad masses of people met the announcement of the overthrow of H. Amin's regime with unconcealed joy and express their eagerness to support the new administration's program. The commanders of all key formations and units of the Afghan army have already announced their support of the new leadership of the party and the government. Relations with Soviet soldiers and specialists continue to remain friendly overall. The situation in the country is normalizing.

In Kabul's political circles it is noted that the Babrak government, evidently, must overcome significant difficulties, inherited by him from the previous regime, in establishing order in domestic politics and economy; however, they express hope that PDPA, with USSR's help, will be able to solve these problems. Babrak can be described as one of the more theoretically equipped leaders of PDPA, who soberly and objectively evaluates the situation in Afghanistan; he was always distinguished by his sincere sympathies for the Soviet Union, and commanded respect within party masses and the country at large. In this regard, the conviction can be expressed that the new leadership of DRA will find effective ways to stabilize completely the country's situation.

[signature]	[signature]
Yu. Andropov	A. Gromyko
[signature]	[signature]
D. Ustinov	B. Ponomarev

31 December 1979  
No. 2519-A

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 42, dok. 10; provided by M. Kramer; trans. by D. Rozas.]

#### Meeting of Soviet Foreign Minister

#### Gromyko and Afghan Foreign Minister Shad Mohammad Dost, 4 January 1980

No. P27

Top Secret

#### SUMMARY

#### RECORD OF MAIN CONTENTS OF THE MEETING OF A.A.GROMYKO WITH THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE DRA, Sh.M.DOST 4 January 1980

A.A.Gromyko welcomed Sh.M.Dost as a representative of the new Afghanistan; informed him of the latest reports from the USSR representative at the UN, O.A. Troyanovsky.

Sh.M.Dost. The situation in Afghanistan remains difficult. The rebels were able to capture a number of the country's provinces, for example, Kunduz, Tokhar, Samangan, and Badakhshan. However, with the help of the Soviet Union, the armed forces of DRA were able to push the counter-revolutionaries out from the mentioned provinces. In the northern part of the country they continue to hold only the administrative center of Badakhshan-Faizabad.

During meetings of the CC PDPA Politburo, the Revolutionary Council and the government of DRA, Babrak Karmal, continually stresses the necessity to carefully pay attention to the friendly and timely advice and wishes coming from the Soviet leaders.

Of great importance are Soviet recommendations concerning the expediency of sending messages in the name of Babrak Karmal to Khomeini and Zia-ul-Haq (they are being prepared right now), as well as the organization of meetings between the chairman of the Revolutionary Council and ambassadors from Iraq, India, and other nonaligned countries with the aim of explaining the meaning of events that took place in Afghanistan and to actively influence them to take a positive attitude towards Afghan affairs.

There was also a press conference by B. Karmal for foreign journalists which took place on the evening of January 3.

The conference was successful, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DRA has ordered all ambassadors in foreign countries to give out visas to any foreign journalists interested in visiting Afghanistan.

A.A.Gromyko. I would like to share a few thoughts about the current situation in the Security Council as well as the character of your appearance at the upcoming session.

You, comrade minister, have every reason to appear as the accuser - not as the accused. It seems there are enough facts for this.

It is necessary to emphasize that the deployment of a limited military contingent in Afghanistan has been undertaken by the Soviet Union as a response to repeated appeals by the DRA to the government of USSR. These requests had been voiced earlier by Taraki during his visit to Moscow and by Amin.

It would also be useful to remind the participants at the Security Council of Article 51 of the UN Charter.

The change in the leadership of Afghanistan is solely the internal matter of Afghanistan. The representatives of Western countries, Thatcher in particular, are trying to draw a correlation between the change in the Afghan leadership and the deployment of the Soviet military contingent in Afghanistan. However, one should emphasize that there is no relationship here. This is purely coincidental.

I can confidentially inform you that we have evidence that Saudi Arabia intends to get six countries bordering it to break off diplomatic ties with the DRA.

As you have requested, we have prepared for you a number of materials, in particular concerning American military bases.

These materials will be sent to New York along with V.S. Safronchuk who is going there to assist you as you have requested earlier.

When you are assaulted [with questions] concerning the deployment of a Soviet military contingent in Afghanistan, you can parry this by exposing the aggressive politics of the USA. In Cuba, the USA, despite the constant demands of the Cuban government and people, continues to maintain its military base in Guantanamo. This is an example of open and rude interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation.

Concerning contacts with Safronchuk and your conversations with him, it is desirable to use discretion and certain caution during conversations in New York, especially inside premises. Meetings and exchanges of opinion can be realized in turn

on the premises of the Soviet representatives to the U.N. or in the buildings of the Soviet consulate-general. It is desirable not to advertise that Safronchuk arrived in New York to render you assistance. Officially, he is going in the capacity of a member of the Soviet delegation to the session of the GA [General A of the UN, which, as is known, is still carrying on its work.

Sh.M.Dost. Should I say something regarding China, and, if so, in what capacity?

A.A.Gromyko. In the case that rude accusations and various kinds of insinuations are leveled in the direction of Afghanistan, it will be necessary to respond with a decisive rebuff. However, in the course of the Security Council session it is hardly necessary to dwell on China, as in such an event the Chinese representative would be happy to hear it. Do not create an advertisement for the Chinese, but certainly do give a rebuff.

Sh.M.Dost. Concerning the propaganda campaigns carried on by the USA and other Western countries on "human rights," shouldn't I speak at length about the fact that after the 27th of December in Afghanistan, the new leadership of DRA has freed all political prisoners, regardless of class, religion, language, tribe or ethnicity, or political views[?] We can, right now, invite to Afghanistan representatives from any country and show them that our jails are empty.

A.A.Gromyko. This is a very wise and important measure on the part of the government of DRA. You should certainly speak about it in detail.

7.I.80.

# 020/gs

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 14, dok. 36; provided by M. Kramer; trans. by D. Rozas.]

# CC CPSU Politburo transcript, 17 January 1980 (excerpt)

[handwritten] P179

Top Secret

Only copy

Working Transcript

MEETING OF CC  
CPSU POLIT BURO  
17 January 1980

Chaired by Comrade BREZHNEV, L.I.

Attended by Coms. Andropov, Iu.V., Grishin, V.V., Gromyko, A.A., Kirilenko, A.P., Pel'she, A. Ia., Suslov, M.A., Tikhonov, N.A., Ustinov, D.F., Chernenko, K.Y., Gorbachev, M.S., Demichev, P.N., Kuznetsov, V.V., Ponomarev, B.N., Solomentsev, M.S., Kapitonov, I.V., Dolgikh, V.I.

## 8. Re: The Issue of the Situation in Afghanistan

BREZHNEV. You remember, Comrades, that several months ago in relation to events in Afghanistan we assigned a Commission made up of Comrades Andropov, Gromyko, Ustinov, and Ponomarev to inform the Politburo, and if necessary, to prepare corresponding documents and submit them to the Politburo.

I will say that that Commission did its work well. Most recently a whole range of resolutions were accepted and corresponding measures were implemented.

It seems to me that the situation in Afghanistan is still far from the time when it will not require daily observation and the acceptance of corresponding operational measures. Therefore, it seems to me that it is not necessary to create any sort of new commission; instead, we will assign the very same Commission to continue its work in the same spirit as it conducted it up until now.

Will there be any objections to that proposal? No.

Then we will consider that the Politburo Commission will act, with its former membership.

GROMYKO. In the leadership of Afghanistan, a consolidation of forces is going on. The often appeal to us for advice. We give it. They make proclamations. There are no essential changes in the military situation. But it also has not worsened. This is a very important element. The Army supports the leadership of Afghanistan.

The international situation around Afghanistan has taken a turn for the worse. The ruckus, which has unfolded particularly broadly in the USA, has also assumed a somewhat weakened form. In NATO there is no unity regarding measures toward the Soviet Union. In any case the Western countries — in particular, FRG, Italy, Turkey, and

other countries — did not follow the Americans, are not in agreement with the sanctions which the USA is applying.

The General Assembly session ended. Many delegates spoke over the three days. But it is necessary to say, that of the 104 delegations which voted for the resolution, many voted without soul, 48 countries abstained and voted against. That is a full one third. In such a way, the Americans managed to lump together the reactionary regimes and to force them to vote for the resolution.

I think that there will be some kind of momentum in the American press, and in the press of other countries. But at the same time, countries like Argentina and Brazil do not agree with the the Americans, for example, on the sale of grain to the Soviet Union. Canada too.

BREZHNEV. Vance came out against the participation of the USA in the Olympic Games.

GROMYKO. Yes, Vance, it's true, did express such a thought unofficially. But on all types of measures the English are very complacent. Giscard d'Estaing sent a message. It is better. An Islamic conference is meeting in Islamabad. K. Babrak appealed to us for advice, whether he should go to the conference. We advised him that it is best not to go outside the borders of the country.

ANDROPOV. In the last ten days in Afghanistan all the organs of party and state leadership were created; even a procurator was named. The Afghan leaders have started more bravely to [missing one or more lines. —trans]. There is one great difficulty in their work — there are many various groups. Despite it all, the difference between the Parcham and the Khalq is still noticeable. Of course, it is necessary to carefully follow the state of affairs in the party and achieve, in accord with our recommendation, unity. They considered the letter of the CC CPSU in the Politburo and at the CC PDPA plenum, and they prepared corresponding directives for the primary party organizations.

The tribes play a big role there. It is very important to win them over to the party's side. Three very imposing tribes announced their support for the Babrak regime. Babrak is doing great work regarding the strengthening of unity. In particular, there are definite shifts in relation to

work with religious officials.

USTINOV reports in detail the military situation in various areas of Afghan territory; he says: overall, the military situation is basically satisfactory, there are now significantly fewer hotbeds of resistance by the rebels.

PONOMAREV speaks about the type of measures which have been taken regarding the creation of the party and the strengthening of unity. He reports that yesterday a group of our advisers consisting of 16 people, with Com. Grekov, L.I. at the head of it, was sent to Afghanistan. Babrak Karmal listens very attentively to the advice of our comrades. The leadership of the party now has a backbone.

BREZHNEV. There is a proposal to accept for consideration the information of Coms. Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, and Ponomarev on this issue.

Assign Coms. Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, and Ponomarev to continue their work on the review and preparation of materials connected with the situation in Afghanistan. Submit to the Politburo issues which require a decision.

ALL. Agreed.

[Source: *APRF*, f. 3, op. 120, d. 44, ll. 31, 42-44; trans. by M. Doctoroff.]

**CPSU CC Politburo decision,  
17 January 1980**

**COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET  
UNION, CENTRAL COMMITTEE**

Top Secret

#P179/USH

To: Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev.

Excerpt from Protocol #179 of the  
Politburo CC CPSU session of  
17 January 1980

On the situation in Afghanistan.

1. To take into consideration the information presented by Comrades A.A. Gromyko, Y.V. Andropov, D.F. Ustinov, and B.N. Ponomarev on this question.
2. To entrust Comrades A.A. Gromyko,

Y.V. Andropov, D.F. Ustinov, and B.N. Ponomarev with continuing their work on analyzing and preparing materials related to the situation in Afghanistan.

All questions that need to be considered should be submitted to the Politburo of the Central Committee.

Secretary of the CC

[Source: *APRF*, f. 3, op. 82, d. 174, l. 117.]

**CPSU CC Politburo Decision,  
28 January 1980, with Report by  
Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov-  
Ponomarev, 27 January 1980**

TOP SECRET

No.P181/34

To Comrades Brezhnev, Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov.

Extract from protocol No. 181 of the CC  
CPSU Politburo session of  
28 January 1980

About further measures to provide for the  
national interests of the USSR in relation to  
the events in Afghanistan

Agree on the whole with the considerations which are put forth in the attached note of Comrades Gromyko, A.A., Andropov, Iu.V., Ustinov, D.F., Ponomarev, B.N.

The MFA USSR, the Ministry of Defense, the KGB USSR, and the International Department of the CC CPSU are to be guided by these considerations in working out and implementing practical measures on Afghanistan.

CC SECRETARY

[attachment]

Re: Point 34 Protocol No. 181

Top Secret  
Special File

To the CC CPSU

About further measures to provide for the national interests of the USSR in relation to the events in Afghanistan

The provision by the USSR of many-sided, including military, assistance to Afghanistan and the coming to power of the government of Babrak Karmal created the necessary conditions for the stabilization of the situation in the DRA and put an end to certain tendencies in the development of the situation in the Middle East which are dangerous for us.

Along with this the development of events bears witness to the fact that the USA, its allies, and the PRC have set themselves the goal of using to the maximum extent the events in Afghanistan to intensify the atmosphere of anti-Sovietism and to justify long-term foreign policy acts which are hostile to the Soviet Union and directed at changing the balance of power in their favor. Providing increasing assistance to the Afghan counter-revolution, the West and the PRC are counting on the fact that they will succeed in inspiring an extended conflict in Afghanistan, as the result of which, they believe, the Soviet Union will get tied up in that country, which will negatively reflect on the international prestige and influence of the USSR.

In the future as well, the necessity of providing for the broad foreign policy interests and the security of the USSR will demand the preservation of the offensive nature of the measures which we undertake in relation to the Afghan events. In working out and conducting them, we would suggest that it is expedient to be guided by the following.

- Henceforth, in relations with the USA, to maintain a firm line in international affairs in opposition to the Carter Administration's provocative steps. Despite the fact that Washington will in the future continue to initiate an anti-Soviet campaign and will strive to impart a coordinated character to the actions of its allies, to realise our countermeasures proceeding from the inexpedience of complicating the entire complex of multi-level relations between the Soviet Union and the USA.

- To intensify our influence on the positions of various NATO allies of the USA, particularly on France and the FRG, to the greatest possible extent using in our interests the differences which have been revealed between them and the USA in the approach to the choice of measures in response to the actions of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

- Keeping in mind that the events in Afghanistan are being used by the USA and the PRC as a convenient pretext for a further rapprochement on an anti-Soviet basis, to plan long-term measures to complicate relations between Washington and Beijing in the context of the development of relations within the bounds of the so-called triple alliance of the USA, PRC, and Japan.

- To consider with the leadership of Communist and working class parties of capitalist and developing countries the issue of the deployment of a broad campaign in support of the Afghan revolution and brotherly assistance to the DRA from the Soviet Union. In addition, through unofficial means to undertake measures to attract to this campaign other mass organizations, organs of the press, etc.

- In the Non-Aligned movement, using the resources of Cuba and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and also the countries belonging to the progressive wing of the Non-Aligned Movement, to inspire statements of support for the Afghan government and to avert possible attempts by the West and China to provoke the Movement to condemn the actions of the Soviet Union, to isolate Afghanistan and to use the developing situation to weaken the progressive wing in the Non-Aligned movement.

- To concentrate the main efforts in opposition to the hostile activity of the USA and its allies regarding the Islamic countries of the Middle and Near East, particularly Pakistan and Iran, and also such influential countries of Asia as India. To actively oppose Washington's policy of knocking together a united front of the West and certain Moslem countries, and of reorienting Islamic fanaticism on an anti-Soviet course.

Proceeding from the fact that the USA and China are most actively trying to use Pakistan and that the most important bases of the Afghan bandit formations are located on the territory of that country, constantly exert a restraining influence on the regime of Zia ul-Haq, including via special channels, and to push him to accept measures to limit the actions of the rebels from Pakistani territory.

- Bring into life measures directed at the preservation of the anti-imperialist, primarily anti-American, elements in the foreign policy of Iran, insofar as the continuation of the crisis in Iran-American relations limits the potential possibilities of the

Khomeini regime to inspire anti-government uprisings on Moslem grounds in Afghanistan.

- Taking into account that the possibilities of the West and China to achieve their strategic goals in Afghanistan are weakened by the absence of a well-organized and influential political opposition to the people's power, direct serious attention to conducting measures, including those of a special nature, to demoralize organizations of Afghan immigrants and discredit their leaders.

- In relation to the U.N. General Assembly's consideration of the so-called "Afghan question," to activate work on unmasking the anti-Soviet and anti-Afghan machinations of the USA, its allies, and China, and also on the neutralization of the consequences of those actions which are unfavorable to the USSR and the DRA.

- While conducting foreign policy and propagandistic measures, to use even more widely the thesis that the Soviet Union's provision of military assistance to Afghanistan cannot be viewed in isolation from the USA's provocative efforts, which have already been undertaken over the course of a long time, to achieve unilateral military advantages in regions which are strategically important to the USSR.

In relation to the difficult domestic political and economic situation in the DRA, along with the intensification of anti-Soviet moods which are taking place among part of the Afghan population as the result of the criminal activity of H. Amin and his circle, a certain period of time evidently will be required for the normalization of the situation in Afghanistan itself.

The consolidation of people's power in the country during the coming years and the stabilization of the domestic political and economic situation in Afghanistan will to a great extent depend on the extent to which there will manage to be provided true unity in the ranks of the Party and the unification of all progressive and national patriotic forces in the framework of a united front.

Taking this into account, provide help and all-around support to the leadership of PDPA in the realization of the goals of the April [1978] revolution and in the fulfillment of our recommendations on the key issues of Party and state construction and the development of the economy, the fundamental proposals of which may be

summed up as follows:

- The consistent implementation in Party life and Party construction of the line about the unity of the Party which has been recommended to the Afghan comrades in the appeals of the CC CPSU to the leadership of the PDPA. The identification and isolation, both in the center and in local regions, of people who may oppose that line, so that they will not be able to exert a demoralizing influence in the Party.

- The utilization of the experience of a range of socialist countries (Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, and others) in the resolution of the issue of the creation of a genuinely representative broad front of left and democratic organizations headed by the PDPA. The strengthening of the influence of the Party on Afghan youth, especially among the student body, the creation, in assistance to the Komsomol, of a range of sport, cultural, and other organizations.

- The utmost consolidation and development of the DRA's progressive socio-political foundations, the acceleration in the working out and acceptance of a new constitution, the creation of opportunities for representatives of tribes and national minorities to participate with full rights in the work of the Dzhirgirs and local councils.

- The establishment of contacts and the conducting of negotiations with the leaders and elders of the most warlike tribes in the DRA and the search for ways to achieve the quickest compromise on conditions for their ceasing the anti-government struggle. Realization of a line on a gradual attack on the position of the tribal reaction, the showing of flexibility and a differentiated approach to various tribes and socio-economic strata.

- The working out of a long-term plan of work with the Moslem clergy which envisions attracting moderate Moslem leaders to cooperate with the authorities, the isolation of representatives of reactionary clerical circles, the establishment of contacts with the Shiite clergy, the inadmissibility of any form (including economic) of discrimination against Shiites.

- The setting up of normal economic life in the country, and, in particular, the improvement of the material basis for workers in the city and village. The provision of a balanced, mutually beneficial cooperation between the state and private sectors. The presentation of broader possibilities in the area of domestic and foreign trade, and also

in the production sphere for the middle and especially the petit bourgeoisie while maintaining state control.

Besides this, from our side:

- To work with the leadership of the PDPA to realize its foreign policy program and to work out further steps to consolidate the foreign policy position of Afghanistan.

- To provide all-around practical assistance in military construction, keeping in mind the quickest creation of a militarily prepared, organized and equipped people's army. Facilitate the consolidation of the PDPA's position among the command staff, and also the intensification of training of the army in the spirit of devotion to the people's power of Afghanistan.

- Keeping in mind the complex tasks which the special services of Afghanistan must resolve, speed up fulfillment of the program to provide assistance via all channels of work of the organs of state security, internal affairs, and people's militias, both in the center and in the local regions.

- Taking into account that in the spring of 1980 in Afghanistan a further activation of the insurgent movement may take place, and also having in mind the well-known historic and national particularities of the Afghans, conduct consultations with the Ministry of Defense and the government of the DRA and conclude appropriate agreements which define the status and legal position of the Soviet military contingents for the whole period of their presence in Afghanistan.

We request consideration.

A. Gromyko            Iu. Andropov  
D. Ustinov            B. Ponomarev

27 January 1980

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 34, dok. 3; provided by M. Kramer.]

#### **Andropov Report to CPSU CC on Talks with Afghan Leaders, 5 February 1980**

Top Secret  
Special folder

CC CPSU

Concerning the discussions with the Afghan leaders.

In accordance with the assignment (#PI80/XP), I held discussions with General Secretary of the Central Committee of PDPA, Chairman of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA B. Karmal, and also with Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of PDPA, Deputy Chairman of the Revolutionary Council A. Sawari, with Minister of the Interior S.M. Gulyabzoy, Minister of Communications M.A. Vatandjar, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of PDPA, Secretary of the Central Committee of PDPA N.A. Nur, member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of PDPA S.M. Zeraf, and Member of the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council of the DRA Major-General A. Kadyr in Kabul on January 31-February 1 (notes on the conversations are attached).

During our conversation B. Karmal handed me, for deliverance to the Central Committee of the CPSU, the text of the letter of the Central Committee of PDPA to party organizations concerning the issues of party unity (attached).

During my stay in Kabul I had conversations with Soviet Ambassador to DRA Comrade F.A. Tabeev, and with the head of the group of our party advisers Comrade L.I. Grekov, who raised several questions concerning our economic and party cooperation with Afghanistan. The questions are reflected in the appendices.

First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan Comrade [Sharif] Rashidov, with whom I had a conversation during my stop in Tashkent on my way to Kabul, believes that considering the increase in the amounts of cargo shipped between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan it is necessary for the central ministries to take measures to put an end to falling behind the schedule in the construction of the joint bridge crossing on Amu Darya river in the region of Termez-Hairaton (memo attached) and also to speed up the process of consideration of his proposal on organizing an independent branch of the Central Asian Railroad in Termez that he presented to the Ministry of Transportation.

It would be advisable to request that concerned departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU and other bureaus examine the questions raised by Comrades Sh. R. Rashidov, F.A. Tabeev, and L.I. Grekov and submit their proposals in this regard in the general order.

Y.V. Andropov

5 February 1980  
#271-A

[Source: *APRF*, f. 3, op. 82, d. 175, ll. 3-4; appendices not printed.]

#### **CC CPSU Politburo transcript, 7 February 1980 (excerpt)**

Top Secret  
Only copy  
Working Transcript

#### **MEETING OF CC CPSU POLITBURO**

7 February 1980

Chaired by Comrade BREZHNEV, L.I.  
Attended by Coms. Andropov, Iu.V., Grishin, V.V., Gromyko, A.A., Kirilenko, A.P., Suslov, M.A., Tikhonov, N.A., Ustinov, D.F., Gorbachev, M.S., Demichev, P.N., Kuznetsov, V.V., Ponomarev, B.N., Kapitonoov, I.V., Dolgikh, V.I., Zimianin, M.V., Rusakov, K.V.

#### 3. About Com. Andropov's conversations with the Afghan leaders about certain issues of Soviet-Afghan cooperation

BREZHNEV. Comrade Andropov, Iu.V. traveled to Afghanistan in accord with the Politburo's decision. Let us listen to Com. Andropov.

ANDROPOV. I distributed a detailed description of the conversations which I had with the Afghan leaders, therefore I think that there is no need to make a detailed report. But all the same I would like to make special note of several issues.

First of all it is necessary to note directly that the situation in Afghanistan is stabilizing now. This is evident from all the data. In the conversation which I had with Com. Karmal, he cited in great detail what has been done in the month since the removal of Amin from power. Although the situation in the country does continue to be complex, and demands the most urgent and pressing measures aimed at its stabilization, the main thing is that now the leadership of Afghanistan understands its fundamental tasks and is doing everything possible so that the situation really does stabilize.

In my conversation, I particularly

stressed the necessity of establishing genuine party unity, heightening of the military readiness of the army, strengthening relations of the party and government with the masses, instituting normal economic life in the country and activating the foreign policy activities of Afghanistan in accordance with the demands of the situation. So, I concentrated on these basic tasks, about which there is plenty of material in the transcript of the conversations. Therefore, it seems to me, there is no need to develop it in detail.

Further, I had conversations with A. Sarwari, S. Gulabzoi, and M. Vatandzhar. Sarwari, as you know is the deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Council and Deputy Prime Minister of the DRA, Gulabzoi is minister of internal affairs, and Vatandzhar is Minister of Communications. All these comrades play major roles in the leadership of Afghanistan. Therefore, it was very important to me to find out how these comrades imagine the affairs to themselves, especially in view of the fact that several of them belong to a different group (as is well known, in the PDPA there are two groups, the Khalq and the Parcham). The task is to liquidate this rift so that they and others feel themselves members of one unified party. I told them directly that by using their influence they could make a heavy contribution to the unification of the party.

I also spoke with them in detail about all the other questions. In particular, I paid attention to strengthening the organs of state power, and the army, and particularly to conducting major work among the tribes so as to attract the people to the side of the party and to strengthen the unity of the people with the party, so that the people would believe in the party's ideals. A great deal was said about all these issues, and I should note that all these comrades correctly understand the tasks in this regard.

Then I had a conversation with the member of the Politburo of the CC PDPA, and secretary of the CC PDPA, chairman of the organizational commission of the CC, Nur Ahmed Nur, member of the Politburo CC PDPA S. Zeraf, and member of the Presidium of the Revolutionary Council of the PDPA, General Kadyr. With them, besides all the issue I raised in the previous conversations, such as strengthening the party and consolidation of the unity of Afghan communists, I stressed as well the necessity of a quick correction of all the shortcomings and

mistakes which had been tolerated earlier. I stressed the necessity of more fully using the breathing space which they have in order to liquidate the contradictions which had arisen inside the party and in the country. I particularly pointed to the correct distribution of responsibilities among the members of the Politburo, and the conscientious fulfillment of his responsibilities by every comrade.

In the conversations much attention was paid to strengthening the army and teaching it attack maneuvers, and its mastering of the technology which has been delivered in sufficient quantity. In the CC Politburo a guidance for action for all military and civilian members of the PDPA was accepted. I have to say that it is a good guidance; it without doubt will help in strengthening the unity of the party and raising the level of its defense preparedness.

Our ambassador and other representatives in the DRA presented several issues of assistance to Afghanistan, including most prominently the construction of an oil refinery. Regarding this, there is an agreement made in 1972. Its capability was set to be 100 thousand tons per year. Now the Afghans request that its capability be increased to 500 thousand tons.

The second issue concerned the development of power engineering on the basis of a common scheme of power generation and supply for the northern regions of Afghanistan. Then they posed the issue of construction of a mining and ore-concentrating combine at the base of the Ainak copper deposit. They also posed such issues as the construction of a transit bridge across the river Amdaryu and complex of installations on the Afghan [river] bank, and the reconstruction of the Kabul house building combine. These are essentially the issues about which I wanted to speak.

USTINOV. Iurii Vladimirovich has made a very thorough report about his journey to Afghanistan. But I want to say that we must speak very carefully regarding a withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan. I think about a year will be needed, maybe even a year and a half, [before] which the situation in Afghanistan has not stabilized, and before that we can not even think about a withdrawal of troops, otherwise we may incur much unpleasantness.

BREZHNEV. I believe that we even need to increase the contingent of forces in

Afghanistan somewhat.

GROMYKO. It seems to me that we need to look ahead a little. Within some time, it goes without saying that forces will be withdrawn from Afghanistan, insofar as they now are introduced at the request of the Afghan leadership and in accordance with the agreement. Let's say that hostile propaganda from China, Pakistan, etc. will stop. Can we in this event speak about a full withdrawal of forces without getting anything in return[?] It seems to me that it would make sense to think about the kind of agreed obligations to set between the sides when it will happen that it will be possible to withdraw the forces. We will not have a full guarantee, I think, that some sort of hostile forces will not further attack Afghanistan. Therefore we have to provide for the full security of Afghanistan.

BREZHNEV. Comrade Andropov's visit to Afghanistan was taken at the request of Babrak Karmal. The conversations and consultations which Iurii Vladimirovich had were very useful and substantive. I think that it makes sense to approve the conversations conducted by Com. Andropov, and to accept the draft of the resolution which he presented.

ALL. Correct.

It is accepted.

[Source: *APRF*, f. 3, op. 120, d. 44, ll. 73, 77-80; trans. by M. Doctoroff.]

#### **CPSU CC Politburo Decisions on Afghanistan, 7 February 1980**

#### COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION, CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Top Secret

#Pl 82/S h.

To: Comrades Brezhnev, Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rashidov—full text; Baibakov, Sosnov, Skachkov—#3, 4 ; Pavlovski—#5.

Excerpt from Protocol #182 of the Politburo CC CPSU session of 7 February 1980

On Comrade Y.V. Andropov's discussions  
with the leaders of Afghanistan concerning  
some aspects of Soviet-Afghani coopera-  
tion.

1. To approve the discussions that Member of the Politburo CC CPSU, Chairman of the KGB USSR Comrade Y.V. Andropov held with the leaders of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on some aspects of Soviet-Afghan cooperation.

2. To ask the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU to submit proposals on the issues of party co-operation mentioned in the discussions with Comrade B. Karmal and with other Afghan leaders, and also relating to the issues raised by the head of the group of the party advisers of the CC CPSU, Comrade L.I. Grekov, to the Central Committee of the CPSU.

3. To entrust the State Committee on Economic Cooperation (SCEC) and the Ministry of Transport Construction to examine the proposals of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan (Comrade Rashidov) on speeding up the construction work on the joint bridge crossing on the Amu Darya river in the region of Termez-Hairaton, and to take necessary measures to increase the speed of work of the Soviet construction organizations. Also, to submit in the regular order proposals on construction of the structure on the Afghan bank (a transfer base) on the conditions of the general contract.

4. To entrust the Gosplan of the USSR and the SCEC with participation of relevant ministries and bureaus to examine the considerations presented by the Soviet Embassy in Kabul on speeding up the construction of the oil-processing plant, power stations and electric power lines according to the "Plan of the electricity supply to the Northern regions of Afghanistan," of the mining and processing group of enterprises on the copper deposits site in Aynak, and of the reconstruction of the housing construction groups of enterprises in Kabul.

5. The Ministry of Transportation should speed up the consideration of the proposals of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan (Comrade Rashidov) on setting up an independent branch of the Central Asian Railroad with the terminal in Termez.

6. To entrust the Commission of the Politburo CC CPSU on Afghanistan to think out the question of the new relations between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan under the treaty, having in mind the realization of this idea at corresponding time, and

taking into account the further development of the situation in Afghanistan and around it.

Secretary of the CC

[Source: *APRF*, f. 3, op. 82, d. 175, ll. 1-2.]

**CPSU CC Politburo Decision on Soviet Policy on Afghanistan, 10 March 1980, with report on Proposal by Fidel Castro to Mediate between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and approved letter from L.I. Brezhnev to Fidel Castro**

TOP SECRET

No.P187/33

To Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Zamiatin.

Extract from protocol No. 187 of the CC CPSU Politburo session of 10 March 1980

About our further foreign policy line in relation to Afghanistan and about a response to F. Castro's appeal

1. Approve the considerations contained in the note of Comrades Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rakhmanin of 10 March 1980 (attached).

2. Affirm the draft instruction to the Soviet Ambassador in Havana (attachment 1).

3. Affirm the draft instruction to the Soviet Ambassador in Kabul (attachment 2).

CC SECRETARY

[attachment]

Re: Point 33, Protocol No. 187

Top Secret

To the CC CPSU

In accord with the instruction of 28 February of this year (P185/I) and in connection with F. Castro to L.I. Brezhnev (telegram from Havana No. 167), we report the following considerations.

Upon the determination of our further foreign policy steps on issues which concern Afghanistan, including taking account of F. Castro's proposal that Cuba provide its good offices to organize negotiations

between Afghanistan and Pakistan, it seems to be necessary to take into account the following points.

The situation in Afghanistan and around it continues to remain complicated. Although the new measures which have been undertaken by the Afghan leadership inside the country and in the international arena are facilitating the stabilization of the situation in the country and the consolidation of the international position of the DRA, this process is going slowly. The combat readiness of the Afghan forces for the time being remains low. The actions of the foreign and domestic counter-revolution are continuing, dependent on the material, military, and political support from the USA, China, Pakistan, and from a range of other Moslem countries with reactionary regimes as well.

Judging by everything, a successful resolution of the internal problems and the consolidation of the new structure in Afghanistan will demand not a small amount of effort and time, for the length of which the Soviet forces there will remain the basic stabilizing factor standing in opposition to the further expansion of the activity of domestic and foreign counter-revolutionary forces.

Along with this, in the interests of creating more favorable conditions for the stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan, it might also make sense to use the apparent interest in efforts to find a political solution to that issue which has begun to appear in Western and in Non-Aligned countries under the influence of our firmness on the Afghan issue. It is important, however, to direct the conduct of those searches in an appropriate way, to fill it with contents that are advantageous to us, in counterweight to the efforts of the Western countries, disguised as [seeking] a political settlement, to achieve simply a rapid withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan so as to change the regime which exists there now.

In this regard, the thought expressed by F. Castro, that Cuba, in its capacity as Chairman of the Non-Aligned movement, would propose an initiative to make its good offices available in the matter of organizing negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, might turn out to be useful.

Accordingly, in L.I. Brezhnev's response to F. Castro it will be expedient to express our favorable attitude to his idea

about the provision by Cuba of its good offices in setting up negotiations between Afghanistan and its neighbors and in working out corresponding guarantees of non-interference in the internal affairs of the DRA. In this regard it is necessary, of course, to arrange with F. Castro that he from his side and we from our own should talk over this idea with B. Karmal. It is also necessary to explain to F. Castro our approach to a possible political settlement and in this regard the complexity of the Afghan events, so that Castro realistically evaluates the situation and does not feed on illusions of a simple and quick achievement of a settlement.

Keeping in mind the task of providing favorable conditions for the stabilization of the situation inside Afghanistan and the necessity for the world to get used to the new situation in that country and the Soviet Union's role there, our approach to a political settlement of the Afghan situation could harmonize both the initial and more long-range tasks. In this regard, the transition to a final resolution of the more long-term tasks would depend on the resolution of the initial tasks, so it is possible to constantly bring influence to bear on that process.

In its general appearance the outline of a political settlement could consist of a complex of bilateral agreements between Afghanistan and its neighbors, above all Pakistan, and systems of corresponding guarantees from the USSR, USA, and certain other states, each of which should be acceptable both to Afghanistan and to the opposing side.

The first task should become the start of consultations between Afghanistan and its neighbors aimed at a normalization of their relations. In this regard, continue to try to ensure that the neighbor-countries of Afghanistan, and also the United States and other countries involved in anti-Afghan activities, from the very beginning of the political settlement process, undertake practical measures which would bear witness to the cessation of their interference, including military, in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Directly link this demand with a possibility of the positive development of the process of political settlement.

As far as the concrete content of the agreements which could be worked out between Afghanistan and its neighbors is concerned, in them, besides the consolidation of the general principals concerning respect for the sovereignty and readiness to develop

relations on the basis of principles of good neighborliness and non-interference in each others' internal affairs, obligations should be fixed about the cessation of armed and any other hostile activity from the territory of those countries against each other, and also about the problem of refugees from Afghanistan. In particular, a ban on the enlistment and the use of refugees in underground activity against the DRA and the liquidation of refugee camps located directly on the border with Afghanistan, the repatriation of refugees to Afghanistan, and the resettlement of those of them who do not wish to return in remote regions of Pakistan and Iran could be discussed. In the final stage of the realization of such measures on the territory of Pakistan and possibly of Iran too, it would be possible to envision some form of verification with the participation of Afghanistan.

In the process of working out such bilateral agreements, evidently, there will arise the issue of mutual respect for the current borders between the participating states in the agreement, keeping in mind that Pakistan will strive to secure Afghanistan's recognition of the Durand Line. Historically, this issue is a complicated one for Iran. Its final settlement is directly connected to the development of the situation in Afghanistan itself and around it. Correspondingly, it would be inexpedient for the government of the DRA to prematurely—even before the true position of Pakistan will become clear—commit itself with a declaration about its readiness to recognize the Durand Line. According to tactical considerations, it is more advantageous for the Afghans to use this issue to receive from Pakistan maximal concessions on questions in which it holds an interest.

The negotiations aimed at the working out of concrete agreements should be conducted directly between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and also between Afghanistan and Iran. This, on the one hand, would strengthen the position of the government of the DRA, and on the other would exclude the "internationalization" of a political resolution of the Afghan issue, which is undesirable for us. The role of Cuba in its capacity as chairman of the Non-Aligned movement would consist of getting the bilateral negotiations started with the agreement of the participants and in a certain influence on their conduct through its provi-

sion of good offices, but not in the replacement of the direct negotiations between Afghanistan and its neighbors.

Agreements which are achieved in the course of these negotiations would be backed by appropriate guarantees, in the first place from the USSR and the USA, but also from certain other countries from among those which would be acceptable both to Afghanistan and to the other side. Posing the issue in this way would allow Afghanistan to deflect, say, the candidacy of China.

Now it would be premature to determine the detailed content of the guarantees and the exact make-up of the participants, insofar as this will depend both on the contents of the agreements themselves and on the development of the situation. The main point of the guarantees should be that the countries which provide the guarantees will respect them and by their own authority will fortify the bilateral agreements of Afghanistan with Pakistan and Iran. The USA must accept as well the obligation not to conduct any sort of underground activities, including those from the territory of third countries, against Afghanistan and its government.

In the context of considering the guarantees it might be possible to pose as well the issue of the growth of the USA's military presence in the region of the Indian Ocean both in terms of the threat to the security of the Soviet Union which that would create, and also from the point of view of the incompatibility of such actions with the task of stabilizing the situation in the Middle East.

During the consideration of both the guarantees and the overall problem of a political settlement, it makes sense to conduct the matter so that the governments of the participating states clearly understand that issues which touch on the system which exists in Afghanistan must not in any way be the subject of negotiations. In the same way it must be clear that issues which concern Afghanistan must not be considered and decided beyond the government of the DRA or without its participation.

Drafts of L.I. Brezhnev's response to F. Castro and our appeal in this regard to B. Karmal have been prepared taking into account the considerations which have been put forth above.

We request consideration.

A. Gromyko Iu. Andropov D. Ustinov  
B. Ponomarev O. Rakhmanin

10 March 1980

[attachment 1]

To the clause 33 of the Protocol No. 187

Top Secret  
Supplement I

ABSOLUTE PRIORITY [Vne ocheredi]

HAVANA  
SOVIET AMBASSADOR  
Copy:KABUL - SOV[iet]AMBASSADOR  
(for orientation)

Pay a visit to F. Castro and transmit him the following letter from L.I. Brezhnev:

“TO FIRST SECRETARY OF THE CC  
OF THE COM[MUNIST] PARTY OF  
CUBA, TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE  
STATE COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL  
OF MINISTERS OF THE REPUBLIC  
OF CUBA

Comrade Fidel CASTRO RUZ

Dear comrade Fidel,

Regarding your letter, I would like to report that we agree in general with its estimate of the existing situation in the world and [with] your assessment that the Afghan issue is being artificially blown up by imperialist forces to cover their encroachments against detente, peace, sovereignty, and independent development of peoples. Events in Afghanistan, beyond any doubt, do not provide the real cause of the present-day aggravation of the international situation. Without these events, imperialism would find some other pretext to aggravate the situation in the world. To this testify the steps taken by the United States even before the recent events in Afghanistan and out of any relation to them.

We are convinced, however, that a coordinated and firm policy of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and other fraternal countries is a guarantee that socialism, in the final analysis, will prevail in the interest of peace and of defusing the present situation, which was created by the actions of the most aggressive circles of imperialism.

We and our Cuban friends hold a unanimous opinion on the present correlation of

forces in the Non-Aligned Movement. With regret one has to state that many among the non-aligned countries have recently fallen under the influence of a campaign that is inimical to the cause of social progress.

We fully understand the present predicament of Cuba in the Non-Aligned Movement in the status of its chairman and we value even higher [Cuban] efforts to prevent the misuse of this Movement's authority against the interests of socialism.

I believe, Fidel, you should know in detail the situation inside Afghanistan. I must tell you straightforwardly that it remains complicated and tense. Domestic and external counterrevolution, supported by material, military, and political aid from the USA, China, Pakistan and a number of other Muslim countries ruled by reactionary regimes, have intensified their subversive activities. A realistic estimate of the situation tells that some time will pass before the Afghan revolution becomes irreversible and its political and social gains become firm. It is therefore not a coincidence that the imperialists and their fellow-travellers [pripeshniki] persist in attempting, one way or another, to compel the immediate and complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

However, when some people in the West became convinced of our firmness, they began to take an interest in the search for political solutions of the problem connected with Afghanistan. However, behind this lies visibly the same quest, achievement by political means of the same goals - a change of the existing regime in the DRA. Western countries blatantly ignore the government of B. Karmal and attempt to conduct affairs concerning Afghanistan behind the back of the government of the DRA and without its participation. This approach to political settlement, of course, should be categorically rejected.

On our side, we stand for a political settlement, but for a real settlement, aimed first and foremost at the liquidation of the causes that brought about the existing situation, i.e. at effective and guaranteed termination of aggression and all other forms of interference into the affairs of Afghanistan; [we also stand] for a settlement that ensures the sovereignty [and] independence of Afghanistan and further a consolidation of the gains of the Afghan revolution. It is obvious that the questions related to the existing

order in Afghanistan, [and to] the composition of its government, cannot by in any way a subject of negotiations. Equally must it be clear that the issues concerning Afghanistan cannot be discussed and decided on behalf of [i.e., without-trans.] the government of the DRA. We understand that there is a unity of opinions with you on this issue, and that precisely these motives dictated your initiative regarding Cuba's assistance in starting up talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

It is known that the government of the DRA stated very clearly its intention to maintain relations of peace and friendship with its neighbors, particularly Pakistan. Cuban assistance in the form of goodwill service in establishing this kind of relations between Afghanistan and its neighbors could, in our view, be useful. By the way, in our opinion the term “goodwill services” is more applicable here than “mediation.”

Of course, we will need a thorough coordination, first of all with the Afghan leadership, on the course of actions. It is important to prevent a substitution of some kind of international actions for direct negotiations between the existing government of Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is the goal of the authors of various plans that are being nurtured today in the West, who do not want to deal with the existing Afghan leadership. It seems inadvisable to us to have any degree of involvement on the part the General Secretary of the U.N in these affairs. This, among other aspects, would unavoidably be linked to the well-known anti-Afghan resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations. As to the question about a possibility of assisting Cuba in its goodwill services on the part of some other countries, members of the Non-Aligned Movement, this could probably be tackled later with a view to the developing situation; now this question should rather be left aside.

It seems to us that, in starting talks with Afghanistan and Pakistan, and then, probably, also with Iran, we should from the very beginning keep our eyes on the goal of developing a complex of agreements among [those countries], agreements that, in addition to general principles of respect of sovereignty, development of good-neighborly relations, and non-involvement into the internal affairs of each other, would also contain clear and specific commitments to a

cessation of hostilities and any other hostile activity conducted from the territory of these countries against each other and to the settlement of the issue of refugees from Afghanistan. In particular, we should demand a ban on recruitment and use of refugees for subversive activity against the DRA and [demand the] liquidation of refugee camps in the immediate vicinity of the frontiers with Afghanistan, the repatriation of refugees to Afghanistan and resettlement of those among them who would not wish to return, to central areas of Pakistan and Iran.

Bilateral agreements that might be achieved in the course of such negotiations between Afghanistan and its neighbors could be supported by appropriate guarantees from, first of all, the USSR and the United States, and other states, each of whom would be acceptable for Afghanistan as well as for the opposite side.

Such is in general terms a scheme of political settlement as we see it. Obviously, its realisation will demand considerable effort and time, considering that the imperialist and other reactionary circles will put obstacles in the way. Therefore we have no illusions as to a possibility of fast movement towards this solution.

So much for the considerations that we wanted to share with you, dear Fidel, in response to your letter. As a practical matter, we stand on the point that your idea [about the mediation initiative] must be discussed in advance with B. Karmal. On our side we also will approach him on this subject and, judging what his reaction could be, we expect to continue to discuss with you the issues concerning realisation of your initiative. We also expect to hear your opinion concerning the considerations that we have laid out.

You are right, Fidel, in pointing that in the existing situation Cuba has a chance to move to a more active policy within the framework of the Non-Aligned Movement in defense of peace and international security. This is all the more important, since the imperialist forces are striving to see in Afghanistan the only cause of aggravation of international tension, to divert attention from their dangerous activities aimed at the subversion of detente, to weaken the struggle of people for their rights.

In conclusion I would like to send you and the members of the leadership of the CC of the Communist Party of Cuba warm-

est regards and best wishes from myself and from all our comrades.

With comradely welcome,

L. BREZHNEV

10 March 1980".

Inform upon delivery by telegraph

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 34, dok. 5; documents provided by M. Kramer and Raymond L. Garthoff; translations by Carter-Brezhnev Project (report) and Vladislav M. Zubok (Brezhnev to Castro).]

**CPSU CC Politburo Decision on Afghanistan, 10 April 1980, with report by Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov-Zagladin, 7 April 1980**

Top Secret

#P191/IV

To: Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov, Zimyanin, Arkhipov, Zamyatin.

Excerpt from Protocol #191 of the Politburo CC CPSU session of 10 April 1980

Concerning our further policy on issues related to Afghanistan

To approve the considerations on this issue submitted by the Politburo CC CPSU Commission on Afghanistan (memo attached).

The Commission should continue monitoring the development of the situation in Afghanistan and around it closely, and solve the emerging problems as they arise according to the considerations stated in the memo, submitting relevant proposals to the Central Committee of the CPSU as necessary.

The Departments of the Central Committee upon consulting the Commission should carry out a coordinated propaganda policy on the basis of the considerations stated in the memo, and guide the central organs of the press, radio, and television accordingly.

Secretary of the CC

[attachment:]

To #IV of Protocol #191

Top Secret  
CC CPSU

We are presenting some considerations concerning our further steps in relation to the situation in Afghanistan and around it.

Situation in Afghanistan and the role of the Soviet troops.

1. The development of the situation in Afghanistan after the introduction of the limited contingent of the Soviet troops in December 1979 confirms our assessment that it was a timely and a correct action. It undermined the plans to overthrow the revolutionary regime in DRA and prevented the emergence of a new hotbed of military threat on the Southern borders of the Soviet Union. It put an end to Amin's adventuristic policy line, which led to the goals and objectives of the April [1978] revolution being discredited, to abandoning cooperation with the Soviet Union, and to establishing close ties with the West. The cadres of the People's Democratic party, the army, and the administrative apparatus loyal to the revolution had been saved from physical execution. Gradually the conditions for active participation in the revolutionary movement of both the former groups "Parcham" and "Khalq," along with other representatives of patriotic and national-democratic forces, are being created.

The new leadership of the DRA headed by B. Karmal with comprehensive assistance from the Soviet Union in general correctly outlined the tasks related to internal normalization, the organization of military resistance to the internal and external counterrevolution, for overcoming the harmful consequences of the Amin regime, and for achieving a relationship of trust with the tribes and other strata of the population, and began to work on practical solutions to those problems.

2. At the same time the situation in Afghanistan remains complicated and tense. The class struggle, represented in armed counterrevolutionary insurrections, encouraged and actively supported from abroad, is occurring in the circumstances where a genuine unity of the PDPA is still absent,

where the state and party apparatus is weak in terms of organization and ideology, which is reflected in the practical non-existence of local government organs, where financial and economic difficulties are mounting, and where the combat readiness of the Afghan armed forces and the people's militia is still insufficient. The efforts that had been undertaken notwithstanding, such important political problems as establishing relations with Muslim clergy, tribal leaders, and middle and petit bourgeoisie have not yet been solved. The agrarian reform has not been completed, especially in the Eastern and Southern regions of the country.

3. The Soviet troops stationed in Afghanistan provide decisive assistance in establishing control over the situation in the country. Together with the Afghan armed forces they have successfully carried out operations for elimination of armed rebel formations in several provinces of the country. As a result of those operations, the organized armed forces of the counterrevolution have suffered substantial losses, and thus the military threat to the existence of the new regime has been significantly reduced.

These are all reasons to believe that after the military operations planned for the immediate future are completed, there will be a relatively long period during which, even with support from abroad, the counterrevolutionary forces would probably be unable to carry out any large-scale military actions. Such a prognosis is supported by the fact that already now the counterrevolutionaries have had to change their tactics; they are mostly engaging in terrorist acts and small group actions. At the same time they are putting their stakes on economic sabotage, disruption of transportation and food supplies, arousing religious, nationalist, and anti-Soviet feelings, [and] animosity toward the government and its undertakings. However, one should not exclude the possibility of the counterrevolution making an effort to organize massive uprisings in certain provinces of the country.

4. In these circumstances the need for carrying out consistent and purposeful measures for achieving a genuine ideological, political, and organizational unity in the ranks of the PDPA, and for strengthening its influence in the country, for unifying all national-patriotic forces, for creating an effective apparatus of local government, for

improving the combat readiness of the army, the state security forces, and the people's militia, for solving the primary economic tasks, and for improving the work with tribal leaders, assumes the primary importance.

5. Meanwhile our troops in Afghanistan will have to continue to carry out their tasks of defending the revolutionary regime in the DRA, defending the country from external threats, including sealing off the borders of the country together with the Afghan forces, ensuring the safety of the major centers and communications, and also building up and strengthening the combat readiness of the Afghan armed forces. Only when the situation in Afghanistan stabilizes, and the situation around the country improves, and only upon a request of the DRA leadership, may we consider the question of the eventual withdrawal of our troops from the DRA.

Situation around Afghanistan and the relevant objectives.

The development of the situation around Afghanistan has recently been characterized by a certain stratification of the forces hostile to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan and to the Soviet Union.

1. The United States and China continue to hold to a hard line aimed at changing the political regime in Afghanistan and at the immediate withdrawal of the Soviet troops. Other countries exhibit a certain readiness to search for compromise solutions for a political settlement in the existing situation, even though those solutions, as a rule, are unacceptable.

Thus, in contradiction to the USA position, the majority of the Western European countries do not demand the withdrawal of the Soviet troops as a preliminary condition for any settlement, but consider it a part of the process of such a settlement. Gradually the understanding emerges that there could not be any resolution of the Afghan question without accepting the fact that Afghanistan, being the Soviet Union's immediate neighbor, is a part of the zone of Soviet special interests. Our decisively negative reaction to the absolutely hopeless plan of "neutralization" of Afghanistan proposed by the British, and aimed at the change of the Afghan political regime by removing its current leadership, definitely encouraged this evolution in the positions of the Western European countries.

2. A tendency to abandon the initial

positions of sharp condemnation of the Soviet actions in Afghanistan by some of the countries that held such positions before is emerging among the members of the Non-Aligned Movement. Their positions are changing toward searching for such a settlement that would allow Afghanistan to maintain its status as a nonaligned country. This is the line taken by India, which is concerned about a possibility of Pakistan's rearmament with the assistance of the USA and China, and about the buildup of the USA military presence in the Indian Ocean and in the Persian Gulf.

The government of Pakistan has recently been showing some signs of unwillingness to follow the USA policy on the Afghan question blindly. One such sign was the willingness to receive the Cuban Foreign Minister as a representative of the state chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement in Islamabad. Although the Cuban initiative of offering good offices for bilateral negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakistan with the goal of normalization of their relations so far did not produce any concrete results, such steps would be expedient in the future, and this is exactly what the Cubans are going to do, using their contacts with many nonaligned countries.

3. At the same time, it would be advisable for us to maintain our contacts with the countries that express interest in searching for a political settlement of the Afghan situation. During such meetings we should continue to consistently develop the idea that the basis of any political settlement should be a complete and guaranteed cessation of all aggressive actions and all forms of subversive activities and interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan.

During our meetings with representatives of Western European and other countries it is important, as always, to point out that the questions concerning the current regime in Afghanistan, the composition of the government and the like, could under no conditions be a subject of negotiations; and that any questions whatsoever concerning Afghanistan could not be discussed or resolved without the DRA government, without its current leadership.

4. Concerning the possible set of issues for discussion in connection with the Afghan settlement, besides the question of real guarantees of non-renewal of armed and foreign interference in the internal affairs

of Afghanistan, we should raise such questions as the reduction of the USA military presence in the Indian Ocean and in the Persian Gulf, the creation of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean, and the liquidation of foreign military bases there—all this against the USA efforts to limit the discussion to Afghanistan itself. Raising those questions would allow us to put pressure on the Americans and to influence the negotiating process for our benefit. Besides, it would permit us to increase the number of countries that view our position on Afghanistan favorably, or at least with understanding.

5. It is advisable to work on the question of encouraging other countries of the socialist commonwealth to take a more active part in providing Afghanistan with assistance in political, economic, and other spheres. This question needs special consideration.

6. Therefore, our policy in the questions of an Afghan settlement should be aimed at, first, helping decrease the tension which was created by the West in connection with the introduction of the Soviet troops into Afghanistan; secondly, at creating more favorable external conditions for internal consolidation of the revolution in the DRA, and for making the revolutionary changes irreversible; and thirdly, at creating conditions for the future eventual withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, when it would be justified by the political and military situation in the country and in the region in general.

7. We should begin with the assumption that at certain point in time we could sign a new treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan, which would make it clear for everyone that we are ready to ensure the defense of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, of its socio-economic and political regime from all forms of external aggression. This question could be discussed in the future taking into account the development of the situation, but it needs to be solved positively. Those who inspire the aggression against Afghanistan will not have reasons for objections against a defensively-oriented treaty of the kind that the USA has with dozens of countries.

Such a treaty will not mean that Afghanistan loses its status of a nonaligned country. One just needs to be reminded that Pakistan has been accepted into the non-

aligned movement regardless of the existence of the American-Pakistani agreement of 1959, according to which the USA considers it to be “vitally important for national goals and for general peace to preserve the independence and the territorial integrity of Pakistan,” and pledges to take “necessary measures including the use of armed forces” in a situation of aggression against Pakistan and upon the request of the Pakistani government.

In relation to this, it would be expedient for Afghanistan not only to maintain, but also to strengthen its role in the Non-aligned Movement, using it for building up its contacts with other non-aligned countries.

8. It is assumed that realization of the considerations mentioned above will require a close and constant coordination of actions between the Soviet Union and the DRA leadership on all aspects. Our rich experience of relations with new Afghanistan will help ensure such coordination.

We are requesting your consideration.

A. Gromyko Y. Andropov D. Ustinov  
V. Zagladin

7 April 1980  
#0304/gs

[Source: *APRF*, f. 3, op. 82, d. 176, ll. 9-17;  
translation by Svetlana Savranskaya.]

**CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 8 May 1980, with Politburo Commission Report, 6 May 1980, and Approved Cable to Soviet Ambassador in Kabul**

*Proletarians of the world, unite!*  
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.  
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Top Secret

No. P[olitburo session] 195/[Issue] XYIII

For comrades Brezhnev, Kossygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Russakov, Zamyatin, Smirnyukov

Excerpt from the Protocol no. 195 of the session of the Politburo of the CC CPSU from 8 May 1980.

On the proposals for political settlement

concerning Afghanistan.

1. To agree with the considerations on this issue laid out in the memorandum of the Commission of the Politburo CC CPSU on Afghanistan on 6 May 1980 (attached)

2. To approve the draft instructions to the Soviet ambassador in Kabul (attachment 1) and the Soviet ambassador in Havana (attachment 2) [not printed--ed.]

SECRETARY OF CC

[attachment]

To the point XYII of the Protocol no. 195

Secret

CC CPSU

In accordance to the decision of 10 March 1980 (Pyongyang 187/33) a common line has been worked out with the leadership of the DRA on the issue of a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan. It was assumed in doing this, that later, particularly taking into account the implementation of the Cuban initiative of goodwill services and the overall development of the situation around Afghanistan, it will be possible to return to a more specific definition of a foundation where one could start in bringing about a political settlement.

At the present time it is advisable to recommend to the Afghan leadership to step forward with an across-the-board program of political settlement stemming from the scheme of principles which has been agreed upon earlier. Such a step would make it easier to influence the developing situation around Afghanistan in a direction favorable for Afghanistan and the USSR. It would also promote the international stature of the government of B. Karmal.

It is advisable to inform F. Castro of our recommendations to B. Karmal concerning the promotion of such a program, since the Cuban comrades need to take these recommendations into account while implementing their initiative of setting up talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Submitting for consideration,

A. Gromyko Yu. Andropov D. Ustinov  
B. Ponomarev

6 May 1980  
no. 391/gs

[attachment 1]

Concerning point XVII of the  
Protocol no. 195

Secret  
Attachment 1

KABUL  
SOVIET AMBASSADOR

Pay a visit to B. Karmal and, referring to the order, give him the following information.

As has become known, it has been agreed in the course of the exchange of opinions with the Afghan leadership regarding the mission of goodwill services by Cuba to continue joint coordination on the issues concerning the promotion of the idea of political settlement.

The analysis of the situation reveals that at the present moment there is an ongoing divergence of approaches of various countries towards Afghanistan and what happens around it.

On one side, the USA, China, and a number of other states continue their hostile subversive activity against Afghanistan, actively strive to counteract consolidation of positions of the government of the DRA inside the country and on the international arena. It is no coincidence, therefore, that Cuba's initiative to set up a dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan evoked a sharp negative reaction in those countries.

On the other side, the reaction of some other countries, particularly Arab states of the Steadfastness Front [against Israel-ed.], to the declaration of the government of the DRA in favor of a political settlement, to the clarifications made by the Minister of Foreign Affairs Sh.M. Dost during his recent trip, and also to the useful efforts undertaken by Cuba concerning the mission of goodwill services, all this definitely indicates the emergence of more realistic trends. By the way, the mission of goodwill services of Cuba turned out to be undoubtedly useful for at least one reason: it became clear today who really stands for a political settlement and who would prefer to limit oneself to talks on this subject in order to mask the continuing interference into the affairs of Afghanistan.

All this testifies to the necessity of further and more intense efforts to promote the

idea of a political settlement, to fill it with content corresponding with our joint interests. These interests, as we believe, will be well served if the Afghan government would promote an across-the-board program of political settlement, which would become a logical follow-up and specific development of the repeated declarations of the DRA about its readiness to normalize relations with Pakistan and Iran.

It is absolutely clear that realization of bilateral agreements between Afghanistan and Pakistan, [and] between Afghanistan and Iran, constitute an obligatory key element of a political settlement. It is no coincidence, that this principled position is consciously ignored in all kinds of Western plans, based on the intention to internationalize the Afghan issue and to resolve it without the participation of the government of the DRA and against the interests of Afghan people.

The advancement of an across-the-board program of settlement by the Afghan government would be, in our opinion, very timely today also from in view of exercising appropriate influence on the position of the countries, participants of the next session of the Ministers of foreign affairs of the Islamic states, forthcoming in May of this year.

If our Afghan friends share this opinion, [they] could publish in the immediate future a Declaration of the government of the DRA, where, in the introductory part they would formulate in a comprehensive program some specific proposals concerning a political settlement.

The introductory part of the Declaration may point out that Afghan people, by proclaiming in April 1978 a national democratic revolution, made its final choice and set itself upon the path of construction of a new society in the country, based on principles of equality and fairness, while preserving its Islamic character and respecting historic and national tradition, the society that excludes exploitation of man by man. [The Afghan people] would like to build a new life for itself under peaceful conditions, developing friendly and cooperative relations with all its neighbors, with Muslim countries [and] all other states. However, it confronted brutal interference, including by military force, into its internal affairs, on the part of the imperialist and other reactionary forces.

To underline, that the people of Afghanistan is full of determination to defend the freedom and independence of its Motherland, its right to define for itself a social-political order under which it would like to live.

Then one could formulate the following specific postulates of the program of political settlement itself.

Affirming that in accordance to the basic principles of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan the international affairs of the DRA are based on the principles of peaceful coexistence and on the policy of positive and active non-alignment, the government of the DRA declares its intention to achieve a political settlement to ensure complete and guaranteed cessation of aggressive actions against Afghanistan, subversive acts and any other forms of interference from outside into its internal affairs, to liquidate the existing tension in the area and to overcome the differences through peaceful means, by means of negotiations. To this end:

1) The government of the DRA proposes to the governments of Pakistan and Iran to hold Afghan-Pakistani and Afghan-Iranian negotiations, having in mind the development of bilateral agreements about normalization of relations. Such agreements might contain commonly accepted articles concerning mutual respect for sovereignty, readiness to develop relations on the basis of principles of good neighborliness and non-interference into internal affairs, and might include specific commitments to suppress military and any other hostile activity from their territory against each other.

2) The government of the DRA appeals again to the Afghans who temporarily stay, for different reasons, on the territory of Pakistan and Iran, to return to the Motherland. It confirms that they would be respected and their liberties and personal protection would be guaranteed, and they would be able to choose freely their place of residence and type of occupation. The government of the DRA appeals to the authorities in Pakistan and Iran to assist the free return of the aforementioned persons to Afghanistan. However, if any part of those Afghans prefers to stay [abroad], then the questions concerning their presence must also be discussed during bilateral negotiations with a view to achieving appropriate agreements.

3) Upon achieving mutually satisfac-

tory solutions to the problems indicated in points 1 and 2, and upon normalization on this basis of relations between Afghanistan and its neighbors, the government of the DRA would be ready to examine other issues of bilateral relations, including those that had long been a bone of contention.

4) Proposing to hold bilateral negotiations with Pakistan and Iran without any preliminary conditions, the government of the DRA firmly stands on the view that these negotiations are incompatible with the continuation of hostile activity against Afghanistan. Correspondingly, from the very beginning of the process of political settlement, one should pass practical measures convincingly testifying to the effecting of a cessation of military and any other kind of interference into the affairs of Afghanistan on the part of all states involved in such interference.

5) The government of the DRA considers that, besides a complex of bilateral agreements between Afghanistan and Pakistan, [and] Afghanistan and Iran, another constituent part of political settlement must be appropriate political guarantees of some other states that would be acceptable both for Afghanistan, and for all other participants of bilateral agreements. Among those, in the DRA's opinion, should be the Soviet Union and the United States. The chief meaning of the guarantees must reside in the fact that the countries-guarantors will respect themselves and by their authority will support bilateral agreements of Afghanistan with Pakistan and Iran. As to the guarantees on the part of the USA, they must include a clearly stated pledge not to conduct any kind of subversive activity against Afghanistan, including from the territory of third countries.

6) The government of the DRA declares that the issue of the withdrawal of Soviet limited military contingent from the territory of Afghanistan should be resolved in the context of a political settlement. The cessation and the guaranteed non-resumption of military incursions and any other forms of interference into internal affairs of Afghanistan would remove the causes that made Afghanistan turn to the USSR with the request to introduce the aforementioned contingent into its territory. Specifically, the issue of the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan will depend on resolution of the issue of effective guarantees to bilat-

eral agreements of Afghanistan with Pakistan and Iran.

7) The government of the DRA favors taking into account, in the process of political settlement, military-political activity in the area of the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf by the states that do not belong to this region. While sharing the concern of other states regarding the build-up of the military presence of the USA in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, the government of the DRA supports a proposal to turn this area into a zone of peace, to liquidate foreign military bases there, and to carry out other measures to reduce tension and increase security.

While putting forward proposals on a political settlement, the government of the DRA once again with all determination declares, that the questions bearing on the interests of Afghanistan cannot be discussed much less resolved without the participation of the government of the DRA and alongside it. At the same time the Afghan government considers as helpful the efforts of other states that favor a start of negotiations. In this regard it welcomes and supports the initiative taken by the Republic of Cuba in its capacity of chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement, to offer its goodwill services.

The government of the DRA expects, that the specific program of political settlement that it offers will meet adequate understanding, first of all, on the part of Pakistan and Iran, and will allow [them] to move in practical way to such a settlement through negotiations.

In the end tell B. Karmal that simultaneously with the proposal of the program of political settlement it would be good to take measures for its broad dissemination using the channels of media, as well as through Afghan embassies abroad and foreign missions in Kabul.

On our side, we will give to this initiative of Afghanistan the required political, diplomatic, and propagandist support.

Report upon delivery by telegraph

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 34, dok. 8; provided by M. Kramer; translation by Vladislav M. Zubok.]

**CPSU CC Politburo decisions,  
19 June 1980**

TOP SECRET

No. P200/Vi

To Comrades Brezhnev, Andropov, Grishin, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Kosygin, Kunaev, Pelshe, Romanov, Suslov, Tikhonov, Ustinov, Chernenko, Shcherbitskii, Aliiev, Gorbachev, Demichev, Kuznetsov, Mash-erov, Ponomarev, Rashidov, Solomentsev, Shevardnadze, Dolgikh, Zimyanin, Kapitonov, Rusakov, Savinkin, Smirnyukov.

Extract from protocol No. 200 of the session of the Politburo of the CC CPSU of 19 June 1980

#### Measures on Afghanistan.

1. To approve Comrade Brezhnev's proposals on the immediate measures on Afghanistan.

To proceed with the assumption that the Soviet Union will continue to provide political, military, and economic assistance to Afghanistan in order to help ensure the national independence and territorial integrity of Afghanistan, to strengthen the people's democratic regime and the leading role of the People's Democratic Party.

2. To consider expedient to withdraw several military units whose presence in Afghanistan now is not necessary.

To charge the Ministry of Defense of the USSR to make a decision on the number and composition of the troops to be withdrawn and on the time frame and the order of their withdrawal from Afghanistan.

To charge Comrade Iu. V. Andropov to coordinate the issues concerning the withdrawal of some Soviet military units from Afghanistan with B. Karmal.

3. To use the withdrawal of some Soviet military units from Afghanistan as leverage for demanding that Pakistan and Iran cease their hostile actions against the DRA and to stop sending interventions from their territory into Afghanistan.

Politburo CC CPSU

[Source: *APRF*, f. 3, op. 82, d. 176, ll. 101-102; translation by Sveta Savranskaya.]

**Information from the CC CPSU to  
Erich Honecker, 21 June 1980**

21.06.80

Confidential

Following the traditions established in the relationship between our parties, we would like confidentially to inform you of the following.

At one time we sent you information on the deployment of a limited Soviet military contingent in the territory of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. At the time we informed you that this action was taken as a result of numerous requests by the Afghan government in connection with a sharp increase in imperialist aggression, primarily by the USA, as well as by China, using formations of Afghan counterrevolutionary bandits who are entrenched in Pakistan and Iran.

Given the current situation the CC CPSU, taking into account the fact that the interventionists have been dealt a serious blow and that with respect to this there is no longer a need for the presence of the entire initial military contingent deployed in Afghanistan, has deemed it expedient to withdraw several military units, the presence of which is not critical at this time. This measure is being carried out with the complete agreement of the Afghan government.

Of course, if the intervention directed against the progressive achievements of the Afghan people, against independence and the territorial integrity of DRA continues, or worse still, increases, then all necessary measures will be taken not only to strengthen the Afghan armed forces, but also our military contingent in Afghanistan.

The withdrawal of several Soviet military units from Afghanistan rests on the fact that Soviet Union will continue to render political, military and economic support to Afghanistan, with the aim of maintaining the national independence and territorial integrity of Afghanistan, buttressing the people's democratic regime and the fundamental role of the People's Democratic Party.

We intend to use the withdrawal of several Soviet military units from Afghanistan in order to secure from Pakistan and Iran the cessation of hostile activities against the DRA and the smuggling of interventionists into Afghanistan from their territories. We reckon that our friends will follow the same course.

[Source: SAPMO, Berlin, JIV 2/202, A. 575; obtained by V. Zubok.]

# CC CPSU Plenum, 23 June 1980 (excerpt)

PLENUM OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE  
OF THE CPSU  
23 JUNE 1980

Sverdlovsk Hall, 11:00 a.m.

[. . .] **Brezhnev:** Not a day goes by when Washington has not tried to revive the spirit of the "Cold War," to heat up militarist passions. Any grounds are used for this, real or imagined.

One example of this is Afghanistan. The ruling circles of the USA, and of China as well, stop at nothing, including armed aggression, in trying to keep the Afghans from building a new life in accord with the ideals of the revolution of liberation of April 1978. And when we helped our neighbor Afghanistan, at the request of its government, to give a rebuff to aggression, to beat back the attacks of bandit formations which operate primarily from the territory of Pakistan, then Washington and Beijing raised an unprecedented racket. Of what did they accuse the Soviet Union[?]: of a yearning to break out to warm waters, and an intention to make a grab for foreign oil. And the whole thing was that their plans to draw Afghanistan into the orbit of imperialist policy and to create a threat to our country from the south crashed to the ground.

In the Soviet act of assistance to Afghanistan there is not a grain of avarice. We had no choice other than the sending of troops. And the events confirmed that it was the only correct choice. (Continued applause).

[. . .] **Gromyko:** [. . .] Given all that was achieved by the fraternal countries in the international arena, especially in the 1970s, in the struggle for detente and peace, we note something else: the general situation in the world has grown more complicated, tension has grown, above all in our relations with the United States. The question arises: what is the reason for this?

The opponents of detente do not trouble themselves even with a minimal dose of objectivity in explaining the reasons for such a situation. They are building their policy on deception of the peoples. Imperialist policy and deception of the peoples are

indivisible. From all corners they announce that the Soviet Union has supposedly changed its policy and by its own actions threatens the West and its interests. In every way they exaggerate in this regard the Afghan events, they cast it in a false light. In pursuit of these goals they break all their former records of trickery, lies, and evil puffery.

Acting on the true course of events, the Soviet Union directly casts back in the face of the officials of the imperialist states facts like the acceptance by the USA and NATO, in demonstrative form, of the decision to increase sharply their military budgets, to abruptly whip up the arms race, to deploy new American intermediate range weapons in Western Europe, to make ready the strike ["rapid development"-ed.] force in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.

To all this, to all of our well-founded accusations against the NATO bloc, they can raise no objection. And how can they object, if all this happened when the so-called Afghan issue was not even mentioned.

. . . Comrades, for our actions in Afghanistan, for the fact that we fulfilled our obligation to international solidarity in relations to revolutionary Afghanistan, for the fact that the aggressor already has received a solid rebuff, the Soviet Union does not intend to make any excuses to anyone, and the inspirers of aggression against the Afghan state are beginning to feel that. Those should ask for pardon who organized and stand behind the aggression against Afghanistan, who concocted the criminal plans in relation to that country, the independent existence and security of which have a direct relation to the security of the Soviet Union. We accuse the organizers of the aggression against Afghanistan and demand that that aggression be stopped. (Applause).

Of course, it would be premature to believe that the complexity in relation to Afghanistan is already behind us. The external enemies of Afghanistan and the domestic reactionary forces will still make themselves known. But the matter is now on the correct path. Afghanistan will not return to the past. Our Party and our people can be sure of that. (Applause).

For us now, as Leonid Il'ich announced, there is no need to have in Afghanistan a military contingent even of the size which it was when it was introduced. But if the situation demands it, we at any

time will be able to strengthen our contingent, so as to reliably work together to provide for the independence and territorial integrity of Afghanistan.

The possibility of reaching at an appropriate time a Treaty of mutual assistance between the Soviet Union and the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, which would clearly demonstrate the resolve of both countries not to allow any encroachment from without on the independence and integrity of the Afghan state, deserves serious attention.

... We have proposed and propose that Washington be led in our mutual relations by the principles of equality, equal security, mutual advantage, non-interference in each other's domestic affairs. In a single word, we have built and are ready in the future to build our relations with the USA on the principles of peaceful coexistence.

Declaring our readiness to maintain normal relations with the USA, we proceed from the fact that hostility between the two powers is not only unwise, but also dangerous. At the same time we more than once have warned the Americans, that they should take into account the lawful interests of the Soviet Union and that the Soviet Union will not permit anyone to trample on those interests. Many of you, evidently, have in your memory how during the terms of office of various Presidents throughout the post-war period, American policy rocked from side to side. It cost the Soviet Union considerable effort to lead the USA to an acknowledgement of the single reliable basis of our relations—a policy of peaceful coexistence.

Now the American administration has once again begun to veer wildly. The underlying cause of the current break in Soviet-American relations is Washington's attempt to do whatever it takes to achieve military superiority over us.

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 14, dok. 40; provided by M. Kramer.]

**Information from the CC CPSU to  
Erich Honecker, 18 July 1980**

18/7/80  
Confidential

DISPATCH

The other day, the President of Pakistan Zia-ul-Haq addressed us with a proposal on holding talks with Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran under the mediation of the Soviet Union. The goal of these talks should be, in his words, the normalization of bilateral relations, the preservation of Afghanistan's status as independent and friendly to the Soviet Union and the assurance of a guarantee not to interfere in its internal affairs.

In the opinion of Zia-ul-Haq, such a meeting could take place in Moscow during the second half of August of this year, first on the level of Foreign Ministers, and then on the level of national and government leaders. The President of Pakistan announced that so far he has not discussed this idea of his with the government of Iran, but he expressed confidence that Iran will lend its support.

From the very beginning we were not sure of the seriousness of Zia-ul-Haq's intentions. Nevertheless, after consulting with the government of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, we decided to express, in principle, a positive regard to his proposal.

However, following this, as we suspected, Pakistan essentially went back on their word. Under the guise of additional "explanations" of their proposal they started to put forth completely unacceptable preconditions for these talks.

First of all, Pakistan directly and rudely declares the "unacceptability" of Babrak Karmal as the head of the Afghan government and that he must be replaced by someone else. Secondly, Pakistan declares that it will continue to act on the basis of Pakistan's obligations stemming from the decisions made by the Conference of Islamic Nations. Thirdly, despite Zia-ul-Haq's earlier conviction that Iran will support his proposal for direct talks with Afghanistan, Pakistan is distancing itself from that as well.

Obviously we have no intention to continue the dialogue with Pakistan on the basis of their current position, which constitutes a particularly rude interference in the internal affairs of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

[Source: *SAPMO*, Berlin, J IV 2/202, A. 575; document provided by V. M. Zubok.]

**Report by Soviet Defense Minister  
Ustinov to CPSU CC on "Foreign**

**Interference" in Afghanistan,  
2 October 1980**

Secret

CPSU CC

On Foreign Interference in the Internal  
Affairs of the Democratic  
Republic of Afghanistan (DRA)

Following the victory of the revolution in Afghanistan, the USA and its allies in NATO, as well as China, Pakistan, Iran, and several reactionary Arab countries, launched subversive actions against the DRA, and these actions were greatly stepped up once Soviet troops were sent into Afghanistan.

The USA and its allies are training, equipping, and sending into DRA territory armed formations of the Afghan counter-revolution, the activity of which, thanks to help from outside, has become the main factor destabilizing the situation in Afghanistan. The most serious actions against the DRA are being launched from the territory of Pakistan, where armed detachments of Afghan reactionaries are being trained at 42 sites. In total, over 60,000 rebels, including more than 50,000 who have been infiltrated into DRA territory, have been trained in Pakistan in 1980 with help from American, Chinese, Pakistani, and Egyptian instructors.

The Iranian leadership is openly supporting the Afghan reactionaries. There are 13 training camps on Iranian territory for the Afghan rebels. Some 5,000 people have been trained at these sites, including nearly 3,000 who have been sent into Afghanistan.

American instructors are taking an active part in the training of rebels on the territory of Pakistan. These instructors have come mainly from the Washington-based "International Police Academy" and the Texas-based school of subversion. In March and April of this year alone, the USA sent 100 instructors through Karachi into the regions of Pakistan bordering on the DRA. Some of these instructors directly organized the operations of rebel units on the territory of Afghanistan.

The USA is providing shipments of weapons to the Afghan rebels mainly through third countries (Egypt and Saudi Arabia). The direct supply of weapons to the Afghan rebels in Pakistan is carried out via transport assets of the Pakistani ground

and border forces, and also through the national transport corporation.

The Carter administration is seeking to unite the Afghan counterrevolution, promising its leaders that if they unite, they will receive unlimited help in the form of weapons and money. The USA chief of mission in Pakistan, B. King, said this during a meeting this past March with the secretary of Pakistan's defense ministry, Lieutenant-General D. Khan. The USA consulates in Peshawar and Karachi are working to unite the scattered groups of the Afghan counterrevolution. An "Afghan section" that has been created in the USA consulate in Karachi is supervising rebel operations and providing them with weapons and equipment.

The American authorities are also instigating actions by anti-Afghan emigre groups in the United States itself. With the direct participation of the CIA, the "Association of American Aid to Afghan Refugees," the "National Liberation Front of Afghanistan," the "Unity Council," and the "Committee for Solidarity in Organizing the Liberation of Afghanistan" have been set up in the USA. These organizations have been given the task of coordinating the actions of anti-Afghan forces abroad and of providing financial aid to armed detachments of the Afghan counterrevolution.

The American CIA has devised special recommendations "for the use of religious movements and groups in the struggle against the spread of Communist influence." In accordance with these recommendations, agents from the American special services in Pakistan are carrying out vigorous work among the Pushtun and Beluga tribes, provoking them to carry out anti-government acts in Afghanistan.

Foreign interference in the DRA's internal affairs, above all by the USA, is thwarting efforts to normalize the situation in Afghanistan.

Reported for informational purposes.

D. Ustinov

2 October 1980

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 82, d. 177, ll. 84-86; translated by Mark Kramer; first publication in Russian in *Novaya i Noveishaya Istoriia* 3 (May-June) 1996, pp. 91-99 (document on 98-99), intro. by G.N. Sevastionov.]

CPSU CC Politburo transcript

(excerpt), 10 March 1983

SESSION OF THE CC  
CPSU POLITBURO  
10 March 1983

Chairman: comr. ANDROPOV Yu.V.

Present: comrs. Aliiev G.A., Gorbachev M.S., Gromyko A.A., Pel'she A. Ya., Tikhonov N.A., Chernenko K.U., Demichev P.N., Dolgikh V.I., Kuznetsov V.V., Solomentsev M.S., Kapitonov I.V., and Ryzhkov N.I.

[...] 6. On the situation in Afghanistan and additional measures towards its improvement.

GROMYKO. In accordance with the resolution of the Politburo, a group of high-ranking party, soviet, military and production management officials traveled to Afghanistan. This group put in some good work there. They put together a set of proposals for the further stabilization of the situation in Afghanistan. We examined these proposals during meetings of the CC Politburo Commission on Afghanistan. These proposals contain problems that must be decided in the immediate future by both the Afghan and the Soviet sides. Financially speaking, this will cost approximately 300 mln. rubles in the course of three years. This is a large, yet minimum sum, and it seems that we should make this expenditure.

On the whole, the situation in Afghanistan is, as you know, difficult. Lately, certain elements of consolidation have been examined, but the process of consolidation is moving slowly. The number of gangs [rebel groups] is not decreasing. The enemy is not laying down its weapons. The negotiations with Pakistan in Geneva are moving slowly and with difficulty. This is why we must do everything to find a mutually acceptable political settlement. In advance, it can already be said that this process will be a lengthy one. There are questions which must be discussed separately. One should only keep in mind that for now we cannot give Pakistan consent on concrete time periods for the withdrawal of our troops from the country. We must exercise caution here. Yes, the situation is stabilizing. It is good that the Afghan army has grown to 140 thousand. But the main trouble is that the central authorities have not yet

reached the countryside: [they] rarely interact with the masses, about one third of the districts is not under the control of the central authority, and one can feel the fragility of the state government.

In closing, I would like to say that evidently we need to take the steps which are outlined in the recommendations given to you for examination. It seems that it will be necessary to hold a meeting with Karmal and a group of leading officials of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan sometime in April. It seems that it would also be expedient for Yu. V. Andropov to meet personally with Babrak Karmal.

TIKHONOV. When speaking of 300 mln. rubles, this refers to free assistance.

ANDROPOV. You remember how arduously and cautiously we decided the question of deploying troops in Afghanistan. L.I. Brezhnev insisted on a roll call vote by the members of the Politburo. The question was examined in the CC Plenum.

In deciding the Afghan problem we must proceed from existing realities. What do you want? This is a feudal country where tribes have always been in charge of their territories, and the central authority was far from always able to reach each Kishlak [an Afghan district]. The problem is not in Pakistan's position. We are fighting against American imperialism which well understands that in this part of international politics it has lost its positions. That is why we cannot back off.

Miracles don't happen. Sometimes we are angry at the Afghans because they act illogically and work slowly. But let us remember our fight with *basmachism* [banditry]. Why, back then, almost the entire Red Army was concentrated in Central Asia, yet the fight with *basmachi* continued up until the mid-1930's. And so in our relations with Afghanistan there must be both demands and understanding.

As concerns the recommendations of the Commission, are they not a little imposing with exact instructions as to what should be done by the Afghan side and by ours?

GROMYKO. Of course we will work to complete the recommendations.

ANDROPOV. Yes, so that it should be a political document. It must be much more flexible.

PONOMAREV. We will complete these materials.

ANDROPOV. Evidently we do need

these talks with Karmal. It will probably be advantageous to hold them in two rounds; moreover, my discussion with Karmal should be organized last.

KUZNETSOV, TIKHONOV, GORBACHEV. That's right.

ANDROPOV. Then, perhaps we will make the following decision: To agree with the findings reported by the Politburo Commission on Afghanistan and accept the expediency of holding discussions with B. Karmal and a group of other leading officials of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan in March-April of this year. At the same time we can ratify the draft resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers on giving additional economic assistance to the Afghan Republic.

The resolution is approved.

#### 7. On the Afghan-Pakistan negotiations on the questions of political settlement

ANDROPOV. It seems that the question is clear.

GROMYKO. The Afghans, of course, must be given materials which would give them the ability to prepare well for the negotiations.

PONOMAREV. They very much need these materials.

ANDROPOV. Then let us approve the resolution.

The resolution is approved.

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89 per. 42, dok. 51; provided by M. Kramer; trans. by D. Rozas.]

#### **CPSU CC Politburo Transcript (excerpt), 20 March 1986**

Top Secret  
Only copy  
(Draft)

SESSION OF CC CPSU POLITBURO  
20 March 1986

Chairing: com. GORBACHEV M.S.

Attending: com Aliev G.A., Gromyko A.A., Zaikov L.N., Ligachev E.K., Ryzhkov N.I., Solomentsev M.S., Chebrikov, V.M., Dolgikh V.I., Eltsin B.N., Yeltsin B.N., Sokolov S.L., Talyzin N.B., Biryukova A.P., Zimianin M.V., Medvedev V.A., Nikonov V.P., Razumovskii G.P., Yakovlev A.N.

GORBACHEV: Before we start discussing the issues on the agenda, I would like to inform you on some questions.

A troubling cable has arrived from Aden. They want to shoot 50 people there. I think we should issue an appeal, pointing out that the main thing today is unity. And the actions of this kind can aggravate internal strife.

GROMYKO: Right

GORBACHEV: Let Yegor Kuzmich [Ligachev], Viktor Mikhailovich [Chebrikov] and the MFA prepare the necessary instruction.

LIGACHEV: The Bulgarians refused to receive Muhammed.

GORBACHEV: We should not dramatize it. They have to face certain difficulties, too, regarding this question.

According to information from confidential channels, [East German leader Erich] Honecker let himself speak in a way that testifies to his misunderstanding of our point of view about Socialist self-government of people, that socialism itself is a self-government.

[pages missing-ed.]

GORBACHEV (reads a memorandum on Afghanistan). This is a strict party document. The situation is quite dramatic. B. Karmal is very much down in terms of health and in terms of psychological disposition. He began to pit leaders against each other.

SOLOMENTSEV: A correct position.

CHEBRIKOV: Karmal tells himself that he cannot cope with his functions (he reads a cable).

GROMYKO: One could instruct Mikhail Sergeevich to speak with him.

[Source: f. 89, per. 36, d. 18; provided by M. Kramer; trans. by V.M. Zubok.]

#### **CPSU CC Politburo transcript (excerpt), 13 November 1986**

Top Secret  
Only Copy  
Working Draft

MEETING OF CC CPSU POLITBURO  
13 November 1986

Chaired by comr. GORBACHEV M.S.

Also present: comrs. Vorotnikov V.I., Gromyko A.A., Zaikov L.N., Ryzhkov N.I., Solomentsev M.S., Chebrikov V.M., Shevardnadze Eh.A., Demichev P.N., Dolgikh V.I., Yeltsin B.N., Talyzin N.V., Biryukova A.P., Dobrynin A.F., Zimyanin M.V., Medvedev V.A., Nikonov V.P., Razumovskii G.P., Kapitonov I.V.

[...] 11. On [former Afghan king] Zakhir Shah.

GORBACHEV. Have all comrades familiarized themselves with the memorandum from comrs. Chebrikov V.M., Shevardnadze Eh. A., Sokolov S.L., and Dobrynin A.F.?

POLITBURO MEMBERS. Yes, we have.

GORBACHEV. Then let us exchange opinions. I have an intuition that we should not waste time. Najib needs our support. He objectively evaluates the situation and understands the difficulty of the existing problems. He believes that the activation of measures directed towards national reconciliation, strengthening of the union with the peasantry, and consolidation of political leadership of the party and the country is a pressing task.

Karmal is stalling. [translator's note: Gorbachev here uses an idiomatic Russian expression—"Karmal vydelyvnet Krendelya"—which literally means, "Karmal is walking like a pretzel." The expression, derived from a term for the weaving and unsteady gait of a drunkard, in this case signifies Gorbachev's assertion that Karmal is not behaving in a straightforward manner.]

We have been fighting in Afghanistan for already six years. If the approach is not changed, we will continue to fight for another 20-30 years. This would cast a shadow on our abilities to affect the evolution of the situation. Our military should be told that they are learning badly from this war. What, can it be that there is no room for our General Staff to maneuver? In general, we have not selected the keys to resolving this problem. What, are we going to fight endlessly, as a testimony that our troops are not able to deal with the situation? We need to finish this process as soon as possible.

GROMYKO. It is necessary to establish a strategic target. Too long ago we spoke on the fact that it is necessary to close off the border of Afghanistan with Pakistan

and Iran. Experience has shown that we were unable to do this in view of the difficult terrain of the area and the existence of hundreds of passes in the mountains. Today it is necessary to precisely say that the strategic assignment concludes with the carrying of the problem towards ending the war.

GORBACHEV. It is necessary to include in the resolution the importance of ending the war in the course of one year - at maximum two years.

GROMYKO. It should be concluded so Afghanistan becomes a neutral country. Apparently, on our part there was an underestimation of difficulties, when we agreed with the Afghan government to give them our military support. The social conditions in Afghanistan made the resolution of the problem in a short amount of time impossible. We did not receive domestic support there. In the Afghan army the number of conscripts equals the number of deserters.

From the point of view of evaluating the domestic situation in Afghanistan, we can sign under practically everything that Najib suggests. But we should not sharply cut off Karmal, as he serves as a symbol to his people. A meeting of our representatives with him should be held. It is also necessary to try keep him on the general track; to cut him off would not be the best scenario. It is more expedient to preserve [his relations] with us.

Najib recommends a rather wide spectrum of steps. They deserve attention. One path is to draw in the peasant masses on the way of supporting the government power; another - negotiations with Islamic parties and organizations inside Afghanistan and beyond its borders, which are ready to compromise; third path - relations with the former king. I think that we should not spurn them. This should be done possibly in a combination other than proposed by Najib. Right now a more concrete stage of discussion with him concerning these questions is needed. A certain plan of actions is necessary. Here, it seems, our participation is needed, in particular, through the course of our contacts with Pakistan.

Concerning the Americans, they are not interested in the settlement of the situation in Afghanistan. On the contrary, it is to their advantage for the war to drag out.

GORBACHEV. That's right.

GROMYKO. It should be considered how to link India into the settlement. A de-

lay in the resolution of these problems does not increase our opportunities for settlement. Right now the situation is worse than half a year ago. In one word, it is necessary to more actively pursue a political settlement. Our people will breathe a deep sigh if we undertake steps in that direction.

Our strategic goal is to make Afghanistan neutral, not to allow it to go over to the enemy camp. Of course it is important to also preserve that which is possible in the social arena. But most important - to stop the war.

I would agree that it is necessary to limit this to a period of one-two years.

SOLOMENTSEV. It would be good to complete a political settlement for the 70th anniversary of [the 1917] October [Revolution].

GROMYKO. It is difficult to talk about such a period of time.

CHEBRIKOV. On this question many decisions have been made. Much energy has been put in. But, unfortunately, the situation, both in Afghanistan and around it, continues to remain difficult. I support the proposal of Mikhail Serge'evich [Gorbachev] that it is necessary to live up and push the problem towards a logical conclusion. Indeed, we posed the question of closing the border. Andrei Andre'evich [Gromyko] is partly right, speaking about the difficulties of such a closing, due to the geographic and other conditions. But partly the failure in the closing is also tied to the fact that not everything was done that could have been. Right now the enemy is changing its tactics. He is going underground. It is necessary to look for the means to a political solution of the problem. The military path for the past six years has not given us a solution.

What should have been done? First of all, it was necessary to receive Najib in Moscow. He has never visited us. It is possible that Karmal's conduct can be in some way explained by the fact that as of now we have yet to invite Najib to come here. There have been telephone conversations with him through intermediaries, but that's not [enough]. A direct conversation is necessary. It could clear up a great deal. It is important not to put off such a conversation; a day or two should be found for the purpose.

Another important question - the question of cadres.

GORBACHEV. Who is preventing him from solving the cadre questions?

CHEBRIKOV. Well, each of us, a little bit. Such was the case with Dost, with the minister of defense, with supplementing the membership of the CC PDPA Politburo.

GORBACHEV. I thought that we gave Dost agreement on deciding these questions.

CHEBRIKOV. Then why is nothing being decided? We speak less about Afghanistan than we do about where will Dost work and where will the minister of defense be sent. Then it is necessary to give instructions to comr. Kryuchkov who is now in Kabul, not to avoid these questions in meetings with Najib, but to tell him directly that he must decide them as he finds necessary.

SHEVARDNADZE. Right now we are reaping the fruit of un-thought-out decisions of the past. Recently, much has been done to settle the situation in Afghanistan and around it. Najib has taken up leadership. He needs practical support, otherwise we will bear the political costs. It is necessary to state precisely the period of withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. You, Mikhail Serge'evich, said it correctly - two years. But neither our, nor Afghan comrades have mastered the questions of the functioning of the government without our troops.

After the trip to India, it would be expedient to invite Najib to Moscow. We must regard Afghanistan as an independent country and entrust Najib to make decisions independently. He wants to create a headquarters for the military command. Why should we hinder him?

I expressed hesitation concerning the replacement of Dost, as he is an experienced diplomat and has a wide cultural horizon. But nevertheless, if the first secretary of the PDPA believes that it is necessary to replace him, then we must give him the liberty to make the decision.

Arguments are being made as to who must accomplish the closing off of the borders - the army or state security organs? And this question must be decided by Najib, not by us.

Bearing in mind the prospects for future development in relations with Afghanistan, it is important to put stress on economic cooperation. Without this, our foundations there will be difficult in the future.

I support the proposition of Victor Mikhailovich [Chebrikov] on the importance of meeting with Najib.

GORBACHEV. We can give corresponding instructions to comr. Kryuchkov.

SHEVARDNADZE. Both comr. Kryuchkov and comr. Vorontsov are good people, but their discussions cannot replace meeting with the General Secretary.

GORBACHEV. Here, probably, Akhrome'ev S.F. hears about the organization of a headquarters for the military command of DRA and smiles. Would these headquarters really command our troops?

DOBRYNIN. We must give liberty to Najib. Two questions arise here. First—the idea of national reconciliation, and second—the political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan.

Karmal must be removed. But we must remember that through national reconciliation, not a single member of the CC PDPA Politburo supports Najib. There is no concept of such reconciliation.

GORBACHEV. The concept of settlement exists—we have established that—but in practice the problem is being resolved. Sergei Fedorovich, perhaps you will solve it?

AKHROME'EV [USSR dep. minister of defense]. No, it will not be possible to solve it.

DOBRYNIN. The question of the concept has not become the most important for the Afghan government. I come out in favor of receiving Najib in Moscow. Right now a message could be given to comr. Kryuchkov about the meeting with Najib. Let him tell Najib that he himself should make the decision concerning Dost, Karmal, but that this must be done without stirring up factionalism.

AKHROME'EV. Military actions in Afghanistan will soon be seven years old. There is no single piece of land in this country which has not been occupied by a Soviet soldier. Nevertheless, the majority of the territory remains in the hands of rebels. The government of Afghanistan has at its disposal a significant military force: 160 thousand people in the army, 115 thousand - in Tsarando and 20 thousand - in state security organs. There is no single military problem that has arisen and that has not been solved, and yet there is still no result. The whole problem is in the fact that military results are not followed up by political [actions]. At the center there is authority; in the provinces there is not. We control Kabul and the provincial centers, but on occupied

territory we cannot establish authority. We have lost the battle for the Afghan people. The government is supported by a minority of the population. Our army has fought for five years. It is now in a position to maintain the situation on the level that it exists now. But under such conditions the war will continue for a long time.

50 thousand Soviet soldiers are stationed to close off the border, but they are not in the position to close off all passages where cargo is transferred across the border. I repeat that we can maintain the situation at the current level, but we need to look for a way out and resolve the question, as Andrei Adre'evich [Gromyko] has said. We must go to Pakistan.

GORBACHEV. Why do you hinder Najib?

AKHROME'EV. He should not be building headquarters, but a state committee on defense. We allow him to make cadre changes.

VORONTSOV. A few words to continue the thought, just expressed by comr. Akhrome'ev S.F. Afghanistan is a peasant country (80 percent of the population are peasants). But it is exactly they who have least benefitted from the revolution. Over eight years of the revolution agricultural production has increased by only 7 percent, and the standard of living of peasants remains at pre-revolutionary levels.

By the acknowledgment of comr. Najib himself and a member of Politburo, comr. Zeray, in a conversation with me, the party "has still not reached the peasantry," land-water reform has turned out unsuccessful and has not been realized (now comr. Najib has already taken up to review from a more stability-of-life oriented perspective), the peasant has not received significant material benefit from the revolution. Even right now, in the words of comr. Zeray, when there are only 5 mln. people out of a population of 18 mln. under the control of the government (moreover, 3 mln. of them live in the cities and only 2 mln. in the country - this is no more the 300-400 thou. families), the party and the government have not inherited from the previous government precise plans on how to quickly raise the standard of living of these 300-400 thousand peasant households which are under the sphere of influence of the government.

By the declaration of the member of the Politburo responsible for the economy

and agriculture, comr. Zeray, "because of various reasons, the status of peasants in the government zone is in certain ways worse than in regions of counter-revolutionary activity." To the question of how this can be explained, comr. Zeray told me that "the regions under the control of the counter-revolution are better supplied with goods of first necessity (these goods are shipped there by contraband from Pakistan). A similar situation exists in Khost, Uruzgan, and other border regions. Sometimes a paradoxical situation arises when the peasants in regions under our control, said comr. Zeray, receive goods not from us, but from zones of gang-formation." Urgent measures are needed in this most important question - the improvement of the situation of peasants in the government zone.

Many members of PDPA leadership are without initiative, and have gotten used to waiting for recommendations from our advisors and have become sort of armless. It seems that our advisors in the beginning frequently "struck them on the arms."

Such is not comr. Najib. He creates the impression of a talented and decisive person. He must be given the opportunity to make decisions himself, only looking to make sure that because of his [inexperience] he does not amuse himself with secondary details. And he must have the opportunity to himself create his own "command" [or team].

GORBACHEV. In October of last year [1985] in a Politburo meeting we determined upon a course of settling the Afghan question. The goal which we raised was to expedite the withdrawal of our forces from Afghanistan and simultaneously ensure a friendly Afghanistan for us. It was projected that this should be realized through a combination of military and political measures. But there is no movement in either of these directions. The strengthening of the military position of the Afghan government has not taken place. National consolidation has not been ensured mainly because comr. Karmal continued to hope to sit in Kabul under our assistance. It was also said that we fettered the actions of the Afghan government.

All in all, up until now the projected concept has been badly realized. But the problem is not in the concept itself, but in its realization. We must operate more actively, and with this guide ourselves with

two questions. First of all, in the course of two years effect the withdrawal of our troops from Afghanistan. In 1987 withdraw 50 percent of our troops, and in the following [year] - another 50 percent. Second of all, we must pursue a widening of the social base of the regime, taking into account the realistic arrangement of political forces. In connection with this, it is necessary to meet with comr. Najib, and, possibly, even with other members of the CC PDPA Politburo.

We must start talks with Pakistan. Most importantly, [we must make sure] that the Americans don't get into Afghanistan. But I think that Americans will not go into Afghanistan militarily.

AKHROME'EV. They are not going to go into Afghanistan with armed forces.

DOBRYNIN. One can agree with USA on this question.

GORBACHEV. We must give instructions to comr. Kryuchkov to meet with Najib and give him an invitation to visit the Soviet Union on an official visit in December 1986.

It is necessary to also tell comr. Najib that he should make key decisions himself.

Entrust comrs. Shevardnadze Eh.A. (roll-call), Chebrikov V.M., Sokolov S.L., Dobrynin A.F., Talyzin N.V., and Murakhovsky V.S., taking into account the discussion which took place in Politburo meetings, to coordinate, make operative decisions, and make necessary proposals on solving the Afghan question and settling the situation around Afghanistan.

POLITBURO MEMBERS. We agree.

The resolution is passed.

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 42, dok. 16; provided by M. Kramer; trans. by D. Rozas.]

**CPSU CC Politburo Decision of  
24 January 1989, with attached report  
of 23 January 1989**

Communist Party of the Soviet Union.  
Central Committee

Top Secret  
Special File

No. P146

To Comrades Gorbachev, Ryzhkov,  
Chebrikov, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev,  
Iazov, Murakhovsky, Kriuchkov

Excerpt from Protocol No. 146 of the  
meeting of the Politburo of the CC CPSU  
of 24 January 1989

Question of the Ministry of the Foreign  
Affairs USSR, Ministry of Defense  
USSR, Committee of State Security USSR

To agree with the understandings set forth  
in the note of Comrades Shevardnadze E.A.,  
Yazov D.T., and Kryuchkov V.A. of 23 Janu-  
ary 1989 (attached)

Secretary CC

[attached] to article VI protocol #146

Top Secret  
SPECIAL FILE

CC CPSU

On the measures pertaining to the  
impending withdrawal of Soviet forces  
from Afghanistan

In the difficult situation characterizing the state of affairs in Afghanistan, one can increasingly feel the inner tension stemming from the impending withdrawal of the remaining units of Soviet troops. The attention of the regime and the forces of the opposition is totally focused on 15 February, when, in accordance with the Geneva accords, the term of stay of our military contingent must end. In addition, the given timetable for Kabul is even more constraining, as the last Soviet military units must leave the Afghan capital in the beginning of February.

Practically throughout the entire country, military engagements between the government forces and the opposition continue to take place, in the course of which the government has essentially been able to maintain its positions, although with the help of Soviet aviation. The enemy has thus been unable to capture Jalalabad, Kunduz, and Kandahar. However, everyone understands that the main battle is still ahead. Currently the opposition has even decreased its military activity somewhat, saving up its forces for the coming period. Comr. Najibullah believes that it is intent on expanding its activities simultaneously in several key directions after the withdrawal of Soviet forces.

It should be emphasized that the Afghan comrades are seriously worried as to how the situation will turn out. In general, their resolve to resist the enemy is strengthening; they are taking a number of emergency measures and trying to arrange more rationally the forces that are available. To a certain extent, the Afghan comrades are counting on the continuation of their contacts with a fairly significant number of commanding officers within armed detachments of the enemy, on the strong disagreements which continue to exist within the opposition, and on the incompatibility of some of its leading political groups, in particular the "Islamic Association of Afghanistan" ([Burhanuddin] Rabbani) and the "Islamic Party of Afghanistan" ([Gulbuddin] Hekmatyar). Armed clashes between detachments of these and other opposition groups are not just continuing, but are taking on wider proportions as well.

The president is even closely examining such a possibility as declaring martial law or taking other extraordinary measures in the country, thinking that this may facilitate the adoption and execution of difficult decisions in the critical period ahead. At first he was leaning towards implementing martial law in our presence, but in the course of the discussions with him that have taken place, he arrived at the conclusion that this would best be done after the Soviet forces have left Afghanistan.

The Afghan comrades express their understanding of the decision to withdraw Soviet forces and affirm it once again, but, in conjunction with this, having soberly assessed the situation, point out that they cannot manage completely without our military assistance. Such assistance, in their opinion, could be rendered in forms different from today's and on a limited scale, but, nevertheless, would be a serious support both practically and psychologically. The Afghan comrades believe that if, after the withdrawal of Soviet forces, the opposition is unable to capture the principal centers in a swoop, then the Peshawar "alliance of seven" and the Teheran "union of eight" will have to enter into negotiations with Kabul to work out the future government arrangement in Afghanistan, which they steadfastly refuse to do at this time. The most important thing, emphasize the Afghan friends, is to hold out for at least the first three-four months after the departure of the Soviet

forces, after which the situation may gradually begin to shift to their advantage. Such an opinion is borne out by some remarks made by representatives of the opposition, in the course of contacts with Soviet representatives in Islamabad. By these remarks it was implied that if the government of Najibullah holds out, they will re-examine their current position of not recognizing it in the capacity of a negotiating partner.

In the given situation there arise for us a number of difficult elements. On the one hand, our departure from decisions, which have been made and announced, to complete the withdrawal of our forces on 15 February may cause us extremely undesirable complications in the international arena. On the other hand, there is no assurance that shortly after our departure there will not arise a very serious danger to the regime that, throughout the world, is associated with us. Especially since the opposition, during the decisive period, may well manage to coordinate its actions for a given time, which is what the American and Pakistani military circles have been persistently urging them to do. Certain apprehensions also arise due to the fact that there is still no real unity within the PDPA, and factional, tribal, and other disagreements remain. Impulsiveness and memories of past "injustices" are transparent in the thinking of some Afghan leaders. Feeble, to say the least, are the actions of prime minister M.H. Sharq and many ministers in his cabinet.

A most serious factor remains the fact that violations of the Geneva accords by Islamabad have acquired not just an open, but a flagrant character. Pakistani borderguards are directly participating in military operations on Afghan territory. Bombardments of bordering regions of Afghanistan are taking place, arms flow continuously, and armed bands are crossing over from Pakistan. As before, the headquarters of the Afghan opposition parties, their training centers and bases continue to function unimpeded in Peshawar and other cities. All of this is done by inertia [concerning policies] established under Zia-ul-Haq. It is unlikely that B[enazir]. Bhutto is in a position to change the situation in the near future.

Both we and Afghanistan have been continuously, in a decisive manner, and citing concrete facts, condemning and continue to condemn such actions of the Pakistani government. Such a line is meant to be con-

tinued also in the future, including in the UN Security Council as well as in contacts with the Pakistani government itself.

1. The chief question on which depends the continuing evolution of the situation boils down to this: will the government be able to maintain Kabul and other large cities in the country, though above all the capital? The situation in Kabul is difficult; indeed, the main problems are not even military, but economic. It is very clear that the opposition plans to organize an economic blockade of Kabul, close off its supply of foodstuffs and petroleum products, and provoke discontent and even direct insurgence of the populace. Already, such a blockade is virtually being carried out by the forces of the opposition in the form of highway robberies and intimidation and bribery of drivers of Afghan ground-based freight vehicles destined towards Kabul. It should be pointed out that the present complications with flour and foodstuffs in general in Kabul are to a significant degree related to the fact that the directive to inflict defeat on Ahmad Shah, whose detachments present the greatest threat to the road between Kabul and Hairaton, was not carried out when the time was ripe.

At the present time, just the monthly requirement of flour in Kabul is around 15 thou. tons. Recently, several thousand tons of flour were delivered by Soviet motor and air transport. However, it is imperative to have stored provisions for at least 2-3 months, which would be controlled by the President and which would give the Afghan friends the possibility of feeling secure in this matter.

Since such large stores can be created only with the help of motor transport, we are talking about getting flour and other foodstuffs through the Hairaton-Kabul highway. In the words of comr. Najibullah, if the road remains functionally secured until May, the survival of the regime is guaranteed. Evidently, the Afghan friends will not be able to secure the normal functioning of the road without our help. We must proceed from the fact that a break in the functioning of the Hairaton-Kabul highway cannot be allowed. In addition, special attention will have to be paid to the most vulnerable section of the highway, which is the Salang pass with its more than three kilometer-long tunnel.

In preparation for the delivery of such

assistance it is necessary, during the remaining time, to intensify through all channels the condemnation of the actions of the opposition, which is obstructing the delivery of foodstuffs to Kabul and other large Afghan cities; moreover, one should lay stress not on the fate of the present government, but on the situation of the population of these cities, which is seriously suffering as a result of such barbarous actions.

In principle, it is possible to consider the following scenarios:

First scenario. Citing the difficult situation of the civilian population, leave one division, i.e. approximately 12 thou. people, on the Hairaton-Kabul highway. The given scenario is hardly desirable, as a question may arise at the UN that we did not completely withdraw our forces. Despite the fact that Pakistan is not fulfilling its obligations under the Geneva accords, one may assume that the majority of countries in the UN would not support us because, for many, the question of the military is at the crux of the problem.

Second scenario. Citing the threat of starvation in Kabul and other cities, appeal to the UN to urgently provide a shipment of foodstuffs and petroleum products to the cities and send the UN troops to maintain the highway in operation. Until the arrival of the UN forces, leave our military subdivisions in these positions to carry out strictly humanitarian functions - provide the population with foodstuffs and petroleum products. In conjunction with this, affirm that the withdrawal of the Soviet military contingent has taken place. Announce that, after the arrival of the UN forces, our subdivisions will immediately return to the Soviet Union.

However, this scenario is practically unfeasible, since the deployment of UN forces requires a decision of the Security Council, on which we cannot depend.

Third scenario. Withdraw all troops by 15 February, as planned; affirm this in the international arena with pronouncements by the governments of USSR and the Republic of Afghanistan. Then, under the request of the Afghan government with which it will appeal to the countries of the world, begin the escort of convoys of civilian cargo with the apportionment of Soviet military units for their defense. The escort of such convoys could start within approximately two weeks after the withdrawal of Soviet

troops. Prior to this time, create a widespread general opinion with condemnations of the actions of the opposition, which is sentencing the population of Afghan cities to death from starvation. With the backdrop of such general opinion the escort of convoys by our units would appear to be a naturally humanitarian step. In addition, under this scenario, a number of sections of the road would have to be surmounted with a fight each time.

Fourth scenario. Withdraw almost all Soviet troops by February 15. Officially affirm the withdrawal of the Soviet military contingent in a corresponding statement. But, under the pretext of transferring some posts on the Afghan Side of the Hairaton-Kabul highway, leave Soviet units in some of the more important points, including in the Salang pass. Avoid creating much noise, on our part, about this action; note only that this is but a small number of Soviet military personnel who were slightly delayed by the fact that the Afghan side has not yet taken over from them the stated posts. After some time, as in the third scenario, begin escorting convoys to Kabul under our military protection.

Under all these scenarios we can begin with the fact that these operations would be undertaken by our regular units, but they must be formed on a volunteer basis, primarily from among military personnel who are serving out their duties in Afghanistan or those that have served their term and are now in Soviet Union. In conjunction with this, offer a salary of 800-1000 rubles per month, partially in Afghan currency, for the rank-and-file and significantly increase the officers' salaries as well.

Give international observers the right - and announce this widely - to verify whether we are actually escorting civilian goods. In the nearest future, talks should be held with the UN Special coordinator of humanitarian and economic assistance programs Aga Khan with the aim of using these programs and the mechanism of the Special coordinator in order to counteract the extremists' plans to stifle Kabul and other large Afghan cities with an economic blockade.

In the talks with Aga Khan it should be suggested that UN convoys of foodstuffs, petroleum products, and medical supplies go not only through Pakistan, but, to a significant extent, through Soviet Union.

In all of the four enumerated scenarios it is intended that at least an insignificant number of Soviet troops is to be left behind after 15 February 1989.

There still remains to be examined yet another, fifth, scenario - Soviet forces are withdrawn completely before 15 February, but we give the Afghan Side additional assistance, including financial, in the organization of the defense of the Hairaton-Kabul highway using their own forces, up to the point of completely providing for these Afghan units for a determined time-period, though, undoubtedly, this would be tied to considerable difficulties, especially in ensuring a dependable convoy escort.

As for the Kabul airport, keeping in mind its importance, it is expedient to have there, with the conclusion of corresponding agreements with the Afghan Side, our own control tower staff, numbering up to 100 people.

2. From the side of the Afghan government a question has been raised concerning the continuation of air assaults and bombardments of the armed opposition forces carried out by Soviet aviation from our territory after the withdrawal of Soviet troops. The difficulty of this question is being explained to the Afghan comrades; they are being advised to think about how to make better use of the capabilities of their own aviation under the new circumstances. On the whole, our explanations have been received with understanding, but, at the same time, they say that in some of the more critical situations, the use of Soviet aviation may be simply indispensable. It appears that this question cannot be examined without taking into account all the internal and external factors.

3. The Afghan Side assigns serious significance to having at its disposal such powerful types of weapons as the R-300 rockets and batteries of "Hurricane" multi-rocket launchers. These questions evidently require a differentiated approach to this or another type of weapon, but the general line should be directed, inasmuch as is possible, towards a more complete satisfaction of Afghan requests. It should be kept in mind that the very fact of possessing such types of weapons would strongly reinforce our friends psychologically and give them confidence in their forces. Taking this into account, batteries of "Hurricane" have already been set up in the Special Guards and the

RA [Republic of Afghanistan] army. The R-300 rocket batteries, which are currently with the Soviet military contingent, may also be transferred to the Afghan Side after modifying them to an export model and after the preparation of Afghan personnel for use and maintenance of these units, which should be quickly carried out on our territory.

4. It would be expedient to positively decide the question concerning the use of the USSR border force capacities in the Afghan border zone, keeping in mind, however that the Soviet mobile border groups currently stationed there will not remain.

5. Lately, we have been doing quite a bit to give the Afghan friends economic assistance in accordance with exactly those difficulties that Afghanistan is in. This assistance, despite all kinds of difficulties with which both we and the Afghans met during its shipment and distribution, has without a doubt averted numerous undesirable turns in the situation's development.

Nevertheless, in view of the difficulty of the Afghan situation, we must once again very carefully re-examine the current economic processes which are of the utmost importance to its internal political situation. We must determine what can be done additionally to improve the Afghan economy which is in a critical state and, in effect, on the brink of ruin; we must give operational assistance to solve the acute problems which are arising, in particular through the shipments of foodstuffs and goods of first necessity to Kabul and various provinces of the country, including Badakhshan.

6. In conjunction with all these measures, it is necessary, as before, to continue giving the Afghan Side assistance in ironing out relations with the opposition in Pakistan, Iran, and Western Europe. We must pay attention to every nuance of the opposition's mood to catch the more suitable moments when we can use the necessary influence to split it, separating the "moderates" from the extremists. In particular, right now it is important to support the mission of the representative of the Secretary-General of the UN B. Sevan who has agreed to work towards the creation of a consulting panel for resolving the future government structure of Afghanistan.

Through our diplomatic channels, it will be necessary to take continuing steps in our work with all countries which are in one way or another connected to the con-

flict in Afghanistan.

Special attention should be paid towards supporting contacts with the Pakistani Side, using the upcoming talks involving the USSR minister of foreign affairs in Islamabad.

8. It is essential to carry on even more goal-oriented propaganda work concerning Afghanistan, for which all scenarios of developments in the Afghan situation must be thoroughly analyzed ahead of time. Of particular importance will be the securing of propaganda concerning the decision to introduce martial law in Afghanistan, if such is taken by President Najibullah.

E. Shevardnadze V. Chebrikov

A. Yakovlev D. Yazov V. Murakhovskii  
V. Kryuchkov

23 January 1989

#65/OS

20 copies

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 10, dok. 4; provided by M. Kramer; trans. by D. Rozas.]

**CPSU CC Politburo Decision,  
13 May 1989, with report by Zaikov-  
Shevardnadze-Yazov-Kryuchkov**

*Proletarians of the World, Unite!*

Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

No P158/6

To com. Gorbachev, Ryzhkov, Zaikov, Chebrikov, Shevardnadze, Yakovlev, Yazov, Baklanov, Belousov, Kryuchkov, Belyakov, Pavlov A., Falin

Excerpt from the protocol no. 158 of the session of the Politburo of the CC CPSU on 13 May 1989

On additional measures to influence the  
Afghan situation

1. To agree with considerations of com. Zaikov L.N., Shevardnadze Ed. Y., Yazov D.T., Kryuchkov V.A., reported in the memorandum of 12 May 1989 (attached)

2. For the Ministry of Defense of the USSR, the Committee on State Security [KGB] of the USSR, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR to take necessary measures for realization of the proposals in

the memorandum.

3. For the State commission of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on the military-industrial questions, the Ministry of Defense of the USSR together with corresponding ministries and agencies to decide urgently on the possibility of an increase of delivery of R-17 missiles and their combat divisions to Afghanistan [in the amount of] up to 10-12 units per day and to take appropriate measures for that.

SECRETARY OF CC

To point 6 of Protocol no. 158

Top Secret

CC CPSU

On additional measures to influence  
the Afghan situation

During the almost three months since the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the armed forces of the Republic manage to oppose the opposition supported by Pakistan, the USA, and Saudi Arabia. However, the enemy, who realises that its plans to overthrow the government of Najibullah may be in danger, does everything to increase its military pressure. It focuses on the seizure of Jalalabad in order to set up its "transitional government" and to lay siege to Kabul.

In view of preparations for a new massive assault on Jalalabad with a large involvement of the Pakistanis, all the way to the sending of Army formations camouflaged as "Malishi," we published a Declaration of the MFA USSR and undertook other measures of a preventive nature, including ones in covert channels.

Taking into account this development, it would be advisable to carry out a number of measures to bolster the government of the Republic of Afghanistan and to exert a constraining influence on the Afghan opposition and Pakistan.

1. Of special importance in the current situation is a constant display of powerful impact on the enemy by combat fire, its further intensification, the use of the most effective types of weaponry. In this regard, we should search for additional reserves to accelerate delivery of armaments and ammunitions into Afghanistan, particularly the

armament like R-17 missiles, air-defense equipment, and others.

2. The question about conducting bombing raids by Soviet aviation from the territory of the USSR requires additional study.

3. We should continue demonstrative relocations of our aircraft from Soviet airfields near the border with Afghanistan, having in mind that these relocations should be done without any camouflage so that they could be observed by the Pakistanis and the opposition. [We should] continue further the flights of the Soviet military reconnaissance aircraft over Afghanistan, particularly in the areas of Jalalabad and Khost, possibly at lower altitudes, with the aim of obtaining aero-photographic data about military concentrations of the enemy.

4. With regard to the idea of Najibullah about sending foreign volunteers to Afghanistan to render assistance to the government of the Republic in the repulsing of aggression, there is nothing to object to, if the Afghan friends do this kind of work with a number of countries, particularly Muslim ones.

5. It is decided that we will continue a constant political-diplomatic campaign with the aim of influencing [public opinion] on the Afghan issue in the United States, Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and also insofar as one can use the capabilities of India, the Non-Aligned Movement. In particular, the Afghan theme will continue to be a focus in Soviet-American contacts. It is advisable to accept the proposal of Saudi Arabia to play a mediator's role between us and the Afghan opposition. We have in mind to take into account the anti-Afghan line of Pakistan in developing bilateral ties with this country.

L. Zaikov E. Shevardnadze D. Yazov  
V. Kryuchkov

12 May 1989

no. 390/os

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 89, per. 10, dok. 35; trans. by Vladislav M. Zubok.]

# US-Cuban Relations and the Cold War, 1976-81: New Evidence from Communist Archives

*Editor's Note: The Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union ended years ago, but it thrives in two places: on the Korean peninsula, where communist North confronts capitalist South across the 38th parallel in a tense armed standoff; and between the United States and Cuba, where Fidel Castro remains in charge almost four decades after the revolution he led came to power in 1959—still passionately committed to socialism and still the nemesis of Washington, which refuses to recognize and regularly lambasts his government. Even as such Cold War landmarks as the Bay of Pigs and Cuban Missile Crisis recede into history, relations remain as problematic as ever, and as likely to become entangled in U.S. domestic politics. Presidents from Kennedy to Clinton have maintained an economic embargo on and refused to establish diplomatic relations with the Castro regime, and given at least rhetorical support to a Cuban emigre community in the United States that openly calls for its overthrow. Havana, in turn, has regularly denounced Washington as an imperialist bully seeking to strangle, subvert, and topple the Cuban revolution.*

*The past year (1996) provided ample evidence that Cold War-era acrimony continues to flourish across the narrow straits separating Cuba and Florida, as exemplified by the enactment in the United States of the "Helms-Burton Amendment" (a controversial law, sharply criticized in Europe, designed to punish firms or individuals doing business with Cuba); the fatal shooting-down by a Cuban air force fighter of a plane piloted by a U.S.-based anti-Castro Cuban emigre group; and fervent anti-Castro declarations by both major presidential candidates in their election campaigns.*

*The translated East-bloc documents below, dealing with U.S.-Cuban relations during the Cold War period*

*of 1976-1981, thus constitute a source of potentially valuable insights both for historians and for analysts of current and future interactions between Washington and Havana. Although scholars (with few exceptions) still lack access to Cuban archives which might allow a more accurate and perceptive reconstruction of Cuban decisions, policies, and motives, the opening of other archives in the former communist world offer new opportunities to probe what was happening on "the other side" of the U.S.-Cuban impasse, and of Cold War events in which Cuba played a part. Elsewhere in this issue of the CWHIP Bulletin, for example, appear translations of Russian on the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and Russian and East German documents on the 1977-78 Horn of Africa events (as well as a rare instance of Cuban archival documents that **have** emerged, in this case relating to Havana's policies in Africa obtained by Prof. Piero Gleijeses).*

*All but one of the documents that follow were obtained from the Russian archives in connection with the "Carter-Brezhnev Project," a series of oral history conferences on U.S.-Soviet relations and the collapse of detente in the mid-1970s organized by the Center for Foreign Policy Development at Brown University in cooperation with the National Security Archive, the Cold War International History Project, and other academic and archival partner institutions. These documents, obtained from the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD) (the archival repository for records of the former Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1952-1991) and the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF), both in Moscow, include:*

*\* a background report on Cuban-American relations, 1976-1979, prepared by the Soviet Embassy in Havana in the spring of 1979;*

*\* a record of a June 1979 conversation between the Soviet ambassador to Cuba and Fidel Castro regarding the recently-held Vienna summit between Jimmy Carter and Leonid Brezhnev;*

*\* documents on the September 1979 "Cuban brigade" controversy, in which a political furor erupted in the United States over reports that a Soviet military brigade was stationed in Cuba; although the flap died down after it became evident that the Soviet force was a residual presence dating from the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis rather than a newly-deployed "combat" force (as some alleged), the episode side-tracked Congressional consideration of ratification of the just-signed SALT II treaty and exacerbated Soviet mistrust of the Carter administration;*

*\* a December 1979 analysis of current trends in U.S.-Cuban relations privately presented to the Soviet ambassador in Havana by the head of the responsible department of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee;*

*\* the transcript (provided by the Cubans to the Soviet Embassy in Havana) of a secret November 1981 meeting in Mexico City between U.S. Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and Cuban Vice President Carlos R. Rodriguez.*

*Of the Russian documents printed here, perhaps the Haig-Rodriguez transcript is the most surprising given the Reagan Administration's combative public stance toward Cuba at the time (when Haig, hinting at military action, said Washington should "go to the source" to stop Cuban support of leftist insurrections in Latin America). In their meeting, kept secret at the time, Haig and Rodriguez discussed current tensions in bilateral relations and also reviewed past disputes, such as the Cuban interventions in the Angola and Ethiopia crises examined elsewhere in this Bulletin. The Haig-Rodriguez encounter constituted a rare discussion*

between senior officials of the two countries, and is all the more remarkable in that it occurred precisely at a moment of acute tension between them. Alas, the accuracy of this Russian transcript and other details concerning the meeting are difficult to ascertain at the moment, since records on this meeting apparently remain secret in both the U.S. and Cuban archives.

Presenting commentaries on the Russian documents noted above are two scholars who have authored numerous works on U.S.-Cuban relations: **Peter Kornbluh**, Senior Analyst and Director of the Cuba Documentation Project at the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository located at George Washington University in Washington, DC; and **Jorge I. Domínguez**, Dillon Professor of International Affairs and Director of the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University and author of *To*

*Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy* (Harvard University Press, 1979).

In addition to the Russian documents, the translated materials include an excerpt from the East German transcript of a May 1980 summit meeting in Havana between Castro and the leader of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), Erich Honecker, in which Castro presents his version of the "brigade" controversy of the previous autumn and other aspects of East-West relations. This excerpt, as well as a Castro-Honecker conversation in East Berlin in April 1977 also excerpted in this issue of the Bulletin, are from a larger collection of records of Honecker-Castro conversations between 1972 and 1989 obtained from the SED archives in Berlin by **Christian F. Ostermann**, a doctoral candidate at Hamburg University currently based at the National Security Archive, who has also joined the Cold War International

History Project as Associate Director. Ostermann plans to analyze and present additional translated selections from the Honecker-Castro conversations in a future CWIHP publication.

Both the Russian and East German documents were obtained and translated via the collective efforts of the CFPD, the National Security Archive, and CWIHP. They and other declassified U.S. and East-bloc documents obtained by the Carter-Brezhnev Project are available for research at the National Security Archive, Gelman Library, 7th floor, 2130 H St. NW, Washington, D.C. 20037; e-mail: nsarchiv@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu; tel. (202) 994-7000; fax: (202) 994-7005. The collection is part of the Russian and East-bloc Archival Documents Database (READD), maintained by the Archive and CWIHP. READD hopes to include Cuban documents if and when the archives in Havana become accessible to scholars.—James G. Hershberg

#### USSR Embassy in Cuba, "Informational Letter on Contemporary Cuban-American Relations," 26 April 1979

EMBASSY OF THE USSR  
TO THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA

TOP SECRET

Copy No. 4

Ser. No. 223

26 April 1979

#### INFORMATIONAL LETTER ON CONTEMPORARY CUBAN- AMERICAN RELATIONS

Havana

1979

The process of relaxation in Cuban-American relations, which was abruptly interrupted in 1976, commenced anew with the election of Jimmy Carter as president of the USA. The new American administration, by all appearances, is counting on the results of normalization in relations and expansion of trade with Cuba to restore certain positions in the economy and turn the country's difficulties to its own advantage. In this regard the question continues to surface regarding the possibilities inhering in a prospective "break" between Cuba and the USSR.

A large influence in the change of Carter's policies has been contributed by an

influential group of individuals in his close circle ([U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations] A. Young, [Democratic Senator from South Dakota] G. McGovern and others), who believe that the normalization of relations represents greater opportunities for the United States to neutralize the policies of Cuba toward Africa and Latin America.

As part of the new approach, the Americans have come out with official pronouncements about their readiness to commence discussions with Cuba on the problems existing between the two countries "without preliminary conditions." The Carter administration has also taken practical steps to reduce tensions in relations. Flights over Cuban territory by reconnaissance aircraft have been terminated; several measures have been undertaken to bring a halt to terrorist activity of Cuban revolutionaries on USA territory; and the prohibition of travel to Cuba has been relaxed. USA authorities have begun to warn the Cubans about hostile activities being planned by Cuban emigres, and a number of their participants have been arrested and prosecuted in the American courts.

The Cuban government has adopted a wait-and-see attitude, although in general it has reacted positively to these USA gestures. In a series of public statements, and also in the course of meetings with American senators and congressmen arriving in Havana during this period, Fidel Castro has indicated

the readiness of Cuba in principle to improve relations with the United States, and as a mandatory condition has put forward the demand for an end to the economic blockade.

In early 1977, both countries undertook practical steps toward the goal of improving relations. In March, at the initiative of the Americans, the first direct negotiations at the level of deputy foreign ministers since the interruption of diplomatic relations took place in New York. In April, in Havana, agreements were signed concerning fishing rights within the 200-mile zone along with preliminary agreements on delimitation of the maritime economic zone. At the initiative of the Americans, interest sections have been opened in the embassy of Switzerland in Havana and the Republic of Czechoslovakia in Washington. American citizens with families living in Cuba have been granted the right for their families to visit the United States.

In late 1977, the policy of Cuba in Africa, in particular its international assistance to Ethiopia, put the brakes on the process of normalizing relations with the USA. However, in spite of threatening pronouncements in the press and from an array of congressmen concerning the Cuban military presence in Ethiopia, the USA administration refrained from exerting serious pressure on Havana and attempted to preserve the conditions for dialogue. In December 1977, at

the behest of Carter, Representatives F. Richmond and R. Nolan visited Cuba and expressed to Castro the president's concern in connection with the "growing Cuban intervention" in Ethiopia. In February 1978, the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs S[antiago]. Roel Garcia, secretly visited here at the instructions of President L[opez]. Portillo and conveyed to Castro an oral message from [U.S.] Vice President [Walter] Mondale expressing the concern of the American government about the presence of Cuban troops in Ethiopia. Through the intercession of Portillo, the position of principle held by Cuba on this question was communicated to Carter. It was represented that, in the case of necessity, the Cuban military specialists located in Ethiopia would take part in military operations only on the territory of that country.

In May 1978, during the course of the well-known events in the Zairian province of Shaba, which the Americans attributed to the Cuban presence in Africa, Fidel Castro met with the head of the American Interests Section in Havana, L[yle]. Lane, and through him transmitted to Carter an oral message in which he emphasized that Cuba "has no ties whatsoever" to the events in Shaba.

The USA government attempted to diminish the tensions arising in relations between the two countries during late 1978 in connection with the propaganda campaign in the USA centering around the issue over the supply of Soviet MiG-23 fighters to Cuba. In Havana, during a closed meeting between Fidel Castro and representatives of the Carter administration, the latter attempted to justify the resumption of flights over Cuba by USA reconnaissance aircraft on the grounds that the appearance of the MiG-23's had provoked significant anxiety in the United States and that the president had been forced to adopt a "position which would permit him to assure the American people that everything was being done to ensure the security of the country." The Americans also declared that the training of naval forces taking place off the Cuban coast was being carried out in the traditional region and was not being directed against Cuba. The Cuban side took this explanation under advisement.

Notwithstanding the developments outlined above, a certain amount of progress continued in connection with several specific questions regarding bilateral relations. In late 1977, in connection with the expiration of the temporary agreement on the delimitation of the maritime economic zone, the Americans proposed to conduct new negotiations. In December an agreement

was struck that conclusively strengthened the maritime boundaries between the two countries. In January 1978, an agreement was reached between the coast guards of the two countries calling for the rendering of assistance to vessels in distress in the Straits of Florida, common efforts against the trafficking of narcotics, and a halt to terrorist activity by Cuban counterrevolutionaries on USA territory.

The Cubans were permitted to open accounts in American banks, which was necessary, in part, for normal operation of the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, which was also granted the right to transmit consular payments to Havana. Cuban emigres, living on USA territory, were permitted to send their relatives in Cuba up to 500 dollars every three months. American tourists visiting Cuba received the right to bring back into the United States goods having a value of up to \$100 per person.

In response to these "gestures" from the Carter administration, the Cuban government freed three Americans who were serving sentences for espionage activity (out of eight). Readiness was declared to favorably examine the question concerning the remaining Americans being detained under the condition that the USA, for its part, would release the Puerto Rican freedom fighters Lolita Lebron and her three comrades [imprisoned for involvement in a November 1950 assassination attempt against President Harry Truman]. American citizens with families located here were returning to the United States (in all about 250 individuals); and persons having dual citizenship were permitted to leave.

A policy of dialogue continued between the parties. Exchanges of opinions on a wide variety of issues concerning bilateral relations took place among contacts at various levels, including those during closed meetings in Atlanta (USA) in August and in Cuernavaca (Mexico) in October 1978. In this connection the Americans emphasized that the principal impediment to full normalization of relations was the Cuban military presence in Africa. From their part they undertook efforts to exert pressure on Cuba in this regard, and to obtain at least a partial withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and Ethiopia. In this connection, official representatives of the American administration declared in closed meetings that if Cuba sincerely desired an improvement in relations, then it must make "positive steps" in the areas of "vital interest" to the USA located in Africa and Puerto Rico. For example, to begin with, the withdrawal of forces from Angola and Ethiopia would lead to a readiness by the USA to examine the

question of lifting the ban on the sale of medicine and certain types of equipment for the nickel industry. They pointed out that the presence of Cuban forces in Africa and the possibility of their intervention in Zimbabwe and Namibia was causing anxiety in the USA and preventing the president from reaching a decision in respect to the economic blockade. The Americans attempted to attain assurances that Cuba would not intervene militarily in Zimbabwe and Namibia, and exhorted Cuba to support Western plans for a "peaceful settlement" of those problems.

In response to the Americans it was firmly declared that Cuba would not impose any preliminary conditions on the normalization of relations with the USA but would not back down on questions of principle relating to its foreign policy. It was further emphasized that the solidarity of Cuba with African and other countries, and the internationalist assistance rendered by it to Angola and Ethiopia, could not be the subject for negotiations with the USA. "We will withdraw our forces from there," Castro stated in discussions with the Americans, "when conditions of peace and security are achieved there. And this will be done on the basis of agreement with the governments of those countries, and not as the result of pressure exerted by the USA."

It was indicated further that Cuba did not oppose a peaceful political settlement to the problems of Zimbabwe and Namibia, but that it refused to bind itself in connection with its future policy in that region, considering that the racist regimes might undertake such provocations and aggressive actions against Angola as would "demand a response." At the same time it was emphasized that Cuba adhered to a constructive position and consistently therewith was in favor of a peaceful settlement to conflicts, including those arising among African countries. As an example, they pointed to the efforts previously undertaken by the Cubans to attain a peaceful resolution to the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia, and the assistance rendered by them in support of an improvement in relations between Angola and Zaire.

In the course of meetings with official representatives of the Carter administration, Castro emphasized that the principal impediment to the normalization of relations was the economic blockade and the presence of the American base at Guantanamo. He stressed that Cuba regarded as highly immoral the policy of utilizing a blockade as an "instrument of pressure and imposition of demands." It was stated to the Americans that the problems of Africa and Puerto Rico

were not related to the economic blockade and that Cuba would not conduct negotiations on those questions in exchange for its lifting. "Cuba," Castro emphasized, "is not China and is not Egypt. It has nothing in common with those countries which can be pressured or bought."

All the same, in the course of these contacts with the Cuban side an obvious degree of flexibility was demonstrated. A readiness was declared to include, in the general discussion of normalizing relations, as a condition to the lifting of the economic blockade, the issue of compensation for the nationalized property of Americans, claims for which were calculated at 1.8 billion dollars (considering interest at 6% for 18 years, that sum will almost double). The Americans were apprised that Cuba, in turn, has counterclaims for losses resulting from the economic blockade, and that only on this basis could negotiations on that theme be conducted.

The Cuban leadership has stimulated interest on the part of certain business circles in the USA in studying the possibilities of future trade and economic ties. The organization "Business International" conducted a seminar in Havana with the participation of leaders of major corporations from the USA, Japan, and several West European countries. It was made particularly apparent that the participants wielded broad influence in USA political circles and were in a position to exert pressure on Congress necessary from Cuba's perspective.

In late 1977, Cuban Minister of Foreign Trade M[anu]el Fernandez visited the USA at the invitation of the Council on East-West Trade. He attended a conference in Washington in which the leaders of more than 80 USA trade and industrial firms and representatives of the Commerce Department and State Department participated. The minister announced that in the event the economic blockade were lifted, Cuban-American trade could reach several hundred million dollars per year. Cuba would be interested in acquiring USA grain, feedstock resources, medicines, chemical products, light and heavy metals, construction materials, turnkey factories, miscellaneous equipment and other goods.

Groups of American business leaders and businessmen from the states of New York, California, and elsewhere, have visited Havana. The Cubans believe that there are American companies who are seriously interested in the conduct of business in Cuba. These companies are even prepared to waive their claims for compensation of their nationalized property.

Notwithstanding, the economic block-

ade continues to be maintained essentially in its entirety. The prohibition on exports of American goods, imports of Cuban products, issuance of commercial and financial credits to Cuba by governments and private financial institutions, and activity by banks of the USA and other countries containing American capital, accounts and dollars, continues in force.

At the same time, the USA has been forced to implement modifications in those aspects of its policy which had related to trade with Cuba by foreign countries. The ministries of finance, trade and state department have been permitted to issue licenses for transactions concluded with Cuba by companies of those countries which are controlled by American monopolies. They are able to export nonstrategic materials and import Cuban products. Exports to Cuba of goods from third countries containing up to 20% in components of American manufacture are also permitted.

On the other hand, subsidiaries of American monopolies located in third countries are not permitted to maintain accounts with Cuba in American dollars, to issue it credit for a period of more than one year, or to transfer technology.

In sum, according to data of the USA Interests Section in Havana, from October 1975 through January 1979 the USA Commerce Department has issued licenses to subsidiaries of American firms in third countries for the export of nonstrategic materials in the amount of 450 million dollars, although not all applications for export licenses have been realized, and the share of goods directly produced in the USA is not greater than 5-6%.

Licenses have been granted for such products as electric motors, industrial scales, tractors, light and heavy automotive equipment, equipment for the paper industry, pharmaceuticals, florescent lamps, herbicides, locomotives, textile machines, boilers, etc. Exports of navigational systems, computers, communications, electrical distribution equipment, construction machinery, electronic experimental equipment and so forth, are prohibited. Up to 50% of applications for the issuance of licenses have been granted to subsidiaries of American companies located in Canada and Argentina.

It should be borne in mind that a lifting of the economic blockade would not automatically result in the development of trade between the two countries. Cuba would first of all have to comply with the provisions of the USA Trade Act of 1974 requiring it to guarantee the right to emigrate from the country and to conclude bilateral trade agreements. Failing this it will

not be granted most favored nation trading status, nor will it be eligible for credits from the Export-Import Bank or the USA Commercial Credit Corporation. Without such status, products for Cuban export will be subject to high customs tariffs (for example, cigars at \$4.50 per pound plus 25% of their value).

The USA has attempted to apply the provisions of the embargo to imports of Cuban nickel by Japan, Italy, and France. These governments have been informed that the USA will not permit the import of special steels using Cuban nickel. At the same time, in the course of Cuban-American contacts in 1977-78, according to data provided by "Business International Cooperation," five leading USA nickel companies announced their interest in cooperation with Cuba after the lifting of the economic blockade in the sphere of nickel production and trade.

A new and recent significant step in Cuban-American relations is the decision of the Cuban government to release more than three thousand political detainees (not less than 400 persons per month) on the condition that they go to the United States; and to permit the departure of Cubans wishing to reunite with their families abroad and visits by Cuban emigres to their relatives. This decision, adopted on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of the domestic situation regarding emigration, marks a fundamental reexamination of the previous policy on that question. At the negotiations which took place in Havana in November and December of 1978 with representatives of the Cuban emigre community, Castro confirmed this decision and emphasized that up to 500 political detainees will be released each month. However, implementation will depend in the final analysis on a decision by the USA to admit them into the country.

In a closed meeting with representatives of the American administration in late 1978, Castro stated that the "primary factor" making possible the adoption of these decisions was the policy of the Carter administration, which had "ceased to encourage terrorist and subversive activity and intervention in the internal affairs of Cuba." This, in his words, had created a new environment, making possible a new approach to the emigration issue.

The United States turned out to be totally unprepared for Cuba's proposal, which scored a serious moral and political victory - the American administration was deprived of its trump card consisting of the supposed violation of human rights. The USA was confronted by the need for a response to the Cuban initiative. Moreover, the American

administration was subjected to strong pressure from representatives of the Cuban emigre community. Under the circumstances, the USA officially announced that it would accept all of the political detainees (up to 3,500 individuals), to be released at the rate of 400 persons per month, together with their families. In order to examine this problem, special commissions from the USA Justice Department came to Havana. In October 1978, the first group of political detainees and their families departed for the USA. This March, the Americans introduced a new simplified procedure for the issuance of visas to political detainees in order to facilitate the conditions for the admission into the USA of up to 400 persons every month.

In the beginning of this year, Cuban emigres began to arrive on visits to their relatives. According to accounts of friends, the number of such persons in 1979 will exceed 100,000 individuals. During the first three months of this year around 20,000 Cuban emigres have arrived.

The Cuban leadership understands the need to intensify its ideological work in the country relating to the new policy in connection with emigration. This question occupied an important role in presentations by Castro at the recent Seventh Plenum of the Central Committee of the party and at a national conference of party leaders last February. In accordance with conclusions reached by the Division of Revolutionary Orientation of the Central Committee of the party, measures have been worked out to neutralize the negative influence from a massive arrival of emigres for meetings with their relatives. Party organizations at all levels have been authorized to explain to the workers the basis for the present policy in relation to the Cuban emigre community.

Cuban-American contacts have achieved a definite development in the spheres of culture, science, and sport. The improvement of these contacts is serving as one of the methods for achieving a mutual understanding between the two countries, as well as an additional source for the receipt of hard currency. Thus, on the commercial front, the National Ballet of Cuba completed an extended tour of the USA in 1978. Its performances in Washington and New York were attended by around 100,000 spectators. The director of the ballet, A. Alonso, was elected as an honorary foreign member of the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts. Her essay on Cuban ballet was published in the USA.

Last year and again this year, the musical groups "Iraqueres," "Moncada," "Manguardi," "Los Papines," and "Aragon" toured in the United States, along with the

composer-performers A. Brouver, S. Rodriguez, P. Milyanez, and the singers T. Martinez, E. Burke and others.

American artists and choreographers participated in the Sixth International Ballet Festival in Havana. Last March, in the large concert hall here named after Karl Marx, three joint concerts by American and Cuban musicians and singers were held. They were attended by members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba C. R. Rodriguez and A. Hart, and by member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the party A. Peres Efferá.

Cuban Minister of Culture A. Hart had discussions in Havana with the vice president of the firm "Columbia Broadcasting Systems" about the possibility of releasing a recording of Cuban music in the USA.

In 1978, 35 film critics were invited from the USA. Based on their examination of Cuban films and meetings with colleagues, they published a series of positive materials in the American press about Cuban cinematography. This ensured the success of the Cuban Film Week, organized in Washington, New York, San Francisco, Chicago, and Los Angeles, which was attended by a delegation of cinematographers under the leadership of the director S. Alvarez. It met with leading representatives of the American cinema, as well as university students and professors.

An American rental company is now acquiring Cuban films for display in cinema houses and on television. The journal "Cuban Cinema" will be re-published in English in the United States. In 1978, 16 American films were purchased through an intermediary firm in Italy.

The first high school contacts have been established. Late last year, a delegation headed by Minister of Higher Education F. Vecino visited the United States. It visited eight universities and met with their deans, the Assistant Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, and a number of senators. At the invitation of F. Vecino, teachers from the Universities of Pittsburgh, Massachusetts and Minnesota this year visited Havana University and Central University, as well as polytechnic and agricultural institutes. An exchange of small groups of students for training in agricultural specialties has been proposed. The son of Senator McGovern is currently enrolled at the University of Havana.

Several contacts between scientific institutions are being worked out. Thus, the National Center for Scientific Studies is now receiving informational materials. The American side is offering Cuba assistance

in studying the application of solar energy for the cooling of industrial and residential buildings.

Last March, at the invitation of the Minister of Public Health H. G. Mundis, the USA Assistant Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, USA Surgeon General H. Richmond, was here. At a press conference he announced that he was favorably impressed by the development of public health in Cuba, especially the low rate of infant mortality and the degree of attention directed to health care among the adolescent population. During the course of negotiations, the Cuban side sounded out the possibility of purchasing pharmaceutical supplies in the USA. H. Richmond was received by Fidel Castro. Under the auspices of UNESCO, several Cuban medics are receiving on-the-job training in the USA.

An exchange of literature is taking place between Casa de las Americas in Havana and New York, nongovernmental organizations involved in cultural ties with Latin American countries. This year, the Vice President of the Cuban Institute of People's Friendship (ICAP) J. Gayardo visited the USA for negotiations with Casa de las Americas in New York over the organization of informational work at the local community level relating to real life circumstances in Cuba.

In April of this year, at the invitation of ICAP, for the eleventh time, 130 progressive young Americans visited Cuba as members of the "Venceremos" brigade, to become acquainted with the country and to participate in the sugar harvest.

Traditional annual Cuban-American boxing matches have been started up. This year American athletes participated in international meets in Havana in classical and free form competitions. It is expected that they will participate in the Brothers Barrientos international light athletic tournament.

An examination of the development in Cuban-American contacts permits the conclusion that the Cuban leadership is maintaining a firm position on the issue of normalizing relations with the USA, decisively rejecting attempts by the Americans to exert pressure on Cuba, and that Cuba will not yield on matters of principle relating to its domestic and foreign policy as a form of "payment" for the normalization of relations.

The Cuban leadership understands as well the negative consequences in the domestic ideological realm and the international arena that would be brought about by a full normalization of relations with the United States.

In this connection it may be assumed that contacts with the USA on a variety of levels, particularly in the spheres of cultural, scientific, and athletic ties, will continue and expand. Both sides are expressing interest in preserving the level of contacts already attained and in making further progress.

Considering the importance of the issue of Cuban-American relations in the context of the present and future interests of the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist bloc, and the desirability and necessity of receiving information about it from the Cubans, it would appear appropriate and fitting to continue an exchange of opinions with our Cuban friends on this problem, utilizing for this purpose joint visits and meetings of governmental and party leaders as well as responsible employees of the Foreign Ministries of the USSR and Cuba.

It is evident that special attention should be directed to an analysis of the conditions being put forward by the American administration for the normalization of relations with Cuba.

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR  
TO CUBA  
/s/ V.VOROTNIKOV

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 76, d. 828, ll. 1-13; translation by the Carter-Brezhnev Project; copy on file at National Security Archive.]

**Soviet Ambassador to Cuba V.I. Vorotnikov, Memorandum of Conversation with Fidel Castro, 25 June 1979**

From diary of V.I. Vorotnikov

TOP SECRET  
Copy No. 4  
Ser. No. 326  
4 July 1979

Record of Conference  
with First Secretary of the Central  
Committee of the Communist Party of  
Cuba and Chairman of the State Council  
and Council of Ministers  
of the Republic of Cuba,  
Comrade Fidel Castro Ruz

25 June 1979

We received a visit today from F. Castro at my request. Pursuant to instructions, I reported to him the results of the meeting and negotiations in Vienna between Secretary General of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR Comrade L.I. Brezhnev, and USA President

Jimmy Carter.

1. Having listened closely to me, Castro expressed his gratitude for the information "which," he said, "is extremely important and interesting, and represents a synthesis of the Soviet Union's appraisal of the points of the Vienna conference which, judging from its achievements, was a convincing success of Soviet foreign policy and personally for Comrade L.I. Brezhnev. I will send a congratulatory telegram to Comrade Brezhnev, the text of which will also be published in the national press," Castro stated.

As the discussion continued, Castro touched upon the events taking place in Nicaragua and the results of the latest conference of the OAS [Organization of American States] in Washington, which he described as the latest in a series of crippling defeats suffered by American imperialism in the Western hemisphere. In his words, that meeting of the OAS demonstrated with complete clarity that today ever more Latin American countries are exhibiting "disobedience" to the demands of the United States. He pointed out further that these issues will be the subject of discussion tomorrow during his meeting in Havana with the president of Venezuela [Luis Herrera Campins]. "I am certain," Castro declared, "that the Americans will not dare to intervene unilaterally in the affairs of Nicaragua, and that Somoza will eventually be required to leave."

2. At his own initiative, Castro raised the issue of a member of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, Comrade R. Valdes Vivo, recently removed from his duties, who had failed to discharge the functions entrusted to him and was unable to correctly and precisely fulfill his assigned task in a recent trip to a number of African countries.

"We assigned him a single and essential task - to inform several African leaders that we would be unable to render military assistance to them, and instead Valdes became distracted in the disposition of other problems which he did not have the authority to discuss. And this resulted in damage to our activities, and raised a host of doubts and false rumors not only among our Soviet friends, but among the Africans as well," said Castro. "We discussed the performance of Vivo extensively and acknowledged all of his past services, but we were unable to excuse his lack of discipline and disobedience in the execution of such important and sensitive assignments. This was the only correct decision. We have now appointed Jesus Montane Ordenez to the post of Manager of the General Division of In-

ternational Relations, an experienced, tested comrade, a serious, disciplined, thoughtful and, at the same time, personable individual," Castro explained.

From my part, in accordance with instructions previously conveyed, I once again assured him that, in Moscow, the activities of the Cuban government in Africa are regarded with complete confidence and that, in connection with the Rhodesian question and other issues, it is considered that the USSR and Cuba are acting in conformity and with a unity of purpose.

3. At the conclusion of the discussion, Castro informed me that the sugar harvest was almost complete but that, apparently, as a result of heavy rains, they would not succeed in reaping in this harvest the planned eight million tons of sugar. "There will be somewhere around 7.9 million tons or slightly more," he noted. Touching on the matter of the supply of Cuban sugar to the USSR and the delay already allowed for in that connection, Castro said, "I have discussed this matter with C.R. Rodriguez (who informed me about the letter from Comrade I.B. Arkhipov and your conversation with him), and with other Cuban comrades, and I am aware of your difficulty with the supply of sugar. We are doing everything we can," he said, "to stop the interruption and cure the shortfall in the July sugar supply, perhaps to some extent in August, but most likely a portion of the supplies (approximately 80 thousand tons) will be delayed until December." In this connection Castro emphasized several times that they will not permit a similar situation to recur.

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR  
TO THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA  
/s/ V. VOROTNIKOV

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 76, d. 833, ll. 40-42.]

**Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Vorotnikov, Memorandum of Conversation with Raul Castro, 1 September 1979**

From the journal of TOP SECRET  
Vorotnikov, V.I. Copy No. 3  
Original No. 393  
13 September 1979

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION  
with the second secretary of the CC CP of  
Cuba, deputy chairman of the State  
Council and Council of Ministers,  
minister of FAR [Revolutionary Armed  
Forces] of the Republic of Cuba

Raul Castro

1 September 1979

On September 1 Raul Castro visited the embassy. He anxiously described the extensive Western, primarily American, anti-Cuban media campaign, timed to coincide with the VIth conference of the heads of states and governments of non-aligned countries. The theme of the increased Soviet military presence in Cuba and the stationing there of ground troops was particularly exaggerated. What is being referred to specifically is an infantry brigade numbering 3,000 soldiers. In recent days American officials have supported this campaign. R. Castro noted the statement by the State Department spokesman Hodding Carter in which he dwelled on the supposedly "recent discovery of Soviet combat units in Cuba," and demands by Senators Stone and Church to conduct an investigation into the question of the Soviet military presence on the island. Furthermore, R. Castro recounted that on September 1 Wayne Smith, the new head of the USA Interest Section in Havana visited the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In his conversation with the deputy minister of foreign affairs of Cuba, P[elegrin]. Torras, he stated that he was authorized to convey the American government's "concern" about the "evidence" of the presence in Cuba of a brigade of Soviet troops. P. Torras replied that the Cuban side would not accept this line of questioning and that American diplomats are fully aware - although the USA fails to understand it - that Cuba is a sovereign state and should be addressed as such, or else it will be impossible to achieve mutual understanding between the two countries. W. Smith hastened to explain that he received instructions only to communicate "concern" and did not require an answer to his statement. He added that the State Department considered it inappropriate to react to the statements by Senators Stone and [Idaho Dem. Frank] Church through bilateral diplomatic channels, without recourse to public debate. The American diplomat also expressed his regret that his first meeting with P. Torras took place on this unpleasant occasion.

In connection with these actions by the USA and considering that this question could emerge at any moment at the Conference of the NAM [non-aligned movement], F. Castro authorized R. Castro to come to an agreement with the Soviet side on a possible reply. The Cuban leaders proposed the following reply: "For the past 17 years a symbolic Soviet combat unit, created as a training center where Soviet military specialists train officers of the FAR [Revolu-

tionary Armed Forces] to use and maintain new military equipment, has indeed been located in Cuba." R. Castro emphasized that they proposed this version out of principled convictions and experience with previous confrontations with Americans regarding the Soviet military presence on the island, and consider that we should not camouflage the real state of affairs but, at the same time, should not make a concession to the Americans, who could easily interpret attempts to negate the presence of a training center on Cuba as a repudiation by Cuba and the USSR of their right to create such a center and send necessary military personnel there. R. Castro added that the Americans have known about this brigade for a long time and that he was struck by the cynicism with which they affirm that it was "recently" detected. He also noted that they had no doubts that the VI conference of the NAM in Havana was one of the domestic and foreign policy reasons for the outbreak of the anti-Cuban campaign.

He further described the proceedings of the meeting of the foreign affairs ministers of the countries of the NAM. On September 1, by the end of the session, the agenda for the Conference of heads of states and governments was practically approved. The inclusion on the agenda of the problem of Western Sahara was the only point on which there was serious discussion. The representative from Morocco spoke against the inclusion of this topic on the agenda because he contended that this was a colonial issue, which had been decided under the auspices of the UN a long time ago, and in consequence of which an agreement with Spain et al. had been signed. Some countries supported him, however, they were in the minority; of the 31 delegations speaking out on this topic, only four urged that Western Sahara not be included on the agenda for the summit conference.

R. Castro considered the dinner given by F. Castro in honor of [Yugoslav leader] J.B. Tito on August 30 to be strictly a formality. The negotiations which took place between F. Castro and J.B. Tito on the next day, however, were useful in his view. The Non-Aligned Movement was unable to achieve mutual understanding on many issues, and on the issue of Kampuchea each leader merely stated his point of view. At the same time J.B. Tito's effort to avoid open confrontation with Cuba and other socialist countries was noticeable and the general tenor of the discussion was rather calm. In a private conversation with F. Castro, the Yugoslav leader tried to convince him that Yugoslavia's policies could not be considered anti-Soviet at all, and, in particular,

stated that he did not allow anti-Soviet books to be published in Yugoslavia, assuming he knew of their content in advance.

R. Castro also said that J. Tito's entourage, particularly, [Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milos] Minic, was noticeably more "cocky" in his approach to Cuba and the USSR, than he (Tito) himself. During the negotiations Minic tried to outdo Tito and give his own answer or make his own attempt to interpret Tito's words. Thus, for example, Tito agreed to publish a joint Yugoslav-Cuban communique in the press, but then Minic started saying that this would be difficult to accomplish, and as a result it was never drafted.

J. Tito also met with [Ethiopian leader] H. Mengistu. The latter openly posed a whole series of questions about Yugoslavia's policy towards the NAM; however, Tito evaded direct answers to them and talked his way around them with general arguments and appeals to maintain the unity of the Movement.

It still remains undecided whether or not J.B. Tito will speak at the opening ceremony of the Conference of heads of states and governments or during the working session. Yugoslavia claims that, since he is the only founder of the Movement who is still living, he should speak at the opening of the Conference. However, irrespective of how this will be decided, J. Tito will speak in any case, in all likelihood after F. Castro.

During the visit of the Minister of Defense of Nicaragua to the USSR, R. Castro emphasized again that improving military cooperation is not an issue, and that they only intend to influence Bernardino L[arios]. Montiel on political and educational issues. R. Castro related that at one time F. Castro had advised the Sandinistas to appoint one of the former Somoza officers who went over to the revolutionary side as minister of defense. The front's leadership selected B.L. Montiel who gives the impression of an honest and candid individual, but who does not have any fixed political positions. He is mostly "for show"; the army is being built without his knowledge and all real power in this area belongs to the commander-in-chief of the people's Sandinista army, Humberto Ortega. B.L. Montiel senses this and tried to send in his resignation. To prevent his resignation and give him the appearance of authority, the leaders of the FSLN (Sandinista National Liberation Front) organized a trip to Cuba for the minister and asked for the cooperation of the Cubans in the organization of trips for B.L. Montiel to other countries. The first reaction of the Cuban friends was that it would not be appropriate for him to travel

either to the GDR or to the USSR. They said this to H. Ortega. He answered that he shares their fears, but explained Montiel current situation and said that he was already promised trips to Cuba, Arab states, and Europe, and once again affirmed that what was proposed was only an unofficial, private, exclusively "informational" visit. After this second request by H. Ortega, considering that they themselves suggested to the Sandinistas that they make the former Somoza officer defense minister, the Cuban leaders decided to turn to the Soviet side on this matter.

R. Castro also commented that the Nicaraguan foreign minister, Miguel D'Escoto, who was also in Cuba, was a former Jesuit priest, but apparently one of a small number of "red priests" in Latin America. He is educated and has a grasp of many issues, but his political views cannot be called clear and well-founded. However, he has conducted himself very well at the session of the OAS on Nicaragua and now at the conference of ministers of foreign affairs of the NAM in Havana. His appointment to the position of minister of foreign affairs of the FSLN also followed the advice of F. Castro to include several priests in the government. The minister of culture is a second priest in the government.

I thanked R. Castro for the information he conveyed.

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR  
TO THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA  
(V. Vorotnikov)

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 77, d. 833, ll. 63-67; trans. by Elizabeth Wishnick.]

**Minutes of CPSU CC Politburo  
Meeting, 27 September 1979 (excerpt)**

Top Secret  
Only copy  
Working Transcript

MEETING OF THE CC  
CPSU POLITBURO

27 September 1979

Chaired by Comrade BREZHNEV, L.I.  
Attended by Coms. Grishin, V.V., Kosygin, A.N., Suslov, M.A., Ustinov, D.F., Chernenko, K.Y., Demichev, P.N., Ponomarev, B.N., Solomentsev, M.S., Tikhonov, N.A., Gorbachev, M.S., Dolgikh, V.I., Zimianin, M.V., Kapitonov, I.V., Rusakov, K.V.

[. . .] 5. About a response to the President of

the USA regarding the issue of the Soviet military personnel in Cuba

BREZHNEV. Last night Carter once again appealed to us via the hot line regarding the issue of the story they have dreamed up about the presence of our military brigade in Cuba. There is nothing new in the message. We informed Com. Gromyko, who is conducting negotiations with Vance, about that.

Today com. Gromyko sent a rough draft of a response to that telegram.

I think that we must assign the same commission to urgently and attentively review, and if necessary, rework this draft, after which, as Com. Gromyko suggests, having agreed with Fidel, we will send our response to Washington, to Carter.

The comrades are familiar, evidently, with the draft. The telegram was distributed.

KOSYGIN. I agree with the draft response, but with a minor editorial correction. I would strike three [sic—trans.] words: "...and to be ruled by cold reason."

BREZHNEV. Comrades Aleksandrov, A.M. and Ponomarev, B.N. also have corrections.

ALEKSANDROV. I would like to suggest beginning the text of the letter with the following: "First of all, I must openly tell you, Mr. President, that we are extremely surprised by the openly hostile to the Soviet Union campaign which has been launched in the USA with the active participation of the Administration, for which the United States has absolutely no real reasons and no legal basis. It seems to us that the only result of the swelling of this artificially created campaign can be a real loss to the relations between our countries and to the stability of the peace, the importance of which we discussed in Vienna."

BREZHNEV. Com. Ponomarev, B.N. also supports this proposal.

If the comrades have no other remarks, then let us approve the text of this letter taking into account the proposed corrections and send it for agreement with Com. Castro. And if no remarks arrive from Com. Castro, then it follows that we should send the letter to Carter via the hot line.

RUSAKOV. Perhaps it is necessary to assign the MFA to prepare a text of information on this issue for the leadership of the brother parties of the socialist countries, with the exception of Romania.

BREZHNEV. If there are no more remarks, let us accept such a resolution.

ALL. We are agreed.

[Source: *APRF*, f. 3, op. 120, d. 42, ll. 335,

339-40; translation by Mark Doctoroff.]

**CPSU CC Politburo Decision, 27  
September 1979, with Brezhnev-Carter  
Hotline Correspondence**

*Proletariats of all countries, unite!*  
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.  
CENTRAL COMMITTEE  
TOP SECRET

No.P169/V

To Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin, Andropov, Gromyko, Suslov, Ustinov, Ponomarev, Rusakov.

Extract from protocol No. 169 of CC CPSU Politburo session of 27 September 1979

About a response to the President of the USA regarding the issue of the Soviet military personnel in Cuba

1. Approve the draft of Com. Brezhnev, L.I.'s response to the President of the USA J. Carter on the given issue (attachment 1). Send this response after coordinating it with Com. F. Castro. Transmit the response via the direct line Moscow-Washington.

2. Affirm the draft instructions to the Soviet Ambassador in Havana (attachment 2).

3. Assign the MFA USSR and the [General] Department CC CPSU to prepare a draft of information for the leadership of the fraternal parties of the Socialist countries (except Romania) taking into account Com. Gromyko's conversations with C. Vance in New York and in accord with the exchange of opinions which has taken place in the Politburo, and submit it to the CC CPSU.

CC CPSU SECRETARY

15-ke  
ob

[attachment 1]

Re: Point V, Prot. No. 169  
Top Secret

Attachment 1

Dear Mr. President,

My colleagues and I have familiarized ourselves with your appeal.

First of all, I must openly tell you, Mr. President, that we are extremely surprised

by the openly hostile to the Soviet Union campaign which has been launched in the USA with the active participation of the Administration, for which the United States has absolutely no real reasons and no legal basis. It seems to us that the only result of the swelling of this artificially created campaign can turn out to be a real loss to the relations between our countries and to the stability of the peace, the importance of which we discussed in Vienna. We are sorry that despite it all you maintain the made up version of the Soviet military unit which is supposedly located in Cuba.

My advice to you: drop this version. We have a military training center in Cuba, which has existed there for more than 17 years. It carries out its training functions in accord with an agreement with the Cuban government. It does nothing more and can do nothing more. You can be entirely calm about that. In a conversation with A.A. Gromyko, Secretary of State C. Vance, himself, also remarked that the Soviet Union had done nothing which contradicts the 1962 agreement, and the Soviet military personnel which is stationed on Cuba does not present any sort of threat to the United States.

(I repeat, there is a military training center in Cuba; it will exist. We do not have any intention of changing its status as such a center. We are informing you of this in order to show good will, since this entire issue relates entirely and exclusively to the competence of two sovereign states — the Soviet Union and Cuba.)

[Along the margins of the above paragraph the following is written: "Conditional, taking into account the possible opinions of F. Castro."]

But if that which is going on now in the United States around this issue is an attempt which is motivated by some other considerations, then we can only express our regret about that.

It seems to us that any sort of other thoughts should recede before the significance of the Soviet-American relations, in which now the important place is occupied by the Treaty on Limitation of Strategic Arms (SALT-2).

Let us, Mr. President, proceed from the results of the exchange of opinions on the key issues of Soviet-American relations and problems of world politics which we had in Vienna and which I value highly.

In general, Mr. President, I wanted to tell you one thing: it makes sense to remove this artificially contrived issue without spoiling the atmosphere, showing restraint and consideration.

I think that such an approach would

correspond to our mutual interests.

With respect.

L. BREZHNEV

27 September 1979

[attachment 2]

Top Secret

HIGH STATE MATTER

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USSR/USA

251448E

-P.1-

Dear Mr. President,

I am sending this message, sincerely hoping that you and your colleagues will favorably regard the constructive proposals aimed at resolving the new problem which has arisen in the relations between us, which Secretary Vance made to Minister Gromyko. The presence in Cuba of a brigade of Soviet troops, which we consider to be combat troops, causes deep and serious concern on the part of the American government and American society. This concern was not caused artificially. The quickest possible resolution of this problem by mutual agreement will prevent the unfavorable development of our mutual relations and will allow both our countries to continue the course toward which we are striving—to broaden the bounds of American-Soviet cooperation.

Mr. President, both you and I have worked intensively—you longer than I—to achieve an agreement on SALT-2. It would be a tragedy for our countries if this work for peace would be today threatened as a result of the fact that both our governments could not resolve the problem which has caused on one side a feeling of deep concern.

On parting in Vienna, we agreed to openly inform each other when necessary, and I am writing to you specifically in the spirit of that openness and our common adherence to the establishment of more stable mutual relations.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

His Excellency James E. Carter  
President of the United States of America  
The White House, Washington

LINES OF DIRECT COMMUNICATION,  
KREMLIN COMMITTEE of STATE SECURITY OF THE USSR

TRANSLATION

Copy of Issue No. 93/2 of No 1

25 September 1979

ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT  
COMMUNICATIONS TRANSLATED

Pages

Special Center for Lines of Direct Communication in the Kremlin

6:25 P.M. 2

Telephone numbers: PATS 44-82

TRANSLATOR [illegible]

[Source: APRF, f. 3, op. 89, d. 69, ll. 128-30  
134-45; translation by M. Doctoroff.]

**Conversation between Soviet Ambassador to Cuba A.S. Seletskii and Jose Antonio Arbesu, Head of the USA sector of the Cuban Communist Party Central Committee, 27 December 1979**

FROM THE JOURNAL  
OF SELETSKII A.S.

SECRET

Copy No. 3

Issue No. 2

"03" January 1980

RECORD OF CONVERSATION  
with the head of the U.S. sector  
of the Americas Department of the CC of  
the Communist Party of Cuba Jose  
Antonio Arbesu

27 December 1979

In the conversation at the CC of the Communist Party of Cuba J.A. Arbesu presented some considerations concerning current Cuban-American relations.

The USA policy in the question of normalization of relations with Cuba is determined by two main factors: their military-strategic interests, and the domestic situation, said Arbesu. At the same time, from the military-strategic point of view, there are two policy lines in the USA leadership now: the line of the National Security Council, and the line of the State Department. Thus, Brzezinski thinks that Cuba, "as a result of its economic dependence on the Soviet Union," does not have its own foreign policy, that it is a "Soviet satellite", and that therefore, there is no sense in talking to Cuba. All the questions concerning, for example, the Cuban actions in Africa or in Central America should be discussed with the Soviet Union so that it would "put the needed pressure on Cuba."

The USA State Department takes a different approach in relation to Cuba. They believe that in spite of all those things, the questions concerning Cuba should be discussed with Cuba itself, not with the USSR.

In the last several months Brzezinski line took over in the American leadership, said Arbesu; and that had a negative effect not only on USA-Cuban relations but also on their policy to Latin America in general. The USA instigated the well-known "microcrisis" concerning the presence of the Soviet military training center in Cuba, renewed reconnaissance flights over our territory, conducted provocative maneuvers on their base at Guantanamo and naval exercises near our coasts. All this led to the situation where now we have reached "the lowest point in our relations with the USA since Carter became President in 1977," mentioned Arbesu.

At the same time the State Department does not want to close the door completely, and has shown an interest in maintaining our contacts. American congressmen, businessmen, university professors continue to visit Cuba, though in smaller numbers, and our cultural and sports contacts continue. The State Department, mentioned my interlocutor, agreed to conclude an agreement between the coast guards of our two countries, and allowed our aircraft to fly to the USA, mostly to transport members of the Cuban community for visits with their relatives in Cuba. The Americans were supposed to ratify the agreement on fishing before the end of this year. However, since the USA Congress is currently in recess, the agreement would probably be approved by the USA government with the subsequent ratification by the Senate.

The "gestures" made by the American side toward Cuba earlier remain in force, said Arbesu. Thus, our Interest Section in Washington was allowed to have accounts in American banks, which is necessary for its normal functioning, and to transfer the consular fees to Havana. Cuban citizens residing in the United States still have a right to transfer \$500 to their relatives in Cuba every three months. American tourists are allowed to bring Cuban goods valued up to \$250 into the United States. We consider all this, reiterated Arbesu, as a sign of the State Department's desire to maintain a certain, although minimal, level of relations as a basis for their future improvement when the circumstances become more favorable.

Arbesu pointed out that since December 1978 the American side no longer showed the initiative to conduct "closed meetings" with the Cubans, during which in the past they exchanged opinions on a broad spectrum of international, especially African and Latin American, problems. It is apparent, said Arbesu, that the Carter administration is now more than convinced that we would not make any concessions in

the principled issues of our policy in Africa and in other regions of the globe, especially in the circumstances when the economic blockade of Cuba is being maintained in its fullest form. However, Arbesu mentioned, the Americans show some interest in a dialogue with our Interest Section in Washington, though it has a certain situational character. For example, when the "microcrisis" concerning the presence of the Soviet military specialists in Cuba came up, they discussed it with our representatives at the Interest Section.

The American side also tried to put pressure on us in the question of Nicaragua, said Arbesu. However, they did not make any official statements in that regard. Besides, it is not in Carter's interest to raise this issue because his political opponents could exploit it. If Carter claims that Cuba interferes in Nicaraguan affairs, it would give a reason for his opponents to blame him for not giving the necessary support to Somoza; and this is not in his interest.

Arbesu said that the question of lifting the American economic blockade of Cuba remains frozen, and is not on the agenda now. He mentioned that it might be reasonable to expect that when the USA Congress gathers in session, it would make a decision granting us licenses for purchase of some pharmaceutical products and drugs in the USA. Therefore, now we can speak about only a partial lifting of the economic blockade, emphasized my interlocutor.

Arbesu said that as far as he knew, the Americans did not in any form raise the question of Cuba joining the Treaty of Tlatelolco [in which Latin American countries agreed to make the region a nuclear-free zone], or the Non-proliferation Treaty. Besides, he said, the USA is well informed about our position in those questions.

No doubt, said Arbesu, the beginning electoral campaign in the USA will have more and more influence on their policy toward us. The recent "microcrisis" could be explained by Carter's desire to show himself as a "strongman," who can be "tough" when USA interests are at stake. He wanted to remove the accusations presented by his opponents who blame him for his "weakness."

Besides, mentioned Arbesu, we believe that the so-called "expansionism" will be one of the themes of this electoral campaign in the USA. It will mean primarily the Soviet Union, and its actions in Africa, for example, and it will certainly touch upon us as well.

The electoral campaign which has begun in the USA also led many Senators and Congressmen, who always stood for im-

proving relations with Cuba, not to speak about it publicly. Senator G. McGovern has to exercise caution now because the state in which he will run for reelection [South Dakota] is well known for its conservative electorate. The same could be said about Senator Church [of Idaho]. Other "young Senators [Representatives]," like, for example, F. Richmond, and R. Nolan, even though they are not up for re-election this time, prefer not to mention the question of normalization of relations with Cuba now.

In regards to who the winner will be, said Arbesu, in our opinion it is still too early to make predictions. For example, we do not exclude the possibility of J. Carter winning the election. At the same time, E. Kennedy would be able to ensure more governorships and seats in Congress for Democrats. We should not discount the possibility of the victory of the former CIA Director G. Bush either.

Regarding the Republicans, mentioned Arbesu, governor Reagan has more chances for success than [John] Connally.

In a nutshell, said Arbesu in conclusion, we believe that until the elections and a new President is in the White House, even if that is J. Carter again, we should not expect any significant steps for improving relations with Cuba from the American administration. After the elections a lot will depend on the evolution of the international situation in general. For example, on how the events unfold in Iran and in Central America. For the USA now Iran represents one of the main problems.

ADVISER AT THE EMBASSY OF THE  
USSR IN THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA  
/s/ A. SELETSKII

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 77, d. 642, ll. 18-21; translation by Svetlana Savranskaya.]

**Transcript of Conversation between  
Cuban Premier Fidel Castro and East  
German leader Erich Honecker,  
Havana, 25 May 1980 (excerpt)**

(uncorrected)

Minutes of  
the official talks between the Secretary  
General of the SED Central Committee  
and chairman of the State Council,  
Comrade Erich Honecker and the First  
Secretary of the Central Committee of the  
Cuban Communist Party, the chairman of  
the State Council and the Council of  
Ministers of the Republic of Cuba, Fidel  
Castro Ruz at the Palace of Revolution in

Havana

Wednesday, 28 May 1980  
(Beginning: 9:45 a.m.)

Fidel Castro: Dear Comrade Erich Honecker! Dear German comrades!

Your visit, dear Comrade Honecker, has long been on our agenda, long before it came to the problems of the recent past, long before the military maneuvers [scheduled by the U.S. at its Guantanamo Bay naval base for May, but cancelled--ed.]. But now it has a special meaning that your visit is taking place right now, at a time of increased activity of the USA and the other enemies of our revolution.

Hostility and aggression, of course, did not come all of a sudden, but there are reasons for this: the liberty of Ethiopia, events in Nicaragua, the situation in Central America; then there was the conference of the nonaligned countries [in Havana in September 1979], and aggression gradually increases in this whole situation. During the conference of the nonaligned countries, they were very angry and started a malicious campaign. At that time, they discussed the issue of the Soviet brigade, exactly at the time of the conference of the nonaligned countries. We corresponded with the Soviet comrades regarding this issue. We took the view that this should be called a brigade. But when we explained all that to the Soviet Union, it was called a study center. Of course, the Soviet comrades did not want to aggravate the international situation any further, and since SALT II still had to be discussed in the Senate, there was no other option than calling it a "study center." Thus, the brigade was called study center no. 12. Once this had been said, we had to stick to that term.

I have expressed this in a special way on the USA-TV and in the USA-press: what you call a brigade and we call a study center is something that we have had for 17 years now.

This unit came here after the October [1962] Crisis. Actually, we strongly resisted a total withdrawal of troops. Finally, we managed to have one brigade stay with us, and for 17 years, this brigade has been here. These troops were not included in the agreements following the October Crisis. The October Crisis affected the missiles, the bombers, and the nuclear weapons, but not the troops. When the brigade stayed with us, no agreements were concluded.

In any event, we always would have liked to see these troops called a brigade for one reason: we must not relinquish our right to have Soviet brigades here. We did not

relinquish that right. If we call this a study center for moral reasons, then we relinquish the right to have a brigade. At the May 1 demonstrations, I said that we have got study center no. 12, but that we would like to have numbers 13, 14, 15. But the malicious campaign started with that brigade. All USA presidents knew that we have a brigade here. One can hide a pen, but not an entire brigade with tanks, guns, with 2,000 to 3,000 men. Everyone knows this. The CIA tries to find out whether the soldiers have a bride or not. They want to know everything. They knew about the presence of this brigade, and for 15 years, they treated this as a secret, the issue has never been discussed.

When the October Crisis started they were not bothered by the fact that we had a brigade here. No president has raised this issue, neither Kennedy nor Johnson, neither Nixon nor Ford. But now, the current president does.

The Americans themselves believe that the president has made a mistake to discuss this question just at the same time when the Senate was supposed to discuss SALT II and the conference of the nonaligned countries was taking place, with the intention, of course, of bringing Cuba into a difficult legal situation, to portray it as a country with a Soviet military base, because they took up the issue and produced a big scandal, a very big scandal. This caused damage to SALT II and led to a tense climate, the pretext to create an operational military command near Cuba. In reality, it is an intervention force that they have created just after this problem. It is also possible that Carter thought that, under such strong pressure, the Soviet comrades would be forced to withdraw these troops. That's what they thought. Perhaps Carter hoped to achieve a political success.

The Soviet comrades made it clear right from the beginning that they are not willing to discuss the issue, that these troops would not be withdrawn. In the end, it was a disaster for Carter. But this was part of the escalation of threats.

Then, there were the spy planes over Cuban territory. The most recent event was the organization of a naval exercise, including a landing in Guantanamo military base. Actually, they have taken a step back because of the great mobilization of the masses. We announced to organize mass rallies all over the country. The issue of Mariel existed before. We already had organized the April 19 mass rallies and after that, they took a step back. They canceled the landing exercise in the military base, and even signaled that they were ready to negotiate a suspension of the Mariel exercise.

That was on April 29, about 48 hours

before May 1. Once they had said that, I thought they were ready to suspend the exercise. I told my comrades they might explain that we were going to respond on May 1 or 2. Yet on April 30, at night, during the first hours of May 1, before the mass rally we organized against the military exercise, at this point they proclaimed the suspension of the exercise. The very same day! This is the first time that they set up something like this on such a big scale, and they have suspended it without any conditions. The planes haven't been flying over our country for several weeks. Mariel and the issue of the USA interests section here is giving them a big headache now. There are 380 counter-revolutionaries. This is the situation. They want to negotiate. But what they are interested in is to resolve these two issues.

We are saying that this has to be discussed globally. And just at that time Comrade Honecker's visit takes place, and therefore it is of great importance for us.

The Mexican government, too, has adopted a friendly attitude towards us. Recently, the Mexican president announced that he would visit Cuba, too. [Jose] Lopez-Portillo is going to visit our country on July 28. He announced the visit almost three months in advance, in the midst of this tense situation. Clearly, this has political implications.

The Mexican press also behaved well. And Mexico's attitude in general was a positive one. When Lopez-Portillo visits us, we will give him a great reception. We will choose roughly the same route that you have taken. Usually, we don't take choose a long route but a much shorter one. It is an exception that we chose such a long route. I think the last visit for which we organized such a big trip was [Algerian leader Houari] Boumediene's; we also did it for Brezhnev.

Moreover, the state security is very worried during such big visits. Lots of people have to be deployed because there is always a potential risk. I suppose this is the same in the GDR as it is here in Cuba. We are located in immediate proximity to the USA, and it is always possible that someone will infiltrate. Hence, such a trip is always potentially dangerous.

This is the time at which you have arrived, Comrade Honecker, this is why this visit is of special importance for us, and we feel very honored. I am convinced that this visit will contribute to the future development of the relations of the two countries. The people are very excited about this visit and there is great satisfaction with it.

Erich Honecker:

Comrade Fidel, please let me convey

the warmest salutes [*die herzlichen Kampfesgruesse*] from the CC of the German Socialist Unity Party, the State Council, the Council of Ministers, and the people of the German Democratic Republic to you, the members of your delegation, and the party and state leadership.

We are very pleased to have the opportunity to visit revolutionary Cuba, the American island of liberty, at the present time because we know - as you have already pointed out - that this visit has special importance. First, this visit takes place at a time when the USA apparently is trying to increase tensions at the international level. In this context, it goes without saying that the measures the USA has taken against Cuba in the Caribbean are of particular importance. It is obvious that this USA exercise has been drawn up according to a long-term plan. It has become clear that detente, which has its primary basis in Europe, does the imperialist circles no good.

In the meantime, the Americans not only have been kicked out of Vietnam, but the Vietnamese also managed to counter China's aggression. In addition, the Americans had to leave Iran because of the Iranian people's revolution. Of course, this is an uncomfortable matter for the USA's political elites; since the stake is not only the oil, which does not belong to the American imperialists, but also an outpost at the southern border of the Soviet Union.

Moreover, there were the events we could witness on our trips through Africa, such as Angola, Zambia, Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Yemen. We had meetings with the South African national liberation movement, with SWAPO [the Southwest African People's Organization], with the ANC [African National Congress], and also with the Organization for African Unity in Addis Ababa. The OAU Secretary General, [Edem] Kodjo - in presence of all African ambassadors - presented me a copy of the OAU charter and gave a speech of anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist, and anti-racist character. He expressed strong solidarity with the socialist German Democratic Republic and thanked us. It became clear that Africa - and not only the socialist countries - is heading off for new shores, which are not those of imperialism.

The scheme of Camp David, which basically did not solve any problem concerning the Middle East, was declared doomed to failure. Except for Egypt, all countries - including Saudi Arabia - are against the Camp David agreement. The resolution of the Near East conflict is dashed by Israel's imperialist stance, which is strongly backed by USA monopolies.

The situation in the Caribbean has to be seen in this context. The USA, albeit very reluctantly, would have tolerated Cuba, since they understand that because of the then-concluded agreement, the Soviet Union stands behind Cuba. They know that the whole socialist community stands behind Cuba, that behind the slogan "Hands off Cuba!" stands the power of socialism.

Through the powerful manifestation of revolutionary Cuba within the last couple of weeks, the mobilization of the Cuban people, they felt that the revolutionary regime and the government of Cuba led by Fidel Castro are very solid.

I completely agree with Fidel Castro: they feel that Cuba is not alone, that it is virtually the lighthouse of socialism in America, that it provides a stimulus for the anti-imperialist revolution in Latin America. They had to swallow the fact that Cuba is revolutionary, but Nicaragua came as a great surprise to them. As we all know, events in Nicaragua did not fall out of the blue, and they felt that the Nicaraguan revolutionaries had the moral and material support of Cuba. Add to this the events in El Salvador.

The USA imperialists have a strong interest that all is quiet in their "backyard." But there is a new revolutionary wave in Latin America. As Comrade Fidel rightly pointed out: Kennedy kept quiet about the so-called Soviet brigade, as did Johnson, Nixon, and Ford. In the beginning, Carter did not feel like broadcasting it. However, we have seen that there are powerful elements within USA imperialism that don't like detente at all. They reached the conclusion that cooperation with the Soviet Union benefits the socialist movement in Europe and Asia and the national liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. For a long time, they have been preparing a blow against the policy of detente, in order to go over to a policy of confrontation.

It is not yet clear whether they will take the crucial step, that is, the step from confrontation to war; because a military attack on Cuba means world war, as does a military attack on the GDR. They know that the Soviet Union, after the forced American withdrawal from Iran, did not permit them to compensate through the occupation of Afghanistan or the strengthening of USA influence there. Thus a situation was created that is reflected by various actions and in the development that Comrade Fidel Castro has pointed out.

The US-Americans aim at increasing tensions on the international level. Certain elements have an interest to dramatize the situation, to make it seem as if the outbreak of World War III is imminent. We have seen

that they can't ignore the power of the Soviet Union and its allies. For the first time ever, war would be carried to directly to the USA. In the past, the USA has always sent merely an expeditionary corps across the Ocean when the war was almost over. Now they must reckon that a war with nuclear weapons also affects the USA.

The big fuss they make about Afghanistan is of the same nature as the invention of the Soviet brigade in Cuba just at the time of the conference of the nonaligned countries [and] the ratification of SALT II. For a long time, the most aggressive circles within the USA have been preparing their strike against the policy of detente, against peace, because they want to tip the global balance of power in their favor. They want to counteract the further strengthening of Real Socialism, the development of national liberation movements in Africa and Latin America, the development of communist and workers' parties within the capitalist countries, and their mass impact in the struggle against the attempts of the bourgeoisie to pass on the burden of crisis to the working people.

In fact, this can be discerned directly from recent political events. They are known to Comrade Fidel and the other comrades. Recently, at the session of the Political Advisory Committee of the Warsaw Pact countries in the Polish capital, we have examined this situation. On the basis of Comrade Brezhnev's fundamental speech, his assessment of the present and future international situation, the declaration drew concrete conclusions. You know that declaration. In my speech in Warsaw, I have pointed out that the current attempt to further heighten international tensions results from the mounting crisis within the capitalist countries, which leads some imperialist elements to regard war as their last resort. Whether the countries of Real Socialism and the masses all over the world are going to allow for this, however, is a different question.

We have to note the fact that the Vladivostok agreements [of December 1974 between Brezhnev and Ford regarding a framework for SALT II] were not kept by Carter. Comrade Fidel already mentioned that despite prolonged negotiations and the signatures of Vienna, SALT II has not been ratified by the U.S. Congress and Senate.

Furthermore, we must note that, against the will of world public opinion and that of many NATO member states, the 1978 NATO Council Meeting in Washington has adopted the NATO long-term program, which envisions yearly increases in military expenditures until 1990. At a time when what matters is adding a military dimension,

i.e. disarmament, to detente, they have adopted the long-term defense program, in spite of opposing resolutions passed by the UN.

NATO's [December] 1979 Brussels missile deployment decisions [to deploy medium and intermediate range missiles in West Germany and elsewhere in Western Europe] are a provocative step. At the same time when disarmament is on the global agenda and Carter, at the signing of SALT II in Vienna, talks about the existence of a rough balance of military power on the global level, they raise an outcry over an alleged Soviet threat and pass this defense program in Brussels.

Basically, the production of new American intermediate nuclear forces and their deployment in Western Europe is an attempt to undermine the results of SALT II. They want to offset the fact that Soviet missiles can reach the USA. This is supposed to be achieved through the deployment of American intermediate-range (nuclear) missiles having a range beyond Moscow up to the Urals. While it takes 20 to 30 minutes for the missiles that are deployed in the USA to reach the Soviet Union, they only need 5 minutes when deployed in the Federal Republic, Belgium, and Great Britain, except for the so-called wing missiles [*Fluegelraketen*], which would also violate the neutrality of such states as Sweden.

Hence, this a large scale, long-term attempt to tip in favor of American imperialism the rough balance of military power that currently exists in the world. This is supposed to put pressure on the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, including Cuba, on countries like Nicaragua, and others, and on the national liberation movement. They want to foster anything that leads to an alliance of the USA, Japan, China, and, if possible, the FRG, too, against Real Socialism and the national liberation movement. For us, a very interesting aspect is that China supports the so-called reunification of Germany, i.e. the elimination of the GDR.

It is necessary to recognize this situation. On the other hand, the situation certainly is not like the reactionary imperialist circles would have it. Of course, Real Socialism is strong enough to defy the USA. It is perfectly possible to shatter the USA imperialism's attempt to conduct a large-scale offensive against the socialist countries and the national liberation movement.

In this context, we regard socialist Cuba, the American island of liberty, as playing a very important role. Our country's citizens, the citizens of the Soviet Union, and those of all socialist countries, see it as a

banner that is waved by the Cuban people under the leadership of its communist party and that of Fidel Castro.

Likewise, our struggle, too, the GDR's and the CSFR's [Czechoslovak Socialist Federal Republic's] struggle, is a banner for all peace-loving people in the world, since we don't allow imperialism to take any step against our borders. I am mentioning the CSFR because, together with us, it is fighting in the front line.

In the aftermath of [the 1975 East-West accords at] Helsinki, the West German imperialists have attempted to build up a fifth column in the German Democratic Republic. To this end, they addressed not only counterrevolutionary elements, which, of course, still exist in our country, too, but also the reactionary, the unsteady, and the uncertain. All this took place under the slogan of human rights.

They placed their hopes in the Protestant and the Catholic Church, which have 8.5 and 2.5 million members, respectively. These churches and their bishops were supposed to act in our country as guerillas of the West. With the help of the 6,000 Western citizens, who, as a result of the international recognition of the GDR and the ensuing establishment of Western embassies, came to our country, they undertook subversive activities. The American, the Federal German, and other embassies established contacts with our artistic intelligentsia in particular. One million copies of a so-called manifesto against the GDR party and state leadership have been published, allegedly written by leading SED functionaries. Under the slogan of human rights, it has been tried to set up committees for the "protection of human rights" and the "protection of workers' rights."

Various elements have been given the opportunity to use the FRG's TV and radio to influence the GDR. All around the clock, 24 hours a day, 35 FRG radio stations are broadcasting political commentaries. The three Western TV channels were also used for interviews with certain authors and other GDR people, which were conducted "on behalf of the SED against the SED leadership." On behalf of socialism in the GDR, they spoke out against the SED's alleged dogmatism. They disguised themselves as socialists, but all their efforts were in vain.

In May of last year, our republic held municipal elections. There were mass rallies all over the country, where all issues were discussed. More than 99 percent of the citizens voted for the candidates of the national front, despite the fact that the Western media had asked the people either not to vote at all or to vote against these candi-

dates.

In Berlin, we organized a big rally of the GDR's youth. 700,000 FDJ [Free German Youth] members marched up. This left even the Western correspondents flabbergasted. After all, there are only 1.2 million people living in the capital. 700,000 FDJ members marched into Berlin and dominated the city at the time.

(Fidel Castro: From all over the country?)

Yes, from all over the country.

(Fidel Castro: How were they accommodated?)

In tents, in schools, in apartments, or in other peoples' homes. This was a big campaign. They didn't have much time to sleep, but they all had a place to stay. Some families hosted up to 7 teenagers. The family slept in the kitchen, so that the FDJ members could sleep in the bed and living-rooms. There was huge attendance. We never had had something like this before.

During these four days, the Western journalists were not subjected to any restrictions in their interviews. Moreover, some 200,000 people from the Federal Republic and West Berlin came to the capital to discuss with the FDJ members. In any case, none of them managed to report something negative. They were surprised that this youth is different from what they thought.

Along a wide front, we prepared for the 30th anniversary of the GDR [in October 1979]. 250,000 young people marched in Berlin. Comrades Brezhnev, [Polish leader Edward] Gierek, [Czechoslovak leader Gustav] Husak, [Bulgarian leader Todor] Zhivkov, [Hungarian leader Janos Kadar], [Mongolian leader J.] Zedenbal, and others were there. In any case, we gave our adversary such a thrashing that he lost all his interest in continuing his shameless propaganda against the GDR with the same ferocity as before.

At this time, the Chancellor of the FRG, Helmut Schmidt, requested a meeting. This means that while adhering to their revanchist attitude towards the GDR, they were forced to accept that socialism has a solid basis in our country.

Then, at the transition from 1979 to 1980, there was the heightening of international tensions.

(Fidel Castro: One question before we continue. In which month did this marching up of the 700,000 young people take place?)

This was in May 1979, and in October, on the occasion of the 30th anniversary, there were 250,000. The demonstration in May, at Whitsun, was the big response to our adversary's campaign which claimed

that the GDR youth does not support the regime. Since then, they keep quiet or say that it has to be admitted that the enthusiasm was not organized.

Then, dear Comrade Fidel Castro and dear Cuban Comrades, there was the apparent heightening of international tensions in late 1979/early 1980. We have reacted with great level-headedness to this situation. On January 9 we had a reception for the diplomatic corps. There, I expressed the GDR's hope that it would be possible to reduce international tensions because there is no alternative to the policy of peaceful coexistence. Only the American ambassador did not attend the reception since our politburo and the Council of Ministers had made a statement in support of the entry of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into Afghanistan following the Afghan government's request. A couple of days later we had a hare-hunt for the diplomats.

We have continued our policy of socialist buildup with great popular support, and I expressed to Chancellor Helmut Schmidt my readiness to meet him for a talk in 1980.

They all were surprised that the GDR, together with the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, reacted so calmly to Carter's confrontational course. Indeed, the citizens of our republic stand firmly behind the policy of the party and the government, which is directed against Carter's confrontational course and stands up for peaceful coexistence and international cooperation. We have activated our ministerial exchange with the FRG, but also with Belgium, the Netherlands, France, and Austria. While one has to proceed from the assumption that the Western governments, particularly with respect to the boycott of the Olympic Games [in Moscow in summer 1980], will show a certain class solidarity with the USA, they still hesitate to identify entirely with the hardened policy of the USA administration.

Thus, it came to the meeting [on May 19 in Warsaw] between Leonid Brezhnev and Giscard d'Estaing, about which you are probably informed. Finally, there was the long delayed meeting [on May 16 in Vienna] between the new Secretary of State in the Carter administration, [Edward S.] Muskie, and [Soviet Foreign Minister] Comrade [Andrei] Gromyko. Today, the GDR newspapers report that on June 30 and July 1 the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Helmut Schmidt, is going to meet with Comrade Brezhnev in Moscow.

During my stay in Belgrade, on the occasion of Tito's funeral [8 May 1980], I had talks with several statesmen.

Many expressed the desire to talk to

me. Of course, the first meeting I had was with Comrade Brezhnev, who, after his health cure is back on the world stage in full health. Old comrades-in-arms and friends sat together the night and talked about current issues. I had meetings with [Indian leader] Indira Gandhi and various other personalities, which I don't want to go into at this moment, and with Helmut Schmidt, too.

Two issues were central. The first issue was that, because of our commitment to never again let a war start from German soil, one has to resist the Carter course of confrontation. We thus discussed the necessity to supplement the political dimension of detente with detente in the military field, not to support, but to counteract the unpredictable policy of Carter.

The second issue was the boycott of the Olympics. I said that it is an insult to the Soviet Union and to Comrade Brezhnev personally, if the athletes of the Federal Republic are prevented from participating at the Olympic Games in Moscow. Schmidt told me that he is under heavy pressure from the USA. Moreover, he said that this was the "mildest reaction" to the "invasion," the "intervention" of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan as he put it.

I said: Mr. Schmidt, what you call an "intervention" in Afghanistan is no intervention at all. On this issue, we apparently have differing points of view. You used to be defense minister and you know exactly that after the Americans got kicked out of Iran, they now try to gain a foothold in Afghanistan—through external aggression, as a compensation for the weakening of their position in Iran, so to speak. Hence, the Soviet Union simply had to respond to the requests that Afghanistan already had voiced several times before by sending a limited contingent of troops to that country. As soon as Afghanistan's neighbors ensure non-interference in Afghan domestic affairs and the stopping of the external aggression, guaranteed by the USA, the Soviet Union, perhaps France as well, as soon as the Afghan government declares that the Soviet troop contingents can be withdrawn or reduced, the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan will begin. I pointed out that Fidel Castro, as chairman of the nonaligned movement, has made a similar proposal.

Schmidt did not want to see it this way. He told me: Mr. Honecker, have you seen the maps of the Soviet invasion? I said: I also have maps, but this is irrelevant; stopping the external aggression is the crucial issue.

Then I had to go to the meeting with Comrade [Zambian President Kenneth] Kaunda, and Schmidt asked me: When are

we going to meet in the GDR? I answered: First, go to Moscow to Comrade Brezhnev, then we can meet in the GDR.

That's how we parted, and we both found that this was a useful meeting. Certainly, this meeting has a certain impact on the situation in Europe, because the Federal Republic has some influence on its western, northern, and southern allies. Of course, we don't believe that we are the center of the world, the normalization of GDR-FRG relations, however, certainly is of great importance for detente in Europe. It helps to restrain the belligerence of the USA. After all, the Federal Republic of Germany is the second strongest power within NATO.

The events in the Caribbean, and especially the anti-Cuban campaign of the USA and the Western media are related to the heightening of international tensions. In this context, our visit, which had been planned for a long time, indeed carries great international importance. This view has been expressed yesterday by the "Pravda" and this morning by the "Neues Deutschland." They wrote that, especially in the present situation, the solidarity with revolutionary Cuba shown by the Soviet Union and its allies, including the GDR, is of great importance. In the GDR, we have started a big solidarity campaign under the slogan: "Hands off Cuba! - Stop the American economic embargo against Cuba! - Stop the espionage flights! - Give up the USA military base in Guantanamo!" I was pleased to hear that the espionage flights are currently being suspended.

Under these conditions, Comrade Fidel Castro, we renew the fraternal solidarity and our comradeship in arms between the GDR and revolutionary Cuba. We are aware that we are fighting in the front line, but we know there are strong reserves in behind. On this basis, we look with optimism into the future and will develop our bilateral relationship further.

I apologize for having talked so extensively about the international situation, but I was prompted by your statements on these issues.

Fidel Castro:

What Comrade Honecker has told us is very interesting. We have listened with great attention. The international situation is of vital importance for us; because its aggravation means increasing dangers for Cuba.

As I have already pointed before, the Yankees have been very angry with us for some time and they toy with the idea of how to get back at us, especially after events in Angola and Ethiopia. In our contacts, they

insisted on a troop withdrawal from Angola and Ethiopia. We always replied that we are not on any account going to discuss this issue with them. We refused to talk about it. This was one of their most pressing demands.

Another demand relates to our solidarity with Puerto Rico's independence; and it is virtually a tradition of the revolution to show solidarity, to give support, if there is a struggle for the liberation and independence of Puerto Rico.

This was before the revolution in Grenada, a small country. This has important implications in the Caribbean, where there is instability after the success of revolution in Nicaragua [words unintelligible.] the difficulties in Central America.

For some time they have been hoping that we would make a mistake, so that they can teach us a lesson, as they put it. Thus we must act with great caution on all these issues.

It is not our fault that there are revolutions. We are [not] responsible for what happens in El Salvador. This is a phenomenon that has developed over time. Except for the example that Cuba gives, and to give an example is always best, because solidarity, too, plays a big role. These political phenomena, however, arise virtually as natural events, because the people no longer accept such a situation. When such a revolutionary situation emerges in these countries, then inevitably this leads to tensions. Thus, with the revolution, of course, there are tensions. In Afghanistan, too, with the revolution, there were tensions, and the new situation in Iran, the revolution, has produced tensions in that region. We take an interest in what happens in the Caribbean, but also what happens in all other areas of the globe, what happens in Afghanistan.

Some Yankees, some groups of forces within the intelligentsia, are developing the argument, the strategy, that, when a crisis unfolds in one part of the globe, in Iran or Afghanistan, in the Indian Ocean or anywhere else in the world, then the USA has to respond [against] Cuba. They have said that quite frankly. If they have some clash with the Soviet Union in a part of the globe where the balance of power is unfavorable for the USA, then they should respond in a place where the balance of power is favorable for the USA. Because one should not think that only a global conflict is possible. A world conflict is the most severe. The decisions are of tremendous importance and they are dramatic ones. However, the real prospects for a conflict, not a general conflict, but a local one, are much greater.

In this sense, it doesn't matter to us in

which part of the globe it happens. It will affect us. This is why the failure of detente is of special importance to us, of very special importance. First, because detente eliminates the possibility of a global conflict, but at the same time eliminates the possibility of local conflicts and also the opportunities for repression and attacks on the liberation movement.

Of course, detente has numerous advantages, particularly if it involves disarmament and a lowering of military spending. This is virtually the only way to give the Third World more resources for their development. This is why the policy of the Cold War, of arms races, is a catastrophe for all countries, but particularly for our country, given its geographic position. However [it is a catastrophe for Cuba], not only because of this position, but also as a developing country, and it is not only political and military effects, but also economic ones in Latin America. The Cold War can trigger a special effect. This allows the USA to better control certain wavering governments and to conduct a policy towards the whole liberation movement that suits them. This hurts the revolutionary movement all over the world, but especially in Latin America; because the Yankees believe that Latin America is their back yard. The USA has an interest in what happens in Asia, what happens in Europe, in Portugal, and so on, but they have a much stronger interest in what happens in Latin America, in the revolutionary changes in Latin America. Particularly in a Cold War situation, an intervention becomes more likely. This is why, for us, the issue of changing the current course and of finding the way back to detente, if possible, is of tremendous importance.

Erich Honecker:

There are some new aspects. We got information about the meeting between Comrade Brezhnev and Giscard d'Estaing. This meeting came as a complete surprise to the USA.

Even if one takes into account the existence of a certain class solidarity between France and USA imperialism, this talk between Comrade Brezhnev and Giscard d'Estaing still suggests that France intends to pursue a policy independent from the USA and is not willing to support the hardened, Cold War, course of the USA. Giscard d'Estaing explained that France will not support the USA's economic sanctions against the Soviet Union, that its athletes will go to Moscow, and that France does not want the FRG to become the leading power in Western Europe. France, Giscard d'Estaing said, has an interest in the further

existence of a divided Germany as an important element of the European balance of power. With respect to the issue of Afghanistan, France wants a political, but not a military solution, and this goes for Afghanistan as well as for Iran. By and large, this is a useful element, since it limits the chances of the USA to revive the Cold War with all its ferocity.

In this context, the conversation that the new American Secretary of State, Muskie, had with Comrade Gromyko is interesting, too. Muskie presented himself as the man who wants to be the number one in U.S. foreign policy. He did not mention Brzezinski's name, but he said: I am independent from the President's entourage. Mr. Gromyko, let us discuss the issue of Afghanistan and sort it out.

Comrade Gromyko replied: We sent our limited contingent of troops to Afghanistan only after there was interference in Afghanistan's domestic affairs, when there was the danger that you would get a foothold in Afghanistan after you got kicked out of Iran. Comrade Gromyko added, as discussed in Moscow, that Afghanistan is nothing but a pretext for the USA to heighten international tensions. This means, this was a result of long-planned steps taken by the USA.

Comrade Gromyko went on saying: Give up the boycott, so that your athletes can come to the Olympic Games. It is a symbol of your attempts to stir up the Cold War. Also, this contradicts your statement, Mr. Muskie, that you want a healthy international climate. Muskie said this could not be changed, the President has taken his decision. Thereupon, Comrade Gromyko explained that the President already has changed his mind so many times, perhaps he could do it again in this case. Muskie replied that this would not be possible.

In concluding, Muskie said that he would inform his President. Comrade Gromyko could proceed from the assumption that he, Muskie, has been Secretary of State for 20 days while Gromyko has been in office for 20 years. However, he would like to say that the USA wants a normalization of the situation between the USA and the Soviet Union.

No one knows whether this was only diplomatic maneuvering or not. The ratification of SALT II played an important role in the conversation. According to Muskie, it is not impossible that, after the elections, the situation might change. The conversation has demonstrated that the USA does well understand the implications of the aggravation of the international situation.

Fidel Castro has pointed out that the

international situation leads to Cold War, also leads to an increased danger of local conflicts, including the Caribbean. On the other hand, the peoples' revolutionary movements have examples in the form of other countries, as Cuba here in Latin America; but they are objectively determined. If a subjective factor is added to that, then such welcome events as in Nicaragua take place. Of course, the USA now endeavors to prevent a second Nicaragua in El Salvador, and their actions in South Korea also demonstrate their determination to defend the status quo. On the other hand, there are such events as those mentioned by Comrade Fidel Castro, e.g. Grenada in the Caribbean.

As far as the African region is concerned, you are under heavy pressure of the USA because of your military operations in Angola and Ethiopia. But we are sitting in the same boat, even though we don't have any troops there. We only have technical experts there. The USA is very curious about what the GDR does in Africa, be it in Angola or Ethiopia, in Zambia or Mozambique, Namibia or South Africa. We have a lot of cadres there who are active in various fields, and we train cadres for them. This is why the USA is currently tightening its policy towards the GDR. Above all, they bring their influence to bear on the banks in order to hurt us, in order to create economic problems in the GDR.

However, our economy is sound, we have enough allies. In addition to the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, there are also imperialist monopolies that want to trade with us. For example, we are expanding our economic relations with France, Italy, Scandinavia, and Belgium. After this visit, Comrade Mittag will go to Mexico. This year or next, President Portillo plans to visit the GDR.

We have met the Cuban comrades in Angola and Ethiopia. I would like to thank you, Comrade Castro and the other comrades for the extensive security measures that you have provided; a whole Cuban battalion in Luanda.

Fidel Castro: Yes, I remember. We asked our comrades there to provide comprehensive support for Comrade Honecker's trip.

Erich Honecker: We felt this support everywhere, and I would like to thank you on behalf of our delegation and of our republic as a whole.

Fidel Castro: I believe it was a very good initiative of the GDR's party and government to send such a delegation to Africa. It supports the liberation movement and is very beneficial for us. It is very important to develop the GDR's cooperation with these

countries, and we are very happy about that. Among the socialist countries in Eastern Europe the GDR is the country that pays greatest attention to Africa. When I talk about the socialist countries in Eastern Europe, I would like to exclude the Soviet Union. Because for a long time it has made a lot of efforts in this area. I am convinced that the African countries greatly appreciate the cooperation of the Soviet Union and the GDR. This is important; because if the GDR does not go there, others will go, who have different intentions, who want to cultivate relations in order to moderate developments. I am thinking of the Yugoslavs. They want to exert influence in a sense which is not the most positive. This is why the GDR's presence helps us a lot to maintain the most radical positions.

Erich Honecker: The speech you gave before our State Council [in April 1977] is still ringing in our ears. This was after your trip to Africa. Since then we have increased our engagement there.

Fidel Castro: This is very important for all of us, for the whole revolutionary movement. The Ethiopian comrades are very happy that you want to supply a cement factory. We have promised to help them to put up the cement factory. But the contribution to sustaining the radical spirit in these countries, in Ethiopia, in Angola and Zambia, in Madagascar has to be added to that, and is very beneficial for us within the framework of the nonaligned movement.

The great success of the VIth summit conference [of nonaligned countries in Havana in September 1979] notwithstanding, the radical countries are in the minority, but we were able to win them over on the most important issues, and thereby to isolate the countries with reactionary positions; because there actually were very significant disagreements at the nonaligned conference.

The situation in Afghanistan has caused a lot of problems for us, particularly with regard to the Third World. We remained in the absolute minority. The imperialists exploited this issue. At that time, we were fighting for the Security Council, and we gained some 90 votes. Colombia was a major obstacle for us, they got 50 votes then. We would not have backed off but would have continued the elections, however, because of the events in Afghanistan, we had to talk to the Mexicans and to give up the idea. It would have been nonsense, many votes would have been lost, and this did a lot of harm to the nonaligned movement, because the number of progressive, radical countries still is very limited. There is a middle group, though, which can be won over on some issues.

Of course, the situation has aggravated, for several months already, and also already before events in Afghanistan. The events in Afghanistan basically are a pretext for carrying through the boycott and all these measures. This started after the confirmation of SALT.

You mentioned Carter's words in Vienna; however, when Carter came back to the USA, he gave a speech before Congress and used quite sharp words with respect to Cuba. In this speech he explained to the public that he had told Brezhnev that Cuban adventurism in the Caribbean constituted an obstacle to detente and peace. He expressed fairly wicked intentions toward us, and basically accused us of constituting an obstacle to detente, an obstacle for the relations between the USA and the Soviet Union.

He basically asked the Soviet Union to control us. Just at this time, we wanted to have some contact, because the revolution in Nicaragua had reached its final phase, and they wanted to talk to us. We refused to talk to them and, after Carter's speech before Congress, we cancelled a meeting they had scheduled.

The worst in all of this was the policy of preparing certain armaments. The decision to deploy 570 missiles is a very serious issue. I agree with you that this deployment upsets the balance of power. If Europe deploys an additional number of missiles against the Soviet Union, then this is a change in the correlation of forces. There are no missiles close to the USA. We can understand this situation very well, because we experienced the October Crisis. When the missiles were deployed here, the Yankees disagreed, and they almost provoked a world war precisely because the missiles that were deployed in Cuba could have reached the USA within a couple of minutes. This would have annulled the entire warning system and all time calculations. The Yankees didn't agree at all with the installation of such missiles. We had 52 missiles here, but they are talking about 570 intermediate range missiles against the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union's long range missiles do not have that range, the USA's intermediate range missiles in Europe, however, can reach the Soviet Union; this is a traumatic situation.

Erich Honecker: Helmut Schmidt told me at our meeting: Mr. Honecker, we are afraid, this is why we agreed with that missile decision; because the Soviet Union got these SS-20 missiles, as you call them, and they are aimed at us, the Federal Republic. I replied: Mr. Schmidt, if you are afraid of the missiles, then you should have been

afraid before the decision, because the missiles that can reach you in the Federal Republic are not at issue here at all. The group of the Soviet armed forces has got them, and the NPA [National People's Army of East Germany] has got them, too. We can destroy Bonn with missiles at any time, or even the whole Federal Republic. The missiles, however, that you want to deploy, they are supposed to reach up to the Urals. The USA thereby achieves superiority over the Soviet Union in terms of missiles. These are the issues at stake and not the Federal Republic.

The USA wants to turn Western Europe into an anti-Soviet missile carrier, and they want to shift the risk to Western Europe. Thereby, they shift the military balance, and we will not allow that to happen. This means that now we must have defense systems against missiles that can reach us within 5 minutes. This necessitates great armaments efforts.

At the VIth conference of the non-aligned countries, you said that armaments should be reduced and that a \$500 million fund should be created. However, if now, following the Brussels decision, these missiles are built, there will be no detente in the military field. Then we have to muster all means in order to increase our defense efforts. We will not allow a military imbalance to the disadvantage of the socialist countries. Your comparison is a very good one. The USA has made a big fuss about 50 missiles at the time of the October crisis. Now they want to want to deploy 570 missiles right on the Soviet Union's doorstep. After the elimination of their Iranian bases and facilities, they now try the same in Afghanistan. Moreover, there are their activities in Turkey.

The aggravation of the international situation thus is intertwined with the heightened crisis in the Caribbean, the USA's backyard, so to speak. But the USA is not going to succeed.

Fidel Castro: I would like to add the following story. In the resolution of the October crisis, the USA has pledged to withdraw the missiles from Turkey and Italy. They have done that. In a certain sense, their plans [to deploy missiles in Western Europe] are illegitimate and violate the October crisis agreements. This has not been publicized, but [former Soviet leader Nikita S.] Khrushchev has shown me the letters, the letters related to the agreements. This was a tacit pledge to withdraw the missiles there. They were of a different kind than today's; however, they, too, could reach the Soviet Union.

Erich Honecker: Then they relocated

the missiles to submarines, to ships. It is known that exactly at the peak, if you can say so, of the USA's plans against Cuba, the Soviet Union has pointed to this agreement. Comrade Gromyko did the same when talked to Muskie. This is how all this is intertwined with each other.

Fidel Castro: I believe Brussels is the most serious step they have taken.

What you said with regard to Muskie, we think that he has certain ideas. Some political circles in the USA take the view that to chose Muskie for that function was a smart move; because what one got to know about Muskie was that he is a liberal, not an aggressive man. He has no bad reputation. There is no doubt that he has been appointed Secretary of State just at a point when Carter feels weak. I think he has made some demands. Among other things, he said that he is independent, and that he will not be Brzezinski's tool but a true Secretary of State. There have always been disagreements between Vance and Brzezinski. Every time they sent a contact group to us or to Panama, or to Costa Rica, this group consisted of two men. The first belonged to the State Department, the other to the National Security Council. At any rate, I am of the opinion that Muskie will pursue a policy of defending his positions against Brzezinski, and he will claim authority.

Erich Honecker: This is why he said he is responsible for foreign policy.

Fidel Castro: He can exert a positive influence. Vance has exerted a positive influence. The policy of missile buildup is Brzezinski's. The policy of allying with China against the Soviet Union is Brzezinski's. He traveled to China, he had pictures taken of himself at the border.

Erich Honecker: He had a picture taken of himself at the [Pakistani] border with Afghanistan, with a machine gun in his hand.

Fidel Castro: Yes, he is a cunning devil.

Erich Honecker: This policy is dangerous, but he won't succeed. However, it can cost us a lot.

One has to say that resistance against this policy is beginning to show in Western Europe. It's true, they bow before the USA and they have seriously supported the missile decision, e.g. the FRG. However, we had conversations in the Netherlands, in Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy, and France. The leading politicians of these countries don't want a Third World war.

We are in contact with the folks of big FRG companies, the chemical industry, Mannesmann, and others. They all oppose the boycott, too. It is very interesting that even the Federal Republic's protestant

church, together with and on suggestion of the GDR's church, has issued a statement against the Carter policy.

Fidel Castro: Is it correct, that you have so many Protestants in your country? Are they indeed religious?

Erich Honecker: They are church members, and of course they are religious, otherwise they were not members. I had conversations with the bishops. This was the first time ever in the history of the GDR. They said: We don't want to be partisans of the West. We are GDR citizens. The members of our congregation work for socialism. We conceive of ourselves as a church within socialism. I couldn't say anything against that. The vast majority of the people feel attached to their state, to socialism, and the leaders of the church are smart, they take that fact into account. They exert an influence on the churches in the Federal Republic and in the USA. At the World Council of Churches, they have introduced a resolution calling for the continuation of detente and disarmament. It has been presented to the governments of all countries. The Protestant churches of the GDR and the USA have issued a common statement calling for the continuation of detente. Hence, certain changes become apparent here.

Of course, the church does not want to join together with us completely. This is evident, they can't do that. However, it is still better to have a church that is loyal to the socialist state than one that works against it.

In the USA, too, there are quite a lot of people who oppose the policy of confrontation, otherwise Vance would not have had to go. He was against the military adventure in Iran. What you said about Muskie confirms our information that Muskie indeed wants to act more independently. We have to exploit that.

Fidel Castro: I believe that a lot of people understand that the third world war would also be the last.

Concerning the boycott of the Olympic Games, a many people believe that the USA's non-participation increases the others' chances at the Games a lot.

Erich Honecker: With respect to the chances of preventing a third world war, we are optimistic, even though you never know what some lunatics will get up to.

Regarding the Olympic Games, there are some people in our country who think that the USA does not send its athletes to Moscow because it is afraid that they would again lose against the GDR's athletes as was the case in Montreal [in 1976].

(12:25 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.: Lunch Break)

Erich Honecker: As for the movie we've just seen, I have already asked if we can get it for our TV.

Fidel Castro: In less than four weeks we have organized three big rallies, the last of them being the one for your arrival yesterday.

Erich Honecker: This huge manifestation has already been covered by our TV yesterday, as will be today's negotiations; everything in color. Millions of GDR citizens are watching this. 80 percent of the people have a TV-set.

Fidel Castro: Hence, there are much more viewers than there are Catholics and Protestants.

Erich Honecker: These are loyal citizens as well.

Fidel Castro: If we said that we have Catholics, then we could talk about millions of Catholics who are baptized. Yet actually, nobody becomes involved with the church. Our relations with the church are not that bad. In the early days of the revolution it was necessary to make some priests leave the country, to expel them; because Catholicism was the faith of the rich. 60% of the people were farmers, and on the countryside there was not a single church. In other Latin American countries they do exist. Once a year, priests visit the villages to baptize the people, but they lack a religious education, they were only educated in the big landowners' private schools. Therefore, religion did not exert a particularly strong hold on the people. Nevertheless, we are very careful in our relations with the church, especially given the situation in Latin America, not to admit that the revolution is opposed to the church. In addition, we have talked a lot about the Christians' closeness to the Marxists, and said that Jesus was Christian.

Erich Honecker: The Sermon on the Mount says something along these lines, too.

Fidel Castro: There are many priests with a revolutionary attitude in Latin America. We think this is of great importance.

Erich Honecker: We also integrated a lot of them into the National Front. At the elections, they call upon the people to vote for the candidates of the National Front.

I come from a miners' town. The majority of the people was Catholic. There was a street where 80% of the people living there voted for the KPD [the Communist Party of Germany].

After 1945, we had Priest Kleinschmidt in the GDR, who was responsible for all of Mecklenburg, and we had priests on the National Front's National Council. We had

a bishop, Bishop Mitzenheim, responsible for Thuringia. He was awarded the National Medal of Honor in gold for his contribution to the building up of our republic. We thus approach the issue of cooperation between Christians and Marxists in the same manner.

Fidel Castro: The archbishop of Salvador [Archbishop Oscar Arnulfo Romero, assassinated on 24 March 1980] was an apostle of the poor, of the revolution. The CIA killed him. He exercised strong resistance and cried out against repression. The church in Salvador has a very revolutionary attitude, and this is of great importance for Latin America as a whole. In Jamaica, I met with church representatives, as I did in Chile in 1972. I talked a lot about the alliance between Christians and Marxists. This is no tactical alliance, but a strategic one.

I mentioned Jamaica. Jamaica currently faces a very difficult situation, above all for economic reasons, particularly because of the oil price. They produce bauxite. The oil price has increased 15 times, the price of bauxite only two times. [Jamaican leader Michael] Manley is a very able man, but he has got some problems.

The opposition party is influenced by the CIA, and they do all that they can in order to destabilize and overthrow the government. Now we have to see how these problems can be solved. It is a very dramatic situation that shows certain similarities to the situation in Chile at the time. We give them any kind of support they request. Yet sometimes they act like the Chileans at the time.

Erich Honecker: Every people has to learn by experience.

Fidel Castro: They simply are too democratic—Comrade Honecker, the floor is yours now.

Erich Honecker: I've already taken up a lot of time.

Fidel Castro: You have much more to tell than I do. To sum up, I would like to say the following:

It is our party's belief that our relations with the GDR are very good ones. We are very satisfied with how this relationship has developed, and we are very grateful to the GDR. You are virtually the first country with which we have concluded the coordination of the five-year plan. In our view, all issues have been settled to our satisfaction, and this helps us a lot. Our discussions with the others have not yet been concluded.

As for the political issues, we fully agree. I believe that there still are a lot of possibilities to develop our cooperation in the economic and political field. But things are going well. This is what I wanted to say

regarding political issues in general.

I suppose there is not much I need to tell you about our own problems; during our conversations we return to that topic time and again. Yesterday I have already talked a little bit about our difficulties. And there are shortcomings, too. But we fight against these shortcomings to get rid of them.

With regard to the implementation of the planning and management system for the economy we have made some progress. We have been working on that for years, and currently we do a lot to improve efficiency.

We had some difficulties in meeting the goals of the five-year plan. The five-year plan will not be fulfilled, but we will nevertheless make significant progress. The cement factory we are going to open tomorrow is one example. With this five-year plan, we face problems in the world market. Unfortunately, our economy is highly dependent on international trade, on trade with the Western countries. We have to buy some products from the Western countries, particularly food, e.g. milk. We do a lot in order not to be dependent on the West. We have agreements with the GDR concerning the production of powdered milk. As a result, we will no longer depend on Canada, France, and other Western countries, at least not to such a high degree, the dependence will be reduced.

There are also many chemicals, e.g. pesticides, herbicides, where we are dependent on Switzerland and the FRG, because the socialist countries have not yet developed such chemicals. Unfortunately, there is no hope that the GDR will develop such products in the foreseeable future. We also must buy a lot of equipment from the Western countries. It will be the same for you. Above all, the issue is raw materials, many sorts of raw materials, and spare parts. In sum, a significant part of our trade depends on relations with the West.

In addition, the prices of sugar and nickel were low for some years. This year, the price of sugar has increased. The world price of sugar will probably very good next year, and this helps us a lot in dealing with these difficulties.

However, there are other problems as well. We had some obscure plagues recently. We believe that these plagues were caused by sabotage.

First, there was a fungal disease in our tobacco plantations. This year, 90% of our tobacco production were destroyed, and we had to import tobacco. Fortunately, there are chemicals that are well-suited for fighting this sort of fungus. We have made a strong effort and we got the necessary amount for next year. Therefore, we believe that we will

have solved the problem by next year; because this plague has brought us into a very difficult situation. Other countries were hurt, too. In Jamaica, the whole tobacco production has been destroyed, in Canada, too, and perhaps the USA will be affected as well. It's blue mould [*Blauschimmel*].

On our sugar plantations we also had a very serious plague, but it affected only one type. 30% of our sugar plantations have been planted with this type of sugar. This led to a loss of some 1 million tons of sugar. We fight against this plague by replacing this type of sugar with another one, a new type, which is resistant against this disease.

Then there is the African swine fever, which we are fighting successfully. This swine fever is practically under control. It is strange, though, three plagues all at the same time.

A couple of days ago a plane overflew our country and dropped a gelatin-like, liquid substance containing a fungus; quite clever, in microscopically small capsules. Currently, we are conducting research on the issue. These things were dropped in a width of 25 kilometers. We haven't publicized anything yet, because we are still in the process of conducting research. We have asked the Soviet comrades for help. But we still need more facts.

This is very disquieting, however, since these could be symptoms of bacteriological warfare. These chemicals are highly developed. The material that has been used does not come from a small group of counterrevolutionaries, it belongs to a highly developed industry. Now we don't know who has done this. We know for sure that we are dealing with fungi, a type of fungus that could damage the sugar. We are doing the relevant tests before we publicize something. The dropping took place 12 to 14 days ago. But we don't have all elements available yet. Perhaps this is psychological warfare?

Furthermore, there are various signs of sabotage. A couple of weeks ago a very serious act of sabotage occurred. A day-nursery in a high-rise was set on fire. This fire was very dangerous, because there were 570 children in the nursery at this point. By a miracle, all children were saved.

A few days later, the same thing happened to a old people's home in Jamaica. 150 old women died. Imagine what would have happened here if 100 children had died! Maybe the people would have killed the rogue. The people might have killed some 10,000 of these guys, but then the problem would have gotten out of hands; because we have to run a visible campaign with the party and the mass organizations in order to keep the people calm. They want to strike back,

and we are at pains to calm the people down. If 150 children had died, then we would have witnessed serious acts of revenge. And apparently this was the intention.

Three days ago a special school was set on fire, a dangerous incident, too.

Yesterday a small rum factory was set alight. Hence, there is sabotage, and this either could have been planned by the CIA or instigated by the radio stations of the USA and the venomous pirate radio stations. Altogether, these acts are typical of the CIA's war of nerves. Therefore, we will have to take more drastic measures and send some people before the firing squad. These are terrible things. Our main concern is that they use bacteriological means against the economy.

Our problem is that we are heavily dependent on agriculture. Our exports depend on agriculture. Agriculture suffers from natural plagues, such as droughts. However, there are also these artificial plagues, and now we struggle with this kind of difficulties.

Nevertheless, the morale is good. We have practically formulated the next five-year plan already. It is not a very ambitious one, but a modest, a realistic plan, that has been calculated cautiously, on the basis of low world prices. If the situation improves, we will try to fulfill the plan.

We now coordinate the plans with the other socialist countries. We are preparing for the II Party congress. It will be characterized by a fighting spirit.

The party has grown, perhaps a little bit more than we desired, because we improved very restrictive criteria, always in search for excellence. Recently we tried to increase the number of workers in the party. Our comrades also work in services, intelligence, the ministry of the interior, the military. We also had a special campaign aimed at increasing the percentage of workers. Currently the party has 400,000 members and candidates. At the time of the I. Party congress, there were 150,000 members and candidates. The youth organization has 450,000 members, and it has a restrictive character, too. We will stick to this policy because we look not so much for quantity but for quality. The party is very unified, the people are very unified. All the people who are sitting here are comrades, all revolutionaries are comrades, and even the rogue is ready to fight. The people who are now leaving our country and go to the USA, who are no revolutionaries at all, have a revolutionary mentality. They are rebels. They refuse to obey orders. They will give the USA a big headache, although they are enemies of the revolution.

There are two very interesting phenomena. They all believe what the revolutionary government says, and second, they have the methods of the revolution, a revolutionary style.

This is strange. The Yankees concentrate them in bases, and there they organize the revolt. They don't obey any orders. With these rogues they have imported rogues with a revolutionary style. In comparison, the other emigrants in the USA are calm, but the Cuban people raise all sorts of outcries.

Hence, this is the situation. The West does not really understand this. 90 % of the people are steadfast and agree with the revolution, 10 % are against the revolution, but the latter are militant. The West does not really understand this phenomenon. This will remain the same for 30 or 40 years, as long as we have the USA on our doorstep. There will always be a small minority. I am totally convinced of that, we must not have any illusions about it.

Therefore, every country where there is a regime change means increased security for our revolution. Each additional revolution makes us stronger because we gain allies. For 20 years, we have been isolated, on our own, now there are already three of us in the region: Grenada, Nicaragua, and Cuba. Moreover, there are friendly states, such as Panama and Jamaica, for example; some countries that have developed a positive attitude towards us compared to the time of our isolation, when not a single country had a friendly attitude towards us. Mexico only entertained formal relations with us, but no relations of a friendly nature. This situation has changed a lot.

Mexico's position is a very interesting one; since after the discovery of the huge (crude) oil resources, its economic situation has changed, its power has grown. The dependence on the USA has been decreased.

However, at the same time, this engenders a danger, because the USA demand that Mexico supplies them with 4,000 barrels of (crude) oil every day in order to solve their energy problems. The Mexicans are afraid of the USA. They don't want to follow the USA's oil policy, but maintain a limited position that corresponds to the country's development needs in order to simultaneously expand the markets. But Mexico plays an important role in this area of the globe, a very important role, since it has got the economic power because of the oil. Hence, attention should be paid to Mexico. Lopez Portillo, the Mexican president, has a good attitude, a brave position, he is open-minded, and this should be taken into account.

Argentina and Brazil are in a different situation. These countries are much more

dependent on the USA. Brazil seeks to increase its independence. Without any doubt, this is a very reasonable government, but the situation is different from that in Mexico. Mexico can be seen more as an ally, as a friend.

The Yankees have asked the Mexicans to do them some service here, in order to solve their problems with us. We told the Mexicans that we would agree, if the goal is to solve all problems at the same time, not only those that are of interest to the USA. They Mexicans said that they agree with that.

When the Mexicans, the Yankees, and we sit at a table, the relation will be two to one on some issues. The Mexicans have invited representatives from Panama, and we have said that it is better to have more Latin Americans. Maybe it is better for us if the Mexicans participate in these talks. Therefore we agreed. We don't know what is going to happen and where it is going to happen because the Yankees are quite constrained in their actions because of the campaign. Before the elections, Carter must make no concessions at all. Therefore, the situation is not going to change before the elections. On no account, can we help Carter solve his own problems. What guarantees is Carter going to give us? And what if he loses the elections? They don't talk about Angola and Ethiopia any more, now they talk about solving the problem in the USA's interests section which is full of counter-revolutionaries, and in Iran, they demand their hostages. They were afraid that our people would attack the consulate. Before our demonstration, they were very concerned, and Mariel is the second issue that they are very concerned about.

There, we are the ones who issue the exit visas. They are afraid of Latin America, of the people from Haiti, Mexico, and the next problem is the hijacked plane. They are interested in agreements and they are concerned about that.

However, they always find something new. At the time, they talked about subversion in Latin America, now there are new issues. In this pre-election period, it is very difficult for them to make concessions. Hence, we remain at the present point as long as the elections have not taken place.

This was a broad outline of the current situation. We will provide further information about Cuba, but these were the main issues.

Erich Honecker: Comrade Fidel Castro, thank you for your explanations. It is quite obvious that there are no issues between us that need further discussion.

As far as we know, the communique

has been prepared. All questions have been settled, and we have expressed our opinions on international issues.

We consider the conclusion of the treaty on friendship and cooperation very important.

(Fidel Castro: This is our first treaty.)

The people of the German Democratic Republic will be delighted when they learn about it, and it is certain that this will receive great attention; just as our stay here already receives great international attention. The conclusion of this treaty will outline all that what we, even more so than before, will have to live up to in our mutual cooperation.

Despite all agreement with regard to economic and other issues, there will be a whole string of additional possibilities to develop the cooperation of two countries that are so much joined together in friendship as are the German Democratic Republic and the Republic of Cuba.

We in the GDR follow with great pleasure with how much energy you implement the decisions taken at the 1st Party congress of the Communist Party. We follow with deep sympathy your efforts concerning the preparation of the 11th Party congress, about which you have just informed us.

The remarks you made in the context of the Party congress regarding the effectiveness and quality of your work are very familiar concerns for us. We, too, devote increasing attention to these issues given the conditions of our development. Moreover, in our activities we proceed from the assumption that revolutionary Cuba commands great authority and conducts a very active, principled foreign policy in full accordance with the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community while certainly taking into consideration your country's specific situation.

It is obvious that in the preparation of your 11th Party congress you are concerned with a whole string of issues that we also have to deal with in preparing for our Xth Party congress. Recently our Central Committee held its 12th conference. Supplementing the Politburo's report on the organization of our Xth Party congress, I held a speech there. The Xth Party congress has been scheduled for 11-16 April 1981. We publicized the agenda and at the same time we announced that motions to be considered by the Party congress have to be proposed before the end of March. In the context of the summoning of our Xth Party congress the entire country will engage in a great debate about the future shaping of the German Democratic Republic's developed socialist society. Of course, this will be re-

lated to the continuing carrying through of the GDR's foreign policy.

As far as foreign policy is concerned, the problems are quite obvious. The cooperation with the Soviet Union is the cornerstone of our foreign policy. We coordinate our foreign policy with the socialist brother nations. Concerning foreign policy, there is agreement as to the basic issues, the issue of the further consolidation of the unity and indivisibility of the community of socialist countries, the issue of defending the achievements of detente, its supplementing with arms reductions, and active support for national liberation movements. In this process, we pay great attention to the development of the nonaligned countries about which Comrade Fidel Castro has informed us in the context of the Havana conference and the subsequent events.

Although all these issues concerning the future development of our foreign policy are understood, the citizens of the GDR certainly face a lot of problems. World events are highly complex, so that the Party has to be very active in this area; this all the more so since the enemy seeks to deceive the people through the mass media and to disguise its aggressive policies, particularly that of the USA. We have created a solid basis regarding these issues. The comrades now are increasingly capable of thinking for themselves and clarifying these issues in dialogue with the people.

In January of this year we held big talks with our party's first district secretaries (*Kreissekretäre*) under consultation of the local government secretaries (*Sekretäre der Bezirksleitungen*).

Fidel Castro: How many districts are there in your country?

Erich Honecker: There are 136 districts (*Kreise*), but also a whole string of industrial districts. Altogether there were 600 comrades present there. At this meeting, we assessed the class struggle between socialism and imperialism and its implications for the work of our party. One can note the differences between the various imperialist countries, but the basic conflict still is the one between socialism and imperialism. The imperialists are quite united in their struggle against socialism, they only disagree with regard to method.

We also evaluated the development of the national liberation movement and the role of the Communist and workers' movements in the developed capitalist countries. It was a broad range of international issues, which are mainly ideological issues, and issues concerning the future shaping of the developed socialist society. For example, we discussed the question how to continue

our dynamic economic policy under changed international economic conditions in combination with the execution of our socio-political program. These questions are certainly not only of theoretical importance; above all they concern the masses and hence the Party.

We believe that we can compensate for the changed international economic conditions, which find expression in increasing prices, in inflationary tendencies, through higher labor productivity. You know our development, therefore I don't have to go into detail. The main problem we face is to combine the advantages of the socialist social order with the scientific-technical revolution. This means, among other things, especially a more efficient management of natural resources. We have great supplies of brown coal in our country. Within the framework of the plan, we are currently making it our task to extract 300 million tons of brown coal a year instead of the 240 million tons we have produced in the past. Of course this is a huge task, since it involves the opening of new coal mines.

Fidel Castro: How many kilocalories does coal have?

Erich Honecker: 2,000 to 3,000, it varies. However, given the increase in world prices, this is a very important natural resource.

Fidel Castro: How many tons of brown coal are necessary to substitute 1 ton of oil? I am talking about the type of brown coal that you produce.

Erich Honecker: Practically, we use brown coal for our carbochemical industry. Relatedly, it is the source material for various raw materials, plastics, rubber (elastomers?), for the production of gas. We just have opened a new factory near Buna. Near Leuna we then saw the old plant, which works in the field of carbochemistry. The new one works on the basis of oil. Initially, we intended to abandon carbochemistry because at that time oil was cheaper than brown coal. We wanted to switch completely to petrochemistry. But now we are developing a stronger carbochemical industry, and the new plant produces 100,000 tons of PVC per year on the basis of brown coal, rock salt, and lime. This leads me already to the answer to your question. 4 tons of brown coal are necessary to substitute one ton of oil. However, this is not the crucial issue. Crucial is the fact that we have brown coal, but not oil. This is why we now support brown coal and develop the carbochemical industry to produce plastics and rubber. The second way of exploiting brown coal consists of using it as a source of energy. Currently our grid has a capacity

of 18,000 megawatts, on the basis of brown coal in fact.

Fidel Castro: This is eight to nine times as much energy as we produce. So, 60 million tons of brown coal produce the same as 15 million tons of oil. This is more than what Romania produces.

Erich Honecker: I have picked this example because, under the changed international economic circumstances, for us as a country lacking in raw materials it is certainly more effective to use brown coal for carbochemistry, for coke, town gas. This is a crucial component of the GDR's economic power.

Fidel Castro: But 300 million tons of coal are the same as 75 million tons of oil.

Erich Honecker: At any rate, we don't have the oil, but we have the brown coal. We import 20 million tons of oil per year, which we use primarily for chemical processes. In addition, we import 4 billion cubic meters of natural gas, and we produce 8 billion cubic meters ourselves. However, our domestically produced gas has a low calorie content - ca. 2,000. We use this kind of gas mainly for process energy because it is less well suited for chemical processes.

Hence, the first principle is to use our own raw materials more efficiently for the development of our economy. These are, as mentioned before, brown coal; moreover, the earths for the porcelain industry, which experiences a rapid development, both china and porcelain for technical use actually. We have the earths for developing the glass industry - we were presented the thermopanes in the *Palast*, but glass is mainly used for house building. We have great deposits of potash. We produce around 3.2 million tons annually, part of it gets exported. In recent years we have increased production by 1 million tons. We also have supplies of uranium, and it is known that uranium-mining is strongly developed. The uranium is mined by a German-Soviet company. Uranium can be used for peaceful and for non-peaceful purposes.

This is already it as far as our own supplies are concerned. We have to import oil, gas, ore for our metallurgy, various metals, precious metals for the metallurgy, sheet steel, etc. All these questions of improving efficiency and quality, with which the party is concerned in its entire work, played a role in the discussions with the first district secretaries, not only regarding better exploitation of these raw materials, but, relatedly, for a more efficient development of certain pace-setting industries. The production and processing of brown coal are certainly pace-setting for the development of our economy.

Fidel Castro: How long are the supplies

going to last?

Erich Honecker: Until the year 2000 and beyond. Supplies for the next 30 years are ascertained. We don't have to worry about that. Our greatest worries concern the raw materials that we don't have such as oil and gas, gold, silver, nickel, wood, etc.

Fidel Castro: Why do you need gold?

Erich Honecker: For microelectronics, for example. Of course the processing of these raw materials is pace-setting, but especially the development of microelectronics. At this year's Leipzig spring fair, the visitors were very surprised by the triumph of microelectronics in a several of the GDR's industries, e.g. in machine tool engineering, where it plays a very important role in the context of automating entire production processes, in the car industry, through the use of industrial robots, in the rolling mill industry, certainly in measurement technology, in the gadget industry, in ship and crane building. In our republic, almost every industry witnesses the triumphant march of microelectronics. This is necessary since 95 to 99 percent of the increase in industrial production is supposed to be achieved through increasing labor productivity.

Fidel Castro: Microelectronics and higher productivity will make up for the workers that you are lacking.

Erich Honecker: Indeed, we are saving 300 million man-hours per year because of technological improvements and the scientific management techniques. In one year we saved 167,000 workers simply by increasing labor productivity. Despite the crisis of the capitalist world market, despite the price increases national income on average grew by 4% annually within the COMECON, industrial production by 5 to 5.5%. Overall net income grew by 4%, those of workers and employees by 4.7%. Retail sales are up by 4% on average. This could only be achieved because of the division of labor within the COMECON, especially with the Soviet Union, and the strong increase in the productivity of the working people of the GDR.

Now I'd like to tell you how we managed to achieve such an increase in labor productivity. This is possible because we have a standardized socialist system of education; almost every child of our people goes to kindergarten, all attend the 10-class polytechnic secondary school. This not only leads to a higher level of general education, but creates a better basis for professional training as well. The best get sent to the universities and technical colleges.

Since the German Democratic Republic came into existence 1.4 million skilled

workers have graduated from the universities and technical colleges. Without the high level of education among workers, without the good professional training for everyone, without the fact that under the worker and peasant power 1.4 million people attended universities and technical colleges such an economic and hence social development of the GDR would not have been possible. This is the reason why the GDR belongs to the ten most powerful industrial countries. Stalin's slogan: "The cadres take all decisions." still holds true. This is the only way to develop the various branches of our economy: electrical engineering/electronics, metallurgy, scientific equipment-building, the shipyard industry, mechanical engineering, the chemical and the optical industry, etc., of course the ceramics industry as well.

When you are planning your IIInd Party congress—and you mentioned that the cement factory with an output of 1.6 million tons of cement per year will play an important role, it is the biggest cement factory in Latin America, and many new factories have been built in Cuba—our experience has been, and this is all I can speak of, that one has to educate the cadres and rely on them. The issue is not only discipline at work and making full use of working hours, but also to achieve a balance between the scientific-technical cadres and the cadres with good professional training, who know their trade, who are loyal politically and skilled workers as well. This is the secret that allows the GDR to defend the position that it has gained.

We discussed all these issues at the meeting with the district secretaries and explained that only through the further dynamic development of the GDR's economy we can ensure our social policy and the comprehensive strengthening of the GDR against attacks by our imperialist enemies. This is the case simply because here people have the tendency to compare. For them, socialism has to be more attractive than capitalism. Since you can get three of the FRG's TV channels here, but only two of the GDR, the actual situation is decisive.

The last ten years have witnessed the biggest housing program ever in the history of our country. Between 1971 and 1976 we have built or modernized 603,000 apartments. This is the final year of the 1976-1980 five-year plan, and in compliance with the decision of the IXth Party congress we will have built or modernized 750,000 apartments, 510,000 of them with the help of apartment factories; of course this is a huge housing program since, for every new household, the equipment, i.e. floor covering, drapes, furniture, etc. has to be added.

Fidel Castro: Where do you get the wood for the furniture from?

Erich Honecker: We fell 7 million cubic meters of solid timber per year ourselves, the forestry ministry wants to increase the output to 8 million. The rest of the wood are imports, particularly from the Soviet Union. But we do not only use wood. For the furniture, we increasingly use plastics, rubber, etc. We make chipboards from wood shavings and import chipboards. Sometimes the furniture looks as if it was made from oak or birch or walnut, or even from African walnut, from precious woods. Yet actually it is film produced in our factories that gives that impression. Our Party printerries produce film, and this wood has proven to be of higher quality than natural wood. Various corrosives have been used for testing. The material lasts.

The housing program is the centerpiece of our social policy. Moreover, we are in the process of introducing gradually the 40-hour workweek while retaining the 5-day workweek. We have increased minimum vacation from 15 and 18 to 21 days, we have taken special measures concerning the protection and support for mother and child and the family. We have increased the paid leave for mothers for the first child to six months, it used to be six weeks, and to one year for the second child.

Fidel Castro: This country will become a real anthill.

Erich Honecker: See, Fidel, you must proceed from the conditions in your country, we from those in ours. We are building socialism under different conditions. I wouldn't mention this at all if the development of our peace-oriented foreign policy and anti-imperialist solidarity weren't closely related to the issue of the further shaping of the developed socialist society and intellectual-cultural life.

At the same time we have to set aside considerable resources not only for international solidarity with the peoples of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, etc., but also for our defense, the development of the National People's Army, the army, the air force, and the navy. It is known that our army is hardly small, and it is equipped with the whole range of state-of-the-art weaponry with which the Soviet troops in the GDR are equipped, too.

We explained all these tasks openly before the Party and at the same time said: if we fulfill them we will be able to keep the prices for basic consumption goods, rents, and services stable. All this is worked through by the Party, discussed with the people.

I can say that this year we are noting a

great improvement concerning qualitative economic indicators, especially with regard to the increase in labor productivity. This leads me to our Xth Party congress. We have discussed political-ideological issues, we have explained openly the basic economic issues that have to be mastered. We have decided that what matters is to consolidate and gradually expand our social achievements. Now it is up to the Party and the people to fulfill these tasks.

Because of the results we already have in hand we are very optimistic. My speech before the first district secretaries was read out to 150,000 party activists, and then these issues were discussed within the entire Party. Each basic organization has an action plan for realizing the political-ideological, economic, and cultural goals.

In the economic field the working people of more than 120 combines have made it their task to bring an additional 2 to 3 daily productions to the plan, with the same amount of raw materials and other inputs if possible.

We have 16.9 million citizens in our republic. Following the principle of individual selection, which says that the best should belong to the Party, we have 2.1 million members and candidates. 56% of them are workers. For the first time in the Party's history 20% belong to the scientific-technical intelligentsia. This means more than 450,000 scientists, technicians, graduates of the universities and technical colleges are Party members. This enables the Party to fulfill the tasks explained before. According to a decision taken at the 12th session of the Central Committee, for every 800 members there will be an elected delegate.

We are deeply convinced that in connection with the open discussion within the Party surrounding the Party congress, with the help of the dialogue between the Party members and the entire citizenry, in the year 1980 the conditions for formulating at the Party congress another program for the development of the GDR until the year 1985 will be created. Here we envision an average annual increase in labor productivity of 4% for the years 1981 to 1985, and of 5% per year in industrial production. The figures for income, net income, retail sales, for investment, housing, and other social programs will correspond to that.

We thus fight for the realization of our Party program, adopted at the IXth Party congress, by setting ourselves the goal of further shaping the developed socialist society and creating the conditions for a gradual transition to communism.

I apologize if my explanations have been too extensive. There were some ques-

tions, which perhaps can be answered later in more detail. These questions concern problems in the development of the GDR. Just like the comradeship between the Cuban Communist Party and the German Socialist Unity Party is the centerpiece of our friendship, the Party is the decisive force in your country. It couldn't be otherwise. We thus create the basis for the further development of the relations between the German Democratic Republic and socialist Cuba.

Fidel Castro: We have a Communist Party, but haven't built socialism yet; you have a Socialist Unity Party and are already building Communism.

Erich Honecker: This is the dialectic. Moreover, this is always connected with what you have said before. There are different ways to Communism. The important thing is to actually pursue these paths. Then it is no longer decisive how the party calls itself. All of us who are sitting here come from the German Communist Party (KPD), from the Communist youth organization. Through the unification of Social Democrats and Communists we became the German Socialist Unity Party. Now we have already developed so far that we think of Communism. You first thought of Communism and called your party Communist Party.

Fidel Castro: It's Karl Marx's fault. I have listened carefully to your explanations because we can still benefit more from the GDR's experience. That's what I was thinking of when you talked about the system of education. With respect to some things the conditions in your country are different from those in ours. There are some issues where we can use your experience. We have to make an effort in that regard.

In the realm of professional training there is still a lot of room for improvement.

Our situation, though, is very different from yours. Let us compare just a few figures. You produce nine times as much electricity as we do, and you consume 16 times as much wood. These are only two examples. We face severe constraints concerning raw materials and have no energy sources, neither gas nor oil. We don't even have wood. We are asking the Soviet comrades to establish a Cuban colony in Siberia for the production of wood.

Erich Honecker: You can get it. The Bulgarians are there. We also got an invitation, but we are lacking workers.

Fidel Castro: You should transfer this invitation to us.

Erich Honecker: Agreed.

Fidel Castro: Then we make the deal together. In the Soviet Union, people think that the Cubans can't work in Siberia be-

cause of the cold. But thousands of Cubans are in the South of Angola, in the trenches, for months. Why shouldn't they be able to work in Siberia? I am convinced that they can work there, and we are having discussions along these lines with Comrade Baibakov and various personalities in the Soviet Union. However, they doubt that we can stand the cold.

Erich Honecker: If we can stand the heat, why shouldn't you be able to stand the cold?

Fidel Castro: There are remote areas, where they kept prisoners, but that doesn't matter.

Erich Honecker: There are vast areas, and we got such an offer, too. We couldn't accept it for the reasons mentioned before. Therefore we have a well-developed forestry [sector]. Unfortunately, you don't, for objective reasons, and what we can't get, we have to substitute through chemistry. Yet what it does not produce are the silicon chips for microelectronics, the microprocessors.

Fidel Castro: We have silicon.

Erich Honecker: We have silicon en masse. We control the whole silicon chain with the help of our scientists. We have produced the multispectrum camera at Zeiss. When Comrade [Gunter] Mittag met Schmidt [on 17 April 1980 in Bonn], he claimed that our camera was better than the American one. We are not modest as far as our productive capabilities are concerned. However, apart from that, what is actually crucial are the cadres.

Fidel Castro: Where do you produce that camera?

Erich Honecker: In Jena. But in Dresden, the industry is very powerful, and the institute for microelectronics is located there.

I have yet to fulfill an honorable task. On behalf of our Party's Central Committee, the Council of State, and the Council of Ministers, I would like to invite a party and government delegation of the Republic of Cuba under the leadership of Comrade Fidel Castro to visit the German Democratic Republic. Our people would be pleased if Fidel visited the GDR.

Fidel Castro: The next time, I will be more experienced and thus able to make better use of my stay with all what I have learned now about microelectronics. I won't go hunting wild pigs, won't go to Rostock, but visit the factories instead. Halle is a very nice area, it has young cities, sports facilities, a new swimming bath, a very good wine tavern, and a very big enterprise, Leuna. There I saw the militia branches, this is a very interesting spot for visitors. I always think of Halle. It was very nice there. In

Dresden, I had a chance to see the marks left by the war. I was told, however, that everything has been removed. I think that this was a mistake. One should have left one devastated district as it was.

I am pleased to accept your invitation to visit the GDR.

(End of the official talks: 6:35 p.m.)

[Source: *Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR im Bundesarchiv* (Berlin), DY 30 J IV 2/201/1365; obtained by C.F. Ostermann; translation for CWIHP by Ostermann and Holger Schmidt.]

**Transcript of Meeting between U.S. Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr., and Cuban Vice Premier Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, Mexico City, 23 November 1981**

Embassy of USSR to Republic of Cuba	TOP SECRET Copy No.____ Ser. No. 544 8 December 1981
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**CC CPSU**

Attached please find a stenographic record received by the Soviet Ambassador from C. R. Rodriguez of his conference with U.S. Secretary of State Alexander A. Haig which took place in Mexico City on 23 November of this year.

Attachment: original in Spanish, 38 pages, and translation consisting of 26 pages; this address only.

AMBASSADOR OF THE USSR  
TO THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA  
/s/ V. VOROTNIKOV

[attachment]

Translated from Spanish

CONFERENCE OF DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA CARLOS RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ WITH U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE ALEXANDER HAIG, IN MEXICO,  
23 NOVEMBER 1981  
"YEAR OF THE 20TH ANNIVERSARY OF VICTORY AT PLAYA GIRON"

(Stenographic record, State Council)

Carlos R. Rodriguez. [Mexican Foreign Minister] Jorge [Castaneda], why don't

you stay with us a while? I'd like to make some introductory remarks.

Jorge Castaneda. Okay.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. Just one more minute (spoken in English). Can you sit with us for a little while?

Jorge Castaneda. Of course.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. Just a second (spoken in English).

It seems to me necessary and fitting that we express the thanks of the Cuban government to the government of Mexico for the kind intentions it has displayed in making the conduct of this meeting possible.

When the government of Mexico communicated this suggestion to us, we immediately expressed our agreement. Indeed, this was a difficult moment, inasmuch as, in the entire period of our revolution, we have never encountered such a torrent of accusations and threats against our country, and besides that we knew that our counterpart would be the Secretary of State, one of the very most active exponents of this trend, Mr. Haig himself. Notwithstanding, we consider that this meeting comports with the principles to which we have adhered since the moment of victory of the Cuban Revolution and its ascendance to power.

We have never refused to engage in dialogue. We have always considered that dialogue must take place in conditions of equality and mutual respect, and, for our part, we approach dialogue in the light of respect for principles which, from our point of view, are not subject to debate.

We have had contacts with the American government over the course of these years: contact with the Ford administration, and the Carter administration, on parallel levels. There were moments of rapprochement. And then circumstances arose which cut short that rapprochement.

In our message to the government of Mexico, we wanted to say that, from our side, we are in complete accord with the ideas expressed yesterday by President Lopez-Portillo, who called for an end to the verbal terrorism which has been widely utilized by both sides in the recent past, and for a beginning to the process of detente.

From our standpoint, within the framework of these principles to which we adhere, we consider that this is possible, and with these intentions we have come to this meeting, which has not been easy, at which discussion will take place over the resolution of problems that have deteriorated to the brink of confrontation, but which, in our opinion, can find a solution that is acceptable not only for bilateral relations, but for relations in all of this region, provided that both sides will demonstrate respect for each

other and the rights of each.

Alexander Haig. I applaud you for your outstanding introduction. For the past some time I have been following your pre-eminent career.

I also am very grateful to President Lopez Portillo for the invitation, which he made several months ago to President Reagan, to function as a party assisting in these negotiations.

Jorge Castaneda. As a messenger.

Alexander Haig. We don't have an adequate expression for "assisting party" and therefore, if you prefer, one may say "messenger" or "bridge."

(Jorge Castaneda leaves the room).

In Washington, we consider that this is a very fitting occasion for our meeting, because, indeed, we are going through a critical moment in the history of these twenty-odd difficult years. The only course open to us leads to the requirement that we make a choice. In any event, we believe that it is essential to conduct negotiations between the two governments prior to proceeding further.

Prior to the commencement of this meeting, I already expressed to Jorge our appreciation for this constructive initiative, which has made it possible to discuss our circumstances and, beginning with this, our first meeting, to forge ahead in an examination of the questions which are a cause of concern to both countries.

I'm very grateful that you have come from a long distance to this unofficial, secret meeting. From our side, we intend to hold it secret.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. That is consistent with our wishes. We have decided to do the same.

Alexander Haig. I have been involved with these problems for a greater portion of my time that you might suppose. In the beginning, I started working in Washington under President John Kennedy. After the so-called missile crisis I was an assistant to Cyrus Vance and well remember those difficult days which followed upon that crisis, and the actions taken by each side against the other which, in the final analysis, brought to you, instead of potentially dangerous consequences, a period of relative tranquility. Then, beginning in 1975-76, for various reasons, matters began to go very poorly and have continued to deteriorate. And now we have come to a crossroads which, by all indications, even by a most modest appraisal, may be described as dangerous.

Looking at our relations in all of their manifestations during the course of the past twenty years makes it evident to me that the difficulties, the beginning to which occurred

in 1975 under my former colleagues Ford and Kissinger, and also the domestic situation in the United States created under the influence of Vietnam and the Watergate scandal - that it was these, and not only ordinary geopolitical reasons, that formed the basis for a process of continual worsening in relations and growing repercussions, which I regard as very dangerous factors in the cause of international peace.

At that time, I was located abroad, but nevertheless discussed the question in detail with Kissinger and Ford. At that time they were not in a position to achieve a general consensus in the United States with regard to support of a policy that they considered correct at that moment. Subsequently, the Ford presidency dialectically reflected the spiritual condition of the American people after the Vietnam War and Watergate.

All that has changed now. Now any disposition of forces gives rise to a counter-measure. That is what has happened in this case. These days our national spirit has significantly strengthened, allowing the attainment of unprecedented levels of military expenditures, and simultaneously creating a readiness to come to terms with limitations in the social and economic sphere. That spirit is developing into an ever greater growth of the desire to come to a solution of international conflicts which the American people regard as a threat to peace.

In that which concerns the United States and Cuba, it seems to me, in essence, that we never had any tensions as a result of ethnic or spiritual conflicts. To the contrary. Historically, Americans and Cubans were very close and had good relations, relations based on mutual respect. However, due to objective reality - founded or unfounded - the people of the United States regard the chain of events as a challenge to their vital national interests, as intervention. This situation has come about during an extended course of time, beginning in 1975 and continuing right up to this day. First Angola, then Ethiopia, South Yemen, the threat to North Yemen, and in all of this Cuba has played a role.

Beginning in 1978, we have seen a renewal in our hemisphere of actions characteristic of the beginning of the 1960s. These have been regarded by the people as an unacceptable intervention from the point of view of the interests of the United States. That is what it was like in the 1960s. In the beginning of the 1970s there came a period of calm. Then an increase in tensions began anew. In our subjective assessment, all this does not differ so significantly from relations with the Soviet Union and Soviet actions.

After the missile crisis, we went through a long period of tensions. The situation improved at the end of 1969, even in spite of the conflict in Vietnam and the role of the Soviet Union in that conflict, which was major, candidly speaking, major. I was located there at that time and believe that Americans came to the conclusion that matters in that situation were handled improperly. That was an attempt to resolve a problem arising exclusively out of conceptions of a struggle for so-called social justice between two parts of Vietnam, at the same time as it was necessary to approach the problem from the point of view of relations between the superpowers who, in essence, made the war possible. Americans drew from this the conclusion that domestic [internal? indiginous?--ed.] forces should create the conditions - either by peaceful means or through the shedding of blood - to provide for their future. Just operating exclusively on their own resources - well-founded or otherwise - they can express their concerns and the state of mutual relations among the people. I can say that the United States adheres to exactly this position in relation to Central America.

I do not believe that President Reagan has some kind of preconceived notion regarding the social system in Cuba. This must be determined by the people of Cuba.

Our capability for coexistence, notwithstanding ideological conflicts, is manifested most graphically in relations with other Communist regimes: China, Yugoslavia and the growing number of countries in Eastern Europe. Notwithstanding all of the Soviet rhetoric to the contrary, the problem is not here. In other words, in their judgment about everything, they ascribe our difficulties with you to ideological dissatisfaction on the part of the United States in relation to the political system in Cuba.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. It is good that we are here together (spoken in English).

Alexander Haig. I was saying that we are looking at the relationship between the global activity of the Soviet Union and the local activity of Cuba.

We are capable of arithmetic and know that one third of your resources are provided by the Soviet Union: everything that relates to transportation, equipment, materials, all of the assets and means necessary for sustenance of the Cuban economy.

On the other hand, in 1975 we were witnesses to a situation which subjectively led us to conclude that the Soviet leadership assessed the changes which took place in our country as changes of a geopolitical character - I am talking about Watergate and the war in Vietnam. This was abundantly

clear in the widening of activity in Africa, Southeast Asia, and in Northwest and Western Asia. In this manner, there exists a tendency - correct or mistaken - to believe that an agreement exists between Moscow and Havana in connection with various international activities, at least a tacit one, if not explicit. All this has created a mood in the United States which brought Mr. Reagan to power.

We are closely following public opinion polls, and I can assure you that the mood of the people in the United States is definitely militating toward a change in our relations with Cuba, a change that is not positive for Cuba, but which regards Cuba as a threat. I assume that there is room here for some subjective misstatement, but this is the fact of the matter.

I suppose that any leader comes to power having certain fixed opinions about things, and President Reagan is no exception. Maybe he will turn out to be an exception, if you consider the recent past, and his understanding of how to fulfill his mission. But I can assure you, that he is a man of peace, a man who wants to relieve the people from the burden of armaments, a man who does not oppose social transformations. His approach to the conflicts at the Cancun Conference, and his initiative in connection with the basic direction of developments in the Caribbean Basin, should serve as a reference point. Pursuant to his instructions, I have met with the leaders of Eastern Europe and representatives of the Angolan regime. In my opinion, all of this attests to the fact that we are talking not about ideology, but about a geopolitical problem. And specifically, due to this understanding, he is ready to pursue matters to the most dangerous line. In recent months he has been occupied with an examination of this problem. We are thoroughly familiar with the reality of Cuba in the area of security, economics and defense. We understand well the vulnerability of Cuba. We have discussed this problem with the Soviet Union for a long time. They understand perfectly well the meaning of these discussions and are aware of the limitations on activities, transgression of which could lead to confrontation between the superpowers, for which we are prepared.

At the same time, we have analyzed with great care the needs of Cuba, in the sense of its hopes for the future. It seems to us that the Cuban people have suffered a great deal from sacrifices imposed from abroad. We believe that the possibility still exists for a normalization of its relations not only with the United States, but with all of this hemisphere.

You are aware, Mr. Minister, that in the developing countries of the so-called "Third World," there are many leaders who today are turning away from the Soviet Union's arms, its technical assistance, and trade with it, from participation in economic relations, where the reward is measured on a scale of sacrifice. You yourselves suffer from this reality and have a right to participate in international trade, including trade with the United States. I know that President Reagan considers trade with Cuba a possibility. We must discuss this in the atmosphere of mutual respect to which you referred, which must be the goal of an independent peace, and to do this it is necessary to account for geopolitical reality.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. Thank you very much.

I have listed with great interest to the exposition of principals laid forth by the esteemed Secretary of State. At the outset I will speak to two points. First of all, to your words about the position of Reagan on the question of bilateral relations with Cuba and its common position on the problem of peace and problems confronting humanity today.

We have keenly felt the danger of the approach to this problem by Reagan and his group of leaders from an ideological point of view. Speaking candidly, in the public pronouncements, first and foremost of Reagan, we perceive a great ideological content. And we have been greatly surprised by its manifestation in the declarations of the Secretary of State as well. And we have been surprised more than once because, judging from information received from prominent European leaders, we had gained a different impression about the positions of Mr. Haig on international questions, which we had considered to be more pragmatic. That does not mean that they are not based on principle, only that they are more pragmatic, not so much determined by the influence of ideology.

What we have heard gives us cause for reflection.

The second element that I consider to be important inheres in the treatment of the mutual feelings of the people of the United States and Cuba. I am fully in accord with that.

Despite 22 years of continuous sharp exchanges, there is no anti-American sentiment in Cuba. It does not exist among the people, and we, the leaders, similarly do not rule with anti-American sentiments. We can say this absolutely categorically. This is seen in the course of any meetings of Americans with our people, irrespective of their posts and positions.

I am satisfied with the opportunity -

after the words just spoken by the Secretary of State - to attribute the current intensification of our conflicts to geopolitical reasons. And I would hope to possess all of the necessary eloquence, within the short time available to us, in order to attempt to prove that the geopolitical reality is not what it is made out to be in this case.

I am aware that the Secretary of State is a great lover of philosophy. Thus, even in the seventeenth century, since the time of Hume, it has been considered proven that the factual appearance of "B" following the appearance of "A" does not signify that "A" necessarily is the cause of the appearance of "B." I will attempt, in the briefest of fashion, in order to avoid tiring you, to describe our interpretation of events, beginning in 1975.

We became involved in Angola without the slightest wish to establish our military presence there. Speaking of military presence, I have in mind the presence of regular troops. In sending the first 150 people to Angola, we had absolutely no conception of what would become of the events in that country. This I can state to you unequivocally.

We had long maintained our ties with the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] in its struggle against Portuguese colonialism. President [Agostinho] Neto requested our assistance in the preparation of groups which led to organization of the Angolan army. With this aim we dispatched 150 persons in three schools: one located in the south, the other in the northeast, and the third around Luanda. The subsequent development of events ensued as follows: suddenly we received news from Neto that they had been attacked by forces from Zaire and troops of Holden Roberto from the north, and by South Africa from the south.

I can assure you unequivocally, inasmuch as I played a direct role in this matter, that when the decision to dispatch Cuban forces into Angola was made, we communicated nothing about it to the Soviet Union. We were not even aware of its point of view on that account. And we had absolutely no idea of the number of troops that it would be necessary to send. In this manner, the first group was dispatched when the forces in the southern theater advanced more than 400, almost 500 kilometers from the Namibian border, approaching Lobito and Benguela, and the forces of Zaire were located 30 kilometers from Luanda. In this situation we sent at first not regular troops, but rather groups of commandos.

It is true that subsequently an agreement was reached between Cuba and the So-

viet Union regarding the activity of the forces, inasmuch as the Soviet Union already had an obligation to Angola to supply arms and it became necessary to speed up its implementation. As a result, we reached an agreement, and we don't deny this, under which the Soviet Union proceeded to dispatch certain types of weapons, and we sent people who were capable of using them.

And thus it was. When we became involved in the events in Angola, we had absolutely no concept of the geopolitical conceptions about the importance of Angola in light of the interests of the Soviet Union. We saw in Angola a friendly country, a group of revolutionaries struggling against colonialism, against South Africa, and embarked on all of this.

And then Ethiopia stepped to the front of the line. How did all of this happen there?

We established relations with Ethiopia at the request of Somalia. We had maintained no diplomatic ties with Ethiopia, and we harbored serious doubts in relation to the process that was taking place in that country. At the time, the leader of the revolution was not Mengistu. Power was in the hands of Teferi Bante. And I was personally assigned to establish contact in Colombo [Sri Lanka], where I headed the Cuban delegation at a conference of the heads of state and governments of the non-aligned countries [in August 1976], to establish contact with Teferi Bante and Ali Bukarom, at that time Vice President of Somalia, for the purpose of attempting to reconcile them among themselves, which turned out to be impossible because of the refusal of Teferi Bante.

Subsequently, Vice President [of Somalia Gen. Mohamed Ali] Samantar, simultaneously occupying the post of Minister of Defense of Somalia, came to Cuba. I was in charge of the preliminary negotiations with him. In their course he addressed himself with a request for military assistance from Cuba for an attack on Ethiopia, claiming that that country represented the greatest danger to socialism in North Africa. At that moment we had no idea that our troops would ever end up in Ethiopia. We had a group in Somalia, which was rendering assistance in the creation of a militia, and the Soviet Union had armed forces in Somalia and was utilizing the Somali port of Berbera as a base for its navy. This is how the close cooperation with Somalia came about.

Samantar had a discussion with Fidel and Raul Castro, who counseled in favor of restraint and the conduct of negotiations.

During his visit to Africa [in March 1977], Fidel Castro met first with Siad Barre and then in Ethiopia with Mengistu, and agreed with them to conduct a historic meet-

ing in Aden. That meeting was attended by Mengistu and his assistants, Siad Barre and his assistants, Ali Rubayi, who at that time was the president of [South] Yemen, Fattah Ismail and Ali Nasir, who is now the president of South Yemen, and Cuba was represented by Fidel Castro and myself. Fidel worked - and when I say Fidel, it is because he was at the center of that meeting - from 10:00 p.m. to 7:00 in the morning, trying to achieve a consensus among the parties. However, this proved impossible to attain, because Siad Barre unequivocally rejected all of the suggestions presented at the meeting. While the meeting did not lead to an agreement, nevertheless Siad Barre promised not to attack Ethiopia. And then, when Siad Barre attacked Ethiopia, we considered ourselves obligated to Mengistu, whom we had persuaded to attend the peace conference which had taken place in Aden.

One fine day, all of this will come to light. You can believe me or not, but some day this will be common knowledge.

The outward geopolitical character of these events is completely at odds with the essence of the true facts. I had the privilege to accompany Fidel Castro at the time of his meetings with the leadership of the Soviet Union. These were attended by Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, who had just returned from Africa, Gromyko, and Rusakov. And it was we who insistently urged the need to render military assistance to Ethiopia. This was the situation, to be distinguished from that in Angola, because in this case preliminary negotiations were taking place. But in these negotiations it was Fidel Castro himself who first advocated military assistance. History will bring all of this to light.

I did not understand what was said about Yemen, because our forces have never been there. Subsequently we spoke about Nicaragua, where the same is occurring.

In [South] Yemen, with the assistance of a small number of specialists, we helped to organize the militia. In this connection I can assure you that if the war, which Yemen began, did not turn into an extended war between the North and the South, this was mainly owing to the position of Cuba, which not only played no role in it, but which categorically and completely opposed the war, and the current position of the commanding army of Yemen, which surrendered all of its positions . . . was in large part connected with these events. [ellipsis in original--ed.]

In this fashion, it would be desirable, that in connection with this everything should be entirely clear - I am interested first and foremost in the logic of the develop-

ment of events, namely, the logic.

Let us turn now to Latin America, where, as you say, beginning in 1975, there has been a return to events characteristic of the 1960's.

As you indicate, there was a tranquil period in relations between the United States and Cuba. I would say, as you did, that this tranquil period was interrupted by the events in Angola. I believe that this was connected to the pride of Secretary of State Kissinger, who had his own plan for a solution for Angola, which did not include the government of Agostinho Neto[:]; this is aptly described by [ex-CIA officer John] Stockwell in his book [*In Search of Enemies*], which nobody could deny and Kissinger, having maintained ties with us, from that moment became our most sworn enemy.

The administration of Carter came to power and brought to life a prolonged and difficult process. We believe that the principal actors in the Carter administration understood the gist of events in Angola, but that, unfortunately, the information of the CIA about Shaba was completely mistaken.

On the very day [25 May 1978] when I was to meet, and did meet with Cyrus Vance in New York, one hour beforehand President Carter delivered a speech in Chicago, in which he laid on us the responsibility for the events in Shaba, in relation to which we had not the slightest connection and in respect to which we even conducted serious discussions with our Angolan friends, warning them about the danger of placing the forces of the Shaba gendarme at the border. That ruined everything.

And then came Nicaragua.

I suggest to you, Mr. Secretary of State, that you would be committing a serious error in allowing a geopolitical mirage to impel you toward a mistaken interpretation. I wanted to note, for example, that the mistake in Shaba had a most negative result. Beginning in 1976, quietly, saying nothing to anybody, and without any pressure on us, we began to pull our people out of Angola, inasmuch as we considered that more of them were located there than was necessary to ensure minimal security for that country during the period in which we were organizing their armed forces. The events in Shaba forced Neto to address us with a desperate request, not only to refrain from removing personnel, but to return a portion of those personnel that we had already removed. For this reason, we now have more people in Angola than were there in 1976.

As for Central America. It is not only we who say that it would be a mistake to conceive of that which has happening now in Central America as a result of external

subversive activity; even such moderate government leaders as Lopez-Portillo are completely open in their adherence to this view. I believe that he knows [Venezuelan President] Carlos Andres Perez. I believe that Carlos Andres Perez is a right-wing Social Democrat and holds to the same assessment. All who, during the course of many years, have engaged in analysis of the circumstances in Central America, all who, during the course of many years have studied it, have come to the opinion that this situation is inflammable, naturally inflammable.

The circumstances of the struggle against Somoza gave rise to these events. We helped the Sandinista front in every way that we could, with all of the means that we were able to deploy. But we were not the only ones who helped them. You know that there were several governments in Latin America who helped them substantially more than we did. Thus, this was a situation, which was regarded by Latin America as a fatal tumor which it was necessary to remove.

We are close friends with the Sandinistas. [But] It would be a serious mistake to believe that the Sandinistas rely on the advice that we give them. On the contrary, they have a very clear concept of that which they are required to do.

We believe that the Sandinistas are inclined to preserve in Nicaragua a pluralistic system. It is known that several of the Sandinistas want to carry out a revolution that is deeper than that which exists at the moment. This is a fact. And we always speak the truth as we understand it. I believe that they understand perfectly well that it will be difficult and undesirable to hasten the process of intensifying the revolution. I believe it is correct what you said yesterday before your departure from Washington, to the effect that the possibility of negotiations with the Sandinistas is not to be excluded, although I am disturbed by your pronouncement, which bore the resemblance of a threat directed at Nicaragua, that time is running short. I distinctly regret your making that statement, and we can exchange our opinions on that score.

We are rendering and will continue to render to Nicaragua our solidarity and support, inasmuch as we consider this our obligation and our right. We have no intention, regardless of the consequences, to refuse the solidarity which we consider to be right. I believe that Cuba is not in the slightest degree interfering in Nicaragua. We have there 2,759 people, of which 2,045 are teachers, 240 are technicians, 159 are doctors, and 66 are nurses. We have no forces in Nicaragua. We have there several dozen military

advisors of various categories, rendering assistance in the organization of the armed forces and training of the Nicaraguan army. That is all that we have there.

When we hear the repeated pronouncements of the esteemed Secretary of State about our dispatch of 500-600 soldiers to Nicaragua, and the statements of other leaders in the United States to the effect that we have there 3,000 military instructors, all of this seems truly absurd to us, inasmuch as, it seems to me, we are in a position to know what we have there. We are prepared to publish a list of those 500 persons, who went there on the day when [U.S. columnists Roland] Evans and [Robert] Novak wrote that in the course of two days, 500 Cubans arrived; we can state their names, the place where they lived in Cuba, and the place where they were teaching in Cuba. We can tell you the places, where they are teaching now. We can publish the names and places of employment of the 2,700 Cubans located in Nicaragua. And this will be easy to verify. It is true that we have there 2,759 persons. This is true. But it can be easily and universally verified, that there are no [Cuban] soldiers in Nicaragua.

It surprises us to hear talk that Cuba has sent arms, which Nicaragua has received for its defense, and that such arms are funneled through Cuba. I have even heard declarations from Mr. Haig himself on this score. If the intelligence services of the United States speak of this, then they speak of what they do not know, for it would be easy for them to verify whence these armaments came, how they were delivered, on what they arrived, in what manner they were followed, and not one of them came through Cuba.

Naturally, we are not inclined to disclose the source from which they came and how they arrived, but we know that the CIA knows how they arrived, in what manner, from where, and how many. So why do they say that it came from Cuba; why do they insist that Cuba is involved in this[?] Cuba is in agreement with the concept that Nicaragua should be armed. Nicaragua has made it completely clear to us, and we share their opinion, that they are arming themselves not because they are next to Honduras, not because they may suffer an attack from El Salvador, and not because Guatemala might participate in an attack against them, but for a combination of these factors, in addition to the threat from the United States. This much is clear. You tell me. I know, that [State Department official Thomas] Enders has stated to the Nicaraguans, that it is absurd for them to arm themselves, inasmuch as the United States can destroy all of it in

the course of a very short period of time. This is true, this is true, it is for sure. However, not one self-respecting small country will reconcile to a demand that it admit to its own destruction without putting up a fight. I think it is necessary to understand this. I think that it should be understood.

El Salvador.

We do not have there, Mr. Haig, we do not have there any troops, nor any military advisors, and we say this to you with the same clarity with which we have spoken to other leaders from different parts of the world. We have declared this and are ready to prove it. We would request to be shown even one instance of an appearance there of these fabled Cuban troops. In those places where Cuban troops are located, they are universally recognized, and in El Salvador they are nowhere to be found, inasmuch as there are no Cuban troops, and no Cuban military advisors there.

We are explaining all of this out of a desire to prevent a dramatic confrontation under circumstances in which it is possible to attain a mutual understanding by means of negotiations. When we say that we are not supplying armed forces to this or another part of the world, we say this not because it would be a violation of the moral principles of Cuba or somehow unlawful. There is one confirmed fact: the United States has troops in various parts of the world. President Reagan has admitted that the USA is rendering support to Afghan counter-revolutionaries located in Pakistan. He has publicly declared this.

Not long ago the administration forced Congress to repeal the "Clark Amendment" on the grounds that it wanted a free hand for the purpose of rendering assistance to [UNITA leader Jonas] Savimbi and other forces operating against the government of Angola. Frankly speaking, we do not understand why the United States, merely because it happens to be, at the present time, one of the most powerful states, can have a right which we, being a small country, do not have. I believe that it is irrational to hold such a position. That is our principal point [*iskhodnaia tochka*], to which we will adhere.

Thus, I have attempted with considerable specificity to prove the absence of geopolitical reasons. We could say the following: What does the "White Book" say? The "White Book" contains certain truths, and certain lies, as well as certain data about the supposed ties between the revolutionaries who are struggling in El Salvador against the right-wing junta, and the Soviet Union. And what is evident from this: the fact that the Soviet Union has absolutely no desire

to involve itself. I am acquainted with colleagues who are noted there. These colleagues exist and are carrying out their obligations. But these colleagues have no power, they are not authorized to bestow the name of the Soviet Union, not one iota. It is clearly visible, that the Soviet Union in no way wants to be entangled in anything which is seen to be a revolutionary process in which it does not desire to participate.

I would like to tell you something in addition to this. Certain American leaders are always expressing the opinion that the Soviet Union acted as a hostile influence between the United States and Cuba, that it fermented in Cuba hostile feelings towards the United States. I could tell you that the opposite is true. Many of the conflicts that we have had with the Soviet Union were occasioned by the acts, words, and positions of Cuba, which did not correspond with the intentions of the Soviet Union in this portion of the world. I believe that nothing worries the Soviet Union more than the course of developments in the situation in Central America and the Caribbean Basin, which could become a new element in the conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. I believe that when Mr. Haig and Mr. Reagan have the opportunity to consult with Fidel Castro, he will tell them about this in greater detail than I can, because, although I have attended many meetings, nevertheless, no one could speak about this problem more than he.

Such are the facts.

And what about our position in relation to the events in El Salvador? At the present time we are in favor of a political solution. A political solution which, naturally, we understand to be more or less encompassed in the plan which was announced yesterday by President Lopez-Portillo: the possibility of convening a Founding Assembly, but with the participation of all the forces involved in the conflict, including the Revolutionary-Democratic Front and the Front for the National Liberation of Farabundo Marti. Such is the position of Cuba.

We are prepared for any compromise in this direction, a compromise in which, as we understand it, the other parties will also be committed, including the United States. We must all take these obligations upon ourselves. We can discuss the extent of our participation in all of this. In this connection our intentions were communicated by Comrade Fidel Castro to President Lopez Portillo, to the Deputy Chairman of the Socialist International Vishnevsky, to the chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party of Canada [Edward] Broadbent, communi-

cated in a letter to [Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliot] Trudeau during the course of an exchange of correspondence with him. In this I repeat that for which we are prepared.

You touched upon our difficulties and our vulnerability. This is true. We are vulnerable, and our people has suffered a great deal from the American blockade. You call this an embargo. We consider ourselves to be blockaded by the United States. We have suffered physically. Our hospitals at times have been without medicine. We have suffered economically. Three days ago I received a communication from London, in which it was indicated that several companies, due to pressure from the Americans, had difficulty obtaining nickel. The Japanese have repeatedly stated to us, that owing to American pressure, they cannot develop economic relations with us to the extent that they would like to achieve.

We well understand, and Fidel Castro has spoken about this, that if we could improve relations with the United States, then our conditions would be better. The very fact of having the United States as a potential market, located several miles from us, would ease our problems. We would have access to technology that is currently inaccessible to us, we would have access to financing which we do not have, and we believe that this is desirable and possible. But I would like for you to understand our point of view, that we do not intend, for the purpose of achieving that, to sacrifice that which we consider to be our primary principles. Of course, you have not told me, that we must sacrifice them. But I would like to discuss this question as it arises from the concepts of the current administration of the United States. As we understand this matter, we are not being requested to be an ally of the United States or to conform with the social system that exists there. We do not like the social system in the United States. But, naturally, that is the social system of the United States, and the American people are entitled to decide what they must do. In view of all these realities, it follows that we should examine the following principles:

First, the sovereignty of Cuba - the inalienable right, being understood to include territorial sovereignty, including the base at Guantanamo; we have the right to trade with the entire world, including the United States.

Second: we have a right to solidarity with the countries of the "Third World," and in particular, with the countries of Latin America.

Third: our friendship with the Soviet Union. We are friends of the Soviet Union,

close friends. We reject any suggestion that we are an agent of the Soviet Union in any part of the world. I have explained to you the nature of our position on this issue. We not only have real feelings for the Soviet Union, cemented in a common ideology, but also we have received significant assistance from the Soviet Union for our own economic development. Naturally, with that assistance alone we cannot develop our country as quickly as necessary and as we would like to. However, we do not believe that such assistance is incompatible with the establishment of normalized relations between the United States and Cuba.

Alexander Haig. Mr. Rodriguez, I believe this has been a very fruitful exchange. I am certain that you will forgive me, if I do not agree with all of this logic. Several months ago our intervention prevented a serious clash between your forces located in Angola and the South Africans. But the next time it is possible that we will not have such success in stopping their movement with the assistance of our influence.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. But I would say that our forces are located far away from them, and that it was not merely your intervention, but our restraint.

Alexander Haig. I know that. I am aware of that. But they would have advanced further to your bases, and we stopped it. We knew nothing about their operations or about when they would commence. But the fact that they appeared served as a source of information for them concerning the operations of SWAPO [the Southwest African People's Organization]. They even captured a Soviet prisoner, who has not stopped talking to this moment about how he was captured, about the scale of activity and coordination of activities in Angola. He did not exclude anything from his observations.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. But that was not a Cuban prisoner. Correct?

Alexander Haig. Correct. We knew where the Cuban armed forces were located, and we also know, that it would be highly desirable, if Cuba would pull out of Angola. This would help Angola, it would help Cuba, and it would assist in the resolution of the issue over the independence of Namibia and normalization of conditions. This is something that I have discussed with the Soviets, the Angolans, and the governments of the "Front Line," and there is an ever growing opinion, that this is the very thing which you must do.

And moreover, as concerns the events which you described, and the activity of the CIA, I can assure you, that they are in possession of information about military aircraft which has been supplied by you to other

countries. I could furnish you with information about these things which, perhaps, are taking place without the knowledge of some members of the government. That can happen. It has happened at times even in our country, not very often, but in certain instances.

We believe that the presence of Cuba in Nicaragua constitutes a threat to the continent, and in addition, we believe that the activity of Nicaragua in El Salvador likewise constitutes a serious threat. I can assure you categorically that we are in possession of comprehensive proof of such involvement. There isn't the slightest bit of doubt about it. It's a fact. We have photographs, documents, minutes of interrogations and "confirmations" by those interrogated. For this reason, I cannot agree with that which you are telling me. I am not saying that you have no right to say it. You have every right to say what you want to, but we also have a right to draw our own conclusions from the events as we see them. We have proof, and we are telling you about it.

Unfortunately, the time has come, when the rhetorical debate between the United States and Cuba will not solve the problem, and, on the contrary, there is an array of areas in which the sovereignty of Cuba is not in the slightest bit implicated. However, Cuba is exporting revolution and bloodshed on the continent.

We know what you write, we know what you defend, we know what you are talking about, and we believe that it constitutes a threat to peace and stability, and we cannot see it in any other light, inasmuch as we are talking about objective reality.

You complained about the embargo. We have not had an effective embargo, but we can impose one on sugar, on the production of all the products which you use to obtain hard currency. However, we don't want to do that, we don't want to have any other complications. I must inform you of this. You speak of solidarity with the Sandinistas. I believe that you would render to them the greatest form of solidarity, if you would bring the Cubans home, and say to the Sandinistas that they should establish an order that does not violate the rights...

Carlos R. Rodriguez. Return doctors? Teachers? Return three thousand Cubans who...

Alexander Haig. We have a very good account of the doctors, teachers, Angolan veterans and military advisers, their titles, names and past activity.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. It would be interesting to take a look at it.

Alexander Haig. I can assure you that the benign picture that you have painted does not conform to reality. I'm not saying that you don't have a significant number of teachers there, but they are teaching your philosophy to Nicaraguan children, just as they tried to do in Chile. However, we do not agree that you have the right to do that. The Nicaraguans have the right to teach their people what they believe in. You are deeply involved in the Sandinista revolutionary movement, and we suggest that this creates a great risk for us all: for the Cubans, for the hemisphere, and for Nicaragua. We believe that Cuba should reexamine this. Nobody is asking Cuba to humiliate itself; we are not talking about that. We are talking about the conditions of ever increasing bloodshed in Central America.

We believe that the only solution for El Salvador is to allow the Salvadoran people themselves to decide their own fate, that is, by means of the electoral process, in which all sides should participate. A Legislative Assembly would be created, in which the political process would conform completely with the will of the people. But we cannot consent to Nicaragua's intervening in El Salvador under the mask of solidarity or any other revolutionary ruse, as it has been doing for quite some time. And your presence there, your assistance, facilitates this. Just as day follows night, this is the objective reality.

I have no doubts about the facts which you have marshalled with respect to Shaba or the situation in Ethiopia. However, the question arises, on what basis do Cuban forces continue to be located in Angola, performing various functions, and in Ethiopia[?] Why do the regimes want this? I am addressing a serious question to you, not in respect to Ethiopia, but about the situation in Angola.

You say that you are not involved in South Yemen, but I can tell you, that we have counted large and small aircraft, which have flown from Ethiopia to South Yemen, and we have heard radio broadcasts...

Carlos R. Rodriguez. And did you see Cubans as well?

Alexander Haig. We have intercepted radio broadcasts in the Spanish language. I have read them every day. And if it wasn't you, then it was Ethiopians that speak Spanish remarkably well. And for this reason, I am telling you, that all of this activity, be it within the framework of geopolitics or otherwise, has convinced the Americans that it has a geopolitical connection.

Consequently, we must find a solution, if we are interested in peace and stability in the immediate future, we must find a solu-

tion to these problems. Otherwise, we will be required to pursue a different course, which, I believe, after my discussions with you here, would not be desirable for you. I know that the United States also does not want this, but it is prepared, after many years of not being in a position to take any measures, is ready to take them very quickly. Therefore, I am speaking to you of the need to immediately find a solution. I can assure you, that these solutions would not impinge the honor, sovereignty, or integrity of Cuba or the Cuban people. Nobody wants that. That would be foolish. And it is an objective fact, that it would be much easier to achieve this by force, but that is not our intention. However, frankly speaking, we believe that time is slipping away.

We have not disclosed to the American public our data or the information that is available to us. You have seen the "White Book," but we have another fifty of them. We have volumes, records of radio broadcasts, data from technical reconnaissance, we have photographs.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. A good factory for "White Books."

Alexander Haig. It's just the first chapter.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. But I understand that you have a good factory for "White Books."

Alexander Haig. Notwithstanding, the President does not want to do this, although he is prepared to do it and very soon. This would incite great enmity, and would stir up emotions even more. I insist that you take seriously what I have told you, and on an assessment that any sound-minded American will be compelled to make in the face of the events I have described. This does not mean that your involvement has not been exactly as you have described it; however, we regard this as a serious threat to our vital interests and the interests of peace and stability in the hemisphere.

If you share my opinion that stability and peace are desirable in the hemisphere, then you can work out a solution that does not compromise your dignity. How could this be accomplished so that nobody even asked you about that? I have already said that it would be necessary to extol the firmness of Cuba and its spirit of self-sacrifice. However, the basic problem in this matter remains the same, about which we are engaged today in the whole world: peaceful changes in the framework of acceptable legality, and not through bloodshed, arms, and not by the means of instigating terrorism and revolution.

And so, if the Cuban Revolution has matured to this point, then that is fine. If

that is not the case, then we are on a path toward confrontation, and soon. I know that this sounds like rhetoric, but believe me, I have examined and reexamined many documents, detailed reconnaissance data, the content of negotiations conducted in all parts of the word; much of may be inexact, and I am certain that there is inexactness in the "White Book," and it could not be otherwise. It has to do with reconnaissance and intercepted documents which, for the most part, we have examined in Colombia, where the involvement of the Cubans was significant, and we did not raise the question about Colombia...

Carlos R. Rodriguez. Let's talk about that as well...

Alexander Haig. Your involvement was significant...

Carlos R. Rodriguez. Not as significant as it was said to be.

Alexander Haig. ...but significant enough to raise problems. And this is occurring also in Guatemala...

Carlos R. Rodriguez. If you will permit me, I will address that later.

Alexander Haig. ...fine, what I am saying is, that we must find a solution and quickly.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. What solution?

Alexander Haig. There must be a solution, because nobody gave Cuba the divine right to interfere in the internal affairs of the countries in this hemisphere, regardless of what arguments may be advanced to justify it. You know that today we have 34 military advisors in El Salvador. And how many does Cuba have in Nicaragua?

Carlos R. Rodriguez. We have there not many more advisors, not many more.

Alexander Haig. We are in possession of intelligence, and you are correct when you say that there are many independent forces in Nicaragua. And they tell us every day what is happening there every day. And what is happening is unacceptable. Regardless of the manner in which you describe it, regardless of what seems to you subjectively as moderation, it cannot be accepted. Anxiety exists in the countries of this hemisphere. There was a time when Cuba held very sound positions in the non-aligned world. However, issues have now arisen concerning its involvement. It is essential that we come to a mutual understanding, otherwise the results may be very serious. And we are not talking about the intervention of American forces against Nicaragua, we are not going to do that. However, we can find no explanation for an army of 50,000 men and a militia of 200,000 men. There is no justification for that.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. Why not?

Alexander Haig. Fine, as countries they have the right to do this, but if they choose this course, then they must pay the price for that choice. And this gives rise to anxiety in all of the countries in the region, and they are bound to oppose it. This constitutes a danger. Wherein lies the necessity for this? I have no information to suggest that any country wants to invade Nicaragua. If you have in mind a handful of Somoza supporters, who are engaged in smuggling in Honduras and who do not even have arms, the government of Honduras has announced that it is attempting to relocate them to another place in order to avoid any pretext for an invasion. And that effort has already been underway for a period of several months. I say to you in complete candor, that time is slipping away from us.

For this very reason, as you are aware, the Mexicans proposed this approach. I have studied all of the negotiations that took place during the time of the Carter administration, and they were nothing but a series of delaying tactics, in order to prevent any progress. And nothing was achieved by that, not a thing. We do not want to establish that kind of a dialogue, you don't want that, and we don't want it. If you are prepared to speak seriously, we are also prepared. But we are in need of a prepared context for discussions and some kind of sign from your side that results will be achieved.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. Inasmuch as we have little time, I will try to be brief, laconic, and objective.

First, you have insisted upon the need for a solution and have expressed the interest of the United States in a solution in which there would be no humiliation of Cuba or threat to the sovereignty of Cuba. We are prepared to search for a solution, and we must come to an agreement at another time about what steps to take, because this involves not only the United States and Cuba, but also the other countries of the region, and the revolutionary forces with their own criteria and points of view. We believe that Mexico could be a uniting link in this matter. We could conduct an even more direct exchange of opinions.

Alexander Haig. Let's maintain contact directly, without intermediaries, as we have done in the past. We could send our ambassador with special authority, General [Vernon] Walters, to Havana. We can meet, in turn, in Havana and New York, because, in my view, we must commence a dialogue immediately.

Carlos R. Rodriguez. I believe that this is important, and we are ready to do it. In addition to this I would like to introduce several clarifications, because certain misun-

understandings can arise.

I do not want at this time to commence a discussion about the facts, although at some point we can also discuss whether there or not there is falsification. When General Walters comes to Cuba, I think that it is important for him to bring with him as much data as possible in order to examine it for the purpose of interpreting these facts.

I remember that the "Bay of Pigs" was brought about by information from people located in Cuba that led the CIA to a mistaken conclusion. As regards your reference to aircraft, I can tell you, that everybody knows what is taking place in Cuba. We have no factions in the government. We have a division of labor. However, the members of the Politburo know everything that the military is doing. And I can assure you that you are telling me things with which I cannot in the slightest bit agree, frankly speaking, not in the slightest degree. About Angola, about Ethiopia. They ask, why are we still located there[?] Because they want us there, and the same in Angola. If, as a result of what is happening there now (we already know about the results of the meeting of the contact group, about the decision of the foreign ministers of Africa, we see that there is an opportunity to achieve a consensus on Namibia, and that there are visible signs of progress), if as a result of a solution to the Namibia issue the Angolans allow us to withdraw our forces, then we are ready to leave there. There is no doubt about this whatsoever. But I am concerned by the fact that we have in Angola not only several thousand soldiers, several tens of thousands of soldiers, but also several thousand construction workers and civilians.

And the information that you are spreading about Nicaragua is a complete falsification. We can discuss all of this with General Walters in detail in the course of several days. We can discuss this, and we can give you all of the details that are of interest to you, because we do not want a confrontation to arise because of a mistake.

We are also prepared for a confrontation. We know that such a confrontation will be traumatic for our people. We have no doubt about this. But neither are we afraid of a confrontation. What we fear is an unnecessary confrontation, in which, as a result of errors by both sides, as a result of an absence of contacts, thousands of Americans and hundreds of thousands of Cubans will perish. This worries us. And I am worried by other elements of interpretation which, I believe, we must discuss. If necessary, I can on any day leave for New York and organize a different, more detailed meeting. But several of your personal interpretations

which, as you say, are also consistent with the interpretations of the President of the United States, cause me great anxiety. For example, I do not believe that the United States has any right to interfere in matters related to the presence of Cuban teachers in Nicaragua. This, and what they are teaching, is a question for the Nicaraguan government to decide. I can assure you, that these are elementary school teachers who can hardly teach Marxist-Leninism. I don't know whether you have ever attempted to read any books about Marxist-Leninism, but it would be very difficult for our 2,700 teachers to teach Marxist-Leninism to little Indians. However, we believe that only the government of Nicaragua, and no other, must decide whether or not they need our teachers. I am convinced of this, because I have had enough discussions with the Nicaraguan leadership and I have also spoken with Fidel, and I know from other discussions, at which I have been present, that the Nicaraguans do not have the slightest desire or interest to intrude in Honduras. They understand perfectly well that this would lead them into a confrontation with the United States, and there would be nothing worse for Nicaragua, than to be pulled into a confrontation with the United States.

We can and must continue our discussion about all these things. You say that time is slipping away from us. Let us use it to the maximum extent. I want to say one thing: Cuba never lies, and Fidel never lies. That which we say, we can prove. I have stated to you what we are prepared to do, where we can achieve a consensus, and where we cannot achieve a consensus. When we say "We are obligated to do it," we are obligated.

You spoke of Colombia. You do not know how these members of M-19 ended up in Cuba. [Colombian] President [Julio-Cesar] Turbay [Ayala] had a telephone conversation with me in which he requested me - requested me! - that we accept in Cuba members of M-19, inasmuch as they had seized a group of ambassadors in the embassy of the Dominican Republic. As a result, they came to Cuba. They were in Cuba, they underwent preparation, just as thousands of others who come to Cuba. Any Latin American who comes to Cuba - member of the intelligentsia, poet, military person - wants us to teach him to use firearms. And we have taught thousands. That is true. And we never conceal the truth, but we have had nothing in common with the training of the group that infiltrated Colombia, and had nothing to do with its arming. The countries who have spoken about this are fully aware of who trained them, who gave them

weapons, and who organized them. I can assure you that Fidel Castro exerted efforts to prevent this adventurism, not for the sake of the government of Turbay, but for the sake of the fate of those young people that we knew would be killed. This was an ill-conceived adventure.

However, as to why Cuba trained the men of M-19. At our initiative, an agreement was reached with [Colombian] President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen, when he came to power, when he again recognized Cuba: we agreed not to help, in any way, any one partisan group, and we fulfilled that agreement. You can ask Alfonso Lopez about this. And we adhered to this under the government of Turbay. And only after the government of Turbay assumed a hostile position in the United Nations, which we, in a geopolitical sense, interpreted as a provocation directed by the United States, only then did we consider ourselves discharged from that agreement.

There is no obligation that we have taken upon ourselves with any country, group or government, that we have failed to honor. This should be clear to the United States.

[Source: *TsKhSD*, f. 5, op. 84, d. 584, ll. 1-27; translation by Bruce McDonald; document obtained by Carter-Brezhnev Project and on file at National Security Archive.]

## RESEARCH IN MOSCOW

Scholars needing research performed in the Russian archives may contract with scholars at the Russian Center "Archival Conversation at the Historical Archives Institute (HAI) of the Russian State University for the Humanities in Moscow. For further information please direct inquiries to:

**Prof. Alexander B. Bezborodov;** Historical Archives Institute (HAI); Russian State University for the Humanities; Moscow, Russian Federation; fax: (7-095) 432-2506 or (7-095) 964-3534; tel.: (7-095) 921-4169 or (7-095) 925-5019

Scholars may also address inquiries regarding possible collaboration for research in Russian archives to:

**Prof. Alexander O. Chubarian;** Director, Institute of Universal History; Leninsky prospekt 32a; 117334 Moscow, Russian Federation; fax: (7-095) 938-2288; tel: (7-095) 938-1009

## COMMENTARIES

CUBA AS SUPERPOWER:  
HAVANA AND MOSCOW, 1979

by Jorge I. Domínguez

In 1979, Cuba behaved as if it were a superpower. Tens of thousands of Cuban troops were stationed in Angola and Ethiopia, and hundreds of other Cuban military advisers, trainers, and additional troops were posted to other countries across the seas. Cuba had international programs assisting about three dozen countries in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and South-east Asia; many of these programs required the overseas deployment of Cuban personnel, while others provided training in Cuba itself for over 20,000 foreigners. In part for these reasons (and notwithstanding Havana's tight alliance with the Soviet Union), Cuba had been elected chairman of the Nonaligned Movement—at the time a significant organization of African, Asian, Latin American, and Caribbean countries—and it hosted its sixth summit in Havana in September 1979.

Cuba was also the Soviet Union's only truly reliable military ally in the Cold War, and the Cuban armed forces proved to be the only communist army capable of fighting effectively in distant locales for objectives at best remote from the "cause" of the defense of the homeland. From the mid-1970s to the end of the 1980s, over 300,000 Cuban troops served abroad. In any given year, relative to its population, Cuba had more troops posted overseas every year than the United States had posted in Vietnam at the peak of its engagement in that war. In the 1970s and 1980s, the Cuban armed forces were able to accomplish three times on African soil (in Angola in 1976 and 1988, and in Ethiopia in 1978) what the United States could not do in Vietnam and what the Soviet Union could not do in Afghanistan: Cuban troops won the wars they went to fight.

Nearly two decades later, this account reads like a fantasy, for Cuba's government today is struggling to survive, all its troops have been repatriated,

and its concessional foreign aid programs have ended. The Soviet Union no longer exists, and the Russian Federation is unable and unwilling to provide Cuba with the funding and other support that permitted the latter to behave as if it were a superpower.

The declassified documents from the Soviet archives, which this note accompanies, are drawn mainly from the year 1979; even the document that dates from 1981 focuses principally on events that had taken place at the end of the 1970s. None of the documents breaks major new ground;<sup>1</sup> the basic issues these documents discuss have been part of the public record for some time. But the documents do shed interesting light on a variety of questions, the most important of which is the nature of the Soviet-Cuban relationship at what turned out to be the apex of their joint influence in world affairs.

In the summer of 1979, the United States (re-)discovered the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. That brigade had been left in Cuba since the 1962 missile crisis consistent with the same "trip-wire" concept that had led the United States to keep troops in Europe. In each case, the forward forces posted by the respective superpower were deemed insufficient to stop an all-out invasion by the other superpower, but the presence of those forward forces had deterrent value: if an invasion were to occur, both superpowers would be immediately and automatically locked in war. As it turned out, some time in the late 1960s the U.S. government lost track of the Soviet brigade in Cuba; it was found only as a result of intensified intelligence monitoring of Cuba in the late 1970s.

The attached documents for September 1979 discuss the Soviet and Cuban response to the new U.S. challenge. The issue for the two governments was to decide how honest they should be in their response to the United States. With authorization from President Fidel Castro, on September 1 Armed Forces Minister General Raúl Castro sought an agreement with the Soviet Union on the content and style of the reply. General Castro's preferred formulation was: "For the past 17 years a symbolic So-

viet combat unit, created as a training center where Soviet military specialists train officers of the [Cuban armed forces] to use and maintain new military equipment, has indeed been located in Cuba." He recalled Cuba's "experience with previous confrontations with Americans regarding the Soviet military presence on the island" and emphasized that "we should not camouflage the real state of affairs." Certainly, he emphasized, there should be no attempt "to negate the presence of a training center on Cuba" because that would be interpreted "as a repudiation by Cuba and the USSR of their right to create such a center and send the necessary military personnel" to Cuba.

In fact, as the subsequent documents indicate, the Soviets chose to camouflage. Their response to the United States acknowledged the presence of a "military training center" but did not acknowledge that it was a "combat unit," contrary to Cuba's preference. In 1979, the Cuban leadership behaved as good believers in democratic centralism. Fidel Castro's own reassurances to the United States emphasized that it was a military training center, with no reference to a "combat unit"—echoing the Soviet position exactly.<sup>2</sup> Only in September 1991, when the Russian Federation government announced its decision to withdraw the combat brigade from Cuba, did Havana publicly vent its anger that the Soviets had rejected Cuba's advice in 1979.

Cuba believed that the Soviet position in 1979 retreated from the principle that both governments had the right to agree to station a Soviet combat unit in Cuba. Cuba was closer to the mark. The settlement of the 1979 crisis in fact modified the series of understandings begun in 1962 that had evolved over time. For the first time those mutual understandings extended to conventional forces. Also for the first time, the Soviets accepted a limitation on the presence of their military personnel in Cuba, pledging (27 September 1979 document) that "We do not have any intention of changing its status as [a military training] center." In effect, this minicrisis was settled through a uni-

lateral Soviet concession to the United States.

Other important areas of disagreement between the Soviets and the Cubans become evident in the minutes of the 23 November 1981 meeting between Cuban Vice-President Carlos Rafael Rodríguez and U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig.<sup>3</sup> The text makes it clear that the talks were not successful. Nonetheless, the minutes show a perhaps surprisingly accommodating opening gambit from Haig, followed by his lack of understanding of one key point that Rodríguez was communicating. Haig's principal concern was the close connection between Cuba and the Soviet Union in backing Cuban overseas operations. Rodríguez kept telling Haig, in effect, that it was fine for the United States to blame Cuba but, please, do not blame the USSR.!

Rodríguez first asserts: "I can assure you unequivocally, inasmuch as I played a direct role in this matter, that when the decision to dispatch Cuban forces into Angola was made [in 1975], we communicated nothing about it to the Soviet Union. We were not even aware of its point of view on that account." Next, Rodríguez discusses the Ethiopian war (1977–78): "I had the privilege to accompany Fidel Castro at the time of his meetings with the leadership of the Soviet Union. . . . And it was we who insistently urged the need to render military assistance to Ethiopia. This was the situation, to be distinguished from that in Angola, because in this case preliminary negotiations were taking place. But in these negotiations it was Fidel Castro himself who first advocated military assistance." Finally, Rodríguez turned to the troubles in Central America: "Certain American leaders are always expressing the opinion that the Soviet Union acted as a hostile influence between the United States and Cuba, that it fermented in Cuba hostile feelings toward the United States. I could tell you that the opposite is true. Many of the conflicts that we have had with the Soviet Union were occasioned by the acts, words, and positions of Cuba, which did not correspond with the intentions of the Soviet Union in this portion of the world."

These three statements are quite consistent with everything that had been known about the nature of Cuban-Soviet relations in general, and specifically on these issues. The only exception is that Rodríguez claims a larger role for Cuban initiative in making the decision to enter the Ethiopian-Somali war on Ethiopia's side, whereas scholars had believed that the Soviets had had a considerably greater impact in making that original decision. The key point that Haig, and others, missed is that the USSR had a restraining effect on Cuba in the late 1970s, and that serious differences occurred between the Soviet Union and Cuba because the latter was much more militant. To be sure, Cuba could not have conducted such a far-ranging foreign policy were it not for the massive Soviet political, economic, and military backing, and on this central issue Haig was right to challenge Rodríguez.

The attached documents also feature other interesting aspects of Soviet-Cuban relations. For one, they demonstrate a thorough and competent knowledge of Cuban affairs and policies by Soviet embassy officials. They show a very close communication between the two governments on large and small issues that concern them. The minutes of the Soviet Politburo meetings underscore the importance Soviet leaders accorded to securing Fidel Castro's agreement on the proposed joint course—even if Castro's views did not prevail in the end.

The documents also shed light on the role of several key Cuban officials, some of whom remain important players in contemporary Cuba. Rodríguez was long a thoughtful and cosmopolitan influence at the peak of the Cuban government, and his encounter with Haig—though ultimately unsuccessful—confirms his reputation for statesmanship. José Antonio Arbesú has been for many years a senior Cuban government and communist party decision maker and analyst with broad responsibilities for U.S.-Cuban relations; the 27 December 1979 document illustrates his broad competence in analyzing U.S. affairs. Raúl Valdés Vivó has repeatedly been given high responsibility by Cu-

ban government officials, and has repeatedly produced nefarious results. The 4 July 1979 document cites Fidel Castro's judgment that Valdés Vivó "failed to discharge the functions entrusted to him and was unable correctly and precisely to fulfill his assigned task in a recent trip to a number of African countries." Valdés Vivó "raised a host of doubts and false rumors not only among our Soviet friends, but among the Africans as well." In 1996, Valdés Vivó, then heading the School of Political Science at the University of Havana, took the lead in launching an assault on the highest-quality semi-autonomous Cuban research think-tanks, intolerantly and dogmatically criticizing their research on Cuba.<sup>4</sup>

The documents conclude with a timeless statement about Cuba's approach to international affairs. Though not always honored, it remains an important signpost for governments that must still deal with Fidel Castro's government: "There is no obligation that we have taken upon ourselves with any country, group, or government that we have failed to honor."

<sup>1</sup> I have written about these issues in Jorge I. Domínguez, *To Make a World Safe for Revolution: Cuba's Foreign Policy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979).

<sup>2</sup> Castro's remarks in *Granma Weekly Review*, 7 October 1979, 2.

<sup>3</sup> For Haig's account, see his *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 130–137.

<sup>4</sup> For an example of his writings on general Cuban affairs in recent times, see Raúl Valdés Vivó, "¿Sociedad civil o gato por liebre," *Granma*, 4 January 1996, 2.

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### A "Moment of Rapprochement": The Haig-Rodríguez Secret Talks

by Peter Kornbluh

The United States "will go to the source" to stop Havana's alleged export of revolution in Central America, Secretary of State Alexander M. Haig, Jr. dramatically warned Fidel Castro's Cuba shortly after Ronald Reagan took

office. On 23 November 1981, Haig did just that, sitting down for a secret meeting with Cuban Vice-President Carlos Rafael Rodríguez in Mexico City to discuss the issues that divided the United States and Cuba.

Of all the American presidential administrations that have dealt with Fidel Castro since 1959, Reagan's seemed the least likely to engage in a dialogue with Cuba's communist government; and of all the hardline officials in the Reagan Administration, Alexander Haig seemed the most unlikely choice for such a mission. "I want to go after Cuba," Haig told his then deputy Robert McFarlane in early 1981 as he demanded a plan for U.S. military pressure against Castro. As McFarlane reported in his memoirs, "it was as though Haig had come into office thinking, 'Where can we make a quick win?' and judged that place to be Cuba."<sup>1</sup>

For that reason, the Haig-Rodríguez talks stand as an extraordinary episode of U.S.-Cuban diplomacy at the height of the Cold War in the Western Hemisphere.

Extreme secrecy surrounded preparations for the talks: Reagan and Haig kept most of the U.S. government out of the loop; an unmarked car was used to ferry Haig from the U.S. Embassy to the private home of Mexican Foreign Minister Jorge Castaneda; and Haig and Rodríguez agreed this would be an "unofficial, secret meeting." Yet it quickly leaked to the Spanish magazine *El País*, and then to the Mexican and U.S. press. In a televised interview with CBS News in January 1982, Reagan admitted that such a meeting had, in fact, occurred.<sup>2</sup>

Moreover, since the 1984 publication of Haig's memoirs,<sup>3</sup> historians have had a U.S. version of the Mexico meeting. Haig's rendition of events, and his summary of the substance of the talks, generally comports to the Cuban version printed in this issue of the *Bulletin* (although it omits discussion of how the secret meeting came to occur in the first place). This Cuban transcript—originally in Spanish, translated into Russian, obtained by scholars from the Russian archives and now translated into English—provides new details, as well as the flavor of the discussion and

insights into the style and personalities of the two diplomats involved.

The Mexican government was simultaneously intermediary, mediator, and catalyst for the Haig-Rodríguez meeting. Alarmed by the Cold War rhetoric emanating from the Reagan Administration—much of it from Haig himself—in 1981 the government of President Jose Lopez-Portillo sought to mitigate the growing potential for U.S. intervention in Central America and the Caribbean by urging dialogue instead of what the Cubans described as "verbal terrorism." In an effort to preempt future hostilities, Mexican Foreign Minister Jorge Castaneda called for "a ceasefire of silence." "Mexico," he offered, "is prepared to serve as a bridge, as a communicator, between its friends and neighbors."<sup>4</sup>

Lopez-Portillo's major opportunity to promote an agenda of negotiations came at the North-South Summit held at the Mexican resort of Cancun in October 1981. Cuba had been involved in the preparatory meetings for the summit, and Mexican officials hoped the gathering of world leaders might provide an opportunity for a "discreet" meeting between Castro and Reagan. But, according to one of the conference organizers, Andres Rozental (now Mexican ambassador to Great Britain), U.S. officials balked when they learned Castro was scheduled to attend. "If Fidel came, Reagan wouldn't," Rozental recalls being told. Although Mexico had long resisted U.S. pressure to isolate Cuba, Lopez-Portillo was forced to call Castro and essentially disinvite him. "Castro understood immediately," Rozental remembers, "and graciously agreed not to make it an issue."<sup>5</sup>

Instead of the summit, Lopez-Portillo invited the Cuban leader to a private meeting on the island of Cozumel in July. The two talked about a potential U.S.-Cuban dialogue. Through Mexico, Castro passed the message that he was willing to discuss all outstanding issues with Washington.

Haig and other administration hardliners, however, forcefully opposed talks with Cuba as anathema to a strategy of raising Castro's level of anxiety through verbal threats and U.S. military

maneuvers in the Caribbean. "There could be no talk about normalization, no relief of the pressure, no conversations on any subject except the return to Havana of the Cuban criminals [from the Mariel boatlift] and the termination of Cuba's interventionism," Haig wrote in his memoirs.<sup>6</sup>

During the limousine ride to the airport with Reagan after the Cancun summit, however, Lopez-Portillo and Castaneda put their appeal directly to the president of the United States. According to one Mexican official, Lopez-Portillo essentially called in his chips: he asked Reagan to return Mexico's favor of disinviting Castro to Cancun by authorizing a U.S. emissary to meet secretly with Cuba's vice president later in the year. Reagan readily agreed, and subsequently directed Haig to undertake this mission when the opportunity arose in November.

The meeting took place in the spacious home of foreign minister Castaneda, located in a suburb of Mexico City. According to a member of Castaneda's family, the Mexican foreign minister introduced the two protagonists to each other in his library, and then left them to talk privately, aided only by a Cuban translator.

The house, according to family members, had no secret taping system. Yet, the Top Secret 38-page transcript of the discussion, which Vice President Rodríguez provided in Spanish to the Soviet ambassador to Havana in December 1981, suggests that the meeting may in fact have been recorded—perhaps by the Cuban interpreter. In any event, the existence of an apparently verbatim record allows historians to chart the issues, diplomatic positions, and tenor of the discussion.

The central issue on Haig's agenda was Cuba's alleged role in supporting the Sandinista government in Nicaragua and funneling aid to the El Salvadoran guerrillas. Drawing on what he called "volumes, records of radio broadcasts, data from technical reconnaissance ... photographs," Haig charged that Cuba, in "tacit agreement" with the Soviets, was fueling revolution in Central America. "We regard this as a serious threat to our vital interests and the

interests of peace and stability in the hemisphere," he stated.

In response, Rodriguez spent considerable time and detail attempting to refute the U.S. "evidence" of Cuban involvement in revolutionary movements from Central America to Africa. "I am aware that the Secretary of State is a great lover of philosophy," he said to Haig, noting that

Since the time of Hume, it has been considered proven that the factual appearance of 'B' following the appearance of 'A' does not signify that 'A' necessarily is the cause of the appearance of 'B'.

The U.S. had a "mistaken interpretation" of Cuba's role in Nicaragua and El Salvador, Rodriguez asserted, which he blamed on CIA distortion of intelligence. In response, Haig reasserted that the U.S. possessed "proof" that Cuba was "exporting revolution and bloodshed on the continent." Dismissing Rodriguez's lengthy version of world events since 1975, Haig declared: "I can assure you that the benign picture that you have painted does not conform to reality."

Notwithstanding the acrimonious disagreement on the nature of Cuba's role abroad, the Haig-Rodriguez discussions did produce a surprising commitment toward coexistence. Unlike the Democratic Clinton Administration—which a decade later would demand that Cuba democratize as a prerequisite for normalizing relations—Haig made it clear that Washington took a *realpolitik* position on Cuba's internal political setup. "I do not believe that President Reagan has some kind of preconceived notion regarding the social system in Cuba," Haig stated. "This must be determined by the people of Cuba." Later in the conversation Haig noted that "President Reagan considers trade with Cuba a possibility." While dismissing past "moments of rapprochement" as "a series of delaying tactics" on the part of the Cubans, Haig stated that "if you are prepared to talk seriously, we are also prepared."

According to the transcript, Rodriguez and Haig agreed that Mexico "could be a uniting link in this matter"

of continuing talks, and that conducting "an even more direct exchange of opinions" would be desirable. Haig, at his own initiative, suggested that special U.S. envoy General Vernon Walters visit Havana for additional talks. "We can meet, in turn, in Havana and New York, because, in my view, we must commence a dialogue immediately," Haig is recorded as saying at the close of the meeting. "I believe that this is important, and we are ready to do it," replied Rodriguez.

In the immediate aftermath of this meeting, both the Mexican interlocutors and the Cubans believed that a positive step had been taken toward dialogue between Washington and Havana. "We had accomplished what we wanted—to get them together," recalled Andres Rozental. Face-to-face, the Cubans found Haig to be far more level-headed, respectful, and reasonable than his vitriolic Cold War rhetoric had led them to expect. In Rodriguez's opinion, shared later with Mexican officials, Haig was "neither crazy nor stupid, but a reasonably intelligent, experienced person with whom conversation was possible." Rodriguez was said to be impressed that Haig was willing to send Walters—an official of "great authority, close to President Reagan"—as an envoy to continue the talks, and that the Secretary of State had emphasized the need to make a supreme effort to settle issues through "la via pacifica"—the peaceful road.

Haig, on the other hand, appears to have interpreted the meeting as evidence that U.S. pressure on Castro was working. "Clearly the Cubans were very anxious. They had read the signs of a new American policy."<sup>7</sup> Haig returned to Washington to push, again, for a blockade. Walters did make a secret trip to Havana in March 1982—Mexican officials contributed once again to the arrangements—and spent five hours conferring with Castro and Rodriguez on Central America. But nothing concrete came of the talks.

In the end, as Ambassador Rozental puts it, the Mexican initiative was a "failure in getting anything going" between the United States and Cuba. Moreover, U.S. military involvement in

the Central America conflict escalated dramatically in the months and years that followed, and for most of the decade, Nicaragua and El Salvador were wracked with the violence and bloodshed that Mexico had hoped could be avoided if the Reagan Administration and Castro's government could achieve a *modus vivendi*.

Yet, the fact that the Haig-Rodriguez talks occurred at all may well have mitigated against the further development of the even more overtly bellicose U.S. policy toward Cuba that Haig, among others, initially sought. The talks also set the stage for negotiations between Washington and Havana over immigration that took place in 1984. At the very least, the U.S.-Cuba meeting in Mexico demonstrated that a "moment of rapprochement"—a civil, rational high-level dialogue—was possible, even at a peak of acrimony in bilateral relations.

<sup>1</sup> McFarlane recalled that Haig wanted to "close Castro down," and directed McFarlane to "get everyone together and give me a plan for doing it." McFarlane writes that when he came up with an options paper that pointed out the practical drawbacks of blockading Cuba or other types of unprovoked hostility, Secretary Haig harshly reprimanded him. "Six weeks ago I asked you to get busy and find a way to go to the source in Cuba. What you've given me is bureaucratic pap. . . . Give me something I can take to the President so that he can show a substantial gain during his first year in office. I want something solid, not some cookie-pushing piece of junk." Eventually, McFarlane reports, calmer heads prevailed and the Reagan Administration decided to stick to the agreements on Cuba worked out with the Soviets during the Cuban missile crisis. See Robert McFarlane, *Special Trust* (New York: Cadell & Davies, 1991), 177-181.

<sup>2</sup> See "Reagan Says Haig Met Key Cuban," *New York Times*, 28 January 1982. State Department officials, according to the story, "described themselves as 'quite surprised' that the President had said what he did. They still insisted they knew of no such meeting."

<sup>3</sup> Alexander M. Haig, Jr., *Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 133-136.

<sup>4</sup> Quoted in Morris J. Blachman, William M. Leogrande, and Kenneth E. Sharpe, eds., *Confronting Revolution: Security Through Diplomacy in Central America* (New York: Pantheon, 1986), 276.

<sup>5</sup> Author's telephone interview with Rozental, October 1996.

<sup>6</sup> Haig, *Caveat*, 133.

<sup>7</sup> Haig, *Caveat*, 136.

## *More New Evidence On* **THE COLD WAR IN ASIA**

*Editor's Note: "New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia" was not only the theme of the previous issue of the Cold War International History Project Bulletin (Issue 6-7, Winter 1995/1996, 294 pages), but of a major international conference organized by CWIHP and hosted by the History Department of Hong Kong University (HKU) on 9-12 January 1996. Both the Bulletin and the conference presented and analyzed newly available archival materials and other primary sources from Russia, China, Eastern Europe and other locations in the former communist bloc on such topics as the Korean and Vietnam/Indochina Wars; the Sino-Soviet Alliance and Split; Sino-American Relations and Crises; the Role of Key Figures such as Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Joseph Stalin, and Nikita Khrushchev; the Sino-Indian Conflict; and more. The new information presented via both activities attracted considerable media attention, including articles or citations in the New York Times, Washington Post, Time Magazine, Pravda, The Guardian, and Newsweek, as well as a report on the Cable News Network (CNN); garnering particular notice in both popular and scholarly circles were the first publication of conversations between Stalin and Mao during the latter's trip to Moscow in Dec. 1949-Feb. 1950, Russian versions of correspondence between Stalin and Mao surrounding China's decision to enter the Korean War in the fall of 1950; and translations and analyses of Chinese-language sources on the 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis, particularly in light of the resurgence of tension in that region (including Chinese military exercises) in the period leading up to the March 1996 Taiwanese elections.*

*The Hong Kong Conference, as well as the double-issue of the Bulletin, culminated many months of preparations. The basic agreement to organize the conference was reached in May 1994 between CWIHP and the HKU*

*History Department (particularly Prof. Priscilla Roberts and Prof. Thomas Stanley) during a visit by CWIHP's director to Hong Kong and to Beijing, where the Institute of American Studies (IAS) of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) agreed to help coordinate the participation of Chinese scholars (also joining the CWIHP delegation were Prof. David Wolff, then of Princeton University, and Dr. Odd Arne Westad, Director of Research, Norwegian Nobel Institute). Materials for the Bulletin and papers for the conference were concurrently sought and gathered over the subsequent year-and-a-half, climaxing at the very end of December 1995 and beginning of January 1996 (in the midst of U.S. shutdown of the federal government and the worst blizzard to strike Washington, D.C. and the East Coast of the United States in many years) with the production of the double-issue and the holding of the conference, after some final fusillades of e-mails and faxes between the Wilson Center in Washington (CWIHP's director as well as Michele Carus-Christian of the Division of International Studies and Li Zhao of the Asia Program) and Priscilla Roberts at HKU.*

*Despite last-minute obstacles posed by weather and bureaucrats (i.e., visa troubles), more than 50 Chinese, American, Russian, European, and other scholars gathered in Hong Kong for four days of discussions and debates. CWIHP provided primary organizational support for putting the program together and financial backing to bring the participants to Hong Kong (with the aid of the National Security Archive and the University of Toronto), while HKU provided the venue and covered on-site expenses, with the help of generous support from the Louis Cha Foundation. In addition, as noted above, the IAS, CASS in Beijing helped coordinate Chinese scholars' participation; and Profs. Chen Jian (Southern Illinois University/Carbondale) and*

*Zhang Shuguang (University of Maryland/College Park) played a vital liaison role between CWIHP and the Chinese scholars. The grueling regime of panel discussions and debates (see program below) was eased by an evening boat trip to the island of Lantau for a seafood dinner; and a reception hosted by HKU at which CWIHP donated to the University a complete set of the roughly 1500 pages of documents on the Korean War it had obtained (with the help of the Center for Korean Research at Columbia University) from the Russian Presidential Archives.*

*Following the Hong Kong conference, CWIHP brought a delegation of U.S., Russian, Chinese, and European scholars to Hanoi to meet with Vietnamese colleagues and to discuss possible future activities to research and reassess the international history of the Indochina and Vietnam conflicts with the aid of archival and other primary sources on all sides; the visit was hosted by the Institute for International Relations (IIR) of the Vietnamese Foreign Ministry. Contacts between CWIHP and IIR and other Vietnamese scholars continue on how best to organize activities to exchange and open new historical sources; these are likely to include the publication of a special Bulletin devoted to new evidence on the conflicts in Southeast Asia, and, in coordination with other partners (such as the National Security Archive, Brown University, and the Norwegian Nobel Institute), the holding of a series of conferences at which new evidence would be disseminated and debated.*

*To follow up these activities, CWIHP plans to publish a volume of papers from the Hong Kong Conference (and related materials); this volume, in turn, will complement another book containing several papers presented at Hong Kong: Odd Arne Westad, ed., *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1953*, scheduled for publication in 1997.*

*In addition, this section of the present Bulletin presents more information on several topics addressed both at Hong Kong and in the previous Bulletin:*

*\* Russian and Chinese documents on the Mao-Stalin summit in Moscow that help flesh out the conversations between the two leaders published in the previous Bulletin;*

*\* an analysis by William Taubman (first prepared for Hong Kong) of the personal conflict between Khrushchev and Mao and its role in the Sino-Soviet split, as well as contemporaneous Russian documents (from both Moscow and East Berlin archives);*

*\* another paper prepared for Hong Kong, by M.Y. Prozumenshikov, on the significance of the Sino-Indian and Cuban Missile Crises of October 1962 for the open rupture between Moscow and Beijing, along with supplementary Russian and East German archival materials;*

*\* and, perhaps most intriguingly, a Chinese response to a controversy opened in the previous Bulletin about the discrepancy between Russian archival documents and published Chinese documents regarding communications between Mao and Stalin on Beijing's entry into the Korean War in October 1950 (along with new evidence on a key omission from a Russian document in the last Bulletin).*

*Additional materials are slated for publication in CWIHP Working Papers, future Bulletins, and via the Internet on the CWIHP site on the National Security Archive's home page on the World Wide Web: <http://www.nsarchive.com>*

*Following is the program of the Hong Kong Conference:*

**Cold War International History Project  
Conference on New Evidence on the  
Cold War in Asia  
University of Hong Kong,  
9-12 January 1996**

Panel I: New Evidence on the Origins  
of the Sino-Soviet Alliance

Chair: Odd Arne Westad (Norwegian Nobel Inst.); Papers: Michael M. Sheng (Southwest Missouri State Univ.),

"Mao, Stalin, and the Struggle in Manchuria, 1945-46: Nationalism or Internationalism?"; Yang Kuisong (Inst. of Modern History, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences [CASS], Beijing), "On the Causes of the Changes in Mao's view of the Soviet Union"; Niu Jun (Inst. of American Studies [IAS], CASS), "The Origins of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-50"; Brian Murray (Columbia Univ.), "Stalin, the Division of China, and Cold War Origins"; Commentators: James Tang (Hong Kong Univ.), O.A. Westad (Norwegian Nobel Inst.)

Panel II: New Evidence on the Korean War

Chair: Jim Hershberg (CWIHP):

*Session 1: The North Korean Dimension*

Papers: Alexandre Mansourov (Columbia Univ.), "Did Conventional Deterrence Work? (Why the Korean War did not erupt in the Summer of 1949)"; Hakjoon Kim (Dankook Univ., Seoul), "North Korean Leaders and the Origins of the Korean War"; David Tsui (Chinese Univ. of Hong Kong), "Did the DPRK and the PRC Sign a Mutual Security Pact in 1949?"

*Session 2: The Course of the War*

Papers: Shen Zhihua (Ctr. for Oriental History Research, Beijing), "China Had to Send Its Troops to Korea: Policy-Making Processes and Reasons"; Kathryn Weathersby (Florida State Univ.), "Stalin and a Negotiated Settlement in Korea, 1950-53"; Chen Jian (Southern Illinois Univ./Carbondale), "China's Strategy to End the Korean War"; Fernando Orlandi (Univ. of Trento, Italy), "The Alliance: Beijing, Moscow, the Korean War and Its End"

Comment: Allen S. Whiting (Univ. of Arizona), Warren I. Cohen (Univ. of Maryland/Baltimore)

Dinner Talk: John Lewis Gaddis (Ohio Univ./Athens), "The Division of Labor: Sino-Soviet Relations and Prospects for

Revolution in Asia, 1949-58"

Panel III: New Evidence on Sino-American Relations in the Early Cold War

Chair: W. Cohen (Univ. of Maryland/Baltimore); Papers: Zhang Bai-Jia (Inst. of Modern History, CASS), "The Limits of Confrontation: Looking at the Sino-American Relations during the Cold War Years from the Chinese Perspective"; O.A. Westad (Norwegian Nobel Inst.), "The Sino-Soviet Alliance and the United States: Wars, Policies, and Perceptions, 1950-1961"; Tao Wenzhao (IAS, CASS), "From Relaxation to Tension in China-US Relations, 1954-58"; Xiao-bing Li (Univ. of Central Oklahoma), "The Making of Mao's Cold War: The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis Revised"; Yongping Zheng (IAS, CASS), "Formulating China's Policy on the Taiwan Straits Crisis, 1958"; Comment: Nancy Bernkopf Tucker (Georgetown Univ.); Gordon Chang (Stanford Univ.); He Di (IAS, CASS)

Panel IV: Chinese Policy Beyond the Superpowers: Engaging India and the "Nationalist States"

Chair: Samuel F. Wells, Jr. (Wilson Center); Papers: Ren Donglai (Nanjing Univ.), "From the 'Two Camp' Theory to the 'Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence': A Transition of China's Perception of and Policy Toward the Nationalist States, 1949-1954"; Roderick MacFarquhar (Harvard Univ.), "War in the Himalayas, Crisis in the Caribbean: the Sino-Indian Conflict and the Cuban Missile Crisis, October 1962"; M.Y. Prozumenshikov (TsKhSD, Moscow), "The Influence of the Sino-Indian Border Conflict and the Caribbean Crisis on the Development of Sino-Soviet Relations" [presented in absentia by J. Hershberg (CWIHP)]; Comment: Norman Owen (Hong Kong Univ.)

Panel V: From Alliance to Schism: New Evidence on The Sino-Soviet Split

Chair: Zi Zhongyun (IAS, CASS); Papers: Dayong Niu (Beijing Univ.), "From Cold War to Cultural Revolu-

tion: Mao Zedong's Response to Khrushchev's Destalinization and Dulles' Strategy of Peaceful Evolution"; Deborah Kaple (Princeton Univ.), "Soviet Assistance and Civilian Cooperation in China"; Zhang Shuguang (Univ. of Maryland/College Park), "The Collapse of Sino-Soviet Economic Cooperation, 1950-60: A Cultural Explanation"; Sergei Goncharenko (IMEMO, Moscow), "The Military Dimension of the Sino-Soviet Split"; Mark Kramer (Harvard Univ.), "The Soviet Foreign Ministry's Appraisal of Sino-Soviet Relations on the Eve of the Split"; Comment: Chen Jian (Southern Illinois Univ./Carbondale); Zheng Yu (Inst. of East European, Russian, and Central Asian Studies, CASS)

#### Panel VI: Aspects of the Sino-Soviet Schism

Chair: Robert Hutchings (Wilson Center):

#### *Session 1: Border Disputes:*

Papers: Tamara G. Troyakova (Inst. of History, Far Eastern Branch, Russian Academy of Sciences, Vladivostok), "The Soviet Far East and Soviet-Chinese Relations in the Khrushchev Years"; David Wolff (Princeton Univ.),

"On the Borders of the Sino-Soviet Conflict: New Approaches to the Cold War in Asia"; Christian Ostermann (Hamburg Univ./National Security Archive), "The Sino-Soviet Border Clashes of 1969: New Evidence from the SED Archives"; Commentator: Thomas W. Robinson (American Asian Research Enterprises)

#### *Session 2: The Warsaw Pact and the Sino-Soviet Split*

Papers: L.W. Gluchowski (Univ. of Toronto), "The Struggle Against 'Great Power Chauvinism': CPSU-PUWP Relations and the Roots of the Sino-Polish Initiative of September-October 1956"; Werner Meissner (Hong Kong Baptist Univ.), "The Relations between the German Democratic Republic and the People's Republic of China, 1956-1963, and the Sino-Soviet Split"; Commentator: M. Kramer (Harvard Univ.)

#### Panel VII: New Evidence on Chinese and Soviet Leaders and the Cold War in Asia

Chair: J.L. Gaddis (Ohio Univ./Athens); Papers: Haruki Wada (Inst. of Social Sciences, Univ. of Tokyo), "Stalin and the Japanese Communist Party, 1945-1953 (in the light of new Russian ar-

chival documents)"; Vladislav M. Zubok (National Security Archive), "Stalin's Goals in the Far East: From Yalta to the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950"; Li Hai Wen (CPC CC), "[Zhou en-Lai's Role in] Restoring Peace in Indochina at the Geneva Conference"; William Taubman (Amherst College), "Khrushchev versus Mao: A Preliminary Sketch of the Role of Personality in the Sino-Soviet Dispute" [presented in absentia by M. Kramer (Harvard Univ.)]; He Di (IAS, CASS), "Paper or Real Tiger? U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Mao Zedong's Response"; Comment: David Shambaugh (Univ. of London); Vojtech Mastny (independent)

#### Panel VIII: New Evidence on the Indochina/Vietnam Conflicts and the Cold War in Asia

Chair: A.S. Whiting (Univ. of Arizona); Papers: Mark Bradley (Univ. of Wisconsin at Milwaukee), "Constructing an Indigenous Regional Political Order in Southeast Asia: Vietnam and the Diplomacy of Revolutionary Nationalism, 1946-49"; Mari Olsen (Univ. of Oslo), "Forging a New Relationship: The Soviet Union and Vietnam, 1955"; Ilia Gaiduk (Inst. of Universal History, Moscow) "Soviet Policy Toward U.S. Participation in the Vietnam War" [presented in absentia by J. Hershberg (CWIHP)]; Zhai Qiang (Auburn Univ.), "Beijing and the Vietnam Conflict, 1964-65"; Robert K. Brigham (Vassar College), "Vietnamese-American Peace Negotiations: The Failed 1965 Initiatives"; Igor Bukharkin (Russian Foreign Ministry Archives), "Moscow and Ho Chi Minh, 1945-1969"; Comment: R. MacFarquhar (Harvard Univ.)

#### Closing Roundtable on the New Evidence, Present and Future Prospects and Research Agenda:

Participants: Niu Jun (IAS, CASS), O.A. Westad (Norwegian Nobel Inst.), Chen Jian (Southern Illinois Univ./Carbondale), W. Cohen (Univ. of Maryland/Baltimore), R. MacFarquhar (Harvard Univ.), K. Weathersby (Florida State Univ.)

### CONFERENCE ON REGIONAL CHINESE ARCHIVES HELD

In August 1996, the US-China Archival Exchange Program of the University of Maryland (College Park) and the Chinese Central Archives Bureau held a conference on "Regional Chinese Archives," with sessions and activities in Beijing and other northern Chinese cities (Jinan, Qingdao, Yantai, Tianjin). Participants included both Chinese and American scholars and archival authorities from regional, urban, national, and Communist Party archives.

On behalf of the Cold War International History Project and the National Security Archive (a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository located at George Washington University), Prof. David Wolff, now CWIHP's Director, gave a presentation on declassification procedures in the United States and opportunities for using the Freedom of Information Act to conduct research on issues of interest to China. As an illustration, Wolff presented a compilation of "Selected Re-

cently-Declassified U.S. Government Documents on American Policy Toward the Development of Atomic Weapons by the People's Republic of China, 1961-1965." Assembled by then-CWIHP Director Jim Hershberg with the help of the National Security Archive and the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, the documents included White House, State Department, and CIA materials on the events surrounding China's first detonation of an atomic explosion on 16 October 1964.

The gathering, coming nine months after the CWIHP Hong Kong Conference, also offered an opportunity to continue the Project's ongoing contacts with Chinese colleagues.

For further information on the conference and the US-China Archival Exchange Program, contact Prof. Shu Guang Zhang, History Dept., 2115 Francis Scott Key Hall, College Park, MD 20742-7315, tel.: (301) 405-4265; fax: (301) 314-9399. --J.H.

## MORE ON MAO IN MOSCOW, Dec. 1949-Feb. 1950

Editor's Note: The previous issue of the *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* (no. 6-7, Winter 1995/96, pp. 4-9) contained translations of the Russian transcripts of two conversations (16 December 1949 and 22 January 1950) between Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and Chinese leader Mao Zedong during the latter's visit to Moscow in December 1949-February 1950. Mao's trip to the USSR, shortly after the victory of the Chinese Communist Revolution and the establishment in October 1949 of the People's Republic of China, marked the only personal encounter between these two giants of 20th-century history, and led to the signing on 14 February 1950 of a Sino-Soviet treaty formally establishing an alliance between the two communist powers—a landmark in the history of the Cold War.

To provide further examples of the newly-available East-bloc evidence on this crucial event, the *Bulletin* presents below a selection of translated additional materials from Russian and Chinese sources. They include three records of conversations between Mao and senior Soviet officials, on 1, 6, and 17 January 1950, located in the archives of the Russian Foreign Ministry, formally known as the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVPRF), and provided to the *Bulletin* by Odd Arne Westad, Director of Research, Norwegian Nobel Institute (Oslo), author of *Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944-1946* (NY: Columbia University Press, 1993); Westad's commentary precedes the documents.

In addition to immediate considerations relating to Mao's activities in Moscow, the conversations cover a range of subjects concerning Sino-Soviet ties—political, diplomatic, economic, and military. Especially notable for Cold War historians concentrating on international relations are the exchanges on joint strategy in the United Nations to unseat the Guomindang (Kuomintang) representative (foreshadowing a Soviet boycott that would enable the Security Council to approve U.N. participation in the Korean War) and a discussion of U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson's National Press Club speech of 12 January 1950—particularly his efforts to foment discord between the USSR and China. These conversations, of course, should be read in the context of the two previously mentioned Stalin-Mao conversations, which bracket them (other talks are believed to have taken place, but no additional transcripts have emerged).

In contrast to the Russian documents, which were found by outside scholars working in the archives, the Chinese materials were published since the late 1980s in "neibu" or "internal" editions which have gradually made their way outside China, where they have been extensively used by scholars.<sup>1</sup> Most of these collections were assembled by teams working for or with authorities of the Chinese state or the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), with outside scholars receiving little or no access to high-level archives for the post-1949 period, and thus unable to inspect the originals (let alone the surrounding documentation) of the materials contained in these publications. Nonetheless, albeit with due caution, scholars' use of such publications over the past decade has transformed the study of CCP and PRC foreign policy (at least through the 1950s), as well as the actions and motivations of senior figures such as Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) and Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai).

To make these Chinese-language materials accessible to an English-reading audience, two U.S.-based Chinese scholars have undertaken to translate, edit, and annotate a multi-volume collection of materials on PRC/CCP foreign policy since World War II, culled from PRC sources. The two are Prof. Shuguang Zhang (University of Maryland/College Park), author of *Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), and *Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1995); and Prof. Chen Jian (Southern Illinois University at Carbondale; during 1996-1997 visiting fellow at the U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC), author of *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (NY: Columbia University Press, 1994). The first volume was published in November 1996 by Imprint Publications (Chicago): Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., *Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia: New Documentary Evidence, 1944-1950*.<sup>2</sup>

The translations of Chinese materials below, mostly communications from Mao in Moscow back to other members of the PRC leadership left behind in Beijing, are among more than 200 translated texts included in that volume, the vast majority of which are either reports of the CC CCP or of Mao himself. Introduced by Prof. Warren I. Cohen (University of Maryland/Baltimore), the volume also includes extensive annotations, a glossary, and a chronology; subsequent planned volumes include two volumes covering the 1950s. All the footnotes for the Chinese documents, as well as the translations themselves, are taken from *Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia: New Documentary Evidence, 1944-1950*. All but one of the Chinese documents originally appeared in *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao* [Mao Zedong's manuscripts since the founding of the People's Republic], vol. 1 (Beijing: Central Press of Historical Documents, 1987), the first in a series of compendia of collected Mao documents that has now appeared in more than ten volumes reaching into the early 1960s. Although they have made extensive efforts to ascertain the authenticity of the documents by consulting with officials and scholars who have had access to the archives, both editors stress the need for caution and critical analysis of these source materials and the importance of encouraging the fastest and fullest possible opening of PRC and CCP archives as a far preferable and more accurate method of exploring China's recent past.<sup>3</sup>—James G. Hershberg.

<sup>1</sup> For an analysis of the opportunities and pitfalls of this source, see Chen Jian, "CCP Leaders' Selected Works and the Historiography of the Chinese Communist Revolution," *CWIHP Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 131, 144-146.

<sup>2</sup> Cloth: ISBN 1-879176-20-3 (\$55.00): Imprint Publications, Inc., 520 N. Michigan Ave., Suite 840, Chicago, IL 60611; tel.: (312) 595-0668; fax: (312) 595-0666; e-mail: IMPPUB@AOL.COM

<sup>3</sup> Comments made at seminar at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C., 4 December 1996.

## Fighting for Friendship: Mao, Stalin, and the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950

by Odd Arne Westad

Kremlinologists of yore used to liken analyzing political conflict in the Politburo to watching a dog-fight taking place under a rug. One could hear sounds of fighting, groans from those badly bitten, and see the rug moving as positions changed. But it was not until the rug was removed that it was possible to determine who had come out on top and what damage had been done to those who lost.

Until very recently, analyzing the events of the Sino-Soviet summit meeting in Moscow in late 1949-early 1950 has been a bit like watching the Kremlinologists' dogs.<sup>1</sup> We have not known much, except to register a general sense of unease on both sides when they alluded to these meetings over the subsequent decades. Until 1995—when the Cold War International History Project obtained and published records of two conversations between Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong during the summit<sup>2</sup>—no transcripts from the many conversations held during the summit were publicly available. The only documents which Western scholars could use were the published treaties, which on most issues were as uninformative as all other Soviet friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance agreements.<sup>3</sup>

This constituted a strangely limited harvest for what undoubtedly was among the most important political summit meetings of the 20th century. Not only were these the first and only face-to-face meetings between the two great Communist dictators. They provided the fundamental shape for the Sino-Soviet alliance, a compact which formed the political direction of both states and which Western leaders for many years during the most intense phase of the Cold War regarded as a deadly threat to the capitalist world system. The meetings also formed impressions and images among leaders on both sides, shades of which have been visible at all important junctures in Sino-

Soviet relations since the Moscow summit.

Part of the reason why so little has been regarded as "known" about these meetings is the mythology which grew up around the physical encounter between the Stalin and Mao figures. Especially for Mao, these meetings were an integral part of the story of his rise to power, and, no less importantly, the growth of his unique knowledge and understanding. Mao loved to talk about his "humiliation" at Stalin's hands in Moscow, and about how the Korean War had proven him (Mao) correct, and how the Soviet leader, once again, had come to realize his mistakes toward the end of his life. Until 1956, Mao told this story repeatedly to members of his inner circle, and after 1956—when open criticism of Stalin became acceptable following Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—the Chinese leader told it to visitors of all sorts who came to call on him at Zhongnanhai, the compound for the Chinese leadership in Beijing. For Mao and for all members of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the Chairman's encounter with Stalin became a central part of revolutionary discourse.<sup>4</sup>

What do we then "know" almost fifty years after the event, as the cover is slowly sliding away?

The Moscow summit had a long and unhappy pre-history. Mao had requested a meeting with Stalin on at least three occasions since early 1947, but the Kremlin boss—the *vozhd*—had turned him down each time, with excuses ranging from the military situation in China, to international diplomacy, to the Soviet grain harvest. Even after Stalin promised senior CCP emissary Liu Shaoqi in July 1949 that Mao would be invited to Moscow as soon as the People's Republic was set up,<sup>5</sup> the Chinese in October and November had to pressure the Soviet ambassador in

Beijing, N.V. Roshchin, to get Stalin's OK. When Mao's train finally left Beijing on December 6, the two sides had still not agreed on a framework for what should be discussed in Moscow.

Mao had three matters at the forefront of his mind as his train wound its way toward the Soviet capital. He wanted security against a potential American attack. He wanted Soviet assistance in the construction of socialism. And he wanted to remove the stigma which, in his view, had been inflicted on Chinese-Soviet relations by Stalin's signing in 1945 (at the close of World War II) of a Sino-Soviet Treaty with Mao's bitter rival, the Nationalist Government headed by Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kai-shek]. The best way to achieve all of these aims, Mao concluded, was to sign a new treaty between the two countries, based on Communist solidarity, discarding the 1945 pact. But the Chinese leader was in no way certain that Stalin would accept such a proposal, and he was prepared to act with great care, so that his wish for a new treaty did not stand in the way of the two other aims, both of which could prove more obtainable.<sup>6</sup>

Stalin, on his side, wanted to test Mao, his commitment to "proletarian internationalism," and his style of behavior in Moscow. With unflinchable faith in his own ability to separate friends from enemies, Stalin agreed to a meeting with the new Chinese leader in order to see how Mao would hold up under scrutiny. Stalin had not yet decided whether or not to sign a new treaty, nor had he made up his mind about any major agreements with the new Chinese regime, prior to Mao's arrival in Moscow. Based on what we know of his behavior in other contexts, it is likely that Stalin sought material for his conclusions primarily from the Chinese attitude to the post-World War II territorial arrangements in East Asia and from Mao's attitude toward the

*vozhd* personally.

What happened between the two sides in Moscow from December 17 to January 2 remains shrouded in mystery. Stalin obviously wanted to impress the Chinese, to show them Soviet power by arranging visits to memorials and symbols of the achievements of Communism. It is also obvious that he did not want anyone to engage in any further discussions of the main political issues beyond what had been said at the meeting between Mao and himself on December 16.

Beyond that, everything is still conjecture. Mao may have feigned illness to avoid accepting the Soviet agenda for "sightseeing" and to insist on an immediate continuation of the political talks. The Soviets then used Mao's "illness" to explain why substantive meetings with Stalin, or any Soviet leader, were impossible, thereby trying to force Mao to come up with suggestions for a specific agenda. Mao may indeed have been ill. We know that he was not in good health in October, and the strenuous journey to Moscow could hardly have helped.

Even more important is why Stalin decided to let his guest kill time over the New Year holidays holed up in a government *dacha* near Moscow. The most likely explanation is that the Soviet leader just could not make up his mind on what the outcome of the Chinese visit would be, and as long as the boss did not act, his subordinates could not take any initiatives on their own. The exertions of his own 70th birthday celebrations (on 21 December 1949) and the ensuing New Year functions may also have taken their toll on the *vozhd* and made it inopportune for him to seek out difficult negotiations just at that time.

We know that Stalin did meet with Mao on at least three occasions during this period, but existing sources indicate that those meetings were brief and dealt exclusively with specific practical issues, such as sending Soviet teachers to China and Soviet assistance in repairing the Xiaofengman hydroelectric station. In their book *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War*, Sergei N. Goncharov, John W.

Lewis, and Xue Litai surmise that it was rumors among the foreign press corps in Moscow that Mao was being spurned or even put under house arrest by his Soviet hosts which compelled Stalin agree to let TASS publish an interview with the Chinese leader on January 2. In that interview, Mao referred to the 1945 treaty and trade issues as items being under consideration by the two sides.

Just what happened in the Kremlin during the day of January 2 we do not know. Oral history sources indicate that Molotov and Mikoyan together approached the boss and suggested holding talks with the Chinese at some point over the coming two weeks. Stalin agreed, and entrusted the two with seeking out Mao and informing him.<sup>7</sup> After seeing Molotov and Mikoyan, Mao fired off a jubilant telegram to Beijing, telling of "an important breakthrough" in his work: The Soviets had agreed to signing a new treaty and would receive Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in Moscow to negotiate it.

Based on what we now know, Mao was almost certainly overstating his case. As the Chairman's conversation with Molotov on January 6 shows, Stalin had in no way green-lighted a new treaty, and was still holding open the possibility of merely amending the 1945 text. In spite of the several meetings between Mao and Soviet officials over the following weeks, to which Goncharev, Lewis, and Xue allude, there is no evidence from archival sources of when the Soviet leader gave his go-ahead for a new treaty to be negotiated. It was not until meeting with Mao and Zhou on January 22 and declaring "to hell with" the Yalta accords that Stalin made clear to the Chinese that he was ready to scrap the 1945 text.

A contributing factor to Stalin's change of mind may have been the conversations on U.S. foreign policy which were held in Moscow and Beijing in the interim. As shown by the record of the January 17 meeting—where the topic for discussion was Secretary of State Dean G. Acheson's speech on developments in Asia before the National Press Club in Washington on January 12—Mao was very much aware of how im-

portant it was to the Soviets for him to appear willing fully to coordinate his policies toward the United States with Moscow. The effect of Molotov's and Vyshinskii's alerting the Chinese to Acheson's speech (and particularly his claim that the Soviets were out to subjugate China) was to give Mao a chance to demonstrate his loyalty to the boss. (At the same time in Beijing, Mao's intelligence chief, Li Kenong, told the Soviets that a peaceful liberation of Taiwan might be possible after all.<sup>8</sup>)

Zhou Enlai had prepared well on his long train trip across Siberia. From his arrival in Moscow on January 20, the Chinese Prime Minister was the dynamic force in the negotiations, which soon took the form of Chinese proposals and Soviet counter-proposals.<sup>9</sup> On almost all issues concerning the alliance treaty, bilateral assistance, trade, and credits and loans, the Chinese drove their agenda forward, while the Soviets argued over details. The Chinese got less, and some times much less, than what they bargained for, but they got some form of agreement on all areas which were important to them.<sup>10</sup>

While the economic negotiations showed the Chinese that Stalin's lieutenants could drive a hard bargain, what really hurt the CCP leaders in a way that none of them ever forgot was the Soviet propensity for introducing territorial issues into their negotiating tactics. The Soviet negotiators made Mao feel like he was forced to part with pieces of Chinese sovereignty in Manchuria, Xinjiang, and Mongolia to get the Soviet assistance which he needed. Especially when the Soviets introduced the issues of excluding all non-Soviet foreigners from Manchuria and Xinjiang and establishing joint Sino-Soviet companies in Xinjiang, Mao must have felt that he paid a heavy price.

As we see clearly from the Chinese record, Stalin's tactics, driven by suspicion and rancor, were unnecessary for preventing Sino-American rapprochement and most unhelpful for establishing a lasting Sino-Soviet relationship. Stalin kept his railway and naval concessions in Manchuria (although the leasing period was shortened), and secured phrasing in the secret additional

protocols on Xinjiang and Manchuria which gave him a sense of strategic control of these areas. But Stalin and his associates paid a price for their concessions which was considerably higher than the price Mao paid for signing the agreements which provided him with protection, legitimacy, and aid. By his actions, Stalin undermined Chinese faith in the commonality of ideological principles between the two sides.

The “lessons” of Soviet perfidy in 1949-50 poisoned China’s relationship to Moscow through the 1950s and beyond. Almost twenty years after the signing of the treaty, as Zhou Enlai advised Vietnam’s Communists on the diplomatic aspects of liberating their country, he recalled his and Mao’s experiences with the Soviets in the late 1940s. “The closer to victory your struggle is, the fiercer your struggle with the Soviet Union will be.... The closer your war comes to victory, the more obstructive and treacherous the revisionist Soviets—who cannot compare even to Stalin—will be. I refer to [our] past experiences in order to make you vigilant.”<sup>11</sup>

As the evidence now stands, it is hard to see it corroborating Goncharev, Lewis, and Xue’s view of Stalin and Mao as, in Michael Hunt’s phrase, “shrewd nationalists and resolute realpolitikers engaged in an intricate game of international chess.”<sup>12</sup> Where they see a well-considered plan, at least on Stalin’s part, the documents suggest a good deal of improvisation and indecision on the part of the Soviet leadership. If one adds to this the multiple and often unintended consequences of cultural misperceptions and quirky personalities so clearly brought out in the memoirs, the picture which emerges is rather of two “giants of history” struggling, and ultimately failing, to construct a purpose to their bilateral relationship beyond the treaty text.

The Chinese side, if anything, came out better than the Soviets as far as a “realist,” interest-oriented agenda is concerned. Mao’s decision-making was, in 1950, still oriented toward consensus within his party and relied heavily on trusted advisers whose judgments influenced his own thinking.

Stalin, on the other hand, often made hasty decisions based on little or no information or consultation. And since there was, at least in this case, little room for initiatives by any of Stalin’s subordinates, the result was a disjointed policy-making process, through which the Soviets won a pyrrhic victory—extracting Chinese concessions, but losing the opportunity to forge a lasting alliance.

<sup>1</sup> By far the best survey of the summit available is in Sergei N. Goncharov, John W. Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993), 84-129. Although very little has been published in China in terms of documents (except the items which are included in the present collection), there are a number of memoirs dealing with the summit. The most important is Shi Zhe, *Zai lishi juren shenbian* [Alongside giants in history] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1991). Shi was Mao’s interpreter in Moscow.

<sup>2</sup> The Mao-Stalin conversations of 16 December 1949 and 22 January 1950 were published in *CWIHP Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 5-9, with commentaries by Chen Jian, Vojtech Mastny, Odd Arne Westad, and Vladislav Zubok.

<sup>3</sup> For an overview of what was known up to the mid-1980s, see Peter Jones and Sin Kevill, comps., *China and the Soviet Union 1949-84* (London: Longman, 1985). For a comparative view, see Margot Light, ed., *Troubled Friendships: Moscow’s Third World Ventures* (London: British Academic Press, 1993).

<sup>4</sup> See, e.g., Mao’s March 1956 conversation with Soviet ambassador Pavel Yudin, *CWIHP Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 164-167.

<sup>5</sup> Soviet records on Liu Shaoqi’s trip to Moscow in the summer of 1949 have recently been released from the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF) and published in the journal *Problemi Dalnego Vostok* [Problems of the Far East] introduced by former Soviet ambassador to Mongolia Andrei Ledovsky. For an English translation, see Andrei Ledovsky, “The Moscow Visit of a Delegation of the Communist Party of China in June to August 1949,” *Far Eastern Affairs* 4 (1996), 64-86.

<sup>6</sup> See Odd Arne Westad, “Brothers: Visions of an Alliance,” in Westad, ed., *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance*, forthcoming.

<sup>7</sup> Former Soviet Vice-Foreign Minister Mikhail Kapitsa, author’s interview, 7 September 1992.

<sup>8</sup> Record of conversation, Shibaev-Li Kenong, 16 January 1950, Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVPRF), f. 0100, o. 43, p. 302, d. 10, ll. 38-44.

<sup>9</sup> See Vyshinskii to Stalin, 2 February 1950, and attached draft agreements, AVPRF, f. 07, o. 23a, p. 18, d. 234. On ll. 29-34 Vyshinskii summarized his conversation with Zhou earlier that day.

<sup>10</sup> See Roshchin’s and Mikoian’s conversations with Zhou on February 12, summarized in AVPRF, f. 07, o. 23a, p. 18, d. 234, ll. 71-74 and 64-68. For a very interesting summary of prospects for trade, see Kosiachenko et al. to Molotov et al., “O torgovle s Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respublikoi” [“On trade with the People’s Republic of China”], 12 February 1950, AVPRF, f. 07, o. 23a, p. 18, d. 237, ll. 1-249.

<sup>11</sup> Transcript of talks between Vietnamese and Chinese party delegations, Beijing, 11 April 1967.

<sup>12</sup> *CWIHP Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 143.

#### TRANSLATED RUSSIAN AND CHINESE DOCUMENTS ON MAO ZEDONG’S VISIT TO MOSCOW, DECEMBER 1949-FEBRUARY 1950

##### Document 1: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 18 December 1949<sup>1</sup>

(1) [I] arrived in Moscow on the 16th and met with Stalin for two hours at 10 p.m. (Beijing time). His attitude was really sincere. The questions involved included the possibility of peace, the treaty, loan, Taiwan, and the publication of my selected works. (2) Stalin said that the Americans are afraid of war. The Americans ask other countries to fight the war [for them], but other countries are also afraid to fight a war. According to him, it is unlikely that a war will break out, and we agree with his opinions. (3) With regard to the question of the treaty, Stalin said that because of the Yalta agreement, it is improper for us to overturn the legitimacy of the old Sino-Soviet treaty. If we abolish the old treaty and sign a new one, the status of the Kurile Islands will be changed and the United States will have an excuse to take them away. Therefore, on the question of the Soviet Union’s thirty-year lease of Lushun [Port Arthur], we should not change it in format; however, in reality, the Soviet Union will withdraw its troops from Lushun and will let Chinese troops occupy it. I expressed that too early a withdrawal [of the Soviet troop from Lushun] will create unfavorable conditions for us. He replied that

the Soviet withdrawal of troops [from Lushun] does not mean that the Soviet Union will stand by with folded arms [in a crisis]; rather, it is possible to find ways through which China will not become the first to bear the brunt. His opinion is that we may sign a statement, which will solve the Lushun problem in accordance with the above-mentioned ideas, and that by doing so, China will also gain political capital [*zhengzhi ziben*]. I said that it is necessary for us to maintain the legitimacy of the Yalta agreement. However, public opinion in China believes that since the old treaty was signed by the GMD [Guomindang; Kuomintang, KMT], it has lost its ground with the GMD's downfall. He replied that the old treaty needs to be revised and that the revision is necessarily substantial, but it will not come until two years from now. (4) Stalin said that it is unnecessary for the Foreign Minister [Zhou Enlai; Chou En-Lai] to fly here just for signing a statement. I told him that I will consider it. I hope that the commercial, loan, and aviation agreements will be signed at the same time, and the Premier [Zhou Enlai] should come. It is hoped that the Politburo will discuss how to solve the treaty problem and offer its opinions.

[Source: *Pei Jianzhang et al., Zhonghua renmin gongheguo wajiaoshi [A Diplomatic History of the People's Republic of China] (Beijing: World Affairs Press, 1994), 17-8; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia: New Documentary Evidence, 1944-1950 (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1996), 128.*]

**Document 2: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, 19 December 1949 (excerpt)**

(1) As to the question of the Burmese government's request to establish diplomatic relations with us, you should ask it in a return telegram if it is willing to cut off its diplomatic relations with the Guomindang, and at the same time invite that government to dispatch a responsible representative to Beijing for discussions about establishing diplomatic relations between China and Burma. Whether the diplomatic relations will be established or not will be determined by the result of the discussions. It is necessary that we should go through this proce-

sure of discussion, and we should act in the same way toward all capitalist countries. If a certain capitalist country openly announces the desire to establish diplomatic relations with us, our side should telegraph that country and request that it dispatch its representative to China for discussions about establishing diplomatic relations, and at the same time, we may openly publish the main contents of the telegram. By doing so, we will be able to control the initiative.<sup>2</sup>

[Source: *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong's manuscripts since the founding of the People's Republic; hereafter JGYLMZDWG], vol. 1 (Beijing: Central Press of Historical Documents, 1987), 193; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 129.*]

**Document 3: Telegram, Mao Zedong to CCP CC, 22 December 1949**

Central Committee:

(1) According to [Wang] Jiaxiang, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Germany all want to do business with us. If this is true, we are going to have trade relations with three more countries besides the Soviet Union. In addition, we have done business or are going to do business with Britain, Japan, the United States, India and other countries. Therefore, in preparing the trade agreement with the Soviet Union, you should have a comprehensive perspective. While we should naturally give top priority to the Soviet Union, we should at the same time prepare to do business with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Britain, Japan, the United States, and other countries, and you need to have a general evaluation of its scope and volume. (2) The telegram of the 21st has been received. We have arranged with Stalin to have a discussion on the 23rd or 24th. After that discussion, we will be able to determine the guideline, which we will inform you by telegraph.

[Source: *JGYLMZDWG, 1:197; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 129.*]

**Document 4: Memorandum, 1 January 1950 Conversation of Mao and USSR Ambassador to China N.V. Roshchin**

FROM THE DIARY OF Secret  
ROSHCHIN N.V. Copy No.2

**MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION  
WITH THE CHAIRMAN OF THE  
PEOPLE'S CENTRAL GOVERNMENT  
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF  
CHINA, COMRADE MAO ZEDONG  
1 JANUARY 1950**

Following the orders of the USSR Secretary of Foreign Affairs, comrade [Andrei] Vyshinskiy, on January 1 [I] visited the Chairman of the People's Central Government of the People's Republic of China, comrade Mao Zedong.

After an exchange of New Year greetings and other formalities, a friendly and warm conversation took place, during which comrade Mao Zedong related the following.

During the past few days he received a report from Beijing that the governments of Burma and India expressed their readiness to recognize the government of the People's Republic of China. The position of the Chinese government on this matter is as follows: to inform the governments of Burma and India that if they are sincere in their wishes to mend diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China, first they must completely break all ties with Jiang Jieshi, unconditionally refuse any kind of support and assistance to this regime, making it into an official declaration. Under the condition that the governments of these countries accept the aforementioned proposals of the Chinese government, the Indian and Burmese governments may send their representatives to Beijing for negotiations.

Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out that there is also information, which states that in the very near future England and other countries of the British Commonwealth will evidently take steps toward recognizing the People's Republic of China.

Touching upon the military situation in China, comrade Mao Zedong pointed out that as of now all of the main Guomindang forces on the mainland of China have been crushed. In the Szechuan and Xinjiang [Sinkiang] provinces approximately 400 thousand Guomindang troops were taken prisoner and switched to the side of the People's Liberation army. For the remainder of the Khutzunan cluster, numbering 30-40 thousand persons, all the routes for

retreating to Tibet and to the south have been cut off. They will be destroyed in the very near future. In Yunnan there are also up to another 30 thousand persons scattered to the south-west from Kunming in separate groups of Guomindang followers, but their fate has been decided.

Mao Zedong requested to transmit the following information concerning his health condition and his plans for further stay in Moscow to the leaders of the Soviet government:

“My health condition — says Mao Zedong, — has improved after a two-year resting period. For the last four days I have been sleeping 8 hours a day with no problems, without taking special sleeping medication. I feel much more energetic, but when going for a walk, I cannot remain out in the fresh air for more than a quarter of an hour — I get dizzy. With regard to this, I intend to rest one more week in total peace and completely restore a normal sleeping pattern.”

Further he pointed out that following the week-long rest period he would like to visit comrades Shvernik, Molotov, Voroshilov, Beria, Malenkov, Vasilevskiy, and Vyshinskiy. These visits will have to take the nature of ordinary conversations. He will not talk about any specific topics nor discuss any business matters. There must be one visit per day, they must not be very lengthy, and he thinks that the best time for them would be after 5-6 pm.

During the same time period he would like to meet with I.V. Stalin to discuss business matters.

After completing the discussion concerning business matters, during the remainder of the stay he intends to place a wreath at Lenin's mausoleum, see the subway system, visit a few collective farms, attend theaters, and with that finish his stay in Moscow.

Comrade Mao Zedong emphasized that he refrains from visiting factories, meetings with large audiences, and giving public speeches, because it is tiring to his health and may, once again, disturb his sleeping pattern and provoke a relapse of spells of dizziness. Previously he intended to visit different places in the Soviet Union, but presently, due to his health condition, he refrains from traveling around the Soviet Union, because there is a long trip home ahead of him.

Upon leaving Beijing he intended to

stay in the USSR for three months, however, presently the circumstances of [his] work in China are forcing him to reduce the length of his stay to two months. Keeping in mind the eleven-day [train] travel to Beijing, he intends to leave Moscow at the end of January, counting on being in Beijing on February 6.

After listening to all of comrade Mao Zedong's announcements, I stated that I will report all of his wishes to the government the very next day.

Further I asked comrade Mao Zedong if he is aware of the proposal made by the Soviet government in November [1949], to hand over a few hundred Japanese army officers to the Chinese government, in order to bring them to justice for crimes and atrocities which they committed while stationed in China.

Comrade Mao Zedong stated that he was aware of this even prior to his departure from Beijing, but because they were busy with preparations for the trip to Moscow, the Chinese government was not able to look into this matter seriously. His point of view on this matter is as follows: as a matter of principle, the Chinese government will take these criminals and will put them on trial for all their deeds. However, taking into consideration that presently the attention of the Chinese people is concentrated on the events surrounding the elimination of the final remnants of the Guomindang and that the Chinese court system has not yet been ironed out, the Chinese government cannot begin the trial process without preparing the population for it, because it will not have a proper political effect. Besides, the Chinese government must at the same time prepare the trials against the Guomindang military criminals.

Taking into consideration all of this — says Mao Zedong, — I suppose that we will be able to take the military criminals from Soviet territory after six months. I ask the Soviet government to keep these criminals for the first six months of 1950 on its territory and, if possible, to collect more information on them for the trial. In the beginning of the second half of the year we will take them and will put them on trial.

On this the business discussion was concluded. Following the discussion comrade Mao Zedong invited me to the table to have dinner together with him. I accepted the invitation.

The conversation was translated by Shi Zhe (Karskiy).

After parting with comrade Mao Zedong, I remained to wait for the car with Karskiy. The latter informed me that comrade Mao Zedong has been feeling much better for three days already. He sleeps fine, without taking medication, jokes, is cheerful and talkative with everyone, but, the same as before, cannot be out in the fresh air for long. He still gets spells of dizziness. Comrade Mao Zedong firmly decided to rest another week and not travel anywhere. On January 2 a conference of doctors will take place.

USSR AMBASSADOR IN CHINA  
/s/ (Roshchin)

[Source: *Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVPRF)*, Moscow, f. 0100, op. 43, d. 10, papka 302, ll. 1-4; document provided by O.A. Westad; translation for CWIHP by Daniel Rozas.]

#### **Document 5: Telegram, Mao Zedong to CCP CC, 2 January 1950<sup>3</sup>**

Central Committee:

(1) Our work here has achieved an important breakthrough in the past two days. Comrade Stalin has finally agreed to invite Comrade Zhou Enlai to Moscow and sign a new Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance and other agreements on credit, trade, and civil aviation. Yesterday, on 1 January, a decision was made to publish my interview with the Tass correspondent, and it is in the newspapers today (2 January), which you might have already received. At 8:00 p.m. today, Comrade Molotov and Comrade Mikoyan came to my quarters to have a talk, asking about my opinions on the Sino-Soviet treaty and other matters. I immediately gave them a detailed description of three options: (a) To sign a new Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance. By taking this action, we will gain enormous advantages. Sino-Soviet relations will be solidified on the basis of the new treaty; in China, workers, peasants, intellectuals, and the left wing of the national bourgeoisie will be greatly inspired, while the right wing of the national bourgeoisie will be isolated; and internationally, we may acquire more political capital to deal with the imperialist countries and to examine all the treaties

signed between China and each of the imperialist countries in the past. (b) To publish through the news agencies of the two countries a brief communique stating that the authorities of the two countries have exchanged opinions on the old Sino-Soviet treaty and other issues, and have achieved a consensus, without mentioning any of the details. In fact, by doing so we mean to put off the solution of the problem to the future, until a few years later. Accordingly, China's foreign minister Zhou Enlai does not need to come here. (c) To sign a statement, not a treaty, that will summarize the key points in the two countries' relations. If this is the option, Zhou Enlai will not have to come either. After I have analyzed in detail the advantages and disadvantages of these three options, Comrade Molotov said promptly that option (a) was good and that Zhou should come. I then asked: "Do you mean that the old treaty will be replaced by a new one?" Comrade Molotov replied: "Yes." After that we calculated how long it would take for Zhou to come here and to sign the treaty. I said that my telegram would reach Beijing on 3 January, and that [Zhou] Enlai would need five days for preparations and could depart from Beijing on 9 January. It would take him eleven days by train [to travel to Moscow], so he could arrive in Moscow on 19 January. The negotiation and the signing of the treaty would need about ten days, from 20 January to the end of the month. Zhou and I would return home in early February. Meanwhile we also discussed the plans for my sightseeing outside [my quarters and Moscow], and we decided that I would visit Lenin's tomb, travel to Leningrad, Gorky, and other places, and make tours of such places as an ordnance factory, the subway (Molotov and Mikoyan recommended these two items) and a collective farm. We also discussed the problem of my meeting with various Soviet leaders (so far I have not left my quarters to pay an individual visit to any of them).

(2) Please finish all the preparations [for Zhou's departure] in five days after you receive this telegram. I hope that [Zhou] Enlai, together with the minister of trade<sup>4</sup> and other necessary aides, and with the necessary documents and materials, will depart from Beijing for Moscow by train (not by air) on 9 January. Comrade Dong Biwu will assume the post of acting premier of the Government Administration Council. The

news should not be publicized until Zhou has arrived in Moscow.

(3) Are the above-stated arrangements feasible? Will five days be enough for you to finish the preparations? Does [Zhou] need one or two more days for preparation? Is it necessary for Comrade Li Fuchun or other comrades to come to offer assistance? Please consider them and report to me in a return telegram.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:211-2; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 131-2.]

**Document 6: Telegram, Mao Zedong to CCP CC, 4 a.m., 3 January 1950**

Central Committee:

My telegram of 11:00 p.m. yesterday must have reached you. Comrade [Zhou] Enlai's trip to the Soviet Union must be officially approved at a meeting of the Government Administration Council. The Council should also be informed that the main purposes of Zhou's trip are as follows: to negotiate and sign a new Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance (in comparison to the old treaty, there will be some changes concerning the status of Lushun [Port Arthur] and Dalian, although the details still have to be negotiated; however, the defense against possible aggression of Japan and its allies and the recognition of Outer Mongolia's independence will continue to constitute the basic spirit of the new treaty); to negotiate and sign a credit agreement (we have proposed the sum of \$300 million, which will be provided over a few years; the reason why we have not requested more is that [we believe] it better for us to borrow less than to borrow more at present and for several years); and to negotiate and sign a civil aviation agreement (it will benefit the development of our own aviation industry) and a trade agreement (by defining the scope of the barter trade with the Soviet Union, we will be in a more favorable position to determine the orientation of our own production, as well as to conclude trade agreements with other countries). In addition, you should gather all the members of the Government Council now in Beijing for a briefing. At both meetings, you should point out that this move [the signing of an alliance treaty with the Soviet Union] will place the

People's Republic in a more advantageous position in the world. It will press the capitalist countries to come to our terms; it will be favorable for China to be recognized unconditionally by various countries, and for the old treaties to be abolished and new treaties to be signed; and it will deter the capitalist countries from taking reckless actions.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:213; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 132-3.]

**Document 7: Telegram, Mao Zedong to CCP CC, 6 a.m., 5 January 1950**

[Your] telegram of 7:30 p.m., 4 January has been received. (1) We have already arranged [with the Soviet leaders] for Zhou to come here with approximately seventeen aides. He can come. There should be no problem. We have also informed the authorities here that the train will leave Beijing on the night of 9 January. (2) It is better if Bao Erhan, Deng Liqun and the head of the trade department of the Yili [Ili] region could arrive in Moscow on 21 or 22 January, two or three days after [Zhou] Enlai's arrival; but it is fine if they come on 19 January, the same day Enlai arrives. Please inform me immediately about your decision [on this matter]. Please also decide and report to me what kind of transportation Bao Erhan and Deng Liqun will need for getting here. Do we need to dispatch a plane from here, or is it possible for the air transportation regiment now stationed in Xinjiang assign a plane for them? Please inform me of your decision immediately by telegraph. (3) Concerning the key points of the negotiation and the preparatory work [for the negotiation], all the points you have put forward should be carefully considered, and preparations should be made accordingly. Since we are going to engage in negotiations, we should present our views extensively, and should make our points clear. After Enlai's departure, the Central Committee may continue to study these issues, and inform us of its opinions by telegraph at any time. As far as the materials on trade are concerned, if you are unable to have them ready in five days, you may continue working on them after Enlai's departure, and report to us by telegraph at any time.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:215; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., *Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia*, 133.]

**Document 8: Telegram, Mao Zedong to  
CCP Central Committee, 5 January  
1950**

Please pay attention to two matters: (1) When the question of replacing the [old] Sino-Soviet treaty with a new treaty has been reviewed by the Government Administrative Council and the [Central People's] Government Council, please urge all the participants to maintain secrecy. (2) Before Zhou [Enlai] departs with his more than ten [assistants], or on their way [travelling to Moscow], it is necessary for him to assemble all those people to declare discipline to them, telling them that undisciplined words and actions are prohibited, and that they must obey orders on every occasion.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:217; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., *Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia*, 134.]

**Document 9: Conversation between  
A. Vyshinsky and Mao Zedong,  
Moscow, 6 January 1950**

FROM THE DIARY OF SECRET  
A.Y. VYSHINSKY

**MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION  
WITH THE CHAIRMAN OF THE  
PEOPLE'S CENTRAL GOVERNMENT  
OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF  
CHINA, MAO ZEDONG  
6 January 1950**

On 6 January of the current year, I visited Mao Zedong. After a brief exchange of greetings and formalities conversation of the following content took place.

1. I informed Mao Zedong that with regard to the request of the People's Central Government of the People's Republic of China for assistance with the disastrous condition of the Jilin [Xiaofengman] hydro-electric power station, the Soviet government has made a decision—to send, within a period of five days, four Soviet experts to China for a month, who must write a report on the condition of the hydro-electric gen-

erating station and draft the necessary measures for putting an end to the disastrous condition of the Jilin [Xiao-fengman] hydro-electric power station.

Mao Zedong voiced his gratitude to the Soviet Government for rendering the necessary assistance by answering that the help rendered by the Soviet Union in this matter is of great significance to China's entire national economy.

2. I informed Mao Zedong that, with regard to Liu Shaoqi's telegram concerning fuel supplies from the Soviet Union for the use of pilot training, [we] intend to answer that, according to calculations made by our experts, it has been determined that the need for fuel for the aforementioned purpose is determined by the standards of the Soviet Army in the following amounts: 13,400 tons of high-octane gasoline, 5,270 tons of low-octane gasoline, 1,315 tons of aviation oil, and 26 tons of product P-9.

The Soviet Government will give an order to direct the aforementioned amount of fuel to China in the course of the first half of the year, starting with January. As far as the methods and conditions of payment by China for the delivered fuel are concerned, they can be determined during the negotiations concerning the commodity circulation for the year 1950.

Mao Zedong voiced his agreement with the telegram and asked to express gratitude to the Soviet Government for this assistance. As far as the amount of fuel goes, he said that "our people would like to acquire more" and they have to be under strict control. He is grateful to the Soviet Government for reviewing the calculations in this situation, an action with which he completely agrees. Mao Zedong added that the matter of fuel expenditure has to be dealt with in a strict manner, because it will be in the interests of China itself, which must be more frugal in using the articles of outside assistance. Mao Zedong asked [me] to leave him the text of the telegram.

3. I asked Mao Zedong whether he thinks it would be more expedient for the People's Republic of China to address the Security Council of the United Nations with a declaration that the remaining of the Guomindang representative in the Security Council is unlawful and that he must be expelled from the Council. As for itself, the Soviet Union intends to support this kind of declaration and, in its turn, to demand the

Security Council to expel the representative of the Guomindang group from the Council. In the event that the Guomindang representative remains in the Security Council, the Soviet representative will declare that he will not participate in the work done by the aforementioned Council so long as the Guomindang representative will be participating in it.

Mao Zedong said that he agrees with this course a hundred percent and thinks that copies of such a declaration from the People's Republic of China to the Security Council can be directed to the members of the Security Council simultaneously.

I noted that after coordinating this matter from the Chinese side, I will have to present the proposal to the Soviet Government for consideration.

4. Mao Zedong said that, in regard to the message of the Soviet Government to the People's Government of China concerning the Japanese military criminals /971 persons/, he would like to report the following:

1. In general, there is no doubt that the Japanese military criminals must be transferred to China to stand trial.

2. However, the Chinese Government intends to put the Japanese military criminals on trial at the same time as the Guomindang military criminals. The organization of such a trial process is planned to take place approximately during the first or second half of 1951. Therefore, it would be desirable for the Soviet Government to agree temporarily to keep the aforementioned Japanese military criminals in the Soviet Union, roughly until the second half of 1950.

I noted that, since the Soviet Union is bound by corresponding obligations — to repatriate all Japanese military prisoners by January of 1950, perhaps it would be more expedient to agree on formally considering the Japanese military criminals as having been transferred to China, but in fact to temporarily leave them on the Soviet territory.

Mao said that this is the exact formula he considers to be the most expedient.

5. Mao stated that he is increasingly coming to the conclusion that the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union need to draft a new treaty of friendship and alliance between the two nations. The drafting of a new treaty between us, he said, stems from the completely new relations, which have evolved between the People's

Republic of China and the Soviet Union following the victory of the People's Revolution. A review of the existing treaty is especially necessary, since two important components of the treaty, Japan and the Guomindang, have suffered major changes: Japan has ceased to exist as an armed force and the Guomindang has been broken up. Besides, as is well known, a certain group of the Chinese people is expressing dissatisfaction with the existing treaty between China and the Soviet Union. Thus, the drafting of a new treaty of friendship and alliance between China and the USSR would be in the best interests of both sides.

While answering Mao Zedong, I said that the question of a new treaty, in my eyes, seems to be a complicated matter, since the signing of a new treaty or reviewing of the existing treaty and introduction of any kind of corrections may be used as an excuse by the Americans and the English for reviewing and altering parts of the treaty, changing which may cause damage to Soviet and Chinese interests. This is not desirable and must not be allowed to occur.

Mao noted that, without a doubt, this circumstance must be taken into consideration when creating a formula for solving the given problem.

Persons present during the conversation: comrades Kovalev I.V., Fedorenko N.T., and also Wang Jiaxiang and Shi Zhe / Karskiy/.

The conversation lasted approximately 45 minutes.

A. Vyshinsky

[Source: AVP RF, f. 0100, op. 43, d. 43, papka 302, ll. 1-5; provided by O.A. Westad; translation for CWIHP by Daniel Rozas.]

**Document 10: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai and CCP CC, 6 a.m., 7 January 1950**

[Zhou] Enlai and the Central Committee:

We have received the two telegrams on the management of the question of establishing diplomatic relations with Great Britain and India and the telegram on export-import trade, dated 8:00, 5 January. In regard with the question of export-import trade, you must pay special attention to making an overall plan on the total varieties

and volume of exports to and imports from such countries as the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany, and Hungary, as well as Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, India, Burma, Vietnam, Thailand, Australia, Japan, Canada, and the United States, for the whole of 1950. Otherwise, we may find ourselves in a disadvantageous position. It is hoped that, after [Zhou] Enlai's departure from Beijing, [Liu] Shaoqi, Chen Yun, and [Bo] Yibo will pay attention to this matter.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:218; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 134.]

**Document 11: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Zhou Enlai and CCP CC, 6 a.m., 7 January 1950**

[Zhou] Enlai and the Central Committee:

At 1:00 a.m. today (the 7th), Vyshinskii came to my quarters to talk about three matters: (1) [The Soviet Union] is in a position to satisfy our request of purchasing airplane fuel. (2) [The Soviet Union] is in a position to satisfy our request of offering assistance in repairing the dam of the Xiaofengman waterpower station. A letter with formal response to these two issues will be passed to me tomorrow (the 8th). (3) [He] proposed that our foreign ministry should issue a statement to the United Nations Security Council, denying that Jiang Tingfu, the representative of the former Guomindang government, had the legitimate right to hold China's seat at the Security Council. Vyshinskii made it clear that if China issued such a statement, the Soviet Union was ready to do one thing: if Jiang Tingfu remained at the Security Council as China's representative (and it was said that he would even become the president of the Security Council this year), the Soviet Union would refuse to attend the Security Council's meetings. Vyshinskii asked my opinion. I immediately stated that China's foreign ministry could issue a statement like this. I also said that my telegram would reach Beijing on 7 January, and that a statement signed by China's foreign minister Zhou Enlai could be issued on 8 January or 9 January. I asked him that, in addition to sending the statement to the United Nations Security Council

and the United Nations' general secretary, if it was necessary, at the same time, to send the telegram to the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States, and France as permanent members of the Security Council. He said yes. He said that the Soviet Union would take due action in accordance with China's telegram. He made it clear that he asked my opinion in the capacity of [Soviet] foreign minister, and I made it clear that my agreement was official. After receiving this telegram, please move forward immediately, so that the telegram with this statement could be sent out before [Zhou] Enlai's departure [for Moscow] on 9 January. In addition to sending the telegram to the United Nations' secretary general and the Security Council, the foreign ministries of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States, and France should also be notified by telegram, with the text of the telegram to the United Nations attached. Please let me know of the arrangement on this matter, as well as if you would be able to send out the telegram on 9 January.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:219-20; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 134-5.]

**Document 12: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai, 12 p.m., 7 January 1950**

[Liu] Shaoqi, [Zhou] Enlai:

Here is a draft of the statement<sup>5</sup> that Zhou is to telegraph to the president of the United Nations General Assembly, the United Nations secretary general, and the governments of the ten member states of the United Nations Security Council (do not send it to Yugoslavia). Please dispatch the telegram per this draft.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:221; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 135.]

**Document 13: Telegram, Mao Zedong to CCP CC and CCP Northwest Bureau, 10 January 1950 (Excerpt)**

The Central Committee, and pass on to Liu [Bocheng], Deng [Xiaoping], He [Long] and the Northwest Bureau:

(1) I fully agree to the plan to dispatch troops into Xizang [Tibet] contained in Liu [Bocheng]'s and Deng [Xiaoping]'s telegram of 7 January.<sup>6</sup> Now Britain, India, and Pakistan have all recognized us, which is favorable to [our] dispatching troops into Xizang.

(2) According to Comrade Peng Dehuai, the four months needed for dispatching troops [to Xizang] will start in mid-May (in the previous telegram I mistakenly wrote "three months").<sup>7</sup>

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:226-7; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 136.]

**Document 14: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 13 January 1950**

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi:

(1) I will depart for Leningrad today (the 13th) in the evening and will be back to Moscow in two days. (2) I have arranged for Liu Yalou, Soviet advisor Kotov and two other men to come here. Please inform Nie Rongzhen of this matter. (3) Xiao Jinguang can now be appointed as commander of the navy; please also inform Nie Rongzhen about this appointment.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:234; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 136.]

**Document 15: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 13 January 1950**

(1) I agree with your telegram dated 13 January about implementing the order to requisition foreign military barracks and preparing to force the United States to evacuate all the former U.S. consulates from China.<sup>8</sup> (2) I agree that the Shanghai Military Control Commission should confiscate or requisition immediately all the property left by the U.S. Economic Cooperation Administration there. (3) As far as the problem of taking over the property left by the puppet regime in Hong Kong is concerned, please make a decision after the Foreign Ministry and the Central Finance and Economics Commission have provided their suggestions. I have no specific opinion on this matter. (4) Vyshinskii came to my quar-

ters and talked with me this evening. He proposed that our government should send a telegram to the United Nations, addressing the question of sending our representative to the United Nations to replace the Guomindang's representative, since a very serious struggle is now under way in the Security Council over the legitimacy of the GMD's representative. While the Soviet Union supports our government's statement about expelling the GMD's representative, the United States, Great Britain, and the majority of the member states oppose the expulsion. Therefore, it is necessary for China to make a further statement. The telegram can be sent out a week from now. I have agreed to his proposal. The Central Committee may need to consider a nominee for our head representative and report to me by telegraph, and the final decision will be made after [Zhou] Enlai gets here. (5) I will leave for Leningrad tomorrow (the 14th), at 10:00 p.m., not today. I will stay in Leningrad for one day, the 15th, and will return on the 16th. [Wang] Jiaxiang, [Chen] Boda, Shi Zhe, Wang Dongxing will accompany me. Ye Zilong and the technical staff will stay to work in my quarters here. The Central Committee may send its telegrams to me as usual.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:235-6; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 136-7.]

**Document 16: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Hu Qiaomu, 14 January 1950**

Comrade [Hu] Qiaomu:

I shall leave for Leningrad today at 9:00 p.m. and will not be back for three days. I have not yet received the draft of the Renmin ribao ["People's Daily"] editorial and the resolution of the Japanese Communist Party's Politburo. If you prefer to let me read them, I will not be able to give you my response until the 17th. You may prefer to publish the editorial after Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi has read them. Our Party should express its opinion by supporting the Cominform bulletin's criticism of Nosaka and addressing our disappointment over the Japanese Communist Party Politburo's failure to accept the criticism. It is hoped that the Japanese Communist Party will take appropriate steps to correct Nosaka's mis-

takes.<sup>9</sup>

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:237; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 137.]

**Document 17: Conversation, V.M. Molotov and A.Y Vyshinsky with Mao Zedong, Moscow, 17 January 1950**

FROM THE DIARY OF TOP SECRET  
V.M. MOLOTOV

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION  
OF V.M. MOLOTOV AND A.Y.  
VYSHINSKY WITH THE CHAIRMAN  
OF THE PEOPLE'S CENTRAL  
GOVERNMENT OF THE PEOPLE'S  
REPUBLIC OF CHINA, MAO  
ZEDONG, 17 JANUARY 1950

After an exchange of greetings and a brief dialogue on general topics, a conversation of the following content took place.

1. I told Mao Zedong, that on 12 January [1950] the USA Secretary of State Acheson gave a speech at the National Press Club, which touched on certain international matters, in particular, matters concerning China, USSR and their mutual relations. Acheson's statements concerning these matters are a clear slander against the Soviet Union and were designed to deceive directly public opinion. The United States went bankrupt with its policy in China, and now Acheson is trying to justify himself, without shying away from deceitful means in the process. An example of the extent of Acheson's fabrications can be seen in the following segment of his speech:

"The following is taking place in China: the Soviet Union, armed with these new means, is partitioning northern regions of China from China and incorporating them into the Soviet Union. This process has been completed in Outer Mongolia. It has been almost completed in Manchuria, and I am sure that Soviet agents are sending very favorable reports from Inner Mongolia and Sinkiang [Xinjiang]. This is what is happening. This is a partition of entire regions, vast regions, inhabited by Chinese, a partition of these regions from China, and their in-

corporation into the Soviet Union.

I want to announce this, and maybe I will sin against my doctrine of repudiating dogmatism. But, in any case, I want to say that the fact that the Soviet Union is taking over four northern regions of China, is the most important and the most significant factor in any great power's relations with Asia.

What does this signify to us? This signifies something very, very important."

I advised Mao Zedong to familiarize himself with Acheson's entire speech and left him a full text of this speech (as reported by TASS).

Mao Zedong said that until now, as is known, these kinds of fabrications were the job of all kinds of scoundrels, represented by American journalists and correspondents. And now this dirty work has been taken up by the Secretary of State of the USA. As they say, the Americans are making progress!

I responded that, with regard to Acheson's speech, we think the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China should respond accordingly. At the same time, I pointed out that according to a TASS announcement from Washington, on 14 January, the former consul general in Mukden, [Angus] Ward, while responding to questions from the press, stated the very opposite of what Acheson said in his speech on 12 January. In addition, I quoted the appropriate portion of Ward's declaration, which stated that he did not see any signs which would point to the Soviet Union's control over the administration of Manchuria or its attempt to incorporate Manchuria into the USSR, even though the Soviet Union is exercising its treaty rights concerning the joint administration of KChZhD [Chinese Changchun Railroad].

I said that we intend to react to Acheson's aforementioned speech with a declaration from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. However, we would prefer for the Chinese government to be the first to make a statement on this matter, and afterwards, following the publication in our press of the declaration of the People's Government of China and Ward's statement, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs would make an appropriate statement.

Mao Zedong said that he agrees with this, and there is no place here for any

doubts. At the same time, however, he inquired if it would not be better for Xinhua [Chinese News Agency] to make this kind of declaration.

I answered that since the matter concerns a speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USA on an important matter, the declaration should not be made by the telegraph agency, but rather by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China.

Mao Zedong said that he shares the same opinion and, after familiarizing himself with Acheson's speech, tomorrow he will prepare the text for the declaration [to be made by] the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, submit it to us for suggestions and corrections, and then telegraph it to Beijing, so that the Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs, presently performing the duties of the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, can publish this declaration. At the same time Mao Zedong pointed out that in this declaration he will expose Acheson's slanderous fabrications against the Soviet Union.

Mao Zedong asked what, in our opinion, is the actual purpose of Acheson's slanderous declaration and could it, this declaration, be a kind of smokescreen, using which, the American imperialists will attempt to occupy the island of Formosa?

I said that, after going bankrupt with their policy in China, the Americans are trying, with the help of slander and deception, to create misunderstandings in the relations between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. I also said it is impossible to disagree that they are using the dissemination of slander as a kind of a smokescreen, in order to carry out their plans of occupation. In addition, I noted that, in our opinion, the declaration of the People's Government of China regarding Acheson's speech could point out that the fabrications of the USA Secretary of State are an insult to China, that the Chinese people did not lead a struggle, so that someone else could rule or establish control over one or another part of China, and that the Chinese people reject Acheson's declaration.

Mao Zedong said that he agrees with this and will immediately start drafting the declaration. At the same time he asked for the text of Acheson's speech and Ward's declaration to the press to be transferred to Beijing for the Xinhua agency. I promised

to do so this very evening and immediately made arrangements with comrade Vyshinsky.

Afterwards Mao Zedong said that during the past few days the Americans have mobilized the activities of their [diplomatic, intelligence and information] networks and are testing the ground for negotiations with the People's Government of China. Thus, a few days ago, the head of the American telegraph agency in Paris addressed Mao Zedong with a question on how he would react to the famous American expert on far-eastern affairs [State Department official Philip C.] Jessup's trip to Beijing for negotiations. Almost simultaneously, information was received from Shanghai stating that steps are being taken by the American consulate in Shanghai, through representatives of the Chinese national bourgeoisie, to obtain agreement from the People's Government of China to send their representative to Hong Kong for negotiations with Jessup. However, we are paying no attention to this American ground testing, said Mao Zedong.

Furthermore, Mao Zedong said that, as he already informed comrade Vyshinsky earlier, the People's Government of China is taking certain measures toward forcing the American consular representatives out of China. We need to win time, emphasized Mao Zedong, to put the country in order, which is why we are trying to postpone the hour of recognition by the USA. The later the Americans receive legal rights in China, the better it is for the People's Republic of China. On 14 January of this year, the local government in Beijing informed the former American consul of their intention to appropriate for their own use the barracks formerly used by foreign armies, rights for which were acquired by foreigners through inequitable treaties. Occupation of the aforementioned buildings essentially means that the American consul will be deprived of the house he is inhabiting and will force him to leave Beijing. In response, the American consul in Beijing started threatening the Chinese government that USA, as a sign of protest, will be forced to recall all of their consular representatives from Beijing, Tientsin, Shanghai, and Nanking. This way, said Mao Zedong in a half-joking manner, the Americans are threatening us with exactly that which we are trying to accomplish.

I noted that this policy of the Central People's Government of China is designed,

first and foremost, to reinforce the country's internal situation, which is sufficiently clear and understandable to us.

2. Furthermore, I said that the declaration by the People's Republic of China, which states that maintaining the Guomindang representative in the Security Council is unlawful and that Jiang Tingfu must be removed from it, as well as simultaneous actions by the Soviet representative in the Security Council, caused a commotion and, to a certain extent, confused our enemies' camp. However, in order to bring the struggle begun in the UN to a conclusion, we would consider it expedient for the People's Republic of China to appoint its own representative to the Security Council. And it would be preferable for this appointment to take place as soon as possible.

Mao Zedong responded that he had a conversation with comrade Vyshinsky concerning this matter and completely agrees with such a proposal. However, for us, emphasized Mao Zedong, this matter presents a technical problem - selection of the candidate. The only suitable candidate is the present deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs comrade Zhang Hanfu, even though he is somewhat weak for the purpose. I would like to coordinate the question of appointing Zhang Hanfu with comrade Zhou Enlai upon his arrival in Moscow.

I said that if that is the only problem, he can talk to Zhou Enlai over the phone (VCh [a high frequency link] ), while he is en route.

Mao Zedong willingly agreed to communicate with Zhou Enlai over VCh and to coordinate this question immediately.

3. After this I said that according to our information the head of the Guomindang delegation in the Union Council for Japan, General Zhu Shi-Min, wants to break with the Guomindang and switch to the side of the People's Republic of China. However, we have no confidence that this information is sufficiently reliable and, in addition, we do not know Zhu Shi-Min well and it is difficult for us to arrive at any definite conclusion about him. For this reason we would like to discuss the matter with Mao Zedong and find out whether we should wait until Zhu Shi-Min announces his switch or, without waiting for it, demand the removal of the Guomindang representative from the Union Council for Japan.

Mao Zedong said that from his point

of view it would be more expedient to act through the Secretary of the Guomindang delegation in the Union Council for Japan Chen Tin-Cho, who not long ago sent a letter through General Derevyanko concerning the work he is performing with regard to the switch of the aforementioned delegation in Tokyo to the side of the People's Republic of China. We, noted Mao Zedong, need to exert influence on Zhu Shi-Min and convince him to switch to our side. This would allow us to reach a smoother solution to the question of our representative's appointment to the Union Council for Japan.

Mao Zedong said that he will prepare a response to Chen Tin-Cho's letter and will send it to us for delivery to the addressee in Tokyo.

I said that this proposal is acceptable and we will be able to deliver comrade Mao Zedong's answer to Chen Tin-Cho through General Derevyanko.

The conversation lasted 1 hour 20 minutes.

Persons present during the conversation: comrade N.T. Fedorenko and Shi Zhe (Karsky).

V. MOLOTOV [signature]

18.1.50

[Source: AVPRF, f. 07, op. 23a, d. 234, pap. 18, ll. 1-7; provided by O.A. Westad; translation for CWHIP by Daniel Rozas.]

#### **Document 18: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 17 January 1950**

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi:

(1) In response to the Vietnamese Government's request to establish diplomatic relations [with us], we should consent to it and give it our reply immediately. I have drafted a reply. Please broadcast it tomorrow (the 18th), while at the same time telegraphing it to Ho Chi Minh by internal radio transmitter.<sup>10</sup> (2) Our foreign ministry should pass the Vietnamese Government's statement requesting establishing diplomatic relations with foreign countries to the Soviet Union and the other new democratic countries.<sup>11</sup>

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:238; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy

and the Cold War in Asia, 138.]

#### **Document 19: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 18 January 1950**

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi:

The telegram of 17 January has been received. (1) That the United States is evacuating all its official personnel from China is extremely favorable for us. However, those democratic figures who have suffered from the fear of the United States may have some disagreement with such actions as the requisition of foreign military barracks. Please pay attention to making explanations to them. (2) When the British charge d'affairs [John C.] Hutchinson arrives in Beijing, what questions should we raise in discussions with him? The Central Committee should draft a written document on the basis of a discussion with members of the foreign ministry, which should define the guidelines, approach that we are to adopt and the concrete issues that we are to address. The document should be reported to me in advance.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:241; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 138.]

#### **Document 20: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 5:30 p.m., 18 January 1950**

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi:

(1) This afternoon, at 4:30, I had a telephone conversation with [Zhou] Enlai (he has arrived in Sverdlovsk and will, probably, arrive in Moscow on 20 January, at 5:00 p.m.), and we felt that as Zhang Hanfu does not have the necessary prestige and qualification, he should be assigned as a deputy. It is more appropriate to let Luo Fu become China's chief representative to the United Nations. A telegram to the United Nations has been drafted, and if the Central Committee agrees, please dispatch it and publish it tomorrow, on the 19th. (2) According to [Zhou] Enlai, both Gao Gang and [Li] Fuchun agree that Luo Fu is qualified to be [China's] diplomatic representative. But Luo Fu himself is yet to be informed. When you publish the telegram [to the United Nations], please send a telegram to Luo Fu at the same time, explaining that as we did not have

enough time, we were unable to get his consent in advance, and that we thus ask for his understanding. He will be notified in a separate telegram for the time of his departure for the United Nations. (3) The completion of the procedure on his nomination can be waited until the convening of the sixth session of the Government Council. If you feel necessary, you may summon the vice-chairpersons of the government and the leading members of the major parties for a discussion tomorrow, the 19th. (4) Since [Zhou] Enlai will soon come to Moscow, the statement can be issued in Li Kenong's name. (5) As what you did the last time, after the telegram is dispatched, copies of it should be sent to the diplomats of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, and other countries in Beijing. (6) When the Xinhua News Agency publishes the news, it must be introduced that Zhang Wentian is a member of the CCP Central Committee, that he participated in the 25,000-li Long March, and that he has been responsible for various kinds of revolutionary work. (7) Please let me know of the progress of your arrangement on this matter.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:242; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 138-9.]

**Document 21: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 5 a.m., 19 January 1950**

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi and convey to [Hu] Qiaomu:

(1) I have written an article in the name of [Hu] Qiaomu. Please carefully scrutinize it and then publish it.<sup>12</sup> (2) The article, "Japanese People's Road (toward Liberation)," is very good.<sup>13</sup> It is now being translated into Russian, and we are preparing to submit it to Stalin to read.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:245; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 139.]

**Document 22: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 5 a.m., 25 January 1950**

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi:

(1) [Zhou] Enlai, Li [Fuchun], and oth-

ers arrived here on 20 [January]. On 21 [January], the twelve of us participated in a meeting in commemoration of Lenin. On 22 [January], six of us, including Shi Zhe, had a discussion with Comrade Stalin and others, in order to settle the questions concerning principles and the working procedures. On 23 [January], Zhou [Enlai], Wang [Jiaxiang] and Li [Fuchun] had a discussion with Mikoyan, Vyshinskii, and Roshchin about several concrete issues. On 24 [January], we handed to Vyshinskii a draft of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance worked out by us.<sup>14</sup> We are now drafting a second document, that is, the agreement on Lushun, Dalian, and the Chinese Chanchun Railway, and, probably, the drafting can be finished today. We have also decided that we will make a third document, the Sino-Soviet barter agreement, ready in three days. All in all, our work is proceeding quite smoothly. (2) Attached here is the draft of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance. Please ask the Central Committee to discuss it and report its opinions to me by telegraph. Please pay attention to keeping it from the outsiders.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:251-2; English translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 140-1.]

**Document 23: Remark, Mao Zedong, "About the Negotiations on Establishing Diplomatic Relations with Britain," 29 January 1950**

Zhou [Enlai]: Please make the following response [to Beijing]: When [John C.] Hutchinson comes, only the problems concerning the relations between Britain and Jiang Jieshi and other problems related to establishing diplomatic relations [between Britain and the PRC] should be discussed. The question of the requisitioning of the military barracks should not be touched upon. While meeting the Dutch charge d'affairs, if he mentions the recognition of Indonesia in exchange for [Dutch recognition of the PRC], the matter should be reported to the superiors for consideration.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:253; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy

and the Cold War in Asia, 141.]

**Document 24: Telegram, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai to Liu Shaoqi, 1 February 1950**

Comrade Liu Shaoqi:

Please convey our greetings to Comrade Ho Chi Minh.<sup>15</sup> He has played the role as the leader and organizer in the heroic struggle for Vietnam's national independence and the establishment of a people's democratic government in Vietnam. China and Vietnam have recognized each other, and will soon establish diplomatic relations. The Soviet Union has already recognized Vietnam, and it is hoped that the other new people's democratic countries will all give their recognition (our embassy in the Soviet Union has delivered Vietnam's memorandum asking for foreign recognition and establishing diplomatic relations to the embassies of all new democratic countries in the Soviet Union). We sincerely congratulate Vietnam's joining the anti-imperialist and democratic family headed by the Soviet Union. We wish that the unification of the entire Vietnam would be soon realized. We also wish Comrade Ho Chi Minh and his comrades-in-arms good health.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:254; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 141-2.]

**Document 25: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 10 February 1950**

Comrade Liu Shaoqi:

(1) It is approved that Su Yu may deploy four divisions in naval operation maneuver.<sup>16</sup> (2) The first several phrases<sup>17</sup> in the preface of the credit agreement, which mention China's compensation to the Soviet Union, should not be omitted. (3) The treaty and the agreements should be published by both sides on the same day, and you will be specially informed about the date. (4) [Chen] Boda has written an editorial for the Xinhua News Agency, which we will look over and send to you tomorrow. Please ask [Hu] Qiaomu to scrutinize it, and then publish it at the same time the treaty is published.<sup>18</sup>

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:257-8; transla-

tion from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., *Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 142.*]

**Document 26: Telegram, Mao Zedong to Liu Shaoqi, 12 February 1950**

Comrade [Liu] Shaoqi:

Here is an internal party telegram I have just drafted. Please give it some consideration as soon as you receive it and dispatch it quickly[:]

All central bureaus, bureau branches, and front-line committee:

A new Sino-Soviet treaty and a series of agreements will be signed and published in days. Then, when different regions hold mass rallies, conduct discussions, and offer opinions, it is essential to adhere to the position adopted by the Xinhua News Agency's editorial. No inappropriate opinions should be allowed.

[Source: JGYLMZDWG, 1:260-1; translation from Shuguang Zhang and Jian Chen, eds., *Chinese Communist Foreign Policy and the Cold War in Asia, 142-3.*]

<sup>1</sup> After leaving Beijing by train on 6 December 1949, Mao Zedong arrived in Moscow on 16 December and stayed in the Soviet Union until 17 February 1950. Liu Shaoqi was put in charge during Mao's absence. When Mao was in Moscow, he maintained daily telegraphic communications with his colleagues in Beijing, and all important affairs were reported to and decided by him.

<sup>2</sup> After the Burmese government had cut off all formal relations with the GMD government in Taiwan, the PRC and Burma established diplomatic relations on 8 June 1950.

<sup>3</sup> During the first two to three weeks of Mao Zedong's visit in Moscow, little progress had been achieved in working out a new Sino-Soviet treaty that would replace the 1945 Sino-Soviet treaty. This telegram recorded the first major breakthrough during Mao's visit to the Soviet Union.

<sup>4</sup> China's minister of trade at that time was Ye Jizhuang.

<sup>5</sup> The full text of Zhou Enlai's telegram to the United Nations, which was dispatched on 8 January 1950, was as follows: "Lake Success, to Mr. Carlos Romulo, President of the United Nations General Assembly; to Mr. Trygve Li, Secretary General of the United Nations; also to the member states of the United Nations Security Council—

the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, France, Ecuador, India, Cuba, Egypt, and Norway: The Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China is of the opinion that it is illegal for the representatives of the remnants of the reactionary gang of the Chinese Nationalist Party to remain in the Security Council. It therefore holds that these representatives must be expelled from the Security Council immediately. I am specially calling your attention to this matter by this telegram, and I hope that you will act accordingly."

<sup>6</sup> In this telegram, Liu Bochong and Deng Xiaoping reported that they planned to dispatch the 18th Army to Tibet by the summer and fall of 1950.

<sup>7</sup> On 24 January 1950, the CCP Central Committee formally issued the order to dispatch the 18th Army to enter Tibet.

<sup>8</sup> On 6 January 1950, Beijing Municipal Military Control Commission ordered the requisition of former military barracks of the American diplomatic compound in Beijing, which had long been transformed into regular offices. Mao Zedong is here referring to this matter.

<sup>9</sup> On 6 January 1950, the Cominform Bulletin published an article criticizing Nosaka Sanzo, a member of the Japanese Communist Party's Politburo, for his alleged "mistake" of putting too much emphasis on the peaceful path to power in Japan and his "wrong understandings" of the existence of U.S. influence in Japan. Although Nosaka had long been known as a faithful support of the CCP (he spent the war years in Yanan and attended the CCP's Seventh Congress), the CCP leadership still decided to maintain as identical stand with the Cominform in criticizing Nosaka. For a more detailed description of the "Nosaka affair," see John Gittings, *The World and China, 1922-1972* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), 160-162.

<sup>10</sup> On 19 January 1950, *Renmin ribao* [People's Daily, the CCP Central Committee's official mouthpiece], published a statement by the Chinese government which formally recognized the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, announcing that the PRC would be willing to establish diplomatic relations with DRV.

<sup>11</sup> The Soviet Union and other East European countries quickly established diplomatic relations with the DRV.

<sup>12</sup> As a response to Acheson's speech made at the National Press Club on 12 January 1950, this article particularly criticized Acheson's comments on Sino-American relations. For the text of the article, see *Renmin ribao*, 21 January 1950.

<sup>13</sup> This article was the CCP leadership's response

to the Nosaka affair (see above, Mao Zedong telegram to Hu Qiaomu, 14 January 1950, and corresponding footnote).

<sup>14</sup> This draft was worked out by Zhou Enlai under Mao's direction.

<sup>15</sup> Ho Chi Minh, after walking for seventeen days, arrived on the Chinese-Vietnamese border in late January 1950, and then he was taken to Beijing to meeting Liu Shaoqi and other CCP leaders. He made it clear that his purpose to visit China was to pursue substantial Chinese military and other assistance to the Vietminh's struggles against the French. He also expressed the desire to visit the Soviet Union. By the arrangement of the CCP, Ho Chi Minh then travelled to the Soviet Union and met Stalin and Mao and Zhou there. He would come back to China together with Mao and Zhou and to continue discussions with Chinese leaders. These discussions resulted in Beijing's (but not Stalin's) commitment to support Ho. For a more detailed discussion, see Chen Jian, "China and the First Indo-China War, 1950-1954," *The China Quarterly* 132 (March 1993), 85-110.

<sup>16</sup> This refers to Su Yu's plan to attack the GMD-controlled Zhoushan islands.

<sup>17</sup> The phrases to which Mao refers here are as follows: "The Government of the Soviet Union agrees to satisfy the request of the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China for a loan that is to be used in payment for the machines, facilities, and other material that the Soviet Union has agreed to provide China."

<sup>18</sup> This editorial, entitled "The New Era of Sino-Soviet Friendship and Cooperation," was published by the Xinhua News Agency on 14 February 1950.

## FUTURE BULLETIN ISSUES

Future issues of the *CWIHP Bulletin* are already being compiled, and you are invited to contribute! Among the themes currently projected for upcoming issues are: New Evidence on the End of the Cold War (in both East-Central Europe and the USSR); New Evidence on the Indochina/Vietnam Wars; New Evidence the Cold War in the Balkans; Stalin and the Cold War; and the Intelligence Services and the Cold War.

On these and other topics relevant to Cold War history, the *Bulletin* welcomes submission of important new East-bloc evidence (particularly archival documents), as well as reports on research conditions in former (or present) communist countries and on research projects and activities.

**THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN  
THE RUSSIAN AND CHINESE  
VERSIONS OF MAO'S  
2 OCTOBER 1950 MESSAGE TO  
STALIN ON CHINESE ENTRY  
INTO THE KOREAN WAR:  
A CHINESE SCHOLAR'S REPLY**

by SHEN Zhihua  
translated by CHEN Jian\*

*[Translator's Note: The Chinese Communist Party leadership made the decision to enter the Korean War in October 1950. For several years, scholars have relied upon Chinese documents available since the late 1980s to discuss the process by which Beijing made that decision. Among these documents, one of the most crucial was a telegram Mao Zedong purportedly sent to Stalin on 2 October 1950, in which the CCP chairman informed the Soviet leader that Beijing had decided "to send a portion of our troops, under the name of Volunteers, to Korea, assisting the Korean comrades to fight the troops of the United States and its running dog Syngman Rhee."*

*With the opening of Russian archives in recent years, however, a sharply different version of Mao's 2 October 1950 message to Stalin has emerged, according to which Mao related that because dispatching Chinese troops to Korea "may entail extremely serious consequences," many CCP leaders believed China should "show caution" about entering the conflict, and consequently Beijing had tentatively decided against entering the war.*

*How did such a sharp discrepancy between the Chinese and Soviet versions of this communication occur? Which (if either) is correct? What really happened in Beijing and between Beijing and Moscow in October 1950? In the previous issue of the CWIHP Bulletin (Winter 1995/1996), which first published the Russian version of the disputed telegram, Russian scholar Alexandre Mansourov questioned the accuracy and even authenticity of the Chinese version. Debate continued in January 1996 at a conference on "New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia" organized by CWIHP and hosted by Hong*

*Kong University. In this article, specially prepared for the Bulletin, a participant in that conference, Chinese historian Shen Zhihua, presents the results of his investigation in Beijing concerning the Chinese version of Mao's telegram and addresses Mansourov's question. An earlier version appeared in spring 1996 in the Beijing publication Dangshi yanjiu ziliao (Party History Research Materials.--C.J.)*

As I have argued elsewhere,<sup>1</sup> China's decision to enter the Korean War was based primarily on crucial national security (as opposed to ideological) considerations. After conflict on the peninsula broke out into large-scale war in June 1950, and especially when the military situation turned from North Korea's favor to disfavor that autumn, the attitudes of China and the Soviet Union toward the Korean situation experienced profound changes, leading to divergent directions in policy. While the Soviet Union became increasingly cautious about engaging itself in Korea (at one point, Moscow even considered abandoning the North Korean communist regime to defeat), China began to adopt a strategy of positive defense, a strategy which would eventually lead to its entry into the War. The Chinese leaders' primary concern was how to guarantee stable development—for the People's Republic of China, which had only come into existence the previous fall after an exhausting civil war. However, if necessary, the Chinese leaders did not fear entering a direct military confrontation with the United States, the number one power in the world, under the banner of "resisting America and assisting Korea, defending our home and our nation."

As it is by now well known, China's final decision to enter the war was reached in the first three weeks of October 1950, after the successful U.S.-U.N. landing at Inchon put the North Korean regime in danger of imminent collapse. On 28 September 1950, the (North) Korean Labor Party politburo decided to solicit direct Soviet and Chinese military support. On September 29 and 30, Kim Il-song and Pak Hon-yong sent two urgent letters to, respectively,

Stalin and Mao Zedong, requesting direct Soviet and Chinese military support.<sup>2</sup> Stalin immediately kicked the ball to the Chinese. In a telegram to Mao Zedong on October 1, Stalin urged the Chinese to "move at least five to six divisions toward the 38th parallel at once," without mentioning what Moscow would do to support the North Koreans.<sup>3</sup> At the most crucial moment of the Korean War, Mao and his comrades in Beijing had to decide if they would take on the main responsibility and burden for rescuing North Korea.

How did the Chinese leaders respond to Stalin's and Kim Il-song's requests to dispatch Chinese troops to Korea? Because of the recent emergence of two sharply different versions of Mao Zedong's telegram to Stalin dated 2 October 1950, this has become an issue under serious debate among Chinese and foreign scholars.

In 1987, the first volume of *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao* [*Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Founding of the People's Republic*] was published under the *neibu* category (meaning "for internally circulation only"). It included the main part of what was identified as a telegram by Mao Zedong to Stalin on 2 October 1950, reading as follows:

(1) We have decided to send a portion of our troops, under the name of [Chinese People's] Volunteers, to Korea, assisting the Korean comrades in fighting the troops of the United States and its running dog Syngman Rhee. We regarded the mission as necessary. If Korea were completely occupied by the Americans and the Korean revolutionary forces were substantially destroyed, the American invaders would be more rampant, and such a situation would be very unfavorable to the whole East.

(2) We realize that since we have decided to send Chinese troops to Korea to fight the Americans, we must first be able to solve the problem, that is, that we are prepared to annihilate the invaders from the United States and from other countries, and to drive them out [of Korea]; second, since Chinese troops will fight American troops in Korea (although we will use the name the Chinese Volunteers), we must be prepared for an American declaration of war

on China. We must be prepared for the possible bombardments by American air forces of many Chinese cities and industrial bases, and for attacks by American naval forces on China's coastal areas.

(3) Of the two issues, the first one is whether the Chinese troops would be able to defeat American troops in Korea, thus effectively resolving the Korean problem. If our troops could annihilate American troops in Korea, especially the Eighth Army (a competent veteran U.S. army), the whole situation would become favorable to the revolutionary front and China, even though the second question ([the possibility] that the United States would declare war on China) would still remain as a serious issue. In other words, the Korean problem will end in fact with the defeat of American troops (although the war might not end in name, because the United States would not recognize the victory of [North] Korea for a long period). If this occurs, even though the United States had declared war on China, the ongoing confrontation would not be on a large-scale, nor would it last very long. We consider that the most unfavorable situation would be that the Chinese forces fail to destroy American troops in large numbers in Korea, thus resulting in a stalemate, and that, at the same time, the United States openly declares war on China, which would be detrimental to China's economic reconstruction already under way, and would cause dissatisfaction among the national bourgeoisie and some other sectors of the people (who are absolutely afraid of war).

(4) Under the current situation, we have decided, starting on October 15, to move the twelve divisions, which have been earlier transferred to southern Manchuria, into suitable areas in North Korea (not necessarily close to the 38th parallel); these troops will only fight the enemy that venture to attack areas north of the 38th parallel; our troops will employ defensive tactics, while engaging small groups of enemies and learning about the situation in every respect. Meanwhile, our troops will be awaiting the arrival of Soviet weapons and being equipped with those weapons. Only then will our troops, in cooperation with the Korean comrades, launch a counter-offensive to destroy the invading American forces.

(5) According to our information, every U.S. army (two infantry divisions and one mechanized division) is armed with

1500 pieces of artillery of various caliber ranging from 70mm to 240mm, including tank guns and anti-aircraft guns, while each of our armies (three divisions) is equipped with only 36 pieces of artillery. The enemy would control the air while our air force, which has just started its training, will not be able to enter the war with some 300 planes until February 1951. Therefore, at present, we are not assured that our troops will be able to annihilate an entire U. S. army once and for all. But since we have decided to go into the war against the Americans, we should be prepared that, when the U.S. high command musters up one complete army to fight us in a campaign, we should be able to concentrate our forces four times greater than those of the enemy (that is, to use four of our armies to fight against one enemy army) and to marshal firing power one and a half to two times stronger than that of the enemy (that is, to use 2200 to 3000 pieces of artillery of 70mm caliber and upward to deal with the enemy's 1500 pieces of artilleries of the same caliber), so that we can guarantee a complete and thorough destruction of one enemy army.

(6) In addition to the above-mentioned twelve divisions, we are transferring another twenty-four divisions, as the second and third echelons to assist Korea, from south of the Yangzi River and the Shaanxi-Gansu areas to the Long-hai, Tianjin-Pukou, and Beijing-Southern Manchuria railways; we expect to gradually employ these divisions next spring and summer in accordance with the situation at the time.<sup>4</sup>

Although the message was not published in its entirety,<sup>5</sup> the above text has made its importance self-evident. Since the late 1980s, Korean War historians have widely cited this telegram as main evidence to support the notion that by early October 1950, the Chinese leadership, Mao Zedong in particular, had made the decision to send Chinese troops to Korea.<sup>6</sup>

However, the opening of Russian archives in recent years indicated that Mao, via Soviet ambassador to China N. V. Roshchin, had sent a message to Stalin on 2 October 1950 that drastically differs from the above-cited Chinese version. The Russian version reads as follows:

I received your telegram of 1 October 1950. We originally planned to move several volunteer division to North Korea to render assistance to the Korean comrades when the enemy advanced north of the 38th parallel.

However, having thought this over thoroughly, we now consider that such actions may entail extremely serious consequences.

In the first place, it is very difficult to resolve the Korean question with a few divisions (our troops are extremely poorly equipped, there is no confidence in the success of military operations against American troops), the enemy can force us to retreat.

In the second place, it is most likely that this will provoke an open conflict between the USA and China, as a consequence of which the Soviet Union can also be dragged into war, and the question would thus become extremely large.

Many comrades in the CC CPC judge that it is necessary to show caution here.

Of course, not to send our troops to render assistance is very bad for the Korean comrades, who are presently in such difficulty, and we ourselves feel this keenly; but if we advance several divisions and the enemy forces us to retreat; and this moreover provokes an open conflict between the USA and China, then our entire plan for peaceful construction will be completely ruined, and many people in the country will be dissatisfied (the wounds inflicted on the people by the war have not yet healed, we need peace).

Therefore it is better to show patience now, refrain from advancing troops, [and] actively prepare our forces, which will be more advantageous at the time of war with the enemy.

Korea, while temporarily suffering defeat, will change the form of the struggle to partisan war. We will convene a meeting of the CC, at which will be present the main comrades of various bureaus of the CC. A final decision has not been taken on this question. This is our preliminary telegram, we wish to consult with you. If you agree, then we are ready immediately to send by plane Comrades ZHOU ENLAI and LIN BIAO to your vacation place to talk over this matter with you and to report the situation in China and Korea.

We await your reply.<sup>7</sup>

The obvious contradictions between these two versions of Mao Zedong's 2 October 1950 telegram to Stalin have inevitably raised serious questions concerning what really happened in Beijing and between Beijing and Moscow in October 1950. At a seminar held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington, D.C. on 13 December 1995, and in his article in the Winter 1995/1996 issue of the *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*,<sup>8</sup> the Russian scholar Alexandre Y. Mansourov cited the Russian version of Mao's telegram to argue that the Chinese leaders were reluctant to send troops to Korea, and that they might have completely backed away from their original intention to send troops to Korea early in October 1950. Further, Mansourov questioned the authenticity of Mao's telegram published in *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*. Comparing the styles and contents of the two versions, he pointed out that since the Russian version is a copy of an actual document kept at the Presidential Archive in Moscow, it should be regarded as more reliable than the published Chinese version, which, he argued, could be "unreliable, inaccurate, unsent, or perhaps misdated."<sup>9</sup> He even stated that one cannot "exclude the possibility that the text was altered or falsified by Chinese authorities to present what they deemed to be a more ideologically or politically correct version of history."<sup>10</sup>

Mansourov's casting of doubt on the authenticity of the Chinese version of Mao's telegram was based on a simple, yet seemingly reasonable, deduction: because the contents of the two versions are drastically different, and because the Russian version appeared authentic, something must have been seriously wrong with the Chinese version.

The situation, however, is more complicated. After the exposure of the Russian version of the telegram, party archivists in Beijing carefully searched Mao's documents at CCP Central Archives, and confirmed that the original of the Chinese version of Mao's 2 October 1950 message did indeed exist and

is kept there (this author was provided access to it). The telegram was in Mao's own handwriting and was longer than the version that was published in *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao* (the published version did not include the sections about China's requests for Soviet ammunition and military equipment). However, the format of this telegram differed from that of many of Mao's other telegrams: while other telegrams usually (but not always) carried Mao's office staff's signature indicating how and when the telegram was dispatched, this telegram does not.<sup>11</sup> So, while it is certain that the Chinese version of Mao's telegram is a genuine document, there exist reasonable grounds on which to believe that it might not have been dispatched.

At the same time, the party archivists in Beijing could not find the Russian version of the 2 October 1950 telegram in Mao's files at CCP Central Archives. This, however, does not mean that the Russian version is not a genuine document. One explanation of its absence in Mao's files might be found in the format of the document: It is not a telegram Mao Zedong directly sent to Stalin, but is a message included in Roshchin's telegram to the Soviet leader. Therefore, it is quite possible that Mao verbally delivered the message to Roshchin and authorized the Soviet ambassador to convey it to Stalin. Because the message may not have been in written form in the first place, it may not be so strange that one cannot locate a copy of it at the CCP Central Archives.

If the above analysis is correct, one must further ask a question: Why did

Mao draft one telegram (the Chinese version) but deliver another message (the Russian version) to Stalin via the Soviet ambassador?

If we put this issue into the context of the tortuous processes through which the CCP leadership reached the decision to send troops to Korea, we may find that a major reason for Mao not to dispatch the draft telegram to Stalin could lie in the fact that the Chinese leadership had not yet reached a consensus on this issue. Since the outbreak of the Korean War, Mao Zedong had been carefully considering the question of sending troops to Korea. After the Inchon landing in mid-September, he seemed to have been determined to do so. However, according to the materials now available, the Chinese leaders did not formally meet to discuss dispatching troops to Korea until after 1 October 1950. The reality was that many Chinese leaders had different views on this issue. We now know that after receiving Stalin's October 1 telegram, Mao summoned a Central Secretariat meeting the same night. Attending the meeting were Mao, Zhu De, Liu Shaoqi, and Zhou Enlai. Unable to attain a consensus on sending troops to Korea, the group decided to continue to discuss the issue the next day at an enlarged Central Secretariat meeting (attendants would include high-ranking military leaders in Beijing).<sup>12</sup> It was after this meeting that Mao sent an urgent telegram to Gao Gang, instructing him to travel from the Northeast to Beijing immediately. Mao also ordered the Northeast Border Defense Army to prepare to "enter operations [in Korea] at any time."<sup>13</sup>

According to the materials now available, as well as the recollections of those who had been involved, we are able to draw a general picture about the enlarged Central Secretariat meeting on the afternoon of 2 October. Mao Zedong emphasized at the meeting that it was urgent to send troops to Korea, and the meeting thus decided that Peng Dehuai should be asked to command the troops. Mao also instructed Zhou Enlai to arrange a special plane to pick up Peng in Xi'an (where Peng was then the military and Party head). However, the

**BROTHERS IN ARMS:  
THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SINO-  
SOVIET ALLIANCE, 1945-1963**

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meeting failed to yield a unanimous decision to send troops to Korea. It thus decided that an enlarged Politburo meeting would be convened to discuss the issue on October 4.<sup>14</sup> Evidently, before the Party leadership had reached a final decision, it would have been impossible for Mao to give an affirmative response to Stalin's October 1 request.<sup>15</sup> In actuality, even at the October 4 enlarged Politburo meeting, which would last until October 5, the opinions of the CCP leaders were still deeply divided, with the majority, at one point, strongly opposing sending troops to Korea. The main tendency of the meeting was that "unless absolutely necessary, it was better not to fight the war."<sup>16</sup>

Within this context, it is easier to extrapolate what really happened with the Chinese version of Mao's telegram. It is quite possible that as Mao was willing to send troops to Korea, he personally drafted this telegram after receiving Stalin's October 1 telegram. However, because the opinions of the CCP leadership were still divided on the issue, and because the majority of Party leaders either opposed or had strong reservations about entering the war, Mao did not think it proper to dispatch the telegram. In fact, the Russian version of Mao's message mentions that "many comrades in the CC CPC judge that it is necessary to show caution." This indicated that the division of opinions among CCP leaders was a reason for Mao to send the message found in Russian archives, but not his personally drafted telegram, to Stalin. Of course, how, exactly, Mao changed his plans regarding the message is a question that might only be illuminated with further research, including the opening of additional archival materials in Moscow and, especially, Beijing.

Now, a question that needs further exploration is: Does Mao's message via Roshchin, as regarded by Roshchin and Stalin at that time, as well as currently interpreted by Mansurov, indicate that Mao was reluctant to send troops to Korea, or that the CCP leadership had changed its original stand on the Korean issue? This question should be answered in relation to Mao Zedong's

## STALIN, MAO, KIM AND KOREAN WAR ORIGINS, 1950: A RUSSIAN DOCUMENTARY DISCREPANCY

by Dieter Heinzig

There is some evidence that Stalin and Mao, during the latter's stay in Moscow between December 1949 and February 1950, discussed the feasibility of a North Korean war against South Korea (cf. Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War. The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* [New York: Columbia University Press, 1994], pp. 85-91). But what we are particularly keen on knowing is whether Stalin informed Mao Zedong about the fact that he, on 30 January 1950, gave North Korean leader Kim Il Sung, although in general terms, the green light for an attack on South Korea (cf. Kathryn Weathersby in the *CWIHP Bulletin* 5 [Spring 1995], pp. 3, 9).

At last I found strong evidence that he did not. It is contained in Mao's conversation with Soviet Ambassador Pavel Yudin on 31 March 1956, a version of which was published in *CWIHP Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 164-7. In this version, on page 166 a part of Yudin's original record is omitted. It reads as follows (omitted part underlined):

"Important things which, evidently, to some extent strengthened Stalin's belief in the CCP, were your (my) information about the journey to China and the Korean War—the performance of the Chinese People's volunteers, although concerning this question, said Mao Zedong, we were not consulted in a sufficient way. Concerning the Korean question, when I (Mao Zedong) was in Moscow, there was no talk about conquering South Korea, but rather on strengthening North Korea significantly. But afterwards Kim Il Sung was in Moscow, where a certain agreement was reached about which nobody deemed it necessary to consult with me beforehand. It is noteworthy, said Mao Zedong, that, in the Korean War a serious miscalculation took place regarding the possibility of the appearance of international forces on the side of South Korea."

The source is contained in the documents on the Korean War declassified by the Russian Presidential Archive (APRF) in Moscow which were cited by Kathryn Weathersby in *CWIHP Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), p. 30. It is Ciphred telegram; Strictly secret; Taking of copies forbidden; From Beijing; 20. IV. 56 (handwritten); Perechen III no. 63 kopii dokumentov Arkhiva Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii po teme: "Voina v Koree 1950-1953," p. 157; list of the archival delo: 150; nos. of fond, opis, and delo not given. Before the text quoted above: "On 31 March I visited Comr. Mao Zedong," after "P. Yudin." The text quoted above is introduced by the handwritten insertion (...), and it ends with the same insertion. Evidently, the text was included in the Presidential Archive's collection as an excerpt as it is the only part of Yudin's record which has to do with the Korean War.

For the CWIHP version of Yudin's record three sources are quoted (see p. 167). One is *Problemy Dalnego Vostoka* 5 (1994), pp. 101-109. Responsible for this publication are A. Grigorev and T. Zazerskaia. Here no reference whatsoever is made indicating that something was omitted. I did not see the two other (archival) sources quoted in the *CWIHP Bulletin*. But obviously there is no reference to an omission either, otherwise this would certainly have been indicated in the *Bulletin* version.

The text quoted above not only adds to our knowledge about the decision-making process during the preparatory phase of the Korean War. In addition, the way the text was discovered shows that Russian censors are still active—not only by withholding documents, but also by offering incomplete documents.

considerations before and after October 2, as well as by comparing the contents of the Chinese and Russian versions of the telegram.

First of all, it should be emphasized that Mao Zedong felt that he was forced to make the decision to send troops to Korea. He fully understood that China's involvement in the Korean War would entail great difficulties. On this point, his views basically coincided with those of his comrades who opposed or had strong reservations about sending troops to Korea. In actuality, those reasons that Mao listed in the Russian version, such as America's technological superiority, the danger of an open war with the United States, and the possible negative domestic reactions, were all reflected in the Chinese version, though from a different angle. When Mao mentioned in the Russian version that "many comrades in the CC CPC judge that it is necessary to show caution," this does not mean that he had changed his own determination. A careful comparison of the two versions leads to a different conclusion: Mao did not change his goals but rather the tactics he would use to achieve them. Instead of replying directly and positively to Stalin's request, Mao adopted a more indirect and ambiguous response, so that he would be able to reconcile his own determination to enter the war with the disagreements still existing among other CCP leaders, while at the same time keeping the door for further communication (and bargaining) with Stalin open. This interpretation would explain why the CCP chairman specifically informed Stalin in the Russian version that "A final decision has not been made on this question. This is our preliminary telegram." It also explains why he proposed to send Zhou Enlai to consult with Stalin.

That Mao had not altered his determination to enter the war was most clearly demonstrated by his attitude at the October 4-5 Politburo meeting. Although the majority of CCP leaders attending the meeting continued to express strong reservations about entering the Korean War, Mao told them that "all of what you have said is reasonable, but once another nation, one that is our neighbor, is in crisis, we'd feel

sad if we stood idly by."<sup>17</sup> Mao finally convinced his comrades of the need to send troops to Korea at the October 5 meeting. Once the decision was made, the Chinese leaders acted immediately. (It is unclear whether this decision was taken before or after Mao received Stalin's response—which strongly urged Chinese intervention in Korea, even at the risk of World War III—to his earlier telegram indicating doubt about entering the war.) After the October 5 meeting, Mao invited Zhou Enlai, Gao Gang, and Peng Dehuai to dine with him, and they further discussed some of the details. Mao also instructed Peng and Gao to travel to Shenyang to convey the Politburo's decision to division-level commanders of the Northeast Border Defense Army, preparing to enter operations in Korea by October 15. The next day, Zhou Enlai chaired a Central Military Commission meeting, which made concrete arrangements about how the troops should prepare to enter operations in Korea.<sup>18</sup>

It should also be noted that there exists no irreconcilable contradiction between the Chinese leaders' previous agreement to send troops to Korea and Mao's expression that China would "refrain from advancing troops" in the Russian version. Scholars who believe that China had completely changed its stand have ignored an important condition, that is, every time the Chinese leaders mentioned that China would send troops to Korea, they made it clear that a crucial precondition for taking action was that the enemy forces crossed the 38th parallel. In Zhou Enlai's meeting with K. M. Pannikar, India's ambassador to China, early in the morning of October 3, the Chinese premier particularly emphasized that if the U.S. (not South Korean) troops had crossed the 38th parallel, China would intervene.<sup>19</sup> As of October 2, this precondition had not yet materialized.<sup>20</sup>

In addition to the above factors, Mao did not give Stalin a direct and positive response because he sensed the need to put more pressure on Stalin. An important condition for China to enter a war with the United States was that it would receive substantial military sup-

port, especially air cover for Chinese ground forces, from the Soviet Union. By analyzing the two versions of Mao's telegram, a common point was that Mao believed that if China was to enter the war, it must win the war, and win it quickly. Only a speedy victory would solve all of China's difficulties and worries. In order to achieve a rapid victory, it was necessary that the Soviet Union, China's main ally, to provide the PRC with adequate military assistance, the air support in particular. However, Stalin, in his October 1 telegram to Mao, as well as in several other communications with the Chinese leadership before and afterward, failed to clarify this crucial issue. Without reaching clearly-defined and concrete agreements with the Soviets, Mao might have felt that it was better not to give Stalin's request a direct and positive response. This could have been the most important reason underlying Mao's proposal to send Zhou Enlai to the USSR to meet Stalin. And this also could explain why, under the circumstance that the Chinese leadership had already made the decision to enter the Korean War, Mao told Stalin on October 7 that China "would not be able to send troops [to Korea] at this moment, but would do so after some time."<sup>21</sup> The key question had now become Soviet air support for Chinese troops that were to fight in Korea.

<sup>1</sup> See my paper, "China Was Forced to Enter the Korean War: Causes and Decision-making Process," prepared for "New Evidence on the Cold War in Asia," international conference sponsored by the Cold War International History Project, University of Hong Kong, 9-12 January 1996.

<sup>2</sup> For Kim's letter to Stalin of 29 September 1950, see *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 110-111; the original is kept in the Archives of the President, Russian Federation (APRF), Moscow, fond 45, opis 1, delo 347, listy 46-49.

<sup>3</sup> Filippov (Stalin) to Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, 1 October 1950, *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 114.

<sup>4</sup> *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao [Mao Zedong's Manuscripts since the Founding of the People's Republic]* (Beijing: Central Press of Historical Documents, 1987), 539-540.

<sup>5</sup> *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao* makes it

clear that the text of the telegram published is incomplete. In the original of the telegram, according to Chen Jian, who based his description on "interviews with Shi Zhe and Beijing's military researchers with access to Mao's manuscripts," Mao also asked Stalin to deliver to the Chinese large amounts of military equipment, including tanks, heavy artillery, other heavy and light weapons, and thousands of trucks, as well as to confirm that the Soviet Union would provide the Chinese with air support when Chinese troops entered operations in Korea. See Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 177.

<sup>6</sup>For examples of such citations, see the editor's note in footnote 30 of Alexandre Y. Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War, September 16-October 15, 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), at 107.

<sup>7</sup>Telegram, Roshchin to Filippov [Stalin], 3 October 1950, conveying 2 October 1950 message from Mao Zedong, *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 114-115.

<sup>8</sup>For the article and accompanying documents, see Alexandre Y. Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War, September 16-October 15, 1950: New Evidence from the Russian Archives," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 94-119.

<sup>9</sup>Mansourov, "Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War," 107, fn. 30.

<sup>10</sup>Ibid.

<sup>11</sup>By comparison, early on the morning of 2 October 1950, Mao sent another telegram to Gao Gang and Deng Hua which carries the record of when it was dispatched (2:00 am) and the signature of Yang Shangkun, director of CCP Central Administrative Office, to witness its dispatch. For the text of the telegram, see *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, 1:538.

<sup>12</sup>See Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War*, 173. My own interviews, as well as those of Xu Yan (a leading Chinese scholar on the history of the Korean War), also confirmed that the 1 October 1950 Central Secretariat meeting did not reach a consensus on sending troops to Korea.

<sup>13</sup>Telegram, Mao Zedong to Gao Gang and Deng Hua, *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, vol.1, p.538.

<sup>14</sup>Wang Yan et al., *Peng Dehuai zhuan* [A Biography of Peng Dehuai] (Beijing: Contemporary China Press, 1993), 400.

<sup>15</sup>Basing his discussion of the meeting on the Chinese version of Mao's 2 October 1950 telegram, Chen Jian, in *China's Road to the Korean War* (p. 175), asserted that top CCP leaders had reached general consensus on sending troops to Korea at the October 2 meeting, and that Mao proposed before the end of the meeting that he would personally send a telegram to Stalin to inform the Soviet leader of the decision. This points appears to be in error if the Russian version is correct.

<sup>16</sup>Nie Rongzhen, *Nie Rongzhen huiyilu* [Nie Rongzhen's Memoirs] (Beijing: People's Liberation Army Press, 1984), 735.

<sup>17</sup>Peng Dehuai, *Peng Dehuai zishu* [The Autobiographical Note of Peng Dehuai] (Beijing: People's Press, 1981), 472-74.

<sup>18</sup>Xu Yan, *Diyici jiaoliang* [The First Test of Strength] (Beijing: Chinese Television and Broadcasting Press, 1990), 24; Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War*, 185. For Stalin's reply (n.d., probably October 5 or 6) to Mao's earlier telegram, see Stalin to Kim Il-Sung, 8 [7] October 1950, *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 116-17.

<sup>19</sup>Zhou Enlai *waijiao wenxuan* [Selected Diplomatic Papers of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: The Central Press of Historical Documents, 1990), 25-27.

<sup>20</sup>According to the intelligence reports the Chinese leaders had received by October 2, only South Korean troops had crossed the parallel. As late as October 14, when U.S.-South Korean troops had broken up the North Korean defense line for Pyongyang, Mao, in accordance with the intelligence reports from the Chinese military, still believed that "it seems that the Americans are yet to decide whether or not and when they would attack Pyongyang ... The American troops are now still stationed at the [38th] parallel." *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao*, 1: 559-61.

<sup>21</sup>See *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), 116.

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# KHRUSHCHEV VS. MAO: A PRELIMINARY SKETCH OF THE ROLE OF PERSONALITY IN THE SINO-SOVIET SPLIT

by William Taubman

Traditional and historical differences, ideological arguments, economic and geo-political issues, even racial tensions—these and other sources of the Sino-Soviet conflict have been analyzed along with the main episodes in the decades-long dispute. It has also been said that personalities of Chinese and Soviet leaders played a large role—how could they not given the likes of Stalin, Mao, and Khrushchev?—but that side of events has been less studied.

Chinese sources indicate that Mao took the Sino-Soviet conflict quite personally, that he did not have a high regard (to say the least) for Khrushchev, and that he even tried deliberately to demean the Soviet leader. As for Khrushchev, his own memoirs indicate quite clearly that Mao got under his skin. Khrushchev prefaces his account of the conflict by condemning those who imply that the split stemmed from a mere “clash of personalities.”<sup>1</sup> Yet he himself keeps coming back to that same cause. The trouble with Mao was his “unwillingness to consider anyone else his equal.” When it came to the question of who would lead the world communist movement, “everything depends on personal characteristics, on how one or another leader feels about himself, and in which direction he directs his efforts.”<sup>2</sup>

As the Communist saying goes, these and other similar references aren’t accidental. Almost against his will, they register Khrushchev’s conviction that the personal dimension, and in particular the clash between himself and Mao, was central.

But what was it about Mao that so irritated Khrushchev? Was Mao’s ability to provoke him exceptional, or was Khrushchev in general easily provoked? What light does his conduct of Sino-Soviet relations shed on Khrushchev as a leader? And how did Khrushchev’s leadership affect Sino-Soviet relations?

Not all political leaders are equally

good candidates for psychological study. Those who cry out for such scrutiny (as Stalin, Mao, and Khrushchev all do) are distinguished by three traits. First, they have great power; to use Sidney Hook’s well-known phrase, they are “event-making” rather than “eventful” men or women, the difference being that the former truly transform situations, whereas the latter merely attempt to cope with or respond to great changes already in progress.<sup>3</sup> As paramount leaders of totalitarian (or in Khrushchev’s case, perhaps, “post-totalitarian”) systems, all three men surely fit this description.

Second, all three were unique; although leaders, like ordinary citizens, are influenced by values and other ideas widely shared in their societies, Stalin, Mao, and Khrushchev nevertheless took actions and made decisions that no one else in the Soviet or Chinese leaderships would have. It is that fact that invites us to examine their personalities as a prime source of their actions.

The third criterion is a pattern of behavior that seems contradictory, irrational, and ultimately self-defeating. The importance of this is that it suggests a leader is *not* simply doing what a situation dictates, or what a culture encourages or allows, but rather is driven by some internal compulsion that influences his or her behavior.

Although all three traits characterize all three leaders, the focus here is Khrushchev. Not only was he extremely powerful, he was also distinctive among Stalin’s potential successors. No one else in the Soviet leadership, I’d contend, would have (1) unmasked Stalin as Khrushchev did in his secret speech at the 20th Party Congress, (2) placed nuclear missiles secretly in Cuba, and (3) taken those same missiles out again as soon as he was caught in the act. In addition, he stood apart from his peers in three key elements of “political style”: in his rhetoric (Khrushchev was as voluble, earthy, and informal as Stalin and his other colleagues were not); in his approach to work (he was hyperactive far beyond the Bolshevik norm); and in inter-personal relations (in which he counted on face-to-face encounters to gauge and to best his op-

ponents).<sup>4</sup> Not only was this combination of characteristics unusual; in the end, all three traits were viewed as liabilities by Khrushchev’s Kremlin colleagues.

Khrushchev’s rise from the humblest of origins makes his a success story. Yet almost as soon as he reached the top, his self-defeating behavior began—far from all his troubles were of his own making, of course, but many were brought on by his own actions. The Secret Speech itself triggered turmoil in Poland and then revolution in Hungary in 1956. The Cuban missile crisis of 1962 was the beginning of the end of Khrushchev’s decade in power. And there were many other such instances in which Khrushchev’s behavior ended up undermining his own position.

One of the them was the Sino-Soviet conflict itself. This article will look closely at several key episodes, focusing on Mao’s behavior and Khrushchev’s response, before trying to explain the pattern in terms of Khrushchev’s personality.

At first, Khrushchev’s relations with Mao went quite well. The Chinese need for assistance, even greater after the Korean War than before it, guaranteed Khrushchev would get a warm reception in Beijing in 1954, especially since he arrived bearing substantial gifts. Khrushchev claims in his memoirs that he returned from China warning his colleagues that “conflict between us and China is inevitable.”<sup>5</sup> But the fact that those same memoirs misattribute to his 1954 visit the famous Khrushchev-Mao swimming pool encounter that actually occurred in the summer of 1958 suggests that he mistakenly read back into 1954 the alarm he clearly felt four years later.

Even in 1954, however, Khrushchev probably first felt experienced sort of irritation with Mao that would grow steadily over the ensuing years. It was then, for example, that he offered to return the Port Arthur naval base without even being asked to by the Chinese—only to have Mao demand that the Soviets also hand over free of charge the Soviet weaponry located there.

Until 1956, recalls Mao’s doctor,

Li Zhisui, the Chinese leader welcomed Khrushchev's assumption of leadership in the Kremlin. But the latter's speech denouncing Stalin soured Mao on Khrushchev for good. Despite his own personal and other grievances against Stalin, Mao now decided the new Soviet leader was "unreliable," and after that "never forgave Khrushchev for attacking Stalin."<sup>6</sup> Moreover, Mao hardly bothered to conceal how he felt about Khrushchev, and later practically flaunted his contempt in Khrushchev's face.

For example, during his November 1957 visit to Moscow, Mao hardly hid his disdain for his Russian hosts, their hospitality, their food, and their culture. Khrushchev was "friendly and respectful," Dr. Li recalls, and went out of his way to treat Mao as a highly honored

guest. Yet, from the moment he arrived, "Mao was reserved and even a bit cool with Khrushchev," while in private conversations with his Chinese colleagues (which the KGB probably overheard and reported to Khrushchev), Mao overflowed with "private barbs against the Russian leader."<sup>7</sup>

During the first half of 1958, Mao's attitude toward the Soviets darkened even more drastically as he launched the "Great Leap Forward," and resolved to reduce Chinese dependence on Moscow. Ironically, it was just then that Khrushchev decided to propose still more military dependence to the Chinese in the form of a radio station on their territory to be used by Moscow for communicating with its new nuclear-powered, missile-toting submarines.

"We fully expected the Chinese to

cooperate with us when we asked for a radio station on their territory," Khrushchev recalls.<sup>8</sup> When Mao abruptly refused to deal with Soviet Ambassador Pavel Yudin on the issue and instead rudely demanded that Khrushchev himself come to China, the Soviet leader dropped everything and hurried off to Beijing, only to find himself the target of a new round of Maoist condescension and humiliation.

Talks on the radio stations and other military matters began politely. But when Khrushchev took too long repeating points Yudin had made, Mao openly displayed his contempt. Mao smoked throughout despite Khrushchev's well-known aversion to cigarettes. He also mocked his guest's equally familiar penchant for rambling on in disorganized fashion. Mao waved

#### **A New "Cult of Personality": Suslov's Secret Report on Mao, Khrushchev, and Sino-Soviet Tensions, December 1959**

*[Ed. note: Though still masked from public view, the simmering tensions in the Khrushchev-Mao relationship burst into the open between them when the Soviet and Chinese leaderships met in Beijing on 2 October 1959. Khrushchev, who had led a delegation to attend celebrations marking the tenth anniversary of the establishment of the People's Republic of China, was shocked when his criticisms of recent Chinese policies provoked a furious response—and the resulting argument turned so angry that officials on both sides sought to suppress the transcript. (A secret Chinese compilation of Mao's meetings with foreign communist leaders omits this encounter, and scholars have reported finding Soviet documents indicating that the record should be destroyed.)*

*Nevertheless, the Soviet transcript of the meeting has survived—it was cited in Dmitrii Volkogonov's biography of Lenin—and the Cold War International History Project plans to publish it in full when it becomes available, with translation, commentary, and annotation by Mark Kramer (Harvard*

*University). The excerpts below come from another recently-discovered document, a secret report on Khrushchev's trip to Beijing and meeting with Mao delivered two months later by a senior member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Suslov, to a December 1959 Plenum of CC CPSU. The excerpts suggest how the fast developing Sino-Soviet split had moved beyond political and ideological disputes into a highly-personal conflict.*

*The document, part of a large collection of Plenum transcripts and supporting materials recently declassified by Russian authorities, was discovered in the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD, the former CC archives) in Moscow and translated for CWIHP by Vladislav M. Zubok, a scholar based at the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository located at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. (Another excerpt, on the Sino-Indian conflict, is printed after M.Y. Prozumenshikov's article elsewhere in this section of the Bulletin.) A full translation of the Suslov report is slated for publication by CWIHP along with the Mao-Khrushchev transcript noted above.]*

Draft

#### **ABOUT THE VISIT OF THE SOVIET PARTY-GOVERNMENTAL DELEGATION TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA**

[Suslov:...] The crux of the matter is that the leadership of the Chinese Communist party has recently developed tendencies to embellish its successes and capabilities, to exaggerate the degree of maturity of socialist relations in China. Their heads have gotten somewhat dizzy because China is back on her feet and became visibly stronger. There are elements of conceit and haughtiness, that became particularly visible after the second session of the Eighth Congress of the Communist Party of China that took place in May of 1958 [which set China on the path toward the so-called "great leap forward" which Suslov harshly criticized—ed.].

*[Suslov described a series of policy disagreements—in foreign, domestic, military, economic, ideological—between Moscow and Beijing, and how these disputes flared up during Khrushchev's meeting with Mao and other Chinese leaders on 2 October 1959, noting that Khrushchev had remarked that the "nervousness and touchiness" of the "Chinese friends" "does not mesh well with the principle of equality and comradely relations that has become customary in the fraternal family of communist parties...we*

*continued on page 248*

his hand and said, "You've talked a long time but have still not gotten to the point."<sup>9</sup>

Shocked and embarrassed, Khrushchev is said by a Chinese witness to have mumbled, "Yes, don't worry, I will continue," and then blamed Yudin for not making things clear. Later, when Khrushchev explained his hope to build "a common fleet" to contend with America's 7th fleet, Mao is said to have "banged his large hands against the sofa, and stood up angrily. His face turned red and his breath turned heavy. He used his finger to point impolitely at Khrushchev's nose: 'I asked you what a common fleet is. You still didn't answer me.'"

By this time, Khrushchev's lips were pursed and white with strain, while his small, bright eyes flared with anger. But he swallowed hard, and as if in answer to Mao's pointing finger, spread out his arms. "I don't understand why you are acting like this," he said. "We came here just to discuss things together."

"What does it mean to 'discuss things together?'" Mao demanded. "Do we still have our sovereignty or don't we? Do you want to take away all our coastal areas?" Tracing the shape of the Chinese coastline in the air with his finger, Mao added sarcastically, "Why don't you take the whole Chinese sea-coast?"<sup>10</sup>

Struggling to stay calm, Khrushchev shifted to the subject of refueling stops and shore leaves for Soviet submarines at Chinese ports. But Mao rejected the idea out of hand and continued to do so even after Khrushchev noted how NATO countries mounted just such cooperation, and sweetened the pie by offering access the Chinese access to Soviet arctic ports in return.

"We aren't interested," replied Mao, looking at Khrushchev as if (recalls the Chinese witness) the Soviet leader "were a kid trying to do a trick in front of an adult." Moreover, when Khrushchev's face turned red with anger, Mao seemed positively pleased. "We don't want to use your Murmansk, and we don't want you to come to our country either." After that he offered a

further lecture as if to a particularly dense student: "The British, Japanese, and other foreigners who stayed in our country for a long time have already been driven away by us, Comrade Khrushchev. I'll repeat it again. We do not want anyone to use our land to achieve their own purposes anymore."

During the next day's discussions beside the pool Mao invited Khrushchev for a swim. Since the Soviet leader couldn't swim very well, he at first spluttered about in the shallow area, then clambered out with the help of attendants, and finally re-entered the pool with an inner tube. As for Mao, he watched Khrushchev's clumsy efforts with obvious enjoyment, and then dove into the deep end and swam back and forth using several different strokes. For his next trick, Mao demonstrated his skill at floating and treading water, and then, highly satisfied with himself, he swam over to Khrushchev and struck up a conversation in what a Chinese onlooker called "a relaxed, friendly and open atmosphere."<sup>11</sup> After all, Dr. Li continues, "the Chairman was deliberately playing the role of emperor, treating Khrushchev like the barbarian come to pay tribute. It was a way, Mao told me on the way back to Beidaihe, of 'sticking a needle up his ass.'"<sup>12</sup>

To make matters worse, the substantive talks went badly. Moreover, Khrushchev's trip was followed by Beijing's shelling of the offshore islands of Quemoy [Jinmen] and Matsu [Mazu], undertaken without warning Moscow, and in order, says Dr. Li, "to demonstrate to both Khrushchev and Eisenhower that [Mao] could not be controlled, and to undermine Khrushchev in his new quest for peace." Or as Mao himself put it, "The islands are two batons that keep Khrushchev and Eisenhower dancing, scurrying this way and that. Don't you see how wonderful they are?"<sup>13</sup>

In the late summer of 1959, with an explosion building in Sino-Soviet relations, Khrushchev made his third and last trip to Beijing. Behind a facade of politeness, a series of heated clashes made even the tense 1958 talks appear warm and friendly in comparison. Khrushchev's infatuation with America,

which he had just visited, was bad enough in Chinese eyes. His request that the Chinese release two American pilots who had parachuted into Northern China during and after the Korea War, and that they accommodate the Indian leader Jawaharlal Nehru, whose strong "neutralist" and "anti-imperialist" positions were all-important to the socialist camp, enraged the Chinese.

At one point in the talks, Khrushchev charged that the Chinese hadn't consulted Moscow before shelling Quemoy and Matsu in 1958. When Chen Yi counter-attacked, he provoked Khrushchev to a fury. His face turning bright red, Khrushchev shouted at Chen, "You may be a marshal in the army, and I a lieutenant general. But I am the First Secretary of the CPSU, and you are offending me."

"You are the General Secretary, all right," Chen responded. "But when you are right I listen to you, and when you are wrong I will certainly refute you."

At this, Khrushchev looked at Mao, spread his arms widely, and complained that he and his delegation were badly outnumbered in a meeting with the Chinese political bureau. "How many people do you have and how many do I have? The negotiation is unfair and unequal."

Mao smiled, recalls his interpreter, paused, and then began speaking slowly and in a low voice: "I have listened to you for a long time. You have accused us of quite a lot. You say we...did not unite with Nehru, that we shouldn't have shelled Jinmen, that the Great Leap was wrong, that we brag about ourselves as orthodox Marxists. Therefore I have an accusation for you, too—that you are guilty of 'right opportunism.'"<sup>14</sup>

The talks ended abruptly and unhappily. In Vladivostok, where Khrushchev stopped on the way home, he looked depressed and withdrawn. Part of the problem was sheer exhaustion after trips to both the United States and China. But what was also showing in Khrushchev's face was his frustration and rage with Chairman Mao.

The next summer, Khrushchev attacked Mao by name and was attacked in turn by Peng Chen in a fiery clash at

a Romanian Party Congress in Bucharest. Shortly thereafter, the Soviet leader decided to withdraw all Soviet advisers from China immediately, and to terminate all important contracts and projects. According to the Chinese, Moscow withdrew 1,390 experts, tore up 343 contracts, and scrapped 257 co-operative projects in science and technology, "all within the short span of a month."<sup>15</sup> The immediate effects were substantial; the longer-run result was to politicize trade by adding to the long list of issues over which the two sides were now in conflict.<sup>16</sup> Now it was but a matter of time until a full and final rupture took place in the summer of 1963, featuring an exchange of public broadsides in which both Khrushchev and Mao came in for violent personal attacks.

With these highlights (or lowlights) of the dispute in mind, let's return to certain personal characteristics of Khrushchev that help to explain his allergic reaction to Mao.

One such trait was a combination of vaulting ambition and an extraordinarily low level of culture. Just as important was a persistent sense of inadequacy centered around his lack of education and refinement. Khrushchev's remarkable rise slaked both his ambition and his shaky sense of self-esteem. But with ever greater power and fame came more responsibility in areas about which he knew nothing, and over which he had little control. Under such circumstances there were bound to be failures, but with them came increased doubts about his own capacities, thus aggravating a moodiness, impulsiveness, and hyper-sensitivity to slight that had been there all along but were usually covered by gregariousness and extraversion.

Increasingly during his long career, Khrushchev reacted with hostility to actual or implied criticism (especially from better educated and more cultured intelligentsia types), going so far in some cases as to pursue what amounted to vendettas against his antagonists. Moreover, one round of failure led to another to which he reacted badly as well. None of this cycle, I hasten to add, can be isolated from troubles inherent in the Soviet system, and in any effort

### **A Crucial Step toward the Breakdown of the Sino-Soviet Alliance: The Withdrawal of Soviet Experts from China in July 1960**

**by Chen Jian**

For scholars of Sino-Soviet relations, that the Kremlin leadership abruptly decided in July 1960 to recall all Soviet experts working in the People's Republic of China (PRC) is not fresh information. During the great polemical debate between Beijing and Moscow in the 1960s, the Chinese leaders and media repeatedly claimed that the Soviet leadership took this action in order to put more pressure on Mao Zedong and his comrades, so that they would yield to Moscow's evil intention of maintaining China as the Soviet Union's inferior subordinate.<sup>1</sup> As this decision came at a time when China was facing great economic difficulties in the wake of the "Great Leap Forward," Mao and his comrades also used it to make the Soviets the scapegoat of the Leap's disastrous aftermath. Consequently, Moscow's decision proved to be a crucial step toward the breakdown of Sino-Soviet alliance.

Despite the importance of this event, scholars have been unable to gain access to many pertinent documents. Most of our knowledge has been based on Beijing's and Moscow's official accounts, which, as one might expect, offer no more than an incomplete and sometimes distorted version of the story. Recently, however, Dieter Heinzig\*, a German scholar who has extensively studied Sino-Soviet relations and is completing a monograph on the Sino-Soviet relations, 1945-1950, unearthed a key document about this event in the archives of the East German Socialist Unity Party (SED) in East Berlin: a copy of the note delivered by the Soviet Embassy in Beijing to the Chinese Foreign Ministry dated 18 July 1960. It was in this note that the Soviet government formally informed Beijing that it had decided to recall all Soviet experts from China and explained in detail why it had decided to do so. The Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev provided a copy of the note to his Communist comrades in East Germany together with a cover letter, which introduced the background and motives of the decision, thereby more or less repeating the arguments of the note.<sup>2</sup>

Reading this note, one is impressed by the depth of the divergence already present between Moscow and Beijing in 1960. Indeed, the language used in the note was serious, revealing both disappointment and anger among Soviet leaders. While presenting the reasons underlying the decision to withdraw Soviet experts from China, the Kremlin emphasized three particular grievances. First, they made it clear that they had noticed Chinese "dissatisfaction with some Soviet experts and advisors." Second, they criticized the Chinese side's "unfriendly" treatment of, and "sp[ying] on," the Soviet experts. Third, and most important, the Soviet leaders emphasized that they were extremely unhappy, even angry, about the Chinese practice of forcing the Soviet experts to embrace Beijing's viewpoints on the world situation and the orientation of the international communist movement as elaborated in the lengthy article "Long Live Leninism,"<sup>3</sup> which explicitly revealed that the ideological divergence between the Chinese and Soviet leaders was having a tremendous negative impact upon the development of the state relations between the two Communist powers.

A sensitive, controversial, yet central, concept pervading the Soviet note (in a more general sense, also dominating the overall development of Sino-Soviet relations) concerned "equality." Throughout the note, the Soviet leaders attempted to argue that they had always paid close attention to treating China and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), as well as other "brotherly Parties," as equals, and that the decision to withdraw Soviet experts from China was based on the belief that it would better serve a more equal relationship between the two Communist powers.

No matter how sincerely Moscow's leaders might have believed this, the leaders in Beijing would have viewed the whole issue in a radically different way. What is important here is to put the note into a historical context. During the long process of the Chinese Communist revolution, the CCP had consistently regarded itself as part of the Soviet-led international Communist movement. Mao Zedong's "lean-to-one-side" state

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(of the sort Khrushchev, and later Gorbachev, mounted) to reform it. But neither can they be separated from the personal deterioration that Khrushchev (and Gorbachev, too?) underwent as the world they tried so hard to improve unravelled around them. The fact that Khrushchev's Kremlin colleagues, who eventually ousted him, held his mishandling of relations with Mao against him, and that in part, they were correct to do so, underscores both Khrushchev's self-destructiveness, and its impact on overall Sino-Soviet relations.

In the beginning of his decade in power, Khrushchev attached a very high priority to consolidating the relations with Beijing that he believed Stalin had put at risk. Khrushchev condemned Stalin for condescending to Mao, for regarding the Chinese leader as a kind of "cave-man Marxist," and for manifesting "a kind of haughty arrogance" during the latter's visit to Moscow in 1949-50.<sup>17</sup> Khrushchev launched his own relationship with Mao with the feeling that he could, should, and would do much better by the Chinese leader than Stalin had done. But instead of evoking Mao's gratitude and respect, the Chinese leader seemed to be condescending to him. Not only was such lack of fealty a problem in larger ideological and political terms, it grated irritatingly on Khrushchev's uneasy self of self. As a white European, Khrushchev felt a sense of superiority over the upstart Chinese. All the more devastating then that the upshot of Mao's treatment of him was to make Khrushchev himself feel inferior.

Both in 1954 and during their later meetings, Mao's negotiating methods suggested to Khrushchev that the Chinese leader was playing him for a fool. Yet that was precisely the sort of image which Khrushchev could not abide, particularly because he had been forced to trade on it for so long to survive Stalin's terrible suspiciousness toward his top lieutenants.

As one who prided himself on taking the measure of his interlocutors, Khrushchev was particularly annoyed that he couldn't figure Mao out. When Mao tried to convince him that the USSR should respond to an American

attack by retreating beyond the Urals and holding out until the Chinese entered the war, Khrushchev was not only appalled by the idea itself, he was upset that he couldn't tell whether the Chinese leader was being serious.

"I looked at him closely," Khrushchev recalls. "I couldn't tell from his face whether he was joking or not."<sup>18</sup> Later, when he better understood Mao's bluster about standing up to the United States even at the risk of nuclear war, Khrushchev decided that "Mao obviously regarded me as a coward."<sup>19</sup>

Given his chip-on-the-shoulder attitude toward his own Soviet intelligentsia, the last thing Khrushchev needed was to feel intimidated by Mao's philosophical pretensions. In this context, consider the pompous way Mao alluded to Khrushchev's mistakes and then forgave them in a speech in Moscow in 1957: "Lenin once said that there is not a single person in the world who does not make mistakes. I have made many mistakes and these mistakes have been beneficial to me and taught me a lesson. Everyone needs support. An able fellow need the support of three other people, a fence needs the support of three stakes. These are Chinese proverbs. Still another Chinese proverb says with all its beauty the lotus needs the green of its leave to set it off. You, comrade Khrushchev, even though you are a beautiful lotus, you too need leaves to set you off. I, Mao Tse-tung, while not a beautiful lotus, also need leaves to set me off. Still another Chinese proverb says three cobblers with their wits combined equal Zhuge Liang, the master mind. This corresponds to comrade Khrushchev's slogan—collective leadership."<sup>20</sup>

Even with a perfect translation into Russian, it wasn't clear whether Mao's words were a compliment. At this stage of their relationship, Mao's sin wasn't a direct personal challenge, but rather his maddening inscrutability.

Knowing Khrushchev's aversion to being criticized, one can imagine the effort it took to contain himself in the face of Mao's attacks. Ever since 1954 he had gone out of his way to give the Chinese almost everything they wanted.

Khrushchev later claimed that he took Mao's 1958 sallies equably and even self-critically, since he understood how the Soviet request for radio stations on Chinese territory could rub the Chinese the wrong way.<sup>21</sup> But that claim reveals more about his desire to be seen by history as mature and statesman-like than about his actual mood at the time.

Khrushchev claims he wasn't intimidated by Mao's swimming prowess: "Of course, I couldn't compete with Mao in the pool—as everyone knows, he's since set a world record for both speed and distance. I'm a poor swimmer and I'm ready to take my hat off to Mao when it comes to swimming."<sup>22</sup> But if he didn't acknowledge what Dr. Li calls this "insult," surely that was because Khrushchev wouldn't admit to being humiliated.

Khrushchev's withdrawal of Soviet advisers was as self-defeating as it was crude and precipitous. The adverse economic impact affected both sides. Moreover, Moscow lost the chance to exert influence, and to derive invaluable intelligence from advisers in China. The then Soviet Ambassador in China, Stepan Chervonenko, recalls he was "amazed" at news of the withdrawal, and took steps to try to prevent it. "We sent a telegram to Moscow. We said the move would be a violation of international law. If our help to the Chinese must end, then at least let the advisers stay until their contracts were up. We hoped that in the meantime, things would get patched at the top."<sup>23</sup>

Nor was Chervonenko the only Soviet official appalled by Khrushchev's action. Leonid Brezhnev's former aide, Aleksandrov-Agentov later traced the beginning of "internal split between the leader [Khrushchev] and his own associates" to a series of "impulsive foreign policy measures that damaged our own state interests. All you have to remember is the unexpected pull-out from China of not only of our military but also economic advisers—all in spite of existing agreements and contracts. Why? Because of the ideological argument and the rivalry between Khrushchev and Mao...."<sup>24</sup>

The withdrawal of advisers reflects

particularly vividly the role of Khrushchev's personality. Would any other Soviet leader have acted so rashly?

Several times Khrushchev described Mao and the environment around him as "Asiatic," referring especially to the Chinese leader's reliance on "flattery and insidiousness." Describing politics as "a game," Khrushchev confessed his continuing frustration at the way Mao played it. "I believed him," the Soviet leader complained at one point, but "he was simply playing."<sup>25</sup>

When Mao boasted about Chinese uniqueness, recalls Khrushchev, "I was jolted by all that bragging." The true believing internationalist in Khrushchev was offended by Mao's "nationalism and chauvinism." But since no one was a bigger booster than Khrushchev himself, surely there is an element of projection in criticizing Mao for sins Khrushchev shared. Likewise when he charges that Mao's "putting his own person first created friction, and even more than friction in relations between our two countries."<sup>26</sup>

Granted, then, that the Sino-Soviet dispute was personal as well as political, and that Khrushchev let himself be provoked by Mao for the sorts of reasons I have cited. To fill out the picture further, we would need to know why Mao reacted to so negatively to Khrushchev. What was it about Khrushchev personally that Mao found so irritating? Did Mao deliberately go out of his way to provoke his Soviet counterpart? Or was he unaware of how Khrushchev perceived and reacted to him? Did aides of either or both leaders play on their bosses' sensitivities, either knowingly or unknowingly, so as intensify the antagonism between them? Or were they adept enough at outraging each other all by themselves?

Documents from still-closed Chinese archives, as well as additional materials from Russian archives, and not only memoir accounts, valuable as they may be, will be needed to address these and many other aspects of the Mao-Khrushchev relationship.

<sup>1</sup> "Memuary Nikity Sergeyevicha Khrushcheva," *Voprosy istorii* 11-12 (1992), 66.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, 80.

<sup>3</sup> Sidney Hook, *The Hero in History* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1943), 151-170.

<sup>4</sup> See James David Barber, "Classifying and Predicting Presidential Styles: Two Weak Presidents," *Journal of Social Issues* 24:3 (July 1968), 51-79.

<sup>5</sup> "Memuary," 66.

<sup>6</sup> Li Zhisui, *The Private Life of Chairman Mao* (New York: Random House, 1994), 115-118.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 220-224.

<sup>8</sup> *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), 258.

<sup>9</sup> Quan Yanchi, *Mao Zedong yu Heluxiaofu* ["Mao Zedong and Khrushchev"] (Jilin: Jilin renmin chubanshe), 126-128.

<sup>10</sup> Quan, *Mao Zedong yu Heluxiaofu*; Tracy B. Strong and Helene Keyssar, "Anna Louise Strong: Three Interviews with Chairman Mao Zedong," *China Quarterly* 103 (September 1985), 503.

<sup>11</sup> Quan, *Mao Zedong yu Heluxiaofu*, 126-128.

<sup>12</sup> Li, *Private Life*, 261

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>14</sup> Li Yueren, *Waijiao wutai shang de xin Zhongguo lingxiu* ["New China's leaders on the diplomatic stage"] (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 1989), 182-183.

<sup>15</sup> Letter of CCP CC to CPSU CC, 29 February 1964, in John Gittings, ed., *Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 139. See also Steven M. Goldstein, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1937-1962: Ideology and Unity" (manuscript), forthcoming in Harry Harding, ed., *Patterns of Cooperation in the Foreign Relations of China*.

<sup>16</sup> Gittings, *Survey*, 130-131; Goldstein, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1937-1962."

<sup>17</sup> "Memuary," 68, 74.

<sup>18</sup> *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, 256-257.

<sup>19</sup> *Khrushchev Remembers* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 470.

<sup>20</sup> Michael Schoenhals, ed., "Mao Zedong: Speeches at the 1957 'Moscow Conference,'" *Journal of Communist Studies*, 2:2 (June 1986), 121-122.

<sup>21</sup> *Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament*, 260.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 259.

<sup>23</sup> Interview with Stepan Chervonenko, Moscow, 1993.

<sup>24</sup> Andrei Aleksandrov-Agentov, "Brezhnev and Khrushchev," *Novoe vremia* 22 (1993), 39.

<sup>25</sup> "Memuary," 66, 70.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*, 70, 80.

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## SUSLOV ON MAO

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*cannot accept that even our friends talk to us down their nose [svisoka razgovarivali s nami]"; later, after calling the discussions ultimately "quite useful," Suslov noted:]*

One should not omit the fact that the aforementioned mistakes and shortcomings in the field of domestic and foreign policy of the Communist Party of China are largely explained by the atmosphere of the cult of personality of com. Mao Zedong. Formally the CC of the Communist Party of China observes the norms of collective leadership, but in effect crucial decisions are made single-handedly, and thus are often touched by subjectivism, and in some instances are simply not well thought through. Glorification of com. Mao Zedong is visibly on the rise in China. In the party press one can increasingly find such statements that "we, the Chinese, live in the great epoch of Mao Zedong," comrade Mao Zedong is portrayed as a great genius. They call him the beacon illuminating the path to communism, the embodiment of communist ideas. One equates the name of com. Mao Zedong with the party, etc. One presents the works of com. Mao Zedong in China as the last word of creative Marxism, of the same rank as the works of the classics [*klassiki*] of Marxism-Leninism. In effect, the works of com. Mao Zedong are put in the foundation of all educational work in the party and in the country. Even in PRC's colleges and universities the teaching of social sciences during the last two-three years has been reduced to the study of Mao's works. All this, unfortunately, pleases [*imponiruiet*] com. Mao Zedong, who, by all accounts, himself has come to believe in his own infallibility. This reminds of the atmosphere that existed in our country during the last years of life of I. V. Stalin. Of course, we could not talk with the Chinese comrades about it, but the Plenum should be aware of this, yet another aspect in the life of the Communist Party of China....

*[Source: Excerpted from Suslov draft report to CC CPSU Plenum, 18 December 1959, Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), Moscow, fond 2, opis 1, delo 415, listy 56-91; document provided and translated by V. M. Zubok.]*

## SOVIET EXPERTS

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ment in June 1949 formalized the PRC's foreign policy framework, essentially establishing the "new China" as the Soviet Union's junior partner. Although never happy with such a relationship, Mao and his comrades believed that it had been necessary in order to promote China's economic reconstruction, safeguard the nation's security interests, and create momentum for the continuation of the Chinese revolution after its nationwide victory. The situation began to change, however, after Stalin's death in March 1953, and especially after the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1956. Mao and his comrades increasingly believed that it was the CCP, not the CPSU, which should play the central role in the international communist movement. This growing sense of China's superiority, which, in a historical-cultural sense, had a profound origin in the age-old "Middle Kingdom" mentality, combined with many other more specific problems (of the sort usually present in any alliance relationship) to create a widening rift between the Chinese and Soviet leaders. During Khrushchev's visit to China in September-October 1959, the potential tension that had long accumulated between Beijing and Moscow exploded. Indeed, during a long meeting between Khrushchev and Mao and other Chinese leaders on 2 October 1959, the two sides emotionally criticized the other's domestic and international policies, demonstrating that the Sino-Soviet alliance was facing a real crisis.<sup>4</sup>

The Soviet note recalling all Soviet experts from China further intensified the crisis. Beijing could see in it nothing but Moscow's evil intention of imposing new "inequalities" upon them. This became particularly true when Moscow, according to Chinese sources, turned down Beijing's request that the Soviet experts, at least some of them, should stay in China until they had fulfilled their assigned tasks.<sup>5</sup>

These developments virtually destroyed the foundation of the Sino-Soviet alliance. Mao would take the So-

viet withdrawal of experts from China as strong evidence to claim that Beijing's struggle against Moscow was not just one for true communism but also one for China's sovereignty and national integrity. Khrushchev and other leaders in Moscow seemed also determined to meet Beijing's challenge to the Soviet Union's position as the indisputable leader of the international movement.<sup>6</sup> In retrospect, the Soviet decision of July 1960 can be interpreted as a crucial step toward the complete breakdown of the Sino-Soviet alliance.

**Note: The Soviet Embassy in Beijing to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China, 18 July 1960**

Strictly confidential

The Embassy of the Union of the Socialist Soviet Republics in the People's Republic of China has been instructed to inform the Government of the People's Republic of China of the following:

In strict observation of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the PR of China, the Soviet Government sends, in compliance with the request of the Chinese Government, a considerable number of experts to work in China. For this purpose, the Soviet organizations have selected the best and most experienced experts, often bringing disadvantages to the national economy of the USSR. By taking part in the socialist construction of the PR of China, the Soviet experts consider their activities as fulfilling their brotherly international obligations towards the friendly Chinese people. All the while, the Soviet people staying in the PR of China, in true observance of the instructions they have received, refrain from any statements or action that could be interpreted as interference in the internal affairs of the PR of China or as criticism of this or that aspect of the domestic or foreign policy of the Communist Party of China or the Government of the PR of China.

During the visit of Soviet leaders to the PR of China at the beginning of August 1958, the Chinese side expressed their dissatisfaction with some of the Soviet experts and advisors. This could be understood as a reproach directed at the Soviet Union. It is, however, well known that the Soviet Union had never forced its specialists and advisors on anyone. Already at the end of 1956 and the beginning of 1957, the Soviet Govern-

ment presented to the PR of China and the other socialist countries the proposal to recall the Soviet experts, taking into consideration that these countries had by then trained their own cadres and were, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, well capable of solving by their own efforts the practical tasks they were encountering in the fields of economic and cultural developments. The majority of the people's democratic countries had at that time agreed to the proposal of the Soviet Government, and the Soviet experts were recalled from these countries to their motherland. After the Chinese leaders had expressed their critical attitude toward the Soviet experts in the year 1958, the Soviet Government once again presented to the Government of the PR of China the proposal to recall the Soviet experts. But this time, just as in the year of 1957, the Chinese side pronounced that it favored prolonging the stay of the Soviet experts by claiming that they were needed in the PR of China.

Recently, the Chinese side, when dealing with the Soviet experts working in the PR of China, began to pursue an apparently unfriendly line toward the Soviet Union, which was incompatible with the obligation of the treaty as well as with the norms prevailing between socialist countries. Following the instructions from their superiors, Chinese officials distribute specially compiled material in Russian language among the Soviet people propagating views directed against the position of the CPSU and of other brotherly parties. They make efforts to draw Soviet experts living in the PR of China into discussions on questions where certain differences of opinions exist between the CPSU on the one side and other brotherly parties on the other; they make efforts to impose their viewpoints upon the Soviet experts and try to lead them into opposition to the CPSU and the Soviet Government.

The leading officials at the Chinese institutions and enterprises where Soviet experts are working persistently try to draw them into discussions on the above-mentioned questions. So, for instance, on May 19, the office director of the Scientific Research Institute for Electric Industry of the PR of China in Guangzhou proposed to the Soviet experts working in the institute to discuss the questions raised in an anthology especially published in the Russian language under the title "Long Live Leninism," as well as to express their opinions on the articles included in this anthology. Among several groups of Soviet experts in Beijing and other cities of China, Chinese officials forced every Soviet expert to accept copies

of this anthology, which, as it was known, contained anti-Leninist theses to which the Soviet people cannot give their agreement. The deputy chief of the general staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, Yang Zhengwu, and the head of the Propaganda Department of the General Political Department of the Chinese People's Liberation Army, Fu Zhong, both used a consultation meeting attended by a group of Soviet military experts to propagate their views on questions about war and peace, as well as an assessment of the current international situation, that are incorrect, faulty and in contradiction to the basic theses of the [November] 1957 Moscow Declaration of fraternal [communist] parties. There exist also a whole series of other cases in which leading officials of Chinese institutions and enterprises endeavor to draw Soviet specialists into discussions, to put them under pressure, and to influence them by suggesting to them viewpoints quite different from the positions of the CPSU.

The Soviet experts working in the PR of China consider such activities on the part of the Chinese authorities as open disrespect of themselves and of their work, as activities intolerable in relations between socialist countries, and, in fact, as an open agitation against the CC of the CPSU and the Soviet Government.

The Soviet experts, taking into their consideration a variety of facts, have been compelled to conclude that they no longer have the trust of the Chinese side they need in order to fulfill the tasks put before them, not to mention the respect these experts have earned by providing assistance to the Chinese people for [China's] economic and cultural development and military build-up. There exist several cases in which the opinions of the Soviet experts were grossly ignored, or in which there openly existed no wish [on the part of the Chinese] to take their recommendations into consideration, despite the fact that these recommendations were based upon the well-founded knowledge and rich experiences of these experts. This even went so far that the documents prepared by the Soviet experts, which included respective recommendations and technical rules, were demonstratively burned.

This information leads to the conclusion that the Soviet experts in the PR of China are being deprived of the opportunity to fulfill their useful functions and to contribute their knowledge and experiences to the fullest degree. They are practically put into such a situation that their selfless work is not being appreciated, and that they are encountering ingratitude from the Chinese

side.

In view of these facts it is difficult not to believe the information provided by some [of our] experts indicating that they are being spied on. The meaning of these measures is at a minimum incomprehensible to the Soviet people who came to the PR of China with the deeply felt desire to help the Chinese people in building socialism.

Of course, all of this hurts the feeling of the Soviet experts and, even more so, it has caused such a just indignation that they, due to the fact that they are being denied the trust they need, are forced to present to the Soviet Government the request that they be allowed to return to their motherland.

The Soviet Government deems it necessary to declare that the afore-mentioned actions on the part of the Chinese side are unfriendly towards the Soviet Union. They are in contradiction with the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the PR of China, according to which both sides have committed themselves, in the spirit of friendship and cooperation and in accordance with the principles of equality and mutual interests, to developing and consolidating the economic and cultural relations between them. Such activities on the part of the Chinese side make it practically impossible for the Soviet experts to continue to stay in the PR of China.

The Embassy is instructed to inform the Government of the PR of China that the Soviet experts and advisors, including the military, will be, in accordance with their own wishes, recalled to their motherland. While coming to this decision, the Soviet side has also taken into consideration the fact that the Government of the PR of China itself, in the past, has raised the question of ordering a number of Soviet experts working in the PR of China to return to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Government expresses the hope that the Government of the PR of China will understand correctly the causes that have led to this decision.

[Source: *Stiftung "Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR" im Bundesarchiv J IV 2/202/280. Translation from Russian: Dieter Heinzig and Anna Eckner. The copy of the Russian note is not dated but known from other sources.*]

\* Dieter Heinzig is deputy director of the Federal Institute for East European and International Studies in Cologne, Germany.

<sup>1</sup> See, e.g., John Gittings, *Survey of the Sino-Soviet Dispute: A Commentary and Extracts from the Recent Polemics, 1963-1967* (London: Ox-

ford University Press, 1968).

<sup>2</sup> Khrushchev mentioned in the letter that as of August 1958, there were about 1,500 Soviet experts in China.

<sup>3</sup> The Chinese Communist Party's mouthpiece, *Hongqi* (Red Flag) published this article in its April 1960 issue. It summarized the CCP's viewpoints on international issues and the correct orientation of the international communist movement.

<sup>4</sup> For an internal Soviet account of Khrushchev's visit to Beijing, see M. A. Suslov's report to the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 18 December 1959, contained in the Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), and excerpted in this issue of the *Bulletin*.

<sup>5</sup> See Han Nianlong et al., *Dangdai zhongguo waijiao* [Contemporary Chinese Diplomacy,] (Beijing: Chinese Social Science Press, 1989), 364-365.

<sup>6</sup> In this regard, it is revealing that the Soviet note is found in the East German archives, a clear indication that Moscow was spreading its version of events to reassert its leadership role in the movement.

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#### CULTURAL REVOLUTION ARCHIVE ESTABLISHED

*The following item appeared in the China News Digest of 26 November 1996; it was posted on H-Asia by Yi-Li Wu, a doctoral candidate in the History Department at Yale University, and brought to CWIHP's attention by Odd Arne Westad, Director of Research at the Norwegian Nobel Institute in Oslo:*

#### Documents of Cultural Revolution Moved to Archive

After nearly 37,000 documents, tape recordings, and exhibits of the Cultural Revolution era from 47 government ministries were moved to a new central Cultural Revolution archive in east Beijing, archivists said Tuesday that scores of them are either incomplete or in poor condition, United Press International reports from Beijing. A worker at the Beijing Municipal Government Archive said: "One of the biggest problems is there are no indices for the information and there is no way of knowing what is and isn't there." Many of the documents were issued by the late Communist Party Chairman Mao Tse-tung. The new archive will not be open to the public or academics, and government archivists will spend a year or so studying the materials and indexing them in the hope of finding what are missing. They will also attempt to search for more documents although some concede that many of the most sensitive documents will never resurface." (Vic CHIN, YIN De An)

# The Sino-Indian Conflict, the Cuban Missile Crisis, and the Sino-Soviet Split, October 1962: New Evidence from the Russian Archives

by M.Y. Prozumenshikov

The year 1962 was marked by a further intensification of the discord between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Chinese Community Party (CCP) and, correspondingly, between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Beijing's refusal to stay within the boundaries defined by Moscow, which was especially marked after the 22nd CPSU congress at the end of 1961, caused serious anxiety among Soviet officials who frequently spoke of the CCP leadership's deviation "from the generally fraternal countries and parties" and described Beijing's authorities as seeking "to more widely bring into the open their disagreements [with us], both in theory and in practice."<sup>1</sup>

In the international arena, these disagreements touched on a wide circle of problems, including questions of war and peace, peaceful coexistence, evaluations of the character of the contemporary period, and others. Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev, who was trying (albeit inconsistently) to conduct a policy of peaceful coexistence with the West, could hardly agree with the declarations coming from Beijing to the effect that the aspiration "to achieve peace without wars is sheer nonsense," that imperialism "will never fall if it isn't pushed," and which characterized the atom bomb as a "paper tiger."<sup>2</sup> Moscow reacted especially sensitively to Beijing's efforts to depreciate the role of the socialist countries and the international communist movement, having declared the decisive factor of the development of human society in the contemporary epoch to be the national liberation movements of the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In the USSR it was feared, not without reason, that one reason why the "wind from the East had come to prevail over the wind from the West," was the PRC's

desire to strengthen its influence in the "third world," in the process squeezing the Soviet Union out.<sup>3</sup>

Until the fall of 1962, however, both countries succeeded in preserving a semblance of outward unity: the "cracks" in the Soviet-Chinese "monolith" were already apparent to the naked eye, yet it was still not clear whether they were leading to an outright schism. The events of October 1962, when new clashes on the Sino-Indian border and the Caribbean Crisis (Cuban Missile Crisis) broke out practically simultaneously, constitute a turning point in the development of Sino-Soviet relations and signified the beginning of the open split between the two countries.

This article does not attempt to illuminate the causes or recount the courses of the border conflict or the Cuban crisis, but rather, on the basis of archival documents in the former Central Committee (CC) of the CPSU stored in the Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD) in Moscow, to analyze the influence of these dual conflicts in the fall of 1962 on Sino-Soviet relations.

Armed conflicts on the Sino-Indian border first occurred in August 1959 and already caused at that time a mutual lack of understanding between the PRC and USSR. Moscow, having supported Beijing during the suppression of the uprising in Tibet in early 1959,<sup>4</sup> refused to stand so unequivocally on China's side in the border incident. Soviet leaders believed that in many ways the flare-up was provoked by the Chinese themselves, in order to demonstrate in practice their refusal to accept the McMahon line (a 1914 boundary agreed on by British and Tibetan officials which India accepted as the correct Sino-Indian frontier) as the state border between the PRC and India. Moscow clarified its stance in a September 1959 TASS statement calling on both warring sides to resolve the conflict by peaceful means.

The fact that the USSR did not take a clear "class" position in a conflict between a socialist state and a bourgeois state provoked indignation in China. In a 13 September 1959 letter to the CC CPSU, the CC CCP accused the Soviet government (although in a veiled form) of "accommodation and compromise on important matters of principle" and noted that "the TASS statement showed to the whole world the different positions of China and the Soviet Union in regard to the incident on the Indian-Chinese border, which causes a virtual glee and jubilation among the Indian bourgeoisie and the American and English imperialists, who are in every way possible driving a wedge between China and the Soviet Union."<sup>5</sup>

The border conflict placed the USSR in a complicated position for a number of reasons. First of all, Mao Zedong persistently tried to confer on this conflict the character of an important question of the class struggle on an international scale and, accordingly, sought support for their actions from all "fraternal" parties. This did not at all correspond to Khrushchev's views, neither in principle nor in the specific concrete case; while the Soviet leader earnestly desired to preserve good relations with Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, for Mao Nehru was "half man, half devil" and the task of communists was to "wash off his face so that it won't be frightening, like a devil's."<sup>6</sup>

Secondly, the Soviet Union could not act as a peacemaker between socialist China and bourgeois India without violating the principles of proletarian internationalism. Not wishing simply to embrace the Chinese position in the border dispute, the USSR remained deaf to numerous Indian requests to act as a mediator. In this question, Moscow displayed extreme caution; the CC CPSU, for example, categorically rejected a proposal of the director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Acad-

emy of Sciences, P. Gafurov, to organize in Moscow a meeting with the participation of Chinese and Indian scholars on questions connected with the history and mutual influences of Chinese and Indian cultures.<sup>7</sup>

Third, the border conflict sharply worsened the position of the Communist Party of India (CPI): subjected to attacks from the bourgeois parties of India, the CPI also itself split between those who felt that only India was at fault in the conflict and those who suggested that responsibility could be divided between both countries. At the 6th CPI Congress in 1961, Soviet representative M. Suslov exerted considerable effort so that, on the one hand, militant pro-Beijing party members who felt the CPI must always align itself with the CCP would not prevail, and on the other hand, to block discussion at the Congress of a resolution proposed by a number of prominent Indian communists criticizing the PRC and backing Nehru. These Soviet actions could hardly pass unnoticed in Beijing; in a talk with Soviet ambassador S. Chervonenko, CC CCP secretary Deng Xiaoping made a point of referring indignantly to "some Indian communists, who are even praising Nehru."<sup>8</sup>

Finally, another relevant aspect of the problem was the fact that Moscow clearly grasped that Beijing's bellicose method of resolving border questions with India could also be repeated in other disputed portions of the Chinese border, and not necessarily only with countries liberated from colonial dependence. As early as 8 September 1959, two weeks after fighting broke out on the Sino-Indian border, the CC CPSU received from the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs a detailed report "On the Question of the Soviet-Chinese Border." The preparation of such a report at a time when Sino-Soviet relations, at least on this question, were ostensibly satisfactory strongly suggests that at least some Soviet officials already foresaw the danger of border problems with China.

For the previous three years a situation of unstable equilibrium had been maintained on the Sino-Indian border, threatening the outbreak of new armed

conflict. From time to time Moscow cautiously attempted to influence Beijing to take a more moderate position and agree to compromise with India. At that time, Soviet officials believed that such a change in China's approach could occur only "as a result of review by the leaders of the PRC of their foreign policy conceptions as a whole," but this "in the near future is extremely problematic."<sup>9</sup> In contrast to the diplomats, Khrushchev, displeased by the Mao's refusal to heed Moscow's advice, stated in a much sharper way that when he converses with Mao, when he listens to him, he gets the impression that he is speaking with Stalin, is listening to Stalin.<sup>10</sup> From their part, the Chinese persistently told Soviet representatives that resolving the border dispute required influencing India, not the PRC; that "Nehru is the central figure in the anti-Chinese campaign in India, that he does not in any case want to resolve the question of the Sino-Indian border, even in some fixed period."<sup>11</sup> Moscow listened to these statements in silence, leaving them without commentary.

Concurrently with the Sino-Indian border conflict, Soviet and Chinese attention was drawn to events in the Western hemisphere, where in 1959 the Cuban revolution triumphed. The chance to spread their respective understandings of Marxism among the Cuban revolutionaries sparked a lively competition between the two communist giants for ideological influence in Cuba.

Initially, Moscow seized the leadership in this "contest for Cuba," which was in many ways determined by Soviet military and economic aid to Havana. By contrast, although Chinese leaders welcomed the Cuban revolution, if they took a wait-and-see approach with regard to its leader Fidel Castro, in part to preserve diplomatic communications with Taiwan via Cuba. In this regard, noted Soviet representatives in China, who closely monitored the development of Chinese-Cuban relations, in its propaganda during this early period the CCP leadership made no attempt to counterpose their policy toward Cuba to that of the CPSU.<sup>12</sup> The situation changed after Beijing and

Havana established diplomatic relations in September 1960; now the PRC began actively to invite envoys from the "island of freedom" and recruit from them advocates of their own course.<sup>13</sup>

Considering that the Chinese revolutionaries' militant language in many respects echoed the Cubans', Moscow tried by all means to lessen Chinese influence. These efforts did not go to waste. During a visit to China at the end of 1960, Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara in a joint Chinese-Cuban communique expressed approval of the PRC policy of "three red banners"; but one year later, Cuban President Oswaldo Dorticos, in a visit to the PRC, did not once touch on this question despite considerable Chinese efforts.<sup>14</sup>

In Cuba itself, authorities generally tried to minimize the disagreements that had arisen in the communist world. Havana even specially appealed to Moscow and Beijing with a request not to publish anti-Soviet and anti-Chinese materials in TASS and Xinhua bulletins distributed in Cuba, for this could, the Cuban leadership feared, damage the unity of the Cuban people and create additional political difficulties within the country.<sup>15</sup> The Cuban press carefully "filtered" all statements by Chinese leaders critical of Soviet policy (in particular, most newspapers excised such remarks from the speech of Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai at the CPSU 22nd congress); at the same time the Cubans politely but firmly suppressed Soviet attempts to distribute literature in Cuba that enunciated Moscow's point of view on the dispute.<sup>16</sup>

Both the Soviet Union and China naturally counted on extracting advantages from the "special relations" they hoped to establish with Cuba. However, if Beijing embarked on a path of propagandistic expansion through Cuba onto the Latin American continent, then in the USSR a plan took shape to use the island as an unsinkable nuclear base near the shores of the USA. Khrushchev preferred not to let Mao Zedong know about this plan, not only because of the existing disagreements, but also, perhaps, out of a wish to reap future laurels himself and at the same time to strengthen the Soviet position in the

“third world.” This desire might account for the thoroughness and satisfaction with which the CC CPSU apparatus collected the enthusiastic reactions from the developing countries to the TASS report of 11 September 1962 vowing that the USSR would protect Cuba against U.S. aggression. In China, despite the fact that this report fit Beijing’s propaganda style, only 32 lines were allotted to it in the periodical press.

The CC CCP 10th Plenum, which took place in the fall of 1962, strengthened anti-Soviet moods in Beijing. On October 12, Chinese leaders stated that the conclusion of a nuclear weapons nonproliferation treaty (which Khrushchev supported), would further the interests only of the USA, which was trying “to bind China by the hands and feet” in the development of its own nuclear arsenal.<sup>17</sup> An October 20 memorandum from the PRC government to the USSR government on the nonproliferation question, distributed also to representatives of other socialist countries, declared: “However strong the military capabilities of the Soviet Union, it is not able to solve the defense issue of all the socialist nations. For example, on the question of the defense by the Chinese of their borders with India, the Soviet side played just the opposite role.”<sup>18</sup> A similar announcement explained that the military conflict on the Sino-Indian border, which was again flaring in autumn 1962, had not only failed to move the Soviet Union to change its fundamental position but also, from the Chinese perspective, caused Moscow to become even more pro-Indian, since prior to these events it had given India the military helicopters and transport planes, which took part in the border clashes.

In October 1962, Beijing made a last attempt to compel Moscow to take a “class position” on China’s border dispute with India and “to teach certain comrades to separate truth from untruth.”<sup>19</sup> On October 15, *Renmin Ribao* (*People’s Daily*) assistant editor Chen Tseium organized in the newspaper’s editorial office a meeting with foreign correspondents, which was intended, according to the opinion of the Soviet journalists who were present, “to dem-

onstrate the seriousness of the situation on the Indian-Chinese border,” and to urge “the press organs of the fraternal parties to come forward on the given question with accounts of the Chinese side’s positions.”<sup>20</sup> A week later, Soviet ambassador Chervonenko, as he reported to Moscow, spoke on this very question with PRC Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs Zhang Hanfu, and “emphatically declared to Zhang Hanfu that it was necessary to understand who was right and who was not right [in the border conflicts]. It would be incorrect not to distinguish between those who were guilty and those who were not guilty. It would likewise not be right to blur the distinction between the guilty and the innocent.”<sup>21</sup> Such an answer could not be reassuring to Beijing. Chervonenko also mentioned certain problems which were raised by Zhang Hanfu and which evidently were connected “with the aggravation of the situation on the Sino-Indian border, in light of the fact that the Chinese leadership expected different reactions on the part of the Soviet leadership.”<sup>22</sup>

One must also note that at first, the Soviet leadership, preoccupied with Cuban affairs, did not pay particular attention to the renewed aggravation of tensions on the Sino-Indian frontier. The documents relating to events on the border, which various organs of the CC CPSU issued during this period, did not, as a rule, go further than the International Department of the Central Committee, and they were labeled: “Informational Material. To the archive.”

The lack of upper-level Soviet engagement on the border conflict was reflected in Soviet newspaper articles which gave stingy information and, moreover, did not appear in prominent locations. The same lack of top level leadership manifested itself in the conversations of Soviet officials with foreign representatives, in which the Soviets reiterated the old thesis about the need to prevent world conflict.

The situation changed on October 22, when the speech of U.S. President John F. Kennedy effectively put a tough choice before Khrushchev: conflict, with likely use of nuclear weapons, or retreat. The first scenario threatened the

whole world with catastrophe, the second was acutely painful for the USSR and its leader. Searching for a way out, Moscow, in the midst of everything, turned its attention to Beijing. The experience of recent years made it possible for Khrushchev to hope that, at this critical moment in the battle with international imperialism, China would at least momentarily “close its eyes” to the discord and steadfastly support any Soviet action. That had occurred (at least on the surface) in 1956 during the crises in Hungary and Poland, and in 1961 during the Berlin crisis.<sup>23</sup> For his part, Khrushchev was ready to compromise with Mao on a whole series of issues, including the Sino-Indian conflict.

On October 25, with war with the United States potentially imminent, the newspaper *Pravda* published a front-page article, which had been approved by the CC CPSU, essentially rejecting the position that Moscow had maintained during the course of the whole Sino-Indian border conflict. The article called the McMahon line, which New Delhi accepted, “notorious,” “the result of British imperialism,” and consequently legally invalid. Moreover, having made this assertion on the eve of the execution of Chinese plans to settle the conflict, *Pravda* also accused India of being incited by imperialists and being the main ringleaders of the conflict and charged that the CPI was sliding toward chauvinism to the detriment of proletarian internationalism.<sup>24</sup>

Moscow’s unexpected and abrupt reversal—clearly intended as a gesture to shore up the all but moribund Sino-Soviet alliance in the event of war with the West—provoked a sharp reaction, but not exactly the one that the Soviet leadership had expected. From the documents at TsKhSD, it is clear that the article came as a bombshell, especially in India. Nehru declared that he was very pained by the article, which caused significant damage to India’s friendship with the USSR.<sup>25</sup> Even more severe embarrassment arose in the CPI; one party leader, Shripad Amrit Dange, sent the CC CPSU a telegram requesting that it take at least some action to repudiate some of the article’s statements. Very familiar with the sys-

tem, under which the representatives of the other fraternal nations and parties usually followed the Soviet position, unwaveringly supporting the Kremlin, Dange begged Moscow “to stop all the fraternal parties so that they would not write in their newspapers about the McMahon line, things which were similar to that which they would otherwise write.”<sup>26</sup> The telegram went unanswered. Predictably, the pro-Chinese faction of the CPI became noticeably more active, announcing triumphantly that the CPSU was finally “convinced of the folly of its ways and accepted the Chinese perspective.”<sup>27</sup>

In the tangled position in which Soviet diplomats in New Delhi found themselves, they were obliged, in conversations with Indians, to speak of the complicated and confused situation, about the impossibility of defining the reality of any border, even proposing that India wait while Chinese and Indian academicians defined the precise border on the basis of archival documents.<sup>28</sup> The Indians understood what was happening, inferring that the appearance of “such bad articles” in the Soviet press could only be explained “by the situation of the Cuban crisis and the threat of war.”<sup>29</sup>

Soviet officials had expected such reactions, but they hoped to be repaid with active Chinese support in the Caribbean (Cuban Missile) crisis. It was no coincidence that during this period, in conversations with Chinese officials, East German and Hungarian diplomats stressed the need for compromise and cooperation between fraternal socialist parties, rejecting the “clarification of relationships” while there was bitter hostility and potential war with the imperialists.<sup>30</sup> Since the records of these conversations were almost immediately sent to the Soviet embassy in Beijing, and from there efficiently dispatched to the CC CPSU, it is not hard to guess that such conversations were, to a large extent, inspired by Moscow.

However, the effort which the USSR expended to obtain China’s support proved to be entirely disproportionate to the return it received. All that Moscow got from the PRC leadership was an October 25 declaration on the

Cuban question expressing “complete support for the correct position of the Soviet government,” and two large articles in *Renmin Ribao* with bellicose headlines that typified Chinese propaganda of that period, and which approved of the Soviet’s actions in the Caribbean.<sup>31</sup> This was the last praise that Beijing officially conferred upon Moscow. While the Soviet propagandists tried with limited success to organize massive rallies and demonstrations within other nations for the support of their policy, nothing of the sort was attempted in China in October 1962.

Soviet leaders, it seems, did not grasp the fact that during this period the disagreements between the two governments had become too strong to be surmounted with the stroke of a newspaper writer’s pen. Nor did they realize that Khrushchev’s actions in Cuba created a dream-like situation for the Chinese—ensuring a positive outcome, from their standpoint, without requiring them to modify their basic position. For if Kennedy retreated and the missiles remained on the island, it would vindicate the CCP’s militant thesis that imperialism was a “paper tiger” to which one needed to apply the principle of intensified pressure; conversely, Khrushchev’s retreat would strengthen Beijing’s slogan denouncing “contemporary revisionists,” i.e., the Soviets. Moreover, the future of Sino-Soviet relations and the situation in the Communist world as a whole depended, in large measure, on the result of the Soviet-American stand-off. If events developed according to the first scenario, Khrushchev would probably conduct relations with Washington as if with a “paper tiger,” a development which Beijing could interpret as strengthening the correctness of the Chinese line. The second possibility would lead to a final split, between the USSR and China, and the anti-Soviet mood would intensify.

Analyzing the documents available in TsKhSD, one may conclude that the Chinese leaders did not believe that a third, more tragic variant might develop: that the flare-up over Cuba would escalate into World War III. Since Mao loved to issue judgment on themes of global war and was even prepared to

sacrifice hundreds of millions of human lives on the victory altar of Communism, the Beijing leadership evidently firmly believed that such a catastrophe would not happen in October 1962. In the conflict’s tensest moments, Chinese officials remained convinced that there was no danger of thermonuclear war, and that if the affair went so far as a military conflict, it would be of a guerrilla character, as in Algeria, Laos, or South Vietnam.<sup>32</sup> According to Mao, the main reason that war would not break out was that the American imperialists, who feared for their stolen riches, had no reason to desire it. Similarly, the “Soviet bourgeoisie” that had emerged under Khrushchev and had not forgotten about the Stalinist purges maintained a death grip on their privileges. Consequently, Beijing figured that one side or the other had to yield.

In the end an understanding of the lethal danger of nuclear conflict compelled Khrushchev to retreat.<sup>33</sup> Although the Soviet Union understood that their leader lacked the absolute power over his allies in the communist camp to represent the defeat as a “victory in the name of peace,” nonetheless, the USSR did not expect the violent reaction to Khrushchev’s agreement to withdraw the missiles which was to come from Beijing.

As soon as the news of Khrushchev’s retreat reached them, the Chinese authorities put their propaganda machine to work at full throttle; newspapers displayed discussions about the situation in the Caribbean, the cities were covered in slogans in support of Cuba, and the speeches that Castro had given on Cuban television explaining the basic disagreements between the Cuban and the Soviet leaderships actually became bestsellers in China at that time. Soviet diplomats in Beijing disconsolately reported that events on the Sino-Indian border, to which Chinese propaganda up until that time had been devoting most of its attention, had been swept aside and lost in this midst of the uproar over Cuba.<sup>34</sup> Only now, after the Soviet concession had ended the crisis, came the rallies the Soviet leaders had desired in its first days, featuring appearances and speeches by the up-

per-level Chinese leadership: Deng Xiaoping, Zhou Enlai, Peng Zhen, et al.<sup>35</sup> The political campaign culminated with elaborately orchestrated<sup>36</sup> mass demonstrations of solidarity at the Cuban Embassy in Beijing, which took place non-stop from the 3rd to the 6th of November and in which, the Chinese media reported, more than five million people participated.<sup>37</sup>

Soviet officials well understood the ulterior motive behind these mass demonstrations. While under the ostensible slogan of solidarity with Cuba, they sharply criticized those “who were frightened in the face of imperial aggression,” who “bartered with the freedom and independence of another people,” and so on.<sup>38</sup> However, at that moment Moscow was not up to a clarification of relations with China; rather, it sought at any price to get out of the conflict with minimal losses. In fact, in November 1962, Moscow switched roles with Beijing; if during the Sino-Indian border clashes China unsuccessfully appealed for the support of the Soviet Union, now the USSR faced the analogous response from the PRC. During this period, the Soviet ambassador repeatedly tried to secure a meeting directly with Mao, who cited various reasons for avoiding a personal encounter, instead sending much lower-ranking officials. The Soviet Embassy knew full well that during these very days, when Chinese officials asserted that Mao was feeling indisposed and could not receive the Soviet ambassador, the PRC leader was seeing party delegations and representatives of other states.<sup>39</sup> All this amounted to a clear demonstration of the poor relations between the PRC and USSR.

Moscow might have put up with Beijing simply taking a neutral position. However, the PRC decided to exploit the Cuban crisis to explain to “certain comrades that under no conditions is it permissible to trade in the liberty and rights” of other states.<sup>40</sup> The PRC Foreign Minister, Chen Yi, speaking on November 7 in the Soviet Embassy on the occasion of the 45th anniversary of the October Revolution, as Soviet diplomats later reported, lectured them in a “mentor’s tone” about the inadmiss-

ability of any sort of “wishy-washiness” in relations with the imperialist aggressors.<sup>41</sup> Obviously with the approval, of the PRC leadership, *Renmin Ribao* compared the Cuba situation with the 1938 Munich Pact—e.g., charging Moscow with appeasement of imperialism.<sup>42</sup> At that moment, a stronger accusation was difficult to imagine.

The anti-Soviet orientation of statements in China was not limited only to means of mass communication. The CC CPSU received information that in enterprises, offices and even in certain schools across China closed meetings were being held to elucidate the situation around Cuba and the role of the Soviet Union. At these meetings it was essentially stated for the first time openly, and not through hints, that the USSR was conducting a “revisionist” foreign as well as domestic policy. It was true that the responsible party workers who conducted these meetings explained that accusing the Soviet Union of revisionism out loud—like, for example, Yugoslavia—for the time being was not permitted by the tense international situation. But they let it be known that this would be a matter for the coming months. At the same time, it was said in China that the peoples of the socialist countries of Eastern Europe could not sleep at night because of fear of a nuclear conflict.

Judging by the information which flowed into the CC CPSU, one reason behind Beijing’s extreme negative reaction to Moscow’s actions was the fact that the Soviet Union had deployed missiles to Cuba without saying a word to China. Reproaches that Khrushchev had hidden important international information from his allies were heard frequently in China in those days along with unfavorable comparisons to Sino-Soviet consultations during the events in Poland, Hungary, and Laos, when the sides informed each other in a timely manner and therefore made correct decisions.<sup>43</sup> More to the point, on this issue it was as if Moscow and Beijing had traded places: now it fell to Khrushchev to listen to the reproaches which he had only recently addressed to Mao. In autumn 1958, during the Taiwan Straits crisis, and in 1959, at the

outset of military actions on the Sino-Indian border, the Soviets had sought basic operational data from Chinese authorities about the situation, but for a long time was unable to get any. In fact, the USSR didn’t even know from the beginning that military operations already were going full steam: A secret report of the Soviet Embassy in Beijing noted that in 1958 the “Chinese friends” had informed Moscow “about the political goals which are being pursued by this action [in the Taiwan straits] only after two weeks,”<sup>44</sup> while in 1959 Moscow received China’s report about the events on the border only after “a great delay.”<sup>45</sup> Insofar as “the recognition and stressing by the Chinese comrades of the formula about the leading role of the Soviet Union in the Socialist [bloc] might create in world public opinion the impression that the harsh course and the foreign policy actions of the PRC were taken upon agreement with the Soviet Union,”<sup>46</sup> Soviet officials viewed Beijing’s behavior very negatively, and demanded that China coordinate positions in situations where the collective security of the two countries—which under the 1950 treaty creating the Sino-Soviet alliance were linked together by, inter alia, the obligation to provide military assistance to one another—was involved.<sup>47</sup>

There was great amazement in Moscow when in November 1962 the Chinese virtually repeated the old Soviet theses, declaring that the Kremlin’s poorly thought out actions in the Caribbean might have involved the Chinese people in a nuclear war against its will, since although the PRC didn’t know anything about the Soviet preparations, by the terms of the 1950 alliance treaty in the event of the outbreak of war, it would have had to enter the conflict on the USSR’s side.<sup>48</sup>

All this taken together could not but attract the attention of Moscow, which decided, as soon as the clouds over Cuba began to disperse a little, “to bring affairs to order” in the socialist house. On November 5, *Pravda* published a new lead article on the situation on the Sino-Indian border, which in its content sharply contrasted with its predecessor of ten days before and on

the principal issues once again returned to the USSR's old viewpoint on that conflict, in which China did not at all appear to be the victimized side.<sup>49</sup> The new *Pravda* article, however, could scarcely seriously change anything, because by then the border situation had largely stabilized and, in the opinion of diplomats from the socialist countries, both combatants were searching for a means to withdraw from the conflict with as much dignity as possible.

In its main counterattack, Moscow turned to the congresses of the Communist parties of a number of countries which took place in late 1962 and early 1963, and also to the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR which took place in December 1962. Those who did not support Khrushchev were declared "babblers," "ultra-revolutionaries," and "reckless adventurists." In his indignation, the Soviet leader went to the point that he named as the main instigators of war not U.S. President Kennedy or West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (which at the time would have been entirely normal), but ... the Albanians! And although at these congresses there was still preserved the ritual, accepted in the last few years in the Communist world, when Moscow, cursing the Albanians, really had the Chinese in mind, and the PRC, cursing the Yugoslavs, meant the USSR, a new step on the path to a total split had been taken. Khrushchev, in particular, stressed that "someone taught the Albanians to pronounce vile words," and Wu Xiuquan, CC CPC member and former Chinese ambassador to Yugoslavia, speaking in his capacity as the permanent leader of the CPC delegation to the Communist party congresses which were taking place during that period, was subject to well-organized filibusters.<sup>50</sup> In its turn, the CPC responded in a series of articles in *Renmin Ribao* showing that the world had by no means been put on the brink of nuclear war by "babblers" and that "the juggling of nuclear weapons as the solution to international arguments" was in no way a true Marxist-Leninist position.<sup>51</sup>

Analyzing Soviet policy toward the PRC during this period, it makes sense to take into account the inconsistency

and well-known impulsiveness which marked Khrushchev's actions. Indignant at Beijing's position during the Caribbean crisis, Khrushchev, not thinking out very well the consequences of his actions, decided to activate all the levers of pressure in order to teach the Chinese a good lesson in the newly brought to light "classics of Marxism-Leninism."<sup>52</sup> However, the Soviet leader still hoped to preserve a certain unity of the Communist world, viewing these disagreements with the PRC as an annoying misunderstanding which could be settled. The limits to the Soviet leadership's readiness to trumpet its fall-out with Beijing surfaced in December 1962 when the Indians decided to take advantage of the sharpening of Sino-Soviet contradictions and began to distribute in Moscow, through its embassy, materials about the events on the Sino-Indian border. This measure was immediately nipped in the bud by the Soviet side, prompting a sharp protest by the Indian representatives.<sup>53</sup>

The Kremlin also noted the strengthening of the "intellectual ferment" generated by these disagreements inside the Communist world itself. Romania's leaders blatantly tried to exploit the situation to distance itself from the USSR and from China.<sup>54</sup> One alarming tendency, to Soviet officials, was the new willingness of ambassadors from Romania, Hungary, and China, in conversations with Soviet counterparts, to criticize, albeit vaguely, certain actions of the USSR, complaining that Moscow often failed to consult with its allies.<sup>55</sup> Under these conditions, Khrushchev was obliged to call for an end to polemics between parties so that passions could subside.

This appeal did not elicit, however, a positive response in Beijing, for China's leaders had no desire to retreat from the positions which had been won, believing that the USSR's actions in late 1962 had conclusively unmasked Moscow's "revisionist policy."<sup>56</sup> If previously Mao had likened the divergences between the two countries to the gap between one finger and the remaining nine on a person's hands, now Chinese officials described the differences as "diverse interpretations of Marxism-

Leninism."<sup>57</sup> Sensing that the danger of isolation inside the Communist world no longer threatened China, Beijing began to say that "if the international Communist movement collapsed, this will not cause the sky to fall down."<sup>58</sup> The PRC derived confidence also from the fact that if before only Albania openly and unconditionally supported China, now a whole group of Asian communist parties, including those in power, shared clearly pro-Chinese positions. Exploiting another of Khrushchev's ill-considered steps, which in the customs of the time mobilized "progressive people in the West" to criticize China, Beijing began a propaganda counterattack against the Communist parties of France, Italy, and the USA, posing a choice to the USSR itself—to take its satellites under its protection and in this way intensify the contradictions with China, or to stay silent, creating grounds for disagreement with the Western communist parties.

The events of the end of 1962 were a borderline, beyond which the disagreements between Moscow and Beijing and the corresponding split in the Communist world began to assume an irreversible character. For the first time during the whole period of the "Cold War" under conditions of the fierce confrontation between the USSR and the USA, China not only did not support the USSR, but even dared to condemn Moscow's actions. For the first time disagreements were widely published not on questions of secondary importance, but on the principal ideological issues. Finally, for the first time a party which had incited a revolt against the hegemony of the Kremlin did not end up in total isolation; a number of Communist parties unequivocally expressed support for her, and inside Communist parties of pro-Soviet orientation there began to appear Maoist fractions. The trumpet call of the revolution became more muffled and unclear, and Communism itself turned out to be split not only as an ideological credo, but also as a movement which carried out practical work in various countries of the world.

<sup>1</sup> Political Report of the USSR Embassy in China for 1962, Center for the Preservation of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), Moscow, f. 5, op. 49, d. 536, l. 58.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid., l. 64.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid., l. 61.

<sup>4</sup> The anti-Chinese position in this conflict of the ruling circles of India, who defended the Dalai Lama and who tried to organize assistance to the rebels in Tibet, constituted a major source of the sharpening tension on the Sino-Indian border. As far as the USSR was concerned, although Moscow also expressed cautious doubts about the lawfulness of some of Beijing's actions, overall the Kremlin unconditionally supported the PRC, proceeding from the main directive: "Support China's just cause, don't aggravate relations with Nehru." Note of the Editor of the Newspaper *Pravda* V.V. Maevskii to CC CPSU, 12 April 1959, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 302, l. 75. At the same time, the USSR was ready to provide assistance to the PRC in the international arena, where events in Tibet prompted an ambiguous reaction. Information Sheet of the Department of the CC CPSU on Relations with Communist and Working Class Parties of the Socialist Countries, "About the Situation in Tibet," TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 302, l. 75.

<sup>5</sup> Letter of the CC CPC to the CC CPSU Concerning the incident on the Indo-Chinese Border, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 246, ll. 164–165.

<sup>6</sup> Record of Conversation of Mao Zedong with Representatives of Socialist Countries, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 238, ll. 77–78.

<sup>7</sup> Letter of the Institute of Oriental Studies to the CC CPSU about the Conduct in the USSR of Meetings between Chinese and Indian Scholars, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 50, d. 179, l. 195.

<sup>8</sup> Record of Conversation of the Ambassador of the USSR to the PRC S. Chervonenko with the General Secretary of the CC CPC Deng Xiaoping, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 327, l. 132.

<sup>9</sup> Political Report of the USSR Embassy in China for 1959, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 240, l. 97.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. Speech of the First Secretary of the CC CPSU N.S. Khrushchev at the Plenum of the CC CPSU, 1960, TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 469, l. 127.

<sup>11</sup> Record of Conversation of the USSR Ambassador to the PRC S. Chervonenko with the General Secretary of the CC CPC Deng Xiaoping, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 327, l. 131.

<sup>12</sup> Information Sheet of the USSR Embassy in the PRC on the Relations of the PRC with Cuba, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 530, l. 464.

<sup>13</sup> Moscow carefully watched these ties, even noting how often in his speeches Dorticos compared the Cuban and Chinese revolutions; *ibid.*, l. 467.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., l. 475.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> *Renmin Ribao*, 12 October 1962.

<sup>18</sup> Political Report of the USSR Embassy in China for 1962, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 536, l. 72.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., ll. 72–73.

<sup>20</sup> Information Sheet of the *Pravda* Correspondents to the CC CPSU about the Meetings of the Correspondents from Newspapers of the Socialist Countries in the Editorial Offices of the Newspaper *Renmin Ribao*, *ibid.*, l. 355.

<sup>21</sup> Record of Conversation of the USSR Amba-

sador to the PRC S. Chervonenko with the Deputy Minister of the Foreign Affairs of the PRC Zhang Hanfu, *ibid.*, l. 366.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid., l. 367.

<sup>23</sup> Although in 1961 disagreements already existed between the USSR and China, during the Berlin crisis and after the Soviet announcement that autumn of the renewal of nuclear testing, mass pro-Moscow demonstrations were organized in China, and other steps were taken to show PRC solidarity with the USSR and GDR.

<sup>24</sup> *Pravda*, 25 October 1962.

<sup>25</sup> Letter of S. Dange to the CC CPSU, 29 October 1962, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 50, d. 424, l. 105.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid., l. 107.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid., l. 102.

<sup>28</sup> TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 50.

<sup>29</sup> Letter of S. Dange to the CC CPSU, 29 October 1962, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 50, d. 424, l. 106.

<sup>30</sup> See, e.g., Record of Conversation of the Staff Members of the USSR Embassy in the PRC V. Mogul'skii and G. Kireev with the Counselor of the Embassy of Hungary J. Kukuchka, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 50, d. 531, ll. 426–435.

<sup>31</sup> One of the articles, for example, was called, "The Soviet Army is Ready to Strike a Blow to the Enemy." *Renmin Ribao*, 26 October 1962.

<sup>32</sup> Information Sheet of the USSR Embassy in the PRC about the Positions of the Leadership of the CPC in Connection with the Cuban Crisis, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 530, l. 438.

<sup>33</sup> Khrushchev seriously worried that Kennedy might embark on a military conflict using nuclear weapons, pushed not only by American "hawks" but also by the majority of the U.S. population. According to an information sheet of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations specially prepared for the top Soviet leadership, Americans, as of early 1962, asked whether they would favor a nuclear war or submitting to Communism, responded: for war—81%. Information Sheet of IMEMO to the CC CPSU, "Regarding the issue of correlation of forces in the ruling circles of the USA," TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 398, l. 73.

<sup>34</sup> Information Sheet of the USSR Embassy in the PRC about the Relations of the PRC with Cuba, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 530, l. 477.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., l. 434.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., l. 435.

<sup>37</sup> Demonstrations at the Cuban Embassy were meticulously organized: the schedule of processions was reported to the Cubans in advance with breaks for lunch and rest. The Soviet Embassy reported following the first day of the demonstrations, when the enthusiasm of the participants turned out not to be too great (in the opinion of the organizers of these demonstrations), in the factories and enterprises supplementary explanatory work was conducted. Ibid.

<sup>38</sup> Information Sheet of the USSR Embassy in the PRC on the Positions of the Leadership of the CPC in Connection with the Cuban Crisis, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 530, l. 439.

<sup>39</sup> Record of Conversation of the USSR Ambassador in China S. Chervonenko with the Deputy Head of the Department for Relations with Fraternal Communist Parties, CC CPC Zhao Yimin, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 534, ll. 206–207.

<sup>40</sup> Report of the USSR Embassy in the PRC about the Position of the Leadership of the CPC in Re-

gard to the Cuban Crisis, *ibid.*, l. 439.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., l. 440.

<sup>42</sup> *Renmin Ribao*, 5 November 1962.

<sup>43</sup> Record of Conversation of the Attache of the USSR Embassy in China V. Zhdanovich with Employees of Various Embassies in China, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 531, ll. 511–513.

<sup>44</sup> Political Letter of the USSR Embassy in China on the Situation in China on the Occasion of the 10 Year Celebration of the PRC, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 239, l. 202.

<sup>45</sup> Report on the Work of the USSR Embassy in China for 1959, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 240, l. 95.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid., l. 94.

<sup>47</sup> Under pressure from the USSR the Chinese at the end of 1958 promised that "they would not allow any further adventurism." Report on the Work of the USSR Embassy in China for 1958, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 134, ll. 84–85.

<sup>48</sup> Information of the USSR Embassy in the PRC on Chinese–Cuban Relations (December 1962–January 1963), TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 49, d. 624, ll. 49–50.

<sup>49</sup> *Pravda*, 5 November 1962.

<sup>50</sup> The very naming of Wu Xiuquan, who was only a member of the CC CPC, as the leader of the CPC delegation to the congresses of the "brother parties" should have demonstrated the true relation of Beijing to those parties.

<sup>51</sup> *Renmin Ribao*, 15, 31 December 1962.

<sup>52</sup> Khrushchev reacted extremely painfully when Mao was extolled as a great theoretician, evidently feeling his own weakness on that issue. Cf. Speech of the First Secretary of the CC CPSU at the Plenum of the CC CPSU, 1960, TsKhSD, f. 2, op. 1, d. 469, ll. 127–130.

<sup>53</sup> Record of Conversation, Head of Press Department, MFA USSR Iu. Cherniakov, with Press Attache of the Indian Embassy in Moscow I. Dzhein, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 424, ll. 85–86.

<sup>54</sup> [Ed. note: See Raymond L. Garthoff, "When and Why Romania Distanced itself from the Warsaw Pact," *CWIHP Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995), 111.]

<sup>55</sup> Information Sheet, USSR Embassy in the PRC, On the Situation in the PRC on the Eve of the Bilateral Meeting Between the CPC and the CPSU, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 424, ll. 125–126.

<sup>56</sup> Here one may refer also to the visit in autumn 1962 of the Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet L. I. Brezhnev to "revisionist" Yugoslavia, which in the same way prompted a storm of indignation in China.

<sup>57</sup> Information Sheet, USSR Embassy in the PRC, On the Situation in the PRC on the Eve of the Bilateral Meeting between the CPC and CPSU, TsKhSD, f. 5, op. 30, d. 424, ll. 96–97.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid.

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# NEW EAST-BLOC DOCUMENTS ON THE SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT, 1959 & 1962

*Editor's note: The following three selections from Russian and East German documents exemplify the new East-bloc archival evidence that is becoming available on the triangular Sino-Indian-Soviet relations examined in M.Y. Prozumenschikov's article above. (Unfortunately, Chinese and Indian archives on these issues are currently unavailable.)*

The first excerpt is from a much-longer document from the Russian archives—a draft report “On the [October 1959] trip of the Soviet party-governmental delegation to the PRC [People's Republic of China],” dated 18 December 1959, by Mikhail Suslov to Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) Presidium for presentation to a forthcoming CC CPSU Plenum. Suslov, a senior member of the CC CPSU leadership, harshly criticized Chinese domestic and foreign policies in the wake of a contentious meeting between the Soviet and Chinese leaderships during USSR leader Nikita Khrushchev's visit to Beijing in early October 1959 for commemorations of the tenth anniversary of the PRC's establishment.

Although at this point the Sino-Soviet split remained publicly concealed, the angry exchanges at that meeting demonstrated that bitterness between the two communist powers was reaching the boiling point. Not only did Moscow and Beijing seem split on basic approaches to issues of foreign policy (the Soviets favored a more moderate rivalry with the West, the Chinese a more militant and confrontational approach), domestic policy (the Soviets found the “Great Leap Forward” an economic disaster), and ideology (both sides clearly sought the mantle of leadership within the communist world), but a bitter personal antagonism had been revealed: Suslov (clearly reflecting Khrushchev's views) decried the “cult of personality” around Mao

Zedong, likening it to that which had surrounded Stalin, while the Chinese did little to conceal their contempt for Khrushchev.

The excerpt reproduced below concentrates on Suslov's criticism of China's handling of Sino-Indian relations, particularly regarding the border clashes which erupted beginning in the summer of 1959. While agreeing with Beijing's suppression of the “counter-revolutionary rebellion” in Tibet of March 1959, which had ended in the Dalai Lama's receiving asylum in India, Suslov condemned as misguided and damaging China's personal invective against Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and its strategy of using the border clashes to exacerbate Sino-Indian relations and push Nehru toward the West in hopes of inciting revolution in India. Rather than furthering the cause of revolution, Suslov stated, China's actions were damaging “progressive forces” (i.e., the Communist Party) in India, weakening China's (and improving Washington's) standing in Asia, and also impeding Sino-Soviet relations—for the Chinese Communist Party blamed the CPSU for not openly siding with Beijing against India. Suslov, in fact, depicted China's actions as directed not only against India but against the USSR, for they embarrassed Khrushchev on the eve of his own long-sought summit in the United States with President Eisenhower in September 1959, just prior to the trip to Beijing. In sum, Beijing's policy toward India was putting Soviet leaders in an impossible quandary—either to back what they saw as Mao's ill-conceived actions to preserve an increasingly illusory Sino-Soviet alliance (at the price of undercutting Soviet efforts to improve relations with India and the West), or to take a balanced position at the risk of an open split with Mao and the Chinese.

The Suslov report was obtained for

the Cold War International History Project by Vladislav M. Zubok of the National Security Archive from the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documents (TsKhSD) in Moscow. The document was located in Fond 2, a newly-opened collection of declassified transcripts and related materials of CPSU Plenums. Zubok also translated the excerpt reprinted below from Russian into English. A translation and analysis of the entire Suslov report, as well as of the transcript of the climactic 2 October 1959 Mao-Khrushchev summit meeting in Beijing, is in preparation by Mark Kramer of the Davis Center for Russian Studies (formerly the Russian Research Center) at Harvard University for future publication by the Cold War International History Project.

The second section of excerpts, drawn from Russian documents on Soviet-Indian relations and the Sino-Indian border dispute in 1962, is culled from a much larger selection of documents from the Russian Foreign Ministry archives in Moscow, known officially as the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (AVP RF). They were located during research at AVPRF in June 1996 by CWIHP Director James G. Hershberg in the so-called “referentura” (reference) files for Soviet relations with India, in Fond 090 (secret fonds or collection groups begin with a zero; Fond 90 contains “non-secret” records on Soviet relations with India, though these can also be revealing). The translations from Russian were done for CWIHP by Kathryn Weathersby, who also aided in selecting the materials for translation.

The excerpts, mostly from reports from the Soviet Embassy in New Delhi, were chosen to illustrate such topics as Soviet ties to the Indian Communist Party, Soviet perceptions of the Sino-Indian border dispute, and the impact of the border crisis on Soviet-Indian relations, as shown in direct communi-

cations between Nehru and Khrushchev. While these excerpts hint at how the Soviet archives can offer a fascinating and rich window into these and many other aspects of the still-murky Sino-Indian border dispute, much further research in Moscow is still necessary, particularly with key Chinese and Indian archives still closed. In any event, CWIHP would be pleased to assist scholars interested in examining the photocopies of these and other Russian documents obtained during research on Soviet-Indian relations, 1959 and 1962, or in commissioning English translations of more of them. The documents are on file as part of the Russian Archives Documents Database (RADD) at the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository located at the George Washington University on the 7th floor of the Gelman Library, 2130 H St. NW, Washington, DC 20037, tel. (202) 994-7000; e-mail: nsarchiv@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu; fax: (202) 994-7000.

The third section below is the transcript, found in the East German archives, of a 26 December 1962 conversation in Beijing between Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Mongolia, Premier Yumzhagiin Tsedenbal (J. Zedenbal in German). Although the occasion of the talk was the signing of a Sino-Mongolian boundary treaty, the conversation soon turned to the recent clashes along the Sino-Indian border. According to the transcript—presumably kept by the Mongolians, though it is unclear from the document how it came to be translated into German and rest in the East German archives—Zedenbal took the opportunity to criticize Chinese policy in the border dispute with India as detrimental to the interests of the international socialist camp, producing a tense exchange with Zhou. Whether or not the transcript is accurate—no Chinese version is available—the Mongolians clearly wanted to show their Soviet-bloc patrons that they were standing up for Moscow's policy, and Ulan Bator may have circulated the transcript to Moscow and/or its allies precisely for that reason.

The document itself was located in the archives of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) in East Berlin by scholars collecting materials for a volume on relations between the People's Republic of China and the German Democratic Republic: Werner Meissner, ed., *Die Deutsche Demokratische Republik und China, 1949-1990: Politik-Wirtschaft-Wissenschaft-Kultur. Eine Quellensammlung* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1995). The document was not included in the published volume, but was recently obtained by David Wolff, who thanks Prof. Meissner (Hong Kong Baptist University) and his colleagues at the Free University in Berlin, Anja Feege, M. Leutner, and Tim Trampedach, for providing access to this and other documents on China from the former East German archives. The Zhou-Zedenbal record—which made its way into the East German archives and the German language in a manner that remains unclear—was translated into English by Wolff with assistance by Christian Ostermann, Oliver Corff, and James G. Hershberg.

It should be stressed that the materials reprinted below represent only an early sampling of the types of materials that could become available for studying the complicated Sino-Indian-Soviet triangle with the opening of new archives. In coming years, CWIHP hopes to work with scholars using American, Russian, and other archives—particularly the Chinese and Indian archives, should they relax their current secrecy—to explore this important subject, involving an issue that has outlasted the Cold War. While in late November 1996, during a visit to New Delhi by Chinese President Jiang Zemin, PRC and Indian leaders signed an agreement not to use force to resolve their border dispute, the sometimes tense recent history of relations between the world's two most populous countries clearly merits further research and study.

—James G. Hershberg

**I. Draft report dated 18 December 1959, "On the [October 1959] trip of the Soviet party-governmental delegation to the PRC [People's Republic of China], by M. Suslov to CC CPSU Presidium for presentation to a forthcoming CC CPSU Plenum (excerpt)**

Draft

ABOUT THE VISIT OF THE SOVIET  
PARTY-GOVERNMENTAL  
DELEGATION TO THE  
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

[lengthy sections on bilateral questions, including criticism of China's domestic and ideological policies omitted--ed.]

...Now let me move to some issues of foreign policy where certain differences emerged between us and the Chinese comrades.

[here followed criticisms of Beijing's exacerbations of international tensions, Mao's thesis that imperialists were "paper tigers" and seemingly cavalier attitude toward nuclear war, and China's "inconsistent" handling of the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1958 and relations with Japan--ed.]

During this spring relations between the People's Republic of China and India have seriously deteriorated. This deterioration is linked to the counterrevolutionary rebellion in Tibet in March 1959. Reactionary circles of India to some extent were probably involved in this rebellion. However, the rebellion in Tibet would not have taken place, had one implemented timely democratic reforms and appropriate measures to improve economy and culture with a view on historical specifics of Tibet, and had one been duly vigilant with regard to reactionary elements. Unfortunately, Chinese comrades also did not draw appropriate conclusions from the warnings of the CC CPSU about the activities of reactionaries aimed at the forceful separation [otriv] of Tibet from the People's Republic of China.

Chinese comrades were correct when they put down decisively the counterrevolutionary rebellion in Tibet. They claim with justification that the issue of Tibet is a domestic affair of the PRC. We give them full support on this. We stand against the attempts of Western powers to sever Tibet from China, to exploit the Tibetan issue for aggravation of international situation. At the

last (16th) session of the UN General Assembly the representatives of the USSR and fraternal socialist countries resolutely supported the PRC, protesting against the discussion of the so-called "Tibetan question" and other attempts to blacken the People's China, including the one using the Sino-Indian border dispute.

The imperialist tactics aim at making the Tibetan issue a bone of contention first of all between China and India, to pit these two great Asian powers against each other, to aggravate the situation in the South-East Asia, to undermine the influence of the socialist camp, including China, in this region of the world, to weaken the positions of communists in the movement of national liberation. The American press openly admits that one word from India compromises the prestige of the PRC more than one thousand words spoken in the USA.

Regrettably, the Chinese comrades did not take into account this tactic of the imperialists. Responding to the noisy campaign in imperialist mass media about Tibet, they unleashed their own propagandist campaign and concentrated their fire mainly on India and personally on [Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal] Nehru. They accused the Indian government and personally Nehru of an imperialist policy, aimed against China. This was the essence of a large editorial article in "Renmin Ribao" ["People's Daily"] on 6 May 1959, under the title "The revolution in Tibet and the philosophy of Nehru."

Nehru is a well-known politician. One cannot exclude that to some degree he was involved in the intrigues against the PRC. But Nehru is far-sighted enough to recognize the vital importance of India's friendship with China, with the Soviet Union and the whole socialist camp. Nehru behaved with reserve. In his numerous speeches he admitted that Tibet is a part of China, he spoke against the establishment of a so-called "government of Dalai-Lama in exile," stressing the significance of the Sino-Indian friendship. India repeatedly raised the issue of restoration of rights of the People's Republic of China in the UN. Precisely these actions made the rightist bourgeois circles in India, who are linked to Anglo-American capital, to assail Nehru, blaming him for "indecisiveness" and "appeasement" with regard to the People's China. Their goal is to unseat Nehru, to revise the neutralist foreign policy of India, to tilt it in a rightist

direction, to the path of alliance with Western powers. If reactionary circles of India succeed in achieving these goals, it would cause serious damage to the socialist camp and the whole cause of peace, since the present foreign policy line of the Nehru government is a positive factor in the struggle for strengthening peace.

One should ask, what aims did Chinese comrades pursue in attacking Nehru so uncompromisingly? As they explained it themselves, they stood by the principle of "cohesion and struggle." According to com. Mao Zedong, they unmask Nehru as a "double-dealer," "half a man, half a devil," "half a gentlemen, half a hooligan," and in doing this they allegedly "force" him to strengthen friendship with the PRC.

A question, naturally, was raised how to live side by side with this "devil"? How to build relations with India? The Chinese comrades found a solution in forcing Nehru to repent and in pressuring him into cooperation with China. At the same time the Chinese said that they visualize the possibility of the downfall of the Nehru government and see no great trouble if a reactionary pro-Western government comes to power in India. In their opinion, this would only bring us closer to a revolution in India.

Obviously this course inevitably had to lead to further aggravation of relations with India. And it happened, indeed, when after suppression of the Tibet rebellion the Chinese troops approached the borders with India.

The People's China and India inherited from the past unresolved border issues. It is not possible here to dwell on the history and the essence of these issues that deal with some territories located in the Himalayas. But it is important to notice by what methods the Chinese comrades attempted to resolve this problem, so acute and painful for both sides.

For a long time the Chinese comrades postponed a solution of this question. They stressed that in the interests of maintaining good relations with India they would not press with demarcation of the borders and would reckon with the existing realities. However, in the heated atmosphere of the Sino-Indian disputes with regard to the rebellion of Tibet the issue of the border territories became extremely acute. On 25 August [1959] an armed clash took place between the Chinese and Indian border-guards,

and as a result the Hindus lost several people as killed and wounded. Exploiting this conflict, imperialist propaganda raised the uproar about "the aggression of red China." Reactionary nationalists inside India unleashed a fierce anti-Chinese campaign that was accompanied by attacks against Nehru, as well as [against] the Indian communist party.

One should mention that these events took place only a few days before the visit of comrade Khrushchev to the United States. The enemy propaganda did everything to exploit the Sino-Indian conflict for the purpose of disruption of the Soviet peace initiative, to lay blame for China's actions on the Soviet Union and thereby to cause a quarrel between us and India.

With all this in mind, the CC CPSU decided to send a letter to Beijing, expressing our concern about the situation that emerged as a result of the Sino-Indian conflict. It also took a decision to publish a TASS announcement in order to encourage peaceful settlement of the conflict and to give the world public opinion the correct idea about our position. The declaration of the Soviet Union at that time halted escalation of the conflict and thwarted the dangerous game of the imperialists. The governments of the PRC and India announced that further intensification of the dispute would not be in the interests of peace nor in their own interests, and that they would resolve border issues according to "five principles" [pancha sila] of peaceful coexistence.

The course of events, however, demonstrated that the question of the Sino-Indian border is rife with new complications. It is known that on 21 October [1959] there was another armed clash on the Sino-Indian border that caused the loss of lives. After it the anti-Chinese campaign in India flared up with new vigor.

One should keep in mind that there are very influential forces in India that seek to aggravate relations with China. Regrettably, the position of the Chinese comrades on this question is such that it facilitates for the Indian reactionaries mobilization of public opinion in the country against the People's China and puts the progressive forces of India in a quandary.

The Chinese comrades insist that they are guided by the considerations of self-defense and prestige of their country, that the

truth and justice is on China's side. In this regard one must inform the Plenum that the letter we addressed to the CC of the Communist Party of China and the TASS announcement about the Indo-Chinese border conflict did not evoke a proper understanding among the Chinese leaders. In their answer to our letter the Chinese comrades claimed that the incident on the Sino-Indian border had been provoked by the Nehru government, which, as the letter of the Chinese friends reads, "has long been marching in its domestic and foreign policies in the reactionary direction." It follows: "We believe that if one carries out only the policy of unprincipled adjustment and concessions to Nehru and the Indian government, not only would it not make them change their position for the better, but, on the contrary, in the situation of the growing offensive on their side, if China still does not rebuff them and denounce them, such a policy would only encourage their atrocity. It would not be advantageous for the friendship between China and India, and also not be advantageous to make Nehru and the Indian government improve, instead of moving toward further rapprochement with the West."

The letter contains a reproach that "the TASS announcement displayed to the whole world the different positions of China and the Soviet Union toward the incident on the Sino-Indian border, which causes a virtual glee and jubilation among the Indian bourgeoisie, American and British imperialists, who use this to drive a wedge into the relations between China and the Soviet Union. This cannot help evoking regrets."

The analysis of this letter of the CC of the Communist Party of China leads us to two conclusions of fundamental importance. They are the following: the Chinese comrades could neither correctly assess their own mistakes committed in their relations with India, nor the measures taken by the CC CPSU for regulation of the Sino-Indian conflict. The Chinese leadership's assessments of the situation in India and the behavior of Nehru with regard to the conflict are undoubtedly erroneous and arbitrary.

Let me refer to the opinion of our Indian friends expressed in their letters to the CC CPSU and the CC of the Communist Party of China. While registering the aggravation of the situation in India as a result of the conflict, the Indian comrades stated that "if the disputes continue, it would benefit

reactionary forces in India and would cause a negative influence on the masses of the Indian population." Indian comrades justifiably believe that further exacerbation of the Indo-Chinese relations could weaken the democratic movement in India, gravely undercut the position of the Indian communist party and threaten it with a ban. In the words of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of India comr. [Ajoy Kumar] Ghosh, Indian communists do not know how to explain the position of the PRC, the reason why it raised the border issue if China at this time and what hides behind it. All leading officials of the Communist Party of India wonder why the government of the PRC let itself be pulled by Indian reaction into this border conflict.

And as to the statement of the Chinese comrades about the glee and jubilation of Indian bourgeoisie, American and British imperialists, with regard to dissimilar positions of China and the Soviet Union on the incident on the Sino-Indian border, it is erroneous in its basic premises. The imperialists rejoiced indeed, but they did so at the moment when the Indo-Chinese conflict flared up. One can imagine them exulting and rejoicing even more, if the Soviet Union had become enmeshed in this conflict and the impression had been created that there was a united front of all socialist countries against Nehru. Facts demonstrate that the uproar among imperialists seriously abated after the Soviet Union came forth in favor of a peaceful settlement of the Indian-Chinese conflict.

What did aggravation of relations between China and India and other foreign policy gaffes of the Chinese comrades lead to? They led to a diminution of the international prestige of the PRC, to the weakening of her positions in Asia, to an increased tendency, in a number of countries of Asia, to ally oneself with Western powers, with the USA, despite strong hatred among the peoples of Asian countries towards their perennial enemies - the colonizers.

*[after discussion of Soviet-Chinese differences over Indonesia and other foreign policy issues, Suslov recounted the summit meeting in Beijing on 2 October 1959 between Khrushchev and Mao; his description of the exchange dealing with the Sino-Indian border conflict is printed below—ed.]*

From our side in the discussion of foreign policy issues took part comrades

Khrushchev, Suslov and Gromyko. From the Chinese side participated comrades Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhu De, Zhou Enlai, Lin Biao, Peng Zhen, Chen Yi, Wang Jiaxiang.

The discussion took place on 2 October in the residence of the Politburo of the CC Communist Party of China. Comrade Khrushchev informed the Chinese friends about his trip to the USA and his talks with President D. Eisenhower. He stressed that among American political figures there is growing sentiment in favor of peaceful settlement of unresolved, disputed questions and that at the present time there is a very real possibility for further resolute steps toward a more durable peace. In this regard he brought the attention of the Chinese friends to the necessity for the socialist camp to avoid anything that could be exploited by the reactionaries to push the world back to the tracks of the cold war.

Comrade Khrushchev told the Chinese comrades that we do not completely understand their foreign policy, particularly with regard to India, and on the issue of Taiwan.

Comrade Khrushchev pointed out at the necessity to improve mutual information between the leadership of our parties on the issues of foreign policy. One cannot regard as normal the situation, when we, China's ally, do not know what the Chinese comrades may undertake tomorrow in the area of foreign policy. Indeed, all countries of the socialist camp are linked not only by the common ideas and goals, but also by the alliance commitments. Incorrect actions of one country may hurt international situation of the whole socialist camp. One should keep in mind that imperialist propaganda directly link activity of Chinese comrades to the policy of the USSR and other socialist countries. Indeed, communist parties always emphasize that the socialist camp has one line in foreign policy.

As far as the CC CPSU is concerned, we systematically inform the leadership of fraternal parties of socialist countries about most important foreign policy steps of the USSR and, in special cases, we seek their advice.

One must admit that the Chinese comrades reacted to the remarks of comrade Khrushchev painfully. They claimed that their policy with regard to Taiwan and the off-shore straits has been fully justified and is conducted with skill, that their line toward

the Nehru government is correct. At times the tone of our discussion became quite sharp. It came to the point when a member of the Politburo CC Communist Party of China, minister of foreign affairs Chen Yi, claimed that our line on Nehru is allegedly opportunistic [*prisposoblencheskaia*], and the policy of China is more firm and correct. Naturally, we gave a resolute rebuff to these pronouncements.

In connection with the remarks of the Chinese leaders one cannot help wondering how they understand the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence, whether they see it as a general line of foreign policy of the socialist camp, whether they think it is necessary to struggle for relaxation of international tension and for securing general peace.

We are getting an impression that, while recognizing formally the principle of peaceful coexistence between the two global systems, the Chinese comrades tend to regard this principle just as a temporary tactical maneuver.

[*ed. note: after additional critical remarks and recounting of discussion of other matters at the meeting, Suslov noted:*]

One should say that at the end of the conversation on 2 October Mao Zedong and other Chinese comrades declared that they did not want war; that they would resolve the Taiwan issue by peaceful means and would settle the conflict with India through negotiations. They confirmed again that the Communist party of China has a common line and common goals with us. We expressed our satisfaction in this regard.

[*noting that Khrushchev had pointed out the Chinese leadership's "nervousness and touchiness" at being criticised, Suslov harshly criticized the "atmosphere of the cult of personality" surrounding Mao, which he likened to that of Stalin; recalling that during a 1958 conversation with Khrushchev, Mao had compared Soviet-Chinese relations to two hands in which nine fingers were fully unified "and only in one, little finger we have disagreements," Suslov ended his report on an optimistic note, vowing that the Soviet leadership would do its utmost to promote strong ties and friendship between Moscow and Beijing—ed.*]

[*Source: Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), Moscow, fond 2, opis 1, delo 415, ll. 56-91; transla-*

*tion for CWIHP by Vladislav M. Zubok.*]

## II. Russian Foreign Ministry Documents on Soviet-Indian Relations and the Sino-Indian Border Conflict, 1962 (excerpts)

[*The first excerpt is from a 17 January 1962 entry from the journal of Soviet ambassador to India I.A. Benediktov describing a conversation with the Secretary of the National Council of the Communist Party of India (CPI), Bhupesh Gupta. During the conversation, Gupta urgently requests Soviet financial aid for the Indian party for use in an upcoming election campaign; the answer conveyed by Benediktov ten days later suggests that the Soviets responded positively to the request, although the amount is not indicated:*]

Today I received Gupta at his request. Gupta communicated that on 16-17 January a meeting of the Secretariat of the CPI took place in Delhi, at which was discussed the future work of the party apparatus in connection with the death of A[joy]. [Kumar] Ghosh....Gupta said that he desires that the ties of the CPI and CPSU do not become weakened in any way after the death of Ghosh. The assistance in various forms and the comradely advice of the CC CPSU have always been enormously useful to us, he underscored....Gupta said that no other party, not even the communist party of China, can occupy in the hearts of Indian communists the place which belongs to the CPSU...

Gupta reported that after the death of Ghosh at the present time in the party there is an acute insufficiency of means for the pre-election campaign. He expressed the fear that with the death of Ghosh the source for receiving means for the communist party from the CPSU might be closed. These questions were handled by Ghosh alone, Gupta underscored. He never consulted with him /Gupta/, and even less with [Elamulam M.S.] Nambudiripad and G. Nair/ with the latter two only about using the assistance/. All these matters were held in strictest secrecy from other leaders of the party and members of the National Council. This explains the fact that not a single report on this question has appeared in the press. Gupta said that he cannot singlehandedly take on responsibility in

questions of assistance, therefore he considers it necessary to consult with Nambudiripad, whom he characterized as a person of crystalline honesty and whom Ghosh trusted. Gupta confidentially reported that A. Ghosh had not consulted on this problem with Akhmed or with [Shripad Amrit] Dange, who once proposed that he entrust to him alone all matters connected with the receipt of aid from abroad.

Gupta categorically denied that the Chinese friends are giving the CC CPI [Central Committee of the Communist Party of India] financial assistance. The National Council has not received, is not receiving, and will not receive assistance from the CCP [Chinese Communist Party], Gupta declared, and we never will appeal to them with such a request. Moreover, the interlocutor underscored, the Chinese do not know anything about Soviet aid. Gupta noted that he knows this precisely, since he enjoys the trust of both groups in the party. The interlocutor further underscored that the only other channels of aid from abroad are the aid received by the Punjab organization from Sikhs living in England and also the aid at the trade union level through Dange.

Gupta repeated several times that the aid is needed precisely now, since the pre-election struggle must be concluded in the first week of February. After the elections we would like to receive your support in the matter of the theoretical preparation of party cadres, he said. Gupta expressed the conviction that the CPI not only will preserve its seats in parliament, but also will be able to increase their number.

Gupta said that in the election struggle the reactionary forces within the country are now directing their main blow at the authority of the USSR, which has increased in connection with its position on Goa, Kashmir and other questions. The main task of the CPI in the pre-election struggle, Gupta said, is to make clear to the population that the Soviet Union is giving selfless aid to India, is its true friend...

[*Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVPRF), Fond 090, Opis 24, Delo 5, Papka 80, Listy 14-19; document obtained by J. Hershberg; translation by K. Weathersby.*]

[*Benediktov met with Gupta again on 27 January 1962 (as the Soviet envoy recorded*

*in his diary four days later):]*

On 27 January of this year I and Comrade Zhukov G.A. had a conversation with the secretary of the CC CPI Comrade Gupta.

We stated to him the answer of the CC CPSU in connection with his earlier conversation with me. Gupta expressed gratitude for the readiness of the CC and the Presidium of the CC CPSU to assist the leadership of the CPI in this difficult moment and to support it. He promised to inform the CC CPSU about the situation in the party in the future as well...

*[Source: AVPRF, f. 090, op. 24, d. 5, p. 80, ll. 31-36; document obtained by J. Hershberg; translation by K. Weathersby.]*

*[The second excerpt, dealing with the brewing crisis over the Sino-Indian border dispute, is from a 10 October 1962 entry from Benediktov's diary, this one describing a conversation with the provisional charge d'affairs of the Chinese Embassy in India, "Comrade E. Cheng-Chang," referred to as "Comrade E." in the document. In the conversation, the Chinese official gave Beijing's version of the building confrontation, blaming India for attacking Chinese posts along the border, and asserting that India had "gone too far" to resume normal relations with the PRC. Ten days later, China launched a broad attack on Indian positions along the disputed frontier.]*

I received Comrade E. in connection with his departure for his homeland and had a conversation with him.

Comrade E. on his own initiative dwelt in detail on the problem of the Indian-Chinese border dispute. He said that India has finally rejected the proposal of the PRC about negotiations [for] 15 October in Beijing. The Indian side continues to maintain that the recent clash on the eastern border occurred on Indian territory, south of the McMahon line, and was elicited by the advance of Chinese troops to the south and their attack on Indian posts. In fact, Comrade E. said, the entire affair was completely the opposite. Indian troops crossed the McMahon line and attacked Chinese posts far to the north of that line. Comrade E. talked about his last conversation in the Indian Foreign Ministry with the head of the China department, Menon. During this con-

versation Comrade E. asked Menon to take a map of the eastern part of the border, published in India in 1960, and find on it the region in which the clashes are now occurring, orienting by latitude and longitude the places indicated in the Indian notes. As a result it turned out that this region, the latitude and longitude of which were indicated by the Indians themselves, is located significantly to the north of the McMahon line on Chinese territory. Menon, in the words of Comrade E., was forced to acknowledge this, but maintained at the same time that it was not possible that the Indians had crossed the McMahon line and so forth.

Comrade E. stated that the main things that will motivate India to end the conflict with the PRC are, on the international level, the wish to receive money from the USA, and on the domestic level the desire to suppress political forces which are objectionable to the ruling circles. Moreover, in the opinion of Comrade E., the Indian government has already gone too far in this conflict to have the possibility of returning to normal relations....

*[Source: AVPRF, f. 90, op. 24, d. 5, p. 44, ll. 147-148; document obtained by J. Hershberg; translation by K. Weathersby.]*

*[This third excerpt from Benediktov's diary, dated 26 October 1962, describes a conversation with the General Secretary of the Communist Party of India, E.M. Nambudiripad. The encounter took place a day after the Soviet leadership had dramatically modified its policy on the Sino-Indian dispute (in an October 25 article in Pravda), suddenly taking a pro-China position, evidently due to the danger of global war breaking out as a result of the Cuban Missile Crisis, then peaking. While taking pains to welcome the Pravda article as helpful in correcting misunderstandings among Indian Communists, the CPI leader acknowledged that the party secretariat had concluded that "this publication in all probability will inaugurate a new period of anti-Soviet hysteria in India," pushing the Indian Government toward the West, and he pleaded with the Soviets to influence China to resolve the border dispute "without damage to the prestige of India and of Nehru himself."]*

Today at my own initiative, fulfilling the commission of the CC CPSU, I met with

E.M. Nambudiripad and informed him of the statement of the CC CPSU on the Indian-Chinese border conflict. He listened most attentively to the statement of the CC and promised immediately to convey its contents to the members of the secretariat of the National Council of the CPI.

Nambudiripad said that four members of the secretariat, who were in Delhi, today carefully studied and discussed at length the *Pravda* article of October 25 on the border question. "We ask that you transmit this to the CC CPSU, - he continued, - that the publication of this article and the advice of the CPSU contained in this letter of the CC CPSU, truly will help our party get out of the extremely difficult position it is now in. Before this [help] there were moments when we felt ourselves to be simply helpless, but now the party will be able to remedy this situation. We are grateful to the CC CPSU for this help; you can transmit this personally from me and from Comrade B. Gupta." He pointed out the whole array of difficulties the CPI faces in correcting its earlier positions and statements on the border question. The most typical mistake of many communists, in his words, is that they cannot clearly distinguish [between] patriotism and bourgeois nationalism. Some of the members of the party considered it possible [that there would be] support for the Indian position in this dispute from a number of communist parties of the socialist countries in light of the ideological differences between the CCP PRC and other fraternal parties, although - he continued, - I knew that this was impossible and incorrect. Moreover, it is very difficult in general to sharply reformulate the whole system of views on the border conflict held by members of the party, since these views in many cases were contradictory to those expressed in *Pravda* and in this letter of the CC CPSU. In particular, the CPI for three years considered the McMahon line the real border between the two states. Many rank and file members of the party and some members of the leading organs, in solidarity with the widespread opinion among the population, hold to the view that the PRC is [the] guilty [party] in the origin and exacerbation of the border conflict." "Undoubtedly the article in *Pravda* will have an influence on these comrades, he said, it will force them to think through the whole question again." Members of the secretariat Nair and Sharma at

today's meeting pointed out that the *Pravda* article, while in fact criticizing the position of the Indian communists and India's relation to this question as a whole, did not express any critical comments with regard to the PRC and the Chinese comrades.

Nambudiripad reported that the secretariat of the CPI after the discussion of the *Pravda* article today reached the conclusion that "this publication in all probability will inaugurate a new period of anti-Soviet hysteria in India." The campaign that is going on everywhere against the PRC will, obviously, be extended to the Soviet Union, and then to all countries of the socialist system....He expressed the opinion of the secretariat that in connection with this statement of the Soviet press and in connection with the pressure on India from many neutral countries regarding a more rapid peaceful settlement of this conflict, the Indian government...can reach the conclusion that only western countries are our true friends...

"In this connection we very much would like to find out if Soviet leaders could help the CPI give an understanding to the Chinese comrades that it is extremely desirable to give the possibility to Nehru to move toward peace negotiations and cease military actions without damage to the prestige of India and of Nehru himself, - Nambudiripad stated. The Secretariat has unanimously reached the conclusion that such a step by the PRC would have a huge significance for the cause of world peace, for all progressive forces, for the anti-imperialist struggle..."

[Source: AVPRF, f. 090, op. 24, d. 6, p. 80, ll. 134-139; document obtained by J. Hershberg; translation by K. Weathersby.]

[This fourth excerpt is from a 2 November 1962 entry from Benediktov's diary, describing a conversation with Indian Foreign Ministry General-Secretary R.K. Nehru. Approaching the Soviet envoy at a social gathering, the Indian official relayed an oral message to Khrushchev from Indian Prime Minister Nehru (whom he described as "exceptionally busy, very tired"), giving his analysis of the underlying motives behind China's actions in the border dispute. The Indian leader assessed that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai—with whom Nehru had cooperated in championing the rise of the non-aligned movement only a few years earlier—

*opposed the current militant policy toward India, but that leftist dogmatists-sectarians within the Chinese leadership, such as Liu Shaoqi, supported it. They did so, Nehru reportedly maintained, not because of the border dispute, but to strike a blow against the general phenomenon of neutrality in order to discredit Moscow's line of peaceful coexistence and competition with the West, and avoiding general nuclear war. In fact, Nehru was said to declare, the Chinese threatened to embroil the entire world in war, and had divided the globe into two new camps: not East and West, but "one - for the continuation of the human species, the other (the Chinese sectarians) - against."]*

At a reception I met R.K. Nehru, who approached me and began a conversation. He set forth in great detail his views on the Indian-Chinese border conflict, noting that he had expressed them to the prime minister. R.K. Nehru said that the prime minister gave him a letter to N.S. Khrushchev and spoke about his conversation with the Soviet ambassador. In his words, the prime minister greatly appreciates the concern and anxiety of the government of the USSR and the general approach of N.S. Khrushchev to the problem of the Indian-Chinese conflict. "At another time, noted R.K. Nehru, it is possible that the prime minister himself would have spoken about this problem in detail, but now he is exceptionally busy, very tired and we must help him. Therefore I myself will tell you our views."

1. "After my return from China two years ago I personally did everything possible for the peaceful settlement of the border dispute. No one else has played a more important role in this matter than I. To some degree I have weakened my authority by having taken the hardest line on resolving the conflict by means of negotiations. The foreign policy leaders of India tried to the best of their abilities to solve this dispute and preserve friendly relations with the PRC. We did not cease to hope for a peaceful settlement of the dispute and did not make any military preparations, completely not supposing that military actions on the border were possible. The result is our present retreat."

2. "After many years in China, I know very well and am closely acquainted with all the leaders of China and with all the main party leaders. I [can] clearly present the

views of each of them. I am convinced, for example, that Zhou Enlai does not approve the policy of the PRC regarding India, while Liu Shaoqi can approve it."

3. "I am absolutely convinced that the given events are not simply a border conflict, but something more. This is part of a general strategy of Chinese leftist dogmatists - sectarians who obviously now have the upper hand in the leadership of the CCP (Chinese Communist Party). This is the mainspring of the events. These sectarian elements in the CCP are trying to prove their thesis that India, as a capitalist country, will surely join the bloc of western countries, that it cannot conduct a policy of nonalignment for any length of time. They regard Nehru not as a nationalist leader but as a reactionary bourgeois. They are trying by their actions to force India to reject the policy of nonalignment, to draw it into the western bloc, to strike a blow at the entire policy of neutrality, nonalignment, peaceful coexistence. India, as the largest of the neutral countries of Asia, is their first and main target. Thus the issue is not this or that border or territory; the essence of the events is the attempts of the party sectarians of the CCP to prove in practice their theoretical position, an attempt to cross over to the offensive on the ideological front."

4. "I am convinced that their actions are an extension of the CCP's ideological disputes with the CPSU, and that the Chinese sectarians are directing the main blow against the Soviet Union and its foreign policy principles—against peaceful coexistence, the possibility of avoiding war in our atomic age, the possibility of the victory of communism not through war but through peaceful economic competition with the West. We value highly these principles of Soviet policy. I personally don't have anything against the establishment of communism in the entire world, if communism proves its superiority by means of economic, social, and cultural achievements, but not by bombs."

5. "However, the Chinese fanatics, who apparently have gained strength recently, are conducting (and intend to conduct in the future) a senseless course for achieving their goals by any means, including military actions, which is dangerous for all peoples. They, unlike the USSR and even the USA, do not understand the danger of nuclear war. The world is now divided not into East and

West, but into two camps: one - for the continuation of the human species, the other (the Chinese sectarians) - against."

6. "We are on the leading edge of the struggle against the realization in practice by these fanatics of their theoretical program, which is a threat to the entire world, to all peoples. Therefore, everyone must assist our struggle. Therefore we must not in any case retreat before them, not submit to their threats, not agree to conditions which they dictate on the basis of force and seizure of our territory. On the contrary, we must without fail defeat them, smash their first practical attempt to prove their thesis. Only their defeat and the preservation by India of its policy of nonalignment can teach them a lesson and force them to reconsider their theoretical convictions."...

[Source: AVPRF, f. 90, op. 24, d. 5, p. 44, ll. 120-124; document obtained by J. Hersherberg; translation by K. Weathersby.]

[The fifth and final selection from Ambassador Benediktov's diary is from a 12 December 1962 entry recording a conversation with Indian Prime Minister Nehru. In the excerpt presented here, Nehru expressed a positive evaluation of Soviet-Indian relations, complimenting Khrushchev for his role in resolving the Cuban crisis, but in response to the Soviet envoy's emphasis that the border crisis with China be settled peacefully he firmly defended India's stand that PRC forces must withdraw from recently-occupied positions (e.g., return to the line held on September 8) before talks could start.]

In accordance with the commission of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev today I visited prime minister of India J. Nehru. I gave him warm greetings and best wishes from N.S. Khrushchev and other members of the Soviet government.

Nehru first of all inquired about the health of N.S. Khrushchev...

I further set forth the substance of the questions which I was commissioned by Comrade N.S. Khrushchev to communicate to Nehru. I said to Nehru that the Soviet government appreciates the efforts of the Indian government and of Nehru personally which are aimed at preserving the policy of nonalignment, at preserving and further developing the friendly relations with the So-

viet Union. I set forth the opinion of N.S. Khrushchev on questions of the necessity of activating in every way the struggle for peace and general disarmament, for carrying out the policy of peaceful coexistence and resolution of disputed international questions through negotiations. I expressed the wish of N.S. Khrushchev that the border conflict between India and the PRC also will be resolved through peaceful means, through negotiations.

Nehru listened to all of this attentively and with great interest, taking notes in his notebook. He expressed great satisfaction with the friendly relations which exist between the USSR and India, between the governments of both countries and also between Comrade N.S. Khrushchev and him personally. He expressed also the conviction that these relations will not only be preserved, but also will further develop in the future.

The prime minister stated further that he "fully agrees with Mr. Khrushchev in regard to the necessity of our general struggle for peace and disarmament." He gave us to understand that the USSR can count on the support of India in these questions.

Concerning the question of the peaceful resolution of sharp international problems, Nehru stated that "in this regard Mr. Khrushchev has given us all a great example during the incident with Cuba."

Nehru then dwelt in detail on the position of India in the Indian-Chinese border dispute. He said that "all this began not from our side, - it was thrust on us. We do not want it to be prolonged, we do not want to carry out military actions. We would like it to be settled..."

Nehru noted the truth of Khrushchev's observation about the presence of reactionary forces that are trying to push the government to a resolution of the border dispute by military means. He stated in this regard that the government knows about the activities of these forces, but does not consider this the main thing. In his words a very important point is the fact that all the people of India, simple peasants, workers and employees, "all feel the harshest feelings toward China, toward what it did against India. They, of course, do not want war (no one wants it), but they demand the withdrawal of Chinese from Indian territory, they demand the defense of our territory.

We, of course, never will make an incursion into Chinese territory, but it is necessary to consider that the people insist on the liberation of the territory that belongs to India."

In answer to my statement about the necessity of a peaceful resolution of the problem and of explaining to the people the correctness of peaceful means, Nehru said: "We are trying to explain this necessity and will do this in the future." He noted in this regard that attempts at peaceful resolution of the dispute have not yet given results. "We would like to sit at the negotiating table with the Chinese. We are ready. But the government has explained to them that for this it is necessary that the position on the border that existed 3 months ago be restored - the position on 8 September."

Further J. Nehru in detail and confidentially illuminated the question of the relations of India with Pakistan...

[Source: AVPRF, f. 090, op. 24, d. 6, p. 80, ll. 197-203; document obtained by J. Hersherberg; translation by K. Weathersby.]

### III. Record of Conversation (from East German archives) between Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Mongolian leader J. Zedenbal, Beijing, 26 December 1962

4 Cop[ies].

II.

About the Meeting of Comrade Zhou Enlai and Comrade J. Zedenbal

On 26 December the Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China [PRC; VRCh in German], Comrade Zhou Enlai, paid a return visit to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Mongolian People's Republic [MPR; MVR in German], Comrade J. Zedenbal.

During this meeting, which took place in the residence of Comrade Zedenbal, a conversation [took place] between the two [men], which lasted from 11 until 14 hours.

Present during the conversation were: on the Mongolian side—the deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the MPR, Comrade Shagwaral, the deputy Foreign Minister Schagda[r]suren, the Ambassador of the MPR in Peking [Beijing], Zewegmid, the Deputy of the Great People's Hural [Parliament] of the MPR, S. Bata, the Head of the 1st Division of the Foreign Ministry of

the MPR, Comrade Tschimiddorsh; on the Chinese side—the deputy Premier of the State Council and Foreign Minister of the PRC, Comrade Tschen Ji [Chen Yi], the deputy Foreign Minister, Comrade Tshi Peng-fei, the Head of the 2nd Asian Division of the Foreign Ministry of the PRC, Comrade Zhou Tschu-je, the Chief of Protocol of the Foreign Ministry of the PRC, Jui Pei-weng, the Extraordinary and plenipotentiary Ambassador of the PRC in the MPR, Se Fu-schen.

Erdenebulag served as translator on the Chinese side and Adja on the Mongolian side.

After offering tea, fruit, and cigarettes to the guests, and after a short conversation of a protocol nature, photographs were taken and the guests entered a special room where a three-hour conversation occurred.

Hereafter follows a presentation of the contents of the conversation between the Premier of the State Council of the PRC, and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the MPR, Zedenbal.

ZHOU ENLAI: We are very happy, Comrade Chairman Zedenbal, that you have come to our land, in order to sign a treaty concerning the border between our countries. This is a good thing, the meaning of which is to legally define the borders between our friendly lands.

Yesterday you said quite correctly, that the signing of a border agreement would be very meaningful for peace and friendship. A reasonable settlement of the border question between China and Mongolia will be an example and an encouragement for border negotiations with other countries.

Basically, we have reached an agreement concerning the border question with [North] Korea. But we are waiting still for an answer from Korea and therefore have not yet made a public announcement to the press.

Since the Chinese-Mongolian and Chinese-Korean border issues are already settled, all that remains to be done, is to set up joint Commissions on Demarcation of Borders according to the agreed-upon principles.

We are at present conducting negotiations regarding border demarcation with Burma and Nepal. We have the opportunity to resolve this question with the aforementioned countries on a mutually-agreed basis. In this manner we will officially pin

down the border line with these countries.

The border agreement between China and Mongolia will also contribute to the resolution of the border question with our other neighboring countries.

China recently started border negotiations with Pakistan. We think that [we] will soon reach an agreement as our negotiations with Pakistan are taking place in a good atmosphere. The border question with Pakistan is also linked to the Kashmir question, that is, with the question that concerns both Pakistan and India directly. After the conclusion of the negotiations between China and Pakistan, we will sign a provisional protocol; the signing of an official treaty will follow if the Kashmir question between India and Pakistan has been settled.

Anyway, the aforementioned border treaty will reflect the real situation. We are not going to define officially the border between China and Pakistan today. That would be to lead India into a dead end [*Sackgasse*]. The border between India and Pakistan is still officially unresolved.

When you visited India in [September] 1959, Comrade Zedenbal, the border conflict between China and India had just reached a climax. At that time, I informed you regarding the Chinese-India border question, but during your stay in India you tried to avoid this question. We are very interested in this matter.

The major border conflict between India and Pakistan is caused by the Kashmir question. At the western sector of our border with India, this [area] borders on the Aksai and on the Tibetan district of Ali. This was a historically established traditional border line. Pakistan's position on the border question is correct. The border agreement between our countries will undoubtedly be signed, once the status [*zugehörigkeit*] of Kashmir is clarified. India, however, is trying in every way to prevent the conclusion of an agreement. But these attempts lack any grounds.

The Western press—especially the English papers—write, that the Chinese-Pakistani border question corresponds completely to the norms of international relations. But this question only worries the American reactionaries. They think that if China, Pakistan, and India delineate their borders, that would be a blow to the aggressive Asia policy of America and other imperialist states. They assume that the so-

lution of the Chinese-Pakistani border question and the settlement of the Chinese-India border question could hinder their aggression.

Recently the Americans have exerted increased pressure on India and Pakistan demanding a solution to the Kashmir question as soon as possible. It is expected that in the near-future negotiations on the border question will begin between India and Pakistan on the ministerial level.

The English are trying to influence these matters either in the direction that Kashmir belongs to both countries or that Pakistan connects itself into Indian society [*dass sich Pakistan der indischen Gemeinschaft anschliesst*].

We are of the opinion that the border negotiations between India and Pakistan cannot lead to positive results. Nehru is searching for a way to subordinate India and Pakistan to American domination. Clearly, he has no other way out [*Ausweg*]. If this occurs, the situation will become even more complicated, and it will become difficult to explain this problem to the Indian people.

We have sent a letter to the countries of Asia and Africa explaining the Chinese-Indian border question in detail. You have also received this letter, Comrade Chairman Zedenbal.

Since 1961 India is conducting invasions into our border districts and has established 43 border posts there. The area in question is mountainous, has a raw climate, and it snows a lot there.

After the Chinese-Indian border conflict broke out and India continued its invasion systematically, we were forced to remove the aforementioned 43 posts. Several of these were overrun and the entire district cleansed.

On 21 November [1962] our government made the decision to cease fire and to withdraw the border units 20 kilometers into the hinterlands. We suggested the establishment of an unpopulated zone 20 kilometers deep [on each side--ed.]. One must say that in the past there were no Chinese troops involved in the border conflict. There was not a single border guard or [border]-post there, rather, only a patrol [service]. But, administratively, this district was subject to us [our authority]. Since 1949, however, India began to threaten and attack this area. Now, after this area is cleansed, we again have no border guard there. If India, under

these conditions, begins an invasion again, this will be a true challenge and provocation.

If India gives up Kashmir to Pakistan and tries to annex our Aksai district again, this will only be a proof that India is really working for and under the orders of the Americans.

India's attempts to give Pakistan the rich, bounteous Kashmir and, in exchange, to occupy our unpopulated, poor district, only proves [India's] aggressiveness. Under these conditions, we have ceased fire and withdrawn our troops.

The people of Asia and Africa, [and] all the peace-loving people of the Earth, support our policy and our measures. We thank you for the fact that your government welcomed the explanation of the government of the PRC.

Presently, India is in a difficult position. The countries of Asia and Africa are supporting our proposal, and that puts India in an even more exit-less [*ausweglosere*] situation.

Not long ago, a meeting of leading statesmen from many countries took place in Colombo [Ceylon; now Sri Lanka] concerning the Sino-Indian border question. They decided to send the Ceylonese prime minister [Sirimavo Bandaranaike] to China in order to inform us of the results of the conference. It was confirmed that the Ceylonese Minister-president would arrive [in China] on 31 December. We have already received a special plenipotentiary in order to confer on this question. The aforementioned countries are making efforts to reconcile India and China and to initiate negotiations between our countries in order to confirm our cease-fire. We are ready to respond to these efforts. The most important [thing] is that both sides do not allow any renewed clashes. That is our main goal. Many ask, why there is no settlement of the Indian-Chinese border conflict, because the border question between China and Pakistan is actively discussed[?] We think that Pakistan negotiates with us without submitting itself to America and England, although it belongs to an aggressive bloc. India, however, speaks the language of America, although it maintains that it does not belong to any aggressive blocs.

J. ZEDENBAL: Do you consider India a neutral country?

ZHOU ENLAI: India is diverging from

its so-called neutrality. Furthermore, there is a less important border question between China and Afghanistan. In short, we will start negotiations. Experience shows that we can solve the border problems handed down to us by history through friendly negotiations both with socialist countries and with the new states of Asia. The treaty regarding the Chinese-Mongolian border demonstrates this. Both of our states are socialist countries and in a short period we have solved the border question correctly, according to principles of friendship, equality, mutual understanding and mutual concessions. Our countries' governmental delegations have successfully concluded negotiations over the border question. This opens the way to the signature of a border agreement. Consequently, we will have to form a joint commission that will undertake border demarcation on the spot.

J. ZEDENBAL: Thank you, Premier Zhou Enlai both for the information regarding the course of negotiations you are conducting with neighboring countries and for the information about your government's position on this question.

The negotiations between our countries to define exactly and mark the borderline have been successfully concluded, and nothing more stands in the way of signing an agreement. Comrade Premier, you have correctly stated that our countries' governmental delegations negotiated successfully on the basis of mutual understanding, mutual consideration of interests, mutual concessions and mutual regard. I value this as much as you do. Since socialist countries have a common goal and ideology, we definitely must solve all questions that come up between us in the spirit of friendship. The border question between our countries was settled on just such a basis. The goal of the peoples who are building socialism and communism is to eliminate once and for all such problems as border drawing and the like that divide nations from each other.

But for the time being borders will remain. I only say this, because I am taking our final goal, Communism, as my point of departure.

ZHOU ENLAI: There is a Chinese saying that says that in the end the world will be an unitary whole, that there will be no exploitation of man by man. But before we join in one whole, we must establish the borders and provide for our affairs and prosper.

perity.

J. ZEDENBAL: The states and nations will strengthen their independence and develop their countries, consequently and definitely crossing over into a communist order. This is the dialectic of development.

ZHOU ENLAI: This is clearly a question of the distant future.

J. ZEDENBAL: Of course. Our government and our people deeply regret that there was a border conflict between China and India. They are convinced that this problem must be solved in a peaceful manner. That is our position. This conflict between two Asian great-powers and the disturbance of the friendship between them is disadvantageous both for the peoples of both countries and for the maintenance of peace in general.

Our visit to India in 1959 coincided with the heightening [of tensions] on the Chinese-Indian border. I remember, Comrade Premier, that you informed us at that time regarding the state of affairs.

As soon as we were on Indian soil, the correspondents fell upon us with questions regarding the border conflict. Our answer to the correspondents ran: we hope that the border question between these two great powers can be settled in a peaceful manner.

At the meeting with Nehru, I said to him that the correspondents had turned to us with this question; I assume that the border question between the two countries will be settled in a friendly manner. At that time the question was, it seems to me, mainly about a border area of 90,000 square kilometers.

Nehru said that if it was a border disagreement involving a few kilometers, one could make mutual concessions, but that in this case it was a matter of 90,000 square kilometers, whose inhabitants are Indian citizens, who elect representatives to the Indian parliament. Therefore, he said, this question is not so simply solved.

It seems to me that, in fact, it is not easy to reach an agreement involving such a large area. A longer time is clearly necessary for this. As it turned out, the outbreak of the border conflict and the armed clashes have, in essence, complicated the situation. Now, obviously, an even bigger area is involved than before.

We think that the Chinese government's unilateral ceasefire is a reasonable step, taken after full consideration of the circumstances. We hold the view that you are un-

dertaking flexible measures towards settlement of the Indian-Chinese border conflict in a peaceful manner by negotiations.

In general, life confirms daily the need for flexible policies to solve international problems. We do not doubt that the Chinese-Indian border conflict can be settled peacefully.

By "speculating" on the Chinese-Indian border conflict, the reactionary forces in India have strengthened their activity and their offensive against the country's [India's] Communist Party and democratic forces.

We are convinced that the measures that your government has taken towards a ceasefire on the Indian-Chinese border, toward the withdrawal of border troops and towards the future settlement of this problem by negotiation will generate positive results. We are of the opinion that this would be, on the one hand a blow against reactionary forces in India itself, and on the other hand a blow against the forces of imperialism, with the USA at its head. We assume that such measures will strengthen India's neutral stance and will prevent India from abandoning this position. This will advance the battle for peace in the whole world. The American imperialists are making efforts to derive advantages from this conflict. The peaceful settlement would undoubtedly be a serious [line illegible—trans.] for imperialism.

After the signing of the border agreement between our countries, we will begin the demarcation of the borderline. As is well known, during the negotiations our delegation raised the question of the village of Hurimt in the Balgan-Ulgiisk district in western Mongolia. Our inhabitants have erected several buildings there and begun lumbering. Your delegation, however, replied that this place cannot be recognized as Mongolia, because this would meet with difficulties. At the same time, your delegation answered that the inhabitants on both sides have come to an agreement and can find a reasonable solution [to the problem of] the use of the forest's riches. Therefore, I do not want to insist that Hurimt should necessarily belong inside Mongolian borders. Of course, I think that this question must be decided by taking both sides interests into consideration. We are grateful that you have declared yourselves ready to make possible our use of our buildings as well as the forests in this district. This problem

occurred, because there are no other woods nearby. But it can be solved on the basis of friendly, mutual understanding.

Since the founding of the PRC it has become a good tradition that during temporary difficulties caused by drought and dry wind, the administrations of individual districts of our countries, in friendly contacts, have permitted the reciprocal use of pasture land. We hope that it will also be possible in the future, in case of difficulties, to continue this excellent tradition.

I suppose that our Comrade "Landowner" ["Gutsbesitzer"] Shagwaral, who is responsible for agricultural questions would be very interested in this.

We thank you for the help that you have provided in difficult times to the cattle-breeders in our Aimaks and Somons, especially in winter and spring. We also express further our satisfaction that the border question between our countries will soon be settled.

I would like to make use of this meeting, Comrade Premier, to broach two aspects [of Sino-Mongolian relations].

We were and are grateful that for the construction of our country the PRC has provided us with financial and economic help as well as qualified workers. The appropriate authorities in our countries are already negotiating regarding the building of objects agreed upon earlier by our governments. I suppose that these negotiations will continue.

I would like to pose the following two questions to you: First, has railway freight traffic gone down considerably in the last years? Maybe that is also an effect of your drought. We hope that railway freight traffic will go up in the future. The full use of the railway that will be built as a consequence of a three-sided agreement between us and the Soviet comrades is economically advantageous for our country, Comrade Premier. We are convinced that you will take this factor into consideration.

Secondly, one of the forms of help that you provide to us is the provision of workers from appropriate professions. This labor is a great help in the building up of our country. Recently, it has nevertheless happened that a few less conscientious and inexperienced people put down their work. I think you know about this.

*[segment of conversation not printed regarding Chinese guest workers, particularly*

*those from Inner Mongolia (Zedenbal assured Zhou that these are needed for linguistic, not nationalistic reasons); resettlement of Mongolians in China; Sino-Mongolia trade relations—trans.]*

ZHOU ENLAI: With regard to China's economic help to Mongolia, we can discuss this tomorrow afternoon, since we have too little time today to negotiate concrete matters, such as workers, construction, trade and railway freight traffic.

I do not understand the word "regrettable", that you used regarding the Chinese-Indian border conflict. If this refers to India, it is correct. If you said it in reference to China, in order to make us out to be the guilty [party], then that is false. On this question there are differences of opinion among the fraternal parties.

We have undertaken considerable work to inform and provide explanations to the appropriate states and countries. The Indian side put us in an intolerable position. We were forced to take measures. India began a new invasion and set off a conflict. We rebuffed them, since it was such a serious situation. We have taken measures to defuse the situation. We have ceased fire and pulled out troops back. These are unilateral steps. There is no guarantee that this problem is definitively solved. The cause is the aggressive policies of the ruling circles of the Indian government. The Nehru government is wavering and turning away from neutrality. India did indeed declare non-alignment to aggressive blocs, but became ever more dependent on American dollars. India received 640 million dollars from America for military purposes. Nehru's government is turning away from the policy of peace. We must understand imperialism's threat and danger. In India itself, the domestic forces of reaction are becoming ever more active. India is turning away from the policy of peace. Our country, however, ceased fire and took the initiative towards negotiations. The Indian government has not yet expressed itself regarding our proposals and the measures we took. Under these circumstances, I ask you to understand Indian-Chinese relations correctly.

The MPR, as is known, has entered the United Nations. Therefore, the circumstances must be understandable for you. India's representative in the UN is following the policy of the Western countries. India supports the Western powers' policy on

the Hungarian, Korean, and Chinese questions as well as on disarmament. In this way, India is getting ever further onto the side of the reactionary imperialists.

You, Comrade Zedenbal, will probably agree with some of what I'm saying and disagree with part. I am not forcing my opinion on you. Further development will show who is right. Our policy is a peace-loving foreign policy that is guided by the principles of Marxism-Leninism.

J. ZEDENBAL: Our main task is the signing of the Mongolian-Chinese border agreement. This work is on the verge of a successful conclusion.

Clearly, the Soviet Union, the PRC and the other countries of the socialist camp play a major role in keeping peace in the whole world. The socialist countries have taken on the goal to contribute to the fight for peace, each according to his strength. Naturally the socialist countries are interested in the peaceful settlement of the Indian-Chinese border conflict. It is my understanding that our discussion takes this standpoint, as a point of departure. We and you both know that Nehru is not a Communist, but a bourgeois politician. But we and you both understand how important it is, in the interests of the whole socialist camp, to exploit the positive sides of individual bourgeois politicians. We know that your party in its long history has garnered much experience in the exploitation of the deeds of individuals, who are on the enemy's side.

The exploitation of India's policy of neutrality is very important for the socialist camp. We assume that this is what the five principles of co-existence that you, Comrade Premier Zhou Enlai, together with Nehru, proclaimed. It will be very disadvantageous for our camp, if in place of Nehru, a man such as [Moraji] Desai comes to power. Then there will be a danger that India will join an aggressive bloc. In general, we attach the greatest meaning to the preservation and exploitation of India's neutrality. I think you will probably agree with this. The Chinese-Indian border conflict is now on all lips, since in contemporary international relations every event, even if of local character, becomes widely known.

We think that the ceasefire, the pulling back of troops and the readiness for a negotiated settlement of the border conflict through negotiations, a readiness that you decided on after appropriate evaluation of

the conflict and its connections to international problems and in consideration of all the complicated factors, correspond to the interests of the peoples of the socialist camp and all progressive mankind.

ZHOU ENLAI: The hitch is that the Nehru government represents the Grossbourgeoisie and is two-faced. It is correct that in the fight for peace one must also exploit the bourgeoisie. Nehru is however a representative of the Grossbourgeoisie. The reactionary tendency has the upper hand in the Nehru government's policies. We must lead a decisive struggle against him, we must unmask his treacherous machinations. In his pro-American policy, there is no difference between Nehru and Desai. Resumption of negotiations to strengthen peace will be useful. But the Communists see this question differently from other men. The Communist Party of England has differences of opinion with us on other matters, but on the Indian-Chinese border question, we are of the same opinion. It would be good, if in the future you kept this in mind.

J. ZEDENBAL: I understand that the Chinese side does not unconditionally insist on immediately incorporating a 90,000 square kilometer area on the eastern border, that this question will be decided in the future. Is that true or not?

ZHOU ENLAI: I already went to India with Comrade [Foreign Minister] Chen Yi in 1960 in order to settle the Chinese-Indian border question, but we returned with empty hands.

J. ZEDENBAL: The Chinese-Indian border question must not be solved only in the interests of China, but also in accordance with the interests of the whole international communist movement. Given this, I personally think that it would be somewhat better, if you didn't bring up the matter of the 90,000 square kilometers on the eastern sector of the border, but, on the contrary, support the development of class struggle within India in favor of socialism and communism, so that it can contribute to the strengthening of the Communist Party and the democratic forces whereby you would help to accelerate India's transition to communism. There can be no doubt that the border question will be resolved in the future. I repudiate the thought of your intending to weaken or undermine in any way the forces of the Communist Party of India. It would be absurd, if such an idea came into

the head of a Communist.

The kindling of conflict and noise over some 5-10 kilometers of land will, in the end, result in the strengthening of the domestic reactionary forces in India and the fanning of nationalistic passions. This would effect the Communists negatively and be disadvantageous for Socialism.

You Chinese Communists are much more experienced than us, and tempered in revolutionary battle. I am only saying what I think about this question and how I understand it.

ZHOU ENLAI: (Becoming nervous, with altered facial expression)

If you are interested in the Indian-Chinese border question, please examine again the literature that we have provided for the Asian and African countries. Our government is not fighting with India because of a few dozen kilometers of area. We have made absolutely no territorial claims, only the Indian side has. One must understand this correctly. The essence of the matter is that the Indian side is trying to annex an even larger area on the Western sector of the border. How quickly India treads the path of socialism depends, above all, on the revolutionary struggle of the Indian Communist Party and the Indian people. It is important to expose to the world public the evil machinations and dangers, that the reactionary forces of India represent. If we do not expose their reactionary activity, they will go over to the American side, and that is even more disadvantageous.

J. ZEDENBAL: The main thing is not to play into the hands of American imperialism.

It was agreed to continue the conversation the next day.

29 December 1962

*[Source: Stiftung "Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der ehemaligen DDR im Bundesarchiv," Berlin, JIV 2/202-283, B1.0; obtained by D. Wolff; translation by Wolff, O. Corff, and C. Ostermann, with the assistance of J. Hershberg.]*

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# New Evidence on the Cuban Missile Crisis: More Documents from the Russian Archives

by James G. Hershberg

The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 continues to exert an intense fascination on historians, political scientists, journalists, and the general public, and—as apparently the world’s closest brush to thermonuclear war—is likely to continue to do so. Over the past decade, the study of this crisis has expanded to encompass a major influx of new sources and perspectives, primarily stemming from the declassification of new U.S. (and British) documents, but also the addition of Soviet and then Cuban archival materials and perspectives—a process expedited by international scholarly projects as well as the anti-communist upheavals that led to the (partial) opening of Russian archives.<sup>1</sup>

The *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* has previously reported on various new findings regarding the crisis—known to Russians as the “Caribbean Crisis” and Cubans as the “October Crisis”—particularly in issue no. 5 (Spring 1995), which featured an extensive compilation of translated documents from the Russian Foreign Ministry archives in Moscow.<sup>2</sup>

In this issue, the *Bulletin* presents more translated materials from that repository—the Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVPRF)—documenting various aspects of Soviet policy during the events of the fall of 1962. Most were declassified by Soviet/Russian authorities in 1991-1992 and provided to NHK Japanese television in connection with a documentary on the Cuban Missile Crisis aired to mark the 30th anniversary of the event in October 1992; Prof. Philip Brenner (American University), one of the consultants to the show, in turn, subsequently gave copies of the documents to CWIHP and the National Security Archive—a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository based at George Washington University—where they are now deposited and available for research. That collection also contains photocopies of some of the same documents that were separately obtained from AVPRF by Raymond L. Garthoff (Brookings Institution) with the Archive’s assistance.

The translations into English came primarily from two sources. Many of the AVPRF documents obtained by NHK were translated by Vladimir Zaemsky of the Russian Foreign Ministry, who granted permission for their use here. For most of the rest of the documents, the *Bulletin* is grateful to Philip Zelikow, Associate Professor of Public Policy at Harvard University, and Harvard’s Center for Science and International Affairs, for commissioning translations from John Henriksen of Harvard. (Prof. Zelikow, the co-author, with Condoleezza Rice, of *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed: A Study in Statecraft* (Harvard University Press, 1995), is currently involved with two Cuban Missile Crisis-related publication projects, a revision of Graham Allison’s *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, originally published in 1970, and, with Prof. Ernest R. May of Harvard, an edited compilation of transcripts of declassified tape recordings of “Excomm” meetings involving President John F. Kennedy and senior advisors during the crisis, which were recently released by the Kennedy Library in Boston.) In addition, Vladislav M. Zubok, a Russian scholar based at the National Security Archive, translated the records of the two conversations of Soviet Politburo member Anastas Mikoyan (with U Thant and John McCloy) in New York on 1 November 1962, and CWIHP Director David Wolff translated a conversation between Mikoyan and Robert Kennedy.

The translations themselves are broken into three sections: 1) before the crisis, 14 September-21 October 1962 (although for Kennedy and his advisors the crisis began on October 16, when the president was informed that a U.S. U-2 spy plane had photographed evidence of Soviet missile sites under construction in Cuba, for the Soviets the crisis only started on October 22, when Kennedy announced the discovery and the American blockade of Cuba in a televised address); 2) the crisis itself, 22-28 October 1962 (from Kennedy’s speech to Moscow’s announcement of its agreement to withdraw the missiles under United Nations supervision in exchange for Washington’s lifting of the blockade, its pledge not to attack Cuba, and its private assurance that American Jupiter missiles in Turkey would shortly also be removed); and 3) the aftermath, 28 October-10 December 1962 (which included a period of wrangling between Washington and Moscow—and between Moscow and Havana—over the crisis’ settlement, especially over the terms of U.N. inspection of the missile removal and the inclusion of Soviet IL-28 bombers in the weapons to be pulled out, which was not finally nailed down, permitting the blockade to be lifted, until November 20).

For the most part, unfortunately, these materials shed little light on the actual process of decision-making at the highest levels of the Kremlin, and minutes or notes of the discussions among Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev and his associates during the crisis have still not emerged.<sup>3</sup> The Russian Foreign Ministry documents did include top-level correspondence between Khrushchev and Kennedy, and between Khrushchev and Castro, but these have already been published elsewhere<sup>4</sup> and are omitted from the selection below, as are other documents containing material already available to researchers, such as translations of press reports, correspondence between Khrushchev and U.N. Secretary U Thant (and between Khrushchev and British philosopher Bertrand Russell), and cables to Soviet diplomats circulating or reiterating public Soviet positions.

Nevertheless, the Russian archival materials presented here make fascinating reading for anyone interested in the missile crisis, in Soviet or Cuban foreign policy, in crisis politics or diplomacy generally, in some of the leading characters involved in the drama (such as Robert Kennedy, Fidel Castro, Mikoyan, and U Thant), or in reassessing the accuracy and efficacy of American policy and perceptions during perhaps the Cold War’s most perilous passages. For the most part, they consist of Soviet cables from three diplomatic venues (with occasional instructions from “the center,” or Moscow):

\* the *Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C.*, including reports from the USSR's newly-arrived ambassador to the United States, Anatoly F. Dobrynin, on the situation in Washington and his meetings with leading personages, and from Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko on his conversation with Kennedy on October 18;

\* the *United Nations in New York*, from which USSR ambassador Valerian Zorin reported on debates in the Security Council, and on contacts with other delegates and U.N. officials, and then more senior Soviet officials sent to handle the diplomacy of the settlement, such as Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily V. Kuznetsov and Mikoyan, reported on their negotiations with U.S. negotiators John J. McCloy and Adlai Stevenson as well as conversations with U Thant;

\* and the *Soviet Embassy in Havana*, from which USSR Ambassador Aleksandr Alekseev reported on Cuban developments, including the fervor gripping the country when it seemed war might be imminent, the leadership's angry reaction when Khrushchev accepted Kennedy's request to withdraw the missiles without advance consultation with Castro, and the difficult conversations which ensued as Soviet officials, in particular Mikoyan, tried to mollify the upset Cubans and at the same time secure Havana's acquiescence to the measures Moscow had accepted in order to resolve the crisis.

The fact that almost all of the documents below came from the Foreign Ministry archive should induce some caution among readers seeking an understanding of Soviet policy regarding the crisis. Not surprisingly, for instance, they illuminate diplomatic aspects of the events far more than, for instance, either military or intelligence aspects. In fact, the Russian Defense Ministry has declassified a substantial amount of material on "Operation Anadyr"—the code-name for the Soviet missile deployment to Cuba—and other military actions related to the crisis, and the *Bulletin* plans to present some of those materials, with translation, annotation, and commentary by Mark Kramer (Harvard University), in a future issue.<sup>5</sup> As for Soviet intelligence archives, these have not been opened to researchers except on a highly selective basis; however, a book scheduled for publication in 1997 by Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali is expected to draw on these sources. Finally, as noted above, documentation on decision-making at the highest level of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) remains classified, presumably in the Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF).

It is not possible to provide a comprehensive commentary on the significance of the documents, both because of space limitations and also because they may be used by researchers for so many different purposes—not only historians of the Cold War but political scientists, specialists in bureaucratic politics, nuclear theory, and "crisis management," psychologists, specialists in U.S., Soviet, and Cuban foreign policy, biographers of key figures, and many others have looked to the Cuban Missile Crisis for answers and illumination. Best read in conjunction with the other Russian documents published in *Bulletin 5* and elsewhere, as well as American materials, the documents below are offered merely as useful raw primary source material rather than as evidence for any particular interpretation. Nevertheless, some preliminary reactions can be offered on a few issues.

### Pre-Crisis U.S. Military and Covert Policies Toward Cuba

One issue of vital importance during the run-up to the crisis on which the documents here (and in *Bulletin 5*) provide some evidence is the question of how the Soviets perceived the Kennedy Administration's policies and actions toward Cuba, particularly Washington's covert operations against the Castro regime and the likelihood that it would take more direct military action. They clearly show that Moscow's representatives noted, and blamed the United States government in general and the Central Intelligence Agency in particular for, what it called the "piratical raids" by anti-Castro Cuban exile groups being carried out with U.S. support against the island. Although one does not find specific references to "Operation Mongoose"—the code-name for the massive CIA covert operation undertaken with the aim of toppling Castro after the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961—the reports of Ambassador Alekseev in Havana and Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington in September and early October 1962 show that Moscow had no doubt as to who was responsible for what the former called the "landing of counter-revolutionary bands of spies and arms" and "constant acts of provocation."<sup>6</sup> Dobrynin's cable of 15 October, for instance, lays out the role of the CIA in supporting actions of the exile group "Alpha 66."

However, the documents suggest that the Soviets had only a general knowledge of "Operation Mongoose"—although Soviet military intelligence (GRU) archives might well contain more detailed reports—and Moscow remained uncertain as to the significance of the American support of the harassment operations—i.e., whether they presaged a direct U.S. military intervention to overthrow Castro—right up to the eve of the crisis. As the crisis approached, however, Soviet officials appeared to feel more assured that U.S. military action against Cuba was not imminent (which to those in the know in Moscow signified that the secret deployment of missiles could proceed safely). In a document published in *Bulletin 5*, Foreign Minister Gromyko, in fact, cabled Moscow after meeting Kennedy on October 18 in the Oval Office—unaware that the American already knew about the Soviet missile bases in Cuba—that "Everything we know about the position of the USA government on the Cuban question allows us to conclude that the overall situation is completely satisfactory... There is reason to believe that the USA is not preparing an intervention and has put its money" on economic sanctions.<sup>7</sup>

The actual Soviet record of the Gromyko-Kennedy conversation, excerpted here, offers readers a chance to follow in detail this duplicity-filled conversation, in which neither man told the other the most important fact in the situation under discussion. Gromyko dutifully criticized Washington for its actions against Cuba, and acknowledged only that Moscow was providing Cuba with "exclusively defensive armaments" which could not "represent a threat to anybody." Kennedy, for his part, with the U-2 photographs of the Soviet missile bases in Cuba under construction lying in his desk drawer, told Gromyko that the United States "take[s] on trust" Soviet statements about the defensive character of the weapons it was shipping to Castro but reiterated his public warnings that "were it otherwise,

the gravest issues would arise.” While stressing that the situation had taken a turn for the worse since July as a result of Moscow’s stepping-up of military aid to Cuba—calling the situation “perhaps the most dangerous since the end of the Second World War”—Kennedy made no mention of the missiles.

After reading the account of the conversation, it is hard to explain Gromyko’s smug assessment that the situation was “completely satisfactory,” other than as a spectacular case of wishful thinking (or a blase memo to mask a more candid assessment relayed through other channels). It is clear, from his repeated statements of concern, that Kennedy was trying to caution Moscow to rethink its adventure without tipping his cards—and perhaps even signalling a possible way out of the crisis that had (so far as Moscow knew) not even begun. Repeatedly assuring Gromyko that the United States had “no intentions to launch an aggression against Cuba,” Kennedy noted pointedly that, “If Mr. Khrushchev addressed me on this issue, we could give him corresponding assurances on that score,” and repeated the offer twice later in the conversation. A little more than a week later, of course, after the world had been brought to the brink, precisely such a declaration from Kennedy would give Khrushchev the fig leaf he needed to swallow his pride and accept the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba.

The Russian documents reveal nothing new on the issue of whether, in fact, the Kennedy Administration had been moving toward taking military action against Cuba even before it discovered the existence of the Soviet nuclear-capable missiles on the island in mid-October. In a previous publication, the current author presented evidence that the U.S. government and military undertook serious contingency planning, and even some preliminary redeployments, in September and the first two weeks of October 1962 toward the objective of achieving, by October 20, “maximum readiness” for either an air strike against or invasion of Cuba, or both, although the article remained agnostic on the issue of whether Kennedy had actually made a decision to attack Cuba or simply wanted the option available.<sup>8</sup> Recently, a potentially crucial, yet still problematic, piece of evidence from American archives has surfaced to suggest that, literally on the eve of the crisis, the Kennedy Administration was *not* on the verge of imminent military action against Cuba.

At issue is a recently declassified purported fragment of notes of a conversation on the afternoon of Monday, 15 October 1962, between Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor. (At that point, the U-2 photographs taken over Cuba the previous day had not yet been identified as revealing Soviet missile sites under construction, a development that would take place only later that afternoon and evening and be reported to the president the following morning, October 16.) During a discussion of contingency plans concerning Cuba, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) minutes—obtained by the National Security Archive through the Freedom of Information Act—paraphrase McNamara as saying: “President wants no military action within the next three months, but he can’t be sure as he does not control events. For instance, aerial photos made available this morning show 68 boxes on ships that are not believed to be Il-28s and cannot be identified. However, the probabilities are strongly against military action in the next 30 days.”<sup>9</sup> Similarly, a recently-declassified JCS historical report prepared in 1981 evidently relies on those notes in stating (without citation) that in their meeting on October 15, “the Secretary [McNamara] said that President Kennedy wanted, if possible, to avoid military measures against Cuba during the next three months.”<sup>10</sup>

If accurate, the notes would certainly constitute a strong piece of evidence against the hypothesis that the Kennedy Administration believed it was headed toward, let alone desired, a military confrontation with Cuba in the immediate future, just before news of the missiles. The evidence is problematic, however, due to an unfortunate case of destruction of historical evidence by the JCS that apparently makes it impossible to evaluate the context or provenance of McNamara’s reported remarks (see footnote for details).<sup>11</sup>

## **Berlin and Cuba**

One issue which has long intrigued students of the crisis is the nature of its connection, if any, to the simmering U.S.-Soviet confrontation over Berlin—which had quieted somewhat since the erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 and the Checkpoint Charlie confrontation between Soviet and U.S. tanks two months later, but remained unfinished business and a potential flashpoint. Given the centrality of Berlin and Germany to the Cold War in Europe, in fact, some U.S. officials jumped to the conclusion upon the discovery of Soviet missiles in Cuba that their deployment was actually a Khrushchevian gambit to distract American attention and energy from Berlin, where Moscow might make its next move. Indeed, during the crisis, a special subcommittee of the White House “Excomm” (Executive Committee) was formed, under the chairmanship of Paul H. Nitze, specifically to assess the situation in Berlin in the event that the crisis spread there, perhaps if the Kremlin applied renewed pressure there in response to U.S. threats or use of military force against Cuba.

Some evidence has surfaced to show that at least some Soviet officials did suggest the option of opening up a Berlin front in response to Kennedy’s speech announcing the blockade of Cuba on October 22. In a toughly-worded cable the next day, Ambassador Dobrynin cabled an analysis from Washington recommending an “appropriate rebuff” that might include “hinting to Kennedy in no uncertain terms about the possibility of repressions against the Western powers in West Berlin (as a first step, the organization of a blockade of ground routes, leaving out for the time being air routes so as not to give grounds for a quick confrontation).”<sup>12</sup> Deputy Foreign Minister Vasily Kuznetsov also suggested that Khrushchev respond with a troop build-up around Berlin.<sup>13</sup> Years later, in his smuggled-out memoirs, Khrushchev blustered that during the crisis, “The Americans knew that if Russian blood were shed in Cuba, American blood would be shed in Germany.”<sup>14</sup> But in fact Khrushchev acted cautiously with regard to Berlin and rejected suggestions to mass Soviet forces around the city.

Instead, a different Berlin connection seems to emerge from the Russian documents—that Soviet leaders had, in September and

early October 1962, deliberately floated the idea of an imminent intensive diplomatic effort (or possibly a renewed superpower showdown) on Berlin, to take place in late November after the U.S. Congressional mid-term elections, in order to distract American attention from Cuba long enough to allow Moscow to complete its secret missile deployment. Such is, at any rate, the strategy that Anastas Mikoyan privately described to Fidel Castro and the Cuban leadership on 4 November 1962 (published in *Bulletin* 5) as the one the Kremlin had followed in the weeks and months preceding the crisis: “We let the Americans know that we wanted to solve the question of Berlin in the nearest future. This was done in order to distract their attention away from Cuba. So, we used a diversionary maneuver. In reality, we had no intention of resolving the Berlin question at that time.”<sup>15</sup> In the memorandum of the Gromyko-Kennedy conversation on October 18, one can see the Soviet Foreign Minister dangling the Berlin bait, suggesting that a summit meeting between Kennedy and Khrushchev take place in the United States “in the second half of November”—when Khrushchev would attend a session of the U.N. General Assembly—“in order to discuss the issues that separate [the USA and USSR] and first of all the questions of the German peace treaty and West Berlin.”<sup>16</sup> Gromyko’s message, in turn, came on the heels of a letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy dated 28 September 1962 threatening to sign a German peace treaty—the same vow that had triggered the Berlin Crisis in November 1958, for it implied an agreement between Moscow and East Berlin that would cut off Western access to West Berlin—but grandly (and ominously) informing Kennedy that in deference to the passions of American domestic politics, “we decided to put the German problem, so to say, on ice until the end of the elections” and will “do nothing with regard to West Berlin until the elections ... [afterwards], apparently in the second half of November, it would be necessary in our opinion to continue the dialogue.”<sup>17</sup> “Some sort of crisis relating to Berlin is clearly brewing now, and we will have to see whether we can surmount it without recourse to military action,” Dobrynin quoted Kennedy as saying in a background meeting with reporters on October 16 in a cable to Moscow three days later.<sup>18</sup> On the same day, with evident satisfaction, Gromyko reported to the CPSU CC after his conversation with Kennedy that in recent days “the sharpness of the anti-Cuban campaign in the USA has subsided somewhat while the sharpness of the West Berlin question has stood out all the more. Newspapers bleat about the approaching crisis vis-a-vis West Berlin, the impending in the very near future of a [Soviet treaty] with the GDR, and so on.” Gromyko even detected a White House-inspired propaganda campaign “to divert public attention from the Cuba issue.”<sup>19</sup>

Only afterward did Mikoyan, at least, realize that at the October 18 encounter Kennedy had been playing along with Gromyko just as Gromyko had been deceiving him—as soon as they discovered the missiles, he related to Castro, they “began crying about Berlin,” and both the Soviet Union and United States were talking about the Berlin Crisis but simultaneously knew that the real crisis was about to erupt in Cuba.<sup>20</sup>

### **Soviet Perceptions of Washington During the Crisis**

While evidence (such as Politburo minutes) necessary to judge the evolution of Kremlin perceptions of Kennedy during the crisis is still lacking, and intelligence assessments remain off-limits, the reports of USSR Ambassador in Washington Dobrynin between 22 and 28 October that have emerged thus far raise some interesting questions about the accuracy and impact of Soviet reporting on its “main enemy” at a critical moment. How is one to evaluate, for example, a cable sent over Dobrynin’s name on 25 October 1962 relaying gossip around the bar of the Washington Press Club at 3 o’clock in the morning to the effect that Kennedy had “supposedly taken a decision to invade Cuba” that night or the next one? Of similarly questionable accuracy was Dobrynin’s “line-up” of hawks and doves within the Kennedy Administration as reported (without giving sources) in a cable of 25 October—listing Robert Kennedy, McNamara, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy and the military as the most ardent supporters of an attack on Cuba, and Secretary of State Dean G. Rusk and Treasury Secretary Douglas Dillon as holding a more “restrained” and “cautious” position; actually, although almost all members of the Excomm shifted their positions during the “13 Days” of the crisis, some more than once, Robert Kennedy and McNamara had been among the less militant, preferring a blockade to an immediate airstrike, while Dillon had more frequently sympathized with military action. Perhaps most interesting, though, in this assessment is the Soviet diplomat’s jaundiced view of John F. Kennedy, who is described as a “hot-tempered gambler” who might be tempted into an “adventurist step” because his reputation, political future, and 1964 re-election had been put at stake.<sup>21</sup>

Many other interesting details emerge from Dobrynin’s accounts—above all the evolution of his back-channel relationship with Robert F. Kennedy, the president’s brother and Attorney General (see box)—but perhaps most interesting are the possibilities such documents offer for reassessing with far more precision how nuclear adversaries perceive (and misperceive) each other during crises.

### **At the United Nations**

The documents from the United Nations also permit a much fuller analysis of the difficult U.S.-Soviet negotiations in New York to work out the terms to resolve the crisis, particularly in combination with the large amount of American documents on the talks between McCloy and various Soviet envoys that have been declassified by the State Department in recent years.<sup>22</sup> Issues dealt with at length include the terms of verifying the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba, haggling over which Soviet weapons should be removed under the rubric of “offensive” weapons, and a good deal of give-and-take over the basic divisions between the United States and Cuba. One dog that did *not* bark in New York City was that of U.S. withdrawal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey—a subject that was covered in a special understanding reached between Robert Kennedy and Dobrynin in Washington—and one finds (on November 1) a firm instruction from Gromyko in Moscow to “Comrades” Kuznetsov and Zorin “not in any circumstances” to touch on the Turkish issue (despite its

having been raised only days earlier in Khrushchev's public October 27 letter to Kennedy), "since it is the subject of direct negotiations between Washington and Moscow."

The documents also permit a far fuller analysis of the role of the United Nations, and particularly Acting Secretary General U Thant, in trying to navigate a delicate neutral role between the superpowers and actively seeking a United Nations role in the resolution of the crisis. Writing both Khrushchev and Kennedy to propose compromise measures to assuage the crisis, traveling to Cuba to seek Castro's approval for UN inspection of the missile removals, negotiating with Mikoyan, Kuznetsov, and Zorin over the mechanisms to conclude the dispute, U Thant emerges as a fuller figure, particularly as the Soviets courted his support (by backing his inspection plan) even at the price of additional tensions with Havana.

### Soviet-Cuban (and Khrushchev-Castro) Tensions

The reports of Soviet envoys' reports dealing with Cuba, particularly those of USSR ambassador Alekseev in Havana, add to the emerging story of differences between Khrushchev and Castro that has long been known of in general but which became far more vivid and concrete with the appearance, first, of the third volume of Khrushchev's posthumously-published tape-recorded memoirs in 1990,<sup>23</sup> followed by the release later that year of the Castro-Khrushchev correspondence at the height of the crisis,<sup>24</sup> and finally, in January 1992, with the holding of an oral history conference on the crisis in Havana with Castro's enthusiastic participation.<sup>25</sup>

From a peak of ostensible revolutionary solidarity in the early days of the crisis, Soviet-Cuban ties became strained as the crisis wore on by a series of disagreements—from Moscow's concern that Cuban zeal (reflected in the shooting down of an American U-2 plane on October 27) might provoke a U.S. invasion, to Khrushchev's belief (hotly disputed by Castro) that the Cuban leader had advocated a recourse to nuclear war (if the U.S. attacked Cuba) in his cable to Khrushchev on October 26, to Khrushchev's failure to consult with Castro before agreeing to Kennedy's terms for withdrawing the missiles on October 28, to a dispute over whether to permit UN inspection of Soviet ships in Cuban ports to verify the withdrawal of missiles, to a Cuban anger over Moscow's succumbing to Washington's demand to pull out Soviet IL-28 bombers as well as the nuclear missiles.

The alarming reports received by Moscow from its envoy in Havana helped lead Khrushchev to dispatch his trusted trouble-shooter,

## MORE ON BOBBY AND THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

by Jim Hershberg

In accounts of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Robert F. Kennedy—the Attorney General and brother to President John F. Kennedy—has occupied a singular place, and not merely because his posthumously-published memoir, *Thirteen Days*, became a best-selling (and sometimes controversial) account of the crisis as well as a unique portrait of what it felt like to be a high-level decision-maker looking down the gun barrel of nuclear war.<sup>1</sup> RFK also garners special attention for his key role at two particular points in the crisis. One came early on, in the secret debates in the White House "Excomm" (Executive Committee) after the missiles were discovered in mid-October, when he ardently opposed a surprise U.S. air strike against the sites under construction in Cuba, likening such an action to Pearl Harbor ("I now know how Tojo felt," he noted at one point in the debate) and condemning it as morally unworthy; the argument helped turn the tide in the debate away from an air strike and toward a blockade or "quarantine," which Kennedy announced to the world on October 22. The second key moment came at the climax of the crisis, on Saturday evening, October 27, with Moscow and Washington seemingly on a collision course, when Robert Kennedy met secretly with Dobrynin at the Justice Department and the two men hammered out the terms of a secret arrangement whereby the Attorney General conveyed his brother's oral pledge that Washington would quickly pull its Jupiter missiles out of Turkey, as Khrushchev had publicly proposed earlier that day, so long as the Soviets removed their own missiles from Cuba and kept quiet about the Turkish aspect of the deal.<sup>2</sup>

Recently-released Russian archival documents, published in English translation in the *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* (the present issue and no. 5, Spring 1995), shed additional light on Robert F. Kennedy's actions during the crisis, particularly his back-channel contacts with Soviet ambassador Dobrynin. This article seeks to note briefly some of these new findings, and also appends Robert F. Kennedy's own declassified memorandum of the controversial 27 October 1962 encounter with Dobrynin to supplement the Dobrynin's version (and other accounts) published in the *Bulletin* in early 1995.<sup>3</sup> (The *Bulletin* thanks Prof. Peter Roman of Duquesne University for providing this document.)

First worth noting from Dobrynin's cables is his initial impression of Robert Kennedy as a hardliner and "hot-head," driven by political ambition, liable to support impulsive actions, and hardly a character one would predict that Dobrynin would end up collaborating with to resolve the crisis. This is not altogether surprising given the contentiousness of the issues, the combativeness of Robert Kennedy's personality, and the fact that President Kennedy had used his brother to transmit personally to Dobrynin on 4 September 1962 a strong message of concern regarding Soviet military aid to Cuba. Moreover, in Dobrynin's cabled report of his first meeting with Robert Kennedy during the crisis, late on the evening of October 23 (the night after the president's speech), RFK's deep anger and sense of personal betrayal toward Khrushchev

*continued on page 344*

Anastas Mikoyan, to smooth the Cubans' ruffled feathers, and the Soviet records of Mikoyan's conversations with Cuban leaders in early November 1962, published in *Bulletin* 5, dramatically reveal the emotional rift which had emerged between the two communist allies.<sup>26</sup> (Cuban authorities subsequently released their own minutes of two of those conversations, which are printed below; see box.)

The Alekseev cables printed in the current *Bulletin*, when read in conjunction with the other sources noted above (particularly the Castro-Khrushchev correspondence) helps show how these tensions developed. On October 23 and 25, as the crisis mounted, Alekseev sent highly positive reports on the Cuban people's "calm," confidence, and preparedness for military confrontation, even noting that the imminent danger had prompted a "special business-like efficiency and energy" that had even dispelled the "ostentation and verbosity that are characteristic of Cubans." In the second of the aforementioned cables, however, a glimmer of disagreement appears when Alekseev states that Castro "approves of our policy of not giving in to provocations, and [avoiding] unnecessary conflicts," yet at the same time "expressed a belief in the necessity of shooting down one or two piratic American [reconnaissance] planes over Cuban territory." Another potential disagreement begins to surface when U Thant explores using Cuban President Oswaldo Dorticos' proposal to the UN General Assembly of October 8—in which the Cuban said a guaranteed U.S. pledge of non-aggression against Cuba would remove the need for Cuban military preparations; while Moscow echoed this formulation in Khrushchev's secret October 26 letter to Kennedy, the Cubans were now deeply distrustful that such a promise could be trusted.

By October 27, a new fissure had opened up over Khrushchev's public letter that day to Kennedy, which for the first time raised the possibility of a trade of Soviet missiles in Cuba for U.S. Jupiter missiles in Turkey—an idea raised without regard to the sensibilities of the Cubans, who thought they had an iron-clad agreement with Moscow to deploy the missiles that could not be "swapped" for American missiles elsewhere in the world. When Gromyko dispatched a message to Castro through the Soviet Embassy in Havana informing him that it would be "advisable" for him to quickly endorse Khrushchev's letter to Kennedy, Castro responded via Alekseev complimenting Khrushchev's "great diplomatic skill" but also noting that it had provoked "symptoms of a certain confusion in various sectors of the Cuban population and among some members of the military," who were asking "whether it constitutes a rejection by the USSR of its former obligations." Castro also defended the downing of the American U-2 that day, brushing aside Alekseev's admonition not to "aggravate the situation and initiate provocations."

On the following day, October 28, Cuban anger deepened as Moscow and Washington settled the crisis over their heads, and to add insult to injury Moscow began pressuring Castro to agree to allow United Nations inspectors to examine the Soviet missile sites on the island to verify that work had stopped. "Confusion and bewilderment are reigning inside the Cuban leadership" as a result of Khrushchev's agreement to dismantle the missiles, Dorticos told Alekseev, adding that "under the present conditions of great patriotic enthusiasm of our people this report would be perceived by the infinitely electrified masses as a cold shower." Alekseev's excuses that technical problems had delayed the sending to Havana of an advance copy of Khrushchev's letter to Kennedy—which had been read out over Moscow Radio before Castro (let alone Kennedy) received a copy—made hardly a dent in the "picture of incomprehension" painted by another senior official, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez.

In subsequent days, as Castro and Khrushchev jostled in their correspondence and Cuban forces continued to fire on American U-2 planes, the Soviets implored the Cubans to display "self-restraint" and not take actions that could "give the aggressors a pretext to blame our side," and vainly reiterated that "we consider it necessary" to satisfy U Thant's desire to have the UN conduct on-site inspections on Cuban territory—a demand Castro and the Cuban leadership angrily rejected in an open show of defiance.

But it was Khrushchev's letter of October 30 that sent Castro's anger to an even higher pitch; in it the Soviet leader acknowledged that "some Cubans" wished that he had not declared his willingness to withdraw the nuclear missiles, but that the alternative would have been to "be carried away by certain passionate sectors of the population and [to have] refused to come to a reasonable settlement with the U.S. government," leading to a war in which millions would have died; Khrushchev also said he had viewed Castro's cable of October 26 "with extreme alarm," considering "incorrect" its proposal that the Soviet Union "be the first to launch a nuclear strike against the territory of the enemy [in response to a non-nuclear U.S. invasion of Cuba] ... Rather than a simple strike, it would have been the start of thermonuclear war."<sup>27</sup>

Reading the letter "attentively," as described in Alekseev's report of the meeting (printed below), Castro had only two, terse responses: there were not merely "some" Cuban comrades who failed to understand Khrushchev's position, "but the whole Cuban people"—and as for the second item, Castro denied proposing that Khrushchev be "the first in delivering a blow against the adversary territory," only in the event that Cuba had been attacked and Cubans and Soviets were dying together; perhaps Khrushchev misunderstood or the translation was in error. Alekseev, unfazed, not only defended the translation but made it clear that Khrushchev had understood him all too well—"even in this case [of aggression]," the Soviet envoy admonished Castro, "it is hardly possible merely to approach mechanically such an important issue and to use nuclear arms without looking for other means." The message: just as West Europeans had cause to wonder whether Americans would "trade New York for Hamburg," linking local to strategic deterrence, the Cubans were sadly mistaken if they believed Moscow was ready to undertake global thermonuclear war—with the suicidal consequences that entailed—in defense of the Cuban Revolution.

<sup>1</sup> Books that have appeared on the crisis in English in recent years incorporating newly-available evidence include: James G. Blight and David A. Welch, *On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd ed. (New York: Noonday, 1990); James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, *Cuba On the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse* (New York: Pantheon, 1993); James A. Nathan, ed., *The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992); Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, eds., *The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National*

*Security Archive Documents Reader* (New York: New Press, 1992); Robert Smith Thompson, *The Missiles of October: The Declassified Story of John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992); Mary S. McAuliffe, ed., *CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Washington, DC: CIA History Staff, October 1992); Gen. Anatoli I. Gribkov and Gen. William Y. Smith, *Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994); and Dino A. Brugioni, *Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis*, updated ed. (New York: Random House, 1990, 1991, [1992?]). The volume of *Foreign Relations of the United States* covering the crisis, previously scheduled for publication in 1993, had still not appeared as of the end of 1996, but should include additional declassified U.S. documentation when it appears; mention should be made, however, of a *FRUS* volume that appeared in 1996 compiling Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence and communications during the Kennedy Administration: U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963, Vol. VI: Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996). The National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository located at the Gelman Library at George Washington University in Washington, D.C., published a microfiche collection of declassified documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1992 and maintains files of additional documents obtained through the Freedom of Information Act that are available for scholarly research.

<sup>2</sup> In *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 1 (Spring 1992), see Raymond L. Garthoff, "The Havana Conference on the Cuban Missile Crisis," pp. 2-4; in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 3 (Fall 1993), see Mark Kramer, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Soviet Command Authority, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," pp. 40, 42-46; and James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, "KRAMER VS. KRAMER: Or, How Can You Have Revisionism in the Absence of Orthodoxy?" pp. 41, 47-50; in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995), see Philip Brenner and James G. Blight, "Cuba, 1962: The Crisis and Cuban-Soviet Relations: Fidel Castro's Secret 1968 Speech," pp. 1, 81-85; Alexander Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, "Using KGB Documents: The Scali-Feklisov Channel in the Cuban Missile Crisis," pp. 58, 60-62; Raymond L. Garthoff, intro., "Russian Foreign Ministry Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis," pp. 58, 63-77; Vladislav M. Zubok, "'Dismayed by the Actions of the Soviet Union': Mikoyan's talks with Fidel Castro and the Cuban leadership, November 1962," pp. 59, 89-92, 93-109, 159; Mark Kramer, "The 'Lessons' of the Cuban Missile Crisis for Warsaw Pact Nuclear Operations," pp. 59, 110, 112-115, 160 (see corrected version in this issue); Jim Hershberg, "Anatomy of a Controversy: Anatoly F. Dobrynin's Meeting With Robert F. Kennedy, Saturday, 27 October 1962," pp. 75, 77-80; and Georgy Shakhnazarov, "Fidel Castro, Glasnost, and the Caribbean Crisis," pp. 83, 87-89.

<sup>3</sup> Although it appears that verbatim records of meetings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU) Politburo may not exist for this period, the declassification of notes of Kremlin discussions concerning the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises, taken by V.M. Malin, prompts hope that similar materials may soon become available in Moscow. A full report on the Malin notes on the 1956 crises, translated, introduced, and annotated by Mark Kramer, appears elsewhere in this *Bulletin*.

<sup>4</sup> For Kennedy-Khrushchev correspondence, see *FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. VI: Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges*, cited above, which includes many exchanges during the missile crisis declassified by the U.S. government in 1991 in response to a Freedom of Information Act filed by the National Security Archive; these were first published in a special Spring 1992 issue of *Problems of Communism*. Correspondence between Castro and Khrushchev during the crisis was published in November 1990 in the Cuban Communist Party newspaper *Granma*; an English translation can be found in an appendix of Blight, Allyn, and Welch, *Cuba On the Brink*, 474-491.

<sup>5</sup> On the Soviet military during the crisis, see Gribkov and Smith, *Operation ANADYR*, cited above; Soviet military evidence on the crisis was also presented in a conference in Moscow in September 1994 organized by the then-head of the Russian Archival Service, R. Pikhov.

<sup>6</sup> See Alekseev to Foreign Ministry, 7 September 1962, in *CWHP Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995), 63.

<sup>7</sup> Telegram from Gromyko to Foreign Ministry, 19 October 1962, *CWHP Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995), 66-67.

<sup>8</sup> James G. Hershberg, "Before 'The Missiles of October': Did Kennedy Plan a Military Strike Against Cuba?" in Nathan, ed., *The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited*, 237-280, a slightly revised version of an article that appeared in *Diplomatic History* 14 (Spring 1990), 163-198.

<sup>9</sup> "Notes Taken from Transcripts of Meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, October-November 1962, dealing with the Cuban Missile Crisis (handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993)," released under the Freedom of Information Act, copy made available by National Security Archive.

<sup>10</sup> Historical Division, Joint Secretariat, Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 1981, "Joint Chiefs of Staff Special Historical Study: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and US Military Responses to the Threat of Castro's Cuba," pp. 11-12; the report, formerly Top Secret, was declassified on 7 May 1996 and released under the Freedom of Information Act; a copy was made available courtesy of the National Security Archive.

<sup>11</sup> In correspondence between the JCS and the National Archives in 1993, subsequently obtained and made available to CWHP by William Burr of the National Security Archive, the JCS acknowledged that in August 1974, the Secretary, JCS had decided to destroy systematically all transcripts of JCS meetings between 1947 and 1974, as well as subsequent meetings after a six-month waiting period. (August 1974 was, coincidentally or not, the month that Richard M. Nixon resigned the presidency in part, many said, due to his failure to destroy the Watergate tapes.) This reason given for this action was that the transcripts "did not constitute official minutes of the meetings but were merely working papers reflecting the reporter's version of events." In 1978, the JCS communication to the National Archives noted, "The practice of recording the meetings terminated in August of 1978 and all materials were subsequently destroyed."

The only exception to this destruction of records, it was reported, was that the JCS History Office took "notes (approximately 30 typed pages) from selected transcripts relating to the Cuban Missile Crisis and various other crises through the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war"—hence the notation on the top of the Cuban Missile Crisis notes in which the McNamara quotation appears that they were "handwritten notes were made in 1976 and typed in 1993."

The letter from the JCS to the National Archives reads as follows:

The Joint Staff  
Washington, D.C. 20318-0400

January 25, 1993  
 Mr. James J. Hastings  
 Director  
 Records Appraisal and Disposition Division  
 National Archives  
 Washington, DC 20408

Dear Mr. Hastings:

This responds to your letter seeking information concerning the destruction of recorded minutes of the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff referred to in an article by the Deputy Chief of the Joint Staff History Office which you forwarded me as an enclosure.

The minutes of the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were recorded in various forms from 1947 to 1978. In August of 1974 the Secretary, Joint Chiefs of Staff determined that the transcripts generated did not constitute official minutes of the meetings but were merely working papers reflecting the reporter's version of events. Accordingly, the Secretary ordered the destruction of virtually all transcripts over six months old after screening for historical significance. He also directed that all future minutes/transcripts, with minor exceptions, would be destroyed at the six month point. The practice of recording the meetings terminated in August of 1978 and all materials were subsequently destroyed. However, it should be noted all of these actions were taken prior to approval of the first Joint Chiefs of Staff records disposition schedule by the Archivists of the United States on 11 December 1980.

The Joint Staff History Office did take notes (approximately 30 typed pages) from selected transcripts relating to the Cuban Missile Crisis and various other crises through the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The Joint Staff concurs with your determination that these notes are records under File Number 00-1 of JAI 5760.2F and will accession them into the National Archives at the appropriate time.

Any further questions you have regarding this matter may be directed to Mr. Sterling Smith on (703) 697-6906.

Sincerely,

/s/ EDMUND F. McBRIDE  
 Chief, Documents Division

Joint Secretariat

<sup>12</sup> Telegram from Dobrynin to Soviet Foreign Ministry, 23 October 1962, *CWIHP Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995), 70-71.

<sup>13</sup> Interview with Georgy Kornienko, cited in Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, *Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996), 260, 266.

<sup>14</sup> *Khrushchev Remembers*, intro., commentary, and notes by Edward Crankshaw, trans. and ed. by Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970; citation from New York: Bantam Books paperback ed., 1971), 555.

<sup>15</sup> Mikoyan-Castro conversation, 4 November 1962, *CWIHP Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995), 96; see also the Cuban version printed in this *Bulletin*.

<sup>16</sup> See excerpts from Gromyko-Kennedy conversation printed below; the document released by the Russian Foreign Ministry archives omits the section of the record dealing specifically with the Berlin question, but the American record appears in U.S. Department of State, *FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. XV: Berlin Crisis 1962-1963* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1994), 370-376. On the Berlin-Cuba connection, see Thomas A. Schwartz, "The Berlin Crisis and the Cold War," *Diplomatic History* 21:1 (Winter 1997), 143-144.

<sup>17</sup> Khrushchev to Kennedy, 28 September 1962, *FRUS, 1961-1963, vol. VI: Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges*, 152-161.

<sup>18</sup> Dobrynin to Foreign Ministry, 19 October 1962, published in this issue.

<sup>19</sup> Telegram from Gromyko to CC CPSU, 19 October 1962, *CWIHP Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995), 66-67.

<sup>20</sup> Mikoyan-Castro conversation, 4 November 1962, *CWIHP Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995), 97.

<sup>21</sup> For Dobrynin's own recollections of the crisis, see Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (1962-1986)* (New York: Times Books, 1995), 71-95.

<sup>22</sup> Much of this documentation was declassified as a result of Freedom of Information Act requests filed by the National Security Archive and is available for research there. Many of the most important documents on the negotiations should appear in forthcoming *FRUS* volumes dealing with the Cuban Missile Crisis and U.S.-Soviet relations during the Kennedy Administration

<sup>23</sup> *Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes*, trans. and ed. by Jerrold L. Schecter with Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1990), esp. 161-183.

<sup>24</sup> See fn. 4, above.

<sup>25</sup> See Blight, Allyn, and Welch, *Cuba On the Brink*, *passim*.

<sup>26</sup> See Zubok, "'Dismayed by the Actions of the Soviet Union': Mikoyan's talks with Fidel Castro and the Cuban leadership, November 1962," *CWIHP Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995). 59, 89-92, 93-109, 159, for records of Mikoyan-Cuban talks on 3-5 November 1962, and Gribkov and Smith, Operation ANADYR, 189-190, 191-199, for Mikoyan's conversation with Castro on 12 November 1962.

<sup>27</sup> Khrushchev to Castro, 30 October 1962, English translation in Blight, Allyn, and Welch, *Cuba On the Brink*, 485-488.

## RUSSIAN DOCUMENTS ON THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

### I. BEFORE THE CRISIS:

14 SEPTEMBER-21 OCTOBER 1962

**M. Zakharov and S. P. Ivanov to  
N.S. Khrushchev, 14 September 1962**

Personal memorandum to N. S. Khrushchev

The USA is conducting intensive air and naval patrols around Cuba, giving special attention to the reconnaissance of Soviet vessels.

The head of the Cuban counterrevolutionaries, Juan Manuel Salvat, announced in a press conference on September 7 that any vessel sailing under a Communist flag in Cuban territorial waters, regardless of its nationality, will be considered a military target and subject to attack without warning.

At present, Soviet vessels approaching the island of Cuba are systematically subjected to air-patrols by USA planes. In September of this year as many as 50 cases were recorded of Soviet vessels being air-patrolled. The patrols were carried out at critically dangerous altitudes (50-100 meters).

With the aim of ensuring the safety of our vessels from acts of piracy on the part of Americans and Cuban counterrevolutionaries, we ask to authorize the following:

1. On every transport vessel bound for Cuba with personnel and arms for one unit (of a formation), to place for self-defense, above and beyond each ship's own armaments, two 23 mm. anti-aircraft combination gun-mounts with a reserve supply of 2 complements (2,400 missiles) for each gun-mount. These gun-mounts are found on the arms of the airborne-landing forces, and they are a powerful strategic tool both for air targets at distances of up to 2,500 meters at heights of up to 1,500 meters, as well as for light-armoured naval targets at distances of up to 2,000 meters. On practice shootings the gun-mount has penetrated armour-plating 25 mm. thick. The gun-mount requires a three-man crew. All in all it is necessary to arm 34 vessels.

2. To confirm instructions given to the captain of the vessel and the head of the military echelon regarding the defense of transport vessels crossing the sea against acts of piracy committed by airplanes, ships,

and submarines belonging to the USA and to the Cuban counterrevolutionaries.

M. Zakharov  
S. P. Ivanov

14 September 1962

[Source: Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense (TsAMO), Moscow; copy provided to CWHIP by R. Pikhov at September 1994 Moscow Conference, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Hendriksen, Harvard University.]

### Cable from USSR Ambassador to the USA A.F. Dobrynin to Soviet Foreign Ministry, 15 October 1962

According to separate confidential reports, the piratic raids by the so-called "Alpha 66" group on the Cuban coast and on several vessels near Cuba are being carried out not from a base on the American mainland, but rather directly from the sea, from American landing ships carrying the corresponding cutters. The crews of these cutters are dispatched directly onto these ships by helicopters in the possession of the Cuban members of the group "Alpha 66," who are based in Miami, Puerto Rico, and the Yucatan.

The American ships carrying these cutters maintain a constant readiness for military action, and meticulously care for the technical condition of the cutters, performing repairs in the case of damage. During this time, the American instructors on these ships direct the training, both tactical and otherwise, of the Cuban crews who carry out operations directly on the cutters.

This sort of tactic allows the American forces to assert that the cutters belonging to the "Alpha 66" group are not acting from a base within USA territory, but from some "unknown bases." As far as the American vessels carrying the cutters are concerned, the Central Intelligence Agency of the USA, which to judge from all available information is directing all these operations, is counting on the fact that detecting and identifying this sort of vessel will not be easy, since there is a lively traffic of American vessels between Florida and the American base Guantanamo in Cuba.

15.X.62 A. DOBRYNIN

[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWHIP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]

### Cable from USSR Ambassador to the USA A.F. Dobrynin to Soviet Foreign Ministry, 19 October 1962

At a closed conference taking place on 16 October for the editors and leading correspondents of the American press, radio, and television, to provide information on the evaluation of the current international situation and the USA's official position in it, President Kennedy spoke. This speech was given exclusively for the personal edification of those present, and it was denied all publication rights.

The content of the President's speech came down to the following.

The government's duty is to seek out global solutions to the global problems facing the USA. There was once a time when war could be seen as an acceptable extension of politics, but nuclear war in its extreme form cannot be seen as such, since it would lead to huge destruction and the loss of millions of lives in the countries taking part in it. The USA must learn to accept and live in the current conditions of direct confrontation between the USA and the USSR, and between Communism's strivings for expansion and the USA's strivings to support the sort of alignment of forces that allows the free nations to thrive, and that allows the USA in particular to safeguard its own interests. In similar situations earlier, the result of such confrontation has always been war—but now the question is how we can get through this period without war and, especially importantly, without nuclear war.

Some sort of crisis relating to Berlin is clearly brewing now, and we will have to see whether we can surmount it without recourse to military action. There are no signs that the Russians are preparing to soften their demands with regard to Berlin; they want us either to get out of there, or to share with them our rights in West Berlin. They would like to start a chain reaction that would ultimately lead to the elimination of American positions in West Berlin and many other

places. The USA is determined not to let this happen. It cannot be allowed to occur. The West's presence in Berlin and its access to the city represent, as before, vitally important interests, and no concessions with regard to them can or will be made to Soviet pressure, whatever form that pressure may take. The problem now consists of the fact that we both have locked horns [in confrontation—ed.].

Nuclear war may be an irrational phenomenon, but there is more to it than this, since recognizing it as irrational does not necessarily signify being saved from it. If both sides come to the negotiating table with an absolute certainty that the other side will in no circumstances have recourse to nuclear war, then that would be one of the surest paths toward such a war, because one side or the other could go one step further and apply a pressure beyond what the other side is able to put up with, and for all intents and purposes we would be heading for catastrophe.

In government circles there is a feeling that we quite possibly have some difficult weeks and months ahead of us due to Berlin, and that a crisis of the first order may arise before Christmas.

With Cuba the situation is different. Berlin is a vitally important issue for both sides, and the fundamental positions of both sides with regard to it remain inflexible. Latin American is another vitally important region. Berlin and Latin America are two dangerous regions. No [U.S.] military actions concerning Cuba could be or should be undertaken until there are signs of overt Cuban aggression against the countries of the Western hemisphere. Cuba should be and is now under close observation, and the USA has been kept informed of what is happening there. The USA's policy consists, as before, in ensuring that the maintenance of Cuba be as expensive as possible both for the USSR and for Castro's regime. It appears unlikely that the USSR could afford to invest funds in Cuba that would be sufficient to meet Cuba's actual and long-term needs. Only the USA alone had a billion-dollar trade with Cuba before the Castro revolution.

According to the American government's calculations, there are currently in Cuba around five thousand Russian military specialists. One must suppose that the Russians are sufficiently experienced people to

understand that the military equipment which they are supplying to Cuba, or can supply in the future, would make little difference if the USA were to consider itself forced to take military action against it. They have enough experience as well in East Germany and the Eastern European countries to recognize the limits of their capacities to revitalize and strengthen the Cuban economy, especially bearing in mind the distances involved. Meanwhile the Latin American countries have taken measures towards isolating Cuba and condemning to failure the Communists' attempts to spread their system throughout the other countries of the Western hemisphere.

There can be no talk of a recognition by the United States of some Cuban government in exile, since that step could free the current Cuban regime from the obligations fixed by treaty toward Guantanamo base and American citizens in Cuba.

There can be no deal struck with the USSR regarding its renunciation of bases in Cuba in exchange for the USA's renunciation of bases in other parts of the world (in Turkey, for example). It is necessary to treat Cuba in such a way as to advance our cause in the general battle into which the USA has been drawn. The strategy and tactics of the USA should be defined by considerations of the defense of its vital interests and its security not only in connection with the Cuban situation, but also in connection with other more serious threats.

The preceding is communicated by way of information.

19.X.62 A. DOBRYNIN

*[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]*

**Cable from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on 18 October 1962 meeting with President Kennedy, 20 October 1962 (excerpts)**

During the meeting with President Kennedy at the White House on 18 October I transmitted to him, his spouse and other members of his family regards from the head

of the Soviet government N.S. Khrushchev and from Nina Petrovna.

Kennedy expressed his gratitude to N.S. Khrushchev for the regards.

Further I said that I would like to give an account of the Soviet government policy on a number of important issues.

[section deleted—trans.]

Now I would like to expound the Soviet government's position on the Cuban issue and the USSR's assessment of the actions of the USA.

The Soviet government stands for the peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, against the interference of one state into the internal affairs of others, against the intervention of large states into the affairs of small countries. Literally, that is the core of the Soviet Union's foreign policy.

It is well known to you, Mr. President, the attitude of the Soviet government and personally of N.S. Khrushchev toward the dangerous developments connected with the USA administration position on the issue of Cuba. An unrestrained anti-Cuban campaign has been going on in the USA for a long time and apparently there is a definite USA administration policy behind it. Right now the USA are making an attempt to blockade Cuban trade with other states. There is talk about a possibility of actions of organized policy in this region under the USA aegis.

But all of this amounts to a path that can lead to grave consequences, to a misfortune for all mankind, and we are confident that such an outcome is not desired by any people, including the people of the USA.

The USA administration for some reason considers that the Cubans must solve their domestic affairs not at their discretion, but at the discretion of the USA. But on what grounds? Cuba belongs to the Cuban people, not to the USA or any other state. And since it is so, then why are the statements made in the USA calling for an invasion of Cuba? What do the USA need Cuba for?

Who can in earnest believe that Cuba represents a threat to the USA? If we speak about dimensions and resources of the two countries - the USA and Cuba - then it is clear that they are a giant and a baby. The flagrant groundlessness of such charges against Cuba is obvious.

Cuba does not represent, and cannot

represent, any threat to the countries of Latin America. It is strange to think as if small Cuba can encroach on the independence of either this or that country of Latin America. Cuban leaders and personally Fidel Castro have declared more than once in front of the whole world and in a most solemn manner that Cuba does not intend to impose their system, that they firmly favor the non-interference of states into the internal affairs of each other.

The people who call for an aggression against Cuba allege that, they say, it is not sufficient to have those statements of the Cuban government, though those statements are supported by deeds. But by that whatever aggressive action or adventure can be justified. Solutions of almost all the international issues are results, you know, of statements, dictums, or negotiations between states, in the course of which corresponding governments give an account of their positions on either these or those questions, as for example takes place now during the conversations that we have with the USA administration. But does the USA administration not believe the statements of the Cuban government? Really, is it not convincing when the Cuban government officially declares its aspiration to settle all disputed questions with the USA administration by means of negotiations? In this regard may be quoted the well-known statement made by Mr. [Oswaldo] Dorticos, President of the Republic of Cuba, during the current session of the UN General Assembly, a statement of which the USA President is undoubtedly aware.<sup>1</sup>

The Cubans want to make secure their own home, their independence. They appeal for reason, for conscience. They call on the USA to renounce encroachments upon the independence of Cuba, to establish normal relations with the Cuban state.

The question is: Is it worthwhile to whip up a campaign and organize different sorts of hostile activity around Cuba and at the same time inimical actions against those states which maintain good relations with Cuba, respect its independence, and lend Cuba a helping hand at a difficult moment? Is it not a destruction of international law, of the UN principles and purposes?

Is it possible, Mr. President, for the Soviet Union, taking into account all of this, to sit cross-handed and to be a detached onlooker? You say that you like frankness.

Giving an account of the Soviet government position frankly as well, I would like to stress that nowadays is not the middle of the XIX century, is not the time of colonial partition and not the times when a victim of aggression could raise its voice only weeks and months after an assault. American statesmen frequently declare that the USA is a great power. This is correct, the USA is a great power, a rich and strong power. And what kind of power is the Soviet Union?

You know that N.S. Khrushchev was positively impressed by your realistic statement during the Vienna meeting about the equality of forces of the two powers—the USSR and USA. But insofar as it is so, inasmuch as the USSR is also a great and strong power it cannot be a mere spectator while there is appearing a threat of unleashing a large war either in connection with the Cuban issue or [with a] situation in whatever other region of the world.

You are very well aware of the Soviet government attitude toward such an action of the USA, as the decision about the draft of 150 thousand reservists.<sup>2</sup> The Soviet government is convinced that if both of our countries favor a lessening of international tension and a solution of unsettled international problems, then such steps should be avoided because they are intended for sharpening the international situation.

If it came to the worst, if a war began, certainly, a mobilization of an additional 150 thousand reservists to the USA armed forces would not have significance. And undoubtedly you are very well aware of this. For the present is not the year 1812 when Napoleon was setting all his hopes upon the number of soldiers, of sabres and cannons. Neither is it 1941, when Hitler was relying upon his mass armies, automatic rifles, and tanks. Today life and military equipment have made a large step forward. Nowadays the situation is quite different and it would be better not to rely on armaments while solving disputed problems.

So far as the aid of the Soviet Union to Cuba is concerned, the Soviet government has declared and I have been instructed to reaffirm it once more, our aid pursues exclusively the object of rendering Cuba assistance to its defensive capacity and development of its peaceful economy. Neither industry nor agriculture in Cuba, neither land-improvement works nor training of the Cuban personnel carried out by the Soviet

specialists to teach them to use some defensive types of armaments, can represent a threat to anybody. Had it been otherwise, the Soviet government would never be involved in such aid. And such an approach applies to any country.

The example of Laos convincingly illustrates this. If the Soviet Union were conducting another policy, not the present one, then the situation in Laos would be different. For the Soviet Union and its friends seem to have more possibility to influence the situation in Laos than the USA. But we were trying to achieve an agreement because we cannot step aside from the main principles of our foreign policy designed for lessening international tension, for undoing knots of still existing contradictions between powers, for the peaceful solution of unsettled international problems. And in this regard our policy is unvarying.

Here is the position and views of the Soviet government on the Cuban issue. The Soviet government calls on you and the USA administration not to permit whatever steps are incompatible with the interests of peace and the lessening of international tension, with the UN principles which have been solemnly signed both by the USSR and the USA. We call on you to ensure that in this issue too the policies of the two largest powers pursue the object of peace and only of peace.

Having listened to our statement, Kennedy said that he was glad to hear the reference to the settlement of the Laotian problem. We believe, he continued, that the Soviet Union really acts precisely in the way which you are describing, and just as the USA the USSR is endeavoring to comply with its commitments.

Regarding the Cuban issue I [Kennedy] must say that really it became grave only this summer. Until then the Cuban question had been pushed by us to the background. True, Americans had a certain opinion about the present Cuban government and refugees from Cuba were exciting public opinion against that government. But the USA administration had no intentions to launch an aggression against Cuba. Suddenly, Mr. Khrushchev, without notifying me, began to increase at a brisk pace supplies of armaments to Cuba, although there was no threat on our side that could cause such a necessity. If Mr. Khrushchev addressed me on this issue, we could give him

corresponding assurances on that score. The build-up of the Cuban military might has badly impressed the American people and the USA congress. As President I was trying to calm public opinion and I have declared that, taking into account the kind of aid rendered by the Soviet Union to Cuba, we must keep cool and self-controlled. But I was not able to find a satisfactory explanation for those actions of the Soviet Union.

Kennedy said later, that the Soviet Union is aware of the American opinion regarding the present regime in Cuba. We consider that it would be better if there were another government. But we do not have any intentions to attack Cuba.

You are saying that we have established a blockade around Cuba, but that is not the case. We have only taken the decision that the ships, after bringing cargo to Cuba, will be barred entry to the American ports to pick up freight.

The actions of the Soviet Union create a very complicated situation and I don't know where the whole thing can bring us. The present situation is, perhaps, the most dangerous since the end of the Second World War. We, certainly, take on trust statements of the Soviet Union about the sort of armaments supplied by you to Cuba. As President I am trying to restrain those people in the USA who are favoring an invasion of Cuba. For example, last Sunday in one of my speeches I declared against one of the American senators, who had previously supported such an invasion.<sup>3</sup>

I repeat, a very dangerous situation has nevertheless arisen regarding this issue and I don't know what can be the outcome.

I answered Kennedy that once there was an attempt to organize an invasion of Cuba and it is known what was the end of the affair.<sup>4</sup> From different official statements and your own statements, Mr. President, everybody knows what were the circumstances and how that invasion was arranged. Everybody knows also that the USA administration needs only to move a finger and no Cuban exiles, nor those who support them in the USA and some countries of the Caribbean, would dare launch any adventure against Cuba.

At this moment Kennedy put in a remark that he had already had an exchange of opinions with N.S. Khrushchev on the issue of the invasion of Cuba in 1961 and had said that it was a mistake.

I should be glad, Kennedy stressed, to give assurances that an invasion would not be repeated neither on the part of Cuban refugees, nor on the part of the USA armed forces.

But the issue is, Kennedy said, that as a result of the USSR government's action in July of the current year the situation suddenly has changed for the worse.

Proceeding with the previous idea, I said that for the Cuban government the vital issue is the question what is to be done next. The question comes to the following: either they will stay unprepared to repulse new attempts at invasion or they must undertake steps to ensure their country from attack, take care of their defense. We have already said that the Soviet government has responded to the call of Cuba for help only because that appeal had the aim of providing Cubans with bread and removing the threat hanging over Cuba by strengthening its defensive capacity. Regarding help, rendered by the Soviet Union, in the use of some exclusively defensive armaments, by no means can it be seen as a threat to the USA. If, I repeat, the situation were different the Soviet government never would have gone along with such an aid.

Kennedy said that, to make things completely clear on this issue, he would like to announce once more that the USA do not have any intentions to invade Cuba. Nevertheless, intensified armaments supplies to Cuba on the part of the Soviet Union, which began in July of the current year, have complicated the situation greatly and made it more dangerous.

My intention, Kennedy stressed, consists in preventing any actions that could lead to war, so long as those actions would not be occasioned by some activity of the Soviet Union or Cuba. In order to confirm that the USA administration believes the defensive character of the armaments supplied to Cuba, Kennedy read the following passage from his statement on the Cuban issue of 4 September 1962:

"Information has reached this Government in the last four days from a variety of sources which established without a doubt that the Soviets have provided the Cuban Government with a number of anti-aircraft defense missiles with a slant range of twenty-five miles similar to early models of our "Nike" [missile].

Along with these missiles, the Soviets are apparently supplying the extensive radar and other electronic equipment which is required for their operation.

We can also confirm the presence of several Soviet-made motor torpedo boats carrying ship-to-ship missiles having a range of 15 miles.

The number of Soviet military technicians now known to be in Cuba or en route—approximately 3,500—is consistent with assistance in setting up and learning to use this equipment.

As I stated last week, we shall continue to make information available as fast as it is obtained and properly verified.

There is no evidence of any organized combat force in Cuba from any Soviet bloc country; of military base provided to Russia; of a violation of the 1934 treaty relating to Guantanamo; of the presence of offensive ground-to-ground missiles; or of other significant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and guidance.

Were it to be otherwise, the gravest issues would arise."

That is our position on this issue, said Kennedy, and in this way it has been expounded by our Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, in his conversation with the Soviet Ambassador.<sup>5</sup> From that position I was proceeding last Sunday when I was voicing the aforementioned statement. Thus, in all my actions I proceed with due regard for statements of the Soviet Union that the armaments supplied to Cuba have an exclusively defensive character.

I [Gromyko] said in conclusion that from the corresponding statements of the Soviet government, including the statement delivered to the President today, the USA administration has a clear view of policy of the Soviet Union on the Cuban issue and also of our assessment of the USA policy and actions regarding Cuba. I had the task of giving the President an account of all of it.

[section deleted—trans.]

Fourth. After the exchange of opinions on the issue of the [atomic] tests I broached the subject of the main principles of foreign policy of the USSR and the necessity to proceed from the thesis that difference of ideologies need not be an obstacle to peaceful cooperation between the USSR and the USA. According to the instructions,

received before departure, the question of a possible meeting of the heads of the two powers has been touched upon.

The Soviet government, as before, is building its foreign policy on the recognition of that indisputable concept that difference in ideologies, to which our states adhere, need not be a barrier to their peaceful coexistence and cooperation in the interests of strengthening the peace. You and we, as it was underlined more than once by N.S. Khrushchev, are human beings and you have your own ideology, and you are well aware of our attitude towards it. The USSR is a socialist state, and is building communism. We are guided by communist ideology. Who will gain the victory in the end—this question must be solved not by the force of armaments, but by the way of peaceful competition and we, the communists, have urged this since the days of Lenin.

We resolutely condemn the calls to solve ideological disputes by the force of armaments. A competition in economics, in satisfying the material and spiritual requirements of the people—that is the field where in a historic, peaceful “battle,” without use of armaments, must be solved the question of which ideology would prevail and which one would quit the stage of history. On behalf of the Soviet government I would like to reaffirm that [position] once more because it is one of the main principles of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union.

In conclusion I would like to say the following:

The Head of the Soviet government N.S. Khrushchev has entrusted me to convey to you that his opinion is that it would apparently be useful to have a meeting between the Head of the Soviet government and the USA President in order to discuss the issues that separate us and first of all the questions of the German peace treaty and West Berlin.

If N.S. Khrushchev has the opportunity, he will arrive in New York in the second half of November in order to attend the session of the UN General Assembly. Thus, we are speaking about a possibility of his arrival in the USA after the elections to Congress. Kennedy said that in the case of N.S. Khrushchev coming to the USA he would be glad to meet him once more. Nevertheless, he said, it would be erroneous to speak about the only point of the agenda of this meeting - to discuss “the Berlin problem and

the signing of the German peace treaty,” because there are others who are also interested in discussing those questions besides our two countries. If Mr. Khrushchev comes to the General Assembly I would be glad to discuss with him questions that we are interested in without any formal agenda and without picking out any concrete issue that must be discussed.

I thanked the President for the conversation during which we have discussed questions that represent interests for both countries, concerning important aspects of the foreign policies of the USSR and the USA. I also underlined the view of the Soviet government that it would be a great historic achievement if the USSR and the USA come to terms over those questions that divide us.

Kennedy responded that he agrees with that remark. As I have already told Mr. Khrushchev, the USA is a large and rich country. The Soviet Union is also a large and rich country. Each of our countries has a lot of things to do inside our countries. As to the outcome of the competition between the, which I hope will be a peaceful one, history will decide it. On Mr. Khrushchev, as the head of the Soviet government, and on me, as the USA President, rests enormous responsibility and we have no right to allow any actions that can lead to a collision.

During the last 9 months while I am holding the post of President we were seeking by all means to settle relations between our two countries. We have reached some success on the Laotian issue. We were aspiring to reach agreements both on Berlin and German problems. Unfortunately we didn't manage to do it.

As to Cuba I cannot understand what has happened in July of this year, particularly taking into account statements made by Mr. Khrushchev that he understands the basis of the USA approach. In spite of success achieved on the Laotian question, the situation around the Cuban issue is becoming more and more complicated.

In conclusion Kennedy transmitted his regards to N.S. Khrushchev and expressed gratitude for receiving the USA Ambassador in Moscow Mr. [Foy] Kohler and several American representatives who had visited the Soviet Union.

For my part I assured the President once more that the policy of the Soviet Union always has been and remains directed at strengthening peace and the elimination

of differences in the relations among all countries, above all in relations between the USSR and the USA, with whom the Soviet Union wants to live in peace and friendship.

[This policy] also applies to the Cuban issue, which was not invented by the Soviet Union, it applies to the question of signing the German peace treaty and normalization on its basis of the situation in West Berlin and it applies to all the other issues that separate our two countries. Our policy is the policy of peace, friendship, the policy of removing differences by peaceful means.

In conclusion I promised to convey the regards from the President to the Head of the Soviet government N.S. Khrushchev and expressed confidence that he would accept it with pleasure.

The conversation lasted 2 hours and 20 minutes. There were present: on the American side - Rusk, Thompson, Hillenbrandt and Akalovsky, on the Soviet side - Semenov, Dobrynin, and Sukhodrev.

A. GROMYKO

20/10/1962

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by Vladimir Zaemsky.]

## II. THE CRISIS: 22-28 OCTOBER 1962

### Telegram from Soviet representative to the United Nations V. A. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 22 October 1962

22 October 1962

On the evening of 22 October, during Kennedy's speech, the United States sent me, as chair of the Security Council, a letter demanding an urgent convocation of the Security Council for a discussion of the “serious threat to the security of the Western hemisphere, and to peace throughout the whole world, posed by continuing and growing foreign intervention in the Caribbean basin.” In oral communication, the Americans called for a convocation of the Security Council on 23 October at 10:30 a.m. Eastern Standard Time.

[U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Adlai] Stevenson's letter reiterated the points made by Kennedy in his radio and television

speech. Appended to the letter was the draft of a resolution which in its main strategic part runs as follows:

"The Security Council...

1. Demands, as a temporary measure, in accordance with Article 40 of the Charter, the immediate dismantling and removal from Cuba of all ballistic missiles and other armaments used for offensive purposes.

2. Authorizes and requests the acting secretary general to dispatch to Cuba a corps of UN observers to ensure fulfillment of this resolution and to deliver a report.

3. Demands the cessation of quarantine measures directed against military deliveries to Cuba after the UN has been assured of the fulfillment of Point 1.

4. Strongly recommends that the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics immediately discuss the issue of measures to be taken to eliminate the currently existing threat to the security of the Western hemisphere and to peace throughout the world, and to deliver a report on this to the Security Council."

We will forward the text of Stevenson's letter and the draft of the resolution to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by teletype.

The United States' formulation of the imaginary threat posed by Cuba and the USSR is clearly aimed at concealing and justifying to public opinion the USA's unilaterally imposed military blockade of Cuba, which is an overtly aggressive act. In light of this, the demand for convening the Security Council is put forth after the USA has in fact established a blockade and undertaken a series of other aggressive actions against revolutionary Cuba. Thus the Americans have presented the Security Council, as they have done in the past, with a *fait accompli*.

Before consulting with the other members of the Security Council on the time for convening the meeting of the Council, we met with the Cuban representative and had a preliminary discussion of the possibility of Cuba's submitting to Council an examination of the issue of the USA's aggressive actions against Cuba.

The Cuban representative is conferring with his government on this issue.

We will undertake measures toward initiating the meeting of the Council no earlier than 3:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time on 23 October, although pressure from the Western majority of Council members for

its immediate convocation has already been exerted.

We will provide supplementary information on our position in the Security Council.

22.X.62 V. ZORIN

*[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWHHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen.]*

**Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba A.I. Alekseev to USSR Foreign Ministry, 23 October 1962**

23 October

Raul Castro has announced that in response to Kennedy's threat, the Cuban government would make a decision regarding the mobilization of all subdivisions of the popular militia.

All in all, 350,000 persons will be mobilized.

The full mobilization of this group will take 72 hours.

The forces of the military units in this group (105,000 persons) have been brought to military readiness, and are occupying departure positions.

The mass labor organizations are devoting all their energy to helping the army and to replacing workers in businesses.

The mobilization will prove to be a new and heavy burden for the Cuban economy, given that the maintenance of the army will cost the country up to one million pesos per day, not counting losses from reductions in production connected with the transfer of significant numbers of workers to the army.

Tomorrow at 12:00 noon, Fidel Castro will deliver a television and radio address to the Cuban people.

Commenting on Kennedy's speech, Raul Castro said that it was undoubtedly aimed at American voters and at the Latin American governments that still have diplomatic ties with Cuba.

Castro thinks that, under this pressure, a whole series of these governments, if not all of them, will break off relations with Cuba.

The Cuban government, said Castro, is firmly and resolutely behind the nation's military spirit and the unity of its people in its resistance to the aggressor.

The Cuban leaders are awaiting the Soviet government's reaction to Kennedy's announcement, and are placing their hopes on the wisdom of our decisions.

Castro said that the USSR, which is surrounded by American bases, has strong arguments to marshal in response to Kennedy, and may enter negotiations with him. With regard to the UN observers who are now being sent to Cuba by the USA, we as a sovereign nation will never admit them onto our soil.

A complete calm and certainty dominate Cuba's leading officials and army commanders, just as they do the popular masses.

To avoid provocations, the troops have been given orders to open fire on enemy airplanes and ships only in cases when the enemy has initiated attack first.

According to Castro, the Americans have denied Cuban workers access to Guantanamo base.

All American civilian planes have been prohibited from flying over Cuba and from approaching its shores.

A radio interception has also been received which prohibits American ships from conducting negotiations with the bases on open channels.

All new facts will be immediately communicated.

23.X.62 ALEKSEEV

*[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWHHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen.]*

**Telegram from Soviet delegate to the United Nations V. A. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 23 October 1962**

23 October 1962

As chairman of the Security Council, I have been sent a letter by the Cuban delegate to the UN, [Mario Garcia-] Inchaustegi, in agreement with his government, demanding an urgent convocation of the Council to discuss the USA's aggressive actions and its blockade of Cuba as acts of war.

According to Inchaustegi, the Cuban minister of foreign affairs, [Raul] Roa, may arrive in New York to take part in the Council's examination of this issue. In con-

nection with this we are taking steps to make the convocation of the Council contingent on Roa's arrival. Nevertheless it can be expected that the Council meeting will have to be convened (given the demands of the Western majority of the Council's members) on 23 October of this year at 3:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time.

During the examination of the issue in the Council, we will declare our objections to the misleading American formulation of it. Bearing in mind the Cubans' demand for entering on the agenda the issue of USA aggressions that they introduced, it can be expected that the affair will come down to entering American as well as Cuban statements on the Council's agenda.

In examining the affair in its essence, guided by the Soviet government's most recent announcements on the Cuban question, we will point out that the USA's aggressions against Cuba cannot be evaluated as anything other than a provocation pushing the world to the verge of nuclear war. We will demand a condemnation of the USA aggressions, the immediate cessation of the blockade they have declared and all infractions of maritime freedom; and an immediate end to all forms of intervention in the domestic affairs of the Republic of Cuba.

We will also propose that the USA government immediately enter into direct negotiations with the Cuban government on the settling of its conflicts with Cuba through peaceful means, as suggested by Dorticos in his speech in the UN General Assembly. In coordination with the Cuban delegation, we will introduce a draft resolution that includes the above-mentioned points.

We will of course vote against the American draft resolution.

We will take action as indicated above, unless we receive other instructions before the meeting of the Council begins.

It is not impossible that, when both draft resolutions are vetoed, the USA will then propose that the Council vote on transferring the issue to the General Assembly.

23.X.62 V. ZORIN

[Source: *Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF)*, Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWHIP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]

**Telegram from Soviet delegate to the United Nations V. A. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 23 October 1962**

23 October 1962

On 23 October at 4:00 p.m., under the chairmanship of the USSR delegate, a meeting of the Security Council took place, on the agenda of which was our issue of the violation of the UN Charter and the threat to peace on the part of the USA.

Attention paid to this meeting was enormous: the assembly hall was filled to capacity, and virtually all the representatives of the Anglo-American bloc of the UN were present.

On approving the agenda we made a declaration in which made note of the false nature of the USA's address to the Security Council, which was a clumsy attempt to conceal the USA's aggressions. We declared that, in reality, there were some pressing issues to be brought before the Council by the USSR and Cuba: concerning violations of the UN Charter and the USA's threat to peace, and concerning USA aggressions against Cuba.

After that the agenda was approved without objections from the Council members.

The text of the Soviet government's declaration on Cuba was distributed as an official UN document, and also as a press release.

The first to speak was Stevenson (registered on the list of speakers yesterday, at the time of Kennedy's radio speech). In his long speech, which was marked by demagoguery and hypocrisy, Stevenson tried in various ways to justify the unprecedented actions of the USA government, the naval blockade of Cuba imposed by the United States, and the acts of piracy on the open sea. Unable to adduce any facts with which to prove the presence of a Cuban threat, Stevenson instead fell into a lengthy description of the post-war history of international relations, attempting to depict in a distorted manner the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and the other socialist states. In conclusion he formally presented the American draft resolution (relayed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by teletype on 22 October). We will teletype the full text of Stevenson's speech to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The next speaker was the Cuban delegate Garcia-Inchaustegi, who delivered a clear speech exposing the provocative actions of the USA against Cuba, and declaring the the steadfast determination of the Cuban people to take up arms, if necessary, to defend their revolutionary achievements. The Cuban delegate demanded the immediate revocation of the measures announced by Kennedy. Characteristically, the Cuban's speech was greeted with friendly applause from the audience.

We will teletype the full text of the Cuban's speech as well.

After that we gave a speech with a declaration in accordance with your number 1197, and introduced a draft resolution. An account of the speech was transmitted by TASS. We are teletyping the full text to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The next meeting has been set for tomorrow, 24 October, at 9:00 a.m. Eastern Standard Time.

In the course of the day we have had conversations with a series of delegates from African and Asian countries, including delegates from the United Arab Republic, Ghana, Ceylon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and others. All of these countries share a serious anxiety about the situation created by the USA's actions. All of them recognize the clear illegality of the USA's actions. They do not yet, however, show sufficient determination to take any concrete steps. Thus, for example, the delegate from the United Arab Republic initially made much of the unofficial Council draft resolution calling for the respective parties to remove the blockade and to end arms stockpiling in Cuba. When we categorically rejected this proposal because it essentially replicated one of the USA's basic ideas—revoking the blockade after the cessation of arms deliveries to the Cubans—the neutral parties prepared another draft resolution.

This draft makes the following stipulations:

1. To call upon all interested parties to abstain from any actions which could directly or indirectly aggravate the situation, and to work towards returning the Caribbean area to the condition it was in before 22 October;

2. To request that the acting Secretary General immediately discuss with the interested parties direct measures to be taken for removing the current threat to the general

peace.

3. To call upon the interested parties to carry out this resolution immediately, and to cooperate with the acting Secretary General in the fulfillment of this aim.

4. To ask the acting Secretary General to report to the Security Council on the fulfillment of the second point.

We remarked that even this draft is not fully satisfactory, in part because it does not even indicate (in clear and unambiguous terms) that the USA's declared blockade of Cuba must be immediately ended.

This evening, after the Security Council meeting, the delegates from neutral Asian and African countries will hold a meeting to discuss the general policy that it would be most advisable for them to follow with regard to this issue. In the course of tomorrow's meeting we will decisively defend the position laid out in our draft resolution, and will exert pressure on the neutrals to do the same.

23.X.62 V. ZORIN

*[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]*

**Telegram from Soviet delegate to the United Nations V. A. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 25 October 1962, on UN Security Council Meeting of 24 October 1962**

25 October 1962

On 24 October speeches were delivered in the Security Council by the delegates from Venezuela, England, Rumania, Ireland, France, Chile, the United Arab Republic, Ghana, and also by U Thant.

Comrade [Deputy Foreign Minister Mircea] Malitza, the delegate from Rumania, fully supported the Soviet Union's formulation of the issue of the USA violation of the UN Charter and the USA threat to peace, and supports with equal conviction the Security Council draft resolution introduced by the Soviet Union.

The speech of the English delegate, [Sir Patrick] Dean, supported the false accusa-

tions of the Soviet Union's alleged installation in Cuba of offensive nuclear missile weaponry, the accusations by means of which the USA is trying to justify its aggressions against Cuba (we are teletyping the full text of the speech). Dean asserted that the only way to restore peace and trust is to remove from Cuban territory the "offensive missiles." It is revealing that Dean tried as hard as he could to get around the question of the naval blockade imposed by the USA on Cuba.

Declaring England's support for the American draft resolution, Dean at the same time expressed his thoughts on the necessity of negotiations between the interested parties.

The French delegate [Roger] Seydoux also supported the American draft resolution, representing it as allegedly furthering the interests of a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Like Dean, he reiterated the false assertions by the USA of the allegedly offensive nature of the armaments supplied by the Soviet Union to Cuba (we are teletyping the full text).

In the speeches by the delegates from Venezuela and Chile, support was given to the justification of the resolution, approved under pressure from the USA, of the Organization of American States, which is opposed to Cuba. They asserted, following USA crib-notes, that the Soviet arms in Cuba upset the balance of power in the Western hemisphere, and constitute a threat to the security of the nations of this area. The delegates from Venezuela and Chile declared their support for the American draft resolution.

The delegate from Ireland, [Minister for External Affairs Frank] Aiken, recognizing the right of the Cuban nation to decide its own fate and to take measures to guarantee its defense capabilities, expressed regret at the same time concerning the fact that the weaponry installed in Cuba represents huge nuclear forces that threaten the neighboring countries. Aiken appealed for a peaceful settlement by means of negotiations. He declined to express his position with regard to both the American and the Soviet draft resolutions.

The delegates from the United Arab Republic, [Mahmoud] Riad, and from Ghana, [Alex] Quaison-Sackey, pointed out that they are approaching the issue at hand in light of the principles established by the

UN Charter and by the Bandung and Belgrade conferences of nonaligned nations (we are teletyping the full texts of these speeches). Proceeding from these principles, the delegates from the United Arab Republic and Ghana defended the right of Cuba to choose its own political regime, and to carry out the necessary defense measures for safeguarding its political freedom and territorial integrity.

In the speeches of both delegates, doubt was expressed about the reliability and well-groundedness of the American assertions about the allegedly offensive character of the weaponry installed in it. Quaison-Sackey recalled with regard to this the fabrication by USA intelligence of false information that has already been used in the past for justifying aggressive actions against Cuba.

The delegates from the United Arab Republic and Ghana declared that they cannot justify the USA actions aimed at establishing a blockade of Cuba. They both emphasized that these actions by the USA constitute a violation of the principle of maritime freedom, and pose a serious threat to peace and general security. In their speeches, they noted the fact that the USA took its unilateral actions behind the back of the Security Council.

The delegates of the United Arab Republic and Ghana have appealed to the parties involved—the USA, the USSR, and Cuba—to resolve the conflict through peaceful negotiations, and have jointly introduced a draft resolution (transmitted by teletype).

The last to speak at today's meeting was the acting Secretary General of the UN, U Thant, who read the text of messages he sent today to Comrade N.S. Khrushchev and to Kennedy. In these messages, U Thant proposed that for a period of two to three weeks "all arms provisioning in Cuba be voluntarily suspended, and that all quarantine activity be suspended by the opposing party." U Thant expressed his support for the proposal that the interested parties meet during this period and discuss the situation. He, U Thant, is willing to provide all necessary services for this purpose, and is at the disposal of the parties involved.

Having learned in the afternoon of the content of the message to the USSR and the USA prepared by U Thant, we told him that we considered it incorrect and wrong-headed of the acting Secretary General to

place on the same level a party on one hand that has taken provocative actions and imposed a naval blockade, and on the other hand parties that have been engaging in normal shipping activity and taking lawful measures for safeguarding their countries' defense. We emphasized that the acting Secretary General's most urgent obligation is to exert necessary pressure on the government of the USA to make them lift the illegal blockade of the Cuban coast, and end their acts of piracy that violate maritime freedom.

Nevertheless, U Thant did not change the content of his messages. The text of U Thant's message to Comrade N.S. Khrushchev has been teletyped to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Throughout the entire day, delegations from the neutral countries of Asia and Africa worked on a draft resolution for the Security Council. We have repeatedly met with the delegates from the United Arab Republic, Ghana, and other countries, explaining to them the necessity of including in the Council resolution a clear demand that the USA lift its naval blockade and cease its other provocative actions against Cuba.

The draft resolution introduced by the delegates from the United Arab Republic and Ghana (the text of which has been teletyped) nevertheless does not mention this directly. The draft resolution proposes that the acting General Secretary reach an agreement without delay with the immediately interested parties regarding the steps that must urgently be taken to remove the present threat to peace and to normalize the Caribbean situation, and it appeals to the interested parties to "refrain during this period from any actions which could directly or indirectly aggravate the present situation."

Although the formulation of this last point is vague, the interpretation offered in the United Arab Republic and Ghanaian delegates' speeches, and the whole tenor of their speeches, nevertheless clearly indicate that the gist of that formulation is a demand for the revocation of the measures announced by Kennedy. Despite the shortcomings of the draft, it must be noted that, if approved, it would significantly limit the USA's capacity to carry out the blockade and its other aggressions against Cuba.

We are also taking into account that, if the matter is transferred to the Assembly, it

will be difficult to count on the approval of a better resolution, since at present a majority of the Afro-Asian group supports the draft put forth by the United Arab Republic and Ghana.

Proceeding from this point, and bearing in mind the Cuban government's views, we believe that it is possible, when the United Arab Republic and Ghanaian draft resolution is voted on, that we, after issuing a statement of its shortcomings and weaknesses, might abstain from voting on it if it can be passed without our votes (that is, without the votes of the delegates from the USSR and Romania), and vote in favor of it if it fails to win the necessary number of votes without our support.

We do not rule out the possibility that Ghana and the United Arab Republic may alter their draft resolution, reducing it to an appeal to the interested parties to conduct immediate negotiations towards a settlement of the Caribbean crisis that threatens the general peace. In voting on such a resolution we will, having voiced our views on its shortcomings, take a similar position: in other words, we will abstain from voting if the resolution can be approved without our votes, and we will vote in favor of it if it would not pass without the votes of the USSR and Romania.

In the event that none of the resolutions is approved by the Council, then obviously an extraordinary special session of the Assembly will have to be convened, which we will not object to.

We will act as outlined above unless we receive other instructions.

The Council meeting will be held on 25 October at 4:00 p.m. local time, when the vote on the resolution will also take place.

It would be valuable if for this occasion we had the text of the official response to U Thant's message to N. S. Khrushchev, if such a response has been made by that time.

According to available information, the USA will respond to U Thant's message in the next few hours.

25.X.62 V. ZORIN

[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]

lation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]

**Cable from Soviet Ambassador to the USA A. Dobrynin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 25 October 1962**

This night (around 3 o'clock in the morning Washington time) our journalist [half-line deleted—ed.] was at the bar of the press club of Washington where usually many correspondents gather.

Barman<sup>6</sup> approached him [one line deleted—ed.] and whispered that he had overheard a conversation of two prominent American journalists (Donovan<sup>7</sup> and [Warren] Rogers) that the President had supposedly taken a decision to invade Cuba today or tomorrow night.

Our correspondent also had an opportunity to talk to Rogers, a correspondent of the "New York Herald Tribune," permanently accredited to the Pentagon. He confirmed that report.

[Half-line deleted—ed.] there is information that an order has been issued to bring the armed forces into maximum battle readiness including readiness to repulse nuclear attack.

We are taking steps to check this information.

25/X/62

A. DOBRYNIN

[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by Vladimir Zaemsky.]

**Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba A.I. Alekseev to USSR Foreign Ministry, 25 October 1962**

25 October

The domestic situation in Cuba with regard to the USA provocations continues to remain calm and confident. The mobilization of the popular militia and the stationing of military units have been successfully completed. The industrial and commercial centers of the country are operating normally.

A special business-like efficiency and energy can be observed among the Cuban

leaders and people. At meetings and gatherings there is almost no trace of the ostentation and verbosity that are characteristic of Cubans. The awareness of an immediate threat has brought the Cuban people even closer, and has strengthened their hatred of American imperialism.

The Soviet Union's authority has climbed to unprecedented heights. The actions of the USSR government in its defense of Cuba are completely convincing the people of the failure of the American provocations. The whole country is preparing to rebuff the aggressors. Committees for the defense of the revolution are establishing, in every city neighborhood, in factories, on the national estates and institutions, first-aid brigades offering immediate help to the wounded. Volunteer brigades are on the alert for profiteers, and are prohibiting the purchase of excessive quantities of goods in stores.

Militia observation posts have been placed on all streets. There are no signs of panic, and no false alarmist rumors are being spread.

The domestic counterrevolution has fallen completely silent, and has not yet shown any signs of activity.

The nation is anxiously awaiting the first clashes between Soviet steamers and the American ships constituting the blockade.

The arrival yesterday and today of two Soviet steamers in Cuban ports without serious complications was met with great relief.

Secretary General U Thant's appeal, and Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's response to it and to Bertrand Russell, were commented upon here as events of the greatest importance.

Meanwhile the radio and newspapers attribute great significance to [Soviet Defense Minister] Marshal R.Ya. Malinsky's speech.

Moreover, Fidel Castro finds great significance in the emergence of a movement for solidarity with Cuba, especially in the countries of Latin America.

It is his view that the USA's current insane actions against Cuba provide firm ground for the further expansion of this movement, which will be able to force the Americans to rethink their plans.

He approves of our policy of not giving in to provocations, and of the possible

avoidance of unnecessary conflicts. Castro, for example, approves of the fact that several of our vessels have turned back from their courses, and thus have not given occasion for any major conflicts.

At the same time Castro, in the course of conversations with our military experts, has expressed a belief in the necessity of shooting down one or two piratic American planes over Cuban territory.

Unverifiable information has been received by us and the Czechs from unverifiable sources on the possibility of an interventionist landing or a bombing of Cuban military targets on 26-27 October. The leadership has taken this information into consideration, but is not taking it very seriously.

The situation in the Soviet colony is normal. All necessary measures have been taken for a possible exacerbation of the situation.

25.X.62 ALEKSEEV

*[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]*

**Cable from Soviet Ambassador to the USA A. Dobrynin to Soviet Foreign Ministry, 25 October 1962**

The situation in Washington remains tense and complicated. At the same time, today in political and diplomatic circles and in the comments of American press, radio, and television, began appearing rays of hope for a peaceful settlement of the Cuban issue and they are related to the quiet, restrained behavior of the Soviet government and its readiness for negotiations with the USA (it is necessary to mention that the Embassy is receiving quite a number of cables and letters from ordinary Americans in which they express their gratitude to the Soviet government and N.S. Khrushchev for their position in the current situation).

Nevertheless, prevailing here are the expectations for further mounting of crisis in the relations between the USA and the USSR over Cuba. In addition to our previous considerations currently we would like to say the following:

1. It is becoming daily stronger the

opinion that steps undertaken by the Kennedy administration regarding Cuba had been dictated by the desire to stop the generally unfavorable for the USA developments in the world and to try to reestablish the status-quo which had existed at the moment of the meeting between N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy in Vienna last year. Risk, entailed with these steps made by Kennedy's administration, is outweighed, in his view, by those unfavorable consequences for the USA military-strategic situation, which would appear in the case of the placing in Cuba of Soviet medium and long-range missiles.

2. Regarding how far the Kennedy administration is ready to go against Cuba, the following impression has been forming.

Judging from available data, the administration sets itself, as a minimal aim, the object of not allowing the emplacement in Cuba the aforementioned missile launchers. Meanwhile, according to some sources, whose reports still need additional checking, the possibility is discussed—in case of not achieving that aim by other means—to destroy the missile launchers in Cuba under construction by a massive air-raid of American aviation. It is necessary to mention that, according to all reports, the Americans are not aware of exact numbers and kinds of our missile weapons in Cuba. This circumstance makes them rather nervous.

3. The most militant line in the USA administration still is held by [Attorney General] R. Kennedy, [Secretary of Defense Robert S.] McNamara, [National Security Adviser McGeorge] Bundy and military men, who insist on a firm approach with the purpose of destroying the missile bases in Cuba, not even stopping at invasion of the island. [Secretary of State Dean] Rusk and [Secretary of the Treasury Douglas] Dillon are now holding a somewhat restrained and more cautious position, though they also favor continued pressure upon us.

In this regard the course of the discussion inside the administration of the President's response to U Thant's appeal [of October 24; see above] seems significant. According to our information, the first group was insisting on a categorical rejection of that appeal. Such an answer had been already elaborated and it was even supposed to be transmitted to the largest information agencies. But at the last moment (around 12 o'clock midnight) the President inclined

to the current, more flexible, [version] prepared by Rusk.

The President is vacillating right now, but, judging from everything, especially the principal direction of USA policy, he is heeding the first group, particularly, his brother. A certain danger of the situation is that the President has largely engaged himself before the public opinion of America and not only America. In essence, he, as a hot-tempered gambler, has put at stake his reputation as a statesman and politician, and thus his prospects for re-election in 1964, what—being an ambitious man—he passionately seeks. This is why it is not possible to exclude completely the possibility that he can, especially taking into consideration his circle, undertake such an adventurist step as an invasion of Cuba.

4. Of course, it is difficult to draw a final conclusion whether there will be such an invasion or not. In the “war of nerves”, which now is going on, the elements of disinformation, for sure, can play a role. In this regard it is necessary to mention that the USA administration has undertaken unusual measures of control over the press. In essence an unofficial censorship has been introduced in great measure. Immediate “conducting” [guidance—ed.] of the press on the part of the Kennedy administration has been strengthened. For example, according to confidential data, today Rusk has summoned the most important American journalists and told [them] that that the tendency [that has] just appeared in some papers to show some decrease of tension (in connection with the first Soviet tanker which has passed through the blockade) did not meet the requirements of the moment and the real state of affairs. The USA administration as before is fully resolved to achieve by “whatever means” the liquidation of the missile bases in Cuba,—underscored Rusk. He also refuted several reports about USA readiness to “exchange” Soviet bases in Cuba for American bases in other countries, for example in Turkey (in this regard Rusk criticized today’s article by [Walter] Lippmann).

5. Apparently, in order to force the atmosphere, there are transmitted (on radio, TV and through the press) reports from different states about bringing to full readiness the systems of civil defense, antinuclear shelters, about food and emergency purchases by the population.

Members of the diplomatic corps who in these days have visited other parts of the country, relate that at the beginning many people in those locations, especially in the western states, perceived Kennedy’s speech of October 22 as a pre-election maneuver, but now the mood has changed. People, among them those who even not long ago were saying that it was “necessary to do something to Castro,” now are badly frightened about what may be the outcome.

Noticeably fewer people can be seen on Washington streets. Government offices are working until late at night. Preoccupation over the possibility of a major war is sensed in business circles too, and it is reflected in sharp ups and downs of actions on the New York stock exchange.

African embassies warned their students at American universities to be ready for evacuation home.

6. In general it is necessary to say that different sources in the journalist and diplomatic corps in Washington agree that currently the probability of a USA armed intervention against Cuba is great. They consider that the Kennedy administration needs only a plausible excuse to “justify” such an action. In this regard it calls attention to the strong underlining (in the evening edition papers and radio transmissions) of the assertions as if in Cuba the construction of missile sites is rapidly proceeding.

The majority of sources agree that the nearest future days will be most critical, insofar as they consider that if the USA finds themselves [itself] involved in negotiations or diplomatic discussions of the whole issue, then it will be difficult to carry out an invasion because of political considerations. In this regard, as it is recognized nearly by everybody here, a very important role is played by the self-possessed and constructive position of the Soviet government, which is restraining further broadening of the conflict, restraining the hottest heads in Washington.

25/X/62

A. DOBRYNIN

[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWHIP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by Vladimir Zaemsky.]

**Telgram from Soviet delegate to the United Nations V. A. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 25 October 1962**

25 October 1962

We have been informed that U Thant has declared his intention to meet successively with the Americans, us, and the Cubans on 26 October. He has proposed meeting with us at 4:30 p.m. Eastern Standard Time; before that he is meeting with Stevenson, and after us with Garcia-Inchaustegui. We will agree to this first meeting with U Thant.

In our talks with U Thant we will transmit Comrade N. S. Khrushchev’s response to the former’s message, and Khrushchev’s response to Kennedy and Russell as well.

We understand Comrade N.S. Khrushchev’s response to U Thant to be saying that the Soviet Union agrees with U Thant’s proposal in its goal of holding preliminary negotiations—allowing the interested parties to meet for a peaceful settlement of the crisis and for a normalization of the situation in the Caribbean area. This includes, on the part of the Soviet Union, the voluntary suspension for 2 to 3 weeks of arms stockpiling in Cuba, and, on the part of the USA, the voluntary suspension for the same period of its “quarantine” activity, including the inspection of ships bound for Cuba.

To judge from Kennedy’s response, the USA is attempting to put forth as the basis of its negotiations its demand for the removal of “offensive weaponry” from Cuba.

For this reason we should expect that the Americans will not agree to the suspension of “quarantine” activity unless this demand of theirs is met.

We of course firmly reject any attempts by the USA to impose stipulations either on us or on Cuba. In this matter we will proceed from the condition that negotiations can only be conducted on the basis of U Thant’s proposal, that is on the basis of the point about suspending arms stockpiling in Cuba, a proposal which the neutral countries support.

The possibility cannot be ruled out that U Thant, under American influence, is attempting to put forth as a primary measure the proposals made by him in his second message to Comrade N.S. Khrushchev, especially the one stipulating that Soviet ves-

sels bound for Cuba keep away from the interception area for a certain period of time, and that the USA for the duration of that same period avoid immediate encounters between their ships and Soviet vessels. In this event we will declare that U Thant's proposal, which is the basis on which all the interested parties have agreed to conduct negotiations, goes above and beyond the "primary measures" that he put forth in his second message.

Since the forthcoming meeting with U Thant is a preliminary one and raises the issue of further negotiations, including a conclusive normalization of the whole situation in the Caribbean region, we ask to be briefed on your decision as to the level, form, and direction of further negotiations.

If there are supplementary instructions for the first meeting with U Thant, we ask you to take into consideration the meeting time proposed by U Thant.

25.X.62 V. ZORIN

*[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]*

**Telegram from Soviet delegate to the United Nations V. A. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 26 October 1962**

26 October 1962

The Cuban delegate, Garcia-Inchaustegui, met with U Thant on 26 October, at which time U Thant entrusted him to deliver to Havana a message from him to Fidel Castro (we are sending this as a separate telegram).

In the conversation with Garcia-Inchaustegui, U Thant, who had informed him of the correspondence between U Thant and Comrade N.S. Khrushchev, and President Kennedy as well, expressed his ideas for using Dorticos's proposal of 8 October in the General Assembly as a way to achieve a lasting normalization of the Caribbean basin situation. The Cuban reminded U Thant that Dorticos in his speech had emphasized the extenuating circumstance that the USA had already declared that it did not

intend to attack Cuba, but that now it had broken their promise.

To this U Thant responded that for this reason it is necessary to specify what guarantees should be made by the USA to assure that it will not take any antagonistic actions against Cuba, and asked Garcia-Inchaustegui to explain the views of the Cuban government on this matter.

2. The head of the Brazilian delegation, [Alfonso] Arinos [de Melo Franco], has worked out a draft resolution on the denuclearization of Latin America and Africa under the observation of a monitoring committee (we will send this as a separate telegram). In a conversation with Garcia-Inchaustegui, Arinos expressed his view that approving this resolution would allow Cuba to "avoid humiliation" if it is forced to renounce the construction of missile bases.

According to Garcia-Inchaustegui, this draft resolution has received great currency among the Latin American countries, and the delegates from the Latin American contingents who met with U Thant this evening should discuss the draft with the acting Secretary General.

Garcia-Inchaustegui told the Brazilian himself that, in his personal opinion, it would be better that the issue of the elimination of all foreign military bases in Latin America be brought up, since then such a formulation would include the base at Guantanamo as well.

26.X.62 V. ZORIN

*[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]*

**Telegram from Soviet delegate to the United Nations V. A. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 26 October 1962**

26 October 1962

I delivered N.S. Khrushchev's response to U Thant's second message (at 13:00 local time).

U Thant expressed satisfaction with the

fact that once again his proposal had been approved. After this, U Thant told us that tonight he had received a response to his second message from Kennedy as well, and at our insistence he provided us with the text of that response (after he had submitted this disclosure to the approval of the USA legation, and after receiving our consent to his disclosing to the USA legation the content of our own response).

We are communicating the text of Kennedy's response as a separate telegram.

U Thant presented us with the possibility of his immediate publication of both his messages to N.S. Khrushchev and to Kennedy, and of both responses given to those messagees by the USSR and the USA. He led us to understand that a comparison of both responses would show the world community that the Soviet Union, unlike the USA, was continuing to aim for support of peace and the prevention of war.

We responded to the effect that we were not yet authorized to agree to the publication of N.S. Khrushchev's response, and would give him an answer later.

We believe it would be expedient to give our consent to the publication of the documents mentioned.

Today at 16:00 there will be a meeting between Stevenson and U Thant. At 18:00 Eastern Standard Time we are once again meeting with U Thant, and if we do not receive other instructions by that time, we will give our consent to the publication of N. S. Khrushchev's second response.

26.X.62 V. ZORIN

*[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]*

**Telegram from Soviet delegate to the United Nations V. A. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 26 October 1962**

26 October 1962

On the evening of 26 October we ([Platon] Morozov and I) met with U Thant, in the presence of [UN Under Secretary for Special Political Affairs Chakravanthi V.]

Narasiman, [UN official Omar] Loutfi, [Military Advisor to the UN Secretary-General Brig.-] General [Indar J.] Rikhye, and, on our request, Comrade [E.D.] Kiselev. After giving our consent to the publication of N.S. Khrushchev's response to U Thant's second message, U Thant immediately released for publication both his message and the responses to them by the Soviet Union and the USA. In so doing, U Thant again emphasized that now the whole world would be again convinced that the Soviet Union is positively and constructively working towards the peace initiative that it undertook, and he also asked to convey his thanks to the Soviet government and personally to N.S. Khrushchev for the speedy and positive response to his second message.

U Thant said furthermore that Kennedy's response to his second message was not as clear as N.S. Khrushchev's response. Nevertheless U Thant noted that, as he sees it, an agreement has been reached at the present moment between the Soviet Union and the USA which, although for only a short period (2 to 5 days, as he put it), ensures the possibility of avoiding dangerous encounters on the open sea. In this way, a situation will be created in which further steps can be taken towards the lessening of tensions.

Stevenson today announced to U Thant that the USA was prepared to approve U Thant's proposal contained in his first message (concerning the cessation for 2 to 3 weeks of arms stockpiling in Cuba, and the USA's simultaneous suspension of blockade activities), on the proviso that measures would be taken to guarantee that ships arriving in Cuba (Soviet ships, as well as freight vessels) are not supplying any weaponry during this period.

U Thant explained that the satisfaction of this demand, either in this way or in some other fashion, is a very important issue for American public opinion. It would be possible to discuss a particular procedure for maritime traffic, or for particular ports of call in Cuba, whereby for example UN delegates from neutral countries, selected by agreement, or representatives of the International Red Cross might one way or another ascertain that vessels arriving in Cuba are not carrying arms. He implied that the Americans would apparently be satisfied with a simple procedure, and would not demand searches or inspections of vessels

bound for, or in the ports of, their destinations.

We declared to U Thant that the American proposal was at odds with U Thant's own proposal, and shows that the USA, unlike the Soviet Union, is not ready to agree to that proposal. We remarked that in giving consent to U Thant's proposal, the Soviet Union was taking a highly important step toward preserving the peace. We pointed out that the Soviet Union would stick to its obligations with unconditional steadfastness if an agreement was reached on the basis of U Thant's own proposal. No checks on this are needed, not only because of what has been put forth, but also because if the arms provisioning continued, it would not be hard to detect anyway. For this reason, the Americans' push for the above-mentioned proposal proves that they are looking for a pretext for not fulfilling the very agreement that would facilitate a conclusive settlement.

We also noted that while the USA is advancing a new proposal that complicates matters, they themselves are continuing to prepare intensively for an invasion of Cuba. If we are to talk about UN observation, then we must first of all demand an immediate end to that sort of military preparation against Cuba, which threatens the general peace.

We noted as well that we cannot enter discussions about what actions may be taken on Cuban territory, since that is a matter for the Cuban government alone to decide. But the forms of monitoring proposed would constitute an obvious interference in the domestic affairs of Cuba.

U Thant said that he understood all this personally, and that he firmly believed that the Soviet Union would keep its word. Nonetheless it is clear that the USA is acting as it is in order to justify before American public opinion its refusal to take the appropriate blockade measures that have been announced.

We told U Thant that the Soviet Union has already approved two of his proposals, proceeding in such a way as to frustrate the American provocation that threatens the peace, and also that it is now up to U Thant, in his capacity as acting General Secretary of the UN, to exert the necessary pressure on the USA with the aim of reaching a provisional agreement for 2 to 3 weeks, based on the initial proposal of U Thant himself.

We emphasized that it is necessary to act quickly, since our ships cannot remain on the open sea for an indefinite period of time, and since the situation cannot be allowed to get out of control. U Thant said that he would do all he could, although he asks us as well to think of measures that would be favorably received by the USA.

At the end of the conversation, U Thant said that today he had presented the Cuban delegate to the UN with the message, to be conveyed to Castro, in which he asked that missile installation work in Cuba, which according to reports received by him from the Americans continues day and night, be suspended for the 2 to 3 week period that is necessary for negotiations.

In response to our question about what plans U Thant had concerning the basis upon which a conclusive settlement would be attainable, U Thant answered that he found the key to this in Dorticos's speech to the General Assembly on 8 October of this year, in which the latter announced that if the USA were to give effective guarantees that they will not undertake a military invasion of Cuba, and will not aid its invasion by anyone else, it would not be necessary for Cuba to take military measures, or even to maintain its army.

U Thant said that today he had explained his point of view to Stevenson, and that the latter had promised to inform Kennedy about it.

In conclusion, we arranged with U Thant that he inform the Americans of our conversation, and agreed that our forthcoming meeting would be contingent upon how events unfold.

At the next meeting, if we do not receive other instructions, we will continue to push for the provisional agreement on the 2 to 3 week period, based on U Thant's proposal that was approved in Comrade N. S. Khrushchev's response, without the supplementary conditions advanced by the USA.

26.X.62 V. ZORIN

*[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]*

**Cable from Soviet Foreign Minister  
Gromyko to USSR Ambassador to  
Cuba Alekseev, 27 October 1962**

27 October 1962

You should urgently meet comrade Fidel Castro and, quoting instructions of the Soviet government, say the following:

"It is considered in Moscow that comrade Fidel Castro should urgently make a statement in support of the proposals of the Soviet government listed in the message from N.S. Khrushchev to President Kennedy of October 27.

It would be also advisable to give a quick answer to the appeal from U Thant and underline in that response that there are no works in Cuba on construction of military units - the issue mentioned in the appeal by U Thant. In addition, in the letter to U Thant it should be also advisable to voice support for the proposals of the Soviet government espoused in the aforementioned message from N.S. Khrushchev.

Regarding the communication (delivered by comrades Fidel Castro and Oswaldo Dorticos to comrade Alekseev) that according to the available data an armed American intervention in Cuba is imminent, we would like to say that our last action of October 27 is intended precisely to interrupt the past or present USA preparations, if indeed your information about the threat of an invasion was correct.

It is almost impossible for the Americans to launch an adventurist invasion of Cuba, using their armed forces, in response to our steps, undertaken in connection with U Thant's initiative, particularly in response to our last action. They know very well that if under present circumstances they were to start an intervention it would brand them as aggressors and hold them up to shame as enemies of peace imitating the worst patterns of Hitlerian perfidy."<sup>8</sup>

You should inform comrade Pavlov [a pseudonym for USSR Gen. Issa A. Pliyev, commander of Soviet forces in Cuba] about our advice to the Cuban friends.

Wire the report on the fulfillment of these instructions.

A. GROMYKO

[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy ob-

tained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by Vladimir Zaemsky.]

**Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to  
Cuba A.I. Alekseev to USSR Foreign  
Ministry, 27 October 1962**

27 October

We have met with Fidel Castro and Dorticos, and have informed them of what you communicated in your telegram.

Castro said that the Cuban leaders would discuss the form and substance of his statement on the issues broached by you, and that this would be done in the briefest possible time.

The letter to U Thant, they said, has already been sent, and for that reason the issue you put forth would be explained in Fidel Castro's speech.

Castro and Dorticos declared that the only difficult point would be finding an appropriate form for the declaration of the prohibition on special arms installation projects, since the Americans are following the progress of those projects with the help of reconnaissance flights, and know a lot about them.

They said that an appropriate form would nonetheless be found, and that a likely condition would be a prohibition on similar projects in Guantanamo base as well.

Referring to Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's letter to Kennedy of 27 October, Castro said that it had been composed with great diplomatic skill, and that it would have a huge influence on global public opinion.

Moreover it puts the USA government in a difficult position, and exposes the illegality of its actions.

Castro supposes that the USA will not agree to the elimination of bases in Turkey, which will make it easier to justify before public opinion the presence of special weaponry in Cuba.

Castro said, however, that concise information supplied by the agency and the evening newspaper on the basic content of this letter brought about symptoms of a certain confusion in various sectors of the Cuban population and among some members of the military. A number of officers have spoken to him about it, asking whether it constitutes a rejection by the USSR of its

former obligations.

Castro believes that the publication tomorrow of the full text of the letter will disperse these doubts, and he will take the first opportunity to explain its main content in a way that is accessible to the public.

After receiving Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's letter and your report, Castro began to assess the situation more calmly and realistically, believing that the opportunity had arrived for a peaceful settlement of the Cuban conflict. He nevertheless continues to believe that the danger of sudden attack still exists as before.

Castro told how a U-2 airplane had been shot down from an altitude of 21 kilometers, and that the Cuban military powers had collected its fragments and the corpse of its pilot.

Meanwhile it has been announced in the newspapers that an invading plane of unknown nationality has been shot down. According to American press reports, USA military forces have acknowledged the plane's downing, and have brought to a state of readiness a formation of paratroopers amounting to 14,000 men, which is allegedly intended to be launched over Cuba.

Castro said that in the event of such an attack, full fire would be turned against the aggressor, and that he was sure of success. During this conversation I informed Castro and Dorticos in an appropriate way of the content of your letter, telling him that in the present circumstances it would not be fitting to aggravate the situation and initiate provocations.

Castro said that he understood the crucial nature of these actions, but that, considering the rise in the army's martial spirit and the Americans' warning, our friends were compelled to take such a step.

27.X.62 ALEKSEEV

[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]

**Telegram from Soviet delegate to the  
United Nations V. A. Zorin to USSR  
Foreign Ministry, 27 October 1962**

27 October 1962

On 27 October I visited U Thant and gave him Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's letter of 27 October, as well as a copy of the message to Kennedy of the same date.

U Thant said that he would study the documents attentively, and that he hoped they would prove to be a constructive contribution to the resolution of the problem.

U Thant then informed me that around noon today Stevenson had visited him and told him about N.S. Khrushchev's message to Kennedy of 26 October of this year. Stevenson did not leave U Thant the text of this message, saying that Kennedy had not authorized him to do so.

It must however be noted that, as Stevenson told U Thant, Kennedy is examining this message in a positive and benevolent frame of mind. Stevenson also let a mistake pass when giving an account of the 26 October message to U Thant, declaring that this message allegedly says that the Soviet Union is prepared to remove all its missiles, missile launch pads, and warheads from Cuba.

We indicated that the message made no mention of such points, but we declined to discuss the matter, pleading our lack of authorization to do so.

U Thant asked us to convey to him, if possible, the text of the above-mentioned message of 26 October in order to take it into account when he examines N.S. Khrushchev's message of 27 October.

Later we asked what U Thant had accomplished in the past 24 hours by way of progress towards the provisional agreement, for 2 to 3 weeks, based on the proposal approved by the Soviet Union (whereby the USSR suspends arms stockpiling in Cuba, and the USA suspends its blockade activities).

U Thant responded that he had not yet discussed that matter with Stevenson again, and was waiting for Cuba's response to his 26 October message on the suspension of missile-base construction. He again reiterated that the USA was very concerned that work there, including the assembly of bombers, is proceeding day and night. "After receiving the Cuban response," U Thant said, "I intend to put before Cuba the possibility of creating some monitoring device (in ports of call) for ascertaining that ships arriving in Cuba are not carrying arms."

We again asserted our negative view of the USA demands that go beyond the bounds of U Thant's proposal, and we insisted that he exert the necessary pressure on the Americans to make them adopt his plan. In all respects it was clear that in the last 24 hours U Thant under American pressure had not taken the necessary measures in that direction, and that he intended to win consent, if only from the Cubans, for establishing a procedure that to some degree at least could be considered to guarantee that ships arriving in the next 2 to 3 weeks in Cuba are not carrying arms. We expressed our dissatisfaction with that course of affairs, and stressed the importance of immediately winning approval for this procedure in order to avert the threat of armed encounter, after which any further negotiations would be rendered impossible.

U Thant said that he shared our concern, and would take action.

U Thant tried (honoring Stevenson's request) to give us the USA legation's letter to the Soviet government, which contained a description of the blockade area around Cuba, on the pretext that N.S. Khrushchev's response to U Thant's second message allegedly contains an agreement to avoid clashes between Soviet vessels and the American naval ships carrying out the blockade, and because they claim that it is important to know which areas are forbidden. We refused to accept this letter on the grounds that, as is well known, the Soviet government considers the blockade illegal (in this we were bearing in mind the fact that in Moscow similar notes from the USA were also returned). U Thant said that he would give the indicated letter back to Stevenson.

(The letter indicated that the blockade area includes: the region with its center in Havana and with a radius of 500 nautical miles, and the region with its center in Cape Maisi on the eastern extremity of Cuba and with a radius of 500 nautical miles as well.)

U Thant gave us the letter in which he expresses his sincere thanks to N.S. Khrushchev for his very constructive 26 October response to U Thant's message of 25 October of this year.

It should be noted that the UN delegates from the neutral countries, like the United Arab Republic and Ghana, have begun to calm down a bit in recent days, since Soviet efforts were able to avert dangerous

clashes in the very first days after the American provocation. Now they have started to say that the settlement of the conflict is mainly a concern for the USSR and the USA, that smaller countries cannot advise great powers on what they should do, and so on.

We will continue to exert pressure on U Thant and the UN delegates from the neutral countries (in particular, we had a conversation today to this effect with the delegate from the United Arab Republic in the Security Council) with the aim of persuading them to support the Soviet proposals, and of exerting pressure on the USA and its allies.

It would be expedient to give U Thant the text of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's message to Kennedy of 26 October, since Stevenson has already informed him about it, albeit in his own interpretation.

We request your consent.

27.X.62 V. ZORIN

*[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]*

**Telegram from USSR Foreign Ministry  
to Soviet diplomats in Washington,  
Havana, and New York,  
28 October 1962**

SOVIET EMBASSY WASHINGTON

SOVIET EMBASSY HAVANA

Copy: New York

To Comrades Kuznetsov, Zorin

On 27 October of this year, the USA consul in Moscow sent a letter to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs telling of the procedure introduced by the USA government with regard to the so-called quarantine, a procedure that will be carried out abroad by USA consulate officials, and within the United States by customs personnel.

In accordance with this procedure, foreign ships bound for Cuba or in transit inside the interception area are required to present to the USA customs official a "Transit Notification" or a "Certificate of the Completion of Customs Formalities."

Samples of the above-mentioned documents were appended to the letter.

On 28 October of this year, the USA embassy forwarded to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the text of the letter that Stevenson gave U Thant concerning the interception areas for vessels.

Both documents have been returned to the American embassy.

This is conveyed for purposes of intelligence and familiarization.

(illegibly signed)

*[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]*

**Telegram from Soviet delegate to the United Nations Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 28 October 1962, on meeting with Cuban delegate to the UN Garcia-Inchaustegui on 27 October 1962**

28 October 1962

1. The UN delegate from Cuba, Garcia-Inchaustegui, has conveyed the following information about his meeting with U Thant on 27 October.

U Thant expressed gratitude for the invitation to visit Cuba that had been extended to him; he valued it as a highly important step, and on 28 October promised to give a definitive answer.

My visit to Cuba, the presence of UN representatives there, declared U Thant, would help avert American aggression against Cuba, since the USA could not carry out an attack while he was there.

U Thant said that in the event that he decides to go, he would intend to take several aides and experts along with him.

U Thant also asked whether the government of Cuba (in the event of his group's journey to Havana) could, on its own initiative, and not because they were official observers, invite U Thant to see first hand whether the construction of missile launch pads and the assembly of bombers had been suspended.

Before this, U Thant had told Garcia-Inchaustegui that Stevenson today had put

a request before U Thant to organize the visit so that UN representatives could conduct an on-site inspection on the cessation of the construction projects mentioned above.

In doing so, said U Thant, Stevenson emphasized in various ways that if these projects had not been stopped, then the USA would take new actions. In response to Garcia-Inchaustegui's question as to what this would mean concretely, Stevenson referred, said U Thant, to the strengthening of the blockade and to a USA demand for the convocation of the Security Council.

According to U Thant, Stevenson also said that Kennedy is examining with great earnestness and urgency the idea put forward by Dorticos in his 8 October speech before the General Assembly as the basis for a settlement.

U Thant then put before the Cubans the matter of the establishing of some procedure that would help ascertain that vessels arriving in Cuba in the next 2 to 3 weeks are not supplying arms.

With regard to the issue of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's message of 27 October, U Thant declared that the formulation contained in it appears to him a positive one.

2. Garcia-Inchaustegui informed us that at 20:30 Eastern Standard Time he heard a Cuban radio broadcast from Havana about the downing by Cuban coastal batteries of an American plane that had invaded Cuban air space.

28.X.62 V. ZORIN

*[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]*

**Cable from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to USSR Ambassador to Cuba Alekseev, 28 October 1962**

28 October 1962

You should meet comrade Fidel Castro and tell him the following:

"In Moscow they have received information from comrade Zorin regarding U Thant's proposal to the Cuban representative at the UN about the possibility of his

trip to Cuba and granting him [and] accompanying aides and experts an opportunity to see themselves that work on creating launchers, characterized by Americans as offensive weapons, had stopped.

Moscow adheres to the opinion that U Thant should be given a positive answer to his appeal. If the Cuban friends share this view we shall inform comrade Pavlov [Pliyev] and give him corresponding instructions about access to launchers for U Thant and accompanying persons.

As is generally known, U Thant made a proposal so that representatives of the International Red Cross (IRC) were allowed to visit Soviet ships going to Cuba in order to ascertain that there are no weapons, seen by the American administration as offensive. We sent instructions to our representatives to the UN in order to give consent to that suggestion, bearing in mind that transportation of the IRC to the Soviet ships will also be done on Soviet vessels or ships of neutral countries.

We would like to inform you that ships going to Cuba right now do not carry any weapons."

Telegraph the report on the fulfillment of these instructions.

A. GROMYKO

*[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by Vladimir Zaemsky.]*

**III. THE AFTERMATH:  
28 OCTOBER-10 DECEMBER 1962**

**Cable from USSR Ambassador to Cuba Alekseev to Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 28 October 1962**

28 October 1962

Due to F. Castro's absence from Havana and according to his instructions, I gave both letters to President Dorticos.<sup>9</sup> In my presence Dorticos called Castro and informed him in a prearranged form that the letters had been received. Castro promised to meet me on his return.

Upon several statements and Dorticos' reaction to N.S. Khrushchev's letter to F.

Castro and to the latest message to Kennedy about the dismantling of special weaponry it became clear that confusion and bewilderment are reigning inside the Cuban leadership.

Dorticos said that, unfortunately, Cuban and Latin American peoples would perceive the decision to dismantle the special weaponry, relying only upon Kennedy's assurances, as a defeat for the Soviet government.

He said that whatever assertions Kennedy made, the Cuban government could not weaken its vigilance.

We understand, declared Dorticos, that this decision of the Soviet government is directed to the preserving of peace and in the end it will be advantageous for the whole socialist camp, including Cuba, but under the present conditions of great patriotic enthusiasm of our people this report would be perceived by infinitely electrified masses as a cold shower.

He said that for the Cuban leaders the most important thing right now is to preserve the Soviet Union's prestige, which had been raised so high in Cuba.

According to him, the counterrevolution will immediately seize this opportunity and direct all its work to revive distrust toward the Soviet Union.

Here, said Dorticos, we must rise to the occasion in order to explain correctly to our people the meaning of the adopted decisions.

He declared that under the created circumstances the Cubans were obliged to publish a statement, differing in tone from N.S. Khrushchev's letter, and there was suggested a preliminary acceptance by the Americans of the five [Cuban] conditions, including evacuation of the Guantanamo base. (transmitted to TASS)

Besides, Dorticos explained, we found ourselves in a difficult situation insofar as we had officially declared that we would not allow any UN observers on our territory.

Until a certain time we will have to stick to this "maximum program" and seek ways of achieving an honorable agreement which could be reached only if we receive from the USA absolute guarantees of our security.

According to Dorticos, no Kennedy statements could be trusted inasmuch as even now the piratical flights over Cuban territory were occurring and this was done not without Kennedy's knowledge.

Dorticos considers that the Americans, probably, will not stop at our consent to dismantle bases of special weapons and will demand additional concessions, in particular, the withdrawal of all the [Soviet] military units.

He also showed concern about possible solution of the question of the remaining in Cuba of our military specialists and the defensive weapons at their disposal, attached for the defense of military objectives.

Dorticos didn't say it openly, but permitted me to understand that the Cubans were not happy with our decision [to remove the missiles under UN inspection] undertaken without previously consulting them.

I told them that the small delay [in providing] the letter [from Khrushchev to Kennedy] was due to merely technical reasons (enciphering, transmission, translation) and made the assumption that insofar as the Cuban comrades had several times informed Moscow about the inevitability of [U.S.] intervention and bombings, probably, some quick and operational actions were needed, so there was no time for coordinations. Dorticos agreed.

After my visit to Dorticos, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez came to see me (he was informed by Dorticos about the content of the letter from N.S. Khrushchev to Fidel Castro) and presented a dismal picture of incomprehension among the Cuban people and several leaders of our decision to dismantle the special installations.

He said that a lot of people think that all our specialists and their weapons would be withdrawn and they were taking it hard.

According to C.R. Rodriguez, F. Castro has also reacted very painfully regarding this decision—and not the content of the decision itself because he considered it to be advantageous for mankind and the Cuban people—but the procedure of its adoption—without a previous consultation.

Particularly, he said, Dorticos had a presentiment that Castro's dissatisfaction would be caused by the phrase that the text of the response to Kennedy was being transmitted by radio.

C.R. Rodriguez explained that F. Castro was defending our decision in conversations with the Cuban leaders, trying to convince them that its results would be seen later, but he had not yet found intelligible arguments for an electrified people. But the most important [thing] is that he skeptically

regards Kennedy's assurances and is convinced that the Americans will go further and put forward new demands.

In my conversations with Dorticos and Rodriguez I said that, in my view, the decision on dismantling those installations did not interfere with Cuban defensive interests. It will not only save universal peace and ensure its strengthening, but this decision of the Soviet Government will eliminate the threat of invasion to Cuba and make it more difficult in the future.

Regarding the issue of the incomprehension of this decision by the politically literate groups of the population, I said that this phenomenon had to be very short and the people itself would understand the wisdom of the decision and thus raise its political maturity. We are confident that Dorticos, Rodriguez, F. Castro and the majority of the [Cuban] leaders will understand correctly our decision and we will find a common language with them. Indeed, there are difficulties to explain it to the people, insofar as it has been excited beyond limits by anti-American propaganda, but we consider that there will not be serious consequences and the nearest future will prove the correctness of our decision.

28/X/62 A. ALEKSEEV

*[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by Vladimir Zaemsky.]*

**Memorandum of Conversation between  
Soviet Foreign Ministry A.A. Gromyko  
and Cuban Ambassador to the USSR  
Carlos Olivares Sanchez,  
29 October 1962**

29 October 1962

At the request of Olivares Sanchez [I] received him at 16.00. [4 p.m.]

The Ambassador asked [me] to inform him about our assessment of the international situation created as a result of the naval blockade around Cuba, announced by the USA administration.

[I] Responded to him that we, the Soviet Government, consider to be a good one the outcome of the recent events in the Car-

ibbean. As a result of the efforts undertaken by the Soviet and Cuban sides there have been received guarantees on the part of the USA administration of non-aggression against the Republic of Cuba, which will be officially formalized after the end of negotiations with the participation of Mr. U Thant, Acting UN Secretary General. In our opinion the result is also a further strengthening of the international position of the Republic of Cuba. Nowadays the Cuban people is seen even more than before as a heroic people who has convincingly demonstrated to the whole world its resoluteness to defend—arms in hand—the liberty and independence of its motherland.

Olivares asked about our opinion regarding the statement made by Fidel Castro on October 28 of the current year.

[I] Responded to him that this statement has received the full comprehension and support of the Soviet Government.

Speaking of time limits for the withdrawal from Cuba of the “Soviet weapons for strategic defense” the Ambassador asked to be informed if those armaments would be returned to the Soviet Union before the Americans fulfill the Cuban government’s demand for liquidation of the USA navy base in Guantanamo.

[I] Responded to him that, in our opinion, the solution of the question of the liquidation of the Guantanamo base, apparently, will require a long time and therefore the presence of certain types of Soviet armaments in Cuba during that period will hardly contribute to solving it positively.

Olivares asked if this meant that the Soviet armaments would be withdrawn from Cuba before the USA administration satisfies other demands listed by Fidel Castro in his statement: to end the economic blockade, subversive activity, piratical actions, and incursions of whatever kind into the air space or territorial waters of Cuba.

[I] Responded to him that when we are speaking about the return of Soviet armaments from Cuba to the USSR we mean only a certain kind of armaments, but not armaments in general. Regarding the fulfillment of the above-listed demands of the Cuban government, we see it as a process that requires a certain time to satisfy all the demands mentioned in the cited statement by Fidel Castro.

Having made a reference to a note received from the Embassy of Sudan and other

available data, Olivares informed [me] that a series of neutral countries accuse Cuba of violating the Belgrade Declaration, explaining their conclusions by the accepted fact of the presence of a “Soviet military base” in Cuba.

[I] Told Olivares that such assumptions do not have the slightest grounds. Each country can use the right not only for individual, but also a collective defense against aggression. It is clear that being the object of continuous aggressive provocations on the part of the USA and even having already been a victim of invasion, Cuba cannot become like a frog voluntarily jumping into the boa’s jaws. Measures undertaken by the Cuban government to strengthen its national defenses are in full accordance with international law and do not contradict a single commonly accepted international norm.

At the conclusion of the conversation Olivares expressed his desire to broaden contacts between officials of the MFA [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] of the USSR and those of the Cuban embassy in such circumstances. He spoke about his interest to receive from the MFA a more complete information [report] about the most important decisions adopted in Moscow and referring to Soviet-Cuban relations, for his own orientation and in order to have the possibility to inform his government personally.

[I] Responded to him that I do understand such an interest, adding that the Ambassador’s desire would certainly be taken into account. [I] Explained that during the recent events we were obliged, in order to save time, to use communication lines of our Embassy in Havana, which ensure an uninterrupted, secure, and quick transmission of reports to Cuba. The Ambassador said that he entirely understands this and agrees with this. He gave me to understand that from the point of view of reliability (code) the communication through our Embassy in Havana is a more suitable method than through the Cuban embassy in Moscow.

In parting Olivares expressed deep gratitude to the peoples of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Government for continuous support of the Cuban people’s struggle for the independence of their motherland.

[I] Thanked Olivares for these sentiments.

At the conversation were present: A. Gonzales, Ambassador’s translator, and V.

Chernyshov, Second Secretary of the Latinamerican Department.

A. GROMYKO

*[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWHIP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by Vladimir Zaemsky.]*

**Record of Conversation between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov and U.N. Secretary-General U Thant, 29 October 1962**

From the diary of V. V. Kuznetsov

**RECORD OF THE CONVERSATION WITH ACTING U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL U THANT on 29 October 1962**

The meeting took place in the UN Secretariat. Present were: on the Soviet side, V.A. Zorin, P.D. Morozov, L.I. Mendelevich, and V.N. Zherebtsov; from the UN Secretariat, U Thant, E.D. Kiselev, O. Loutfi, Narasimhan, and General Rikhye.

At the beginning of the conversation, V.V. Kuznetsov conveyed to U Thant the heartfelt greetings of Comrade N.S. Khrushchev, and the latter’s great appreciation for U Thant’s efforts in a noble endeavor, the attainment of a speedy settlement of the Cuban crisis.

He said that the government of the USSR had ordered him to arrive in New York to aid U Thant in his efforts to eliminate the dangerous situation that has arisen. Although the USSR’s position with regard to the crisis in the Caribbean area seems to be quite familiar to U Thant, V.V. Kuznetsov would nevertheless like to make use of this first meeting with U Thant first and foremost emphasize to certain basic features of the Soviet Union’s position, and the steps taken by the USSR government to assure the fastest possible settlement of the crisis through peaceful means, with the goal of affirming peace and security, and taking into account the interests of all parties.

V. V. Kuznetsov reminded U Thant that the government of the Soviet Union has introduced a series of constructive proposals that received general recognition, and that

provide a good and fair foundation for resolving the whole problem. The Soviet government, bearing in mind U Thant's recommendation, has undertaken to suspend temporarily the traffic of its ships bound for Cuba, and to keep them away for a short period of time from the region declared by the United States as being under quarantine.

The government of the USSR has also declared that on board these ships there are not, and will not be, any arms that President Kennedy and the USA government see as "offensive."

Later the government of the USSR agreed to dismantle and send back to the Soviet Union the launchers now in Cuba that are seen by the United States as "offensive."

In brief, said V.V. Kuznetsov, the government of the USSR has undertaken to approve and accept U Thant's proposal; at the same time it has declared and still declares that for its part it will take any and all measures to prevent an exacerbation of the situation, which could lead to a worsening of the conflict and an unleashing of thermonuclear war. In its actions the government of the USSR is bearing in mind the sincere desire of nations to safeguard peace and calm throughout the globe.

The Soviet government has stressed and continues to stress that the actions of the United States, manifested by the imposition of the blockade, as well as the whole USA policy towards Cuba, are aggressive, and aimed at an exacerbation of the situation rather than a normalization of it. There is no need at present to provide a detailed description of American actions during the past week. That has lucidly been done by the Soviet government's statement, as well as by N.S. Khrushchev's messages to the USA President Kennedy and to U Thant.

If it were to assess the situation as it exists today, V.V. Kuznetsov continued, the Soviet government would note with satisfaction, as has already been noted in N.S. Khrushchev's message, that the USA at the present moment has taken a position which makes it possible to settle the whole Cuban problem on the basis of the Soviet proposals. All this has been the result of the efforts made by the Soviet government, as well as by the United Nations Organization and by U Thant himself. The Soviet Union acknowledges the great efforts that were displayed by U Thant.

President Kennedy's latest response to

N.S. Khrushchev's message testifies to the fact that the American government believes it possible to reach an agreement on the basis of the USSR's proposals. This we consider to be a positive factor. With regard to this it seems to us that the moment has arrived for making a transition from general statements to concrete matters. The government of the USSR is ready to do so.

U Thant has expressed his hope that the exchange of opinions will be fruitful and positive, and that it will help eliminate the threat now present in the Caribbean region. He has also expressed his thanks to N.S. Khrushchev for his greetings and his appreciation of his (U Thant's) efforts to maintain peace. U Thant has asked V.V. Kuznetsov to convey his sincere gratitude for all the understanding and cooperation he has received.

After this U Thant said that he recognizes the danger of the existing situation. That danger intensified late Saturday night and early Sunday morning. At that time there were indications that the point of no return had arrived. U Thant did not sleep that night, conducting endless consultations with Narasimhan and Rikhye. Fortunately nothing tragic occurred.

Khrushchev's response yesterday to Kennedy's message represents a very great commitment to the peaceful resolution of the Cuban crisis. U Thant emphasized that this was not just his personal opinion, but also the opinion of all his colleagues and the overwhelming majority of the permanent UN delegates with whom he has met. For this fruitful and positive gesture, said U Thant, the whole world expressed its gratitude to N.S. Khrushchev and to the government of the Soviet Union.

U Thant said that he too was concerned about the continuing blockade of Cuba on the part of the United States. He recalled his own proposals for a voluntary suspension by the Soviet Union of arms stockpiling in Cuba for a short period of time in return for the United States' voluntary suspension of the blockade. After three-day talks on this issue with the Soviet delegate to the UN, V.A. Zorin, and the USA delegate to the UN Stevenson, U Thant put all his efforts, he said, into finding the fastest resolution of this issue.

At the present time, U Thant said, after his trip to Cuba had been decided, and after the conversation taking place between

V.A. Zorin and U Thant on 28 October, he again addressed a request to the United States to suspend its blockade. In doing so he emphasized that the Soviet Union had undertaken to give orders to its ships to temporarily suspend traffic to Cuba, which signals the acceptance by the Soviet Union of the preliminary settlement proposed by U Thant. U Thant said that he had also declared to the Americans that a continuation of the blockade is especially undesirable during his visit to Cuba. U Thant has still not received a response from the Americans, but hopes to have one in the near future, possibly even today.

V.V. Kuznetsov thanked U Thant for the warm words addressed to the USSR government and personally to N.S. Khrushchev, and said that he would immediately convey them to their destination.

V.V. Kuznetsov agreed that the time has come for turning to concrete problems and ranking them on the basis of their urgency and importance. He was happy to note that, in his outlines as in U Thant's plans, the quarantine issue occupies first place. This suggests that our thoughts and desires are heading in the same direction.

In connection with this, V.V. Kuznetsov recalled that the Soviet government, as N.S. Khrushchev informed U Thant on 25 October, had accepted the first proposal of U Thant, which stipulated in particular a voluntary suspension of all arms transfers to Cuba for a period of two to three weeks, and the simultaneous temporary cessation of the quarantine activity on the part of the United States.

The most recent declarations of the USSR government have created even more favorable conditions for carrying out the proposal to end the quarantine. Nevertheless the quarantine activity still continues. However, as U Thant knows, ship captains have received instructions to remain on the open sea, outside the boundaries of the quarantine activity, for a certain period of time. Such a situation cannot continue for long, since it is depriving Cuba of peaceful goods that are necessary to it, it is creating difficulties for the fueling of the ships remaining on the open sea, and it is incurring losses because of their enforced inactivity. With regard to this, we welcomed U Thant's thoughts on the necessity of resolving this whole issue in the next one or two days. But the imposed quarantine has already been

going on for more than five days, and now there are no longer any reasons for not suspending the quarantine activity.

The declaration of the quarantine by the United States is illegal, and is recognized as such by the whole world. Nevertheless, proceeding from the situation at hand and guided by the interests of peace, the government of the USSR at the present moment is set on the issue of suspending the practical operations of the quarantine. It is quite natural that we would like these operations to cease immediately. In any case we have every right to expect a response from the United States in the very near future, perhaps even before U Thant's departure for Cuba.

U Thant again repeated that the day before he had addressed this question to the Americans, and was awaiting an answer from them that day.

V.V. Kuznetsov asked U Thant what the basic difficulties were in settling this issue.

U Thant answered that the Americans are fully aware of the instructions given to Soviet ships to remain for a short period of time outside the boundaries of the quarantine activity. They are also aware that these instructions have a definite time limit. Before this they have been trying to avoid direct contact between Soviet and American vessels. However, the Americans are afraid that if they allow Soviet ships to approach Cuba, those ships may be carrying arms. For this reason they are insisting that some mechanism be created for ascertaining whether or not such ships are conveying weaponry.

After his talks with V.A. Zorin, U Thant met with the UN delegate from Cuba, Garcia-Inchaustegui, to whom he declared that, since the USSR is not agreeing to the creation of some verification mechanism for ships on the open sea, he, U Thant, proposes to the government of Cuba to examine the possibility of creating such a mechanism in ports of call. In doing so he informed the Cuban delegate of the Soviet views on this matter.

V.V. Kuznetsov thanked U Thant for the information, and said that he understood the latter's position.

He went on to say that the government of the USSR has examined in a spirit of co-operation the ideas expressed by U Thant on the fastest suspension of the quarantine. U Thant proposed three possible ways in

which the issue could be resolved:

- 1) the monitoring of Soviet vessels by American ships;
- 2) checks on the vessels by certain neutral countries;
- 3) sharing these functions with the International Red Cross.

The government of the USSR has examined the issue and has asked to communicate that, if U Thant is not successful in reaching an agreement with the Americans on the temporary suspension of the blockade with the observation of our vessels bound for Cuba, then the Soviet government is prepared to allow, as a temporary measure, the boarding of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba by representatives of the Red Cross for ascertaining that those ships contain no sorts of weapons that concern the President and government of the USA, who refer to them as "offensive weapons."

V.V. Kuznetsov emphasized that the USSR government, in taking this step, is acting on a sincere desire to resolve this problem in the interests of peace, taking into full account the position of the Republic of Cuba.

U Thant expressed his thanks to the government of the Soviet Union for this important decision, made with the purpose of reducing tension and contributing to settling the Cuban problem through peaceful means. He promised to convey immediately the content of this Soviet proposal to the United States.

V.V. Kuznetsov noted that, in accepting one of U Thant's ideas, the Soviet government had not yet worked out the details of the monitoring system, but is raising the possibility that Red Cross representatives could be conveyed onto the Soviet vessels either by Soviet ships, or by the ships of neutral countries. As far as possible cargo checks in the ports of call are concerned, this issue is for the Cuban government to decide, since that is its own territory, and the Soviet government itself cannot make any decision on this matter without Cuban consent.

U Thant thanked V.V. Kuznetsov for his explanation, and said that he would immediately pass this information on to the government of Cuba.

U Thant noted that in the event that the Red Cross takes on the execution of these functions, he himself would determine, according to existing practices and rules of

procedure, the national composition of the inspectors. He asked V. V. Kuznetsov to give his opinion on this matter.

V. V. Kuznetsov said again that we had not yet given thought to the details, but that we would prefer that the groups of Red Cross inspectors be made up of citizens of neutral countries. If U Thant has any thoughts, then they could be discussed, and the Soviet government's views on them could be sought.

U Thant said that, as practice shows, in all cases in which the aid of the Red Cross was requested, the national make-up of its representatives was 95% Swiss.

V. V. Kuznetsov asked U Thant that on future considerations of this matter he take into account our views, as well as the fact that Switzerland is not a member of the UN.

Then he asked U Thant to describe the goal of his trip to Cuba, and any thoughts he has in connection with this trip.

U Thant said that the problem most immediately faced by the Security Council involves three governments: those of the Soviet Union, the USA, and Cuba. For the USA the most urgent problem is the lifting of the quarantine. For the USSR, it is the matter of arms provisioning, the dismantling of missile launchers, and the shipping of them back to the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has already given its consent to all this, and has even agreed to the 2 to 3 week arms provisioning point. The United States has not fully agreed to U Thant's proposal. The quarantine continues even now, and the United States is demanding the creation of a mechanism for ascertaining that arms provisioning is not continuing.

The Soviet Union's decision on the possible use of Red Cross services will in many ways contribute to the settling of this problem.

One of the goals that U Thant is setting for himself on his trip to Cuba is get an idea of what is being done or has already been done with regard to the removal of missile launchers from Cuba. He intends to give a report on this to the Security Council.

U Thant intends moreover to discuss with Castro measures for the safeguarding of the security of Cuba, as well as for the elimination of threats from the USA and certain other countries of Latin America. U Thant emphasized that precise and definite guarantees were equally important both for

the United States and other Latin American countries, and for Cuba. For this reason, U Thant intends to propose that United Nations observers be placed not only on Cuban territory, but also on the territory of the United States and several Latin American countries neighboring Cuba.

V. V. Kuznetsov said that we now have a clearer idea of the task that U Thant is setting for himself during his trip to Cuba. In connection with this he expressed some of the Soviet views on this matter. First and foremost, Kuznetsov stressed, as is already known from N. S. Khrushchev's messages, the missile installations in Cuba are in the hands of Soviet specialists. The Soviet government has stated that it is dismantling and removing these launchers from Cuba.

It is evident from the message sent by N. S. Khrushchev to Kennedy on 27 October and from the later message with which the American government generally agreed, that the Soviet government has agreed to the imposition of on-site checks after the above-mentioned dismantlings, of course with the consent of the government of the Republic of Cuba.

V. V. Kuznetsov asked whether the Americans are not moving away from the position laid out in Kennedy's message.

V. V. Kuznetsov expressed his agreement with the Soviet Union's granting of guarantees on arms provisioning and the dismantling of missile installations, and so too the United States should make guarantees to the effect that it will not infringe upon the security and sovereignty of Cuba either with its own armed forces, or through support for other countries, and that it will not permit or aid the activity on its own territory of subversive sabotage groups. These pledges must be firm.

We have made note of Kennedy's statement that the USA will guarantee that no aggression against Cuba will take place. However, on one hand Kennedy declares that the Soviet Union's statements are reassuring, while on the other hand the USA is making new demands that place the two parties in unfairly different positions.

V. V. Kuznetsov concluded that his idea comes down to the point that the statements existing at the present time are sufficient to lift the quarantine without having to take any measures related to the speedy establishment of checks on the dismantling of missile sites in Cuba.

With regard to this he recalled N. S. Khrushchev's message to Kennedy of 28 October, which said that the Soviet Union was prepared to reach an agreement with the United States on the possibility of UN representatives monitoring this dismantling process. In doing so, Khrushchev referred to his earlier message of 27 October, which said that agents of the UN Security Council could conduct on-site inspections on the fulfillment of the obligations that have been taken on. Of course it will be necessary to receive the permission of the government of the Republic of Cuba to allow these authorized officials to enter the country.

U Thant declared that he now understands better the problem connected with establishing on-site inspections on the dismantling and removal of the missile launchers from Cuba. Now, after N. S. Khrushchev's messages of 27 and 28 October, and the explanations offered by V. V. Kuznetsov, he has a clear idea of the Soviet government's position.

During his stay in Cuba he, U Thant, intends to raise the issue of the dismantling and removal of missile materials from Cuba in his talks with Prime Minister Fidel Castro, and it is possible that the latter will have something to say on this matter.

Returning to the question of guarantees, U Thant said that such guarantees should be bilateral. On his own initiative he decided to raise the issue of the presence of UN representatives in all the countries of this region. If the government of Cuba agrees to some UN presence, said U Thant, then he intends to propose to the Organization of American States and the United States to admit UN representatives onto the territory of the USA and the Latin American countries, in the interests of removing the threat to peace in this area. In its general outlines, U Thant has informed the Americans of this idea.

V. V. Kuznetsov declared that the Soviet Union has formulated its duties clearly and concisely, and that there should be no doubt in anyone's mind about the fulfillment of these duties. As far as the USA guarantees to Cuba are concerned, they have already been generally laid out in outline form. With regard to this, V. V. Kuznetsov has directed U Thant's attention to the passage from N. S. Khrushchev's message of 27 October which refers to what the USA should do about making guarantees to Cuba,

and especially: the USA government will declare in the Security Council that the USA will respect the inviolability of Cuba's borders, its sovereignty, and that it pledges not to interfere in its domestic affairs, not to invade it or let its territory serve as a base for any invasion of Cuba, and that it will also restrain those who wish to take aggressive action against Cuba either from within USA territory, or from the territory of the countries that neighbor Cuba.

V. V. Kuznetsov remarked that, as can be inferred from the Soviet Union's proposals, the duties of all parties should be formulated and represented in the form of joint or individual declarations to the Security Council that express their positions. In this way such obligations will have a more definite character. This can be inferred as well from the proposals of U Thant himself.

According to the Soviet Union, in examining the issue of guarantees it is necessary to take into consideration the views that have been expressed on this matter by Prime Minister Castro of Cuba.

V. V. Kuznetsov again asked about the desirability of receiving an answer regarding the temporary suspension of the quarantine before U Thant's departure for Cuba. In doing so he emphasized that the Soviet Union for its part has made many conciliatory gestures, and that now it is necessary to persuade the other side to make similar ones.

U Thant said that he would immediately communicate information about the Soviet Union's favorable reaction to his proposal about possibly making use of the services of the Red Cross, and with regard to this he wanted to clarify certain details. First, in the event that the Red Cross agrees, the personnel of the inspection groups can be appointed only by that organization. The UN cannot make recommendations to it on that matter. Second, as U Thant understands it, vessels carrying the inspection groups will be supplied by the Soviet Union or neutral countries. Third, the Americans in their talks with U Thant have asked about the vessels chartered by the Soviet Union for carrying its own cargo.

V. V. Kuznetsov said that he was authorized, naturally, to speak only about Soviet vessels.

V. A. Zorin added that the Americans can be sure that Lebanese or Swedish vessels, say, are not carrying arms, as these

governments have officially declared.

V. V. Kuznetsov noted that if the USA wanted an agreement, they would have quickly resolved this matter. If they have no such desire, they can find a million pretexts and ask a million questions. V. A. Zorin said that such an agreement could indeed be reached today, since the positions of all the interested parties have in general been clearly presented.

At the conclusion of the meeting it was agreed that during U Thant's stay in Cuba, contact with him would be sustained through Narasimhan.

The conversation was recorded by V. Zharebtsov.

*[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]*

**Telegram from Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov to USSR Foreign Ministry, 29 October 1962**

29 October 1962

On 29 October we met with U Thant.

We conveyed greetings to U Thant from Comrade N.S. Khrushchev, as well as the latter's wishes for U Thant's success in averting a war, strengthening the peace, and safeguarding the security of all nations. U Thant was told that I had been entrusted by the Soviet government to aid him, U Thant, in his efforts to eliminate the current dangerous situation. We then laid out the basic points of the USSR's position in the Cuban affair, as they were defined in Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's messages to Kennedy of 26, 27, and 28 October 1962. We noted that the USA had declared the Soviet proposals to be generally practicable, which allows the Cuban problem to be resolved on the basis of those Soviet proposals. We emphasized that in view of this, the moment had arrived for moving away from general statements about the positions of the parties, and towards an agreement on concrete steps to be taken. We declared that the Soviet government is ready to take on this practical work.

U Thant asked us to convey to Comrade N.S. Khrushchev his sincere gratitude

and best wishes. He remarked that the situation had been extraordinarily serious, especially towards the end of 27 October, although Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's message of 28 October had relieved the situation. U Thant called that message "a most considerable contribution to peace" and emphasized that this was the general opinion in the UN.

U Thant said furthermore that he also considered it expedient to move towards the working out of an agreement on concrete measures for the settlement of the Cuban situation, and precisely for this purpose he had addressed a request the day before (on 28 October) to the Americans to lift the blockade of Cuba immediately (U Thant used the word "blockade") for a period of 2 to 3 weeks, as had been stipulated in U Thant's first message of 25 October. In doing so, U Thant emphasized that the USSR had already done what U Thant had requested in that message, suspending arms provisioning in Cuba, while the USA had not yet lifted the blockade. It still cannot be said that the Americans have done so, U Thant continued. For him (U Thant) a very strange situation could arise if he is in Cuba (he will fly to Havana tomorrow to meet with Fidel Castro), and the American navy is still continuing the blockade at that time.

We asked U Thant how the Americans are explaining their delay in accepting the decision about lifting the so-called quarantine, even though it is obvious that such a lifting is absolutely necessary both politically and practically. With regard to this, we pointed out the urgency of lifting the quarantine first and foremost because of the necessity of laying a foundation, as U Thant himself suggested, for negotiating a settlement of the Cuban problem. Moreover, because of the continuing blockade, ships carrying exclusively peace-time goods cannot get these goods to Cuba, where they are needed, and furthermore the ships are experiencing fueling difficulties, and their idleness is bringing losses. We emphasized that the Soviet Union has agreed to U Thant's proposal to hold back these vessels bound for Cuba for several days, but that the Americans keep prolonging the period.

U Thant answered that the Americans are demanding checks on the Soviet vessels carrying cargo to Cuba, as one of the conditions on their lifting the quarantine. With regard to this he said that the situation would

be relieved if the Soviet Union agreed to the carrying out of these checks through some "independent agency."

In accordance with your instructions, we informed U Thant that the Soviet government is prepared to give its consent to checks on Soviet vessels bound for Cuba, as U Thant proposed in one of his earlier talks with Comrade Zorin, by representative of the International Red Cross, if the USA refuses to lift the blockade unless such checks are instituted. I emphasized that this is of course a temporary measure, for 2 to 3 weeks until the settlement of the Cuban problem.

U Thant received this information with very great interest, and expressed gratitude to the Soviet government for this new and important step towards settling the Cuban conflict. He said that he would meet today with the Americans, and would secure the lifting of the "quarantine." With regard to the practical issues connected with our proposal for carrying out checks on vessels by representatives of the International Red Cross, we explained to U Thant in accordance with your instructions that the main issue here concerns the checks at sea, in which Red Cross representatives would be conveyed on board Soviet ships by USSR vessels or by those belonging to neutral countries. As far as checks in the ports are concerned, we noted that this falls not within our own jurisdiction, but that of the Cuban government. U Thant came back to this point several times, and it was clear that he prefers instituting checks in the Cuban ports. For our part we consider it feasible to agree with this, as long as our Cuban friends do not object. It is technically possible to carry out checks in ports much faster than on the open sea, and this would keep the Americans from delaying any longer the lifting of the "quarantine."

U Thant then asked how we feel about the fact that the Red Cross will use mainly Swiss personnel to carry out the checks. In doing so he emphasized that, as he knows from past experience, the International Red Cross does not accept any recommendations on the make-up of its personnel, and its own personnel is 95% Swiss. I said that we would prefer that the personnel of the inspection groups consisted of citizens from neutral countries that are represented in the UN.

U Thant also asked whether we agreed to the Red Cross checks on Soviet ships

only, or also on vessels chartered by the Soviet Union. We said that we cannot speak of any vessels other than Soviet ones, but that it would be absurd if the Americans started suspecting the Soviet Union of conveying arms that it calls "offensive" on chartered vessels belonging, for example, to Sweden or Lebanon. U Thant agreed that this would be an absurdity.

We asked U Thant what his intentions were with regard to the forthcoming negotiations in Cuba. U Thant said that he wanted to exchange views with Fidel Castro primarily on how the dismantling of war sites, which is referred to in Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's message of 28 October, would be carried out.

We told U Thant that the military sites mentioned there were in the hands of Soviet officers. U Thant answered that he knew this, and of course would consult with the Soviet Union on this matter.

With regard to this, we reminded U Thant that, as noted in Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's letter of 27 October, the checks should be carried out after the arms are removed from Cuba. What will have to be checked is not the weaponry, but the fact that it is no longer in Cuba. U Thant declined to spell out his own point of view on this matter. It can be supposed that the Americans will insist that inspections be carried out even during the process of dismantling.

U Thant said that he meant to exchange views with Fidel Castro as well on the matters connected with the checks on vessels bound for Cuba.

The goal of his trip to Cuba, U Thant said, would also be a discussion with Fidel Castro on obtaining guarantees for Cuban security, and guarantees for the security of other countries which maintain that Cuba represents a threat to them. He said that he wanted to propose to Castro a formulation that would stipulate a "UN presence" in Cuba on the model of the "UN presence" in the United Arab Republic (Gaza and Aqaba) as a guarantee that nobody will invade Cuba, and that Cuba will not take actions against anybody else.

We told U Thant that really the point about guarantees for Cuban security ought to constitute the most important part of the final settling of the whole problem. Kennedy's statements on this matter are positive, but they seem to have a provisional character, and refer to Cuba's inviolability

from attack in only a very general way. It is necessary to concretize these statements, and to confirm the whole settlement of the Cuban issue, including guarantees for Cuba's security, through the Security Council. With regard to this we referred to the relevant point about guarantees on Cuban security contained in Comrade N. S. Khrushchev's message of 27 October. We also recalled the guarantees that Fidel Castro demanded in his statement of 28 October.

U Thant did not show any reaction to any of this, although he did not object of any of it, but rather returned again to the question of a "UN presence" in Cuba. He said that if Fidel Castro approves this proposal, he will then address a similar proposal to the other party regarding the "UN presence" in the USA and certain Latin American countries. We were given to understand that the goal of this "UN presence" would be to avert attacks on Cuba by counterrevolutionary Cuban emigres now living in the USA and certain countries of Latin America.

We did not meanwhile express to U Thant our attitude to this proposal of his. We assume that it could be viewed positively when one takes into account that U Thant has in mind a "UN presence" on the territories of both parties—of Cuba as well as of the USA and certain Latin American countries. This would mean that with regard to this issue the UN would be keeping the same watch over Cuba as over the USA, which is certainly advantageous.

In their relations to us, the Americans are remaining passive, and decline to meet. Intending to initiate contact with Stevenson, we suggested to U Thant through Kiselev that he arrange a breakfast today and invite the Americans and us. U Thant liked this idea, and he contacted Stevenson. Stevenson, however, refused to accept his invitation, referring to the fact that he had no instructions from the State Department, and that without such authorization he could not meet with Soviet representatives.

29.X.62 V. KUZNETSOV

*[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer-*

*sity.]*

**Telegram from Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov to USSR Foreign Ministry, 30 October 1962**

30 October 1962

On 29 October I received the permanent UN delegate from Cuba, Garcia-Inchaustegui. I welcomed him as representative of the courageous Cuban nation, which is self-sacrificingly standing up for its freedom and independence in its struggle with a powerful and dangerous enemy—American imperialism.

I said that I considered it necessary to meet first of all with the Cuban delegate, and I expressed the hope that, in carrying out the task that stands before us both, we would work in close contact with our Cuban comrades, keeping each other informed and consulting with each other.

Garcia-Inchaustegui gratefully acknowledged the constant support offered to the Cuban nation by the Soviet Union, and said that the Cuban delegates in New York also constantly feel support from their Soviet comrades in their joint work in the United Nations Organization.

Garcia-Inchaustegui said that he had had a meeting with U Thant during which they discussed the latter's trip to Cuba. U Thant intends, after the negotiations in Havana, to leave General Rikhye behind in Cuba as his representative, along with a group of workers supposedly for continuing the negotiations with the Cuban government and for sustaining relations with the UN. The issue of leaving General Rikhye in Cuba will in Garcia-Inchaustegui's opinion be the subject of negotiations between U Thant and the Cuban government in Havana.

On the question of the most urgent matters to which, in his view, U Thant's attention should be given, Garcia-Inchaustegui said that the task of primary importance is the safeguarding of unhindered passage for vessels bound for Cuba and the lifting of the blockade. He has already spoken to U Thant about this, as well as with the delegates from other countries, especially the Afro-Asian countries.

Garcia-Inchaustegui said that the minister of foreign affairs Raul Roa would arrive in New York at the end of this week.

30.X.62 V. KUZNETSOV

*[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]*

**Telegram from Deputy Foreign  
Minister V. V. Kuznetsov to the Soviet  
Foreign Ministry, 30 October 1962**

30 October 1962

On 29 October a second meeting with U Thant was held at his initiative.

1. U Thant informed me that the Americans have favorably received our agreement to the inspection of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba by representatives of the International Red Cross.

U Thant also informed us that he had contacted the Red Cross and received a preliminary response that the Red Cross was ready to undertake the inspection of vessels both on the open sea, and in ports of disembarkation. U Thant intends to negotiate with Fidel Castro on carrying out the inspection in ports.

In the Red Cross's preliminary response received by U Thant, it is indicated that all personnel carrying out the inspection of the vessels will consist of Swiss citizens.

2. U Thant explained to Stevenson our position on the inspection of the dismantlings and the removal of the so-called "offensive" weaponry from Cuba. The Americans asked U Thant to clarify how long the dismantling would take. On his own initiative U Thant put this question to us. We told U Thant that we would ask our government, but provisionally the dismantling will be expected to take 2 to 3 weeks. (In provisionally specifying this time frame, we were proceeding from the relevant points made in Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's message to Kennedy of 27 October.)

We request to be informed about the duration of the dismantling processes in order to give an answer to U Thant.

3. According to U Thant, the Americans are insisting that the monitoring of the dismantling be carried out during the very process of dismantling, and not after its

completion, especially if the dismantling is to take a long time. With regard to this it is advantageous to accelerate the dismantlings, in order not to show the installations to the inspectors. The Americans prefer that the inspection be carried out by the UN, and for the composition of the inspection groups they propose two variants: representatives of neutral countries, or representatives of the immediately interested parties—the USA, the USSR, and Cuba. The Americans, however, according to U Thant, have started insisting less strongly lately on UN inspection during the dismantling process. They are said to declare that if it is not possible to reach an agreement about UN inspections, they will carry out the inspections themselves, and that they have the necessary means to do so.

General Rikhye (U Thant's military advisor) who was present at the conversation explained that with inspections by their own forces, the Americans have in mind flights over Cuba by their own planes carrying photographic equipment, and at low altitudes.

U Thant told Stevenson that the UN can carry out dismantling inspections in Cuba only in the event that the Soviet Union and Cuba agree to it. He asked that there be notification of the Soviet government's position on inspection by UN forces during the dismantling process.

It appears to us expedient to insist on our present position, in accordance with which the appointees of the Security Council should carry out inspections not of the process of dismantling, but of the Soviet Union's fulfillment of its promise to dismantle the installations of weapons which the Americans refer to as "offensive." This would mean that the inspectors would be admitted to sites where there are installations when they have not yet been fully dismantled, and the arms not yet removed. In regard to this, it is expedient to speed up the dismantling of the installations and the removal of the arms. If the dismantling is carried out in a short time, then the issue of inspection during the dismantling process will not arise at all.

We request that you consider this.

4. During the talks with U Thant, his aides delivered reports to him on Kennedy's statement concerning the suspension of the "quarantine" of vessels bound for Cuba during the period of U Thant's stay in Cuba on

30 and 31 October. U Thant asked how we felt about this. We said that such a period was too short for even the vessels located near the blockade zone to make it to the ports of disembarkation.

U Thant noted in regard to this that he gave very great significance to the requirement that during his stay in Cuba his people, like Rikhye, be shown at least from a distance that the installations are being dismantled. In this case, U Thant said, on his return from New York he would issue a statement that his people have been convinced of the Soviet Union's fulfillment of its dismantling obligation, and that for this reason the "quarantine" should not be reimposed. U Thant asked whether the Soviet government could agree to this.

We propose that it would be appropriate to show U Thant himself the dismantling of certain installations during his stay in Cuba on 30 and 31 October. In such an event he would take a firmer stance, and it would be more difficult for the Americans to renew their "quarantine" of Cuba.

If this is recognized as expedient, I request urgently to give corresponding instructions to Havana.

30.X.62 V. KUZNETSOV

*[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]*

**Telegram from Soviet Deputy Foreign  
Minister Kuznetsov and Ambassador to  
the UN Zorin to USSR Foreign  
Ministry, 30 October 1962**

30 October 1962

On 30 October Comrade Zorin, in his capacity as chairman of the Security Council, the term of which expires tomorrow, held the traditional breakfast for members of the Council. Present were the heads of the delegations of all the countries represented by the Security Council, including Stevenson. From the talks during the breakfast, the following is worthy of attention:

1. Stevenson said that the government of the USA agrees to our proposal for checks on vessels carried out by representatives of

the International Red Cross, and prefers that such checks be carried out not on the open sea, but in Cuban ports.

Stevenson said furthermore that now the USA attributes primary importance to reaching an agreement on the inspection of the dismantling of the Soviet military emplacements in Cuba, insisting that such inspection be carried out during the dismantling process. The Americans imagine inspections, as Stevenson said, in the form of planes flying over Cuba with inspection groups on board.

2. The Irish delegate [Frederick H.] Boland voiced a proposal, clearly not without American consent, for convening the Security Council immediately after U Thant's return from Cuba, and, without discussing in detail any other matters at this meeting, to hear U Thant's report and make a decision about authorizing U Thant to create an inspection mechanism for the dismantlings in Cuba. As far as the other matters in the Cuban settlement are concerned, including the matter of guarantees for Cuban security, Boland believes that those matters can be raised in speeches at the above-mentioned meeting of the Security Council, but that approving resolutions on them should be left for a later date.

The delegates from the United Arab Republic (Riad) and Ghana (Quaison-Sackey) voiced objections to Boland's proposal (Riad more firmly, Quaison-Sackey somewhat evasively). They believe that the first priority is resolving the matter of guarantees for Cuban security.

3. The Ghanaian delegate Quaison-Sackey made several remarks about the Congo. The substance of these remarks comes down to the fact that the situation in the Congo is bad, is becoming worse all the time, and that the recourse at present is the use of UN forces against [Moise] Tshombe.<sup>10</sup>

4. Our thoughts on our position and on tactical matters will be sent by separate telegram.

30.X.62 V. KUZNETSOV V. ZORIN

[Source: *Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWHIP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard Univer-*

*sity.*]

**Telegram from Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov and Ambassador to the UN Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 30 October 1962**

30 October 1962

We are communicating several thoughts on the situation that has arisen around the Cuban issue, and on our possible position and tactics in the course of future negotiations with U Thant and the Americans.

First. From talks with U Thant, conversations at the UN, and information from the American press, we have received the impression that the strategy of the USA government is at present directed towards the carrying out of our decision to dismantle military sites in Cuba, rejecting at the same time the necessity of giving clear and firm guarantees of Cuban security, restricted in this regard by the statements issued earlier by Kennedy in his messages to Comrade N.S. Khrushchev of 27 and 28 October, or in the last resort by the Security Council's approval of those statements.

In this regard it is significant that the Americans, as is evident from available information, want the future role of the Security Council and especially of U Thant to come down basically to organizing and carrying out inspections on the dismantling of our missile installations in Cuba.

As far as guarantees of Cuban security are concerned, the Americans understand that a clear and concrete resolution of the Security Council could in this respect tie their hands and keep them from proceeding with their aggressive policy toward Cuba, which it seems they do not intend to renounce. On 29 October a UPI press bulletin said that Rusk "had assured the Latin American envoys that any Soviet-American agreement would pursue the goal of the removal of missiles from Cuba, and in no way would exclude the possibility of new collective measures against Castro."

In light of this, there is reason to expect that Kennedy's statement about the USA government's readiness to "give assurances that there will be no invasion of Cuba" will be interpreted by the Americans in the narrow sense, as saying that the USA and the Latin American countries will not attack

Cuba with their own armed forces. At the same time they are trying to keep their hands free not only in relation to the economic blockade of Cuba and subversive operations against it, but also in their support, perhaps somewhat more disguised than earlier, for the preparation by counterrevolutionary Cuban emigres of military activities against Cuba.

Second. As far as U Thant's line is concerned, he intends, as he told us, to exchange views with Fidel Castro primarily on the issue of the verification of the dismantling of Soviet military sites, and also to ascertain that this dismantling is actually going on. On his return he intends to present a report to the Security Council precisely on these issues, after which the Council will face the practical issue of creating a monitoring apparatus.

It is true that U Thant, taking into account how we put before him the issue of guarantees for Cuba, is preparing at the same time to put before Castro the issue of the so-called "UN presence" in Cuba as a guarantee of its security and a guarantee against any Cuban actions against the other Latin-American countries. In the event of the Cuban government's consenting to this sort of "UN presence" in Cuba, U Thant intends to pose the same question about a "UN presence" on the territory of the USA and certain Latin-American countries. It is however evident that the Americans will try to arrange the Security Council affair in such a way as to give priority to the issue of the mechanism for inspections on the war-site dismantling, and not to the issue of guarantees for Cuba. Moreover, U Thant's plans with regard to the guarantees for Cuba are not yet fully clear.

Third. It appears to us that in these conditions it would be expedient, in the interests of safeguarding guarantees for Cuban security, to try to bring together into one knot the main issues that must be resolved for a peaceful settlement of the Cuban crisis, most importantly the issues of control on the dismantling inspections and of guarantees for Cuba, and to reach a simultaneous settlement of these issues through the Security Council. We intend to suggest that such a resolution be given the form of a joint declaration made in the Security Council by the governments of the USSR and the USA (or by these two separately) concerning a peaceful settlement of the Cuban crisis, the

Cuban government's input on this issue, and the Council's resolution approving all these declarations and entrusting the acting Secretary General of the UN, under the supervision of the Security Council, to carry out the necessary measures according to the procedures of the UN apparatus.

We will propose in the framework of these declarations to stipulate, as a guarantee of Cuban security, the final end to all blockade activity against Cuba, and the duties of the USA in the capacity proposed by Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's message to Kennedy of 27 October, and taking into account Fidel Castro's statement of 28 October.

If the Americans insist, we will consider the possibility of approving the explicit mention in the declaration of the Soviet government's obligation to dismantle the Soviet military sites in Cuba which the Americans call offensive, and of the Soviet government's approval of the inspection system that has been worked out.

The Americans will obviously demand a declaration from the Cuban government that contains an expression of consent to the elaborated guarantees of security and of the inspection system, as well as a formulation of Cuba's non-attack obligations with regard to its neighbors, in accordance with the goals of the UN Charter. We will consult with the Cuban delegation on this issue.

As far as the inspection system on the dismantling is concerned, we propose that our primary position should be to agree to the implementation of the inspections after the completion of the dismantling process. If the Americans insist on carrying out inspections during the dismantling process, it might be possible to agree to this as long as we had guarantees for a monitoring procedure that would of course keep hidden from the inspectors anything we did not want to reveal. The monitoring process should take only a short time to be carried out—only a period necessary for ascertaining that the dismantling has been completed.

With regard to the composition of the inspection apparatus, there are now several variants being advanced in UN circles.

According to facts released by the UN secretariat, U Thant wants to create a monitoring apparatus composed of representatives from a selection of neutral countries belonging to the UN—Sweden, Ethiopia, the United Arab Republic, Mexico, Brazil,

[and] Yugoslavia, and also Switzerland. There is also an idea about delegating the monitoring process to eight neutral countries represented in the Committee on Disarmament (India, Burma, the United Arab Republic, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Mexico, Brazil, Sweden), possibly, with the goal of setting a precedent for resolving questions involving inspections on full and general disarmament. The Americans, U Thant has informed us, are putting forth a variant in which the monitoring groups consist of representatives from the USA, the USSR, and Cuba.

We propose that it would be appropriate to stipulate that the monitoring groups include representatives from countries like Indonesia, Ceylon, the United Arab Republic, and Ghana. In the course of negotiations it would be possible to agree on a variant in which the groups are composed of representatives from eight neutral countries belonging to the 18th Committee on Disarmament.

Furthermore a question arises about future UN measures on strengthening peace in the Caribbean region after the completion of the inspections of dismantling, and also on the inspection (by International Red Cross forces) of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba.

In our opinion, it would be possible to agree to the presence in Havana (or in several Cuban commercial ports) of small groups of UN representatives (of the same composition as the groups verifying military-site dismantling) with the right to carry out selective inspections on the vessels of various countries arriving in Cuba, with the purpose of determining whether or not they are carrying so-called "offensive" sorts of armaments. [One could] make this conditional upon the requirement that the same groups of UN representatives be placed in the USA and the Latin-American countries neighboring Cuba with the right to make periodic inspections of certain regions of these countries with the purpose of determining whether preparations are being made for the invasion of Cuba, either by these countries themselves or by Cuban emigres.

It would be possible to propose that this system of observation operate for the duration, for example, of one year, after which the Security Council would again examine the issue of whether a continuation of the observation is needed.

Fourth. Taking into account President Kennedy's desire, communicated through Robert Kennedy in his conversation with Comrade Dobrynin on 27 October (your #1255), we will not raise the issue of the American bases in Turkey in our negotiations with U Thant and the Americans in New York. At the same time it seems to us possible and expedient to reach an agreement with the USA that in the joint Soviet-American declaration in the Security Council, there be a record of both sides' intention to enter in the near future negotiations for normalizing relations between the NATO countries and the countries of the Warsaw Pact, as has already been outlined in the correspondence between Comrade N.S. Khrushchev and President Kennedy. In doing so it might be possible to include in such a declaration a reference both to Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's message of 28 October and Kennedy's messages of 27 and 28 October, as well as to Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's message of 27 October, in which the question about Turkey is raised.

Fifth. Until now, in our official documents and during negotiations here in New York, our weaponry now being dismantled in Cuba has been referred to as "weaponry considered offensive by the Americans." In the course of future negotiations, and especially during the preparation of the texts of the Security Council documents, we will have to oppose our own concrete formulation to the American formulation "offensive weaponry." It might be possible in our opinion to use, say, the formula "means for conveying nuclear arms at an operational distance a certain number of kilometers."

All the issues laid out here will be the subject of discussions immediately after U Thant's return from Cuba, i.e., after 1 November.

We request your examination.

30.X.62 V. KUZNETSOV  
V. ZORIN

*[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]*

**Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to**

**the USA A.F. Dobrynin to the USSR  
Foreign Ministry, 30 October 1962**

30 October 1962

Today Robert Kennedy invited me to meet with him. He said that he would like to talk about N.S. Khrushchev's letter to the President yesterday.<sup>11</sup>

The President, Robert Kennedy said, confirms the understanding [*dogovorionost*] with N.S. Khrushchev on the elimination of the American missile bases in Turkey (Robert Kennedy confirmed that one speaks of an understanding). Corresponding measures will be taken towards fulfilling this understanding within the period of time indicated earlier, in confidential observance of NATO guidelines, but of course without any mention that this is connected to the Cuban events.

We, however, said Robert Kennedy, are not prepared to formulate such an understanding in the form of letters, even the most confidential letters, between the President and the head of the Soviet government when it concerns such a highly delicate issue. Speaking in all candor, I myself, for example, do not want to risk getting involved in the transmission of this sort of letter, since who knows where and when such letters can surface or be somehow published—not now, but in the future—and any changes in the course of events are possible. The appearance of such a document could cause irreparable harm to my political career in the future. This is why we request that you take this letter back.

It is possible, Robert Kennedy continued, that you do not believe us and through letters you want to put the understanding in writing. The issue of Soviet missile bases in Cuba has unfortunately introduced a real element of uncertainty and suspicion even into confidential channels of contact. We will however live up to our promise, even if it is given in this oral form. As you know, it was in precisely the same oral form that the President made his promise to N.S. Khrushchev regarding the removal of a certain number of American soldiers from Thailand.<sup>12</sup> That promise was kept. So too will this promise be kept.

As a guarantee, Robert Kennedy added, I can only give you my word. Moreover I can tell you that two other people besides the President know about the exist-

ing understanding: they are [Secretary of State Dean] Rusk and [advisor on Soviet affairs Llewellyn] Thompson. If you do not believe me, discuss it with them, and they will tell you the same thing. But it is better not to transfer this understanding into a formal, albeit confidential, exchange of letters (as can be noted, the greatest suspicion in the two Kennedy brothers was elicited by the part of Khrushchev's letter which speaks directly of a link between the Cuban events and the bases in Turkey). We hope that N.S. Khrushchev will understand us correctly. In regard to this Robert Kennedy insistently asked to take the letter back without delay.

I told Robert Kennedy that everything said above I would report to N.S. Khrushchev, emphasizing in doing so that even the President and he, Robert Kennedy, could be sure of the fact that the Soviet government is regarding the understanding that has been reached as strictly secret and not for publication. At the same time, in order to confirm Robert Kennedy's statement about the understanding, I asked him again about whether the President really confirms the understanding with N.S. Khrushchev on the elimination of American missile bases in Turkey. Robert Kennedy said once again that he confirmed it, and again that he hoped that their motivations would be properly understood in Moscow. Taking what they explained into account, I believed it conditionally possible—before receiving any instructions from Moscow—to take this letter [back], since a categorical refusal to do so would, in my opinion, only weaken Robert Kennedy's firm statements on the understanding that has been reached. Moreover, leaving the letter with him, after he had clearly expressed the President's desire not to exchange letters, could scarcely be in the interests of doing business [in the future].

In conclusion Robert Kennedy said that, in his opinion, the events connected with the Cuban issue have been developing quite favorably, and that he hoped that everything would eventually be settled. He added that, on the Turkish issue and other highly confidential issues he was prepared to maintain a direct contact with me as earlier, emphasizing in doing so that the point was the the possible oral considerations of the President and the head of the Soviet government N.S. Khrushchev on the exchange of letters on such delicate issues as missile bases in Turkey, or issues which need to be

handled more by the State Department than by him personally, taking into account the delicacy of his situation as the President's brother and as Attorney General of the United States. I do not want, Robert Kennedy added, to claim for myself the function of the State Department, but my "solitary diplomacy" may be needed several more times, and we will meeting with each other periodically.

I answered to Robert Kennedy that I was prepared to maintain contact with him on highly important issues in the future, passing over the heads, as he himself suggested, of all intermediaries. Robert Kennedy confirmed this. From what Robert Kennedy said it was clear that the President is trying now to avoid exchanging any documents on issues of a highly delicate nature like Turkey which could leave a trace anywhere, but that he favors the continuation of a confidential exchange of opinions between the heads of the two governments.

We believe it expedient to visit Robert Kennedy once again and to issue a statement, in referring to our mission, that the Soviet government and N.S. Khrushchev personally are prepared to take into account the President's desire for maintaining the secrecy of the oral understanding on the removal of the American missile bases from Turkey. It is also expedient to tell of our willingness, if the President is also prepared for this, to continue the confidential exchange of opinions between the heads of the governments on many important unresolved issues, on whose resolution the lessening of international tension, and of the tension between our two countries in particular, is to a very great degree dependent.

I request instructions.

30.X.62 A.DOBRYNIN

[Source: *Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.*]

**Telegram from USSR Foreign Ministry  
to Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V.V.  
Kuznetsov, New York, 31 October 1962**

In the negotiations between the del-

legates of the USSR, the USA, and Cuba with the participation of the acting Secretary General of the UN on the normalization of the situation that has arisen around Cuba, you should follow the messages of N.S. Khrushchev to President John Kennedy and U Thant, and also by the instructions given in our dispatches #1254 and #1267.

In the negotiations you should try to record the agreement deriving from the exchange of messages between N.S. Khrushchev and John Kennedy in the form of a protocol statement that would be presented to the Security Council for all measures taken in accordance with the UN Charter. As a basis for negotiations, after receiving the consent of our Cuban friends, convey to the Americans and to U Thant the statement of protocol, and declare that this statement is being introduced jointly by the governments of the USSR and Cuba. (The text of the statement of protocol is being communicated by separate telegram.)

Since Fidel Castro's statement of 28 October contains a demand concerning the evacuation of the USA naval base in Guantanamo, the protocol statement includes a point concerning the negotiations of the USA and the Republic of Cuba on this matter. If however the USA objects to the inclusion of this point, and this impedes the reaching of an agreement according to the whole protocol statement, then with the consent of the Cuban representative you may not insist on a separate mention of the Guantanamo base in the protocol statement. In this we proceed from the fact that the protocol statement contains Article 16, which stipulates the necessity of carrying out negotiations on other issues, including issues raised in Fidel Castro's statement of 28 October, i.e. in other words, the issue of the military base in Guantanamo.

As far as a possible Security Council resolution with regard to the protocol statement is concerned, in negotiations you should aim for the Council's approving a resolution that would generally contain the following basic points:

"1. The Security Council welcomes with satisfaction and expresses its approval of the agreement reached by the governments of the USSR, the USA, and Cuba with the participation of the acting Secretary General of the UN U Thant, on measures to be taken for normalizing the Caribbean situation, which facilitates the lessening of the

tension that had had arisen in the relations among the countries.

2. The Security Council takes into consideration the obligations of the governments of the USSR, the USA, and the Republic of Cuba recorded in the protocol presented to the Security Council, including precisely:

(Here the text of all 17 articles of the protocol statement is given.)

3. The Security Council is proceeding from the stipulation that the governments of the countries participating in the protocol statement will strictly carry out the obligations they have taken on, which will contribute to the strengthening of trust among the countries and to affirming peace generally.

4. In accordance with articles 10 and 13 of the protocol statement, the Security Council requests the governments of [gap in text] countries to share their own delegates as agents for ascertaining the carrying out of the obligations to dismantle and remove the weaponry indicated in articles 9 and 12 of the protocol statement.

5. The Security Council asks acting UN Secretary General U Thant to grant the group of agents the necessary means and cooperation for carrying out the functions with which they have been entrusted."

The text of the protocol statement is now being submitted to the approval of Fidel Castro.

On receiving the approval of Fidel Castro, we will notify you of the possibility of forwarding this text to the Americans and U Thant on behalf of the Soviet Union and Cuba.

If you have any thoughts pertaining to the local situation, communicate them.

Confirm reception of this telegram.

*[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]*

**Cable from Soviet Foreign Minister  
Gromyko to USSR Ambassador to  
Cuba A.I. Alekseev, 31 October 1962**

You should visit F. Castro and, after reference to these instructions, tell him the

following.

Currently there is a lessening in military tension created around Cuba. But on the diplomatic field we have to accomplish a crucial stage in order to consolidate the achieved success and to bind the Americans by commitments ensuing from the exchange of messages between N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy and F. Castro's statement of 28 October.

We consider that under current conditions we and you should display self-restraint in our official declarations and statements and also in the press, in order to not to give the aggressors a pretext to blame our side for irreconcilability and intractability. We must hold to a firm, but constructive stand. We would like it to be taken into account in your statements, too. It would be good if you in your appearances underline Cuba's readiness to normalize diplomatic and economic relations with the USA and countries of Latin America. It should also be repeated what you have declared more than once about Cuba's devotion to the cause of peace, to the UN principles, among them non-interference of states into the internal affairs of each other.

All of this is needed, of course, not for the aggressors' ears, but for international public opinion.

Telegraph the implementation of these instructions.

31.X.62

A. GROMYKO

*[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by Vladimir Zaemsky.]*

**Cable from Soviet Foreign Minister  
Gromyko to USSR Ambassador to  
Cuba A.I. Alekseev, 31 October 1962**

Visit Fidel Castro and tell him the following:

1. Say, that in Moscow we consider it necessary to satisfy U Thant's desire that the launchers, which are being dismantled, be shown to him and persons accompanying him, among them General Rikhye, even in the course of dismantling. It is advantageous for us, especially taking into account

that U Thant has promised to make a statement immediately on his return to the USA, that the Soviet Union had fulfilled its commitments.

Inform [Castro] also about our consent to permit U Thant's representatives, if he raises such a question, to be allowed to visit sites of dismantling even after U Thant's departure from Cuba, in order to check that the dismantling has been carried out and to be sure about the launchers' withdrawal from Cuba.

Immediately inform about these instructions Pavlov [Pliyev], who has to fulfill them without delay.

2. Inform Fidel Castro that in Moscow it is considered advantageous U Thant's proposal about creating UN posts on the territory of Cuba, corresponding countries of Latin America, and in the USA territory in order to observe compliance with the commitments; this proposal corresponds to both the interests of Cuba and our common interests. Implementation of this proposal for a "UN presence," made by U Thant, would mean that the UN equally regard Cuba and the USA on this issue. That is advantageous for the party which does not intend to attack, i.e. for Cuba, and it is not advantageous for the party with aggressive intentions, i.e. for the USA and their assistants from the Latin American countries.

Immediately inform Pavlov [Pliyev] about these instructions too.

Express confidence that Fidel Castro and his friends would also accept U Thant's proposal, which is very important for us.

We proceed from the assumption that the Cuban government and comrade Pavlov [Pliyev] would undertake all the necessary measures on site.

Cable report on the execution of these instructions.

A. GROMYKO

*[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWHIP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by Vladimir Zaemsky.]*

**Telegram from Soviet ambassador to Cuba A. I. Alekseev to USSR Foreign Ministry, 31 October 1962**

31 October

After we learned that the Cubans will not permit U Thant and his advisors to visit the dismantling of military sites, and honoring Rikhye's request to meet with the Soviet general, Comrade Pavlov [Pliyev] and I made the decision to engage U Thant in talks with myself and General [Igor D.] Statsenko,<sup>13</sup> who would offer him and Rikhye detailed information on the issues raised by them yesterday.

Preliminary to our decision to visit U Thant, I informed President Dorticos, who supported this step.

In our talks with U Thant and Rikhye we provided the following information:

The dismantling of the weaponry was begun on the evening of 28 October, and in a general way has practically already been completed by today. By the end of 1 November or at the latest 2 November all weaponry will have been sent to ports for loading onto ships. The arrival times of the ships may be known only by Moscow, and we requested that the answer to U Thant on this issue be sent to New York.

U Thant and Rikhye expressed thanks for the information, saying that for them it was the chief result of the trip to Cuba, and probably the most significant one after Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's letter of 28 October.

U Thant asked General Statsenko whether he could refer to the latter in his report and mention his family name.

We gave a positive response, saying that Comrade Statsenko had been entrusted with the dismantling of the weaponry, and he answered these questions responsibly.

U Thant said nothing about his talks with Fidel Castro. Your instructions were received after the talks with U Thant.

31.X.62 ALEKSEEV

*[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWHIP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]*

**Cable from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba Alekseev to USSR Foreign Ministry, 31 October 1962**

Met Fidel Castro and gave to him letter from N.S. Khrushchev.<sup>14</sup>

Castro read it attentively and, while doing so, made two remarks.

1. There are not [merely] some Cuban comrades who do not understand the decision regarding the removal of the special weapons, but the whole Cuban people.

2. Apparently, N.S. Khrushchev did not understand me or the translation was not correct since in the cable of 27 [26?] October I did not suggest to be the first in delivering a blow against the adversary territory during the crisis, but in the case if there were an aggression against Cuba and Soviet people would be perishing together with the Cubans.<sup>15</sup>

I told Castro that the translation had been made correctly and, I suppose, the sense of his cable had been understood correctly in Moscow since it was clearly said there about the condition of an aggression against Cuba, but even in this case it is hardly possible to approach merely mechanically such an important issue and to use nuclear arms without looking for other means.

Castro didn't make any additional comment on the letter and said that it was necessary to read it once more and to think.

Today Castro was more composed and said that Da'Cunha, a Brazilian general, had come to see him with a personal message from [Brazilian President Joao] Goulart and suggested the good offices of Brazil in settling the conflict with the USA upon receiving from them non-aggression guarantees. Da'Cunha said that Brazil would not break relations with Cuba and would continue to trade.

He suggested to begin gradual disarmament upon receiving guarantees and to come forward with a statement about Cuba's non-interference into affairs of the Latin American countries.

Castro said that such an approach is the most correct one and therefore the Cubans had told Da'Cunha that they had been accepting such a mediation and were ready for the suggested measures under the condition that the USA accept the 5 points of the Cuban statement including that of eliminating the Guantanamo base. Castro asked what have we spoken about with U Thant and himself informed [me] about their conversation, what has already been recounted to me by Dorticos.

31/X/62 ALEKSEEV

1 November 1962

[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by Vladimir Zaemsky.]

**Telegram from Soviet Foreign Ministry to A.A. Soboleva and A.F. Dobrynin at the Soviet Embassy in Washington, 31 October 1962**

31 October 1962

1. On 28 October the Ministry sent to the USA embassy a note of protest from the Soviet government to the American government concerning the flights around the Soviet ship "Simferopol" by American planes on 24 October of this year, and also concerning the cannon-fire during these flights.

On 31 October the embassy in a response note declares that no artillery shots at the "Simferopol" or near it had been carried out, and that the command of the "Simferopol" could have mistaken for gunfire the use by the plane's pilot of several magnetic photo-illuminating cartridges.

2. On 30 October the embassy sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs a note of protest concerning the "obvious inability or refusal of the Soviet powers responsible for upholding the social order to take measures in recent days to defend the personnel and the property of the embassy."<sup>16</sup>

The embassy raises the issue of the repair of or compensation for damages incurred by embassy property and personnel, and also "expects appropriate measures to be taken for averting a repetition of such cases." This has been conveyed for informational purposes.

[Source: Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF), Moscow; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]

**Telegram from Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V.V. Kuznetsov to USSR Foreign Ministry, 1 November 1962**

On 31 October U Thant, after his return from Cuba, informed us of the results of his trip.

1. According to U Thant, his main task was to ask whether Fidel Castro would give his consent to the establishment in Cuba of UN groups monitoring the dismantling of Soviet military installations. Castro's response was negative. Castro said that Cuba was a sovereign, independent state, and that if it allowed UN monitoring on its territory, it would be a humiliation for the Republic. If the Soviet government gives its consent to the monitoring, then such monitoring should be carried out outside the borders of Cuba's territorial waters.

2. U Thant then asked Castro whether he could leave his own representatives behind in Havana for contact with the Cuban government. Castro said that it would be better to maintain such contact in New York through the new Cuban delegate to the UN, C[arlos]. Lechuga (who arrived from Cuba with U Thant) and through the minister of foreign affairs, Roa, who would soon arrive in New York.

3. U Thant met in Cuba with the Soviet ambassador and a Soviet general, who informed him that the dismantling of military installations had begun on 28 October and would be finished by 1 or 2 November.

On his return to New York, U Thant informed Stevenson of the dismantling, and appealed to him to cease the "quarantine," for which there seems, even from the American point of view, to be no need. Prolonging the "quarantine" will put the Cuban people in a difficult situation.

4. U Thant addressed a request to Castro to return to the USA the pilot of the U-2 airplane that had been shot down over Cuba, if that pilot was still alive. Castro said that the pilot was dead, but that he would send his body back to the USA, if the UN would take care of the transportation matters. Castro also said that the Cuban government would be continuing to act as it had been up to this point with regard to American planes violating the air space of Cuba. U Thant has communicated this to Stevenson.

5. U Thant asked Castro what he imagined the future role of the UN to be in the Cuban affair. Castro answered that the Cu-

ban government would carry on negotiations within the framework of the UN only on the basis of the five principles laid out in Castro's statement of 28 October, and on no other basis. U Thant has communicated this to Stevenson.

Stevenson told U Thant that he would pass all this on to President Kennedy today.

6. We asked U Thant what further steps he intended to take. U Thant said that on the next day, 1 November, he would inform the members of the Security Council, each one separately, of the results of his visit to Cuba, but that he was not prepared to call a meeting of the Council before 6 November (the day on which the national elections will be held in the USA).

U Thant said as well that he considered it expedient to begin the next day to work out the details of the monitoring of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba by representatives of the International Red Cross. He asked to select a representative from among ourselves. In response to our question as to how U Thant envisaged, after his visit to Cuba, the monitoring of these vessels, he said that such monitoring would have to be carried out not in Cuban ports, but on the open sea.

I.XI.62 V. KUZNETSOV

[Source: AVP RF, Moscow; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]

**Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the USA A. Dobrynin to USSR Foreign Ministry, forwarding telegram from G. A. Zhukov, 1 November 1962**

We relay a telegram from Comrade Zhukov:

"On 31 October I met successively with [White House spokesman Pierre] Salinger, Thompson, [Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs and Averell] Harriman, and Lippmann. The welcome was decidedly cordial, and all communicated their warm greetings to N.S. Khrushchev, and expressed gratitude for his wise actions that have opened up the way toward a settlement of the Cuban problem.

At the same time all the participants

emphasized the necessity of confirming as quickly as possible, by way of inspection through any means (through the Red Cross, neutral observers, or aerial photos), that the Soviet bases are being dismantled and the missiles are being removed. They referred to the growing campaign of right-wing figures who assert that "Kennedy has once again become the victim of Soviet deception." This is especially dangerous for Kennedy on the eve of the national elections. For this reason it is extremely urgent for him to receive any available evidence that the agreement with N.S. Khrushchev has been carried out.

All participants said that settling the Cuban crisis would open the way to resolutions of other emerging problems: a prohibition on nuclear testing, an agreement on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, an agreement between NATO and the Warsaw Pact members on a series of issues, and so on.

They still consider the prospect of a meeting between N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy to be a distant one, but they assert that it will become a necessity when the Cuban problem is settled, and when appropriate preparations are made on the level of the staff for guaranteeing that constructive decisions will be made.

I will relay details from New York.  
Zhukov."

1.XI.62 A. DOBRYNIN

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]

**Cable from Soviet ambassador to the  
USAA. F. Dobrynin to Soviet Foreign  
Ministry, 1 November 1962**

1 November 1962

At one of the receptions I had a conversation with W. Lippmann. He confirmed, half in jest, that he "caught it hot" for having published [in a column published on 25 October—ed.], in the middle of the Cuban crisis, an article about the possibility of exchanging Soviet missile bases in Cuba for American missile bases in Turkey, insofar as "a lot of people" here considered that his

article had suggested to N.S. Khrushchev the idea of raising such a question. Lippmann said that he had been writing the article taking into consideration data which had previously received from high-ranking officers of the U.S. Agency for disarmament.<sup>17</sup> Several officers of this Agency believe that the question of bases has become rather obsolete and it must be solved.

Lippmann himself proceeds from the assumption that the issues of American bases in Turkey and Italy can be solved in the relatively near future. There is a certain progress of mood regarding this issue in Washington. Nevertheless, by no means can it be related to the Cuban events. For a number of reasons, Kennedy's administration can't do that. A corresponding decision can be formalized as one of the first, partial actions in the framework of disarmament, but necessarily waiting for a final agreement upon a plan of general and complete disarmament.

Lippmann also said that during the Cuban crisis Thompson played a certain positive deterrent role at the White House. But in general in the course of the last year, according to Lippmann, Thompson has considerably evolved and become closer to [Soviet expert Charles] Bohlen's point of view, i.e., there is no hope of reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union on principal issues due to its extreme obstinacy. With such a pessimistic mood Thompson has returned from the Soviet Union.

Lippmann confirmed that during the Cuban conflict the USA had been very close to war. Even dates for the bombing of the Soviet missile bases in Cuba had been planned — October 29 or 30, but N.S. Khrushchev's response of October 28 to Kennedy's "great relief" drastically altered the subsequent course of events.

01/XI/62 A. DOBRYNIN

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by Vladimir Zaemsky.]

**Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister  
A. Gromyko to Deputy Foreign  
Minister V.V. Kuznetsov at the Soviet  
Mission in New York, 1 November 1962**

1 November 1962

It is necessary that you meet with [U.S. negotiator John J.] McCloy. Inform him that you have delivered a report on the content of the conversation with him, as well as on the statement that the government of the USA, in an expression of its goodwill, has agreed that there be no monitoring of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba until the International Red Cross is involved in such monitoring. In response to this, you have been instructed by Moscow to inform McCloy that our view of this goodwill gesture is a sympathetic one. It will allow the speedy arrival of Soviet ships into Cuban ports, and will facilitate the removal of the dismantled installations from Cuba.

The question of whether to allow observers onto Cuban territory is, of course, an issue that must be decided by Cuba, in its capacity as a sovereign state. The Cubans, and only the Cubans, can make decisions on questions of that sort.

We would like, however, to reach an agreement with the Americans that will keep this whole affair under control.

In the next few days, until 7 or 8 or at the very latest 10 November, we intend to load the dismantled materials onto ships and remove them from Cuba. We have no objections to disclosing photographs of the dismantled and disabled launch pads, as well as of the loaded missiles, which the President and the government of the USA have called offensive weaponry.

We also would have no objections to your ships being shown, at close distance, the missiles loaded on the Soviet ships. But we think that there will scarcely be any doubts in your minds as to the certainty that, once we have announced the dismantling of the military installations and the removal of the missiles, we will carry out these actions within the period indicated by us.

I have been entrusted with the task of emphasizing that the Soviet party is trying to settle this whole issue quickly on the basis of compromise, mutual concessions, and on the conditions put forth in statements by the Chair of the Council of Ministers of the USSR [Khrushchev] and by the President of the USA.

As far as the flights by American planes over Cuban territory are concerned, the Cubans' categorical objections are fully understood and are believed to be justifiable, since such flights represent a blatant

violation of the sovereignty of the Republic of Cuba. The Americans should take into account that such actions affect the national feelings of the Cuban people, which can only complicate the settlement of the difficult issues before us. The Americans would have acted reasonably if they had already ceased this sort of flight, as they should have done given that the condition expressed in the above-mentioned statements stipulating the dismantling of missile installations has been fulfilled, and given that the dismantled materials are being brought together for loading onto ships.

In conclusion, tell McCloy that we expect the Americans to lift the quarantine immediately and completely.

AG

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWHIP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]

**Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the USA A. Dobrynin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 1 November 1962**

[first page of two-page document is missing from copy obtained by CWHIP—ed.]

[...Dobrynin] expressed the hope, in accordance with the letter sent by N.S. Khrushchev, that the USA would renounce the quarantine without waiting for the introduction of a supplementary procedure for inspecting ships, and so on.

Robert Kennedy has said that this issue does not represent any difficulties. The important thing for us now (he implied that he was talking about public opinion, rather than the thoughts of the President himself), is to have some confirmation, from the UN for example, that the Soviet bases are being dismantled, and that the corresponding missile weaponry is being removed.

We and the USA government have essentially two possible courses of actions in this matter: first, to carry out reconnaissance flights over Cuba. But this entails the danger that the Cubans (he emphasized the Cubans, and not the Russians) may shoot down an American plane, and thus a possible new and highly undesirable chain reaction of events in the Cuban affair would

be unleashed.

The second course of action is to get from the UN some information on the dismantling of the bases. The government of the USA could then be satisfied with this as a prerequisite for lifting the quarantine. Robert Kennedy emphasized that he was not yet prepared to talk about the details of this whole affair, since the President did not yet have any information on the results of U Thant's trip. Within an hour, said Robert Kennedy, a government meeting would take place in which this issue would be examined. He promised in the event of an emergency to get in touch with me directly, or, if this occurs during my trip to New York to meet with [CPSU CC Politburo member] A.I. Mikoyan, through Stevenson and Kuznetsov.

Robert Kennedy emphasized that the point was not that they do not trust our information on this account, but rather the question of how to present this whole affair to the public opinion of the USA in connection with the earlier statements offered by the President. It was felt that he had been somewhat worried by how Fidel Castro might hinder the carrying out of the agreement that had been reached.

1.XI.62 A. DOBRYNIN

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWHIP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]

**Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister A. Gromyko to Soviet Ambassador in Havana, with a copy sent to Kuznetsov in New York, 1 November 1962**

1 November 1962

The date for the removal of the dismantled special materials from Cuba has been set for 7 or 8 November, but not later than 10 November. This has become possible as a result of the fact that the necessity of observing strict secrecy in the transfer of the special materials has fallen away. For the removal of these materials it is now possible and advisable to use our usual ships located in Cuban ports or arriving there in the coming days, and there is no need to hide such materials in the ship holds.

It is necessary that you and Comrade Pavlov [Pliyev] be guided by this information. Similar instructions to Comrade Pavlov are being given though the Ministry of Defense.

Confirm reception of this telegram.

A.G.

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWHIP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen.]

**Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister A. A. Gromyko to the Soviet Mission in New York, 1 November 1962**

To the SOVIET MISSION—COMRADES KUZNETSOV, ZORIN

First. Judging by your reports [several words deleted—ed.], the USA and several other states belonging to the Security Council may try to complicate the negotiations underway now in New York among the representatives of the USSR, Cuba, and the USA, by submitting all the issues being discussed in the course of the negotiations to the consideration of the Security Council. This is visible in the proposal by the Irish delegate, Boland, that the Security Council hear U Thant's report and pass a resolution for delegating to U Thant the task of creating a special UN mechanism for monitoring the dismantling of the special installations in Cuba. Besides this, his proposal also stipulates that the other issues of the "Cuban settlement" may also be discussed in the Security Council, although the decision on it may be postponed somewhat. All this means that the USA, along with other countries that support its policy, wants to take all these issues into its own hands in order to drag out the resolution of the issues concerning the security guarantees for Cuba, as well as the securing, by way of agreements, of the USA duties that have emerged from the exchange of messages between Comrade N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy.

You should firmly object to such an attempt to replace the trilateral negotiations, in which U Thant is participating, with a submission of all the issues to the consideration of the Security Council, in which it would be impossible, given its present composition, to reach resolutions that are advan-

tageous for us. Make a statement about this in categorical form to U Thant, Stevenson, as well as to the UN delegates of the other nations that will deal with this issue along with you. Insist on the necessity of prolonging the trilateral negotiations with U Thant's participation, and on their speedy completion by securing the results of the negotiations in a corresponding written agreement (a protocol statement).

Second. 1. On the monitoring of the dismantling and the removal of the special installations. Concerning the issue of monitoring the performance of work towards dismantling the special installations in Cuba, you should operate on the assumption that the dismantling process will be completed by 2 November, and that the dismantled materials will be removed from Cuba by 7 or 8 November, or at the very latest 10 November, if our ships arrive without hindrance in Cuban ports.

2. On the composition of the group of Security Council agents. Proceed on the assumption that for us it is acceptable that the group monitoring the fulfillment of duties to dismantle and remove the special missile installations from Cuba contain representatives from the neutral states proposed by U Thant (Sweden, Ethiopia, the United Arab Republic, Mexico, Brazil, Yugoslavia, Switzerland). Also you may not object to the proposal that this group consist of eight representatives of the neutral nations belonging to the Disarmament Committee (India, Burma, the United Arab Republic, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Mexico, Brazil, Sweden), if such a proposal is introduced. There are also no objections to including in the group the representatives of Indonesia, Ceylon, the United Arab Republic, and Ghana, as you propose.

We consider unacceptable the Americans' proposal for the creation of monitoring groups composed of the USA, the USSR, and Cuba.

3. On the monitoring of vessels bound for Cuba, after the lifting of the blockade. You should proceed from the fact that we have given our consent to the monitoring of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba by the International Red Cross. It is envisaged that this monitoring will be carried out until the end of the so-called "quarantine." From this it follows that the monitoring will be short-term. Your proposal that the system for monitoring the vessels be operative for the

duration, for example, of a year, is not appropriate.

4. On UN posts. In connection with the issue you proposed of monitoring certain regions of the USA and several Latin American countries with the goal of determining whether preparations for the invasion of Cuba are underway, follow the instructions in which we expressed our positive view of U Thant's proposal concerning the "UN presence" in these countries and in Cuba.

You may approve the proposal that the composition of the UN posts for carrying out the indicated functions be similar to the composition of the groups of agents for monitoring the dismantling and removal of special missile materials from the territory of Cuba.

5. On American bases in Turkey. We agree with your opinion. You should not in any circumstance touch on this issue in your negotiations with U Thant and the USA representatives in New York, since it is the subject of direct negotiations between Moscow and Washington. On this point we are keeping you informed only for your personal edification.

6. On the concept of "offensive weaponry." We consider it inexpedient to change the formula that was used in Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's messages and in the protocol draft communicated by you, namely: "weaponry which the USA government has called offensive."

Your proposal to call this weaponry "means for launching nuclear arms at an operational distance greater than (so many) kilometers" could allow the discussion of this issue to acquire an undesirable character for us, since the Americans will naturally be trying to broaden the scope of the weaponry prohibited from installations in Cuba.

Third. Concerning all the main issues relevant to the duties of the parties—the USA, the USSR, and Cuba—and the securing of their corresponding pledges, follow the text of the protocol statement and the instructions contained in our memorandum. Bear in mind, however, that as we have already informed you, you will be carrying out these instructions, as well as the instructions contained in the "second" point of the present telegram, only on receiving reports from us that our Cuban friends have agreed to these proposals.

A.G.

*[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen.]*

**Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister  
Gromyko to Soviet Mission in New  
York, for A. I. Mikoyan,  
1 November 1962**

1 November 1962

Comrade N.S. Khrushchev has entrusted me with the task of relaying the following to you:

1. We have specified here that our installations now being dismantled can be shipped out of Cuba by 7 or 8 or at the latest 10 November. This must be your point of departure in your talks with U Thant, McCloy, and our Cuban friends. Of course this is only on the condition that our ships will be granted safe passage into Cuban ports.

2. In the talks with Fidel Castro, depending on how these talks unfold, you should make use of the following points in your argumentation:

Emphasize that it is the necessity of a speedy lifting of the so-called quarantine that, in our opinion, our Cuban friends are most interested in. They know better than anyone else whether Cuba needs the shipments of goods presently on Soviet ships on the open sea. These cargoes cannot remain on the open sea for long. Among them are perishable cargoes. Moreover, it must be taken into account that there is also an economic aspect to this issue: we are suffering great expenses because the vessels are being detained on their courses. A further detainment will only increase these financial losses. Cuba is not concealing these losses from us. Of course it may be that Cuba is ready to bear the burden of these doubled expenses, in which case it is a different story. We see that you and we have different approaches to how this issue must be resolved.

If our Cuban friends are for some reason not willing to facilitate the resolution of this issue, we will be placed in a situation in which we will have to recall the ships. For at present we are suffering unjustified expenses.

It is impossible not to take into account the damages being inflicted on our prestige

because of the present situation in which our vessels remain immobilized on the open sea. This cannot continue endlessly.

We believe that the missiles have achieved their effect, and achieved it well. You say that you do not believe the Americans. We too do not believe them. But we are operating on the assumption that the socialist states should take the necessary steps to ensure their security, and to coexist with the USA. It is possible that I am simply repeating here what I was saying to you before your trip, but I think that these concerns should be borne in mind when you are presenting our case to Castro. This does not mean, of course, that they should be expressed literally and explicitly. But you must make him clearly understand that we are worried by the unreasonable position that our Cuban comrades have been forced to take.

1.XI.62 A. GROMYKO

*[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWHIP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]*

**Cable of V.V. Kuznetsov on 1 November 1962 Conversation between CPSU CC Politburo Member A.I. Mikoyan and Acting UN Secretary General U Thant, 2 November 1962**

Ciphered telegram

Top Secret  
No copying is allowed  
Copy no. 1

2 November 1962

CC CPSU

Transmitting the record of conversation of com. A.I. Mikoyan

The conversation took place with U Thant on 1 November 1962 in the U.N. mission [of the USSR - trans.].

At the start com. Mikoyan passed to U Thant regard from com. N.S. Khrushchev as well as on his own behalf. He told U Thant that N.S. Khrushchev recalls with warmth the conversations that he had with the acting Secretary General. Personally N.S. Khrushchev and his colleagues believe that

U Thant took a good initiative with the aim of resolving the Cuban crisis and that in this regard we are acknowledging his large contribution. This raises the authority of U Thant himself as well as of the United Nations that could express itself in such a dangerous situation.

He remarked then that although the immediate danger of war has ebbed, nevertheless there are political and diplomatic difficulties and they should be resolved according to the ideas and proposals advanced in the letters of N.S. Khrushchev [and] Kennedy and in the declaration of Castro. He stressed that for its part the Soviet Union was ready to continue its efforts to achieve final resolution of the Cuban issue. He remarked that the acting Secretary General could exercise a certain influence, using his authority, in the process of ultimate settlement of the conflict.

He informed that he was heading for Cuba to meet with the Cuban friends, and decided to stop in New York in order to see U Thant and hear his considerations with regard to his recent trip to Cuba.

U Thant welcomed com. Mikoyan. He reminded him of their meetings in Yalta in November 1955 when U Thant accompanied [Burmese leader] U Nu, and then in Burma. U Thant recalled with warmth his meetings with N.S. Khrushchev in 1955 in Yalta as well as during the trip of N.S. Khrushchev to Burma, and also in the United Nations in 1960 and again this year in the Soviet Union. U Thant expressed his sincere gratitude to N.S. Khrushchev for his encouraging words passed to him in his letters to U Thant and also through our representatives in the UN. He values highly and rejoices at the assessment that the Soviet Union gives to his efforts in the resolution of the Cuban issue.

U Thant stressed that the position of the Soviet government and its head N.S. Khrushchev in the Cuban crisis was gratefully received by the vast majority of the peoples of all the world and met with gratitude by the whole mankind. He remarked that the people now see much more clearly the sincere desire of the Soviet Union to have the UN as an efficacious instrument for maintaining peace and for preventing war.

After that U Thant turned to his trip to Cuba and said the following.

The trip was taken in connection with

the exchange of letters between him and Fidel Castro. In his first appeal to Castro, U Thant called on him to cooperate with the UN in the name of securing peace. In his reply, Castro invited U Thant to visit Cuba personally in his capacity of acting UN Secretary General and to discuss with him the issues concerning the attitude of the government of Cuba on the question under consideration of the Security Council.

U Thant accepted this invitation and visited Cuba, staying there on 30 and 31 October. He held two meetings with Prime Minister Castro, when the Cuban issue was discussed. In Havana he met some diplomats accredited by the government of Castro. The most useful conversations were ones with the Ambassadors of Brazil, Yugoslavia, the UAR [United Arab Republic], and the USSR.

One of the issues on U Thant's agenda during the trip was to clarify the reaction of the Cuban government concerning the agreement of the Soviet Union to allow U.N. observers to check on the fulfillment of the commitment to dismantle Soviet missile launchers in Cuba and to return them to the USSR.

Castro said in categorical form that Cuba is a sovereign and independent state and it would not allow any external organization - be it the UN or anything else - to interfere in the internal affairs of Cuba. Imposition of inspection on the part of the UN would be considered by the Cuban people as an infringement on its sovereign rights and would be considered as a humiliation of the people of Cuba. Such a step cannot be accepted by the Cuban government. If the USSR wants to meet the announced goals of sending the groups of inspectors, then Castro believes that such inspections might be carried out outside of the territorial waters of Cuba.

Castro informed U Thant that on Thursday, 1 November, he was going to speak on radio and television with a speech where he intends to mention this issue. U Thant reportedly advised Castro to postpone this speech, since it is very delicate and would be assessed as a declaration of policy with all consequences that flow out of it. Castro responded to U Thant that he had already put off making of this speech with regard to [U Thant's] visit in Cuba. If the speech were delayed one more time, then people would not understand it. Therefore Castro could not

once again postpone his speech.

The U Thant asked Castro not to mention in his speech the position of the government of Cuba regarding the [issue of] UN inspection, to which he gladly agreed, saying that he would remove this paragraph from the text he had already prepared.

U Thant asked com. Mikoyan, having in mind the confidential character of his conversations with Castro, not to raise this issue on his own initiative.

As Castro pointed out, in his speech he planned to lay out the entire foreign policy of Cuba and in particular to emphasize the five points on the settlement of the Cuban crisis he had advanced on 28 October. To this U Thant responded that in view of the deliberations on the Cuban issue in the Security Council and his own speech he could not do it. The Security Council did not authorize him to discuss with the sides issues of permanent or long-term character of settlement of the conflict in the Caribbean sea.

To this Castro responded that a temporary resolution of immediate problems did not resolve the Cuban issue as a whole. The resolution of these immediate questions, in the opinion of the government of Cuba, had to be linked to resolution of the longer-term problems. The Security Council had to discuss also and resolve the issue about a lasting peace in the area of the Caribbean sea. If the Security Council were preoccupied with resolution of only immediate problems, then similar problems would emerge in the foreseeable future again, and they could create a situation similar to the current one. Therefore the government of Cuba is convinced that to ensure lasting and secure peace in the whole world it is necessary that the Security Council should preoccupy itself with the issue of ensuring lasting peace in the Caribbean region. In case the Security Council would be convened, Castro intends to send to the UN Minister of Foreign Affairs Raul Roa so that he would present the viewpoint of his government on the entire Cuban issue. The delegation of Cuba would address the Security Council with a request to find a lasting and final solution to this issue. The government of Cuba is firmly convinced that such a solution can be found only on the basis of 5 points advanced on 28 October by Premier Castro.

U Thant told Castro that at that point he was not competent to discuss this issue,

although he received with understanding the viewpoint of the Prime Minister of Cuba.

Then in the conversations U Thant and Castro touched on the issue about "the UN presence" in the region of the Caribbean sea during the period of the crisis.

U Thant told Castro that in the interests of the government of Cuba and the Cuban people themselves it would be useful to have in Havana UN representatives, and, if Castro agrees, he was ready to leave 2 to 3 of his officials to establish contacts and to follow-up on their dialogue.

Castro responded that had the government of Cuba agreed at the present moment to the presence of UN representatives in Cuba, it could have been interpreted by people as consent to the presence of inspecting groups of the United Nations. While saying so, he referred to American radio broadcasts which affirm on an hourly basis that the U Thant mission had exactly the inspection goals in mind. Under such terms people might have misperceived such a step. Castro asked U Thant not to insist on this proposal.

He then declared that, if the Security Council accepted some kind of formula to resolve the Cuban issue on a permanent basis, then he, Castro, would be glad to have some kind of UN presence on the reciprocal basis. However, this cannot be done in the present phase.

In conversations with Castro, U Thant raised the question about the return to the USA on humanitarian grounds of an American pilot who, according to press publications, had vanished without a trace in the area of Cuba. Castro told him that the USA aircraft of the type U-2 had indeed violated the aerial space over Cuba in violation of international legislation and the UN Charter. It was shot down by the Cubans, the pilot died, since he could not bail out. Castro would have been ready to return the pilot, and alive, but he is dead, therefore he is ready to return the body under auspices of the UN. (This information U Thant passed to the Americans).

Castro also said that any further violation of the aerial borders of Cuba would be dealt with in a similar way.

The next question that was discussed between U Thant and Castro was about a voluntary suspension by the Soviet Union of its supplies of weapons for Cuba for a period of 2 to 3 weeks and the simultaneous

voluntary suspension of the quarantine on the part of the USA.

U Thant informed Castro about the acceptance on the part of the Soviet Union of such a voluntary commitment, and also that the USA would have also agreed to suspend the quarantine for 2-3 weeks, on the condition that there would be a mechanism for checking if Soviet ships heading for Cuba were not carrying arms.

U Thant informed Castro also that the Soviet Union had agreed that the Red Cross should deal with inspection of vessels outside of the boundaries of the territorial waters of Cuba. He said that for the Red Cross it would have been more convenient to inspect ships in the ports of arrival, and not in the open sea, if, of course, the government of Cuba agreed to that.

Castro said to this, that his government would not allow groups of the Red Cross to inspect Soviet ships on Cuban territory, but if the USSR agreed to the inspection, then the UN should start organizing this business on the open sea.

Responding to the question of U Thant about a possible time of convocation of a next session of the Security Council on the Cuban issue, Castro said that he would have preferred that the Council convene no sooner than next Wednesday, i.e. after the elections in the United States.

Com. Mikoyan thanked U Thant for interesting and useful information, stressing that this would facilitate his talks with Prime Minister Fidel Castro.

He observed that the Americans were now trying to focus all attention on the dismantling and withdrawal of missile equipment, doing nothing on their part concerning the guarantees of Cuba's security.

Therefore Castro is right when he speaks about the need to solve the Cuban issue on a permanent basis. Now it is important to move from general declarations to concrete steps for cardinal solution of the entire issue on the basis of the letters of N.S. Khrushchev [and] Kennedy, and also the just and constructive proposals of Fidel Castro. Naturally, the Americans will object to some proposals of Castro, but his proposals face in the right direction.

On the time of convening the Security Council, com. Mikoyan remarked that we understand the considerations of Fidel on this score. We also would like to say that since general principles of complete liqui-

dition of the conflict has been adopted and declared by the interested sides, and also by the UN, since the acting Secretary General is taking active part in this, then, in our opinion, the Security Council should be convened at the moment when the current negotiations would approach the phase of an agreed-upon document finalizing this crisis. Until then convening of the Security Council would hardly assist in this matter.

Com. Mikoyan voiced the idea that after the end of talks of the sides, some kind of document might be passed for approval to the Security Council and on its basis and in following up on it the Council might take a decision on subsequent practical steps. Such a document might have the character of a protocol which would describe talks that would have taken place between the sides with participation of U Thant on the basis of the letters of N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy, and also the declarations of Fidel Castro, and that would inform about the achieved agreement that, thereby, would have been sealed by the Security Council.

[Mikoyan] said to U Thant that we learned with great interest about his initiative concerning the practicality of having observers in Cuba, in the USA, and in other countries neighboring Cuba for a duration of some period. He informed [U Thant] that N.S. Khrushchev was delighted to see this initiative of U Thant and considered it to be interesting and useful. It is good that Fidel Castro took it in a positive way. This proposal contains in itself the principle of reciprocity, and the USSR is ready to support such a proposal. It could be included into a draft protocol.

He asked U Thant if he had spoken to the Americans on this subject and if so what was their attitude toward this idea.

U Thant said that in conversation with Soviet representatives he advanced several formulas for solution of the issue in its entirety, and the problem of guarantees in particular. At one of these meetings with com. Zorin he indeed proposed that, provided the agreement of the sides, the presence of the UN in the Western hemisphere, in the flashpoints, would be useful. Were it to prove acceptable, then, in the opinion of U Thant, such a measure would have facilitated a settlement of the situation in the Caribbean region on the permanent basis.

U Thant discussed this idea with heads of missions of Latin American [countries]

in the UN even before his trip to Cuba and they seemed interested. Some Latin American delegates not only were interested in this idea but also let U Thant understand that such a measure would be desirable.

The USA so far does not want to openly express its attitude towards this proposal of U Thant. Its reaction was reduced to the argument that, well, since this arrangement concerns all the countries of Western hemisphere, this issue should be discussed in the Organization of American States.

Com. Mikoyan asked U Thant about his opinion regarding a possible form of the document stating the reached agreement.

U Thant said that if the sides agree in general, then the goal will be reached through any such document in the form of protocol, joint declaration, separate declaration of the sides, agreement and even in the form of summing-up declaration of the chairman of the Security Council.

Com. Mikoyan asked U Thant also to express his personal considerations on the time of convocation of the Security Council.

U Thant said that it should be done after the elections in the USA, but everything depends on the sides' agreement. If the sides come to agreement, the Council can be convened at any time.

Then U Thant passed his wish to thank the Soviet Ambassador in Cuba for his genuine and wholehearted cooperation during the trip of U Thant. In particular, U Thant noted that our Ambassador in Havana and the Soviet officer informed him without delay about the time when dismantling of the missile units began, about the time when work will be finished, and about the fact that ships are commissioned for withdrawal of these units. In this regard U Thant asked as a matter of personal interest about the time of arrival of ships to Cuba to pick up the mentioned materiel.

Com. Mikoyan confirmed what our Ambassador in Havana had told U Thant about the time-frame of dismantling. Concerning the time-frame of withdrawal he said that those ships that are now in Cuba will not suffice. However, with regard to the continuing quarantine Soviet ships cannot sail to Cuba. Therefore it is necessary to lift the quarantine, so that Soviet ships could enter Cuban ports, unload their cargoes and load on them the dismantled units [ustanovki]. If one does it in speedily, then

perhaps 10-15 days will be required. He promised to raise this issue in the forthcoming conversation with McCloy.

U Thant said that he addresses the Americans every day with appeals to suspend the blockade. And yesterday, having returned from Cuba, he did the same, making the Americans aware that he was convinced that the dismantling had begun and was under way as it had been promised, and that it would be finished by the announced date.

Com. Mikoyan thanked U Thant for his useful and exhaustive information. They agreed that for the press they will announce about useful exchange of opinions and the friendly atmosphere of the conversation.

At the end of the conversation U Thant said that if A.I. Mikoyan would come back via New York, he (U Thant) would be glad to meet again and learn about the results of the trip. He would like that time to be a more generous host than now and to invite A.I. Mikoyan for lunch and breakfast.

The conversation was recorded by com. Zharebtsov V.N.

## 2.XI.62 V. KUZNETSOV

[Source: AVPRF; obtained by NHK, provided to CWHIP, copy on file at National Security Archive; translation by Vladislav M. Zubok (National Security Archive).]

### Telegram from Soviet envoy G. Zhukov to CC CPSU, 2 November 1962

2 November 1962

Yesterday, on 1 November (before dinner with A.I. Mikoyan), McCloy invited me to his residence and said the following:

1. The Americans express their gratitude for the fact that the American plane making aerial photos of Cuba today was not subjected to gunfire. The photos are still being developed, but the Americans hope that they will confirm the correctness of the statement made by the Soviet general in Cuba, to the effect that the missile dismantling process has already been started.

2. McCloy offered a detailed account of how U Thant had informed him of his talks with Castro (the account coincides with what U Thant told our delegation). He said that he understood the difficulties arising from Castro's refusal of ground-based in-

spections, and that now it was necessary to find new methods of monitoring that would confirm that the dismantling and removal of the missiles had begun (in McCloy's opinion, the best solution would be aerial photos along with a check on the ships removing the cargoes from Cuba on the open sea. McCloy underscored that this monitoring should be formal—without inquiring into the details of the missiles, which are secret).

3. McCloy spoke a lot about the future prospects of an American-Soviet collaboration which would open up as a result of the settling of the Cuban crisis. In his view, it is necessary in the first place to reach an agreement on the cessation of nuclear testing, which would make a huge impression on public opinion. It would be good if this agreement could be signed by Kennedy and Khrushchev. Such a meeting would strengthen public faith that their personal contacts can be fruitful.

McCloy also believes it expedient to conclude an agreement concerning a renunciation of the military use of outer space, and to sign a treaty on at least one bilateral agreement concerning the colonizing of outer space (for example, the launching of a Soviet-American rocket aimed at Venus).

McCloy also reiterated several ideas expressed earlier by Salinger and Thompson (concerning in particular the issue of bases in Turkey—it may be possible, in his view, to eliminate them in the course of “the first stage of disarmament”—by way of “redistribution”).

4. McCloy implied that he would play the role of an unofficial intermediary in the preparation of a meeting between Kennedy and Khrushchev, which in his view could take place within a few months, if resolutions of the issues enumerated above have been completed by that time.

5. McCloy asked us to pass on his warm greetings to N. S. Khrushchev and the members of his family, from himself and his own family.

2.XI.62 G. ZHUKOV

*[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWHIP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen.]*

**A.I. Mikoyan to CC CPSU re 1  
November 1962 Meeting with**

**Stevenson, 2 November 1962**

[...] We raised the question that it was necessary to write down in the form of a protocol the important provisions that are contained in the exchange of messages between N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy taking into account the statement by Fidel Castro. The Americans by all means were evading discussion of this question and trying to bring the whole matter to the organization of control over the dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of the Soviet missiles. Nevertheless, in the course of conversation they were obliged to answer our questions relating to the settlement of the Cuban problem in general and disclosed some of their positions that seem interesting for further negotiations. To save space in this cable we omit our remarks during the conversation. You may learn them from the transcript of the conversation which is being sent separately.

1. Though reluctantly, the Americans agreed with the need to fix in documents the corresponding commitments, including the non-aggression commitment against Cuba. In their opinion, these documents must include: a statement by the Soviet Union on the completion of the missiles' evacuation; a USA statement saying they are convinced of the withdrawal and giving corresponding non-aggression guarantees to Cuba; possibly also a statement by U Thant.

The statement by the Soviet government must be the first.

The texts of these statements will be coordinated in advance.

It is foreseen that a corresponding statement will be made by the Government of Cuba. All these statements must be presented to the Security Council.

The unwillingness of the Americans to sign a protocol, apparently, can be explained in addition by the following thing: they do not want to put their signature side by side with the Cubans'.

The Americans underlined their readiness to include in their statement provisions based on corresponding wording from Kennedy's messages regarding the issue of non-aggression guarantees for Cuba.

When we mentioned that in the American press there has appeared a statement by D. Rusk to the effect that Kennedy's statement is not a non-aggression guarantee to Cuba, Stevenson assured us that D. Rusk

had not said it, but that the press gave an erroneous interpretation of his speech.

Stevenson and McCloy confirmed that the USA are [is] ready to give a non-aggression guarantee to Cuba as it was mentioned in Kennedy's letter, if an inspection in some form confirms that the Soviet “offensive” armament is really removed from Cuba.

Stevenson and McCloy affirmed that the encampments where the Cuban exiles had been training for an invasion of Cuba were currently closed.

2. During the conversation we resolutely demanded the removal of the so-called “quarantine,” underlining that its continuation in no way can help to create a suitable atmosphere for the solution of the Cuban problem and may only complicate the situation. In this regard we noted that the Soviet Union had complied with the request from U Thant for a temporary suspension of armaments' supplies to Cuba, but that the USA had not stopped their “quarantine” for at least some time, as it had been suggested by U Thant.

McCloy and Stevenson evaded a clear answer to the question of ending the “quarantine,” having limited themselves to a reference that to the Soviet vessels going to Cuba would be applied the same procedure as it was on October 25 regarding the tanker “Bucharest,” without an inspection on board, but with the help of a hailing-request by radio.

It is illustrative that in response to our statement that in the event of dropping the practice of “quarantine” and giving our vessels the possibility to visit Cuba without any obstacles some 10-15 days will be needed to dispatch [from Cuba] all the armaments called offensive by the Americans, McCloy and Stevenson said that in their opinion it is hardly possible from the technical standpoint to carry out the mentioned volume of work in such a short period of time. According to McCloy, at least a month would be needed for that.

3. There has been a detailed discussion of methods for control of the dismantling and removal of missiles.

Apparently, feeling the weakness of their position and taking into account objections on the part of Fidel Castro to permit verification on Cuban territory, McCloy and Stevenson declared in the course of discussion that the American side would be ready not to insist on verification methods

foreseen in the message to N.S. Khrushchev and was ready to look for some new methods that would in essence give the Americans the possibility to be certain of the implementation of our commitment to withdraw the weapons.

To our specific question what new methods was he referring to, McCloy said: the USA could limit [itself] to the continuation of their flights which give them confidence that there has not resumed in Cuba an installation of the dangerous for them types of armaments.

If Castro is against a ground verification, continued McCloy, another thing could be done - a transfer of the lists of armaments withdrawn from Cuba, when they would be removed, and of the corresponding information, which however would not disclose Soviet technological secrets. We do know roughly how many missiles currently are situated in Cuba. In this case we could manage without ground verification. We are glad, - said McCloy, - that today our plane had not come under fire when it had been flying over Cuba. As far as we know the anti-aircraft missiles in Cuba are in the hands of your people, not the Cubans, although it's possible that there are some Cuban personnel.

McCloy received a very firm response that the USA [has] no right to overfly Cuba and nobody can guarantee the security of such illegal flights.

4. We raised the question of normalizing relations between the USA [and] their Latin American allies, and Cuba. We also asked what is their attitude to U Thant's plan for a UN presence in the Caribbean. The Americans flatly rejected any inspection of their territory whatsoever and declared: "You will have to trust our word."

At the same time, Stevenson said that the USA aspires to normalize the situation in the Caribbean, but under the condition of Castro's cooperation. We could in some form elaborate mutual guarantees, acceptable to Castro and his neighbors. If Castro is afraid of them, they are afraid of him, too. I consider, said Stevenson, that after the Cuban crisis is settled the tension in this region would be lessened.

In this regard we put the question in this way:

"Castro may ask me if the USA [is] going to re-establish diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba? Maybe you in-

tend to do so not immediately, but some time later?"

Stevenson said that he was not able to give an answer to that question insofar as it is part of the competence of the OAS [Organization of American States]. But perhaps we can consider the possibility of organizing corresponding regional arrangements, giving the necessary confidence to the countries of the Caribbean. I hope that steadily we will succeed in eliminating antagonism between Cuba and its neighbors.

At the same time Stevenson made the observation that currently the "antagonism" between Cuba and its neighbors is instigated by "subversive actions in this region, perhaps undertaken mutually." McCloy noted that "Cuba is the breeding ground of infection and Venezuela an example."

It was clear that in the immediate future the USA [is] not going to re-establish diplomatic and economic ties with Cuba.

5. Stevenson and McCloy stated that the USA refuse[s] point-blank to discuss the question of liquidating the American base at Guantanamo.

6. In the course of the conversation McCloy attempted to broach the subject of an eventual evacuation from Cuba of the Soviet "ground-air" anti-aircraft missiles. We have resolutely warded off this probing, declaring that such a question could not be raised and that we had sold these weapons to a number of countries, including the United Arab Republic and Indonesia. McCloy made the observation that "they are good machines against attacks from air-space."

7. McCloy and Stevenson agreed that it would be good for Soviet and American delegations to try to reach preliminary agreements over the issues to be discussed by the Security Council.

8. McCloy and Stevenson expressed satisfaction over the exchange of opinions and Stevenson underlined that the USSR and USA positions "are not so far from each other." Both of them were inquiring whether I would stop on my way back [from Cuba].

I said in response that for the moment I had no plans to do so but if necessary I assumed it would be possible.

2.XI.62 A. MIKOYAN

[Source: AVPRF; trans. V. Zaemsky; copy on file at National Security Archive.]

**Soviet Record of 1 November 1962  
Dinner Conversation between CPSU  
CC Politburo Member A.I. Mikoyan  
and White House envoy John McCloy  
and U.S. Ambassador to the United  
Nations Adlai Stevenson**

Secret. Copy no. 24

RECORD OF CONVERSATION OF  
com. A.I. MIKOYAN  
WITH JOHN MCCLOY AND ADLAI  
STEVENSON AT A DINNER IN THE  
SOVIET MISSION AT THE U.N.  
1 November 1962

At the outset of the conversation A.I. Mikoyan poses a question about the lifting of the American blockade on the surroundings of Cuba for the period of negotiations, as it was proposed by U Thant in his first missive to com. N.S. Khrushchev and to President Kennedy on 24 October this year.

A.I. Mikoyan says that the USSR accepted recommendation of the acting General Secretary of the U.N., and the United States did not. On 24 October U Thant proposed that the Soviet Union would stop delivery of weapons to Cuba for the duration of talks (2 to 3 weeks), and the United States during the same period would suspend the blockade. The Soviet Union fulfilled the recommendations of U Thant, but the United States did not.

McCloy remarks that U Thant seeks to start as soon as possible to check up Soviet vessels sailing to Cuba, by the forces of the International Red Cross.

Stevenson says that the United States hoped that by the end of next week observers of the International Red Cross would be able to begin their work in Cuba. Here apparently some sort of misunderstanding emerges. It was understood that the suspension of the "quarantine" would be conditioned on the simultaneous introduction of inspection.

A.I. Mikoyan objects that no such understanding took place.

McCloy remarks that perhaps U Thant did introduce the proposal mentioned by A.I. Mikoyan, but the United States accepted not his proposal, but the proposal of Chairman Khrushchev in his letter to President Kennedy.

Stevenson says that in fact the issue about immediate suspension of the “quarantine” is purely academic. Soviet ships will probably not reach Cuba until next week, and meanwhile he hopes that the inspection of the Red Cross will be already in force, and then, naturally, there will be no need for the “quarantine.”

A.I. Mikoyan reiterates that N.S. Khrushchev accepted the proposal of U Thant and the Americans did not accept it.

Stevenson. We believe that a certain understanding was achieved in the letters of N.S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy.

A.I. Mikoyan. This is correct. What was envisaged in the letters must be implemented and will be implemented. However, had the United States adopted the same reasonable approach, permeated with good will, as was adopted by the Soviet Union, then they would have accepted the proposal of U Thant and would have lifted the blockade immediately.

McCloy. Would you make a stop on the way back [from Cuba] in New York?

A.I. Mikoyan. I have no definite plans on this score, but I would not exclude such a stop-over.

McCloy (in a jocular tone). But would Castro let you out?

A.I. Mikoyan. He and I are special friends and will work it out somehow

Stevenson. Perhaps you will bring him along over here?

A.I. Mikoyan. You showed such a poor hospitality to him, that he can hardly be convinced to come to New York again. Such a great power as the United States should be ashamed to mistreat such a small country. When Stevenson had not yet been the USA representative [in the United Nations - trans.], he had good understanding of everything, but now apparently his official position makes him speak and act in a different way.

Stevenson. We learn in government office, but we forget nothing. We immediately accepted the proposal on inspection by the Red Cross. I do not know how many Soviet ships are approaching Cuba, but I would prefer that there will be more of them, so that they would sooner take away your missiles. I must tell you that we were very favorably impressed by the speed with which Soviet officers dismantle the missiles.

McCloy. I am struck by the speed of assembling as well as disassembling [of the

missiles - trans.].

A.I. Mikoyan. Those who can assemble fast, can also disassemble fast. Our military are men of discipline, they punctually fulfill the order of N.S. Khrushchev. But there are not enough ships around Cuba to carry away the equipment which is the subject of the understanding, so in addition other ships will be necessary. And your blockade stands in their way to Cuba and, consequently, hampers the withdrawal of missiles. In other words, the “quarantine” turns itself against your own interests.

McCloy. We would gladly let your ships pass in both directions, if they carry all your missiles away. I would like to be on the ship that would transport the last missiles from Cuba, added McCloy in jest.

A.I. Mikoyan (in a jocular way). So lift the “quarantine” and then everything will be in order. Stevenson will become the one he had used to be before he was nominated [to his position] in the UN.

Stevenson. When do your ships arrive in Cuba?

A.I. Mikoyan. But you have not yet lifted the blockade. Our ships are now in the open sea, about 4-5 days away from Cuba. They should reach Cuba, disembark their load, then load themselves and leave. This would, of course, require a certain time, no less than 10-15 days.

Stevenson. We could agree on a schedule. Next week one might agree on an inspection of the Red Cross; then the “quarantine” might be lifted.

A.I. Mikoyan. I would like to know if [the leadership of] the United States think[s] that we should work out an agreement that would seal what has been said in the exchange of letters between Kennedy and Khrushchev? Or you are interested only in the dismantling and withdrawal of missiles? Would you think that we should agree on other issues touched upon in the exchange of missives, and confirm the achieved understanding in a written document?

Stevenson. First of all we want to reach understanding on the withdrawal of missile equipment from Cuba and we do not want to tolerate that until the establishment of inspection by the Red Cross there would be an uncontrolled flow of armaments into Cuba.

McCloy. There is already too much armament there. We cannot tolerate its build-up.

A.I. Mikoyan. It is correct that there is sufficient amount of armament in Cuba, but we already stopped sending it there.

McCloy. Yes, but we cannot risk, when it may happen that some arms are being withdrawn and other arms are being shipped in. When the missile equipment will be shipped off, the political atmosphere will ameliorate and it will be easier to agree. You preferred U.N. inspections to an inspection of the Red Cross. We agreed to that. We are interested in your ships reaching Cuba soon, and we will not obstruct their way.

A.I. Mikoyan. Arms were not provided to Cuba to attack the United States, but as a means of containment [*sderzhivaiyuchego*], so that there was no aggression against Cuba. But since in his answer to the letter of N.S. Khrushchev J. Kennedy gave the assurance that neither the United States, nor its Latin American allies would attack Cuba, we declared our readiness to pull out some types of armaments from Cuba.

Stevenson. I do not think there is any disagreement on the issue that Soviet ships should enter the ports of Cuba. It is only that the “quarantine” should be preserved until the establishment of the Red Cross inspection. We are interested to see that there will be no new shipments of arms, and we hope you will understand us.

A.I. Mikoyan. We agreed with the proposals of U Thant and declared that we would not bring armaments to Cuba pending the talks. Those ships that are now at sea carrying no weapons at all. I must say that Stevenson is a good diplomat: I am pushing him in one direction of the talk, but he veers off.

Then for some time the conversation was focused on the issues of protocol nature.

In the second half of the conversation the discussion of business resumes.

A.I. Mikoyan. Yet I would like to pose the following question. Would the USA government think to come to an agreement where all that was said in the exchange of well-known letters would be fixed? I have in mind the kind of document that would formulate the settlement of the crisis. We think it is preferable to work out such a document.

V.V. Kuznetsov. The need in working out such a document stems from the understanding achieved between the sides about the settlement of the crisis.

Stevenson. In our opinion, the sole problem that confronts us - it is to work out conditions for inspection that should be carried out by representatives of the Red Circle. This is relatively easy task. One could set up two check-points at the approaches to Cuba's ports, in the South and in the North, where two ships of the Red Cross could be located. These might be ships of neutral countries or any other ships, perhaps even sailing hospitals. On board there could be Red Cross inspectors who could check on ships going for Cuba, so that the character of this check-up would be via radio - inquiring on the ship's origins, where it goes and with what cargo. Inspectors would not board ships. I think that such [a form of] inspection should not create problems. We would be glad to hear from you which ships, in your opinion, must be utilized for these aims. I would like to repeat that one could easily reach understanding on this issue.

There is, however, one problem: measures to check the fulfillment of obligations on dismantling and withdrawal of missile equipment from Cuba. As I understood from U Thant, Castro did not agree to UN inspections stipulated in the exchange of letters between J. Kennedy and N.S. Khrushchev. We hope that you will discuss this issue once again in Havana.

McCloy. I must emphasize that we do not accept the 5 conditions of Castro as the conditions for fulfillment of what had been said in the letter of Mr. Khrushchev.

Stevenson. The problem that concerns us most is that an inspection should be carried out before you report to the Security Council about the completion of withdrawal of missile equipment. Naturally, there should be a check-up of how this undertaking is implemented. I think that such a check-up need not be difficult to carry out.

In addition to that, of course, there is the issue of the form of USA assurance that Cuba will not be subjected to invasion. This also need not present any difficulties.

McCloy. And to a certain extent this is an answer to the question previously posed by Mr. Mikoyan.

A.I. Mikoyan. You keep focusing all attention only on the issue of withdrawal of armaments from Cuba and on inspection. However, the first-order question is to grant to Cuba guarantees of non-intervention against it on the part of other countries of the Western hemisphere, recognition of the

sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Cuban Republic, observation of its territorial inviolability, non-interference into its domestic affairs. Castro demands it, and you apparently do not want to give such assurances.

Castro puts forward also a demand to liquidate the U.S. base in Guantanamo. Why are you refusing to discuss this issue? While pressing your demands, you do not want to hear the legitimate demands of the other side. Of course, this is an issue of American-Cuban relations, but in any case this issue must be discussed with Castro.

The exchange of letters between N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy - this is in essence already an agreement. But by itself the exchange of letters cannot be considered as a final document. One must carry out negotiations to work out such a final document on the basis of the exchange of letters, since this issue has acquired a bilateral international character.

We suggest to conduct negotiations on this basis and believe that the United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba should sign a protocol, with participation of U Thant. Such a protocol might fix all the basic premises contained in the letters of N.S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy.

I repeat, we think that you should consider the proposals advanced by Castro. They are legitimate ones. You should also consider the issue of the base in Guantanamo. I see that you disagree with Castro's demand, but it does not mean that you should turn down any discussion of his demands. One cannot turn such a discussion down, when one wants to normalize the situation.

I would touch on an interesting plan advanced by U Thant; after an agreement among the parties involved, which could be approved by the Security Council, one might agree on the presence of UN inspectors in the area of the Caribbean Sea, including Cuba, and on the South-East coast of the United States and the neighboring Latin American countries. These inspectors could watch over implementation of the understanding on mutual non-interference between the United States and Cuba. This is a very important proposal and its implementation would give a change to fully settle the conflict. One should take into account that Cuba is an independent state. It is impossible to demand that some kind of in-

spection would cover only its territory, if there were no analogous inspection covering the territory of the other side, on the basis of reciprocity.

I must emphasize that if the letter of J. Kennedy had not told of guarantees of non-intervention against Cuba, we would not have agreed to dismantle and withdraw missile equipment from Cuba. But now it comes out as follows: we are withdrawing weapons, and you are back-pedaling on your commitments. Castro does not have trust in your word and he has a right [not to], since the territory of Cuba has already been invaded. It would be a different matter if there would be an official document enforced, containing appropriate guarantees for Cuba and approved by the Security Council.

I would like to know your opinion about the guarantees. What can I tell Castro when I meet him? We stem from the fact that the letter from Kennedy already contains a basis for an agreement on granting to Cuba the guarantees of non-intervention. This is a bilateral problem and both sides must resolve it and fix it in an agreement.

McCloy. In our opinion, the most important [thing] is to withdraw appropriate [offensive - trans.] types of armaments from Cuba as soon as possible. If it is not done, the situation will worsen very much. One can speak about the assurances of Kennedy concerning non-intervention against Cuba, but Castro must not set new conditions on withdrawal of missile equipment. Meanwhile, Castro told U Thant that he would not tolerate UN inspections. The Soviet Union and Cuba must agree between each other on what would be the form of inspection. It is a matter of your relationship. We have only one interest: that the armaments on which we have achieved the understanding would be shipped away and that we would be convinced that they are really shipped away.

I do not think that there would be any problems on the question of the access of ships and on the withdrawal of missile equipment from Cuba. The main thing is to remove missile equipment.

As to the question on granting the guarantees of non-intervention to Cuba, if you think that what the President said is not enough, one could talk about some kind of appropriate commitment [*obiazatel'stve*].

You are posing a question about the possible presence of UN observers on USA

territory, so that there would be no invasion of Cuba. I must say that if you keep insisting on that, there will be additional complications.

A.I. Mikoyan. U Thant expressed this idea.

McCloy. No, he did not suggest it. I repeat: nothing will come out of it.

A.I. Mikoyan. Today in conversation with me U Thant reiterated this idea and said that this issue should be discussed at the Organization of American States.

Stevenson. We believe that the exchange of letters between Kennedy and Khrushchev contains concrete and clear formulas. I think that there is no need for any new understanding, except for resolution of the issue about the inspection method. If we fail to carry out ground inspection, let us seek other means which would assure us that the armaments are withdrawn. Otherwise the danger of conflict will be reborn. I hope that, when the atmosphere will clear up and the missile equipment will be withdrawn from Cuba, it will be easier to agree on other issues. Kennedy has already given appropriate assurances concerning non-intervention against Cuba, and we can confirm it.

We would like to say clearly that any discussion of the issue about liquidation of our base in Guantanamo is out of question. It was given up [*ustuplena*] to us by the government of Cuba on a legal basis, and the American people will under no circumstances renounce it.

A.I. Mikoyan. But the government of Cuba puts forward this question, so it should be discussed.

V.V. Kuznetsov. The government of Cuba has put this question even earlier.

McCloy. We will not concede on this. The position of Castro represents an obstacle on the way to fulfilling commitments formulated in the letter of Mr. Khrushchev.

A.I. Mikoyan. Castro is not and will not be an obstacle to fulfillment of these commitments. The armaments we are talking about is Soviet weaponry and it will be evacuated. As for Castro, he has declared that he would assist the evacuation of these armaments.

McCloy. But he has 145 thousand soldiers against 10 thousand Russians. He can obstruct the dismantling [of missiles--trans.]. Moreover, I think he is already obstructing it.

A.I. Mikoyan. The government of Cuba

has the right of sovereignty and one must seek its agreement on any kind of inspection on Cuban territory. It put forward five conditions, including the demand about liquidation of the American base in Guantanamo. However, beside the issue of the base, there are four more points in Castro's program, and these points are in full agreement with what Kennedy wrote in his letter to Khrushchev. Why don't you want to accept them?

Stevenson. There is only one issue between the Soviet Union and the USA: about full withdrawal from Cuba of certain types of armaments under conditions of inspection and in the presence of the understanding that the supplies of this weaponry will not be resumed. Under these conditions the guarantees of Cuba's security on the part of the United States will be ensured.

Castro raised a number of other issues, but they have nothing to do with Soviet-American relations. In our negotiations we should begin to consider the issues that are within the realm of Soviet-American relations, in the framework of the understanding between Khrushchev and Kennedy.

A.I. Mikoyan. Speaking about the exchange of letters between N.S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy, you blow up only one aspect and maintain silence on the other. You dodge such issues as lifting of the blockade, granting the guarantees of independence to Cuba. We believe that all this should be fixed [*zafiksirovano*] in the document where certain formulas should be reiterated and specified. We believe that our negotiations should result in a document registered in the United Nations and approved by the Security Council. Otherwise, what is happening? The ink has not yet dried up on the letter, but Rusk is already declaring that the United States has not guaranteed the independence of Cuba. It was published in your newspapers, and I read about it on my way to New York.

Stevenson. Rusk said nothing to disavow the guarantees that have been granted in Kennedy's letter. The press gave a wrong interpretation to his declaration.

A.I. Mikoyan. We are proposing to you to prepare jointly an appropriate document and introduce it jointly to the Security Council, then there will be no other interpretations.

Stevenson. I would like to say a few words about the procedure. U Thant believes

that the operation could be finalized in two statements: the Soviet Union could make announcement about the end of withdrawal of the certain types of weapons from Cuba, and the United States would make an announcement that we made sure that these weapons are withdrawn from Cuba. Earlier it was supposed that the appropriate check-up should be done by the forces of the UN, but after Castro's refusal to let UN representatives into Cuba, the question emerged about the method of inspection.

After the withdrawal of the certain types of weapons from Cuba will be confirmed, the USA will declare the abolition of the "quarantine" and that it guarantees non-intervention of Cuba. I see no reason for any other treaties and documents. If the Soviet side has some draft proposals, it is desirable to obtain them, and the American side then will do the same thing.

A.I. Mikoyan. There is no time to consider this issue in detail. It seems to me we should think how to continue the talks.

V.V. Kuznetsov. If the American side agrees, we will discuss this issue.

A.I. Mikoyan. On our side we prefer to have a protocol.

Stevenson. The Soviet Union can and must ensure the withdrawal of the certain types of armaments and a verification that would satisfy the USA and Latin American countries.

The question, however, emerges on what form of inspection is feasible under current circumstances. Four days have already elapsed, and there is no inspection in sight. Therefore, now we should discuss possible forms of inspection. We do not want to constrain you by those formulas that were advanced concerning international inspection. If Castro does not want such an inspection, one can think of different forms of control.

McCloy. We should look at what is acceptable and feasible, but in any case the inspection should be introduced. Therefore we should adapt ourselves to the new situation.

In the first order, of course, we should, as they say, remove the pistol from the negotiating table, in other words to dismantle and withdraw the missiles.

Stevenson. I do not think that some kind of protocol will be necessary, besides the declarations that will be made in the Security Council.

A.I.Mikoyan. Normalization would be complete if the Soviet Union, the USA and Cuba signed a joint document together with the UN Secretary General on the basis of the exchange of letters between N.S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy. In any case, this issue cannot be resolved without Cuba. A decision in which Cuba is not a party will not be binding for her. Cuba must have guarantees of non-intervention.

I would like to know: do you have any ideas about forms of control? If you have them - discuss them in the next few days with V.V. Kuznetsov.

Stevenson. As to the territorial integrity of Cuba, the formulas in the letter of Kennedy are simple and clear: after certain types of weapons will be removed from Cuba, the USA will make an announcement about the guarantee against any kind of invasion of Cuba.

McCloy. As to the forms of verification, the ideal form in my mind would be regular overflights by planes doing aerial photo-reconnaissance, and ground inspection. I hope that the Soviet Union would bear on Castro so that he will agree to the conduct of such inspection as was stipulated in the letter of N.S. Khrushchev. However, if Castro refuses to accept such inspection, we should look for another form. The USA might continue overflights by its planes giving us confidence that one does not resume in Cuba assembly of types of weapons that represent danger for us. But in this case we would like to have assurances that our plans will not be downed. One could also consider yet another possibility. Could you pass to us the lists of armament that is being withdrawn from Cuba? We know approximately how many missiles you now have in Cuba. If you could pass to us the lists of what you will transport on your ships (of course, I understand that these documents will not contain specifications of these armaments), then through comparison of this data with the data about the presence of armaments in Cuba, that is in our disposal, we would follow the process of evacuation of armaments that are of danger for us. I believe that this would be enough. In this case we would get on along ground inspection.

The system of passing of the lists of cargo removed from Cuba would not touch on your security interests. As to overflights, you, as we understand, cannot guarantee that the Cubans would not shoot at our planes.

But we are glad that when today our plane flew over Cuba, it was not shot at. As far as we know, the anti-aircraft missiles deployed in Cuba are not in the hands of the Cubans, but in the hands of your people. Today we intercepted radio-commands and conversations of the anti-aircraft units deployed in Cuba and that confirmed us again in our conclusion. I must say that we are glad that these anti-aircraft missiles are in the hands of the Russians whose hands are not itching like the hands of the Cubans.

In passing, I would like to say that although we do not include anti-aircraft missiles into the category of offensive weapons, we would very much like that you withdraw these missiles as well.

A.I.Mikoyan. As I see, your sense of humor has completely disappeared.

Stevenson. In your conversations in Havana you could cite good arguments in favor of ground inspection: on one side, it would assure us that you are fulfilling your obligations, on the other hand, Castro would obtain confidence that no invasion of Cuba would take place: since U.N. observers would be around.

A.I.Mikoyan. I believe that in the course of today's conversation we laid the ground for upcoming negotiations. I think that we should not now go into detail. You should reflect on what we have spoken about here. We will prepare our drafts as well. It seems to me that until the election day it would be hard for you to take any decisions, but, on the other hand, one should not procrastinate with liquidation of the Cuban crisis.

Stevenson. We could agree even tomorrow in all details with a plan of inspection of ships by the forces of the Red Cross if both sides approve of the proposal of U Thant. We should not put off resolution of this issue. What flag would be on these two inspection ships is of no significance to us.

As to the oversight of the territory of Cuba, if Castro refuses to agree on ground inspection, we could limit ourselves to unilateral conduct of aerial reconnaissance. For this we would only need your assurance that our planes will not be shot at.

McCloy. It seems that it would take not 10-15 days, but probably a month for removal of your missiles.

A.I.Mikoyan. All these are [mere] details. We brought with us military experts - a general and colonel, who could discuss all

these technical issues with you. I would like to speak on another, more important question. It is out of question that we agree with you now on overflights of your plans over Cuba: it is sovereign Cuban territory. But if the USA agreed to the inspection over the area of Miami, it would be a good thing. Then, possibly, the Cubans would agree to such inspection over their territory. One cannot not carry out unilateral inspection - no matter which, ground or aerial. The Cubans would have full reason to be offended, if you were granted the right of regular and permanent overflight over their territory, in a unilateral way.

As for inspections which must ensure a verification of the dismantling and withdrawal of our missiles, here we stand on the same position that was expressed in the letters of N.S. Khrushchev.

Stevenson. As to ground inspection, it was U Thant, not us, who came up with a proposal about the presence of UN inspectors during the dismantling and withdrawal of the missiles. Incidentally, he had in mind permanent inspection till the end of dismantling of the missiles. This would serve the interests of both sides. I understand that Cuba is an independent country, but if it agrees with this, then there would be no need to seek other forms of check-up.

A.I.Mikoyan. We agree to conduct ground inspection, as the letter of N.S. Khrushchev stated, but it is necessary to have some kind of element of reciprocity so that this understanding does not affect the national feelings of the Cubans. This also flows from my conversation with U Thant.

I would like to know if McCloy and Stevenson consider today's exchange of opinion useful?

Stevenson. The conversation was useful and I became persuaded that our positions stay not too far apart.

A.I.Mikoyan. There is misunderstanding [*nedoponimaniie*] as far as the issue of reciprocity of inspections is concerned. U Thant said that Castro is concerned with the presence on the USA of camps where Cuban emigres prepare themselves for invasion similar to one that took place last year.

McCloy. I must assure you that these camps no longer exist, they are closed everywhere.

A.I.Mikoyan. You mean that they do not exist in Latin American countries as well?

McCloy. The camps are closed everywhere. Perhaps there is something somewhere, but in any case the USA does not support this business.

A.I.Mikoyan. But you count Cuban emigres among your own military forces?

McCloy. We are not training them for invasion of Cuba. We allow volunteers of any nationality to be enlisted in our military forces, even Russians can do it. In any case, I assure you that there are no more camps in the USA where Cuban emigres are trained, prepared for invasion of Cuba.

However I would like to tell you frankly, that any inspection on USA territory is out of question. You have to trust in our word.

Stevenson. I want to say that the USA is trying to normalize the situation in the area of the Caribbean sea, but on condition of Castro's cooperation. We might work out some form of mutual guarantees acceptable for Castro and his neighbors. If Castro is afraid of them, they, too, are afraid of him. I believe that after the settlement of the Cuban crisis the situation in this region will

become more relaxed.

A.I.Mikoyan. It is very important what you are saying. Castro might ask me: is the USA going to restore diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba or this question is not on the agenda? Perhaps you have in mind not to do it right away, but after some time? I would like to know what I can tell Castro.

Stevenson. You understand that I cannot answer this question. It is within the competence of the Organization of American States. We cannot conduct business with Castro without its involvement. But one could think of certain regional arrangements providing confidence to the countries of the Caribbean sea. I hope that we would be able gradually to liquidate the antagonism between Cuba and her neighbors. Now this antagonism is being heated by subversive activities which, perhaps, reciprocate each other in this region.

McCloy. I would say that Cuba is the source of infection, and the recent events in Venezuela provide an example. But I would not like to dwell now on this issue. I am

satisfied with today's exchange of opinions. I would be glad to meet you and follow up on this conversation, on your way back from Cuba.

The conversation lasted for 3 hours 40 minutes. Those present were com. V.V. Kuznetsov, A.F. Dobrynin, M.A. Menshikov, G.A. Zhukov; from the American side participated J. McCloy, A. Stevenson, A. Akalovsky.

Note-takers:

G.Zhukov

Yu.Vinogradov.

[Source: AVP RF; obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, copy on file at National Security Archive; translation by Vladislav M. Zubok (National Security Archive).]

**Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba A.I. Alekseev to USSR Foreign Ministry, 2 November 1962**

2 November 1962

**THE MIKOYAN-CASTRO TALKS, 4-5 NOVEMBER 1962: THE CUBAN VERSION**

[Editor's Note: While a large, albeit incomplete, complex of Russian documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis has become available to researchers since 1991—as exemplified by the selection of translated materials in this and past *Bulletins*—documents on the events of the fall of 1962 are still only beginning to trickle out of Cuban archives. The two documents below, translated from Spanish, represent a rare and encouraging sign (as does Piero Gleijeses' article on Cuban policy in Africa elsewhere in this issue) that prospects for historical research in Cuban archives may improve.

The Cuban records concern the tense conversations between Fidel Castro (and other members of the Cuban leadership) and senior Soviet envoy Anastas I. Mikoyan on 4-5 November 1962, in the immediate aftermath of USSR Premier Nikita Khrushchev's acceptance on October 28 of U.S. President John F. Kennedy's demand that he withdraw Soviet nuclear missiles from Cuba. They were apparently released

in response to the publication in the *Bulletin* in 1995 of lengthy Soviet records of the same conversations.<sup>1</sup> The materials were obtained from the Institute of History in Cuba by Prof. Philip Brenner (American University), who provided them to CWIHP, and translated from Spanish by Carlos Osorio (National Security Archive).

While the Cuban documents themselves do not offer any startling information or insights not present in the far more detailed Soviet records of the same conversations—a quick comparison of the two versions of the identical conversations finds them broadly compatible—they are presented as a symbol of what historians can hope will be a thorough process of eventually reconstructing Soviet-Cuban relations on the basis of solid archival evidence from both sides, which can then be compared and cross-checked. Given the amount of passion and controversy that has surrounded this question during the Cold War, and which continues to infuse U.S.-Cuban relations (as Fidel Castro remains in charge nearly four decades after the revolution that brought him to power), the availability of scholarly perspectives and contemporaneous docu-

mentary evidence from Cuban, Russian, and American sources, as well as a continuation of the oral history process that has begun to involve senior Cuban officials in international explorations of such key events as the Bay of Pigs and Cuban Missile Crisis,<sup>2</sup> is clearly a precondition for a serious and comprehensive analysis.

Unfortunately, little information is available at present on the provenance of the Cuban documents provided below, including their precise archival location or who took the notes that are presented; the *Bulletin* hopes to supply additional information, as well as further evidence from Cuban archives should it emerge, in future issues.]

[Translator's Note: The translations at times read awkwardly, for the Spanish documents themselves are occasionally confusing, mixing tenses, subjects and objects in the same phrase. Mikoyan, a Soviet national, appears to be speaking a Castillian Spanish, as he often uses the auxiliary "haber" for the past tense. The note-taker is presumably a Cuban national, so he sometimes skips transcribing the past tense as was used

*continued on page 339*

We will inform Fidel Castro of the content of the documents [not further identified-ed.]. He has entrusted me to convey a translation of the draft to President Dorticos, and to reach an agreement with him on all points.

Dorticos, having read through the document, said that in principle the document serves the interests of Cuba, and that it would be approved.

Separate remarks will be introduced after the discussion of our proposals with Fidel Castro and the other leaders, and also after their talks with Comrade A. I. Mikoyan, which are slated for today.

2.XI.62 ALEKSEEV

*[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWHIP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen.]*

**Telegram from A.I. Mikoyan in New York to CC CPSU, 2 November 1962**

2 November 1962

From the following telegram you will learn the details of the important statement made by McCloy in the talks on monitoring the dismantling of the "offensive weaponry." He declared that in view of Castro's refusal to agree to a ground-based monitoring, the Americans were willing not to insist [on that], knowing the forms and methods of monitoring put forth in Khrushchev's message, [but] that it was necessary to find other methods for convincing the Americans that the dismantling process had been completed and that everything had been removed.

In response to my question about whether there was some concrete proposal as to how this should be done, he said the following: to allow them the possibility of flights over Cuba for inspections from the air, without ground-based monitoring; this was the first point. The second was that the Soviets provide the Americans with information about how much of the weaponry has been dismantled and removed, and when. The important part of this is not to impart secret military information that reveals the nature and capacities of this weaponry.

I rejected here the possibility of flights over Cuba, since that would affect the sovereignty of Cuba itself. The proposal about

information from our side, I said, should be discussed with our military specialists, who arrived with me to aid Kuznetsov.

McCloy reported with great satisfaction that on 1 November their plane had flown over Cuba without being fired at, and had made photos. He attributed this to the presence of Soviet specialists at the anti-aircraft missile installations.

I conclude that if our agreement with Castro not to shoot down American planes retains its force, then when they fly one or two more times it will mean that inspections on the dismantling have been carried out. There remains the issue of inspections on the removal of the dismantled weaponry, which could be resolved through means suggested by McCloy.

In view of this, Castro's position, which rejects the possibility of on-site inspections, will cease to be an obstacle to settling with the Americans the issue of monitoring the dismantling and removal of the weaponry.

I consider all this to be expedient.

In my talks with Castro I will fully explain our position on the issue of monitoring in accordance with Khrushchev's message, I will show him its correctness and acceptability, from our point of view, for Cuba.

In connection with the Americans' proposal laid out earlier, and taking into account the Cubans' arrogance, I consider it expedient not to insist or ensure that they reject their position on not allowing observers onto their territory to check on the dismantling and removal process, the position which they have made clear to U Thant and have published several times in the press.

In truth, in Castro's speech yesterday this position was made to seem somewhat more flexible.

I await instructions concerning this matter in Havana.

2.XI.62 A. MIKOYAN

*[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWHIP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen.]*

**Telegram from A.I. Mikoyan in New York to CC CPSU, 2 November 1962**

2 November 1962

Yesterday in the hour-long discussion with McCloy and Stevenson, the positions of the parties on all issues connected with the Cuban conflict were explained, as well as the American position in the form in which the Americans consider it necessary to define it.

We will be sending to you a short exposition of the most important points of the discussion within 2 or 3 hours, and today, 2 November and 1:00 in the afternoon I will be flying to Cuba. Our comrades will compose a detailed record of the conversation, and will send it after I am gone. The conversation was important, and you should become familiarized with that detailed record of it.

McCloy has declared that with the aim of speeding up the removal of the missiles, before the fine-tuning of the observation system by the Red Cross has been reached, they agree to and are interested in allowing Soviet vessels bound for Cuba entry into Cuban ports without inspection, by way of a hail like the one that was given to the tanker "Bucharest."

We are introducing a proposal to give instructions to all our vessels bound for Cuba to proceed to their destinations.

2.XI.62 A. MIKOYAN

*[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWHIP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen.]*

**Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister A. Gromyko to unidentified recipient, 2 November 1962**

2 November 1962

The head of the American delegation at the negotiations in New York, McCloy, has informed Comrade Kuznetsov on 31 October that Washington has decided that until the Red Cross has begun its monitoring of the vessels bound for Cuba, it would not carry out inspections on these vessels, but to apply to them the same procedure that was applied to the tanker "Bucharest." During this time the "quarantine" will be officially continued.

As is well known, the tanker "Bucharest" passed through a region under American "quarantine" without hindrance.

Six Soviet vessels now on the open sea beyond the announced limits of the "quarantine" have received orders to proceed into the Cuban ports, and at present they are now on their way toward Cuba.

A. G.

*[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWHIP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen.]*

**Telegram from Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov and Ambassador to the UN V.A. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 3 November 1962**

3 November 1962

On 3 November Morozov, Mendelievich, and Timerbaev had a meeting with Narasimhan and Loutfi (replacing U Thant) for the examination of technical issues connected with the sending of observers from the International Red Cross Committee to ascertain that on the Soviet vessels bound for Cuba there is no weaponry considered offensive by the USA.

Narasimhan said that the the secretariat of the UN in New York had not yet received the definitive consent of the International Red Cross to its participation in the organization of the monitoring. An answer from the Red Cross could be received today, 3 November.

Narasimhan also laid out the thoughts of the Americans, as he understood them, regarding the Red Cross's monitoring procedure.

The USA considers it expedient to deploy two vessels with observers from the International Red Cross on the open sea near the Cuban coast—one 8 to 10 miles off Havana, and another in the strait between Cuba and Haiti. The vessels should have radio contact with the UN. On each vessel there should be two groups of International Red Cross observers. Each group should contain eight observers. In this way, 32 observers will be needed in all.

In response to our question about how to manage such a large number of observers, especially when bearing in mind that Stevenson in his talks with us on 1 November of this year had expressed his view that the International Red Cross inspections

could be reduced to radio interrogations of passing ships, Narasimhan answered that in many cases it will be precisely that, but that the International Red Cross observers should have the right to carry out inspections (to check documents, to inspect ship holds, and so on), if such a necessity should arise.

Our representatives remarked that such a proposal from Narasimhan concerning the conferral to the International Red Cross groups of inspection rights contradicts the views expressed earlier by Stevenson. We will continue to insist that the inspections be limited to interrogations by radio.

The USA, Narasimhan continued, is prepared to provide its own transportation for the International Red Cross inspectors. This may be ordinary transportation for the conveyance of troops, even though they would be unarmed and would contain on board civilian passengers.

We told Narasimhan that the Soviet Union, as had already been declared to U Thant, had given its consent to the conveyance of the International Red Cross observers either by Soviet or by neutral vessels. Narasimhan responded that he knew about this, but all the same considered it possible to inform the Soviet Union of this proposal by the USA, which, Narasimhan said, works towards the interests of a speedy organization of the inspections. The USA, in his words, has no objections to the use of Soviet ships. Narasimhan asked us to explain, if possible by 5 November, how soon the Soviet Union could prepare its ships for the International Red Cross observers. For his part, Narasimhan will make inquiries by this time about the possibility of chartering neutral vessels located near Cuba.

Narasimhan raised the issue of reimbursing the costs of chartering the vessels and constituting the International Red Cross groups. In response to the question of how the USA imagines covering the costs associated with the carrying out of inspections by the International Red Cross, Narasimhan said that it was proposing two possible variants—either through the UN (that is, according to their pay scale), or to divide the costs equally between the USSR and the USA.

Our representatives answered that the USA had illegally imposed the so-called "quarantine," that they were now pushing for inspections on vessels bound for Cuba, and that it was completely clear that it is they who should covers the expenses for the

carrying out of such inspections. In future negotiations we should proceed from the assumption that the Soviet Union will assume expenses only for the maintenance of Soviet vessels. As far as the maintenance of the International Red Cross vessels is concerned, we will push for the USA or the UN bearing the burden of these expenses. (It is not out of the question that the International Red Cross will itself pay the expenses for the upkeep of the groups.)

On the issue of how long the inspection procedure by the International Red Cross would be continued, Narasimhan said that it should be carried out for a period of three to four weeks. But it is possible that the duration could be shorter. Everything depends on how long the removal of weaponry from Cuba would continue. As soon as all the weaponry is removed, the inspections, it seems, should cease.

We emphasized that the inspections on vessels by the International Red Cross should be of a short-term nature, as was declared by U Thant in his provisional proposal concerning this issue, which was approved by the Soviet Union. In the future, with regard to time limits we will proceed with aim of imposing the shortest possible limits. We will aim for ceasing the inspections immediately after the removal of the dismantled installations, and the approval by the Security Council of corresponding resolutions for the conclusive settlement of the Cuban crisis.

If our approval of the conveyance of the International Red Cross representatives on Soviet ships is still valid, we ask that you inform us immediately of which vessels in particular are being selected for this purpose, and when they can arrive in the Caribbean Sea area.

Since the Cubans will evidently not agree to admit the International Red Cross observers onto the territory of Cuba in order to then admit them onto Soviet ships, we ask that you inform us what would be the most appropriate port in the Caribbean Sea area in which to take on board these International Red Cross observers.

The next meeting with Narasimhan is slated for the morning of 5 November.

3.XI.62 V. KUZNETSOV  
V. ZORIN

*[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK,*

*provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]*

**Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba A.I. Alekseev to USSR Foreign Ministry, 4 November 1962<sup>18</sup>**

4 November 1962

Today talks were conducted between A.I. Mikoyan and Comrades Fidel Castro, O. Dorticos, R. Castro, E. Guevara, E. Aragonez, and C.R. Rodriguez, as well as myself.

Comrade Mikoyan conveyed warm, fraternal greetings from the Presidium of the CC CPSU and N.S. Khrushchev to the Cuban leaders. He expressed a lofty appreciation of the Cuban revolution, and support for the rebuff to the interventionists; he spoke about our support for Cuba; and he remarked that the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was delighted by the courage and fearlessness displayed by the leaders of Cuba's revolution in these perilous days, and the readiness of the Cuban people to hold firm. Then Comrade Mikoyan said that when the Central Committee learned of the misunderstanding arising in Cuba of several issues and decisions made by us, they came to the conclusion that it would be impossible to clarify these issues by way of mere correspondence. The Central Committee made the decision to send Comrade Mikoyan to Cuba to clarify to our friends our position, and to inform them of issues that are of interest to them. Comrade Mikoyan remarked that he naturally did not have any intention of exerting pressure; his task was simply to explain our position.

Knowing our Cuban friends, A.I. Mikoyan said, I am sure that they too will agree with this. It could of course turn out such that even after the explanations there will be certain points on which our points of view will remain different.

Fidel Castro declared that he has already informed the Cuban comrades present at the talks of the issues raised by him yesterday before Comrade Mikoyan, and made a short resume of these issues.

A.I. Mikoyan remarked that Fidel Castro spoke yesterday in detail and with sincerity, and asked whether the other com-

rades wanted to add anything to this, whether they had other remarks to make.

O. Dorticos asked for an explanation of why N.S. Khrushchev approved the proposal made by Kennedy to declare that there would be no attack on Cuba on the condition of the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba, even though the Cuban government had not yet at this time expressed its own opinion on this proposal.

C.R. Rodriguez put a question to Comrade Mikoyan—where does the Soviet leadership see the essence of victory, does it consist in military success or in diplomatic success? We believed, Rodriguez noted, that we could not yet talk about victory, since the guarantees from the USA were ephemeral.

Then A.I. Mikoyan, developing arguments made in N.S. Khrushchev's letters to Fidel Castro, and also from the discussion of the issue in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, offered additional arguments with the aim of driving away any doubts from the minds of our Cuban comrades. He spoke moreover of the main points of his talks with U Thant, McCloy, and Stevenson.

We will send a full record of the conversation to Moscow via diplomatic mail. Further information on certain new points touched on in Mikoyan's explanations will be provided by separate telegram.

The talks lasted seven hours, more than five hours of which were taken up by Comrade Mikoyan's explanations. Our Cuban comrades listened with attentiveness to A.I. Mikoyan, were interested in details, and sustained the general feeling of cordiality and trust.

We agreed to continue the talks in the same composition tomorrow, on 5 November, at 2:00 in the afternoon local time.

4.XI.62 ALEKSEEV

*[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen.]*

**Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko to Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov and Ambassador to the UN Zorin in New York, 4 November 1962**

4 November 1962

Your thoughts on the statement that Stevenson should make in connection with his letter and memorandum do not provoke any objections.

In addition it is necessary for you to say the following:

Since when have the planes named by Stevenson [IL-28 bombers—ed.] become offensive weaponry[?] After all, these planes are of a type considered outmoded both in its altitude ceilings and in its speed. The putting forth of such a demand constitutes an intentional seeking out of issues that encourage discord and a continuation of the tense state of our relations.

The planes mentioned by Stevenson are associated with coastal defense weaponry. Such a plane cannot appear in conditions of war over enemy territory, since it does not possess the capacity for attaining the necessary altitude and speed. It can appear over such territory only with an air escort. Virtually any military expert would recognize that these planes cannot be placed in the category of offensive weaponry at the present time.

If the USA honestly gave assurances that it would not invade Cuba, then the possession of these planes by the Cubans should not elicit any concern.

We understood the concerns of the Americans when talk began to turn to a definite sort of missile weaponry. Missiles are indeed an uninterceptable and instantaneously effective sort of weapon. There is no reason to put outdated weaponry in the offensive category. Such weaponry will have a defensive, auxiliary function.

As far as photo reconnaissance and reconnaissance in general are concerned, used as they are by all countries, experience shows that it does not always reflect the actual situation.

All this provides the grounds for concluding that the most important issues here must be talked about. We must mutually fulfill the obligations assumed by all parties, and then the issue will be exhausted.

A. Gromyko

*[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]*

**Telegram (No.4448) from the Minister of the USSR Merchant Fleet to Captain of Ship "Amata" via Soviet ambassador in Havana (Alekshev), 5 November 1962**

5 November 1962

I ask that you transmit information on the location of the ship "Amata." Your ship has been selected for use by the Organization of the United Nations for the conveyance of a group of representatives from the International Red Cross consisting of 16 people. Your location, after you take this group on board, should be near the port of Havana, but beyond the 12-mile zone of Cuba's territorial waters. The vessel chosen for these operations should arrive in Havana on 6 November. If you have cargo in your holds leave it in the holds, since the deck should be free. Your ship's number has already been communicated to the UN, as well as the fact that you will be operating at a frequency of 500 kilohertz; beginning on 6 November they will be able to contact you from the UN radio station. On your arrival in Havana, immediately contact our envoy. Bring the vessel into complete order, temporarily move your equipment and crew into tighter quarters, and prepare room for the comfortable accommodation of the representatives of the Red Cross. It is assumed that this group will be with you until 12 November of this year. You will have to come to an agreement with the head of this group concerning food-related matters. You should have ready for operation the ship's motor boat, on which the representatives will be able to travel out onto the arriving vessels. You should follow all the instructions of the group. Report on your carrying out of these instructions, and keep us regularly informed, through closed communication, of your operations.

BAKAEV

*[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWHIP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]*

**Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko to Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov and Ambassador to the UN**

**Zorin in New York, 5 November 1962**

You must adhere to the following position in your negotiations on the lifting of the blockade, elimination of tension, and normalization of the situation in the Caribbean Sea.

The negotiations are being conducted with the aim of eliminating the tense situation which has been threatening to explode into thermonuclear war.

The basis of these negotiations is the agreement reached through an exchange of messages between Comrade N.S. Khrushchev and President Kennedy. The essence of this agreement is as follows.

The USA is giving assurances that no invasion will be inflicted on Cuba, not only on the part of the United States, but also on the part of their allies—the other countries of the Western hemisphere. The Soviet Union for its part will remove from the Cuba the missile weaponry that the President of the USA has called offensive, and will not install such types of weaponry in Cuba again.

Such is the basis of the agreement, and we are adhering to it, because it is the only possible basis now for eliminating the tense situation that has been created. The agreement is the result of a compromise reached through mutual concessions, and it satisfied both parties.

In accordance with this agreement the Soviets undertook on 28 October the dismantling of the missiles. The dismantling was completed on 2 November, and the dismantled missiles have been transported to ports for shipping. As you have already been informed, these missiles will be removed from Cuba on 7 or 8 or at the latest 10 November of this year.

Tell the Americans that if they wish to raise other issues, then they will find many such issues on our side as well, issues which really affect the vital interests of our country and which create concerns about our security. But we are not raising any of these issues at present, because they are too broad, and their resolution will take a great amount of time; moreover, these issues affect not only our two states, but the large circle of states, i. e. they belong to the category of global problems.

If the USA representatives say that President Kennedy, in his speech on 22 October speaking about offensive weaponry,

mentioned bombers in this category, then say the following:

In Cuba there are none of our bombers which could be put in the category of offensive weaponry. They do so with the IL-28 bomber. But this machine is 15 years old. The American military figures surely know very well that this was the first Soviet plane with a turboreactive engine. Fifteen years ago they indeed were rather cutting-edge machines. But now technology has made so many steps ahead that we have not only removed these machines from the arsenal of our army, but have even refused to use them as targets for the training of anti-aircraft units in the Soviet Union. These machines are soon going to be scrapped, and if we sold them to some country, it would only be for using them as training machines for pilot instruction, and to some extent as defensive means—for the coastal defense of a territory with the escort of anti-aircraft machines, and nothing more. These planes are so far from answering the current needs for speed and altitude that their use for other purposes would mean sending people to certain death. We are sure that the American military and USA intelligence understands this well.

Indicate that if the representatives of the USA insist on their demand concerning the IL-28 planes, then by doing so they will only put the USA in a position in which the whole world will see that the United States is not keeping its word, and is imposing unacceptable conditions that create the possibility of a prolongation of the conflict. At that time the whole world will understand that this is precisely the purpose behind the imposition of such conditions.

In Stevenson's letter of 3 November, another issue is raised—it asserts that according to the reports of American intelligence in Cuba, the assembling of IL-28 bombers is still going on. In response to this, say that such assertions are an invention of American intelligence, because it is impossible to see what is not there. Moreover, American photos do not corroborate this. It is clear that this false information is pursuing the aim of avoiding a settlement of the conflict and a normalization of our relations, and indeed a tightening of tensions.

As far as other sorts of weaponry are concerned which the American representatives are now trying to put in the offensive category, tell the Americans that it is neces-

sary to rigorously proceed from the agreement reached through the exchange of letters, that it is necessary for the Americans to hold to the statement of their own President. He said that he was against offensive weaponry, but in favor of the right of each side to possess defensive weaponry.

Say that in general we are not presently authorized to carry on negotiations on points that directly concern the defense interests of the Republic of Cuba. We have not been authorized by Cuba to carry on such negotiations. For this reason, if the Americans insist on this, it will only complicate the settlement.

If the Americans take as their goal a return to an incendiary situation, it will scarcely be in the interests of either the USA or the USSR, or in the interests of the world. We propose to choose reasonable positions, and to proceed in the negotiations from the agreement that has been reached. We have already fulfilled our obligations, have dismantled our missiles, have loaded them onto ships, and in the coming days, that is, not later than 10 November, all these materials will be removed from Cuba. The other side, the United States, should also carry out its obligations, and lift the blockade that has been called a "quarantine." Let us formalize this in documents with the aim that each side affirm its statements in documents, that is, let us formalize this agreement on the basis of which this dangerous moment in the history of our countries, which really could erupt in a catastrophic thermonuclear war, can be eliminated.

Say that we believe that the elimination of this especially difficult situation, and the formalization of this in documents, would serve as a good beginning in the resolution of issues that our states and indeed the whole world faces. This is the issue of disarmament, the issue of the elimination of bases, the prohibition of thermonuclear arms testing, the signing of agreements on non-aggression between Warsaw Pact and NATO countries.

Emphasize that if the USA intends to insist on discussing the issues it has raised, because the President spoke about them and because they allegedly also relate to the conditions of the agreement, then it is fitting to remind them that N.S. Khrushchev also raised other issues in his messages. Both we and the Americans know that USA missile bases are distributed throughout many coun-

tries around the Soviet Union.

For this reason, if the parties talk about what was mentioned in the course of the polemic, and it was indeed a polemic, and if each side insists on having things its own way, then it will render impossible an agreement and the elimination of the tense situation—in other words, we will return to the same incendiary situation that existed before, and that was escaped with such difficulty.

For this reason it is necessary to show understanding and respect for the sovereignty of each state, and to recognize the equal rights of all countries to self-defense.

5.XI A. G.

*[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen.]*

**Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to Cuba A.I. Alekseev to USSR Foreign Ministry, 5 November 1962**

5 November

In connection with our explanations to Fidel Castro of how the decisive moment for us did not allow time for consultation with him on the issue of dismantling, he drew his own conclusions from the exchange of messages between N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy, and doubts crept into his mind as to whether we had familiarized him with all the letters.

In particular, he says that it follows from Kennedy's open message of 27 October that our decision regarding the dismantling had been communicated to Kennedy even before that date.

Before 27 October, I passed on to Castro two confidential letters from N.S. Khrushchev to President Kennedy: of 23 and 26 October.

On the basis of the correspondence I have come to the opinion that Kennedy did not yet have a basis in the message of 27 October for drawing the conclusion that we gave our consent for the dismantling before that date, and it is necessary somehow to explain this to Castro. Comrade Mikoyan has entrusted me with the task of looking into the issue raised by Castro.

In view of the necessity of sending this

telegram immediately, I have not had time to submit it to the approval of Comrade Mikoyan. The talks with Castro will take place on 5 November at 14:00 local time.

5.XI.62 ALEKSEEV

*[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by J. Henriksen.]*

**Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister Gromyko to Mikoyan and Alekseev in Havana, 5 November 1962**

5 November 1962

In response to the telegram from Comrade Alekseev. In the event that it is necessary, you should explain to Fidel Castro that the readiness to dismantle the installations of the so-called "offensive weaponry" was first mentioned only in N.S. Khrushchev's message to Kennedy of 27 October.

It is obvious that some misunderstanding could arise from the fact that Kennedy's message to N.S. Khrushchev of 27 October spoke (with reference to N.S. Khrushchev's message of 26 October) of the "removal" of the weaponry from Cuba; but that was his, Kennedy's, interpretation of the issue. As N.S. Khrushchev's message of 26 October makes clearly evident, it made absolutely no reference to an agreement about the "removal" of our weaponry from Cuba.

Since N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy did not exchange any other messages or statements in those days, besides the ones familiar to our Cuban friends, Fidel Castro's doubts about whether we might have given our consent to the dismantling of the weaponry and its removal from Cuba before 27 October should disappear completely.

A. G.

*[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]*

**Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the USA Dobrynin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 5 November 1962**

5 November 1962

Today the "Washington Post" published an article by [columnist Joseph] Alsop under the title "The Soviet Plan for Deception." The article talks about Robert Kennedy's connection with [Georgi] Bolshakov<sup>19</sup> (the latter was not named directly), and also declared in dramatic tones how that connection was used "for the deception" of the President in the issue of the Soviet missile bases in Cuba. It mentions in particular Bolshakov's reception by N. S. Khrushchev in the summer of this year, and the oral message for the President conveyed through him.

This and several other details are known in Washington only by Robert Kennedy, whom Bolshakov met with after his return from vacation (the article also mentions this meeting). For this reason it is clearly obvious that the article was prepared with the knowledge of, or even by orders from, Robert Kennedy, who is a close friend, as is the President, of Alsop.

After his first meeting with Robert Kennedy, immediately after his return from vacation, Bolshakov no longer met with him. Robert Kennedy promised him to set up a meeting with the President for passing on to him the oral message, but yet did not organize such a meeting.

5.XI.62 A. DOBRYNIN

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen.]

**Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the USA Dobrynin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 5 November 1962**

Having familiarized himself with the text of N.S. Khrushchev's confidential letter,<sup>20</sup> Robert Kennedy said that he would pass it on to the President immediately.

Then, assuming a somewhat surprised air, he tried to represent the affair as if the Soviets, having given their consent in principle to withdraw from Cuba the arms that the Americans call offensive, thereby allegedly came close to adopting the American point of view that had been laid out in the form of the list of weaponry mentioned by the American statement about the "quaran-

tine." This, he said, was how Stevenson had "understood" V.V. Kuznetsov during their first meeting.

I answered that this interpretation of the Soviet position did not correspond to reality. A reference to the declaration cannot have for us the force of an obligation, since it is a document publicized by the USA government in a highly unilateral fashion. It is well known that the Soviets have refused to recognize this document, and thus also the list of weaponry it contains, and to which R. Kennedy is referring. For the Soviet Union, only the written agreement reached between N.S. Khrushchev and the President has the force of law, and we will fulfill the terms of that agreement if the Americans also fulfill their own obligations.

V.V. Kuznetsov also spoken about this to Stevenson. And A.I. Mikoyan spoke about it to Stevenson and McCloy during his recent talks with them, at which I was present myself.

R. Kennedy did not go any further into the details of the list itself, saying, however, that besides the missiles being removed by us, the Americans place great importance as well on the removal from Cuba of the Soviet IL-28 bombers. "We are not insisting on the recall of fighter planes, but bombers with a significant radius of action are another matter entirely." He refused to make any further statements on this subject, saying only that he would immediately pass on N.S. Khrushchev's letter to the President, who was supposed to be flying soon to the city of Boston, where he will vote in the USA congressional elections.

R. Kennedy answered that any additional demands, like the list of weaponry indicated above, render the lessening of the tensions arising around Cuba significantly more difficult to attain, and could only seriously complicate the situation.

Before R. Kennedy's departure, he expressed concern about the Cubans' firing at American planes carrying out observational flights over Cuba on the dismantling of the Soviet missiles. Such gunfire can elicit highly serious consequences, he added.

R. Kennedy was told that the flights by the American planes are a direct violation of the sovereignty of Cuba, and that this whole issue should, in all fairness, be raised not by the Americans but by the Cubans. Every sovereign state has every legal right to defend the inviolability of its borders. And

we are not authorized to carry on the discussion of this sort of issue on behalf of Cuba. Let us rather fulfill the agreement reached in the exchange of messages between the government leaders of both countries, said I to R. Kennedy. Then the situation around Cuba may be normalized. We are keeping our promise, and hope that the USA too does not renege on its own promises and impose unacceptable conditions that create the possibility of a continuation of the conflict.

R. Kennedy limited himself to the remark that they were really seriously worried by the possible consequences of the firing at American planes, and that he personally considered it necessary to say so. We then once again laid out for him our position with regard to the flights of American planes over Cuba.

With this the talks were ended, since R. Kennedy was hurrying to the White House to meet with the President.

5.XI.62 A. DOBRYNIN

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWIHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen.]

**Telegram from V.V. Kuznetsov to USSR Foreign Ministry, 6 November 1962**

First. On 5 November we met with U Thant. We informed him of the exchange of views which had been taking place in recent days with the Americans. We informed him in particular of our proposals, communicated yesterday to McCloy, regarding the monitoring of the weaponry being removed from Cuba (the numerical data on the quantity of launch pads and missiles which was communicated to McCloy was not passed on to U Thant). We lingered in detail over the fact that the USA is asking questions which can only complicate the resolution of the whole problem, such as, for example, their attempts to broaden their definition of the weapons considered offensive by the Americans (the IL-28 bombers, and so on). We noted as well the USA refusal with regard to guarantees of the security of Cuba, explaining meanwhile, on the basis of our protocol draft, how we approximately imagine the USA obligations in this matter. We noted the negative reaction of the USA rep-

representatives to U Thant's proposal for a "UN presence" in the area of the Caribbean Sea, including on USA territory, as a measure seeking to guarantee a lasting peace in this region. We emphasized that the stubborn refusal of the USA to lift the "quarantine" does not at all contribute to the creation of a positive atmosphere for the resolution of the Cuban problem.

Second. U Thant asked a fine-tuning question with regard to our information on the USA attempts to broaden their demands for the removal of our weaponry from Cuba. He asked in whose hands—ours or the Cubans'—the IL-28 bombers can presently be found, as well as the torpedo cutters of the "Mosquito" class and the missiles on board them, missiles of the "air-surface" class, and missiles of the "surface-surface" class, of a small operational radius.

We answered U Thant that we cannot now provide information on this issue. U Thant asked us to make inquiries to Moscow, and to give him an answer "for his own personal information."

We ask that you provide us with information on this issue.

We assume that in examining this issue it would be appropriate to bear in mind that Fidel Castro, in his speech of 1 November, declared not only that Cuba possessed the "strategic weaponry" which now "the Soviet Union had decided to seize," but also that all other weaponry "is our property."

Third. U Thant asked whether there could be a disclosure, through first-hand observation, of the missiles on the vessels that will remove them from Cuba, or whether instead they would be kept in containers. General Rikhye, who was present at the talks, said, not waiting for our answer, that he had proposed that they be packed in a way appropriate for long-distance overseas shipping, with a view for the prevention of corrosion, but that they could be viewed in their outline forms from beneath the packing.

U Thant was also interested in whether all the missiles would be removed by one trip of each of the ships used for this purpose, or whether the ships would instead remove only a part of the missiles at once, returning them to Soviet ports and then sailing back to retrieve the rest. We said that all the missiles would be loaded onto the ships and ready for shipping no later than 10 November, and that consequently the issue of

a gradual removal through several trips would not arise.

Fourth. U Thant, emphasizing that he was speaking for himself personally and would not contact the Americans with regard to this issue, asked whether it would not be possible—unless, after we approve the American proposal for monitoring communicated yesterday by McCloy, the Americans accept the agreement—to entrust the monitoring to representatives of the International Red Cross, the same ones who will be conducting inspections, as is now proposed, on the Soviet vessels bound for Cuba.

We told U Thant that we would provide information on his proposal to Moscow, but that we supposed that the Soviet government had already introduced to the Americans such liberal proposals on the inspection process that they are offering the full possibility for settling the whole issue, if the other side earnestly wants such a settlement.

It appears to us that it is expedient to seek an agreement on the basis of the consent we have already given to the American proposals on the inspection process. If it is not possible to reach an agreement on this basis, examine U Thant's proposal. In such a case it may be possible, in our opinion, to agree that the International Red Cross representatives carry out inspections on vessels leaving Cuba with missiles in the same way that it has been proposed that they conduct inspections on the vessels bound for Cuba.

Fifth. U Thant stated that at each meeting with the Americans (his last meeting with them took place on 2 November) he has asked them questions about guarantees for Cuba's security and about the lifting of the "quarantine," and that he intends to continue to do so.

U Thant reacted with great interest to our information on the exchange of views with the Americans on the subject of the "UN presence" in the Caribbean Sea area. It was clear that this issue is important to him, and that he wants to reach a positive settlement of it. He asked us in particular whether we considered McCloy's negative response with regard to UN posts on USA territory to be "conclusive," or whether it was just an "initial reaction." We said that it was difficult for us to make judgments on this, but that it seemed that it was only an "initial reaction."

U Thant informed us that on 2 Novem-

ber he discussed the issue of the "UN presence" with delegates from Venezuela and Chile, as well as with representatives from the United Arab Republic, and that their reaction was generally positive.

Sixth. U Thant told us, evidently having in mind information published in today's American newspapers on a seemingly imminent meeting of the Security Council, that he considered it necessary and possible to convene the Council only after all issues have been resolved at the negotiations being conducted now.

We fully agreed with U Thant's point of view, and emphasized the inexpediency and even undesirability of convening the Security Council before the conclusion of the negotiations.

Seventh. U Thant asked whether Comrade A.I. Mikoyan intended to stop for a time in New York on his way back from Cuba, and agreed that if so he would like to meet with Comrade Mikoyan to get information on the results of his negotiations with Fidel Castro.

We answered that it was not yet clear to us whether Comrade Mikoyan would stop by New York on his way back from Cuba.

6.XI.62 V. KUZNETSOV

*[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWHIP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen.]*

**Telegram from Soviet envoys in New York V.V. Kuznetsov and V.A. Zorin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 6 November 1962**

6 November 1962  
TOP SECRET

On 5 November we had a meeting with Stevenson and McCloy at the American initiative. The Americans came to the meeting with the clear intention of exerting pressure to get further concessions from the Soviets. Throughout the duration of the whole discussion, which lasted more than three hours, they tried to represent the affair as if the Soviets had still not displayed any willingness to fulfill the obligations stipulated in the correspondence between Comrade N.S. Khrushchev and President Kennedy, notably with regard to IL-28 planes and nuclear

warheads and bombs. At the same time the Americans kept shying away from a discussion of the issues concerning the Americans' fulfillment of their own obligations. The discussion at times became pointed, and this was an effect created largely by Stevenson and McCloy.

1. More than half the discussion was devoted to an exchange of opinions on the issue of the IL-28 planes located in Cuba. Stevenson and McCloy stated that the agreement between Comrade N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy stipulated the removal of all these planes from Cuba, and their return to the Soviet Union. The essence of Stevenson's and McCloy's argument on this issue can be reduced to the following:

Kennedy's statement of 22 October and his proclamation of 23 October placed jet bombers in the category of the so-called "offensive" Soviet weaponry in Cuba. Kennedy's message of 27 October referred to the "offensive missile bases," as well as to "all armament systems that can be used for offensive purposes," apparently including jet bombers in this category. Comrade N.S. Khrushchev indicated in his message of 28 October that the Soviet government had issued instructions to dismantle and return to the Soviet Union the arms that "you call offensive." The Americans call both missiles as well as jet bombers offensive weaponry.

McCloy and Stevenson came back many times in the course of the talks to these arguments, interpreting them in such a way as to make it seem as though the Soviet Union had committed itself to dismantle and return to the Soviet Union from Cuba not only missiles, but also bombers.

We explained our position in detail to McCloy and Stevenson, in accordance with your instructions. We emphasized in particular that at the present time there is only one basis for an agreement, the one established by the exchange of messages between Comrades N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy. As far as Soviet obligations are concerned, that agreement stipulates that the Soviet Union will remove from Cuba the missile weaponry that the President of the USA has called "offensive," and that it will never in the future supply such weaponry to Cuba. The USA in its turn committed itself not to invade Cuba, and not to allow any invasion by the other states of the Western hemisphere. The Soviets are fulfilling to the let-

ter this agreement, which is the result of compromise and mutual concessions. On 28 October the dismantling of the missiles was begun, this dismantling was completed on 2 November, and the dismantled missiles have been brought to the ports for shipping, and will be removed no later than 10 November.

We directed the attention of the Americans to the fact that, if they want to raise new issues, then we have many issues that we will want to raise too, for example concerning the American military bases on foreign territories, but that we are not doing this because we do not want to complicate the negotiations.

We adduced concrete facts concerning the IL-28 bombers, showing that this bomber is a purely defensive weapon, long ago outmoded, and that it can be used only for coastal defense when escorted by anti-aircraft units. We said with regard to this that if the USA representatives insist on their own demands concerning the IL-28 planes, then in doing so they will only place the USA in a position in which the whole world will see that the United States are reneging on their promise, and imposing unacceptable conditions that create the possibility of a continuation of the conflict.

We said that Stevenson's assertion in his letter of 3 November, that according to the reports of American intelligence there was evidence that IL-28 bombers are still being assembled in Cuba, is a fabrication by American intelligence that clearly aims to avoid the settlement of the conflict and the normalization of our relations, and that indeed tightens the tensions. If the United States take as their goal a return to the incendiary situation of earlier, then this is scarcely in the interests of the USA or the USSR, or in the interests of peace. We propose to select reasonable positions, and to proceed in our negotiations from the agreement that has already been reached.

The Americans contested our views of the purely defensive character of the IL-28 bombers. McCloy and Stevenson asserted that "in Castro's hands" these bombers could be offensive weapons, and that for the Latin American region they represent a threatening weapon which the other Latin American countries do not possess.

In response to our statement, in accordance with your instructions, that one cannot always rely on the facts produced by

intelligence reconnaissance and that, with regard to the IL-28 bombers, the American intelligence information on the continuing assembly in Cuba of these planes is incorrect, McCloy asserted that in the photos taken by an American reconnaissance plane over the area where IL-28 planes were being stored, it was obvious that there were more of them in recent days, and that new containers of parts for these planes were being unpacked. In a half-joking tone McCloy stated that once Soviet representatives had also denied even the American intelligence photos of missile bases in Cuba. McCloy said that he himself had seen the photos of recent days in which IL-28 bombers were visible, and that he believed these photos.

We answered McCloy and Stevenson by saying that their formulation of the issue of IL-28 bombers, which were outmoded and which have been removed from the arsenal of our army, is clearly aimed at complicating the whole affair, at slowing the completion of the negotiation work, and at putting into doubt everything positive that had already been achieved at these negotiations. We returned to these opinions many times in the course of the talks. Stevenson and McCloy stated that without resolving the issue of removing the IL-28 bombers from Cuba, it would be impossible to reach any agreement.

At the end of this part of the talks, Stevenson asked whether it should be understood that the Soviets are refusing to remove the IL-28 planes from Cuba. If so, he said, then our position in the negotiations has reached "a very serious impasse." We repeated that these planes are not offensive, and that the Soviets will proceed from this fact in their actions. Isn't Mr. Stevenson already thinking of presenting us with an ultimatum on this issue and blaming the Soviets for the situation created at these negotiations?, we asked in response. He immediately said no, there was no ultimatum at all.

Stevenson said that perhaps the Soviets would think over this issue again, and that the next day or the day after that they could discuss it again. We said that we were willing to discuss any issue in these negotiations, but that as far as the issue of the IL-28 bombers was concerned, it is the Americans who should think it over, since their position on it was complicating the

negotiations.

2. Then Stevenson and McCloy asked one more question—about the nuclear warheads on the missiles, and about nuclear bombs. They asked how we proposed to give the Americans the possibility of ascertaining that our nuclear warheads and bombs had been removed from Cuba in conditions in which ground-based inspection in Cuba was impossible. We stated that the Americans' formulation of still another issue could only complicate the situation. We emphasized that the Soviets would fulfill to the letter all the obligations, stipulated in Comrade N.S. Khrushchev's messages, for returning from Cuba to the Soviet Union the whole complex of weaponry that the Americans have called "offensive." McCloy stated in response to this that the USA did not want to allow "nuclear warheads to be found in Castro's hands," and wanted to be sure that there was no such weaponry in Cuba.

McCloy said moreover that, since ground-based inspection in Cuba was impossible, the Americans would want to be allowed the same possibility for checking on the removal from Cuba of the nuclear warheads that they had been allowed for checking on the removal of the missiles. "Tell us how many nuclear warheads you have in Cuba," McCloy said, "and allow us the possibility to ascertain that they have all been loaded onto your vessels."

We repeated that none of this was being put forth by the Americans in order successfully to complete the negotiations, and that the Soviets would fully and precisely fulfill their obligation to remove from Cuba the "offensive" missiles, along with everything associated with them. We have every right to expect a similarly sincere fulfillment of the American's obligations, instead of the advancement of more and more issues that complicate and delay the resolution of this urgent problem.

3. We have informed the Americans with regard to your instruction No. 2389 on the schedule of departures from Cuba of the ships carrying the missiles on 6 and 7 November. They have made no comment on this information, and have asked no questions.

4. We informed Stevenson and McCloy of our progress with regard to the establishing of inspections on the Soviet vessels bound for Cuba by representatives of the International Red Cross, about which we

also informed Narasimhan today. In spite of the fact that McCloy, in talks at his country house yesterday, was still talking about the USA's lack of objections to the use of Soviet ships for the Red Cross inspections, he stated today that he had doubts about the acceptability for the USA government of our proposal to use the Soviet freight vessel "Amata" for carrying out this inspection by the Red Cross representatives.

At this time McCloy asserted that, since the Soviets had refused to approve the use of American ships for this purpose, the Americans could scarcely agree to the use of a Soviet ship, and that it would be better to charter vessels from neutral states, such as Sweden, for example, for this purpose. Answering our questions, McCloy said that this still did not constitute a definitive response from the Americans, and that he would inform his government of our proposal.

We expressed our surprise with regard to such a change of the USA position on the issue of using Soviet vessels for the Red Cross inspections. McCloy was somewhat embarrassed by this, and repeated several times that yesterday, in talking about the likelihood of American approval for that proposal, he had been expressing only his own personal assumptions.

5. In the course of the talks, we tried several times to lead the Americans toward the issues of guarantees of Cuban security and the lifting of the "quarantine." McCloy and Stevenson did not enter into any real discussion of these issues, even less than they had before at the earlier meetings.

6. At the end of the talks, Stevenson said, as if summing things up, that for them there were still several questions, in his view, which remained either undecided or open-ended; these included questions about the removal from Cuba of the IL-28 bombers, about the granting of the possibility for the USA to be sure of the removal from Cuba of nuclear warheads and nuclear bombs, and about the search for vessels of neutral countries that would be acceptable to both parties for the Red Cross inspection of Soviet ships bound for Cuba.

McCloy told me that the day before he had told President Kennedy by telephone about our talks at McCloy's country house, that the President had given a positive evaluation of the results of the talks, and that this evaluation had been confirmed the next

morning by a telegram from Washington. In McCloy's words, President Kennedy was counting on continued progress at the negotiating table. And he added that they hoped that the Soviets would make an attentive examination of the issues that had been put forth at today's talks.

In response to McCloy and Stevenson, we said that we did not think that the questions referred to by Stevenson were open-ended any longer. Those issues are perfectly clear, and it is only the USA position that is hindering forward movement. We appealed to the Americans to operate in future negotiations on the basis of the spirit of compromise and the desire to guarantee the strengthening of peace that was displayed in the correspondence between N. S. Khrushchev and Kennedy, and to be guided by precisely that spirit when attentively reviewing the considerations we had expressed.

We ask that you inform us on the issue of the warheads.

6.XI.62 V. KUZNETSOV  
V. ZORIN

*[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWHIP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen.]*

**Telegram from Soviet envoy in New York V. Kuznetsov to USSR Foreign Ministry, 7 November 1962**

On 6 November we had a meeting with the Americans, with the participation on their side of Stevenson, the Deputy Minister [Secretary] of Defense [Roswell] Gilpatrick, and Ambassador [Charles] Yost (Stevenson's deputy).

The Americans asked a series of questions connected with the procedure governing the first-hand observation from their ships of our ships' removal of the missiles. They proposed the following procedure for that observation activity:

The American ships will come up close to the Soviet vessels in order to see and photograph the missiles being shipped. If conditions at sea do not permit their ships to approach so close to the Soviet vessels, then unarmed helicopters will be sent from the American ships, and the photographing will be done from them.

In order to be convinced that it is precisely missiles that are being shipped out, rather than something else, the Americans are requesting that the covers or casings be removed from certain missiles during the observation. The desire was expressed that the missiles be shipped on the decks of the ships. Gilpatrick emphasized that they did not have in mind the sort of unveiling of the missiles that would allow a disclosure of their technical characteristics.

The Americans emphasized that they considered it important to become convinced that the entire quantity of missiles that they had been informed of was being removed from Cuba.

The question was raised as to how and where a meeting could be arranged between the American ships with the Soviet vessels carrying the missiles. The Americans proposed that we inform them of the ship's numbers of all our vessels which are headed out of Cuba bearing missiles, so that the captains of the American ships from which the observations will be conducted can be able to make contact with the captains of our ships, and arrange a meeting-place with them without disturbing the itineraries of the Soviet vessels. We said that in that case it would be necessary for the captains of our vessels to have the ship's numbers of the American ships as well, in order to find out whether they should get in contact with those particular ships. Gilpatrick agreed, and proposed that the ship's numbers of the Soviet and American vessels be exchanged.

The Americans also requested to be informed of the departure schedules of the other ships carrying missiles out of Cuba after 7 November.

We believe that the American proposals for carrying out an observation of the removal of Soviet missiles from Cuba are acceptable. In the event that they are approved, we ask to be immediately informed of the ship's numbers of the Soviet vessels, and of the departure schedules of the ships carrying missiles out of Cuba after 7 November, unless all the missiles will have been removed by 6 or 7 November.

7.XI.62 V. KUZNETSOV

*[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWHIP, and on file at National Security Archive; translation by John Henriksen.]*

**From the Journal of V.V. Kuznetsov:  
Record of Conversation with the Cuban  
Representative to the UN, C. Lechuga,  
7 November 1962**

On 7 November 1962 a meeting took place with the permanent Cuban representative to the UN, Lechuga.

V. V. Kuznetsov informed him that in recent days we had been discussing with the Americans a series of problems deriving from the exchange of letters between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, N.S. Khrushchev, and President Kennedy, including the issue of assurances and guarantees that Cuba would not be attacked by the USA or by the other countries neighboring Cuba.

At the present stage of the discussion, we have not yet gone so far as to work out any documents or the details of the agreement. The Americans are now trying to find pretexts for avoiding definite and concrete statements. All in all, they have not been displaying any spirit of cooperation at the negotiating table.

In the American press there are frequent statements about how the USA has apparently won a triumph in the Cuban crisis. But it is clear to anyone who is able soberly to assess the events that, thanks to the firm and peaceful policies of the Soviet Union and the peace-loving actions it has taken in the crisis period, what has really triumphed is the cause of peace, what has triumphed is reason.

Now that the first stage is over and the missiles are being shipped out of Cuba, we consider it necessary to take the following steps in the negotiations with the Americans, steps that should show whether or not the Americans really want to put an end to the crisis and to prevent a repetition of this dangerous military situation. We intend to put before the Americans the issue of how they will fulfill their obligations regarding the guarantee against an attack on Cuba.

Lechuga said that Cuba supports the Soviet Union's peace-loving policies, and that the misunderstanding which had arisen in Cuba after the first steps taken by the Soviet Union had now been completely eradicated. We knew, Lechuga said, that the Soviet government was defending the interests of peace, we were in full agreement with the goals it was pursuing, but we were not

in agreement on the formulations that had been used to do so. It must be borne in mind that the Cubans are a young nation, passionate in character. When the crisis began, the Cubans were full of determination to fight, and for this reason when the events took a different turn, the feeling arose in them that they had experienced a failure. At the same time that this crisis represented a global problem, for Cuba it was also her own problem, one which roused the whole nation, and from that communal feeling came the famous five points appearing in Fidel Castro's statement. Now, however, the Soviet government can be sure that the uncertainty which arose in the first moments of the crisis has been dispelled, and that the Cuban nation is delighted by the firmness and peace-loving actions of the Soviet Union.

Lechuga also said that he had had a meeting with the Red Cross representatives, who had raised the issue of their inspection on the open sea of the vessels entering and sailing from Cuba. They made no mention of the establishing of an inspection procedure in Cuban territory. Lechuga said that he had answered the Red Cross representatives, in provisional fashion, that it did not seem that the Cuban government would offer any objections to that, since the issue at hand did not concern Cuban territory, but rather the open sea, and since this whole affair more directly concerns the USSR and the USA.

The Red Cross representatives said that they intended to carry out their inspection operations under the aegis of the UN, and to select the inspection personnel from the citizenry of neutral countries rather than from those of the interested countries.

Lechuga stated that in the talks with the Deputy Secretary General of the UN Loutfi, the latter had told him that the period of five days, proposed by the Soviet Union as the maximum period in which the inspection of vessels could be conducted, was insufficient, since within this period the Red Cross representatives would not even be able to prepare their ships or send them into the inspection zone. Loutfi also mentioned that the USA had raised the question of the IL-28 bombers located in Cuba, and that he was interested in whether these bombers were manned by Soviet or Cuban pilots.

V.V. Kuznetsov said that our position with regard to the Red Cross inspections was

based on the correspondence between N.S. Khrushchev and Kennedy. We are generally opposed to the carrying out of any inspections at all. The Soviet Union agreed to the possibility of using Red Cross observers for the duration of a very short time only to give assurances that the missiles had been removed from Cuba. Since the USA maintains that the reason for the current crisis is the existence of missiles in Cuba, then it follows that with the removal of these missiles, the reasons adduced by the USA for their actions against Cuba are also removed.

In the negotiations with the UN Secretary General, we said that it was clear that we consider all the actions taken by the USA and leading to the current crisis to be unlawful. It is from precisely that same point of view that we are now conducting negotiations. With the resolution of this problem, there should not be any infringement at all on the sovereignty of Cuba or its legal rights.

In response to the question as to whether vessels could now proceed unhindered to Cuba, Lechuga answered in the affirmative.

With regard to the "IL-28" bombers, V.V. Kuznetsov told Lechuga that the Americans had asked this question during the negotiations with us, but that we had answered that it goes beyond the negotiation parameters defined in N.S. Khrushchev's and Kennedy's letters.

The Americans also raised the issue of the continuation of reconnaissance flights over Cuba, to which we responded that we considered such flights to be a blatant violation of the sovereignty of Cuba, the norms of international law, and the principles of the UN Charter. The continuation of such flights would lead to a prolongation of tensions, and any measures taken by the Cuban government in connection with this will be justified, and all responsibility for any consequences will lie on the shoulders of the United States.

At the upcoming conference we intend to exert pressure on them with regard to the guarantees of non-aggression against Cuba. And as far as the five points put forth in Fidel Castro's statement are concerned, we support them, including the point about Guantanamo, and we are taking this into account in the negotiations with the Americans.

In conclusion V.V. Kuznetsov said that an analysis of the events and of the steps

that we took in the crisis period shows that definite positive results have been attained, that we have definite assurances of non-aggression against Cuba, and that the issue now is how the USA will fulfill its obligations. It is impossible to forget that the whole world is currently watching how the events connected with the Cuban crisis are unfolding.

*[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWHHP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]*

**Telegram from USSR Foreign Minister  
A. Gromyko to A.I. Mikoyan via the  
Soviet Embassy in Havana,  
10 November 1962**

First. Inform our Cuban friends that Moscow agrees with their remarks on the Protocol draft on the elimination of tensions associated with Cuba. The text of the Protocol statement, including the remarks by our Cuban comrades contained in it, has been sent by us to Comrade Kuznetsov in New York for him to relay to the Cuban representative, the USA representatives, and U Thant.

Second. We agree with the thoughts you expressed to our Cuban comrades regarding the inexpediency of making a special statement on the refusal of inspections in Cuban territory of the dismantling and removal of "offensive weaponry." We are also in agreement on your explanations concerning the Cubans' second proposal—on the UN presence in the countries of the Caribbean.

We understand that our Cuban comrades have agreed with these ideas of yours.

Third. With regard to the fact that McCloy and Stevenson, in the talks with you in New York, referred to possible difficulties they might have in signing the Protocol statement, and that they expressed support for fixing the obligations that have been undertaken in the form of separate statements, the following instructions are given to Comrade Kuznetsov:

"If the Americans declare that the signing of the protocol statement is difficult for them because of the fact that the USA and Cuba are supposed to be signing the same document, then you may tell the Americans

that we allow the possibility that the the protocol statement be not formally signed, but affirmed by special separate statements by the governments of the three countries—the USSR, the USA, and Cuba. All these documents in their collectivity will constitute an agreement.

As a last resort you may even go so far as to propose that the document not be formally called a protocol statement, but rather a declaration, which would be affirmed by special separate statements from the three governments.

We will inform you of final instructions concerning the form of the document after this issue has been submitted to the approval of our Cuban friends. Meanwhile, you and the Cuban representative will introduce it as a protocol draft."

In the next meeting with our Cuban comrades, you should clarify their views on this proposal of ours. We request that you inform us immediately of what you find out, so that we can give corresponding instructions to Comrade Kuznetsov.

10.XI A. G.

*[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWHHP, and on file at National Security Archive; translation by John Henriksen.]*

**Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to  
the USA A. F. Dobrynin to USSR  
Foreign Ministry, 12 November 1962**

Your instructions have been carried out. Robert Kennedy has familiarized himself attentively with the content of N.S. Khrushchev's confidential oral message to the President. When he got to the place that spoke of Nixon's defeat in the elections,<sup>21</sup> he immediately grinned, saying: "Your chairman is a real master of colorful expression that expressed the true essence of the issue. Yes, we are quite satisfied with Nixon's defeat, and in general we are not complaining about the results of the election." It was felt that this portion of the message was received with definite satisfaction.

When Robert Kennedy had familiarized himself with the whole message, he said that for the President, for domestic policy considerations, it was very important to receive the Soviet Union's firm agreement to the removal of the IL-28 planes, especially

now that there were essentially no inspections being conducted in Cuba itself. The correspondence between N.S. Khrushchev and President Kennedy of 27 and 28 October implied that an agreement between our countries had been reached. But we understand the difficulties in this area that have now arisen because of Premier Fidel Castro's position, and we are not insisting on this as an unalterable and fundamental condition. But the removal of the IL-28 planes—in an atmosphere of growing criticism within the USA—is a matter of great concern to the President. Let us reach an agreement, continued Robert Kennedy, on the following points: that the Soviet Union will remove its IL-28 planes by a definite date announced in advance, and that on that same day the USA will officially lift its quarantine. All this may be announced immediately.

I answered Robert Kennedy that his proposal is entirely unacceptable for the Soviet side. I then demonstrated the unacceptability of this proposal by using the argument contained in N.S. Khrushchev's oral message that had been passed on to him. In conclusion I expressed my certainty that conveying his proposal to Moscow would prove fruitless.

Thinking a moment, Robert Kennedy said that he would like to confer with his brother the President, after which he would again contact me later the same day. I agreed.

After an hour and a half (all this happened in the evening), Robert Kennedy came to my residence. He said that now, after speaking with the President, he could formulate the American proposal in the following way:

N.S. Khrushchev and the President would reach an essential agreement that the IL-28 planes would be removed by a definite date. After such an agreement has been reached, the USA would, as early as the next day, lift any quarantine even before the removal of the planes had been completed. The Americans would of course prefer that the date agreed upon for the removal of the IL-28 planes be publicized. However, if the Soviets have any objections to the public disclosure of that date, then the President would not insist on it. For him a promise from N.S. Khrushchev would be entirely sufficient. As far as the date is concerned, it would be good if the planes were removed,

let us say, within 30 days. We ask that N.S. Khrushchev be informed of this whole proposal.

Robert Kennedy was told that the President's proposal would of course be communicated to N.S. Khrushchev. As a personal opinion, however, I noted that it was unlikely that such an imminent date could be acceptable to us, all the more so since the fundamental USA obligations—guarantees of non-aggression against Cuba, and other obligations—remain, as before, unfulfilled; moreover, they themselves are pushing everything later and later. And this is happening in circumstances in which the Soviet government is sincerely fulfilling, and essentially has already fulfilled, its own obligations for the removal of the missiles. It is now the Americans' turn.

Robert Kennedy said that the time-frame he had referred to—30 days—is not in any way definitive. That time-frame had been “given to him,” but he thought that there was room for negotiation here as long as the period was not too great, and as long as N. S. Khrushchev generally found the President's proposal acceptable. I want now to make note of one more condition, Robert Kennedy continued. After such an agreement has been reached, especially if it is not publicized, it would be important for us that, even if the end of the agreed-upon period for the removal of the IL-28 planes has not yet been reached, at least some planes will have been disassembled by this time, or if they have just been taken out of containers, that a portion of them be returned to their containers. We need all of this, Robert Kennedy remarked, so that we can satisfy our domestic public opinion by reporting that there has been some progress in the removal of the IL-28 planes. This is necessary, since even [West German Chancellor Konrad] Adenauer is starting now to criticize us publicly for trusting the word of the Soviet Union without inspections in Cuban territory—not to mention the Cuban emigres in certain republics [states—ed.] who are making similar accusations. But the President, Robert Kennedy emphasized, has faith in N. S. Khrushchev's word, and is willing to lift the quarantine immediately if the agreement mentioned above can be reached, even though we really do not have any guarantees with regard to inspections in Cuban territory.

I answered Robert Kennedy that it

would be much better if Adenauer kept his nose out of everyone else's business, and if the USA government told him so directly (here Robert Kennedy energetically nodded his head in a gesture of agreement). I then said that in the proposal that he had advanced, the issue is once again raised of a full elimination of all the tension that has existed, that is, beyond the immediate lifting of the blockade, the obligations of all the parties should be fixed in appropriate UN documents, and non-aggression against Cuba and a strict observation of its sovereignty should be guaranteed; there would also be UN posts established in the countries of the Caribbean region as guarantees against unexpected actions harming another state.

Robert Kennedy said that he believed that an agreement could be reached on all this points. It is important, from the point of view of American public opinion, to have some inspection conducted in Cuba, even in the form of several UN posts. Castro will scarcely go for this unless a similar procedure is imposed on the other countries of the Caribbean basin. But is possible to resolve this too. Robert Kennedy mentioned, as an alternative to this, the plan put forth by Brazil, but then he immediately said that this aspect of the issue was being studied by Stevenson, and that he, Robert Kennedy, could not go into details with regard to it. I can however repeat the firm assurances of the President not to invade Cuba. He authorized me once again to say this now. He was grateful to N.S. Khrushchev for the latter's clarification that the IL-28 planes are manned by Soviet rather than Cuban pilots, but nevertheless the issue of the removal of these planes remains a very important one for the President, and he asks that we consider his proposal.

Further discussion came down to a reiteration of the positions of the parties. Robert Kennedy said in conclusion that he was flying now to New York on personal business, and that he would be willing to meet with me at any time.

When he left, he glimpsed a crowd of dancing couples in the embassy's parlor. Realizing that this was a friendly welcome party arranged by the embassy community for the Bolshoi Theater troupe that had just arrived in Washington, he said that he would like to meet with the troupe. Mingling with and greeting almost all the members of the

troupe, he delivered a welcome speech in which he said that the President was preparing to attend their premier the following evening. At the end, he kissed Maya Plisetskaya when he found out that he and she had been born in the same year, month, and day, and said they would celebrate their birthdays in a week. None of this needs to be mentioned especially, but all in all the behavior of Robert Kennedy, who is ordinarily quite a reserved and glum man, reflects to some degree the calmer and more normal mood in the White House after the tense days that shook Washington, even though this fact is concealed in various ways by American propaganda.

12.XI.62 A. DOBRYNIN

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWHIP, and on file at National Security Archive; trans. J. Henriksen.]

**Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to the USA A.F. Dobrynin to USSR Foreign Ministry, 14 November 1962**

Having familiarized himself with our response, Robert Kennedy said that he would pass it on to the President today. Then, saying that he would like to express a little of his own views provisionally, Robert Kennedy stated the following.

The President—he, Robert Kennedy, expects—will be disappointed by the answer when he receives it. The President's proposal was very simple: the USA would immediately and officially lift the blockade in exchange for assurances—public or not—that before some definite date the IL-28 planes would be removed. The President believes that this proposal of his serves the interests of both countries, and opens the way towards a resolution of the remaining aspects of the Cuban problem, creating a significantly less tense situation than the one that would arise if his proposal was approved by the Soviets. The President intends to fulfill his obligations, which were stipulated by the correspondence between the heads of the two governments. But for this there must be a certain time in which all the details of the future agreement can be worked out. The President's proposal referred to above could be carried out immediately, without any delay. The insistence of the USA government in this matter of the

IL-28 planes has been provoked by the growing pressure that has been brought to bear on the President by representatives of Congress, the press, and so on. It is important that this aspect be properly understood in Moscow, since the President himself has great difficulties in dealing with this issue (Robert Kennedy twice emphasized the "difficulties for the President").

I carried on the discussion with Robert Kennedy of these difficulties using the arguments advanced by N.S. Khrushchev's response. It was especially emphasized that we have removed from Cuba the missiles and warheads, in other words that we have fulfilled the obligations we assumed, while the USA is not fulfilling its own obligations; for this reason, in order to conduct assurance inspections after the missiles and warheads have been removed, the quarantine should have already been lifted by now, the flights by American planes over the territory of Cuba should have already ceased, and the mutual obligations assumed by the parties should have been formalized in appropriate documents under the auspices of the UN.

Robert Kennedy stated that the USA government would not cease its flights over Cuba in circumstances in which he had no other guarantees that the government of Cuba would carry out its end of the agreement. Mr. Mikoyan's long stay in Cuba shows—or at least this conviction has been created in us—that Premier Castro does not want to approve the agreement reached between the President and the head of the Soviet government on such guarantees. We understand the circumstances that have been created, but this does not relieve the difficulties of our position, said Robert Kennedy. The issue of UN guarantees, in the form of UN posts or something like them, would require a significant amount of time before concrete approval of the agreement could be reached. Let us take for example the issue of UN posts in the area of the Caribbean basin. Here Robert Kennedy asked, would the Soviet Union itself really agree to some foreign posts on its own territory? As far as we know, in every such case it has categorically rejected, and still rejects, the idea of observational posts within its borders.

Robert Kennedy was immediately told that evidently he had not been sufficiently familiarized with N.S. Khrushchev's re-

sponse, which spoke, as did his preceding message to the President, of how it seems that our countries must in the first place come back in their disarmament negotiations to the Soviet proposals that stipulated posts in airports, in the major ports, at railroad hubs, and on motorways in order to guarantee for all countries of the world that no country can assemble troops and prepare for attack on or invasion of another country.

Robert Kennedy corrected himself, confirming that such a proposal was indeed to be found in N.S. Khrushchev's responses. By the way, the remark I made has no direct connection to the subject presently under discussion, the subject from which I digressed, he continued. As far as I am aware, there are no unsurmountable obstacles on this point, although for us it seems a highly complicated issue to organize UN posts in the parts of the USA bordering the Caribbean Sea, if that agreement with Cuba is indeed reached. However, just yesterday at a White House meeting I heard that far from all the countries of this area would agree to participate in such an agreement. Thus if you insist on all the countries of the Caribbean area, the whole affair might be delayed even longer. I am saying all this, Robert Kennedy concluded, not in order to discuss the details of this issues—I do not know them myself, since they are the responsibility of Stevenson and Kuznetsov—but rather to show that time is needed for all this, and that it would scarcely be expedient or reasonable to wait for it before lifting the quarantine and removing the IL-28 planes. The President has put forth a proposal that he believes serves the interests of both parties, but that proposal is being rejected now by the Soviets, which can lead only to an extension, or perhaps even a complication, of the present situation which clearly does not satisfy us or, we believe, you. Both parties are equally uninterested in that. We hope nonetheless that Chairman N.S. Khrushchev will be able to approve the proposal put forth by the President, who himself had great confidence in it when he sent it to Khrushchev.

I told Robert Kennedy that the position of the Soviet government has been clearly laid out in today's response by N.S. Khrushchev. The Soviet Union has fulfilled its obligations. Now it is simply the USA government's turn to do the same, so that the situation of tension that has been cre-

ated in the Caribbean Sea can be eased. For this it is necessary: to lift the quarantine without delay, to cease all flights by USA planes over Cuba, and to fix the mutual obligations deriving from the correspondence between the heads of both governments on 27 and 28 October. If corresponding instructions were given by the President to McCloy and Stevenson on the issue of UN posts in the Caribbean Sea area and the parts of the USA that border it—and the Soviet representatives already have such instructions—and if they could reach an agreement, then of course the issue of the time-frame for the removal of the IL-28 planes would not be any complex problem.

Since Robert Kennedy, who often refers to the President's opinion, has been stubbornly continuing to assert the necessity of first resolving the issue of the IL-28 planes' removal, connecting the lifting of the quarantine with that removal, he was directly asked, after mutually reiterating our arguments to each other, whether this meant that the President had already authorized him to give an answer, and that such an answer should be communicated to Moscow?

Robert Kennedy immediately answered that the views he had been expressing, although based on the opinions of the President, with whom he had just that evening discussed all these issues, are nonetheless exclusively his own, Robert Kennedy's, personal thoughts, and that there would be an answer to N.S. Khrushchev's address today from the President himself. Robert Kennedy promised to provide information on that answer immediately.

Towards the end, the conversation started to have a formalized and official air connected with the President's invitation, passed on to me via Robert Kennedy, to visit the White House on the following day along with the Bolshoi Theater troupe.

14.XI.62 A. DOBRYNIN

*[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWHIP, and on file at National Security Archive; translation by John Henriksen.]*

**Telegram from Soviet Foreign Minister  
A. Gromyko to A.I. Mikoyan,  
15 November 1962**

In connection with the last paragraph

of Comrade Kuznetsov's telegram (relayed by you separately), which says that the Americans are insisting that their guarantees of non-aggression against Cuba be made simultaneously with the Soviet Union's promise not to bring any more "offensive" weaponry into Cuba, we have sent the following instructions to Comrade Kuznetsov:

In your memorandum you said that the Americans are persistently pushing for the simultaneous granting of USA guarantees for non-aggression against Cuba and of Soviet guarantees not to bring "offensive" weaponry into Cuba any longer.

From such a formulation of this issue on the part of the USA it can be deduced that they are trying to impose on the Soviet Union and Cuba additional obligations which would basically mean that, besides the sorts of weaponry agreed upon by the correspondence between Comrade N. S. Khrushchev and President Kennedy, Cuba would be deprived of the right to possess any other sorts of weaponry that the USA might call "offensive." The acceptance of such obligations would discriminate against Cuba, since in that case it would be singled out from among the other countries of Latin America that do not bear such obligations. This cannot be acceptable.

Another matter concerns the talk of concluding the agreement through the UN, for example by way of the approval of an appropriate UN resolution stipulating that the territory of all Latin American countries be declared a zone that is free from nuclear arms. Of course the design behind this is to put Cuba on equal footing with the other countries of Latin America; and also the USA, as far as Guantanamo and its other bases in Latin America are concerned, would take onto its shoulders the obligation not to allow any provisioning of nuclear weapons onto the territories of any Latin American country. This would establish an equitable basis for an agreement, and would be acceptable.

With such a formulation of this issue, there would be no discrimination with regard to any participants in the agreement, in this case with regard to Cuba; that is, the issue would be resolved differently than as proposed in the draft resolution put before the UN General Assembly by Brazil, Bolivia, and Chile.

If the Americans continue to insist that

there be simultaneous guarantees by them for non-aggression against Cuba, referred to in Kennedy's messages of 27 and 28 October, and guarantees by us no longer to bring "offensive" weaponry into Cuba, you must proceed from the point that we are willing to make a guarantee not to bring into Cuba the sort of weapons that we agreed to remove from Cuba following the agreement reached by correspondence between the heads of our two governments. In accordance with this, Article 8 of the draft Protocol may be supplemented with the following paragraph:

"At the same time the Soviet government states that it will not bring such weaponry onto the territory of the Republic of Cuba."

This formulation, which refers to "such weaponry," does not give the Americans the chance to broadly and arbitrarily interpret the term "offensive" weaponry to include other sorts of weaponry (including nuclear arms) that the Americans might classify as offensive.

You must submit the position laid out above to the approval of the UN delegate from Cuba. In this we are proceeding from the assumption that our point of view will be acceptable for Cuba, since it derives from the position jointly held by the Soviet Union and Cuba on this matter.

Telegram upon completion.

A.G.

*[Source: AVP RF, Moscow; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWHIP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]*

**Telegram from Soviet Foreign Minister  
A.A. Gromyko to A.I. Mikoyan,  
18 November 1962**

I am transmitting instructions from the Authorities.

If our Cuban friends address you in reference to their decision on firing at American planes, then they should be told the following:

In view of the fact that decision on firing at American planes was not submitted to our approval, we do not consider it possible to take part in this. For this reason, we have given instructions to our military men

not to open fire on American planes.

A. GROMYKO

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWHIP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]

**Memorandum from the Head of the USSR Merchant Fleet to the CC CPSU, 20 November 1962**

I am reporting on the situation on the USSR-Cuban sea lanes.

At the present time, there are 20 dry-cargo ships and 4 oil-carriers on their way to Cuba from Soviet ports on the Baltic, the Black Sea, and in the Far East, carrying industrial and agricultural equipment, automobiles, metal, grain, flour, conserves, sulfates, oil, gas, ammonia, and other loads. Besides this, the tanker the "Tukmus" is nearing Cuba, sailing out of the Canadian port of Montreal with a cargo of animal fat. Four of the vessels mentioned are passing through the zone of the blockade imposed by the USA. The others will reach this zone between 20 and 30 November.

There are 13 dry-cargo vessels and 7 tankers en route from Cuba to Soviet ports. They have all successfully passed through the blockade zone.

The Soviet vessels bound for Cuba are being subjected to overhead flights by USA Navy airplanes during their whole passage across the Atlantic Ocean. Within the blockade zone these flights occur more frequently, aerial photos are taken, American ships come up close to them, inquiring what cargo is being carried and where, and then they follow close behind the Soviet ships until they reach the territorial waters of Cuba. Demands concerning the stopping of the ships or the carrying out of inspections by American naval ships are not forthcoming.

The Minister of the Merchant Fleet  
(V. BAKAEV)

[Source: Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), Moscow; copy provided to CWHIP by R. Pikhov and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]

**Cable from Mikoyan to CC CPSU, 23 November 1962**

CC CPSU

During yesterday's conversation with Fidel Castro and others, when I spoke of the significance of the new success in liquidating the crisis and of the cancellation of both our and the American measures of extraordinary preparedness, Fidel Castro said, that they are, moreover, also preparing to carry out demobilization.

23.XI.62 A. MIKOYAN

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWHIP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by David Wolff, CWHIP.]

**A.I. Mikoyan, Memorandum of Conversation with Robert F. Kennedy, 30 November 1962**

[...] On the evening of 30 November, A.I. Mikoyan was present at a dinner in honor of the American Secretary of the Interior [Stewart] Udall. The guests included R. Kennedy, Deputy Secretary of State [George] Ball, the chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisors [Walter] Heller, the chairman of the Board of Directors of the "New York Times" [Orville] Dryfoos, and the Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin.

All the American guests were with their wives, except for Robert Kennedy who came with his eldest daughter, age 13. He has seven children in all. He said that his wife, together with the other six [children], who had the flu, had gone to Florida to bring them up to [good] condition.

Before dinner, Robert Kennedy, after conversations of a protocol-like nature in the presence of all, asked A.I. Mikoyan to step into another room, where one on one (Dobrynin) [they] first touched on the matter of one Zaslavskii (a Soviet citizen), who married an American tourist, but our court annulled the marriage. He [Kennedy] said that he is embarrassed to present this matter officially, since it has no bearing on the relations between our governments. But for the Minister of Justice [Attorney General] the resolution of this question is important.

The question is small, but delicate, and its resolution would be greeted with satisfaction.

Then he touched on the major questions for which they had left the company - the significance of yesterday's conversations with President Kennedy and the need for contacts between Khrushchev and Kennedy and mutual actions.

The President, said R. Kennedy, considers yesterday's conversation extremely useful, promoting further mutual comprehension between our governments and their heads. In this respect, this meeting can be characterized as definite progress. Such is the opinion of the president himself.

What is most important now?, continued R. Kennedy. The most important, even more important than the fates of my children and your grandchildren, although they, of course, are the nearest and dearest to us, is the question of mutual understanding between Chairman Khrushchev and President Kennedy. Indeed, it now decides the fate of the world. One must admit that in the course of the recent crisis, their personal relations and mutual trust underwent serious trials, as a result of which, frankly speaking, damage was sustained. Therefore, it is very important to do everything to restore fully the trust on which so much depends. We ourselves understand the need for this, for we must look ahead. We, concluded R. Kennedy, sincerely hope that the development of our relations can follow a happier course than in the past.

A.I. Mikoyan replied to R. Kennedy that he fully agrees with the idea of the importance for preserving peace and for the basic improvement of relations between our countries of good personal relations between N.S. Khrushchev and president Kennedy, their mutual understanding and trust of one another. As one of N.S. Khrushchev's comrades-in-arms [*soratsnik*], said A.I. Mikoyan, I can assure you that exactly these thoughts define his approach to his relations with the USA president. N.S. Khrushchev values the personal quality of these relations. The Soviet government renders its due to the self-possession [*otdaet dolzhnoe vyderzhke*] exhibited by the president in the most dangerous moment, when the world stood at the edge of thermonuclear war, but by mutual concessions and compromises, succeeded in averting this war.

Moscow, continued A.I. Mikoyan, no-

ticed the positive role you, the president's brother, played during the confidential negotiations between the president and the head of the Soviet state. Of course, we understand, that you did this, as did we, in the interests of one's own country, one's own people. It was important, however, that you understood correctly, in the critical moment, what those interests were. Let us now complete the outlined resolution to the Cuban question, without complicating it with trivial formal cavils [*melochnaia pridirka*], or even worse, some deviation from the agreement on the final settlement of this question. Indeed, if one speaks the truth, there's not much left to do; it is only necessary to put in writing or to finalize, without excessive procrastination that which the American side obligated itself to do during the exchange of messages between N.S. Khrushchev and the president.

R. Kennedy noted that he agreed that little of essence remained to be done - indeed, "it's 90 percent done," although there are still difficulties that must be overcome. But he, R. Kennedy, did not intend to analyze these difficulties. They were the subject of detailed discussion in New York. He only wanted to emphasize briefly that with which he began: the importance of further developing mutual understanding between the president and N.S. Khrushchev. This will determine to a large extent the success and solution of other questions that still await settlement.

A.I. Mikoyan agreed with this. Returning to his conversation with the president, A.I. Mikoyan said, that although in its course there were a few sharp [*ostryyi*] moments, on the whole he agrees with R. Kennedy's evaluation of the conversation with the president.

To all appearances, this was reflected in the ensuing conversation with Rusk, which took place in a business-like and friendly atmosphere, clearly, not without the influence of the president. R. Kennedy smiled, but he didn't say anything.

In concluding the conversation, R. Kennedy asked [Mikoyan] to give greetings to N.S. Khrushchev. In his turn A.I. Mikoyan sent greetings to the president.

Robert Kennedy showed interest in visiting the Soviet Union and expressed this desire.

A.I. Mikoyan said that this was a good idea and completely realizable. If the de-

crease in tension between [our] countries continues further and the political atmosphere warms up, then this trip would not only be interesting but useful for him.

After our return to the other room, Udall made the first toast to the leaders of the two great nations - N.S. Khrushchev and J. Kennedy - "people of strength and peace." One theme of the toasts and remarks of the American representatives during the meal was to express satisfaction over the fact that our two countries have succeeded in avoiding a clash in the Cuban crisis and [to support] the need to search for ways of avoiding the repetition of similar crises in the future. Note the following pronouncements.

Udall emphasized the pleasant impressions from his trip to the Soviet Union and from his meeting with N.S. Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders. He said that his feelings of sympathy for the Soviet people grew stronger, and he said so despite criticism of these statements in the USA, still in September. He asked [me] to transmit his invitation to visit the United States to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Comrade Novikov, and to the Energy and Electrification Minister, Comrade Neporozhnyi, noting in jest that he was ready to show "some secrets," as was done during his visit to the Soviet side.

A.I. Mikoyan pronounced a toast to the host, Secretary Udall, his wife and children, who were presented to A.I. Mikoyan by their parents. Udall has 6 children.

A.I. Mikoyan joked that although Khrushchev's acquaintance with Udall was brief, and Mikoyan's acquaintance with Udall at the time even briefer, Udall immediately won over Khrushchev and then Mikoyan. Khrushchev said to Mikoyan: What a simpatico [*simpaticnyi*] and good man is Mr. Udall!

When I met him at dinner, said Mikoyan, he made such an impression on me. There are some people, whom you know for years, but actually don't know, and suddenly after decades you see the real face of the man. And there are also those, who after several hours, you can tell what kind of man they are. Udall belongs to this category. When he returned to his homeland after visiting the Soviet Union he landed in an atmosphere of anti-Soviet hysteria. The agents of monopolies, the press and radio tried to get anti-Soviet statements out of him, counter to those he had made in the Soviet

Union. Udall's conscientiousness [*dobrosovestnost'*] was confirmed and he did not give in to this pressure and said what he thought, that is, he repeated in the USA what he had said in the Soviet Union.

A.I. Mikoyan transmitted greetings from N.S. Khrushchev and offered a toast to [Khrushchev's] health.

Ball underlined that the necessary condition for greater trust between the USSR and USA was our renunciation of "the practices [of] a closed society," stating, in particular, that this should be demonstrated concretely by the broadening of exchanges and in our agreement to the sale of bourgeois newspapers on the streets of Moscow.

Replying to Ball, A.I. Mikoyan said, that so long as the arms race continues, it is impossible and unrealistic to demand the open society of which Ball spoke. You also do not have an open society. You have more advertising [*reklam*], but society is closed, but in its own way. When the arms race is eliminated and disarmament takes place, we will then open many places in which the presence today of foreigners is forbidden. Then we will have open exchanges and contacts.

Wishing to draw Heller, the Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, into the conversation (he appears pleasant, a relatively young professor, for the most part silent), A.I. Mikoyan asked Heller how he would explain the fact that, in particular, the USA has more steel producing potential than the USSR, but the USSR in the third quarter of this year produced more steel than the USA. "If you did not need so much steel, why build so many factories and remove huge amounts of capital from circulation, including the living work force [that has become] unemployed. In general, what measures are you taking to remove such disproportions and are they removable at all in a free enterprise system?"

Heller avoided answering by changing the topic of conversation, not wishing to enter an argument where he felt himself weak. A.I. Mikoyan in the context of the dinner did not insist on an answer.

Heller promptly supported Mikoyan's statement on the appropriateness of transferring power and means freed up by the end of the arms race toward raising the standard of living of the people from underdeveloped countries and of the people of the states participating in the arms race.

A.I. Mikoyan invited Heller to visit the Soviet Union.

Those present asked Mikoyan if, in his opinion, Castro is interested in normalizing relations and about Castro himself as the ruler of Cuba.

A.I. Mikoyan in his statements about his trip to Cuba underlined Cuba's interest in having the chance to build a [word illegible] life in a peaceful setting, and the lack of any serious signs of readiness on the part of the USA to normalize [relations] with Cuba.

Dobrynin and Bubnov transcribed the conversation.

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK, provided to CWHIP, and on file at National Security Archive; translated by David Wolff, CWHIP.]

**Memorandum from the Head of the  
USSR Merchant Fleet to the CC CPSU,  
7 December 1962**

I am reporting on the removal of 42 IL-28 planes from Cuba.

1. The ship "Okhotsk," carrying 12 IL-28 airplanes, left the port at Nuevita on 4 December at 23:00 Moscow time.

After the departure of the "Okhotsk" from the port, American planes began flying back and forth over the ship, taking photos. We recorded the identification numbers of the planes.

On 6 December at 9:00, the USA warship number 943 appeared near the stern of the "Okhotsk," and informed the captain of our vessel that it would be following the "Okhotsk" all night, and asked that the boxes containing the IL-28 planes be opened for photographing. The captain gave his consent, and towards dawn on 7 December the USA destroyer carried out an inspection of the Soviet ship.

2. The "Kasimov" left the port of Mariel at 14:45 on 5 December, carrying on board 15 IL-28 planes.

The "Kasimov" was also subjected to constant overhead flights by USA war planes whose identification numbers we recorded.

A bomber of the "Neptune" class, with the number 6-145922, asked us to open the packing of our deck cargo for photographing. This request was fulfilled by the captain of the "Kasimov." After this, the plane

circled over the vessel six times and then flew away.

3. The ship "Krasnograd" left from the port of Mariel on 6 December at 7:30, carrying on board 15 IL-28 planes.

This vessel was also constantly subjected to overhead flights by American planes whose numbers were recorded by us. One plane of the "Orion" class, number 5605-BF-505, and two planes of the "Neptune" class, numbers LK-131499 and JP-22, asked the captain how many IL-28 planes he was carrying. The captain answered that there were 15 "IL-28" planes on board.

The flights over vessels carrying IL-28's continue. The vessels are proceeding normally.

All the planes, 42 units, have been removed. According to the Ministry of Defense, a forty-third plane (an instructional model) was wrongly registered, and had never been received by Cuba.

The Minister of the Merchant Fleet  
V. BAKAEV

[Source: Russian State Economic Archives, Moscow; copy provided to CWHIP by R. Pikhov and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]

**Official note from the US embassy in  
Moscow to USSR Foreign Ministry,  
10 December 1962**

Received by mail  
10 December 1962

Translated from the English  
No. 478

The Embassy of the United States of America is expressing its respect to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and has the honor of quoting from the Embassy's note No. 348 of 24 October 1962. The Embassy has been entrusted by its government hereby to bring to the attention of the Ministry the operational portion of the Proclamation, issued by the President of the United States of America on 21 November 1962, on the lifting of the quarantine announced on 23 October 1962.

"I, John F. Kennedy, President of the United States of America, acting with the

authority given to me by the Constitution and the laws of the United States, hereby declare that at 23 hours 00 minutes Greenwich time on 20 November 1962, I rescinded the powers given to the Defense Department by Proclamation No. 3504 of 23 October 1962, and cancelled the orders it contained to the armed forces under my command."

The Embassy of the United States of America

Moscow, 10 December 1962  
Translated by Ju. Sokolikov

[Source: AVP RF; copy obtained by NHK (Japanese Television), provided to CWHIP, and on file at National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.; translation by John Henriksen, Harvard University.]

**EDITOR'S NOTES**

<sup>1</sup> Gromyko here evidently refers to Dorticos' speech to the U.N. General Assembly of 8 October 1962. Dorticos stated: "Were the United States able to give us proof, by word and deed, that it would not carry out aggression against our country, then, we declare solemnly before you here and now, our weapons would be unnecessary and our army redundant." *New York Times*, 9 October 1962.

<sup>2</sup> Kennedy had asked Congress to approve the call-up of 150,000 reservists on 7 September 1962.

<sup>3</sup> Not further identified.

<sup>4</sup> An obvious allusion to the failed attack on Cuba in April 1961 at the Bay of Pigs by CIA-supported anti-Castro Cuban exiles.

<sup>5</sup> The date of this conversation is not specified in the text, but Kennedy appears to be referring to the meeting between Robert Kennedy and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin on the same day as the 4 September 1962 statement to underline the President's concerns about Soviet military aid to Cuba.

<sup>6</sup> The Russian text is unclear as to whether it refers to a "bar-man" (barkeeper) or a last name such as "Berman," "Barman," or "Burman."

<sup>7</sup> Possibly a reference to journalist Robert J. Donovan.

<sup>8</sup> It is noteworthy that the Soviet message strongly implies that a U.S. invasion of Cuba would not trigger a military response from the USSR, but only political condemnation. This hinted at a brewing disagreement between Moscow and Ha-

vana, for Castro's message to Khrushchev on 26 October 1962—in which he called on the Soviet leader to authorize a “harsh and terrible” attack on the United States should it invade Cuba—clearly reflected the Cuban's belief that Moscow was (or should be) willing to go to war on Cuba's behalf. For an English translation of Castro's letter, which first appeared in the Cuban newspaper *Granma* in November 1990, see James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, *Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse* (New York: Pantheon, 1993), 481–482.

<sup>9</sup> Presumably a reference to Khrushchev's letters on that day to both Kennedy (accepting his proposal to resolve the crisis) and Castro (explaining his decision); for the texts of both letters, see Laurence Chang and Peter Kornbluh, eds., *The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader* (New York: The New Press, 1993), 226–229, 239.

<sup>10</sup> A secessionist rebel leader from Katanga (later Shaba) Province in the Congo (later Zaire) against whom the UN was considering the use of military force, which it later used to quash the resistance.

<sup>11</sup> For an English translation of the letter, which emerged publicly only three decades later when it was released by Soviet officials, see *Problems of Communism—Special Edition* (Spring 1992), 60–62; also U.S. State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, vol. VI: Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), 189–90.

<sup>12</sup> A reference to Kennedy's agreement to withdraw the approximately 5,000 U.S. troops sent to Thailand in May 1962 in response to an attack by the pro-communist Pathet Lao in Laos. Kennedy's decision followed a private appeal in Khrushchev's name conveyed through Robert Kennedy in mid-June by Bolshakov. See Memorandum from Attorney General Kennedy to President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy), 11 July 1962 (regarding meetings apparently held on 18 and 19 June 1962), in U.S. State Department, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, vol. XXIII: Southeast Asia* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1994), 950.

<sup>13</sup> Igor D. Statsenko was the commander of a Soviet missile division deployed to western Cuba.

<sup>14</sup> Alekseev evidently refers to Khrushchev's letter to Castro dated 30 October 1962; an English translation can be found in an appendix to Blight, Allyn, and Welch, *Cuba on the Brink*, 485–488.

<sup>15</sup> Castro here refers to his message to Khrushchev dated 26 October 1962, an English

translation of which appears in an appendix to Blight, Allyn, and Welch, *Cuba on the Brink*, 481–482.

<sup>16</sup> A reference to anti-U.S. protests held outside the embassy in Moscow during the crisis.

<sup>17</sup> Evidently a reference to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, which Kennedy created.

<sup>18</sup> For English translations of the Russian records of conversations in Havana between Mikoyan and Castro and the Cuban leadership on 3–5 November 1962, see Vladislav Zubok, “‘Dismayed by the Actions of the Soviet Union’: Mikoyan's talks with Fidel Castro and the Cuban leadership, November 1962” (plus accompanying documents), *CWIHP Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995), 59, 89–92 and 109, 159.

<sup>19</sup> Until the missile crisis, Georgi Bolshakov, a Soviet official based at the USSR Embassy in Washington, had been used as a back-channel go-between to deliver messages between Khrushchev and the Kennedys, meeting frequently with Robert Kennedy. As the document indicates, this channel ended after the Kennedys concluded that Bolshakov had been used to mislead them by transmitting false reassurances in the summer and early autumn of 1962 that Khrushchev would not send offensive weapons to Cuba or take any disruptive action prior to the Congressional elections in November. Instead, beginning with the missile crisis, a new channel was set up between Robert Kennedy and Ambassador Dobrynin.

<sup>20</sup> For Khrushchev's 4 November 1962 letter to Kennedy, see Chang and Kornbluh, eds., *The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962*, 264.

<sup>21</sup> Nixon had been defeated by his Democratic rival in the California gubernatorial elections, upon which he announced his retirement from politics. The relevant passage in Khrushchev's 12 November 1962 message read: “Now the elections in your country, Mr. President, are over. You made a statement that you were very pleased with the results of these elections. They, the elections, indeed, were in your favor. The success does not upset us either—though that is of course your internal affair. You managed to pin your political rival, Mr. Nixon, to the mat. This did not draw tears from our eyes either....” See James A. Nathan, ed., *The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 290.

## STATE DEPARTMENT, RUSSIAN ARCHIVES COOPERATE ON KHRUSHCHEV-KENNEDY FRUS VOLUME

In an unprecedented example of cooperation between the State Department Historian's Office and the Russian Foreign Ministry archives, a volume of *Foreign Relations of the United States*, the official published record of U.S. foreign policy, has appeared with Russian archival documents.

*Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–1963, Volume VI: Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1996), contains several Russian documents among the correspondence, oral messages, back-channel exchanges, and other records concerning direct communications between U.S. President John F. Kennedy and Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev, including exchanges between the two concerning the Cuban Missile Crisis in Oct.–Nov. 1962 that were declassified by Russian authorities five years ago and published in Spring 1992 in *Problems of Communism*.

One newly-available document from the Russian archives contained in the volume is a translation of a long (approximately 25 type-written pages) 1 April 1963 “talking paper” from Khrushchev to Kennedy. Upon reading through the message when it was presented to him by Soviet Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin, the president's brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, handed it back on the grounds that it was “so insulting and rude to the President and to the United States that I would neither accept it nor transmit its message.” Robert Kennedy told his brother that he had informed an “obviously embarrassed” Dobrynin that a message of that sort, if Khrushchev insisted on sending it, should go through normal State Department channels rather than the confidential back-channel Dobrynin and Robert Kennedy had established during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Thus, no copy of the communication reached the U.S. archives.

FRUS editors called the cooperation with the archives of an ex-Cold War adversary “without precedent in the history of the *Foreign Relations* series,” and expressed thanks to Igor V. Lebedev, Director of the Department of History and Records, Russian Foreign Ministry. The Kennedy-Khrushchev volume (320 pp.), prepared by the Office of the Historian, Department of State, is ISBN 0-16-04018-0 and can be ordered from the U.S. Government Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328.

## MIKOYAN-CASTRO TALKS

*continued from page 320*

*by the Russian and transcribes the meaning of the phrase into the simple past tense. Both documents are evidently transcriptions of memo notes taken during a speech and do not seem to have been corrected. Their overall tone is colloquial. When the meaning was clear enough, I changed the punctuation and divided very long sentences into shorter ones. I did not shorten the phrases whose meaning was unclear. In this latter case, I tried to be as literal as possible; translating word by word. Editor's and translator's insertions appear in brackets, as opposed to parenthetical phrases in the original document. The translation preserves some apparent errors in the originals regarding parentheses and quotation marks, where the punctuation marks are not closed. In general, however, the sense of both documents is understandable even to a reader who is unfamiliar with the events.—Carlos Osorio (National Security Archive).]*

**Document I:  
Cuban Record of Conversation,  
Mikoyan and Cuban Leadership,  
Havana, 4 November 1962**

MEETING OF THE SECRETARIAT OF  
THE CRI WITH MIKOYAN AT THE  
NATIONAL PALACE,  
SUNDAY, 4 NOVEMBER 1962.

Preamble by Mikoyan:

He says he has come to Cuba to discuss their differences with the Cuban Compañeros [comrades] and not to [discuss] what has been stated by the imperialists. They trust us as much as they trust themselves. He is willing to discuss for as long as it takes to solve the differences. The interests of the Soviet Union are common to ours in the defense of the principles of Marxism-Leninism and in all the other interests.

FIDEL: Summarizes our differences in terms of the procedures used to deal with this crisis.

DORTICOS: Asks whether Mikoyan considers that they have obtained the guarantees that president Kennedy offered.

CARLOS: Asks whether the victory mentioned by the Soviets has been attained.

MIKOYAN: Says he will respond to the questions, and asks to be excused for he will speak for a long time. He says he will start with the doubts expressed by Fidel in order to explain them.

He thinks that the main problem consists in explaining why they have sent troops and strategic weapons. If this is not understood, it is very difficult to understand the whole situation. He did not think we had doubts about this. He said that "the fate of the Cuban revolution is a permanent preoccupation of ours, especially since its socialist character was declared. When the imperialists were defeated in Giron [Beach at the Bay of Pigs—ed.], we congratulated ourselves, but we also worried. The *yanquis* [Yankees, i.e., North Americans—ed.] did a stupid thing but we knew they would continue harassing because Cuba is an example that they could not tolerate. Our assessment was that they had two parallel plans; the first one consisted of the economic strangulation of Cuba in order to bring down the regime without a military intervention. The second one consisted of an intervention organized by Latin American governments and their support, as an alternative to the other plan.

We consider the victory of the Cuban revolution as an enormous contribution to Marxism-Leninism. Its defeat would be an irreparable damage to Marxism and to other revolutionary movements in other countries. Such a defeat would mean the preponderance of imperialism over socialism in the world. Such a defeat would mean a terrible blow against the world revolution. It would break the correlation of forces. It is our duty to do everything possible to defend Cuba.

"Our comrades told us that the economic situation in Cuba had worsened due to the *yanquis*' pressure and the enormous military expenses. This worried us for it coincided with the plans of the *yanquis*. We had a discussion about the economic decline and we have helped without you requesting it. You are very modest in your requests and we try to help you. We decided to give you weapons for free and donated equipment for 100,000 men. In addition, in our commercial negotiations, we have looked at all the possibilities and we have tried to provide everything you needed without payments in

kind. We have given you 180 million roubles in order to help you. This is a second phase of help because before that there were commercial and credit agreements but these last deliveries have been in aid.

When Khrushchev visited Bulgaria [on 14-20 May 1962—ed.] he expressed many things to us, he said "although I was in Bulgaria, I was always thinking of Cuba. I fear the *yanquis* will attack Cuba, directly or indirectly, and imagine of the effect on us of the defeat of the Cuban revolution. We cannot allow this to happen. Although the plan is very risky for us, it is a big responsibility for it exposes us to a war. Cuba must be saved[.] "They thought it over for three days and later all the members of the Central Committee expressed their opinions. We have to think a lot about this action in order to save Cuba and not to provoke a nuclear war. He ordered the military to develop the Plan and to consult with the Cubans. He told us that the main condition was to carry out the Plan secretly. Our military told us that four months were needed for the preparations. We thought the enemy would learn about it right in the middle of the plan and we anticipated what to do. We thought the plan would not be carried out to the end, but this was an advantage, for the troops would already be in the Island. We foresaw that, in order not to provoke a war, we could use the UNO [United Nations Organization] and the public opinion. We thought the Plan would not provoke a war but a blockade against weapons and fuel instead. How to solve this - your lack of fuel? Considering the geographic situation of the Island, it has been very difficult to avoid the blockade. If you were closer we could have used our Air Force and our Fleet, but we could not. The *yanquis* do have bases surrounding us in Turkey and blocking the Black Sea. Given the situation, we cannot strike back. Okinawa is too far away too. The only possibility was to cut the communications with West Berlin. In Berlin this is possible.

We have not thought of building a Soviet Base on the Island to operate against the North Americans. In general, we consider that the policy of bases is not a correct one. We only have bases in [East] Germany, first because of the right we have as an invading country, and after that due to the Warsaw Treaty. (Stalin did have bases abroad). In the past, we have had them in Finland and in China too (Port Arthur) -

those bases we have abandoned. We only have troops in Hungary and Poland, to protect the troops in Germany and the communications with Austria.

We do not need bases to destroy the United States because we can attack with the missiles deployed in our territory. We do not have a plan to conquer North America. The only thing we need to do is to launch a counter strike, but that will serve to destroy them without having to send in our troops.

We have sent the troops and strategic missiles only to protect the Island's defense. It was a plan of containment [*contension*] so that the *yanquis* could not provoke an explosion in Cuba. If the missiles are well camouflaged and the *yanquis* do not know where they are deployed, then they can help to contain them. The military told us that they could be well hidden in the palm forests of Cuba. The *yanquis* were not going to locate them. They could not destroy them. During July and August, they did not find anything, it was not until October that they have been found. We were surprised that Kennedy only made reference to technicians and not to our troops. At first, it seems that that is what he thought. Later we learned that he knew more than he was saying, but he was not revealing it not to hinder the electoral campaign. We let the *yanquis* know that we were going to solve the Berlin problem, in order to distract their attention from the other problem. We did not intend to act on Berlin. I can explain this later.

It was known through diplomatic channels that Kennedy did not want to make matters more serious and asked us not to move on the issue of Berlin before the elections. We told him that we agreed to this. We would please him and we would solve it later. We thought it was convenient to please him. In addition, we had not thought of bringing up this problem. When the North Americans learned about the transports to Cuba, they also concentrated their campaign on Berlin. Both sides had their principal interest in Cuba, but appeared as if concentrated on Berlin. In the middle of October, they [the North Americans—ed.] learned about it through Cuba, via the West Germany information service who passed it to the CIA,<sup>3</sup> they first learned about the missiles. They took aerial pictures and located them. Khrushchev ordered that the missiles be laid down during the day and that they

be raised only during the night. Evidently, this order was never carried out. Kennedy did not want to talk about the missiles until the end of the elections. But two Republican Senators learned the news and they had no alternative but to act. We did not know what Kennedy would do and we worried about the preparations or maneuvers of Vieti - an operation named after Castro but backwards.<sup>4</sup> When Kennedy talked about the blockade, we did not have data showing whether it was a maneuver or a preparation for aggression. On the morning of the 28th we received the news confirming that it was an aggression. Although it was announced that the maneuvers were suspended due to a storm, the storm was over and the maneuvers were not carried out. In the meantime, the concentration continued. Khrushchev has strongly criticized Kennedy's words about the blockade. They did not approve of the kind of weapons that Cuba should own and thus they organized a direct aggression. Their plan consisted of two parts: using missiles with conventional loads to destroy the nuclear missiles and then landing and destroying the resistance.

In case of the latter, we would be forced to respond because it is an attack against Cuba and against us too - because our troops were here and this was the unleashing of the World War. We would destroy North America. They would inflict huge losses on us; but they would make every effort to destroy Cuba completely. All the measures we took were taken to protect Cuba. What would have been the result if the plan of the *yanquis* was carried out? Lose Cuba, inflict enormous damages upon the Socialist countries with a nuclear war? While we were in the midst of our discussions, we received a cable from Fidel that coincided with other information in the same vein. After that, ten to twelve hours were left. Given that such a short time was left, we used diplomatic channels. Because when policy-makers want to avoid a war, they have to use diplomatic means. It's important to underscore that Kennedy says now that he was not against the presence of troops here and that he accepts ground-to-air missiles. But once known, the strategic weapons, were not useful anymore...(paragraph missing) [notation in original—ed.]

The withdrawal of the missiles, was a concession on our part. But Kennedy also makes a concession by permitting the So-

viet weapons [to remain in Cuba], in addition, declaring that they will not attack Cuba nor permit that it be attacked. In assessing the outcome, we have gained, because they will not attack Cuba and there will be no war.

In normal conditions, it would be natural that we send you a project [draft—ed.] for you to study and you could then publish it. But that can be done only in normal conditions. An invasion was expected within the next 24 hours. When Fidel sent his cable, there were only ten to twelve hours left. If a cable was sent it had to be crypted, that would take more than 10 to 12 hours. Consultations would have been appropriate, but Cuba would not exist and the world would be enveloped in a war. After the attack, they would have never accepted a truce, due to the warmongers of the Pentagon. Our attitude has produced difficulties, but in making an overall evaluation, in spite of the psychological defects, we can see that the advantages are undeniable.

Com[panero]. Dorticos asks: What guarantees offered by Kennedy have really been obtained? We consider that all agreements cannot be rejected in a nihilistic fashion. Although agreements can be breached, they are important for they are useful for a certain period of time.

In addition, a problem arose with the Turkey issue. [Mikoyan said:] Why did we include the problem of Turkey and the bases? We did not have in our plans to discuss Turkey; but while we were discussing that issue, we received an article from [U.S. journalist Walter] Lip[p]man[n] saying that the Russians will discuss that, [and] that is why we included it. The bases in Turkey are of no importance because in case of war they would be destroyed. There are also bases in England that could damage all the bases anywhere in the world.

Fidel asks whether there were in fact two letters [from Khrushchev to Kennedy], one that mentioned the issue of Turkey, which was broadcast on Radio Moscow, and another in which the issue was not mentioned. [Mikoyan replied:] We sent two letters, one on the 26th that was not published, and another one on the 27th. The issue of Turkey was not included at the beginning, we included it later. But we can describe all that in more detail through a reviewing of

the documents. We have had discussions about your question whether the dismantling of the base at Guantanamo is better. That would be better for Cuba, but from a military point of view of the interest of Cuba, it is not possible. If we decided to withdraw all the weapons from Cuba, then we could demand the withdrawal from Guantanamo, Guantanamo has no importance in military terms. That would be more dangerous, and that is important from a political perspective. Concerning the inspection: if we said we reject any inspection, the enemy could interpret that as an attempt to trick them. All it is about is seeing the sites, where the weapons were and their shipping for a few days. Cuba is in the hands of the Cubans. But because we were the owners of those weapons... (paragraph missing). [notation in original—ed.] We thought that you, after the consultations, you would accept the inspection. But we never thought of deciding anything for you. Why did we think that we could accept a verification of the dismantling by neutrals, without infringement of the Cuban sovereignty? It was understood that no State would accept an infringement of your sovereignty. In very particular cases, a State can... [ellipsis in document—ed.] its acts, by agreement and not due to pressures from abroad - the territory of the Embassy within a sovereign State for example. When discussing the problem of Indochina and Vietnam in Geneva [in 1954], an agreement was reached to create an International Control Commission.

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We spoke about the problem of dismantling with [U.S. negotiator John J.] McCloy in New York. He said that "given that Cuba is opposed to the North American inspection, he did not insist on this formula - for them to verify that the weapons will not be kept hidden in the forest. [no close quotation marks in original—ed.]

I talked to them about the aerial photographic inspection, but I responded that Cuba has the right to its air space. I told them that their planes have flown over Cuba and they were convinced that the dismantling is been carried out. They admitted that, but pointed that not everything is finished. We told them that this is nearly completed and he did not talk further about it. [McCloy said:] We have to be sure that they are not

going to hide them in the forest. We do not want data pertaining to your military secrets; but we need assurances that the missiles will go.

We can provide the pictures of the dismantled weapons and how they are loaded. Nor we will oppose that you observe the ships on the high seas, at a particular distance. They (or you) will see something on the decks. I did not tell them that, but that is our opinion and we will provide them with the materials to convince them that we have withdrawn the missiles. So we will not contradict your [Cuban] declaration, against the inspection or the aerial verification. They feared that the Cubans would not allow us to withdraw the missiles, given that they have 140,000 and you only have 10,000 men. I did not talk about these numbers. He said that the U-2 that was shot down here, was shot at with Russian missiles and probably operated by Russians. Although they think there may be Cubans who are able to operate those weapons. We kept on insisting that they lift the quarantine immediately. I told them that if they wanted the missiles withdrawn faster, they should lift the blockade. Because the ships that are now in Cuba are not able to take those missiles out. [underlined in original]. I told them they should issue instructions so that the inspection of the ships be carried out without anybody boarding the ships. It would rather be carried out in a symbolic manner, asking by radio, as it was done with the tanker Bucharest.

Stevenson said they will accept the proposals of U Thant. We reproached him that he proposed not to bring weapons to Cuba and to lift the blockade. We have complied with this and they continue.

We have losses because the ships wait on the high seas. The losses are considerable, that is why we have allowed the control of the Red Cross. The Red Cross is better because it is not a political institution, nor a governmental institution. U Thant proposed two inspections, one at the shipping harbors and another on the high seas. Not wanting to hurt his feelings, we responded that we accept the inspection on the high seas and not at the shipping harbors.

U Thant, when returning from Cuba, told me that you did not agree, although this verification is easier at the harbors. U Thant is ready, he is choosing the personnel and has already two ships. I do not know more

about it, for it is [Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister V.V.] Kuznetsov who deals with this issue.

In this situation, Thant has played a good role. You cannot ask more, given his situation, he even seems to have a little sympathy for our position. While in Moscow, we received a plan of guarantees. We thought this plan seemed interesting and useful for Cuba.

Why: If the inspection of Cuba, the southern coast of the U.S. and other countries in the Caribbean will be approved (Central America[]) because this way you deprive the aggressor of the possibility to carry out its goals. Of course, this can be circumvented, however. I have been interested in this variant from another point of view. There is an OAS [Organization of American States], and it is the U.S. who profits from it instead of using the UN. But if this plan is approved, it is the UNO that will deal with this part of the American Continent, this constitutes a blow to the Monroe Doctrine. U Thant said that the representatives from Latin American countries agree with this plan, the North Americans avoid responding to it. I asked Mc Cloy and he said at the beginning (as did Stevenson) that the U Thant Plan does not exist. But afterward they discarded the U.S. inspection and they said they can give their word that in Latin America all the camps [of anti-Castro Cuban exiles—ed.] are liquidated. I asked him if all were, and he avoided the question. They said that Cuba was a revolutionary infection, he said that the Latin American countries fear Cuba. A formula can be searched in which Cuba will abandon the clandestine work in exchange for their not attacking.

Fidel was right when he said that it's easier for the USSR to maneuver and maintain a flexible policy than it is for Cuba, all the more as the *yanqui* radio reaches Cuba easily. It is not just to say that we are more liberal. The Cuban revolution cannot be lost. You have to maneuver to save the Revolution by being flexible.

In retrospect the question that arises is whether it was a mistake to send the missiles and then withdraw them from the Island. Our Central Committee says that this is not a mistake. We consider that the missiles did their job by making Cuba the focus of the world diplomacy. After they were captured in photos, they cannot accomplish

their role of containment.

In Latin America no country has the power that Cuba has. No Latin American bloc can defeat Cuba.

In order to understand on what victory rests, you may compare the situation of Cuba now and four months ago (in July). The first advantage is that the North Americans stopped talking about the Monroe Doctrine and before, the whole basis for their policy toward Latin America was that doctrine.

Before, they declared they would not tolerate the existence of a Marxist-Leninist regime in Latin America, now they declare that they will not attack Cuba. Before they did not tolerate a country from abroad in the Caribbean and now they know of the existence of Soviet specialists and do not say a thing.

Before, you could not have any action of the UN in favor of Cuba and now it is working in that sense, all the peoples are mobilized.

The prestige of the Socialist Camp has grown because it defended peace. Although the United States brought the world to the brink of a war, the USSR, by pacific means, was able to save Cuba and the [world] peace.

Peace has been secured for several years and Cuba must be consolidated for it to continue building socialism and continue being the Light-house for Latin America.

The prestige of Cuba has grown as a consequence of these events.

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Fidel asks whether he [Mikoyan] will speak about the Soviet policy in Berlin. Mikoyan agrees to do so in a later interview.

**Document II:  
Mikoyan and Cuban leadership,  
Havana, 5 November 1962**

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE  
SECRETARIAT AND MIKOYAN ON  
MONDAY, 5 NOVEMBER AT THREE  
IN THE AFTERNOON.

After hearing Mikoyan, Fidel says:

We consider that the intentions of the Soviet Government cannot be determined only by the analysis of what happened in face of

an unforeseen situation. Instead, they should be analyzed taking into account the set of agreements we have reached - the weapons were brought under those precepts. One of them is the military agreement that was to be published once all the weapons were brought in and once the Elections were held in the United States. These agreements represent a firm desire of the Soviet Union.<sup>5</sup>

That is why this has to be analyzed under the light of what we intended to do and not under the light of what happened.

If all the steps were carried out, we have no doubt that they would have served as a containment to the plans of the North Americans to attack our country. And the objectives of the Soviet Government and Cuba would have been attained.

At the same time, we knew that the deployment of missiles in Cuba had in sight the defense of the Socialist Camp. They were important not only in military terms, but also from a psychological and political point of view. Besides serving the interests of Cuba, they served the interests of the Socialist Camp as a whole, and we evidently agreed with that. That is how we have understood the step taken, and we also understand it was a step in the right direction. We also agree with the need that a war be avoided and we do not oppose that. In this case, all the measures oriented to attain the two objectives were undertaken. We are in absolute agreement with the goals sought by the Soviet Union, the misunderstandings arise as a result of the way they were attained. We also understand that the circumstances were compelling. They were not one hundred percent normal.

In assessing how the events occurred, we think they could have been dealt with differently. For instance, one thing discussed is the impact that my letter had on the Soviet Government's decision of the [October] 28th. And it is evident that my letter had nothing to do with the course of the events - given the messages that were exchanged between the Soviet and North American Governments on the 26 and 27. My letter's only goal was to inform the Soviet Government of the imminent attack, and it did not contain any hesitation on our part. Furthermore, we expressed that we did not expect an invasion. We expressed that the invasion was possible, but we understood that it was the least probable variant. The most probable event was an aerial attack to destroy the stra-

tegic weapons.

The Soviet Government's decision on the 28, is based on the letter to Kennedy and the response on the 27. The real basis for the 28 decision lies within these two documents. Kennedy's letter on the 28 was an agreement to the proposals Khrushchev sent on the 26 - in the sense that he [Khrushchev] was willing to resolve the issue of all the weapons if the U.S. ceased the aggression. The aggression was the only reason for the military strengthening of Cuba.

Once Kennedy accepted this proposal - which we did not know of - the conditions were set to carry it out starting with a declaration by the Soviets stating that their side was on board and that they would proceed to discuss it with the Cuban Government.

I think that such a declaration, instead of communicating an order to withdraw the Strategic Weapons, would have decreased the tension and would have allowed to carry the discussions in better terms.

But this is a mere analysis of what happened, it does not matter now. What matters now is simply to know what to do and how to attain the main goals that are to stop the aggression and to secure the peace at the same time. If a true and effective peace are attained in the near future, then - under the light of the recent events - we will be able to judge better the steps taken. The future outcome - for which we need to struggle - will either credit or discredit the value of the acts of the present. It is evident that attaining that outcome does not depend so much on us. We are very grateful for all the explanations given and of the effort made for us to understand the things that occurred. We know they happened in abnormal circumstances. There is no question in our minds about the respect of the Soviet Union toward us, the respect of the Soviet Union for our sovereignty, and, the help of the Soviet Union. That is why what is important to discuss is what are the steps to take in the future. We want to reaffirm our trust in the Soviet Union.

COMMENTS OF MIKOYAN (transcribed by Dorticos)

Carlos Rafael: It is my understanding that companero Mikoyan talked about the inspection of the Soviet ships as a Minimum Minorum. But that inspection would take place in a Cuban harbor. They could well

then request the inspection of other sites in Cuba - the forests for instance. They can claim that the missiles could have been diverted from their route between the base and the ships.

FIDEL: How would the inspection they propose take place?

Mikoyan: (transcribed by Dorticos)

FIDEL: Couldn't they do the same on the high seas? What is the difference?

Mikoyan: (transcribed by Dorticos)

FIDEL: Tell companero Mikoyan that I understand very well the interest of keeping U Thant on our side, but for us, that is a critical issue. It would have a disastrous effect on our people. The North Americans say that the inspection is inferred from the letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy on the 28 (Fidel is making reference to the letter of Khrushchev on the 27 where he accepts the inspection of the Missiles Bases by officials of the UNO Security Council, but making reference to Cuba and Turkey agreeing to it). [note in original—ed.]

Just because of this phrase of Khrushchev, they cannot take this as a concession of the Soviet Union. Companero Mikoyan says to hell with imperialists if they demand more. But on the 23 we received a letter [from Khrushchev] saying, to hell with the imperialists...(he reads paragraphs from the letter). Besides, on one occasion we heard of the proposal of U Thant about the inspection in Cuba, the United States, Guatemala, etc., we understand, that concessions should be made, but we have already made too many. The [U.S.] airplanes are taking pictures because the Soviet Union asked so. We have to find a way to provide evidence without inspection. WE DO NOT THINK OF ALLOWING THE INSPECTION, BUT WE DO NOT WANT TO ENDANGER WORLD PEACE, NOR THE SOVIET FORCES THAT ARE IN CUBA. WE WOULD RATHER FREE THE SOVIET UNION OF THE COMMITMENTS IT HAS [MADE] WITH US AND RESIST WITH OUR OWN FORCES WHATEVER THE FUTURE BRINGS. WE HAVE NO RIGHT TO ENDANGER THE PEACE OF THE WORLD, BUT WE HAVE THE RIGHT TO RESIST AGGRESSION. [capi-

tals in original-ed.]

DORTICOS: What has been expressed by companero Fidel does not require a later discussion among us, for we all agree on this criteria (the companeros respond affirmatively)

MIKOYAN (Transcribed by Dorticos)

FIDEL: From our conversation yesterday, we had concluded that the Soviet Government understood the reasons we had to reject the inspection. That was a fundamental issue. That should have been the common ground to talk about common actions. If we do not agree on this, it is difficult to talk about future plans. That is the fundamental political issue. The North Americans persist in obtaining a political victory. The issue of the inspection is to affront the Cuban Revolution. They know there are no missiles. The verification on the high seas has the same effect as in the harbors. The only difference is the humiliating imposition that the U.S. Government wants to carry out for political reasons.

MIKOYAN: (transcribed by Dorticos)

[Source: *Institute of History, Cuba, obtained and provided by Philip Brenner (American University); translation from Spanish by Carlos Osorio (National Security Archive).*]

## EDITOR'S NOTES

<sup>1</sup> See Vladislav M. Zubok, "Dismayed by the Actions of the Soviet Union": Mikoyan's talks with Fidel Castro and the Cuban leadership, November 1962," *CWIHP Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995), 59, 89-92, and "Mikoyan's Mission to Havana: Cuban-Soviet Negotiations, November 1962," *ibid.*, 93-109, 159; for the November 4 conversation, see 94-101, and for the November 5 (afternoon) conversation, see 101-4.

<sup>2</sup> Cuban officials took part in several oral history conferences on the Cuban Missile Crisis which also involved former U.S. and Soviet policymakers, including a conference in Moscow in January 1989 and a gathering in Havana exactly three years later in which Fidel Castro played an active role. The principal organizer of the conferences was James G. Blight, Thomas J. Watson Institute of International Studies, Brown University. For more on Cuban participation in such gatherings, see James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn,

and David A. Welch, *Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse* (New York: Pantheon, 1993), *passim*. Blight and the Watson Institute, in cooperation with the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository based at George Washington University in Washington, D.C., are also involved in organizing oral history conferences on the Bay of Pigs events of 1961, as well as efforts to obtain Cuban sources on such events as the U.S.-Cuban negotiations on normalization of 1975 and Cuban interventions in Africa in the 1970s.

<sup>3</sup> The reference to the West German role in revealing the existence of the missiles to the U.S. administration is obscure, as no such link is present in most historical accounts of the American discovery. Soviet officials may have been inferring a West German role from the presence in Washington on October 16-17 of the Federal Republic of Germany's foreign minister, Dr. Gerhard Schroeder, for meetings with senior American officials, though there is no indication that he brought any intelligence data concerning Soviet missiles in Cuba. See, e.g., Dino A. Brugioni, *Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Random House, rev. ed. [1992?]), 206, 252.

<sup>4</sup> A reference to U.S. Marine exercises, code-named PHIBRIGLEX-62, scheduled to begin on 15 October 1962, practicing amphibious landings of 7,500 Marines on the Caribbean island of Vieques to overthrow a mythical dictator known as "Ortsac"—a fact which was leaked to the press in an obvious psychological warfare tactic. The exercises themselves were also planned to mask preparations for a possible U.S. Navy blockade of Cuba. See citations in James G. Hershberg, "Before 'The Missiles of October': Did Kennedy Plan a Military Strike Against Cuba?" in James A. Nathan, ed., *The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited* (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), 254-5, 275-6 (fns 87, 88).

<sup>5</sup> For the text of the draft agreement, translated from a copy in the Russian archives, see Gen. Anatoli I. Gribkov and Gen. William Y. Smith, *Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Chicago: edition q, inc., 1994), 185-8.

**FOR IMPORTANT  
SUBSCRIBER  
INFORMATION,  
SEE PAGE 421**

**BOBBY AND THE CRISIS***continued from page 274*

shine through clearly, obviously also representing that of his brother. "The President felt himself deceived, and deceived intentionally," Dobrynin quoted Robert Kennedy as saying, noting that he had arrived at the Russian Embassy in "in an obviously excited condition" (although he later "cooled down a bit and spoke in calmer tones"). In general, while Dobrynin resolutely defended Moscow against Robert Kennedy's accusations, the lengthy account of the meeting that he transmitted to the Foreign Ministry must certainly have alerted the Kremlin leadership to just how personally affronted the Kennedy brothers were, and to their apparent determination to confront Soviet ships heading for the blockade line around Cuba.<sup>4</sup>

Quite aside from the substance of the meeting, in terms of subsequent developments it is worth noting Dobrynin's own astute bureaucratic reflex in promoting his own stature in the negotiations—forging this new direct path to the president via his brother (side-stepping normal State Department

channels), the Soviet envoy concluded by recommending that he could meet again with Robert Kennedy to pass "in confidential form N.S. Khrushchev's thoughts on this matter, concerning not only the issues which R. Kennedy had touched on, but a wider circle of issues in light of the events which are going on now." Dobrynin may have sensed an opening in the fact that the previous Soviet Embassy official who had served as Khrushchev's back-channel to Robert Kennedy and thence his brother, Georgi Bolshakov (ostensibly a press attache, presumably an intelligence officer), was evidently in acute disfavor in the White House for having been used to deliver a personal assurance from the Soviet leader that only defensive weapons were being shipped to Cuba. (And, in fact, Dobrynin would report shortly after the crisis that a Joseph Alsop column in the *Washington Post* exposing Bolshakov's role in deceiving the president must have been instigated by Robert Kennedy, for it contained details known "only" by him: "For this reason it is clearly obvious that the article was prepared with the knowledge of, or even by orders from, Robert Kennedy, who is a close friend, as is

the President, of Alsop."<sup>5</sup>)

Before stepping more deeply into Bolshakov's shoes with his October 27 meeting with Robert Kennedy, Dobrynin hinted at his view of the president's brother in a cable of October 25 lumping him, along with Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, and "military men" as taking the "most militant line" in discussions at the White House in favor of attacking Cuba, not only destroying the Soviet missile sites but also invading the island. (Supposedly taking a more moderate line, the envoy reported, were Secretary of State Dean Rusk and Treasury Secretary Douglas C. Dillon.) While Robert Kennedy at the very outset of the crisis had made some belligerent statements (even floating the idea of staging a provocation at Guantanamo to justify U.S. military action<sup>6</sup>), and would later join those harshly criticizing U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. Adlai Stevenson for suggesting the idea of giving up American bases in Turkey and Guantanamo to convince the Soviets to remove their missiles, for most of the crisis he consistently, and at times passionately, argued against precipitous military action: "Robert Kennedy was a dove from the start," wrote Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., citing in particular the notes of the October 18 ExComm meeting, which paraphrase RFK's use of the Pearl Harbor analogy: "...He thought it would be very, very difficult indeed for the President if the decision were to be for an air strike, with all the memory of Pearl Harbor and with all the implications this would have for us in whatever world there would be afterward. For 175 years we had not been that kind of country. A sneak attack was not in our traditions. Thousands of Cubans would be killed without warning, and a lot of Russians too...." Robert Kennedy advocated "action," but also leaving Moscow "some room for maneuver to pull back from their overextended position in Cuba."<sup>7</sup> As of October 25, however, Dobrynin not only grouped Robert Kennedy with the hawks on the ExComm, he judged that the president, "vacillating right now" and "heeding the [militant] group, particularly, his

**JFK LIBRARY RELEASES  
REMAINING TAPES FROM  
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS**

The John F. Kennedy Library in Boston announced in October 1996 that it had completed the declassification of, and was releasing, the remaining tapes of the White House "Excomm" (Executive Committee) discussions that took place in the Oval Office and Cabinet Room during the Cuban Missile Crisis between 18 and 29 October 1962. While extracts of ExComm discussions on the first and last days of the crisis (16 and 27 October 1962) had been declassified and released in the mid-late 1980s, the bulk of the tapes had remained inaccessible until now, although some limited releases of other tape-recorded Excomm materials related to the crisis took place in 1994.

The newly-released tapes total 15 hours and 19 minutes (27 minutes remained classified), making it the larg-

est single release of tape-recorded materials from the Kennedy Administration. In most cases, the Library released only tapes rather than transcripts of the discussions; however, a project is underway at Harvard University to produce transcripts of the tape recordings, after sound enhancement, leading to the publication of a collection (entitled *The Kennedy Tapes*), to be co-edited by Profs. Ernest R. May and Philip Zelikow.

In addition, the Library simultaneously announced the release of 20,000 declassified pages of Cuba-related documents from the National Security Files of the Kennedy Administration. For further information of all the above materials, contact Stephanie Fawcett, Kennedy Library, Columbia Point, Boston, MA 02125; (617) 929-4500 (tel.); (617) 929-4538 (fax); [stfawcet@kennedy.nara.gov](mailto:stfawcet@kennedy.nara.gov) (e-mail).

brother,” might “undertake such an adventurist step as an invasion of Cuba.”

Dobrynin’s rather negative view of Robert Kennedy—even in retrospect, the jaunty Soviet diplomat recalled him as as “far from being a sociable person and lack[ing] a proper sense of humor...[m]oreover, he was impulsive and excitable”<sup>8</sup>—make all the more remarkable the meeting of minds that managed to take place on the evening of October 27. It is not necessary to dwell on that conversation given the scrutiny it has received (and the publication of Dobrynin’s record in a previous *Bulletin*), other than to note that Kennedy’s own contemporaneous draft memorandum of the meeting, printed below, offers additional evidence as to how sensitive the agreement on the Turkish Jupiters was considered. Even in this “top secret” memo to Secretary of State Rusk, Kennedy appears to have penciled out a sentence noting that “per [Rusk’s] instructions” he had told Dobrynin that the Turkish missile issue “could be resolved satisfactorily” in “four or five months.” Instead, in a blatant falsification of the historical record, the revised memo would leave unmodified the assertion that RFK had affirmed that it was “completely impossible for NATO to take such a step under the present threatening position of the Soviet Union” and “there could be no deal of any kind” regarding the Jupiters.

Robert Kennedy’s abhorrence of the idea of leaving a written trace of the under-the-table “understanding” on the Turkish missiles emerges even more clearly from Dobrynin’s account, printed in this *Bulletin*, of his 30 October 1962 meeting at which the Attorney General insisted on handing back to Dobrynin a letter from Khrushchev to Kennedy which had explicitly affirmed the private deal.<sup>9</sup> Robert Kennedy, for his part, had no compunctions about confirming, repeatedly, that a private oral “understanding” existed between the Soviet and U.S. leaderships on the dismantling of the Jupiter missiles in Turkey “within the period of time indicated earlier,” i.e., 4–5 months. However, he added, such a sensitive understanding could not be put down

on paper, even in confidential correspondence between heads of state: “Speaking in all candor, I myself, for example, do not want to risk getting involved in the transmission of this sort of letter, since who knows where and when such letters can surface or be somehow published—not now, but in the future—and any changes in the course of events are possible. The appearance of such a document could cause irreparable harm to my political career in the future. This is why we request that you take this letter back.” (Sensing how crucial the matter was to the Americans, Dobrynin accepted the letter back, even without orders from Moscow.)

Dobrynin’s cable lends contemporaneous corroboration to the assertion in his 1995 memoirs that Robert Kennedy, even in 1962, had linked his actions in the missile crisis to his own political future in keeping secret the arrangement on the Jupiters.<sup>10</sup> (Of course, after the assassination of his brother in 1963, Robert F. Kennedy would indeed run for president, challenging incumbent President Lyndon B. Johnson (and then Vice-President Hubert Humphrey) for the Democratic nomination in 1968, but he, too, would fall victim to an assassin, killed that June on the night of his victory in the California primary.)

Several additional Dobrynin reports of conversations with Robert Kennedy after the crisis appear in this *Bulletin*, mostly dealing with disagreements and details concerning the terms of the final settlement: which Soviet weapons would have to be withdrawn, the timetable for the lifting of the U.S. blockade, disputes over inspection and U.S. overlights, etc. But a few human touches also lighten the diplomatic discourse, and hint at the developing rapport between these two men who probably felt that they had had the fate of the world in their hands.

A meeting at the Russian Embassy on the evening of November 12, for example, began with Dobrynin’s handing over a confidential oral message from Khrushchev to President Kennedy that included a congratulatory note on the results of the Congressional elec-

tions, with special reference to the defeat of Kennedy’s erstwhile presidential rival, former Vice-President Richard M. Nixon, in the California gubernatorial contest.<sup>11</sup> “When [Robert Kennedy] got to the place that spoke of Nixon’s defeat in the elections,” Dobrynin reported, “he immediately grinned, saying: ‘Your chairman is a real master of colorful expression that expressed the true essence of the issue. Yes, we are quite satisfied with Nixon’s defeat, and in general we are not complaining about the results of the election.’ It was felt that this portion of the message was received with definite satisfaction.”

As Kennedy was leaving the Embassy after a tough hour-and-a-half discussion, mostly consumed by haggling over the U.S. demand that the Soviets take their IL-28 bombers out of Cuba,

he glimpsed a crowd of dancing couples in the embassy’s parlor. Realizing that this was a friendly welcome party arranged by the embassy community for the Bolshoi Theater troupe that had just arrived in Washington, he said that he would like to meet with the troupe. Mingling with and greeting almost all the members of the troupe, he delivered a welcome speech in which he said that the President was preparing to attend their premier the following evening. At the end, he kissed Maya Plisetskaya when he found out that he and she had been born in the same year, month, and day, and said they would celebrate their birthdays in a week. None of this needs to be mentioned especially, but all in all the behavior of Robert Kennedy, who is ordinarily quite a reserved and glum man, reflects to some degree the calmer and more normal mood in the White House after the tense days that shook Washington, even though this fact is concealed in various ways by American propaganda.<sup>12</sup>

That an appreciation of the new prominence of the president’s brother extended to Dobrynin’s bosses in the Kremlin became evident in a private conversation between Robert Kennedy and special Soviet envoy Anastas I. Mikoyan, a veteran member of the

CPSU Central Committee, at a dinner party at the home of Interior Secretary Stewart Udall on the evening of November 30—an occasion one American present described as a “strange, seemingly unreal evening” as enemies who had nearly engaged in thermonuclear war only weeks war wiled away the hours in drinking, toasts, and (sometimes forced) convivial conversation.<sup>13</sup> A wily diplomatic trouble-shooter since the Stalin era, Mikoyan was passing through Washington after three weeks of difficult negotiations in Cuba with Fidel Castro over the outcome of the crisis and a day before the Udall affair had met with President Kennedy at the White House.

Before the meal was served (as Mikoyan related in a cable printed in this *Bulletin*), Robert Kennedy invited Mikoyan into a separate room for a tete-a-tete in which he underlined the importance above all (“even more important than the fates of my children and your grandchildren”) of restoring personal trust between his brother and Khrushchev. Mikoyan not only agreed and assured Robert Kennedy that Khrushchev felt the same way, but said that the Soviet government applauded the president’s “self-possession” and willingness to compromise at “the most dangerous moment, when the world stood at the edge of thermonuclear war.”

Moscow, moreover, Mikoyan added, had “noticed the positive role that you, the president’s brother, played during the confidential negotiations” between the U.S. and Soviet leaderships during the crisis. Robert Kennedy expressed an interest in visiting the USSR, an idea which Mikoyan warmly endorsed, especially should relations between the two rivals improve after surviving (and resolving) the rough Cuban passage.

Those relations did in fact improve somewhat in the succeeding months, leading to, among other events, John F. Kennedy’s conciliatory American University speech in April 1963 and the signing of U.S.-Soviet pacts on a limited nuclear test ban and a hot line between Washington and Moscow. But the post-Cuban Missile Crisis opening for a continued rapprochement between

both Kennedy brothers and Khrushchev—a prospect the Americans thought would last through a second Kennedy Administration—ended with the U.S. president’s assassination in Dallas in November 1963 and Khrushchev’s toppling less than a year later.

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**Robert F. Kennedy, Memorandum  
for Dean Rusk on Meeting with  
Anatoly F. Dobrynin on  
27 October 1962**

TOP SECRET

Office of the Attorney General  
Washington, D.C.  
October 30, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE  
SECRETARY OF STATE FROM  
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

At the request of Secretary Rusk, I telephoned Ambassador Dobrynin at approximately 7:15 p.m. on Saturday, October 27th. I asked him if he would come to the Justice Department at a quarter of eight.

We met in my office. I told him first that we understood that the work was continuing on the Soviet missile bases in Cuba. Further, I explained to him that in the last two hours we had found that our planes flying over Cuba had been fired upon and that one of our U-2’s had been shot down and the pilot killed. I said these men were flying unarmed planes.

I told him that this was an extremely serious turn in events. We would have to make certain decisions within the next 12 or possibly 24 hours. There was a very little time left. If the Cubans were shooting at our planes, then we were going to shoot back. This could not help but bring on further incidents and that he had better understand the full implications of this matter.

He raised the point that the argument the Cubans were making was that we were violating Cuban air space. I replied that if we had not been violating Cuban air space then we would still

be believing what he and Khrushchev had said—that there were no long-range missiles in Cuba. In any case I said that this matter was far more serious than the air space over Cuba and involved peoples all over the world.

I said that he had better understand the situation and he had better communicate that understanding to Mr. Khrushchev. Mr. Khrushchev and he had misled us. The Soviet Union had secretly established missile bases in Cuba while at the same time proclaiming, privately and publicly, that this would never be done. I said those missile bases had to go and they had to go right away. We had to have a commitment by at least tomorrow that those bases would be removed. This was not an ultimatum, I said, but just a statement of fact. He should understand that if they did not remove those bases then we would remove them. His country might take retaliatory actions but he should understand that before this was over, while there might be dead Americans there would also be dead Russians.

He then asked me what offer we were making. I said a letter had just been transmitted to the Soviet Embassy which stated in substance that the missile bases should be dismantled and all offensive weapons should be removed from Cuba. In return, if Cuba and Castro and the Communists ended their subversive activities in other Central and Latin-American countries, we would agree to keep peace in the Caribbean and not permit an invasion from American soil.

He then asked me about Khrushchev’s other proposal dealing with the removal of the missiles from Turkey. I replied that there could be no quid pro quo — no deal of this kind could be made. This was a matter that had to be considered by NATO and that it was up to NATO to make the decision. I said it was completely impossible for NATO to take such a step under the present threatening position of the Soviet Union. ~~If some time elapsed — and per your instructions, I mentioned four or five months — I said I was sure that these matters could be resolved satisfactorily.~~ [crossed out by hand—ed.]

Per your instructions I repeated that there could be no deal of any kind and that any steps toward easing tensions in other parts of the world largely depended on the Soviet Union and Mr. Khrushchev taking action in Cuba and taking it immediately.

I repeated to him that this matter could not wait and that he had better contact Mr. Khrushchev and have a commitment from him by the next day to withdraw the missile bases under United Nations supervision for otherwise, I said, there would be drastic consequences.

RFK: amn

[Source: John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA; provided to CWIHP by Prof. Peter Roman, Duquesne University, Pittsburgh, PA.]

<sup>1</sup> Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis* (New York: Norton, 1969; citations from Mentor/New American Library paperback edition, 1969). Questions about the book's reliability deepened after another former Kennedy aide, speechwriter Theodore Sorensen, acknowledged that, as an uncredited editor of the manuscript, he taken it upon himself to delete "explicit" references to the arrangement he and Soviet ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin reached on the evening of 27 October 1962 regarding the removal of U.S. Jupiter missiles from Turkey as part of the settlement of the crisis. Also problematic is the fact that Robert Kennedy's original diary, on which the book is based, has not been opened to researchers. Sorensen made his confession upon being challenged by Dobrynin at a January 1989 oral history conference on the crisis held in Moscow. See Barton J. Bernstein, "Reconsidering the Missile Crisis: Dealing with the Problems of the American Jupiters in Turkey," in James A. Nathan, ed., *The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited* (New York: St. Martin's 1992), 55-129, esp. 56-57, 94-96, 125-126 fn 183.

<sup>2</sup> The most detailed account of Robert F. Kennedy's part in the missile crisis, and his life generally, can be found in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *Robert F. Kennedy and His Times* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978; citations from Futura Publications paperback edition, 1979).

<sup>3</sup> See Jim Hershberg, "Anatomy of a Controversy: Anatoly F. Dobrynin's Meeting with Robert F. Kennedy, Saturday, 27 October 1962," *CWIHP*

*Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995), 75, 77-80.

<sup>4</sup> Dobrynin's cabled report (dated 24 October 1962) of the October 23 meeting with RFK can be found in *CWIHP Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995), 71-73; see also Robert F. Kennedy, *Thirteen Days*, 65-66, and Schlesinger, Jr., *Robert F. Kennedy and His Times*, 553-554, which cites RFK's unpublished memorandum of the meeting. Neither of those accounts note RFK's agitated state, which Dobrynin highlighted. Dobrynin's cable clearly served as a principal source for the account published in Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents* (New York: Times Books, 1995), 81-82. Dobrynin notes that he deliberately did not sugarcoat Robert Kennedy's critical comments about the Kremlin leadership in order to get across the seriousness of the situation.]

<sup>5</sup> See Dobrynin cable of 5 November 1962 in this *Bulletin*.

<sup>6</sup> See transcript of 16 October 1962 ExComm meeting, 6:30-7:55 p.m., John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, MA. The transcript quotes RFK as wondering "...whether there is some other way we can get involved in this through, uh, Guantanamo Bay, or something, er, or whether there's some ship that, you know, sink the Maine again or something."

<sup>7</sup> See Schlesinger, *Robert F. Kennedy and His Times*, 546, 548-49.

<sup>8</sup> Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, 82-83.

<sup>9</sup> See Dobrynin cable of 30 October 1962 printed in this *Bulletin*. Although Robert Kennedy's notes for this meeting and a memorandum to Rusk have been cited from the RFK papers by his biographer—see Schlesinger, Jr., *Robert F. Kennedy and His Times*, 563-564—State Department historians have been unable to locate a U.S. record of this meeting: see *U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States [FRUS], 1961-1963, Vol. VI: Kennedy-Khrushchev Exchanges* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), source note on p. 189. The letter Robert Kennedy handed back, from Khrushchev to John F. Kennedy dated 28 October 1962, was first published in the Spring 1992 issue of *Problems of Communism*, 60-62, and also appears in *FRUS, 1961-1963, Vol. VI*, pp. 189-190.

<sup>10</sup> See Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, pp. 90-91.

<sup>11</sup> Nixon had been defeated by his Democratic rival in the California gubernatorial elections, upon which he announced his retirement from politics. The relevant passage in Khrushchev's 12 November 1962 message read: "Now the elections in your country, Mr. President, are over. You made a statement that you were very pleased with the results of these elections. They, the elections,

indeed, were in your favor. The success does not upset us either—though that is of course your internal affair. You managed to pin your political rival, Mr. Nixon, to the mat. This did not draw tears from our eyes either...." See James A. Nathan, ed., *The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), 290.

<sup>12</sup> See Dobrynin cable of 12 November 1962, printed in this *Bulletin*, and also Schlesinger, *Robert F. Kennedy and His Times*, 567-568.

<sup>13</sup> See Mikoyan report on the Udall dinner, 30 November 1962, in this *Bulletin*; the American account of the party is from George Ball, *The Past Has Another Pattern: Memoirs* (New York: Norton, 1982), 308-309.

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# “Lessons” of the Cuban Missile Crisis for Warsaw Pact Nuclear Operations

by Mark Kramer

The role of the Warsaw Pact in the Cuban missile crisis was negligible. All evidence suggests that the Soviet Union neither consulted nor even informed its East European allies about the installation of medium-range and tactical nuclear missiles in Cuba before the deployment of the former was revealed by the U.S. government.<sup>1</sup> Nor did the Soviet leadership consult its Warsaw Pact allies about the removal of the missiles. Although the Pact declared a joint military alert on 23 October 1962 (the day after President John F. Kennedy’s televised revelation of the Soviet missile deployments), the alert had no more than a symbolic impact and was carried out solely at Moscow’s behest.<sup>2</sup> The joint alert was formally cancelled on 21 November 1962, the same day that the Soviet Union ended its own unilateral alert (and a day after the U.S. naval blockade of Cuba was lifted).<sup>3</sup> So peripheral was the alliance to the Soviet Union’s handling of the crisis that it was not until long after the matter had been resolved that the Soviet Prime Minister, Anastas Mikoyan, bothered to inform the East European governments about the Soviet Union’s motives for deploying and withdrawing the missiles.<sup>4</sup>

The marginal significance of the Warsaw Pact during the Cuban missile crisis hardly comes as a great surprise. In 1962 the Pact was still little more than a paper organization and had not yet acquired a meaningful role in Soviet military strategy.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, the crisis was far outside the European theater, and East European leaders had resisted Soviet efforts to extend the alliance’s purview beyond the continent. Despite fears that the showdown over Cuba might spark a NATO-Warsaw Pact confrontation in Berlin, the situation in Germany remained calm throughout the crisis.<sup>6</sup> Hence, the standoff in the Caribbean was a matter

for the Soviet Union to handle on its own, not a matter for the Warsaw Pact.

Despite the near-irrelevance of the Warsaw Pact during the crisis, the events of October 1962 did have important effects on the alliance, particularly on the nuclear command-and-control arrangements that were established in the mid-1960s. This article will draw on recent disclosures from the East German, Czechoslovak, Polish, and Hungarian archives to show how the Cuban missile crisis influenced Warsaw Pact nuclear operations. No definitive judgments about this matter are yet possible because the most crucial documents are all in Moscow, and the archival situation in Russia is still highly unsatisfactory.<sup>7</sup> Nevertheless, enough evidence has emerged from East-Central Europe to permit several tentative conclusions.

The article will begin by briefly reviewing the “lessons” that the Cuban missile crisis offered for Soviet nuclear weapons deployments abroad. It will then delineate the command-and-control arrangements that were set up in the mid-1960s for Warsaw Pact nuclear operations, and examine the East European states’ unsuccessful efforts to alter those arrangements. The article will conclude with some observations about the legacy of the Cuban missile crisis for Warsaw Pact nuclear operations, a legacy that endured until the Pact itself collapsed in 1990-91.

## “Lessons” from the Missile Crisis

Several features of the Cuban missile crisis were of direct relevance to Soviet nuclear deployments in Eastern Europe later on. The “lessons” that Soviet officials derived from the crisis were of course not the only factor (or even the most important factor) shaping the Warsaw Pact’s nuclear command structure, but they seem to have been of considerable influence, at least implicitly. Although Soviet leaders had

been concerned well before the Cuban missile crisis about the difficulty of retaining secure control over nuclear weapons and about the danger of unauthorized actions, the crisis put these risks into a whole new light.<sup>8</sup> By underscoring how easily control could be lost, the crisis inevitably bolstered Moscow’s determination to ensure strict centralized command over all nuclear operations, including nuclear operations conducted by the Warsaw Pact.

One of the most disconcerting lessons of the Cuban missile crisis from the Soviet perspective was the potential for nuclear weapons to be misused if the aims of local actors were not identical to Soviet goals. It is now known that at the height of the crisis Fidel Castro sent a top-secret cable to Moscow urging the Soviet Union to launch a nuclear strike against the United States if U.S. forces invaded Cuba.<sup>9</sup> Castro apparently had been led to believe that the Soviet Union would be willing to go to war—and risk its own destruction—in defense of Cuba. Nikita Khrushchev’s response to Castro’s plea indicates that the Soviet leader had no intention of ordering the use of nuclear weapons, regardless of what happened to Cuba.<sup>10</sup>

For Khrushchev, this episode was especially unnerving because he initially had given serious consideration to providing Castro with direct command over Soviet forces in Cuba, including the nuclear-capable Frog (“Luna”) missiles and Il-28 aircraft.<sup>11</sup> (Only the medium-range SS-4 and SS-5 missiles would have been left under Moscow’s command.) As it turned out, Khrushchev decided not to give Castro any direct jurisdiction over Soviet tactical nuclear forces; indeed, the draft treaty on military cooperation between the Soviet Union and Cuba, which was due to take effect once the presence of the Soviet missiles in Cuba was publicly announced by Moscow and Ha-

vana later that fall, would have left the “military units of the two states under the command of their respective governments.”<sup>12</sup> Even so, the Cuban leader’s message on 26 October still struck a raw nerve in Moscow.<sup>13</sup> It was a vivid reminder of the dangers that might have resulted if the Soviet Union had delegated any responsibility for nuclear operations.

A related lesson about the dangers posed by local actors pertained to the role of the commander of Soviet forces in Cuba, Army-General Issa Pliev, who was chosen for the post because of his long-standing and very close friendship with both Khrushchev and the Soviet Defense Minister, Marshal Rodion Malinovskii.<sup>14</sup> At no time during the crisis did Pliev have authority to order the use of either medium-range or tactical nuclear missiles, but it is now known that several weeks before the crisis—in the late summer of 1962—Malinovskii had considered the possibility of giving Pliev pre-delegated authority to order the use of tactical missiles against invading U.S. troops if Pliev’s lines of communication with Moscow were severed and all other means of defense against an invasion had proven insufficient. A written order to this effect was prepared on 8 September 1962, but in the end Malinovskii declined to sign it.<sup>15</sup> Thus, at the time of the crisis Pliev had no independent authority to order the use of nuclear weapons or even to order that nuclear warheads, which were stored separately from the missiles, be released for possible employment. The limitations on Pliev’s scope of action during the crisis were reinforced by two cables transmitted by Malinovskii on 22 and 25 October, which “categorically” prohibited any use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances without explicit authorization from Moscow.<sup>16</sup>

The strictures imposed by the Soviet leadership held up well during the crisis, as the procedural safeguards for nuclear operations proved sufficient to forestall any untoward incidents.<sup>17</sup> For the most part, Khrushchev’s and Malinovskii’s faith in Pliev was well-founded. Nevertheless, it is clear that Pliev wanted to ease some of the pro-

cedural restrictions—at least for tactical missiles—even after he received the two telegrams that “categorically” forbade him to order the issuance or use of nuclear weapons without express authorization. On 26 October he sent a cable to Moscow in which he apparently mentioned that Castro wanted him to prepare for a nuclear strike and that, as a result, he had decided it was time to move nuclear warheads closer to the missiles (though without actually issuing them to the missile units). Pliev then requested that his decision be approved and that he be given due authority to order the preparation of tactical missiles for launch if, as appeared imminent, U.S. troops invaded the island.<sup>18</sup> Soviet leaders immediately turned down both of his requests and reemphasized that no actions involving nuclear weapons were to be undertaken without direct authorization from Moscow.<sup>19</sup>

Still, the very fact that Pliev sought to have the restrictions lifted, and his seeming willingness to use tactical nuclear weapons if necessary, provided a sobering indication of the risks entailed in giving discretion to local commanders. The risks would have been especially acute in this instance because there were no technical safeguards on the nuclear weapons in Cuba to serve as a fallback in case Pliev (or someone else) attempted to circumvent the procedural safeguards.<sup>20</sup> This is not to say that it would have been easy for Pliev to evade the procedural limits—to do so he would have had to obtain cooperation from troops all along the chain of command—but there was no technical barrier *per se* to unauthorized actions.

Thus, one of the clear lessons of the crisis was the need not only to maintain stringent procedural safeguards for all Soviet nuclear forces, but also to equip those forces with elaborate technical devices that would prevent unauthorized or accidental launches. This applied above all to nuclear weapons deployed abroad, where the lines of communication were more vulnerable to being severed or disrupted.<sup>21</sup>

One further lesson from the Cuban missile crisis, which reinforced the perceived need for strict, centralized con-

trol over all nuclear operations, was the role that accidents played. The most conspicuous instance came on 27 October when an American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was shot down over Cuba.<sup>22</sup> The rules of engagement for Soviet troops in Cuba did not permit the downing of American planes except those carrying out an attack.<sup>23</sup> When the U-2 was shot down, no one in Moscow was quite sure what had happened—Khrushchev and most others mistakenly thought that Castro had ordered Soviet troops to fire at the plane—but everyone was certain that further incidents of this sort might cause the crisis to spin out of control.<sup>24</sup> The risks posed by accidents would have been especially great if the local commander (i.e., Pliev) had been given independent authority to order the use of nuclear weapons. After all, Pliev and other officers based in Cuba, whose lives were directly at risk during the crisis, were naturally inclined to overreact to unintended “provocations” from the opposing side. To the extent that such overreactions could not be avoided in future crises, it was essential that the consequences be minimized and that further escalation be prevented. Obviously, it would be vastly more difficult to regain any semblance of control if local actors “accidentally” resorted to the use of nuclear weapons.

Hence, the accidents that occurred during the Cuban missile crisis underscored the need for rigid safeguards, both procedural and technical, to preclude the use of Soviet nuclear weapons except in the most dire emergency. This lesson, like the others that Khrushchev and his colleagues derived from the crisis, survived the change of leadership in Moscow in October 1964. Although Leonid Brezhnev altered many aspects of Khrushchev’s military policies, he was just as determined as his predecessor to retain stringent political control over Soviet nuclear forces.

### Nuclear Operations and the Warsaw Pact

Nuclear weapons first became an issue for the Warsaw Pact in mid-1958

when, allegedly in response to deployments by NATO, Khrushchev warned that the Pact would be “compelled by force of circumstance to consider stationing [tactical nuclear] missiles in the German Democratic Republic, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.”<sup>25</sup> Shortly thereafter, the Czechoslovak, East German, and Polish armed forces began receiving nuclear-capable aircraft and surface-to-surface missiles from the Soviet Union.<sup>26</sup> The Bulgarian and Hungarian armies also soon obtained nuclear-capable aircraft and missiles from Moscow; and even the Romanian military was eventually supplied with nuclear-capable Frog-7 and Scud-B missiles. In all cases, the deployment of these delivery vehicles was well under way by the time of the Cuban missile crisis.

The wartime command-and-control arrangements for the new East European weapons were still in flux in 1962, and a variety of options were under consideration. One such option had been alluded to in 1959 by the East German government, which announced that it would “request its allies to place [nuclear] missile weapons at its disposal” if the West German government gained a role in NATO’s nuclear operations.<sup>27</sup> At the time, Soviet officials had reacted warily to this proposal, but had not dismissed it out of hand. Moscow’s stance changed, however, in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis. From then on, all wartime command-and-control arrangements for allied nuclear operations were made to fit a single pattern. The East European countries’ weapons were still officially described as components of the “Warsaw Pact’s joint nuclear forces” and were used for simulated nuclear strikes during Pact exercises, but all nuclear warheads for the delivery systems remained under exclusive Soviet control, and the delivery vehicles themselves would have come under direct Soviet command if they had ever been equipped with nuclear warheads during a crisis. Moreover, the thousands of tactical nuclear weapons deployed by Soviet forces on East European territory were not subject to any sort of “dual-key” arrangement along the lines that NATO established in the mid-

1960s. Whenever Warsaw Pact exercises included combat techniques for nuclear warfare (as they routinely did from early 1962 on), the decision on when to “go nuclear” was left entirely to the Soviet High Command and political leadership.<sup>28</sup> In every respect, then, the East European governments were denied any say in the use of the Pact’s “joint” nuclear arsenal.

The exclusivity of Soviet command was reinforced by secret agreements that the Soviet Union concluded in the early to mid-1960s with Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland regarding the storage of nuclear warheads in those countries. Although all the agreements were bilateral, they were described as coming “within the framework of the Warsaw Pact.” The first such agreements were signed with East Germany and Czechoslovakia before the Cuban missile crisis. The Soviet-East German agreements, signed at various intervals in the early 1960s, covered some 16 storage sites, all of which were controlled exclusively by special troops assigned to the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.<sup>29</sup> The East German authorities had no say at all in the location or maintenance of these facilities, not to mention the use of the munitions stored there.

Soviet agreements with Czechoslovakia were somewhat more complicated because no Soviet troops had been present on Czechoslovak territory since the end of 1945. Two preliminary agreements were signed in August 1961 and February 1962 entitling the Soviet Union to dispatch nuclear warheads immediately to Czechoslovakia in the event of an emergency.<sup>30</sup> After the Cuban missile crisis, those two agreements were supplanted by a much more far-reaching “Treaty Between the Governments of the USSR and CSSR on Measures to Increase the Combat Readiness of Missile Forces,” which was signed by Malinovskii and his Czechoslovak counterpart, Army-General Bohumir Lomsky, in December 1965.<sup>31</sup> The treaty provided for the permanent stationing of Soviet nuclear warheads at three sites in western Czechoslovakia.

This third agreement with Czecho-

slovakia was concluded just after the Soviet Union had worked out a similar arrangement with Hungary.<sup>32</sup> The Soviet-Hungarian agreement was signed by Brezhnev and the Hungarian leader, Janos Kadar, and was kept secret from almost all other Hungarian officials. Much the same was true of an agreement that the Soviet Union concluded with Poland in early 1967.<sup>33</sup> Only a few top Polish officials were permitted to find out about the document.

The Soviet agreements with all four countries covered nuclear warheads slated for use on delivery vehicles belonging to Soviet troops stationed in those countries. Some of the warheads were also intended for weapons deployed by the local armies, but in that case the delivery vehicles would have been transferred to direct Soviet command. Under the new agreements East European officials had no role in the use of the Pact’s “joint” nuclear arsenal, nor any control over the reinforced storage bunkers for nuclear warheads (or even the housing for elite units assigned to guard the bunkers). A senior East European military official later confirmed that “the procedures for the defense and protection of these special-purpose storage centers for nuclear warheads were such that no one from our side had permission to enter, and even Soviet officials who were not directly responsible for guarding and operating the buildings were not allowed in.”<sup>34</sup>

Thus, by the late 1960s the Soviet and East European governments had forged a nuclear command-and-control structure for the Warsaw Pact that gave exclusive say to the Soviet Union. Even before the Cuban missile crisis, Soviet leaders had been inclined to move in this direction, but the crisis greatly accelerated the trend and effectively ruled out anything less than complete control in Moscow.

### **Intra-Pact Debate on Nuclear “Sharing”**

The effects of the Cuban missile crisis could also be felt, if only implicitly, when the Soviet Union had to deal with complaints from its allies about the Warsaw Pact’s nuclear arrangements.

The lack of East European input proved unsatisfactory to several of the allied governments, who urged that they be given some kind of role in nuclear-release authorization. Their concerns were prompted in part by changes in Soviet military doctrine in the mid-1960s, which seemed to open the way for a nuclear or conventional war confined to Europe. Under Khrushchev, Soviet military doctrine had long been predicated on the assumption that any war in Europe would rapidly escalate to an all-out nuclear exchange between the superpowers; but by the time Khrushchev was ousted in October 1964, Soviet military theorists had already begun to imply that a European conflict need not escalate to the level of strategic nuclear war.<sup>35</sup> Under Brezhnev, Soviet military analyses of limited warfare in Europe, including the selective use of tactical nuclear weapons, grew far more explicit and elaborate.<sup>36</sup> Although this doctrinal shift made sense from the Soviet perspective, it stirred unease among East European leaders, who feared that their countries might be used as tactical nuclear battlegrounds without their having the slightest say in it.

The issue became a source of contention at the January 1965 meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee (PCC), where the assembled leaders discussed NATO's plans to create a Multi-Lateral Force (MLF) that would supposedly give West Germany access to nuclear-armed missiles. The PCC warned that if an MLF were formed and the West Germans were included, the Warsaw Pact would have to resort to "defensive measures and *corresponding steps*."<sup>37</sup> The nature of these "corresponding steps" was never specified, but Romanian and Czechoslovak officials at the meeting maintained that the obvious solution was for the Soviet Union to grant its Warsaw Pact allies a direct say in the use of nuclear weapons stationed on East European soil.<sup>38</sup> The Romanians were especially insistent on having responsibility shared for *all* Warsaw Pact nuclear systems, including those deployed with the various Groups of Soviet Forces. Brezhnev and his col-

leagues, however, were averse to any steps that would even marginally erode the Soviet Union's exclusive authority to order nuclear strikes, and it soon became clear during the meeting that Soviet views on such matters would prevail. As a result, the PCC communique simply called for both German states to forswear nuclear weapons, proposed the creation of a nuclear-free zone in central Europe, and advocated a freeze on all nuclear stockpiles.<sup>39</sup> The implication was that arrangements within the Warsaw Pact were best left unchanged.

That stance was reaffirmed over the next few months in a series of conspicuous Soviet declarations that "the Warsaw Pact is dependent on the *Soviet* strategic missile forces" and that "the security of all socialist countries is reliably guaranteed by the nuclear missile strength of *the Soviet Union*."<sup>40</sup> (Italics added by the author.) The same message was conveyed later in the year by the joint "October Storm" military exercises in East Germany, which featured simulated nuclear strikes authorized solely by the USSR.<sup>41</sup> In the meantime, the Soviet monopoly over allied nuclear weapons procedures was being reinforced by the series of agreements signed with Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland, as discussed above. The codification of exclusive Soviet control over nuclear weapons deployed in the other Warsaw Pact countries all but eliminated any basis for the East European governments to seek a role in the alliance's nuclear command structure.

Yet even after the Soviet Union tried to put the matter to rest, controversy persisted within the Warsaw Pact about the allocation of responsibility for tactical nuclear weapons. At a closed meeting of Pact leaders in East Berlin in February 1966, Romania again pressed for greater East European participation in all aspects of allied military planning, and was again rebuffed.<sup>42</sup> A few months later, the Czechoslovak Defense Minister, Army-General Bohumir Lomsky, publicly declared that the East European states should be given increased responsibility for the full range of issues confronting the Warsaw Pact.<sup>43</sup> That same

week, a detailed Romanian proposal for modifications to the alliance was leaked to the French Communist newspaper, *L'Humanité*; the document called for, among other things, an East European role in any decisions involving the potential use of nuclear weapons.<sup>44</sup> Subsequently, at the July 1966 session of the PCC in Bucharest, officials from Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary renewed their bid for "greater rights of co-determination in planning and implementing common coalition matters," including (by implication) the use of nuclear weapons.<sup>45</sup>

As on previous occasions, however, the Soviet Union resisted whatever pressure was exerted for the sharing of nuclear-release authority. In September 1966, a few months after the Bucharest conference, the Warsaw Pact conducted huge "Vltava" exercises, which included simulated nuclear strikes under exclusive Soviet control.<sup>46</sup> The same arrangement was preserved in all subsequent Pact maneuvers involving simulated nuclear exchanges. Thus, well before the signing of the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty put a symbolic end to the whole nuclear-sharing debate, the Soviet Union had firmly established its exclusive, centralized control over the Warsaw Pact's "joint" nuclear forces and operations.

### The Lessons of the Crisis and Allied Nuclear Arrangements

The legacy of the Cuban missile crisis helped ensure that the intra-Warsaw Pact debate in the mid-1960s did not bring about any change in the alliance's nuclear command-and-control structure. Had it not been for the dangers that were so clearly revealed by the events of October 1962, Soviet leaders might have been willing to consider an arrangement for the Warsaw Pact similar to the "dual-key" system that NATO adopted. When Operation "Anadyr" was first being planned in the late spring of 1962, Khrushchev had flirted with the idea of giving Fidel Castro broad command over Soviet tactical nuclear weapons in Cuba as well as over all non-nuclear forces on the island. Ultimately, Khrushchev decided

not to share or delegate any responsibility for the nuclear-capable weapons based in Cuba, but the very fact that the issue was considered at all suggests that if the Cuban missile crisis had not intervened, the Soviet Union might have been receptive to some form of nuclear “sharing” with its East European allies. Indeed, a “dual-key” arrangement for the Warsaw Pact, which would not have provided any independent authority to the East European countries, could easily have been justified as a response to NATO’s policy and as a useful means of strengthening allied cohesion. But after October 1962, when Soviet leaders evidently drew a number of lessons about the risks of even sharing, much less delegating, nuclear authority, the prospects of adopting a “dual-key” system for the Warsaw Pact essentially vanished.

Although Moscow’s willingness to share control over the Warsaw Pact’s “joint” nuclear arsenal would have been sharply constrained even before October 1962 by the lack of permissive-action links (PALs) and other use-denial mechanisms on Soviet nuclear weapons, that factor alone would not have been decisive if the Cuban missile crisis had not occurred. After all, when Soviet officials seriously contemplated allotting partial nuclear authority to Castro in 1962, that was long before Soviet tactical weapons were equipped with PALs. The physical separation of warheads from delivery vehicles, as had been planned for the missiles based in Cuba, was regarded at the time as a sufficient (if cumbersome) barrier against unauthorized actions. That approach had long been used for tactical weapons deployed by Soviet forces in Eastern Europe, and it would have been just as efficacious if a “dual-key” system had been adopted—that is, if the East European armies had been given control over the Pact’s nuclear-capable delivery vehicles. After the Cuban missile crisis, however, the option of relying solely on the physical separation of warheads and delivery vehicles was deemed inadequate. In the latter half of the 1960s, the Soviet Union began incorporating electronic use-denial features into its strategic missiles, and the

same was true of Soviet tactical weapons by the early to mid-1970s.<sup>47</sup> Concerns in Moscow about the physical security of nuclear weapons were hardly negligible before October 1962—in part because of the possibility that requisite procedures might not be followed—but it was not until after the Cuban missile crisis that Soviet leaders fully appreciated the magnitude of this risk.

The Cuban missile crisis also heightened Soviet concerns about the particular dangers posed by crises. To be sure, Soviet leaders were hardly complacent before October 1962 about the need to maintain tight political control over nuclear operations; indeed, the stringent centralization of nuclear command was a consistent theme in Soviet military planning.<sup>48</sup> Even so, it was not until after the Cuban missile crisis—and especially in light of the unexpected interventions by Fidel Castro—that this factor became a paramount reason to deny any share of nuclear-release authorization to the East European governments. Although East European officials could not have ordered the use of nuclear weapons on their own, they might have inadvertently (or deliberately) taken steps in a crisis that would have caused NATO governments to believe that a Warsaw Pact nuclear strike was forthcoming, regardless of what actual Soviet intentions were. That, in turn, might have triggered a preemptive nuclear attack by NATO. Only by excluding the East European states altogether from the nuclear-release process could the Soviet Union avoid the unintended escalation of a crisis.

The risks posed by a “dual-key” arrangement could have been mitigated if the Soviet Union had built in extra procedural and technical safeguards, but this in turn would have created operational problems for Soviet troops who might one day have been ordered to use the weapons. If a future conflict had become so dire that Soviet leaders had decided to authorize the employment of tactical nuclear weapons, they would have wanted their orders to be carried out as fast as possible, before the situation on the battlefield had changed.<sup>49</sup> By contrast, East European political and military officials might have been hesi-

tant about ordering the nuclear destruction of a site in Western Europe, not least because the launch of nuclear weapons against West European targets might well have provoked retaliatory strikes by NATO against East European sites. The problem would have been especially salient in the case of East German officials who would have been asked to go along with nuclear strikes against targets in West Germany. Thus, even though Soviet officials could have developed a hedge against the risks that emerged during the Cuban missile crisis, the safeguards needed for this purpose would have been extremely burdensome, depriving the Pact of the ability to respond in a timely manner. From the Soviet perspective, it made far more sense to circumvent the problem entirely by eschewing any form of shared authority.

It is ironic that the Cuban missile crisis, which barely involved the Warsaw Pact at all, would have had such an important long-term effect on the alliance. It is also ironic that the actions of a third party, Fidel Castro, posed one of the greatest dangers during an event that has traditionally been depicted as a bilateral U.S.-Soviet confrontation. Not only must the Cuban missile crisis be thought of as a “triangular” showdown; its repercussions can now be seen to have been at least as great for Soviet allies, notably Cuba and Eastern Europe, as for the Soviet Union itself.

<sup>1</sup> This statement is based on a perusal of documents from the East German, Czechoslovak, and Polish archives. See, e.g., “Odvolanie opatreni v zavislosti s usnesenim VKO UV KSC, 25.10.62 (Karibská krize),” 25 October 1962 (Top Secret), in Vojensky Historicky Archiv (VHA) Praha, Fond (F.) Ministerstvo Narodni Obrany (MNO) CSSR, 1962, Operacni sprava Generalniho stabu cs. armady (GS/OS), 8/25.

<sup>2</sup> “V shtabe Ob”edinennykh Vooruzhenykh Sil stran Varshavskogo Dogovora,” *Pravda* (Moscow), 23 October 1962, p. 1. For the effects of the alert from 27 October through 23 November, see the series of top-secret memoranda to the CPSU CC Presidium from Soviet Defense Minister Rodion Malinovskii and the Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Mikhail Zakharov, 5 November 1962, 17 November 1962, and 24 November 1962, in Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD), Moscow, F. 89, Opis’ (Op.) 28, Delo (D.) 14, Listy (LL.) 1–8.

<sup>3</sup> “V shtabe Ob”edinennykh vooruzhenykh sil stran Varshavskogo Dogovora,” *Krasnaya zvezda*

(Moscow), 22 November 1962, p. 1.

<sup>4</sup> See the account by the Hungarian charge d'affaires in Washington, D.C. in October 1962 (who later defected), Janos Radvanyi, *Hungary and the Superpowers: The 1956 Revolution and Realpolitik* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), p. 137. China, too, was not informed in advance about either the placement or the withdrawal of the missiles in Cuba. This point was noted by Chinese leaders during the bitter Sino-Soviet polemics in 1963. See, for example, the exchanges in "On the Statement of the Communist Party of the USA," *Peking Review* (Beijing), 15 March 1963, pp. 11-13; "Otkrytoe pis'mo Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza partiinym organizatsiyam i vsem kommunistam Sovetskogo Soyuza," *Pravda* (Moscow), 14 July 1963, p. 1; and "Statement by the Spokesman of the Chinese Government: A Comment on the Soviet Government's Statement of August 21," *Peking Review* (Beijing), 6 September 1963, pp. 7-11. See also the article by M.Y. Prozumenshikov in this issue of the *Bulletin*.

<sup>5</sup> "Razvitie voennogo iskusstva v usloviyakh vedeniya raketno-yadernoi voyny po sovremennym predstavleniyam," Report No. 24762s (TOP SECRET) from Col.-General P. Ivashutin, chief of the Soviet General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate, to Marshal M. V. Zakharov, head of the General Staff Military Academy, 28 August 1964, in Tsentral'nyi arkhiv Ministerstva oborony (TsAMO), Delo (D.) 158, esp. Listy (L.) 352-3, 411-2, 423, and 400. I am grateful to Matthew Evangelista for providing me with a copy of this document.

<sup>6</sup> This point is stressed in the top-secret cables adduced in note 2 *supra*.

<sup>7</sup> On the state of the Russian archives, see Mark Kramer, "Archival Research in Moscow: Progress and Pitfalls," *Cold War International History Bulletin*, No. 3 (Fall 1993), pp. 1, 14-37.

<sup>8</sup> "Razvitie voennogo iskusstva v usloviyakh vedeniya raketno-yadernoi voyny po sovremennym predstavleniyam," pp. 332-3.

<sup>9</sup> "Obmen poslaniiyami mezhdu N. S. Khrushchevym i F. Kastro v dni Karibskogo krizisa 1962 goda," *Vestnik Ministerstva inostrannykh del SSSR* (Moscow), No. 24 (31 December 1990), pp. 67-80, esp. pp. 71-73. This correspondence was first released in November 1990 by the Cuban, not Soviet, government. Fidel Castro was seeking to rebut a claim made in a portion of Nikita Khrushchev's memoirs that appeared in English for the first time in 1990. Khrushchev had recalled that Castro was urging him to launch a *preemptive* nuclear attack against the United States, whereas Castro insisted (correctly) that he had called for an all-out Soviet nuclear attack against the United States only if U.S. troops invaded Cuba. Soon after this correspondence was published in Spanish in the 23 November 1990 issue of the Havana daily *Granma* (and in English in the weekly edition of *Granma*), the Soviet government realized it had nothing to gain by keeping the Russian version secret any longer. Hence, the full correspondence was published in the Soviet Foreign Ministry's in-house journal, as cited here. [Ed. note: For Khrushchev's version, see *Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes*, trans. and ed. by Jerrold

L. Schecter with Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1990), pp. 170-83, esp. pp. 177, 183; for an English translation of the correspondence and an accompanying commentary in *Granma*, see Appendix 2 of James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch (with the assistance of David Lewis), *Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis, and the Soviet Collapse* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993), pp. 474-91; the key letter, of Castro to Khrushchev on 26 October 1962, is on pp. 481-2.]

<sup>10</sup> "Obmen poslaniiyami mezhdu N. S. Khrushchevym i F. Kastro v dni Karibskogo krizisa 1962 goda," pp. 73-5. This point was re-emphasized to Castro by Prime Minister Mikoyan during their conversations in November 1962. See "Zapis' besedy A. I. Mikoyana s prem'er-ministrom revolyutsionnogo pravitel'stva Kuby F. Kastro," 12 November 1962 (Top Secret) and "O besedakh A. I. Mikoyana s F. Kastro," 20 November 1962 (Top Secret), both published in *Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn'* (Moscow), Nos. 11-12 (November-December 1992), pp. 143-7 and 147-50, respectively. See esp. p. 149.

<sup>11</sup> It should be noted, however, that a decision to send 901-A4 nuclear warheads and 407-N6 bombs to Cuba for the Frogs and II-28s was not finalized until 8 September 1962, by which time Khrushchev may already have changed his mind about the command-and-control arrangements. See "Nachal'niku 12 glavnogo upravleniya Ministerstva oborony," 8 September 1962 (Top Secret), Memorandum from Defense Minister R. Malinovskii and Chief of the General Staff M. Zakharov, in TsAMO, "Dokumenty po meropriyatiyu 'Anadyr'," F. 16, Op. 3753. It is eminently possible that the nuclear-capable weapons would not have been equipped with nuclear warheads if they had been placed under Castro's command.

<sup>12</sup> "Dogovor mezhdu pravitel'stvom Respubliki Kuby i pravitel'stvom Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik o voennom sotrudnichestve i vzaimnoi oborone," undated, Article 10.

<sup>13</sup> See Nikita S. Khrushchev, *Vospominaniya* (Moscow: typescript, 1966-1970), Vol. IV, "Karibskii krizis," esp. p. 12. I am grateful to Khrushchev's son, Sergei, for providing me with a copy of the 3,600-page transcript of his father's memoirs. For an English translation of most of the account about the Cuban missile crisis, see *Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes*, trans. and ed. by Jerrold L. Schecter and Vyacheslav V. Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1990), pp. 170-83.

<sup>14</sup> Maj.-General (ret.) V. Makarevskii, "O prem'ere N. S. Khrushcheve, marshale G. K. Zhukove i generale I. A. Plieve," *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya* (Moscow), Nos. 8-9 (August-September 1994), p. 197. Makarevskii served for many years under Pliev's command. Pliev's close friendship with Khrushchev and Malinovskii is overlooked in the jaundiced assessment offered by General Anatolii Gribkov in *Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994), pp. 25-6.

<sup>15</sup> "Komanduyushchemu gruppoi sovetskikh voisk na o. Kuba," 8 September 1962 (Top Secret), in TsAMO, "Dokumenty po meropriyatiyu

'Anadyr'," GSU GSh, F. 16, Op. 3753; reproduced in *Operation ANADYR*, p. 183. For a discussion of this matter and relevant citations, see Mark Kramer, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Soviet Command Authority, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," *Cold War International History Bulletin*, No. 3 (Fall 1993), pp. 40-46, esp. 42-3, 46.

<sup>16</sup> "Trostnik — tovarishchu Pavlovu," No. 4/389 (Top Secret) from R. Malinovskii (Direktor), 22 October 1962, reproduced in *Operation ANADYR*, p. 181. See also Sergei Pavlenko, "Bezmyannye motostrelki otpravlyalis' na Kubu 'shtoyat' nasmert'," *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow), 29 December 1994, p. 4. For further discussion and relevant citations, see Kramer, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Soviet Command Authority, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," pp. 45-6.

<sup>17</sup> In early 1994, General Anatolii Gribkov claimed that Pliev not only wanted to move several nuclear warheads out of storage on 26 October 1962, but had actually issued orders to that effect without authorization from Moscow. See *Operation ANADYR*, p. 63. Gribkov also elaborated on this assertion in a seminar organized by the Cold War International History Project and held at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars on 5 April 1994. However, he produced no evidence to back up his assertion that warheads were actually moved out, and in a lengthy interview in Moscow on 29 September 1994 he said he could not be certain that Pliev had given such an order. Gribkov's initial claim had already been contradicted by the Soviet officer who was in charge of the "central nuclear base" (i.e., the storage site for all nuclear warheads) in Cuba during the crisis, Colonel Nikolai Beloborodov, who testified in late 1992 that "nuclear weapons could have been used only if the missile officers had received orders via their own chain-of-command from the General Staff, and only if we, the officers responsible for storing and operating warheads, had received our own special codes. At no point did I receive any signals to issue warheads for either the medium-range missiles or the tactical weapons." See Lieut.-Colonel Anatolii Dokuchaev, "100-dnevnyi yadernyi kruiz," *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow), 6 November 1992, p. 2. Beloborodov re-emphasized this point several times during an interview in Moscow on 28 September 1994: "No nuclear munitions of any type, whether for the medium-range or the tactical weapons, were ever moved (*byly dostavleny*) out of storage during the crisis. Nor could they have been moved without my knowledge." Beloborodov's account was endorsed by General Leonid Garbuz, the deputy commander of Soviet forces in Cuba in 1962, in an interview that same day in Moscow.

<sup>18</sup> The exact contents of Pliev's telegram on the 26th are unknown, but the numbering of telegrams that are available makes clear that he sent at least two that day, the second of which is the one in question. (The first of his telegrams on the 26th, which was declassified in October 1992, pertained only to air defense operations against possible U.S. air strikes.) The text of the Soviet leadership's response to Pliev's second cable is available (see next note), and, combined with retrospective comments by ex-Soviet officials, it suggests that Pliev referred to Castro's efforts and requested authority to move the warheads (though

not yet authority for actual use). For greater detail about this issue, see Mark Kramer, "The Cuban Missile Crisis and Nuclear Proliferation," *Security Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Autumn 1995), pp. 171-9.

<sup>19</sup> "Troshnik — tovarishchu Pavlovu," No. 76639 (Top Secret), 27 October 1962, reproduced in *Operation ANADYR*, p. 182. See also Kramer, "Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Soviet Command Authority, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," p. 46; and Pavlenko, "Bezmyannye motostrelki otpravlyalis' na Kubu," p. 4.

<sup>20</sup> Marshal V. F. Tolubko, "Glavnaya raketnaya sila strany," *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow), 19 November 1963, p. 1.

<sup>21</sup> See Khrushchev's comments on this point in *Vospominaniya*, Vol. IV, "Karibskii krizis," p. 18.

<sup>22</sup> Army-General Yu. P. Maksimov *et al.*, eds., *Raketnye voiska strategicheskogo naznacheniya: Voennno-istoricheskii trud* (Moscow: Nauka, 1992), pp. 109-10. Detailed first-hand accounts by high-ranking Soviet air defense personnel who took part in the shootdown are available in "Voina ozhidalas' s rassvetom," *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow), 13 May 1993, p. 2.

<sup>23</sup> The rules of engagement are spelled out briefly in the cable from Malinovskii to Pliev, as cited in Dokuchaev, "100-dnevnyi yadernyi krizis," p. 2. More elaborate rules are specified in documents now stored in the Russian General Staff archive; see "Dokumenty po meropriyatiyu 'Anadyr'," in GSh GSh, F. 16, Op. 3753, D. 1, Korebka 3573.

<sup>24</sup> Khrushchev, *Vospominaniya*, Vol. IV, "Karibskii krizis," pp. 17-8.

<sup>25</sup> "Vystuplenie glavy Sovetskoi delegatsii Predsedatelya Soveta Ministrov SSSR N. S. Khrushcheva na Soveshchaniy Politicheskogo Konsul'tativnogo Komiteta gosudarstv-uchastnikov Varshavskogo Dogovora 24 maya 1958 goda," *Pravda* (Moscow), 27 May 1958, p. 3.

<sup>26</sup> Thomas Wolfe, *Soviet Power in Europe, 1945-1970* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), pp. 150-1, 487-9.

<sup>27</sup> "Was ist der westdeutsche Militarismus?" *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), 26 January 1959, pp. 1-2. See also "Wortlaut der Rede Walter Ulbrichts auf dem XXI. Parteitag der KPdSU," *Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), 30 January 1959, p. 1.

<sup>28</sup> Der Bundesminister der Verteidigung, *Militarische Planungen des Warschauer Paktes in Zentraleuropa: Eine Studie*, February 1992, p. 5. [Ed. note: For an English translation of the report, see Mark Kramer, trans. and annot., "Warsaw Pact Military Planning in Central Europe: Revelations From the East German Archives," *CWIHP Bulletin* 2 (Fall 1992), pp. 1, 13-19.]

<sup>29</sup> Militarisches Zwischenarchiv (Potsdam), VA-Strausberg/29555/Box 155.

<sup>30</sup> "Dohoda CSSR-ZSSR o vzajemnykh dodavkakh vyzbroje a voj. tekhniki v rr. 1963-1965," in VHA Praha, F. Sekretariat MNO, 1960-1962, OS/GS, 26/2.

<sup>31</sup> "Dogovor mezhdu pravitel'stvami SSSR i ChSSR o merakh povysheniya boegotovnosti raketnykh voisk," 15 December 1965, in VHA Praha, F. Sekretariat MNO, 1960-1962, OS/GS, 2/16.

<sup>32</sup> See the reports on "Hungary: USSR Nuclear Weapons Formerly Stored in Country," translated in U.S. Joint Publications Research Service,

*Nuclear Proliferation*, JPRS-TND-91-007, 20 May 1991, pp. 14-16.

<sup>33</sup> "O przedswieciu majacym na celu podwyzszenie gotowosci bojowej wojska," 25 February 1967, in Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe, Paczka 6, Tom 234.

<sup>34</sup> Interview with chief of the Czechoslovak General Staff, Major-General Karel Pezl, in Jan Bauer, "Jaderna munice: Asi tady byla," *Ceske a moravskoslezske zemedelske noviny* (Prague), 4 July 1991, p. 1.

<sup>35</sup> See, e.g., Col.-General I. Glebov, "Razvitie operativnogo iskusstva," *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow), 2 April 1964, pp. 2-3; and Col.-General S. M. Shtemenko, "Sukhoputnye voiska v sovremennoi voine i ikh boevaya podgotovka," *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow), 3 January 1963, pp. 2-3. See also Marshal V. D. Sokolovskii *et al.*, *Voennaya strategiya*, 2nd ed. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1963), pp. 373-4. This theme is also evident in "Razvitie voennogo iskusstva v usloviyakh vedeniya raketno-yadernoi voyny po sovremennym predstavleniyam," *passim*.

<sup>36</sup> See, e.g., Col.-General N. Lomov, "Vliyaniye Sovetskoi voennoi doktriny na razvitie voennogo iskusstva," *Kommunist vooruzhenykh sil* (Moscow), No. 21 (November 1965), pp. 16-24.

<sup>37</sup> Cited in "Rech' tovarishcha L. I. Brezhneva," *Pravda* (Moscow), 25 September 1965, p. 2 (emphasis added).

<sup>38</sup> "Stenografische Niederschrift der Konferenz der kommunistischen und Arbeiterparteien der Staaten des Warschauer Vertrages," January 1965 (Top Secret), in Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMDB), Zentrales Parteiarchiv (ZPA) der SED, J IV, 2/202/130.

<sup>39</sup> "O zasedanii Politicheskogo konsul'tativnogo komiteta gosudarstv-uchastnikov Varshavskogo Dogovora o druzhbe, sotrudnichestve i vzaimnoi pomoshchi," *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow), 21 January 1965, p. 1. See also Colonel V. F. Samoilenko, *Osnova boevogo soyuza: Internatsionalizm kak faktor oboronnoi moshchi sotsialisticheskogo sodruzhestva* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1981), p. 259.

<sup>40</sup> See, e.g., Marshal R. Ya. Malinovskii, "Moguchii strazh bezopasnosti narodov," *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow), 13 May 1965, p. 3; Marshal A. A. Grechko, "Nadezhnyi shchit mira i bezopasnosti narodov," *Kommunist vooruzhenykh sil* (Moscow), No. 9 (May 1965), p. 13; and Marshal A. A. Grechko, "Boevoi soyuz bratskikh narodov," *Pravda* (Moscow), 13 May 1965, p. 1.

<sup>41</sup> "Informacna sprava o vysledkach cviceniya 'Oktobrova Burka'," 16-22 October 1965 (Top Secret), in VHA Praha, F. Hlavna Politicka Sprava (HPS), 1965, HPS 1/2.

<sup>42</sup> "Konferenz der kommunistischen und Arbeiterparteien der Staaten des Warschauer Vertrages: Stenografische Niederschrift," February 1966 (Top Secret), in SAPMDB, ZPA, IV 27/208/85.

<sup>43</sup> "Oplot mira i sotsializma," *Krasnaya zvezda* (Moscow), 14 May 1966, p. 5.

<sup>44</sup> "La Roumanie n'a formule aucune demande en ce qui concerne le Pacte de Varsovie: Mise au Point du ministere des Affaires etrangeres a Bucarest," *L'Humanite* (Paris), 19 May 1966, p. 3.

<sup>45</sup> "Stenografische Niederschrift des Treffens fuhrender Repräsentanten der Bruderstaaten des Warschauer Vertrages," July 1966 (Top Secret), in SAPMDB, ZPA, IV 2/202/431.

<sup>46</sup> "Kompleksny material: Cvicenie 'VLTAVA'," in VHA Praha, F. HPS, 1966, HPS 30/2; and "Vyhodnotenie cviceniya 'VLTAVA,'" VHA Praha, F. Sekretariat MNO, 1966, OS/GS, 4/2.

<sup>47</sup> Maksimov *et al.*, eds., *Raketnye voiska strategicheskogo naznacheniya*, pp. 125-126.

<sup>48</sup> See, e.g., *ibid.*, pp. 125-6. See also "Razvitie voennogo iskusstva v usloviyakh vedeniya raketno-yadernoi voyny po sovremennym predstavleniyam," pp. 325-34.

<sup>49</sup> See *ibid.*, pp. 330-36 and *passim*.

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## *New Evidence on 1953, 1956 Crises:* **CONFERENCES IN BUDAPEST, POTSDAM SPOTLIGHT COLD WAR FLASHPOINTS**

In the autumn of 1996, the Cold War International History Project and the National Security Archive, along with European partner institutions, co-sponsored and jointly organized two major international scholarly conferences at which scholars presented and debated new evidence from both Eastern and Western archives and sources concerning two major Cold War episodes in Europe: the 1953 East German Uprising (and the post-Stalin succession struggle in Moscow), and the 1956 Polish and Hungarian crises.

The conference, "Hungary and the World, 1956: The New Archival Evidence," took place in Budapest on 26-

29 September 1996, and was hosted by the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. The international symposium on "The Crisis Year 1953 and The Cold War in Europe" convened in Potsdam, Germany, on 10-12 November 1996, and was hosted by the Center for Contemporary History Research (Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung).

Both conferences grew out of the "Cold War Flashpoints" Project of the National Security Archive, a non-governmental research institute and declassified documents repository based at George Washington University. Previous activities of the Project, undertaken by the Archive in close cooperation with CWIHP and Czech and Polish partners, included the holding of a major international conference in Prague in April 1994 on new evidence on the 1968 Prague Spring and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and a scholarly workshop in Warsaw in August 1995 on new sources on the 1980-81 Polish Crisis, as well as meetings with scholars in Bucharest and Sofia in October 1996 on possibilities for collaborative research in Romanian and Bulgarian archives on Cold War topics.

Future meetings are also scheduled. In June 1997, the "Flashpoints" Project plans to hold an oral history conference in Poland on the 1980-81 crisis, gathering key participants, scholars, and sources from Poland, Russia, the United States, and elsewhere, and the Project is also working with various scholars, archives, and scholarly institutions and projects toward the holding of a series of meetings to present new evidence on the End of the Cold War, including the 1989 revolutions in Europe, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the transfor-

mation in U.S.-Soviet relations.

The Budapest and Potsdam conferences, like others in the "Flashpoints" series, offered a venue for dozens of American, Russian, Central-East European, and other scholars to present new evidence from Western and Eastern archives, and in some cases for former participants in the events to recall their experiences. Key topics covered at Budapest included the Polish upheavals, which immediately preceded the Hungary invasion; Soviet policy toward

### ***THE SOVIET UNION AND THE HUNGARIAN CRISIS OF 1956: THE DOCUMENTARY ANTHOLOGY***

A group of Russian and Hungarian scholars and archivists has cooperated to prepare for publication a Russian-language anthology of archival documents—many of them never previously published—on Soviet policy and the events in Hungary in 1956. *The Soviet Union and the Hungarian Crisis of 1956: The Documentary Collection* is scheduled for publication in 1997. Among the Russian academic and archival institutions collaborating to produce the volume are the Institute for Slavonic and Balkan Studies (Russian Academy of Sciences) and the Institute of History (Russian Academy of Sciences); the Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation; the Archive of the President, Russian Federation; and the Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation. Co-editors include: V.Y. Afiani, B. Zhelizki, T. Islamov, S. Melchin, I. Morozov, V. Sereda, A. Stykalin, I. Vash, I. Vida, E. Dorken, T. Haidu. Financial support for the publication was provided by the National Security Archive and the Cold War International History Project and East European Program of the Woodrow Wilson Center. For ordering and publication information, please contact the editors.

### **MORE ON THE MALIN NOTES**

The publication in this issue of the *CWIHP Bulletin* of the full translation of the Malin Notes on the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises marks their first complete appearance in English. However, versions of them were published in 1996 in Russian and Hungarian by the Russian scholar Vyacheslav Sereda and the Hungarian scholar Janos M. Rainer: in a two-part series presented by Vyacheslav Sereda in Nos. 2 and 3 (1996) of the Russian journal *Istoricheski Arkhiv* [Historical Archives], and in a book entitled *Dontes a Kremlben, 1956: A szovjet partelnokseg vitai Magyarorszagrol* [Crisis in the Kremlin, 1956: The Debates of the Soviet Party Presidium on Hungary] (Budapest: 1956-os Intezet, 1996), published by the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian revolution. In addition, two important analyses of the notes have appeared in English: Janos M. Rainer's two-part series, "The Road to Budapest, 1956: New Documentation of the Kremlin's Decision To Intervene," in *The Hungarian Quarterly* 37:142 (Summer 1996), 24-41, and 37:143 (Autumn 1996), 16-31; and Mark Kramer, "New Light Shed on 1956 Soviet Decision to Invade Hungary," *Transition* 2:23 (15 November 1996), 35-40.

both crises; the impact of the invasion on Eastern Europe; the Western response; China's shifting position on the crises; and Radio Free Europe's controversial role. A number of participants in the uprising itself spoke either as panelists or as members of the audience, and several witnesses to the revolution led a "walking tour of revolutionary Budapest" to scenes of the street battles 40 years earlier.

Among the most noteworthy findings of the Hungary Conference were presentations and analyses of notes from Soviet Presidium meetings in fall 1956 taken by V.N. Malin, head of the CPSU General Department. These notes constitute the only known contemporaneous record of the key sessions of late October and early November at which Kremlin leaders went back and forth over whether to pull out from Hungary or reintroduce new troops. A comprehensive analysis of the significance of the Malin Notes and other recent evidence on Soviet policy toward the 1956 Poland and Hungary crises, along with a translation and annotation of the Malin Notes themselves, has been prepared for the *Bulletin* by Mark

Kramer of Harvard University; it appears immediately following this article.

In Potsdam, sessions examined the origins and consequences of the June 1953 East German uprising; the "Beria Affair" and post-Stalin succession struggle in Moscow; Soviet policy toward Germany before and after June 17; Stalin's death and East Central Europe; and the West's position and actions in 1953. Both conferences ended with roundtables on the long-term significance of the abortive revolts of 1953 and 1956, particularly for the 1989 collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and for contemporary Germany and Hungary.

Both conferences generated considerable public as well as scholarly attention. As might be expected, local interest in the Budapest gathering, coming on the eve of the revolution's 40th anniversary, was intense. The main hall of the elegant Academy of Sciences building on the banks of the Danube was filled on the conference's opening day, and Hungarian media coverage throughout was extensive. Overseas interest was evidenced by three articles

and an editorial in *The New York Times*, as well as pieces in *The Washington Post* and numerous European publications. Timothy Garton Ash, who delivered the concluding remarks for the conference, wrote up his reflections in the 14 November 1996 edition of *The New York Review of Books*.

The Potsdam Conference, for its part, resulted in an Associated Press report, carried in many major newspapers, on newly declassified U.S. documents obtained by the National Security Archive on the Eisenhower Administration's reactions to the events, including a 29 June 1953 report approved by the National Security Council (NSC 158) which, among other actions, declared that one official policy objective was to "Encourage elimination of key puppet officials."

CWIHP is pleased to note the efforts of major contributors to the success of both conferences: Christian F. Ostermann, a scholar based at the National Security Archive and the new Associate Director of CWIHP; the Director of the 1956 Institute, Dr. Gyorgy Litvan, and its Research Director, Csaba Bekes; at the ZZF in Potsdam, Director Prof. Dr. Christoph Klessman, and Anke Wappler; at the National Security Archive, Malcolm Byrne, Pete Voth, and Vlad Zubok; and at the Wilson Center, Jim Hershberg and Michele Carus-Christian. Many scholars assisted in obtaining key documents and in other ways for the conferences. Principal financial supporters for both meetings included the Open Society Institute; the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation; and the Smith Richardson Foundation. Additional support for the Budapest meeting came from the Committee for Research on Contemporary History, Hungarian Academy of Sciences; Europa Institute, Institute of History, Central European University, and Open Society Archives, all in Budapest; and the Stalin Era Research and Archives Project, University of Toronto; additional backers of the Potsdam symposium included the Stiftung Volkswagenwerk (Hannover) and the Bradenburg Center for Political Education (Potsdam).

Since one key purpose of the "Cold

#### OSTERMANN WINS GERMAN STUDIES AWARD FOR ARTICLE ON 1953 EAST GERMAN UPRISING

The Cold War International History Project is pleased to note that Christian F. Ostermann, a doctoral candidate at Hamburg University currently based at the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C. (and CWIHP's new Associate Director), has received an award from the German Studies Association for best article published in *German Studies Review* in History and the Social Sciences for the period 1994-1996. Drawing on newly-opened East German sources as well as declassified U.S. government documents obtained by the author through the Freedom of Information Act, the article—"Keeping the Pot Simmering": The United States and the East German Uprising of 1953," which appeared in *German Studies Review*, vol. XIX, no. 1, February 1996, pp. 61-89—was originally published, in slightly different form, in December 1994 as Working Paper No. 11 of the Cold War International History Project; the author had presented an earlier draft at CWIHP's conference on "New Evidence on the Cold War in Germany" at the University of Essen in June 1994.

The award is supported by the German Academic Exchange Service (Deutscher Akademischer Austausch Dienst). The award citation notes that Ostermann's article "contributes significantly to our understanding of a crucial moment in the Cold War. On the basis of thorough research in recently opened archival sources of the former German Democratic Republic and the United States, Ostermann subjects conventional ideological interpretations to sustained and critical scrutiny. His analysis of complicated episodes, for example, the American food program, sheds light on the development of Cold War policies as a whole. Ostermann's clear prose, deliberate form of expression, and balanced judgments on highly controversial issues are qualities that make this an article of outstanding scholarly merit."

War Flashpoints" Project is to gather new archival materials from all sides of the events, the conference organizers prepared "briefing books" of recently declassified U.S., Russian, and European documents for both conferences: Christian F. Ostermann, ed., *The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and the 17 June 1953 Uprising in East Germany: The Hidden History—Declassified Documents from U.S., Russian, and Other European Archives* (Washington, D.C.: CWIHP/National Security Archive); and Csaba Bekes, Malcolm Byrne, and Christian F. Ostermann, ed. and comp., *The Hidden History of Hungary 1956: A Compendium of Declassified Documents* (Washington, D.C.:

National Security Archive, 1996).

These briefing books, in turn, accelerated the process toward the ultimate preparation and publication by the conference organizers of edited volumes of papers and documents emerging from both the Potsdam and Budapest meetings. In addition, the Cold War International History Project, which has previously published East-bloc documents on all of the major "Flashpoint" crises, plans to publish selected materials from both the Potsdam and Budapest gatherings in forthcoming *Bulletins*, Working Papers, and in electronic form.

For more information on the Budapest or Potsdam meetings, contact Malcolm Byrne or Christian F.

Ostermann at the National Security Archive in Washington, D.C., tel.: (202) 994-7000, fax: (202) 994-7005, or by e-mail: nsarchive@gwis2.circ.gwu.edu; on the Budapest Conference, information can also be obtained from Csaba Bekes at the 1956 Institute in Budapest: (36-1) 322-5228; e-mail: h11339bek@ella.hu. More information on the programs and papers for the Budapest and Potsdam meetings is also available via the National Security Archive/CWIHP home page on the World Wide Web at <http://www.seas.gwu.edu/nsarchive>

—Malcolm Byrne, Jim Hershberg, and Christian F. Ostermann

### **TOGLIATTI ON NAGY, 30 OCTOBER 1956: MISSING CABLE FOUND**

In the midst of the deliberations on 31 October 1956 leading to a decision to invade Hungary to crush the revolution and the government led by Imre Nagy, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union Central Committee (CPSU CC) Presidium approved a secret message to Italian Communist Party Secretary Palmiro Togliatti. Clearly responding to an earlier communication, the Soviet leadership expressed agreement with Togliatti that events in Hungary was heading in a "reactionary" direction and that Imre Nagy was "occupying a two-faced position" and "falling more and more under the influence of the reactionary forces. This cable, a revealing indication of the hardening stand being taken inside the Soviet leadership at this critical juncture, was declassified by Russian authorities in 1992 in conjunction with President Yeltsin's visit to Hungary and presentation of a collection of documents on the 1956 events; an English translation of the message to Togliatti appeared in the *CWIHP Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995), p. 33.

However, only recently has the earlier communication from the Italian CP leader to the Soviets giving the negative assessment of Nagy emerged; although scholars had been unable to locate it in the archives of the Italian Communist Party, a copy of Togliatti's message, dated 30 October 1956, was located in the Archive

of the President of the Russian Federation (APRF) in Moscow. It was first published in the Italian newspaper *La Stampa* on 11 September 1996, and presented by Prof. Federico Argentieri (Centro Studi di Politica Internazionale Studi sull'Europa Centro-Orientale, Rome) to the conference on "Hungary and the World, 1956" in Budapest, 26-29 September 1996, organized by the National Security Archive, the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, and the Cold War International History Project.

Togliatti's cable, translated from the Italian original by Doc and Claudia Rossi, appears below:

Hungarian events have created a heavy situation inside the Italian labor movement, and in our Party, too.

The gap between [Secretary General of the Italian Socialist Party Pietro] Nenni and ourselves that seemed to be closing after our initiatives is now rudely and suddenly acute. Nenni's position on Polish events coincides with that of the Social Democrats. In our Party, one can see two polarized and inappropriate positions. On one extreme there are those who declare that the responsibility for what happened in Hungary is due to the abandoning of Stalinist methodology. At the other extreme are those groups who are accusing the Party leadership of not taking a position in favour of the insurrection in Budapest and who claim that the insurrection was justly motivated and should

have been fully supported. These groups firmly insist that the entire leadership of our Party be replaced, and they believe [Italian trade union leader Giuseppe] Di Vittorio should become the new Party leader. They are based on a declaration of Di Vittorio that did not correspond to the Party line and was not approved by us. We are going to fight against these two opposing positions and the Party will not give up the battle.

Although I assure you that Hungarian events have developed in a way that render our clarifying action in the Party very difficult, it also makes it difficult to obtain consensus in favour of the leadership. When we defined the revolt as counter-revolutionary, we had to face the fact that our position was different from that of the Hungarian Party and of the Hungarian Government, and now it is the same Hungarian Government that is celebrating the insurrection. I think this is wrong. My opinion is that the Hungarian Government—whether Imre Nagy remains its leader or not—is going irreversibly in a reactionary direction. I would like to know if you are of the same opinion or if you are more optimistic. I would like to add that among the leaders of our Party there are worries that Polish and Hungarian events could damage the unity of the leadership of your Party Presidium, as was defined by the 20th [CPSU] Congress.

We are all thinking if this occurs, the consequences could be very serious for the entire movement.

# *SPECIAL FEATURE:*

## NEW EVIDENCE ON SOVIET DECISION-MAKING AND THE 1956 POLISH AND HUNGARIAN CRISES

*by Mark Kramer*

The overlapping crises in Hungary and Poland in the autumn of 1956 posed a severe challenge for the leaders of the Soviet Communist Party (CPSU). After a tense standoff with Poland, the CPSU Presidium (as the Politburo was then called) decided to refrain from military intervention and to seek a political compromise. The crisis in Hungary was far less easily defused. For a brief moment it appeared that Hungary might be able to break away from the Communist bloc, but the Soviet Army put an end to all such hopes. Soviet troops crushed the Hungarian revolution, and a degree of order returned to the Soviet camp.

Newly released documents from Russia and Eastern Europe shed valuable light on the events of 1956, permitting a much clearer and more nuanced understanding of Soviet reactions. This article will begin by discussing the way official versions of the 1956 invasion changed—and formerly secret documents became available—during the late Soviet period and after the Soviet Union disintegrated. It will then highlight some of the most important findings from new archival sources and memoirs. The article relies especially heavily on the so-called Malin notes, which are provided in annotated translation below, and on new materials from Eastern Europe. Both the article and the documents will show that far-reaching modifications are needed in existing Western accounts of the 1956 crises.

### OFFICIAL REASSESSMENTS BEFORE AND AFTER 1991

The advent of glasnost and “new

political thinking” in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev led to sweeping reassessments of postwar Soviet ties with Eastern Europe. As early as 1987, an unofficial reappraisal began in Moscow of the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. Initially, these reassessments of the 1968 crisis did not have Gorbachev’s overt endorsement, but the process gained an official stamp in late 1989 once Communism had dissolved in Eastern Europe. Soon after the “velvet revolution” engulfed Czechoslovakia in November 1989, the five states that took part in the 1968 invasion—the Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary, East Germany, and Bulgaria—issued a collective statement denouncing the invasion and repudiating the Brezhnev Doctrine. In addition, the Soviet Union released its own declaration of regret over the “erroneous” decision to intervene in 1968.<sup>1</sup>

Curiously, though, Gorbachev was much less willing to proceed with a reevaluation of the Soviet invasion of Hungary in November 1956. Not until October 1991, two months after the aborted coup in Moscow had severely weakened the Soviet regime, did Gorbachev finally provide an official apology for the 1956 invasion.<sup>2</sup> Until that time, official judgments about Soviet actions in 1956 had been left primarily to Soviet military officers, who routinely glorified the invasion of Hungary as an example of “the international defense of socialist gains” and of “transforming socialist internationalism into action.”<sup>3</sup> A senior officer on the Soviet General Staff argued in 1987 that the “suppression of counterrevolutionary rebellion,” as in Hungary in 1956, should still be among the chief military

missions of the Warsaw Pact.<sup>4</sup> The same theme was expressed the following year in a Soviet book about the “Military Policy of the CPSU,” which received admiring reviews in Soviet military journals and newspapers.<sup>5</sup>

When political reforms began to sweep through Hungary and Poland in late 1988 and 1989, signs of unease soon cropped up in Soviet military writings. In September 1989, a prominent article by one of the top Soviet commanders in Hungary in October-November 1956, Army-General Pyotr Lashchenko, offered extravagant praise for the Soviet invasion.<sup>6</sup> Very few articles devoted solely to the Hungarian crisis had ever appeared in Soviet military journals (particularly after “normalization” began in Hungary in the late 1950s), so there was no doubt that the publication of Lashchenko’s analysis had been carefully timed. Several months before the article went to press, Imre Pozsgay and other top officials in the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party had publicly declared that the events of 1956 were a “popular uprising against an oligarchical regime that was humiliating the nation.”<sup>7</sup> By contrast, Lashchenko still insisted that the events of 1956 were merely a “counterrevolutionary rebellion that was actively supported by the most reactionary forces of international imperialism.” This harsh assessment was clearly intended to help prevent the political changes in Hungary from endangering the *raison d’être* of Soviet military deployments in Eastern Europe.

Unease within the Soviet military regarding the 1956 invasion continued even after the upheavals of late 1989. In contrast to the official Soviet state-

ment condemning the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, no such statement was issued about the intervention in Hungary. Although numerous Soviet officials, such as deputy foreign minister Anatolii Kovalev, later denounced the invasion of Hungary, the Soviet High Command apparently blocked efforts to release a statement about 1956 comparable to the one about 1968. Moreover, in August 1990, the same journal that had published Lashchenko's 1989 article featured another essay, by a Hungarian lieutenant-colonel, that was even more scathing in its assessment of the "counterrevolution" of 1956; the journal's editors highly recommended the article to their readers. Although senior officials on the CPSU Central Committee staff were secretly ordered in November 1990 to begin studying archival materials from 1956 and preparing an assessment for the CPSU leadership, this effort was intended mainly to find ways of deflecting pressure from the Hungarian government, and no public Soviet statements resulted.<sup>8</sup> Even when the last Soviet troops were pulled out of Hungary in June 1991, Gorbachev still declined to condemn the 1956 intervention.

The Soviet leader's belated apology in October 1991 was soon overtaken by the collapse of the Soviet regime. The new government in Russia under President Boris Yeltsin proved far more willing to reevaluate and condemn controversial episodes in Soviet relations with Eastern Europe. As a result, a large quantity of Soviet documentation about the 1956 Hungarian crisis and Moscow's response has recently become available. Yeltsin turned over a preliminary collection of declassified materials to the Hungarian government in November 1992, which are now stored at the Institute for the Study of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution in Budapest. These documents were all published in Hungarian translation in 1993 as a two-volume collection.<sup>9</sup> A few of the items had appeared earlier in the original Russian,<sup>10</sup> and in 1993 most of the others were published in Russian with detailed annotations in a three-part series.<sup>11</sup> Subsequently, a few additional Soviet documents were re-

leased, most of which are now available in Fond 89 (the declassified collection) of the Center for Storage of Contemporary Documentation in Moscow, the former archive of the CPSU Central Committee. As valuable as these initial items were, they provided only a few tantalizing details about Soviet decision-making in 1956. Some aspects of Soviet decision-making had been revealed in memoirs by Nikita Khrushchev and other former officials, but in the absence of primary documentation it was difficult to know how accurate the memoirs were.<sup>12</sup>

Fortunately, that gap in the historical record has now been at least partly closed. In mid-1995, the Russian archival service finally released the "Malin notes" from the October-November 1956 crisis. Verbatim transcripts of CPSU Presidium meetings were not kept in the 1950s, but Vladimir Malin, the head of the CPSU CC General Department during the entire Khrushchev period, took extensive notes of all Presidium meetings. His handwritten notes, stored in the former

Politburo archive (which is now under Yeltsin's direct control), were all supposed to be declassified by the end of 1996, but regrettably only the ones pertaining to the Hungarian and Polish crises of 1956 have been released so far.<sup>13</sup> The initial batch of Malin notes were provided to a Russian historian, Vyacheslav Sereda, and to researchers at the 1956 Institute in Budapest, who had exclusive access to the materials until the spring of 1996, when the full set were published in Hungarian translation.<sup>14</sup> Since then, other scholars—both Russians and foreigners—have been permitted to study the original documents. Malin's notes about the Hungarian crisis were published in Russian in the summer and fall of 1996, and the notes about the October 1956 crisis in Poland were published in Moscow at the end of 1996.<sup>15</sup> (The portions about Poland had already appeared in the Hungarian translation.)

For an understanding of Soviet policy during the crises in Hungary and Poland, the Malin notes are by far the most valuable items that have surfaced. Although other important documents about the events of 1956 may eventually be released from the Russian Presidential Archive, the former KGB archives, and the Russian military archives, the Malin notes are enough to shed extremely interesting light on Soviet decision-making during the crisis. Moreover, the Malin notes can be supplemented with a vast number of recently declassified materials from the East European archives as well as new first-hand accounts. Of the East European documents, an especially noteworthy item is the handwritten Czech notes from a Soviet Presidium meeting on 24 October 1956, as the crisis in Hungary was getting under way.<sup>16</sup> Of the new memoirs, perhaps the most valuable is an account published in serial form in late 1993 and early 1994 by a high-ranking Soviet military officer, Evgenii Malashenko, who helped command the operation in Hungary in 1956.<sup>17</sup> Together, all these materials permit a much better understanding of why and how the Soviet Union responded with military force in one case but not in the other.

#### THE MALIN NOTES: AN ELECTRONIC SYMPOSIUM

Readers interested in further analyses and commentary on the notes by V. Malin on Kremlin decision-making on the 1956 Polish and Hungarian crises can find them on the Internet: the Cold War International History Project and the National Security Archive, U.S. co-sponsors and organizers of the September 1996 Budapest Conference on "Hungary and the World, 1956: The New Archival Evidence," plan to present commentaries on the significance of the Malin Notes, as well as other materials on the 1956 events, via CWIHP's website on the Archive's home page on the World Wide Web: <http://www.nsarchive.com>.

Commentators will include Russian and Hungarian scholars such as Vladislav Zubok, Janos Rainer, Vyacheslav Sereda, and Vitaly Afiani. Articles on China's position on the 1956 crises in Eastern Europe by Chen Jian and L.W. Gluchowski will also be available.

## NEW FINDINGS

One of the intriguing things about the new evidence is that it tends to bear out much of Khrushchev's brief accounts of the Hungarian and Polish crises. Khrushchev's reminiscences were tendentious (as most memoirs are) and he was confused about a number of points, but overall his account, including many of the details, holds up remarkably well. At the same time, the new documentation provides insight about many items that Khrushchev failed to discuss, and it also allows numerous mistakes in the record to be set right. Although it is impossible in a brief article to provide a comprehensive review of the latest findings, it is worth highlighting several points that cast new light not only on the events of 1956, but on the whole nature of Soviet-East European relations.

### Soviet Responses to the Polish Crisis

New evidence from the Russian and East-Central European archives helps explain why the Soviet Union decided to accept a peaceful solution in Poland but not in Hungary. Poland was the initial focus of Soviet concerns. A series of events starting in June 1956 had provoked unease in Moscow about growing instability and rebellion. The Poznan riots, on 28-29 June, came as a particular shock. Workers from the ZISPO locomotive factory and other heavy industrial plants in Poznan staged a large protest rally on 28 June, which soon turned violent. The Polish army and security forces managed to subdue the protests, but the two days of clashes left 53 dead and many hundreds wounded. It is now known that some Polish officers tried to resist the decision to open fire, but their opposition proved futile because the security forces were willing to carry out the orders and because Soviet commanders (and their Polish allies) still dominated the Polish military establishment.<sup>18</sup> Soviet leaders were taken aback by the events in Poznan, fearing that the unrest would flare up again and spread elsewhere unless strict ideological controls were

reimposed. At a CPSU Presidium meeting shortly after the riots, Khrushchev claimed that the violence had been provoked by the "subversive activities of the imperialists" and was aimed at "fomenting disunity" with the Soviet bloc and "destroying [the socialist countries] one by one."<sup>19</sup> These assertions echoed the public commentaries that Soviet leaders issued right after the riots.<sup>20</sup>

The measures adopted by Polish officials to alleviate public discontent and prevent further disorders had only a limited and transitory effect. By the late summer and early fall of 1956 a new crisis was gathering pace, which soon led to a tense standoff with the Soviet Union.<sup>21</sup> In early October, one of the most prominent victims of the Stalinist purges in Poland in the late 1940s and early 1950s, Wladyslaw Gomulka, triumphantly regained his membership in the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) and was on the verge of reclaiming his position as party leader. The Soviet authorities feared that if Gomulka took control in Warsaw, he would remove the most orthodox (and pro-Soviet) members of the Polish leadership and steer Poland along an independent course in foreign policy. Soviet concerns were heightened by Gomulka's demand that Soviet military officers serving in the Polish army, including Marshal Konstantin Rokossowski, the Polish-born Soviet officer who had been installed as Polish defense minister and commander-in-chief in November 1949, be withdrawn. This demand came after the PZPR Politburo had already (in September 1956) requested the pull-out of all Soviet state security (KGB) "advisers" from Poland.

To compel Gomulka and his colleagues to back down, Soviet leaders applied both military and political pressure. On 19 October, as the 8th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee was about to convene to elect Gomulka as party leader and remove Rokossowski from the PZPR Politburo, Khrushchev ordered Soviet army units in northern and western Poland to advance slowly toward Warsaw. Shortly thereafter, a delegation of top Soviet officials, including Khrushchev,

Vyacheslav Molotov, Nikolai Bulganin, Lazar Kaganovich, and Anastas Mikoyan, accompanied by the commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact, Marshal Ivan Konev, and 11 other high-ranking Soviet military officers, paid a surprise visit to Warsaw. In a hastily arranged meeting with Gomulka and other Polish leaders, the CPSU delegates expressed anxiety about upcoming personnel changes in the PZPR and urged the Poles to strengthen their political, economic, and military ties with the Soviet Union.<sup>22</sup> Gomulka, for his part, sought clarification of the status of Soviet troops in Poland and demanded that the Soviet Union pledge not to interfere in Poland's internal affairs. Although he reaffirmed his intention of staying in the Warsaw Pact, he emphasized that Poland "will not permit its independence to be taken away."<sup>23</sup> Gomulka also renewed his call for the withdrawal of all or most of the Soviet Union's 50 "advisers" in Poland, and again insisted that Rokossowski and other top Soviet officers be removed from the Polish army. The Soviet delegation responded by accusing the Poles of seeking to get rid of "old, trustworthy revolutionaries who are loyal to the cause of socialism" and of "turning toward the West against the Soviet Union."<sup>24</sup>

During these tense exchanges, Gomulka was suddenly informed by one of his aides that Soviet tank and infantry units were advancing toward Warsaw. This large-scale mobilization of Soviet troops, though intended as a form of coercive diplomacy rather than to provoke an immediate confrontation, gave the crisis a new edge. Rokossowski and dozens of other Soviet commanders (and their Polish allies) who were still entrenched in the Polish officer corps were able to keep the Polish army from preparing to defend Gomulka against incoming Soviet forces.<sup>25</sup> Rokossowski's influence, however, did not extend to many of the Polish troops from the Internal Security Corps (KBW) and other combat personnel under the aegis of the Polish Internal Affairs Ministry (MSW), who were fully willing to fight on behalf of the new Polish regime. These units took

up strategic positions all around Warsaw and called in reinforcements as Soviet columns were reported to be moving in.<sup>26</sup> In this game of political-military brinkmanship, a clash seemed to be looming between the KBW troops and Soviet forces, and an even more explosive situation emerged *within* the Polish military establishment, pitting KBW units against troops from the National Defense Ministry under Rokossowski's command. Thus, for a brief while, Poland appeared to be on the verge of civil war as well as a conflict with the Soviet Union.

The latent danger of a clash between Soviet forces and the KBW—a danger that loomed large even though neither side wanted a direct confrontation—spurred Khrushchev and Gomulka to make a renewed effort to find a peaceful solution. After being informed about the troop movements, the Polish leader requested that the Soviet units be pulled back; and Khrushchev, after some hesitation, complied with the request, ordering Konev to halt all troop movements.<sup>27</sup> Although Khrushchev assured Gomulka that the deployments had simply been in preparation for upcoming military exercises, the intended message was plain enough, especially in light of other recent developments. The existence of Soviet “plans to protect the most important state facilities” in Poland, including military garrisons and lines of communication, had been deliberately leaked to Polish officials earlier in the day; and Soviet naval vessels had begun holding conspicuous maneuvers in waters near Gdansk, keeping the Polish Navy at bay.<sup>28</sup> Despite these various forms of pressure, the Polish authorities stood their ground, and the meeting ended without any firm agreement. The official communique merely indicated that talks had taken place and that Polish leaders would be visiting Moscow sometime “in the near future.”<sup>29</sup> In most respects, then, the negotiations proved less than satisfactory from the Soviet standpoint.

Shortly after the Soviet delegates returned to Moscow on 20 October, they briefed the other members of the CPSU Presidium on the results of the trip.<sup>30</sup>

By this point they knew that the PZPR Central Committee had reconvened early on the 20th and had elected Gomulka first secretary and dropped Rokossowski and several neo-Stalinist officials from the PZPR Politburo. Khrushchev made no attempt to conceal his disappointment, arguing that “there’s only one way out—by putting an end to what is in Poland.” He indicated that the situation would get much worse if Rokossowski were not permitted to stay as Poland’s defense minister. Khrushchev lay a good deal of the blame for the crisis on the Soviet ambassador in Poland, Panteleimon Ponomarenko, who, according to Khrushchev, had been “grossly mistaken in his assessment of [Edward] Ochab and Gomulka.” (Khrushchev declined to mention that he himself—and the rest of the Soviet leadership—had “grossly” misjudged the situation in Poland over the previous few months.<sup>31</sup>)

The Presidium adopted Khrushchev’s suggestion that a meeting be held soon in Moscow with leading representatives from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, East Germany, and Bulgaria. Khrushchev also proposed that they consider sending a few senior officials to China “for informational purposes.” In the meantime, the Presidium resolved to “think carefully” about additional measures, including new military exercises and the formation of a “provisional revolutionary committee” that would displace Gomulka. In addition, Khrushchev authorized a new campaign in the press, building on an editorial in the 20 October issue of *Pravda*, which had accused the Polish media of waging a “filthy anti-Soviet campaign” and of trying to “undermine socialism in Poland.”<sup>32</sup> These charges, and subsequent accusations, prompted vigorous rebuttals from Polish commentators.

Strains between Poland and the Soviet Union remained high over the next few days as tens of thousands of Poles took part in pro-Gomulka rallies in Gdansk, Szczecin, and other cities on 22 October. Even larger demonstrations, each involving up to 100,000 people, were organized the following

day in Poznan, Lublin, Lodz, Bydgoszcz, Kielce, and elsewhere. In the meantime, joint meetings of workers and students were being held all around Poland, culminating in a vast rally in Warsaw on 24 October attended by some 500,000 people. Although these events were intended mainly as a display of unified national support for the new Polish leadership in the face of external pressure, some of the speakers, particularly at a rally in Wroclaw on the 23rd, expressed open hostility toward the Soviet Union.

As tensions mounted on 20 and 21 October, Soviet leaders reexamined a variety of economic sanctions and military options, but again they found that none of these options seemed the least bit attractive. At a meeting on the 21st, the CPSU Presidium unanimously decided to “refrain from military intervention” and to “display patience” for the time being.<sup>33</sup> The rationale for this decision remained just as compelling in subsequent days, as Khrushchev emphasized to his colleagues and to other East European leaders during an expanded Presidium meeting on the evening of 24 October: “Finding a reason for an armed conflict [with Poland] now would be very easy, but finding a way to put an end to such a conflict later on would be very hard.”<sup>34</sup> The stand-off on 19 October had demonstrated to the Soviet leadership that most of the Polish troops who were not under Rokossowski’s command, especially in the KBW, were ready to put up stiff resistance against outside intervention. Khrushchev and his colleagues also seem to have feared that Polish leaders would begin distributing firearms to “workers’ militia” units who could help defend the capital. (Gomulka later claimed that arms were in fact disseminated, but the evidence generally does not bear out these assertions.<sup>35</sup> The important thing, however, is that Soviet officials *assumed* that Gomulka would proceed with this step.)

Khrushchev’s reluctance to pursue a military solution under such unfavorable circumstances induced him to seek a *modus vivendi* with Gomulka whereby Poland would have greater leeway to follow its own “road to socialism.”

Gomulka reciprocated by again assuring Khrushchev that Poland would remain a loyal ally and member of the Warsaw Pact. The Polish leader demonstrated the credibility of his promises by ordering Polish officers to cease considering the prospect of a complete withdrawal of the Soviet Northern Group of Forces from Poland.<sup>36</sup> (On 21 October, as the crisis with Moscow began to abate, a number of Polish commanders, led by General Wacław Komar of the Internal Army and General Włodzimierz Mus of the KBW, had thought it was the right moment to press for a total Soviet withdrawal, and they started drafting plans to that effect. Gomulka put an immediate end to their activities.) Gomulka also adopted a far more conciliatory line in public, as reflected in his keynote speech at the rally in Warsaw on 24 October.<sup>37</sup> The Polish leader not only called for stronger political and military ties with the Soviet Union and condemned those who were trying to steer Poland away from the Warsaw Pact, but also urged his fellow Poles to return to their daily work and to refrain from holding any additional rallies or demonstrations.

Over the next few days, Soviet leaders became annoyed when Gomulka insisted that Rokossowski be removed from the national defense ministry (as well as from the PZPR Politburo), a demand that perplexed even Chinese officials, who overall were staunchly supportive of Gomulka.<sup>38</sup> Had the crisis in Hungary not intervened on 23 October, Soviet leaders might well have been inclined to take a firmer stand against Rokossowski's dismissal from the ministry. But by the time Gomulka began pressing this demand on 26 October, the deteriorating situation in Hungary gave Khrushchev a strong incentive to prevent renewed difficulties with Poland. Having been reassured that Gomulka would keep Poland in the Warsaw Pact and retain Soviet troops on Polish soil, Khrushchev reluctantly acquiesced in Rokossowski's ouster. In mid-November, Rokossowski was recalled to Moscow, where he was appointed a deputy defense minister.

Early in the crisis, some members

of the Soviet Presidium, especially Vyacheslav Molotov and Kliment Voroshilov, had strongly opposed the leeway granted to the Poles, but by the time the Presidium met on 21 October, as noted above, all members agreed that it was best to eschew military intervention and to "display patience," at least for a while.<sup>39</sup> Nor were any major signs of dissent evident at the Presidium meeting on 23 October.<sup>40</sup> Participants in the meeting emphasized the "fundamental difference" between the situation in Poland and the emerging crisis in Hungary. Gomulka's speech on 24 October and his follow-up discussions with Khrushchev further convinced the Soviet leader that Poland would remain a loyal member of the "socialist commonwealth" and Warsaw Pact.<sup>41</sup>

This did not mean that all tensions with Poland were instantly dissipated. In addition to continued bickering over Rokossowski's status, Khrushchev remained concerned about the "unacceptable" views espoused by certain PZPR officials, including some who allegedly wanted to assert territorial claims against the USSR.<sup>42</sup> Soviet leaders also were disturbed by reports that an influential PZPR Secretary, Władysław Matwin, had given a speech in Poznań on 10 November in which he condemned recent "abnormalities in Polish-Soviet relations" that had "raised doubts about the sovereignty of our country."<sup>43</sup> Nevertheless, these frictions did not detract from the basic assurances that Gomulka had provided to Khrushchev. By late October and early November 1956 the two sides had reached a broad accommodation that was able to withstand occasional disruptions.

Gomulka's determination to preserve a Communist system in Poland and to remain within the Warsaw Pact had a strong bearing on Soviet policy during the Hungarian revolution. The outcome of the Polish crisis demonstrated that some Soviet flexibility would continue and that a return to full-fledged Stalinism was not in the offing, but it also set a precedent of what would be tolerated. Had Gomulka not been willing to keep Poland firmly within the Soviet bloc, a military confrontation

might well have ensued. The contrast with Hungary was telling. Early on, Soviet leaders may have hoped that they could rely on Imre Nagy to do in Hungary what Gomulka had done in Poland, but the Soviet Presidium soon concluded that there was "no comparison with Poland" and that "Nagy is in fact turning against us."<sup>44</sup>

### The Onset of the Hungarian Crisis

Social pressures had been building in Hungary since the spring of 1955, when the reformist prime minister Imre Nagy was dislodged by the old-line Stalinist leader Matyas Rakosi, who had been forced to cede that post to Nagy in mid-1953. The earlier transfer of power from Rakosi to Nagy, and the shift back to Rakosi, were both effected under Moscow's auspices. In June 1953 the Soviet authorities, led by Georgii Malenkov and Lavrentii Beria, had summoned Rakosi and other Hungarian officials to Moscow for a secret meeting. During three days of talks, Malenkov and his colleagues stressed that they were "deeply appalled" by Rakosi's "high-handed and domineering style" in office, which had led to countless "mistakes and crimes" and had "driven [Hungary] to the brink of a catastrophe."<sup>45</sup> They ordered Rakosi to relinquish his prime ministerial duties to Nagy. Although Rakosi was allowed to remain First Secretary of the Hungarian Workers' Party (HWP), the office of prime minister at the time was seen as more important than the top party position.

By early 1955, however, the political calculus in both Moscow and Budapest had changed. The First Secretary of the CPSU, Khrushchev, had gradually eclipsed prime minister Malenkov, enabling the CPSU to regain its predominant status in Soviet politics. Khrushchev sought to reinforce his victory by prodding the East European countries to halt their New Courses (i.e., the reforms they had adopted when Malenkov was the top figure in Moscow) and to give renewed emphasis to the "leading role" of their Communist parties. This political reconfiguration came at the same time that Soviet lead-

ers were concerned (or claimed to be concerned) that Nagy's policies were giving impetus to "rightist deviationists" and "opportunists" in Hungary who were seeking to realign their country with Yugoslavia or the West. As a result, in March 1955 the CPSU Presidium again summoned top Hungarian officials, including Nagy and Rakosi, to Moscow for secret talks; and a high-level Soviet delegation then traveled to Hungary to oversee the reversal of Nagy's New Course and the elevation of Rakosi's protege, Andras Hegedus, to the post of prime minister. This "friendly interference in [Hungary's] internal affairs," according to a senior CPSU Presidium member, Kliment Voroshilov, provided "a model for our relations with all the People's Democracies."<sup>46</sup>

Nevertheless, these fluctuations were bound to spark social unrest in Hungary. The appointment of Nagy as prime minister in 1953 had helped stave off further disorders of the sort that occurred in Csepel, Ozd, and Diosgyor in the spring of 1953; but the reascendancy of Rakosi in 1955-56 brought all those earlier grievances back to the surface. In the past, Rakosi had been able to rely on mass repression to stifle popular discontent, but by 1956 his options were far more limited because of the post-Stalin "thaw" and de-Stalinization campaign that Khrushchev had launched at the 20th Soviet Party Congress. Those developments created greater leeway for the expression of pent-up grievances in Hungary; and they also helped transform the Petofi Circle, an entity set up by Rakosi in March 1956 as a debating forum for Party youth, into a prominent organ of the anti-Rakosi opposition. In late April 1956, the Soviet ambassador in Budapest, Yuri Andropov, informed the CPSU Presidium about the "far-reaching impact" of the Soviet Party Congress on the public mood in Hungary and about the Hungarian regime's lackluster response:

Through demagoguery and provocations, the right-wing opportunists and hostile elements have managed to create an impression [among ordinary Hungarians] that the Hungarian Workers'

Party leadership, in its current form, is not doing what is needed in Hungary to carry out the decisions of the XX CPSU Congress because some of the old members of the [Hungarian] Politburo are putting up resistance against these decisions and the younger comrades are too inexperienced to proceed with the required work. This impression is doing great damage to the authority of the [Hungarian] Politburo in the eyes of the party *aktiv* and a large segment of the workers.<sup>47</sup>

Andropov urged the Soviet Presidium to give greater support and assistance to Rakosi to prevent the anti-Rakosi forces from extracting further "major concessions to rightist and demagogic elements."<sup>48</sup>

This cable stirred apprehension in Moscow, and the CPSU Presidium decided in early May to send one of its members, Mikhail Suslov, to Budapest for discussions with Andropov and with leaders of the HWP.<sup>49</sup> It took several weeks, however, before Suslov actually left for Budapest. Despite the growing turbulence in Hungary, high-level attention in Moscow was distracted by other matters. When Suslov finally arrived in Budapest on 7 June, his weeklong visit did little to help the situation. In contrast to Andropov's more alarming reports, Suslov assured the CPSU Presidium that there was no real disaffection in Hungary with the HWP leadership. The opposition to Rakosi, he argued, was confined to the HWP Central Committee (formally known as the Central Leadership), where a group supporting Imre Nagy had joined forces with "politically immature and unprincipled officials."<sup>50</sup> Suslov claimed that the problem could be eliminated if "real Hungarian cadres" were "promoted more vigorously" to diminish the "hugely abnormal" representation of "Jewish comrades" in the HWP Central Leadership. He took a number of steps to bolster Rakosi's position and to forestall any potential challenges to Rakosi at a crucial plenum of the HWP Central Leadership scheduled for mid-July. Suslov's strong backing for Rakosi at this point was in line with the views of the entire CPSU Presidium. Later on, Khrushchev privately ac-

knowledgeed that it had been a "great mistake" to "rely on that idiot Rakosi," but in the first half of 1956 no one on the Soviet Presidium seriously questioned the policy.<sup>51</sup>

The assurance of strong, visible support from Moscow (and from Andropov) enabled Rakosi to counter his rivals within the HWP by depicting their criticism as "directed also against the Soviet comrades."<sup>52</sup> Ordinarily, this might have been enough to keep Rakosi in power for another several years, but two unforeseen events in late June 1956 changed the political balance of forces in Hungary. The first development, on 27 June, was a highly publicized meeting of the Petofi Circle, which featured sweeping criticisms of the regime's policies, condemnations of Rakosi for his role in the Stalinist repressions of the late 1940s and early 1950s, and renewed calls for "full freedom of the press." In response, Rakosi persuaded the HWP Central Leadership to adopt a resolution on 30 June that banned the Petofi Circle and explicitly denounced "anti-party elements" and the "anti-party views" of "a certain group which has formed around Imre Nagy."<sup>53</sup> The HWP Central Leadership also reprimanded HWP members who had shown "insufficient vigilance" against "hostile, demagogic attacks," rescinded the party membership of two prominent writers (Tibor Dery and Tibor Tardos) who had "espoused bourgeois and counterrevolutionary views," criticized the HWP newspaper *Szabad Nep* for its "misleading and unprincipled" coverage of the meeting, and prohibited any further gatherings of opposition forces.

This resolution was adopted only hours after another event occurred that had profound implications for Hungary: the outbreak of riots in Poznan, Poland on 28-29 June. Many Hungarians, particularly university students, intellectuals, and a substantial number of HWP members, came to see the Petofi Circle meeting and the Poznan riots as indications that neo-Stalinist regimes throughout the Soviet bloc were suddenly vulnerable. Rakosi hoped to dispel any impression of weakness by returning to his earlier policy of "stern measures"

against “hostile” and “anti-socialist” forces. This marked a reversal of his approach over the previous few months, when he had grudgingly put up with a limited thaw in the wake of the 20th CPSU Congress. At a meeting of the Budapest party *aktiv* on 18 May, Rakosi had even reluctantly acknowledged his part in the “unjust repressions” of the Stalin era. These concessions, limited though they were, raised public expectations in Hungary; but the increased defiance of the Petofi Circle and the riots in Poznan spurred Rakosi to try to reassert an “iron hand.” Within the HWP, however, this move was far from universally welcomed. A large number of officials, especially in the HWP Central Leadership, concluded that the real problem in Hungary was not the opposition forces or the Petofi Circle, but Rakosi himself.

The mounting disaffection with Rakosi was duly noted by Andropov in a cable to the CPSU Presidium on 9 July.<sup>54</sup> Andropov reported that “hostile elements and the intra-HWP opposition have embarked on an open and intensive struggle” against Rakosi. He emphasized that some prominent opposition figures had begun calling for an “independent national policy” and a “national Communist movement,” which would “permit the Hungarians to resolve their own affairs independently, ‘rather than on the basis of Soviet interference.’” Andropov also noted that Gero saw “few ways, unfortunately, to overcome the situation that has emerged.” Although Gero believed that the HWP Central Leadership plenum on 18 July might “restore solid unity” at the top levels of the party, he was concerned that “severe complications could emerge unexpectedly” at the plenum. In this connection, Andropov reported that the former head of state security in Hungary, Gabor Peter, had written a letter from prison accusing Rakosi of direct personal complicity in the Rajk trial. Andropov warned that “if this letter is read out at the plenum, Cde. Rakosi’s plight will be enormously aggravated.” Andropov underscored Gero’s hope of receiving “concrete advice from the CPSU CC,” and he added that “Cde. Gero’s alarm about the situ-

ation is fully understandable.” The ambassador expressed misgivings of his own about the “indecisiveness, feeble actions, and inadequate vigilance of the Hungarian comrades in the struggle against hostile influences within the party and among workers,” and he recommended that the CPSU leadership issue a clear-cut endorsement of the HWP resolution of 30 June “as well as of all the measures needed to strengthen the [Hungarian] party’s unity and to intensify the struggle against hostile forces.”

Andropov’s cable served as the basis for a CPSU Presidium meeting on 12 July 1956, which focused on the latest events in both Hungary and Poland. Malin’s notes from the meeting show that Khrushchev and his colleagues still did not want to come to grips with the underlying sources of political unrest in Hungary.<sup>55</sup> To be sure, the events in Poznan had provoked “alarm [in Moscow] about the fate of Hungary” as well as of Poland: “After the lessons of Poznan we wouldn’t want something similar to happen in Hungary.”<sup>56</sup> Soviet leaders went so far as to characterize the discussions of the Petofi Circle on 27 June as “an ideological Poznan, without the gunshots.”<sup>57</sup> Nevertheless, they displayed little understanding of the pressures that had given rise to such incidents. Khrushchev attributed the recent turmoil in Hungary (and Poland) exclusively to “the subversive activities of the imperialists,” who, he claimed, “want to foment disunity” within the socialist camp and “destroy the socialist countries one by one.”<sup>58</sup> The Presidium ordered that a lengthy editorial be published in *Pravda* reaffirming Moscow’s “internationalist solidarity with efforts to rebuff the enemy.”<sup>59</sup> The appearance of this article on 16 July was intended as a warning that the CPSU leadership would “not permit the dissolution of the unity of the socialist camp under the pretext of respect for national particularities or the extension of democracy.”<sup>60</sup>

The Soviet Presidium also designated one of its members, Anastas Mikoyan, to visit Hungary for a first-hand assessment of the disarray within the Hungarian leadership and the grow-

ing ferment in Hungarian society. Upon his arrival in Budapest on 13 July, Mikoyan met with Rakosi and three other senior Hungarian officials (Erno Gero, Andras Hegedus, and Bela Veg). These preliminary talks convinced Mikoyan that the situation would improve only if Rakosi stepped down. Having been authorized by the CPSU Presidium to do whatever was necessary to “restore unity in the HWP leadership,” Mikoyan bluntly informed Rakosi that it would be best if someone else took over as HWP First Secretary.<sup>61</sup> Rakosi had been hoping to gain Soviet backing for his proposal to “smash the Nagy conspiracy” once and for all—a proposal that envisaged the arrest of Nagy and several hundred other “conspirators,” as well as a broader crackdown—and thus he was stunned by Mikoyan’s recommendation. Nevertheless, Rakosi had little choice but to accept the Soviet “advice.” Mikoyan then turned to the question of a successor. He proposed Erno Gero as a replacement for Rakosi, but Gero initially claimed that it would be better if a “Hungarian official” (i.e., a non-Jew) took over. These demurrals were not entirely sincere, as Mikoyan soon realized, and the matter was settled over the next few days at two emergency sessions of the HWP Politburo. Mikoyan took part in the first session on 13 July and was kept closely informed about the second, on 16 July.<sup>62</sup> As he had proposed, the HWP Politburo endorsed Gero as the new First Secretary. The transition to a post-Rakosi regime was formally approved by the HWP Central Leadership plenum on 18 July, in which Mikoyan played a crucial role.<sup>63</sup>

Mikoyan’s efforts to promote greater political stability in Hungary came at the same time that a group of high-ranking Soviet officers were visiting Hungary to inspect Soviet forces based there (the so-called Special Corps).<sup>64</sup> The officers, led by General Mikhail Malinin, a first deputy chief of the Soviet General Staff, discovered that the command staff of the Special Corps had not yet worked out a secret plan to prepare for large-scale internal disturbances in Hungary. (In the wake of the 1953 East German uprising, the com-

manders of all Soviet forces in Eastern Europe had been ordered by the CPSU leadership to devise appropriate plans for anti-riot and counterinsurgency operations.) When this omission was reported to Soviet defense minister Marshal Georgii Zhukov, he ordered that the requisite documents be compiled immediately. The visiting Soviet generals helped the commander of Soviet forces in Hungary, General Lashchenko, put together a "Plan of Operations for the Special Corps to Restore Public Order on the Territory of Hungary," which was signed on 20 July.<sup>65</sup> This plan, codenamed "Volna" (Wave), envisaged the use of tens of thousands of Soviet troops at very short notice (within three to six hours) to "uphold and restore public order" in Hungary. The plan required a special signal (known as "Kompas") to be put into effect, but the formulation of "Volna" at this stage indicates that Soviet leaders wanted a reliable fall-back option in case their attempts to bolster political stability in Hungary did not pan out.

The growing reservations in Moscow about Hungary's political future turned out to be far more justified than Soviet leaders had hoped. Although the ouster of Rakosi eliminated the most exigent problem in Hungary, it was hardly sufficient to put more than a temporary check on the growth of social discontent. Gero was widely perceived to be of the same mold as Rakosi. Nor was the situation helped any by the "comradely advice" that Gero received from his Soviet counterparts when he took office:

The relaxation of international tensions and the slogan of coexistence [as proclaimed at the 20th CPSU Congress] do not presuppose but, on the contrary, exclude ideological concessions and any accommodation to hostile views. That is why you must eliminate all factors responsible for the collapse of party conduct in Hungary, restore discipline among CC members and the party's rank-and-file, and launch a fierce struggle on the ideological front.<sup>66</sup>

These suggestions were of little relevance to the turbulent political scene in Hungary. By early September, Gero

privately acknowledged that he was still finding it "enormously difficult to foster unity within the party's leadership" and to overcome "sharp disagreements about certain fundamental issues."<sup>67</sup> The lack of "a unified position among the members of the Politburo," Gero believed, was exacerbating the "dangerous and unstable situation in the country as a whole."

Gero's awareness of these problems makes it especially difficult to understand why he was willing to be absent from Hungary over the next several weeks. During most of September and the first week of October, he was on vacation in the Soviet Union (mainly in the Crimea). According to Andropov, "Gero openly acknowledged, when he was setting off on his trip, that he was not at all sure whether 'things would be okay' while he was gone."<sup>68</sup> When Gero finally returned to Budapest in October, he met again with Andropov and told him that "unfortunately, now that I'm back in Hungary, I can see that the situation in the country has become much worse and more turbulent than I had imagined while I was in the USSR."<sup>69</sup> Problems within the HWP, according to Gero, had "gravely deteriorated," and "acute discontent [had] spread throughout the country."

Even Gero's efforts to allay public unrest were widely construed as little more than admissions of weakness. On 6 October, while Gero was still in Moscow, the remains of Laszlo Rajk and three other high-ranking victims of the Stalinist purges were reinterred in Budapest as a crowd of several hundred thousand looked on. Rajk had been sentenced to death on trumped-up charges in October 1949 and was then posthumously rehabilitated in March 1956, despite Rakosi's initial objections. When Rakosi announced the rehabilitation on 28 March, he made no mention of his own culpability and tried to gloss over the whole affair; but Gero was not as closely identified with the Rajk trial, and therefore was willing to permit the reburial. Gero viewed the measure as a convenient way to ingratiate himself with Tito (whom he had met in the Crimea at the beginning of October) as well as a means of defus-

ing internal tensions, but he failed to anticipate what a profound effect the ceremony would have. As soon as Gero returned to Hungary, he realized the implications of what he had done. On 12 October, he confided to Andropov that "the reburial of Rajk's remains has dealt a massive blow to the party leadership, whose authority was not all that high to begin with."<sup>70</sup> Gero also conceded that the ceremony was likely to provoke "even greater insolence" on the part of opposition forces, who will now "openly demand the return of Imre Nagy to the Politburo."

Gero's misgivings proved well-founded. A rapid sequence of events in the second and third weeks of October gave rise to a full-fledged crisis. The HWP Politburo had tried to curb popular ferment by readmitting Imre Nagy into the party on 13 October, but that step, if anything, merely emboldened the regime's opponents. To make matters worse, Gero decided once again to travel abroad at a critical moment. From 15 to 22 October he was in Yugoslavia. Although the main purpose of his trip was to hold negotiations with Tito and other senior officials, he extended his stay to take a vacation on the Yugoslav coast. While he was away, the situation in Hungary grew ever more turbulent, spurred on in part by the concurrent events in Poland.

The surge of discontent in Hungary reached the breaking point on 23 October (just hours after Gero had returned from Yugoslavia), when a huge demonstration was organized in downtown Budapest by students from a local polytechnical university who wanted to express approval of the recent developments in Poland and to demand similar changes in their own country.<sup>71</sup> The HWP authorities initially tried to prevent the demonstration, but their efforts proved futile, as several hundred thousand people gathered in the capital. After a preliminary march to the statue of Josef Bem (a hero from the Polish revolution of 1830 and the Hungarian revolution of 1848), the demonstrators split into several large groups and moved to key points in the city, where they voiced demands for "national independence and democracy." A huge

statue of Stalin in the center of Budapest was torn down. Similar rallies were held in other Hungarian cities, where thousands of protesters called on the government to resign. Faced by this growing wave of unrest, Gero desperately tried to regain control of the situation, but the protests continued to mount.

Gero's plight was made immeasurably worse later in the evening when Hungarian state security (AVH) forces, acting without authorization, opened fire on unarmed demonstrators outside the main radio station in Budapest who were seeking to enter the building to broadcast their demands. The shootings precipitated a chaotic rebellion, which was much too large for the Hungarian state security organs to handle on their own. Soviet "advisers" and military commanders in Hungary had been trying since early October to convince Hungarian officials that stringent security precautions were needed to cope with growing unrest; but, as one of the top Soviet officers later reported, "the leaders of the [Hungarian] party and members of the [Hungarian] government did not adopt the measures called for by the urgency of the situation. Many of them were simply incapable of evaluating the state of things realistically."<sup>72</sup> As a result, the violent upheavals on the evening of 23 October quickly overwhelmed the Hungarian police and security forces and caused widespread panic and near-paralysis among senior Hungarian officials.

### **The Initial Soviet Intervention in Hungary**

Until very recently, nothing was known about decision-making in Moscow on the evening of 23 October 1956, when the first reports came in about the Hungarian revolution. Some gaps in the story persist, but a reasonable account can be pieced together on the basis of new sources, including the Malin notes.<sup>73</sup> It is now known that despite the growing turmoil in Budapest, Gero did not even mention what was going on when he spoke by phone with Khrushchev on the evening of the 23rd. Gero's evasiveness during that conver-

sation is hard to explain. By that point he had already transmitted an appeal for urgent military assistance to the military attache at the Soviet embassy, so it is unclear why he would not want to raise the matter directly with Khrushchev. Gero's behavior in the two months prior to the revolution, when he chose to be out of the country at critical moments, was odd in itself; but his reaction on 23 October seems even more peculiar.

Despite this strange twist, information about the rebellion quickly made its way to Moscow. When the Soviet attache received Gero's request, he immediately passed it on to Andropov, who telephoned the commander of Soviet troops in Hungary, General Lashchenko. Lashchenko responded that he could not comply with the request without explicit authorization from political leaders. Andropov then cabled Gero's appeal directly to Moscow, which prompted Khrushchev to contact Gero by phone for the second time that evening. Khrushchev urged Gero to send a written request for help to the CPSU Presidium, but the Soviet leader soon realized, after the brief conversation ended, that events in Budapest were moving too fast for him to wait until he received a formal Hungarian request (which, incidentally, did not arrive until five days later).<sup>74</sup> A Soviet Presidium meeting had already been scheduled for the 23rd to discuss other matters, and Khrushchev abruptly changed the agenda to focus on the situation in Hungary.

The newly declassified notes from the 23 October meeting show that the CPSU Presidium could not reach a unanimous decision on whether to send in troops.<sup>75</sup> Khrushchev and all but one of the other participants strongly supported the introduction of Soviet forces, but a key Presidium member, Anastas Mikoyan, opposed the decision, arguing that "the Hungarians themselves will restore order on their own. We should try political measures, and only then send in troops." Despite the pro-intervention consensus among all the other participants, Mikoyan held firm in his opposition. The Presidium therefore had to adopt its decision without

unanimity, an unprecedented step for such an important matter. The Presidium also decided to send Mikoyan and Suslov to Budapest along with the KGB chief, Ivan Serov, to provide on-the-scene reports, following up on the tasks they had accomplished in Hungary earlier in the year (see above). In the meantime, Khrushchev authorized Soviet defense minister Zhukov to "redeploy Soviet units into Budapest to assist Hungarian troops and state security forces in the restoration of public order."<sup>76</sup> Khrushchev's directive was promptly transmitted to Lashchenko by the chief of the Soviet General Staff, Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii, who specified that the bulk of the Soviet troops in Hungary were to be used in "establishing control over the most important sites in the capital and in restoring order," while others were to "seal off Hungary's border with Austria."<sup>77</sup>

Having finally received due authorization, Lashchenko was able to set to work almost immediately. The troops under his command had been preparing since late July to undertake large-scale operations aimed at "upholding and restoring public order" in Hungary (see above). In accordance with the "Volna" plan, Soviet forces in Hungary had been placed on increased alert in mid-October, and were brought to full combat alert on 19-21 October at the behest of the Soviet General Staff.<sup>78</sup> Hence, when the mobilization orders arrived from Moscow on the night of the 23rd, the response on the ground was swift, despite dense fog that hampered troop movements. By the early morning hours of the 24th, thousands of soldiers from the USSR's two mechanized divisions in Hungary (the Special Corps) had entered Budapest, where they established a command center at the main building of the Hungarian National Defense Ministry. They were soon joined by thousands of additional Soviet troops from a mechanized division based in Romania and two divisions (one mechanized, one rifle) from the Transcarpathian Military District in Ukraine.<sup>79</sup> The combined interventionary forces were placed under the command of General Malinin, who maintained constant liaison with an

“emergency operational group” of some 80 high-ranking officers from the Soviet General Staff and the main staffs of the Soviet ground and air forces. All told, some 31,500 Soviet troops, 1,130 tanks and self-propelled artillery, 380 armored personnel carriers, 185 air defense guns, and numerous other weapons were redeployed at short notice to Budapest and other major cities as well as along the Austrian-Hungarian border. Two Soviet fighter divisions, totaling 159 planes, were ordered to perform close air-support missions for the ground forces; and two Soviet bomber divisions, with a total of 122 aircraft, were placed on full alert at airfields in Hungary and the Transcarpathian Military District.

For the task at hand, however, this massive array of firepower was largely irrelevant. The intervention of the Soviet Army proved almost wholly ineffectual and even counterproductive. Gero himself acknowledged, in a phone conversation with Soviet leaders on 24 October, that “the arrival of Soviet troops into the city has had a negative effect on the mood of the residents.”<sup>80</sup> Soviet armored vehicles and artillery were sent into the clogged streets of Budapest without adequate infantry protection, and thus became easy targets for youths wielding grenades and Molotov cocktails. Although Hungarian soldiers were supposed to operate alongside Soviet units, troops from the Hungarian state security forces, police, and army proved incapable of offering necessary support, and some defected to the side of the rebels.<sup>81</sup> As a result, the fighting merely escalated. By mid-afternoon on the 24th, at least 25 protesters had been killed and more than 200 had been wounded. The mounting violence, as Mikoyan and Suslov reported back to Moscow, “caused further panic among senior Hungarian officials, many of whom fled into underground bunkers that were unsuitable for any work.”<sup>82</sup>

### Early Rifts Within the Soviet Leadership

The Malin notes confirm that the post-Stalin succession struggle in Mos-

cow, which was not decisively resolved until June 1957, had a strong effect on Soviet policy toward Hungary. As the Hungarian crisis escalated, splits within the Soviet leadership came to the surface. Mikoyan and Suslov, who were both close to Khrushchev, had been sending a flurry of emergency cables and reports back to Moscow from the time they arrived in Budapest on 24 October.<sup>83</sup> These messages were discussed at length by the other members of the CPSU Presidium. At a session on the evening of 26 October, numerous members of the Presidium voiced complaints about Mikoyan, arguing that he “is acting improperly and is pushing us toward capitulation.”<sup>84</sup> The hardline opponents of Khrushchev—notably Vyacheslav Molotov, Kliment Voroshilov, and Lazar Kaganovich—clearly were hoping to use these criticisms against Khrushchev himself. Khrushchev responded by defending his colleague: “Mikoyan is acting just as he said he would. Cde. Mikoyan supported a position of non-intervention” on 23 October. Although Khrushchev strongly disagreed with Mikoyan’s non-interventionist stance, he was not about to let the verbal attacks go unanswered.

At the next session of the Presidium on 28 October, Molotov and Voroshilov stepped up their campaign.<sup>85</sup> Voroshilov charged that Mikoyan and Suslov were “poorly informed” and were “unable to carry out [their] work properly.” Molotov alleged that Mikoyan and Suslov were providing “calm reassurances” while “the situation deteriorates and is gradually moving toward capitulation.” Other officials, including Zhukov and Georgii Malenkov, defended Mikoyan and Suslov, arguing that “we shouldn’t lay blame for the situation on our comrades” and that it was “unfair to condemn [Mikoyan] right now.” These arguments, however, failed to deter Voroshilov from voicing even harsher complaints: “The American secret services are more active in Hungary than Cdes. Suslov and Mikoyan are. We sent [Suslov and Mikoyan] there for nothing.” Khrushchev and numerous other officials, including Nikolai Bulganin (who initially was critical of Mikoyan),

reproached Voroshilov for his remarks, and they urged that the Presidium focus on what to do next, rather than simply engaging in recriminations. An uneasy lull thus ensued. Later that evening, when Suslov returned temporarily from Budapest to give a detailed briefing to the Presidium, Voroshilov and Molotov refrained from any explicit criticisms.

The emergence of pronounced rifts within the Soviet leadership, at a time when the Presidium needed to reach a unified position, clearly hindered Moscow’s response to the crisis. One of the reasons that Soviet officials wavered so much during the crucial days of 30–31 October (see below) is that they were aware of the domestic political repercussions of their actions.

### Zig-Zags in Decision-Making

The Malin notes reveal that as the situation in Hungary deteriorated in late October, the CPSU Presidium had great difficulty in deciding how to respond. On 28 October, senior Hungarian officials began insisting that all Soviet troops would have to be withdrawn from Hungary, a demand that caused alarm in Moscow. At a lengthy meeting of the Presidium on 28 October, all the participants agreed that “we must not withdraw troops” and must instead “act decisively against the centers of resistance.”<sup>86</sup> They voiced dismay that “Nagy is speaking against us,” and they expected that Nagy’s call for the withdrawal of Soviet troops would soon be followed by “a demand for [Soviet] capitulation.” The Hungarian government’s announcement on 28 October that the recent events had been a “national-democratic uprising” rather than a “counterrevolution” sparked particular consternation among Soviet Presidium members, who insisted that “we cannot and will not retreat.”

At the same time, Khrushchev and his colleagues recognized that Soviet options were limited by the sheer pace of events, which had already resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Soviet soldiers and Hungarian civilians. The current Hungarian leaders, Nagy and Janos Kadar, were being challenged by more

radical elements in Hungary, who wanted to overthrow the existing regime. Although Soviet leaders were determined to adhere to a “firm line” and put an end to Nagy’s and Kadar’s “flip-flops,” they reluctantly agreed that they had little choice but to support the current government and to be prepared to withdraw troops from Budapest (though not from Hungary as a whole).

By 30 October, however, the mood within the Soviet Presidium had taken a surprising turn. All the members, including Molotov and Voroshilov, had reached a consensus—ephemeral though it may have been—that the Soviet Union should forgo large-scale military intervention in Hungary.<sup>87</sup> Marshal Zhukov conceded that the Soviet Union had to be ready, if necessary, to withdraw all Soviet troops from Hungary, viewing this as “a lesson for us in the military-political sphere.” Others reluctantly concurred. Khrushchev and his colleagues were well aware that the situation in Hungary had continued to deteriorate, and had taken on distinctly anti-Soviet overtones. Even so, they unanimously agreed to adopt what Khrushchev described as “the peaceful path—the path of troop withdrawals and negotiations”—rather than “the military path, the path of occupation.”<sup>88</sup>

This decision seems to have been predicated on an unrealistic expectation of what could be achieved by the Soviet government’s “Declaration on the Principles of Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship and Cooperation Between the USSR and Other Socialist Countries,” issued on 30 October.<sup>89</sup> A draft of the statement, prepared by high-ranking CPSU Central Committee officials, was reviewed at length and edited by the CPSU Presidium just before it was released. The declaration acknowledged that Soviet-East European relations had been plagued by “egregious mistakes” in the past, and that Moscow had committed rampant “violations of the principle of equality in relations between socialist countries.” It pledged that in the future the Soviet Union would scrupulously “observe the full sovereignty of each socialist state” and reexamine the basis

for its continued troop presence in the Warsaw Pact countries (other than East Germany), leaving open the possibility of a partial or total withdrawal. Most of the Presidium members seemed to view the declaration as a viable way of “extracting us from an onerous position” and of “putting an end to the bloodshed.”<sup>90</sup> Any hopes they may have had, however, were quickly dashed. Had the declaration been issued several months earlier, it might have prevented all the subsequent turmoil, but by the time the statement was broadcast over Hungarian radio on 30 October, events in Hungary had already eluded Soviet control. Moscow’s verbal promises were no longer sufficient to contain either the wave of popular unrest or the actions of Nagy’s government. Although the declaration caused a stir in most of the East-bloc countries, its effect in Hungary was limited. Many of the insurgents were determined to achieve their goals immediately, rather than settling for ill-defined negotiations that, once under way, would be subject to delay or derailment.

Nevertheless, even if Soviet hopes about the declaration were misplaced, the decision to forgo intervention was still remarkable at this late stage. It suggests that for a brief while—a very brief while—the Soviet Presidium actually may have been willing to accept the collapse of Communism in Hungary.

The unanimity of the Presidium’s decision to eschew military force belied the inherent fragility of that position, especially after Khrushchev and his colleagues realized that the 30 October declaration would not have the desired effect. Ominous reports from Hungary, including cables and secure phone messages from Mikoyan and Suslov that were much more pessimistic than their previous dispatches, continued to flow in. Earlier in the crisis, Mikoyan and Suslov had hoped that they could induce Nagy to restore order and achieve a satisfactory political solution, but by the end of October they had markedly changed their tone. In a phone message to Moscow on 30 October, they warned that the uprising could be ended only through the use of

force and that the Hungarian army probably was not up to the task:

The political situation in the country, rather than improving, is getting worse. . . . The peaceful liquidation of the remaining centers [of resistance] can effectively be excluded. We will try to liquidate them using the armed forces of the Hungarians. But there is a great danger in this: The Hungarian army has adopted a “wait-and-see” position. Our military advisers say that the attitude of Hungarian officers and generals toward Soviet officers has deteriorated in recent days, and that there is no longer the trust which existed earlier. It may well be that if Hungarian units are used against the uprising, they will go over to the side of the insurgents, and it will then be necessary for the Soviet armed forces to resume military operations.<sup>91</sup>

Subsequent messages from Mikoyan and Suslov were gloomier still, in part because they sensed that their worst fears were coming true. Within hours after their initial message on the 30th, they learned that an angry mob had launched a bloody attack on the Budapest party committee’s headquarters in Republic Square. The grisly reprisals that some of the attackers carried out against disarmed AVH troops came as a shock not only to Mikoyan and Suslov, but to most Hungarians (including many rebel leaders, who strongly criticized the actions and appealed for calm). The attack caused even greater alarm in Moscow, where scenes of the violence were being featured on newsreels when the CPSU Presidium met on 31 October. Equally disconcerting was the very fact that the mob had been able to seize the building. Three Hungarian army tanks, which had been sent to help the defenders of the site, ended up defecting to the insurgents, just as Mikoyan and Suslov had feared. The siege in Republic Square proved to be an isolated case (and actually helped stabilize the situation a good deal by spurring both the government and the rebels into seeking a peaceful settlement), but amid the general turmoil in Budapest at the time, it initially seemed—at least from Moscow’s perspective—to portend the “deterioration” that Mikoyan and

Suslov had been predicting.

Concerns about the internal situation in Hungary were reinforced by the latest news about international developments, particularly the start of French and British military operations in the Middle East and the increasing signs that unrest in Hungary was spilling over into other Warsaw Pact countries. Each of these factors is important enough to warrant a separate discussion below. Not only were the Suez Crisis and the fears of a spillover crucial in their own right; they also magnified the importance of Hungary's status in the Warsaw Pact. The prospect of an "imperialist" victory in the Middle East and of growing ferment within the bloc made it all the more essential to keep Hungary within the Soviet camp; but on this score, too, there seemed increasing grounds for pessimism. By late October it was clear that momentum for Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact was rapidly building. One of the members of Nagy's new "inner cabinet," Bela Kovacs, explicitly called for a "neutral Hungary" and the end of Hungary's "ties to military blocs" in a speech he delivered on 30 October.<sup>92</sup> That same day, Nagy himself endorsed the goal of leaving the Warsaw Pact, and he opened talks about the matter (and about the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Hungary) with Mikoyan and Suslov, who promptly informed their colleagues in Moscow about the discussions.<sup>93</sup> It seems likely that Nagy's expressed desire to renounce Hungarian membership in the Warsaw Pact was one of the factors that induced the CPSU Presidium on 31 October to reverse its decision of the previous day. To be sure, Nagy had spoken many times in earlier years (especially after he was abruptly removed from power in 1955) about the desirability of Hungarian neutrality, but his decision to raise the issue with Mikoyan and Suslov at this delicate stage must have come as a jolt in Moscow.<sup>94</sup> Once Soviet leaders were confronted by the stark prospect of Hungary's departure from the Warsaw Pact, they realized how much their influence in Hungary had waned.

The confluence of all these circum-

stances was bound to spur a reassessment of Moscow's non-interventionist stance. Khrushchev later recalled that he regretted the 30 October decision almost as soon as the Presidium adopted it.<sup>95</sup> At short notice on 31 October, he convened another emergency meeting of the Presidium to reconsider the whole matter.<sup>96</sup> The notes from the meeting reveal that Khrushchev was not the only one who had misgivings about the previous day's decision. With one exception, all the participants strongly endorsed Khrushchev's view that "we must revise our assessment and must not withdraw our troops from Hungary and Budapest. We must take the initiative in restoring order in Hungary." The only dissenting voice was Maksim Saburov, who argued that "after yesterday's session this discussion is all pointless. [Full-scale intervention] will merely vindicate NATO." His assertions were disputed by Molotov and numerous others, who insisted (not entirely convincingly) that the previous day's decision had been "only a compromise." After further persuasion, Saburov finally came around to support the interventionist position.

With that, the Presidium unanimously approved the full-scale use of military force "to help the working class in Hungary rebuff the counterrevolution."<sup>97</sup> This action brought an end to the long period of indecision and wavering in Soviet policy.

Even so, the reversal on 31 October should not detract from the importance of the consensus on the 30th. The Malin notes suggest there was a chance, if only a very slender one, that the events of 1989 could actually have occurred 33 years earlier.

### The Effect of the Suez Crisis

On 26 July 1956 the new Egyptian leader, Gamel Abdel Nasser, announced that he was nationalizing the Suez Canal Company. Over the next few months the British, French, and U.S. governments tried to persuade (and then compel) Nasser to reverse his decision, but these diplomatic efforts were of no avail. In late October, Israel began mobilizing its army, and on the 29th

Israeli troops moved into Egyptian territory, an action that was broadly coordinated with France and Great Britain. On 30 October the French and British governments sent an ultimatum to Nasser — which the Egyptian leader promptly rejected — and early the next day they joined the Israeli incursions by launching air raids against Egyptian cities and imposing a naval blockade.<sup>98</sup> Western analysts have long speculated about the role of the Suez Crisis in Soviet decision-making *vis-a-vis* Hungary, but until recently there was no real way to know. The new evidence, particularly the Malin notes, does not resolve all the ambiguities, but it does shed a good deal of light on the matter.

On the whole, the Malin notes and other new materials indicate that the Suez Crisis gave Soviet leaders a powerful incentive to resolve the situation in Hungary as soon and as decisively as possible. For one thing, the prolonged diplomatic wrangling over Suez induced the Soviet Presidium to be wary of becoming embroiled in lengthy political disputes the way the French and the British had. Khrushchev raised this point at the Presidium's meeting on 28 October, the day before military action began in the Middle East: "The English and French are in a real mess [*zavarivayut kashu*] in Egypt. We shouldn't get caught in the same company."<sup>99</sup> By this, he evidently meant that if the Presidium allowed the Hungarian crisis to drag on indefinitely, things would only get worse and the Soviet Union would be left facing the same intractable dilemma that the French and British were encountering in Suez.

The start of fighting in the Middle East on 29-31 October, which left Moscow's political ally Egypt in a precarious state, caused even greater complications for Soviet leaders. They worried that a failure to act decisively in Hungary would compound the damage to Soviet foreign policy. This fear was particularly acute after the French and British launched their military operations in the early morning hours of 31 October. When the Soviet Presidium met later that day to reach a final decision about Hungary, reports were al-

ready flooding into Moscow about the spectacular “successes” that the French, British, and Israeli forces were supposedly achieving. It soon turned out that their joint military efforts got bogged down (for want of U.S. support) and a stalemate ensued, but Khrushchev and his colleagues could not have foreseen that when they met on 31 October because they automatically assumed—in a classic case of misperception—that the United States would back the allied incursions. Khrushchev himself expressed the dominant sentiment at the Presidium meeting:

If we depart from Hungary, it will give a great boost to the Americans, English, and French—the imperialists. They will perceive it as weakness on our part and will go onto the offensive. We would then be exposing the weakness of our positions. Our party will not accept it if we do this. To Egypt [the imperialists] will then add Hungary.<sup>100</sup>

Khrushchev’s subsequent comments about Suez, especially at a Presidium meeting on 4 November, show that he believed the decision to intervene in Hungary would help, rather than hurt, Moscow’s policy *vis-a-vis* Suez. The distraction posed by Hungary, he implied, had prevented an effective response in the Middle East. Now that a firm decision to suppress the uprising had been adopted, the Soviet Union would be able to “take a more active part in the assistance to Egypt.”<sup>101</sup>

In another respect as well, Soviet policy in Hungary was linked—if only inadvertently—to the Suez Crisis. The sudden conflict diverted international attention from Poland and Hungary to the Middle East. Because the United States refused to support the Israeli and French-British military operations, the crisis generated a deep split among the Western powers at the very moment when they needed to show unity in response to the events in Hungary. The intra-NATO rift engendered by the Suez Crisis was not a critical factor in Moscow’s response to the Hungarian uprising—after all, the rift was not yet fully evident when the Soviet Presidium met for its fateful session on 31 October—but it did, as Khrushchev pointed

out at the time, provide a “favorable moment” for the Soviet Union to undertake a large-scale military operation in Hungary.<sup>102</sup> The French and British governments, he noted on 2 November, “are bogged down in Suez, and we are stuck in Hungary.”<sup>103</sup>

The invasion of Hungary undoubtedly would have been approved even if there had been no Suez Crisis, but Soviet fears of “imperialist” successes in the Middle East and the sudden emergence of a divisive row within NATO clearly expedited Moscow’s decision.

### Fears of a Spillover

New evidence confirms that Soviet leaders feared the Hungarian revolution might spread into other East European countries and possibly into the USSR itself, causing the whole Communist bloc to unravel. Warnings to that effect had been pouring in throughout the crisis from the Soviet embassy in Budapest, from KGB representatives in Hungary, and from three former Hungarian leaders (Rakosi, Andras Hegedus, and Istvan Bata) who had fled to Moscow after being ousted. Concerns that the Hungarian revolution would spill into other Warsaw Pact countries were heightened by a series of intelligence reports from neighboring Romania and Czechoslovakia. Khrushchev later recalled he had learned from KGB sources that “the residents of the border areas in Hungary had begun seeking contacts with [residents in] the border areas of Czechoslovakia and Romania to gain direct backing from them.”<sup>104</sup> Archival materials fully bear out his recollections.

From Romania, Soviet leaders received word that students in Bucharest and in a large number of Transylvanian cities (Cluj, Tirgu Mures, Timisoara, Baia Mare, and Oradea, among others) were holding demonstrations in support of the Hungarian revolution, and that disturbances were spreading around the country. As early as 24 October, the Politburo of the Romanian Workers’ Party (RWP) felt the need to impose emergency security measures and visa regulations along the border with Hungary, effectively sealing it off to all traf-

fic.<sup>105</sup> The Romanian authorities also established rigorous, comprehensive screening of mail and publications arriving from and going to Hungary. As a further precaution, the RWP Politburo ordered the state security forces (*Securitate*) to reinforce their defenses around key buildings, including transport stations, communications and broadcasting facilities, university complexes, and Communist party and government offices. Leaves and furloughs for soldiers and state security troops were cancelled.<sup>106</sup> Over the next few days, Romanian leaders also took steps to alleviate economic grievances and boost living standards, but overall Romania’s efforts to prevent a spillover from Hungary were geared predominantly toward increased vigilance and preparations for a large-scale crackdown.<sup>107</sup>

Despite these precautions, the Romanian authorities were soon confronted by renewed “agitation and demonstrations by student groups and hostile elements” in many parts of the country, especially Transylvania and Bucharest.<sup>108</sup> Officials who were dispatched to Cluj reported scenes of “mass confusion and unrest.”<sup>109</sup> An unofficial student movement, formed at Bolyai University on 25 October, attracted hundreds of members and gained support from much of the faculty, including many who belonged to the RWP. Romanian officials in the area emphasized that “party members of Hungarian origin” were especially likely to succumb to “hostile” elements, and that ethnic Hungarian students throughout Transylvania were “singing Horthyite and chauvinistic songs.”<sup>110</sup> Most worrisome of all were reports that young people in Baia Mare and Carei were “intent on joining the Hungarian army,” and that Romanian army troops and security forces in the border region were being swayed by the demonstrators’ “tendentious” and “inimical” propaganda.<sup>111</sup> To combat the growing unrest, the RWP Politburo on 30 October set up a “general command staff,” consisting of four senior Politburo members (Emil Bodnarus, Nicolae Ceausescu, Alexandru Draghici, and Leontin Salajan), who were given ex-

traordinary powers, including the right to issue shoot-to-kill orders and to declare a state of emergency.<sup>112</sup> The command staff was successful in its task, but the very fact that this sort of measure was needed was a disconcerting reminder to Soviet leaders that the events in Hungary, if left unchecked, could prove contagious.

Equally disturbing reports flowed into Moscow from Czechoslovakia about student demonstrations in Bratislava and other cities amidst growing "hostility and mistrust toward the Soviet Union."<sup>113</sup> The Czechoslovak authorities denied most of these reports, but they acknowledged that the events in Hungary were having "deleterious psychological effects" and creating a "hostile, anti-socialist mood" among some of the Czechoslovak troops who had been sent to reinforce the 560-km border with Hungary.<sup>114</sup> Senior Czechoslovak military officials warned that the confusion might even "tempt the counterrevolutionary forces [in Hungary] to penetrate into our country and stir up a rebellion in Slovak territory," especially in the southern areas inhabited mainly by ethnic Hungarians.<sup>115</sup> They also warned that the danger would increase "if Soviet and Hungarian units are withdrawn" from northern Hungary, since "it is unlikely that [Czechoslovakia's] existing combat forces will be enough to prevent incursions by counterrevolutionary groups."<sup>116</sup> The risk of a spillover into Czechoslovakia was explicitly cited by Soviet leaders when they approved a full-scale invasion: "If we don't embark on a decisive path, things in Czechoslovakia will collapse."<sup>117</sup> It is unclear whether the actual danger was as great as they feared, but the important thing at the time was the perception in both Moscow and Prague that a failure to act would have ominous consequences.

The growing concerns about a spillover were shared in East European countries further away from Hungary, notably East Germany. Initially, the East German leader, Walter Ulbricht, mainly feared that the return of Nagy might presage a similar turn of events in the GDR.<sup>118</sup> Once the Hungarian

revolution broke out, apprehension in East Berlin rapidly increased. A top East German official, Otto Grotewohl, warned that "the events in Hungary and Poland show that the enemy looks for weak spots in the socialist camp, seeking to break it apart."<sup>119</sup> He and other East German leaders were acutely aware that the GDR itself was one of these "weak spots." Soviet officials, too, were worried that developments in Hungary could undermine their position in East Germany, which by this point was closely tied to Ulbricht. Soviet foreign minister Dmitrii Shepilov warned that certain elements in East Germany might exploit the crisis to launch a campaign against the "Ulbricht clique."<sup>120</sup>

Quite apart from the threat of a spillover into Eastern Europe, Soviet leaders were aware of serious problems in the USSR itself. The inception of de-Stalinization had spawned numerous instances of public disorder and unrest. Mass disturbances erupted in Tbilisi and other Georgian cities in early March 1956, as students, workers, and intellectuals joined together to protest the growing criticism of "our great leader Stalin."<sup>121</sup> These demonstrations marked the first time that "anti-Soviet activities" had occurred in Georgia since Communist rule was established, and Soviet leaders responded by imposing martial law.<sup>122</sup> Very different challenges arose elsewhere in the Soviet Union, where intellectuals and some other groups took advantage of the opportunity to voice long-suppressed grievances. Criticism of Stalin and of the "cult of personality" opened the way for broader complaints about the nature of the Soviet regime itself. Soviet leaders tried to regain control of the de-Stalinization campaign by issuing a decree that specified what was permissible and what was not, but this document failed to put an end to dissidents' activities.<sup>123</sup> Thus, when the revolution began in Hungary, Khrushchev and his colleagues were concerned that intellectuals in the Soviet Union might try to provoke similar disturbances at home. The Soviet authorities saw disturbing parallels between the burgeoning dissidents' movement in the Soviet Union and the activities earlier in the

year of the Petofi Circle in Hungary. They feared that the use of repressive measures might not be enough to restore tight discipline, just as Rakosi's and Gero's efforts had failed in Hungary.<sup>124</sup>

These concerns seemed to gain credence when protests cropped up both before and after 4 November at higher educational institutions in the USSR, including Moscow State University (MGU). State Security (KGB) troops were dispatched to MGU to arrest students and faculty who had staged rallies "denouncing the Soviet military intervention" and had put up "anti-Soviet slogans and posters."<sup>125</sup> The KGB also cracked down harshly on demonstrations in Yaroslavl and other cities where students organized demonstrations and carried banners demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.<sup>126</sup> These incidents underlined the concerns that had prompted the CPSU Presidium's decision on 4 November to "purge all higher educational institutions of unsavory elements."<sup>127</sup> To deter further protests, the authorities ordered the arrests of other presumed dissidents in late 1956 and 1957, but some senior party officials wanted to undertake much more drastic action, launching a crackdown reminiscent of the Stalin era.<sup>128</sup> Their proposals were never formally adopted, but the disturbances in 1956 were enough for Soviet leaders to feel that the invasion of Hungary had narrowly averted a much worse spillover into the USSR.

A number of Western analysts, such as Charles Gati, had long suspected that concerns about a spillover from Hungary were one of the major factors in Soviet decision-making during the 1956 crisis.<sup>129</sup> The new evidence has amply corroborated that view.

### **Mikoyan's Continued Objections**

The pro-intervention consensus on 31 October was formed without the participation of Mikoyan and Suslov, who were still in Budapest. When the two officials returned to Moscow on the evening of the 31st to present their conclusions, they discovered that the matter had already been settled without them. Suslov evidently agreed with the

decision, but Mikoyan was dismayed by it, opposing it just as strongly as he had resisted the original decision on 23 October. Mikoyan pleaded with Khrushchev to call another meeting of the CPSU Presidium to reconsider the matter, but Khrushchev refused. According to Khrushchev's memoirs—which seem eminently plausible on this point—Mikoyan even threatened to commit suicide if Khrushchev did not reconvene the Presidium.<sup>130</sup> Khrushchev responded that it would be the “height of stupidity” to behave so “irrationally,” and he set off to take care of the final political and military preparations for the invasion. Had it not taken the CPSU Presidium so long and been so politically costly to reach a final decision about Hungary, Khrushchev might have been willing to comply with Mikoyan's request; but Khrushchev explained to Mikoyan that he was loath to “resume fruitless discussions” and “destroy our whole plan” now that “everything has been decided and a timetable has finally been laid out.”<sup>131</sup>

Despite these explanations, Mikoyan remained deeply upset by the decision, as he indicated at the Presidium meeting on 1 November (when Khrushchev had already headed off to Brest to inform the Polish leadership of the decision).<sup>132</sup> Mikoyan insisted that “the use of force now will not help anything,” and that “we should enter into negotiations instead.” Although he agreed that “we cannot let Hungary escape from our camp,” he argued that it was still possible to wait 10–15 days to see how the situation would unfold: “If things stabilize by then, we can decide whether to pull out our troops.” The other participants disagreed with Mikoyan, but he held his ground, arguing that an invasion was “inappropriate in the current circumstances.” In public, however, Mikoyan did not display any qualms. The first time that Mikoyan's objections were revealed was in Khrushchev's memoirs, and the Malin notes fully bear out Khrushchev's account.

Interestingly enough, in later years Mikoyan tried to gloss over his anti-interventionist stance in October 1956, arguing that the decision to send in

troops was unanimous.<sup>133</sup> Technically, this assertion was correct because the participants in the 31 October meeting did indeed approve the decision unanimously. What Mikoyan failed to point out is that if he had been present, the decision would not have been unanimous, just as he dissented from the original decision to send in troops on the night of 23–24 October. In spite of this subsequent backtracking, Mikoyan's position in October–November 1956 was in fact both courageous and consistent.

### Janos Kadar's Trip to Moscow

It had previously been known that Janos Kadar and Ferenc Munnich were spirited to Moscow aboard a Soviet military aircraft on the evening of 1 November, and were brought back with Soviet troops after 4 November to be installed as the prime minister and deputy prime minister of a “Provisional Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government.” Nothing was known, however, about what Kadar was doing in Moscow on 2 and 3 November. Almost all Western accounts of the Hungarian crisis have assumed that Kadar was duplicitous and supportive of Soviet military intervention from the outset. The Malin notes provide a more complex picture, offering the first solid evidence of Kadar's and Munnich's roles in the establishment of a post-invasion regime.

Both Kadar and Munnich took part in sessions of the CPSU Presidium on 2 and 3 November, though Kadar did most of the talking.<sup>134</sup> (On the 2nd they were joined by another Hungarian official, Istvan Bata, one of four senior figures who had been transported to Moscow several days earlier, on the evening of 28 October. On the 3rd, they were joined by Imre Horvath, who took detailed notes of the session.) On 2 November, Khrushchev and Malenkov were still away conferring with the leaders of other Warsaw Pact countries and with Tito, but the rest of the Presidium members met at length with Kadar and Munnich. On 3 November, Khrushchev and Malenkov joined in as well.

The notes from the two sessions

indicate that even though Kadar had been willing to travel surreptitiously to Moscow at a critical moment, he did not favor large-scale Soviet military intervention in Hungary. Nor did he arrive in Moscow intent on becoming the head of a new, post-invasion government. At the session on 2 November, Kadar warned that “the use of military force will be destructive and lead to bloodshed.” Such an outcome, he added, would “erode the authority of the socialist countries” and cause “the morale of the Communists [in Hungary] to be reduced to zero.”<sup>135</sup> The next day, Kadar's tone had changed somewhat, though not drastically. He highlighted the existing government's failure to prevent the “killing of Communists,” and said he “agreed with [Soviet officials]” that “you cannot surrender a socialist country to counterrevolution.” Kadar also asserted that “the correct course of action [in Hungary] is to form a revolutionary government.” But even then, he implied that a Soviet invasion would only make things worse—“The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary will be of great significance”—and warned that “the [revolutionary] government must not be puppetlike; there must be a [popular] base for its activities and support among workers.”<sup>136</sup> In this respect, his views differed sharply from those of Bata, who insisted that “order must be restored through a military dictatorship” imposed by the Soviet Army.<sup>137</sup>

It is also interesting that even on the 3rd, Kadar did not portray the recent events in Hungary in a uniformly negative light. Although he claimed that “Nagy's policy has counterrevolutionary aspects” and that “hour by hour the situation [in Hungary] is moving rightward,” he urged the Soviet leadership to recognize that the uprising had stemmed from genuine popular discontent and that “the HWP has been compromised in the eyes of the overwhelming masses.” He argued that “the entire nation took part in the movement” to “get rid of the Rakosi clique.”<sup>138</sup> Kadar's perspective at this time was far more nuanced and insightful than the rigid formulas adopted by his government in December 1956, which char-

acterized the whole uprising as no more than a “counterrevolution” instigated and supported by the West.

One other surprising aspect of Kadar’s remarks is that he made little effort to gloss over his own actions or to downplay the negative influence of Soviet policy. He gave a detailed account of the meetings of the Hungarian “inner cabinet” on 1 November, noting that he “was a supporter of the view that no sorts of steps should be taken without having spoken with Andropov.” This position, however, did not really distinguish Kadar from Nagy, who himself had summoned Andropov to the evening session for urgent consultations about Soviet troop movements.<sup>139</sup> Moreover, Kadar acknowledged that when the consultations were over, he joined the other members of Nagy’s cabinet in voting for the declaration of neutrality, the appeal to the United Nations, and the resolution demanding an immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary. On both the 2nd and 3rd of November, Kadar spoke harshly about past Soviet “mistakes” in Hungary, and was far more critical about Rakosi than about Nagy. His comments on this topic were echoed by Munnich, who argued that the fundamental “source of anti-Soviet sentiments” in Hungary was the population’s “certainty that the [Communist] regime exists and is preserved only through the support of the USSR.”

None of this is to imply that Kadar’s stance in early November was greatly beneficial to Hungary. Kadar was hardly naive, and the fact that he was willing to come to Moscow suggests that he advocated more forceful Soviet action. Nevertheless, the Malin notes do not bear out the notion that Kadar was a quisling from the very start. He took on that function after 4 November, but it was not the role he wanted or envisaged when he arrived in Moscow.

## The Invasion

The CPSU Presidium’s abrupt shift in favor of all-out intervention on 31 October, after more than a week of vacillation, left many political and military tasks to be carried out. Shortly before

the Presidium meeting, Khrushchev had spoken by phone with Gomulka, and the two men had arranged to meet the next day (1 November) in Brest, along the Soviet-Polish border. The Presidium designated Malenkov and Molotov to accompany Khrushchev to Brest. The Presidium also authorized Khrushchev and Malenkov to hold negotiations with Tito so they could try to gain at least tacit support from the Yugoslav leader. In addition, the Presidium approved Khrushchev’s suggestion that they “inform the Chinese comrades, the Czechs, the Romanians, and the Bulgarians” about the upcoming invasion.<sup>140</sup>

When the Presidium meeting adjourned, Khrushchev first contacted Liu Shaoqi and other senior Chinese officials who had been in Moscow for consultations since 23 October. The members of the Chinese delegation, who had kept in close touch with Mao Zedong during their visit, were getting set to return to Beijing on the 31st. Khrushchev wanted to inform them immediately about the new decision, rather than having them find out about it second-hand back in China. The entire CPSU Presidium traveled to Vnukovo Airport on the 31st to meet with the departing Chinese officials and smooth over any ruffled feathers.<sup>141</sup> Khrushchev was concerned that Liu Shaoqi might be upset when he learned about the sudden change in Soviet policy. During consultations with the Soviet leadership over the previous week, Liu Shaoqi had consistently expressed Mao’s view that the “working class of Hungary” must be permitted to “regain control of the situation and put down the uprising on its own,” without further Soviet interference. As late as 30 October, the Chinese delegates had called for Soviet relations with all other socialist states, including Hungary, to be based on the five principles of Pancha Shila: mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; non-aggression; non-interference in internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence.<sup>142</sup> The Soviet decision on 30 October seemed to be in full conformity with these principles, but the *volte-face* on 31 October raised doubts about Chinese reactions.

It turned out, however, that the talks with Liu Shaoqi were much less onerous than expected. After Khrushchev explained why the Soviet leadership had reversed its position, the Chinese delegates condoned the change and promised to go over the matter carefully with Mao. Even before the delegation returned to China, Mao’s own view of the situation was gradually changing as a result of intelligence reports and diplomatic cables flowing into Beijing. It is unclear precisely when Mao shifted unambiguously in favor of the invasion, but the last-minute consultations at Vnukovo Airport may well have been decisive in allowing the Soviet Union to gain strong Chinese backing.<sup>143</sup>

With that task accomplished, Khrushchev and Malenkov were able to set off a few hours later for their rapid series of top-secret meetings with leaders of the other Warsaw Pact countries.<sup>144</sup> At the first such meeting, in Brest, Khrushchev and Malenkov were joined by Molotov for talks with a Polish delegation consisting of Gomulka, Jozef Cyrankiewicz, and Edward Ochab. This meeting was regarded as particularly sensitive and unpredictable because the political situation in Poland was still so turbulent. The three Soviet negotiators hoped to defuse most of Gomulka’s objections, but their efforts in this regard were largely unsuccessful. Although the Polish leader agreed that the “counterrevolution” in Hungary had to be suppressed, he strongly objected to the use of Soviet military force. Khrushchev soon realized that he would not be able to convince Gomulka that direct intervention was necessary, and the Soviet leader was not even sure by the end of the meeting whether Gomulka would refrain from publicly criticizing the action.<sup>145</sup>

Khrushchev’s concerns were not entirely unfounded. Shortly after Gomulka and his colleagues returned to Warsaw, they convened an emergency session of the PZPR Politburo, which “expressed opposition to the USSR’s armed intervention in Hungary.”<sup>146</sup> The Polish Politburo also endorsed the publication of a statement affirming that the crisis should be resolved “by the

Hungarian people alone and not by foreign intervention.” This statement appeared (in slightly modified form) in the PZPR newspaper *Trybuna Ludu* the following day.<sup>147</sup> Moreover, on 2 November, Gomulka publicly offered Warsaw as a forum for Soviet-Hungarian negotiations, which he (and Imre Nagy) hoped would “lead to the settlement of problems in bilateral relations.”<sup>148</sup> When Gomulka’s last-ditch efforts proved futile and the invasion began as scheduled on 4 November, the Polish leader briefly considered voicing his objections openly. After further thought, however, Gomulka decided that he should maintain a discreet public stance to avoid undue antagonism with Moscow.<sup>149</sup> At his behest, the PZPR Politburo instructed the Polish envoy at the United Nations to vote against a U.S.-sponsored resolution condemning the Soviet invasion.<sup>150</sup> Gomulka remained distinctly uneasy about the whole matter, but he kept his reservations out of public view. To that extent, the Soviet consultations with Polish officials in Brest on 1 November were a qualified success. Had Gomulka not been informed at all about the invasion beforehand, he might well have been inclined to adopt a much less accommodating position when Soviet troops moved in.

The Soviet consultations after the Brest meeting went far more smoothly. Molotov returned to Moscow on the 1st so that he could inform the other members of the CPSU Presidium about Gomulka’s reaction. In the meantime, Khrushchev and Malenkov traveled to Bucharest, where they spoke with top Romanian, Czechoslovak, and Bulgarian officials. Not surprisingly, the delegations from all three East European countries vehemently endorsed the Soviet decision. The Czechoslovak leader, Antonin Novotny, and the Romanian leader, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, reemphasized the concerns they had been expressing over the past several days about the growing spillover from the revolution. They were joined by the Bulgarian leader, Todor Zhivkov, in arguing that “it is essential to adopt every appropriate measure, including military intervention, as soon as possible”

to combat “imperialist intrigues” and “preserve the system of people’s democracy in Hungary.”<sup>151</sup>

On 2 November, Khrushchev and Malenkov flew to Yugoslavia, where they met with Tito at his villa on the Adriatic island of Brioni from 7 p.m. until 5 a.m. the following day.<sup>152</sup> When the two Soviet leaders were *en route* to Brioni, they were apprehensive—particularly after the recent session in Brest with Gomulka—that Tito, too, would strongly oppose the Soviet decision; but their concerns proved to be unwarranted. During the ten hours of talks, Khrushchev declined to provide Tito with a precise timetable for the invasion, but he made clear that Soviet troops would soon be intervening in Hungary to “defend socialism” and “halt the killing of honest Communists.” The Yugoslav leader, for his part, left no doubt that he agreed with the Soviet decision, if only because it was the sole remaining way to “crush the counterrevolution” and “prevent the restoration of capitalism in Hungary.” Tito’s earlier support for Nagy had essentially disappeared by this point.<sup>153</sup>

When the question came up of who should be brought in to replace Nagy, Khrushchev mentioned that Janos Kadar and Ferenc Munnich were the leading candidates, with a decided preference for the latter. Tito and other Yugoslav officials at the talks (Edvard Kardelj, Aleksander Rankovic, and the Yugoslav ambassador to Moscow, Veljko Micunovic) argued that it would be better to go with Kadar because of his credentials as a prisoner during the Stalin-era purges, and the Soviet leaders readily agreed. Tito also urged Khrushchev and Malenkov to be sure that the new “Provisional Workers’ and Peasants’ Government” would condemn the Rakosi era and adopt reforms needed to win popular support. Khrushchev assented to these proposals (except for Tito’s suggestion that the newly-formed workers’ councils in Hungary be preserved), and in return Tito pledged to use his special contacts with Geza Losonczy (a close aide to Nagy) to try to persuade Nagy to step down immediately, before Soviet troops entered. That way, the existing Hun-

garian government would collapse, and the Soviet intervention would not appear to be directed against a specific leader.<sup>154</sup> It turned out that Tito was unable or unwilling to fulfill his promise—a failure that caused great irritation in Moscow later on—but Khrushchev did not foresee that when he left Brioni.<sup>155</sup> Even if he had foreseen it, the very fact that Tito was so firmly supportive of the upcoming invasion was enough for Khrushchev to regard the talks as a “pleasant surprise.”<sup>156</sup>

On the morning of 3 November, Khrushchev and Malenkov returned to Moscow having largely accomplished their task of overcoming any reservations that allied Communist states (with the exception of Poland) might have about the impending military action. Khrushchev had ample reason to be pleased when he briefly presented the results of the talks at a CPSU Presidium meeting later that day.<sup>157</sup>

The military side of the invasion proceeded just as rapidly as the political consultations. On 1 November, Marshal Konev was appointed the supreme commander of Soviet forces in Hungary. That same day, tens of thousands of Soviet troops, who had supposedly been withdrawing from Hungary, instead received orders to move back into Budapest to quell the uprising. They were reinforced by many tens of thousands of additional Soviet troops who had been congregating in Romania and the Transcarpathian Military District, along Hungary’s southern and eastern borders.<sup>158</sup> Some consideration was given to having Romanian and Bulgarian soldiers take part alongside the Soviet forces and to having Czechoslovak troops move in simultaneously from the north.<sup>159</sup> Romanian and Bulgarian leaders had told Khrushchev that “they wanted to have their own military units participate in . . . the struggle against the Hungarian counterrevolution,” and the Czechoslovak Politburo likewise expressed its “readiness not only to support intervention, but also to take an active part in it.”<sup>160</sup> In the end, however, Khrushchev and his colleagues decided that the invasion should be carried out

exclusively by Soviet troops. Although one might have thought that Marshal Konev, as commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact, would have preferred a joint operation with the East European armies, he in fact was among those who recommended that the task be left to the Soviet Union alone.

To ensure that mistakes made during the initial Soviet intervention in late October would not be repeated, Konev met with General Lashchenko and other Soviet officers who had been in Hungary from the outset.<sup>161</sup> For a variety of reasons, as one of Lashchenko's aides later explained, the Soviet Union's chances of success were much greater during the second intervention:

In November our combat operations took place under more auspicious circumstances than at the end of October. Budapest was already under martial law; armed groups were less successful in carrying out sudden attacks; and our troops controlled the situation on the city streets. We also had a lot more forces and equipment at our disposal than in October. In addition, our troops were no longer hampered by contradictory directives issued by the Hungarian government (whether and when to open fire, etc.), which had seriously impeded our troops' actions and resulted in needless casualties. . . . The considerable experience acquired by our units in October also contributed to the greater success of our subsequent operations.<sup>162</sup>

In addition to helping out with the final military plans, Lashchenko retained a key command role in Budapest. Responsibility for operations elsewhere in Hungary was assigned to General Mikhail Kazakov and General Mikhail Malinin, both of whom had played a key part in the earlier intervention.

One of Kazakov's first tasks was to ensure that enough Soviet troops were deployed along the border with Austria to forestall any prospect of Western intervention. Soviet leaders decided to err on the side of caution in this regard, not least because Nagy and his colleagues had made a last-ditch attempt on 1 November to obtain military support from either the United Nations or NATO by combining Hungary's formal withdrawal from the Warsaw

Pact and its declaration of neutrality with an appeal to the UN General Assembly.<sup>163</sup> Any hopes of receiving outside support, however, were quickly dashed. The United States expressly prohibited NATO forces from taking any actions that might be deemed at all provocative.<sup>164</sup> Once it was clear that the "imperialist" armies would not be intervening, Konev and his subordinates were able to concentrate their planning and resources on Budapest and other cities where the revolution was at its height.

The West's failure to intervene left Nagy's government in a hopeless situation. Although Hungarian army units had been fighting mainly on the side of the rebels since 28 October (when a ceasefire was declared and a National Guard was formed), the military overall could no longer function as a cohesive whole.<sup>165</sup> In early November, Hungarian defense minister Pal Maleter began preparing as best he could to defend against a Soviet attack, but in the absence of Western military support Nagy was reluctant to order large-scale armed resistance, for fear of precipitating mass bloodshed without any possibility of victory.<sup>166</sup> Among other things, Nagy was well aware that the Soviet Union had systematically penetrated the Hungarian military establishment from the late 1940s on. He feared that dozens of Soviet agents who were still entrenched in the Hungarian officer corps and national defense ministry, as well as a "field staff for Soviet troops in Budapest that operated in direct contact with the Hungarians" from the outset of the crisis, would prevent most of the Hungarian army from being used to support the government.<sup>167</sup> As a result, the majority of Hungarian troops remained confined to their barracks on 4 November and were systematically disarmed by Soviet forces that reentered Budapest.<sup>168</sup> Although some middle- and lower-ranking Hungarian officers, conscripts, and reservists, under the leadership of General Bela Kiraly, took up arms in a last-ditch defense of the uprising, their efforts could not make up for the inaction of most Hungarian soldiers.

Early in the morning of 4 Novem-

ber, a final signal was given for Operation "Whirlwind" (*Vikhr*—the code-name of the invasion) to commence. The fighting in Budapest and many other cities on 4, 5, and 6 November was intense, and even in a small town like Dunapetele the defenders managed to hold out for four days despite being hopelessly outnumbered.<sup>169</sup> Eventually, though, Soviet forces crushed the resistance and installed a pro-Soviet government under Kadar and Munnich. Officials in Moscow were able to maintain direct contact with the new Hungarian government via Leonid Brezhnev and Anastas Mikoyan, who had been sent to Budapest on 3 November for precisely that reason.<sup>170</sup> Some limited fighting continued in Hungary until 11 November, especially in areas well outside Budapest (notably in Pecs, where some 200 fighters held out until the 14th), but the revolution was effectively over by the 8th. Marshal Konev had promised Khrushchev on 31 October that it would take Soviet troops three to four days to "destroy the counterrevolutionary forces and restore order in Hungary," and his forecast was largely borne out.<sup>171</sup>

### Further Rifts Within the Soviet Leadership

Even after the final decision to intervene on a massive scale was adopted on 31 October, the leadership struggle continued to buffet Soviet deliberations about Hungary. This was evident not only at the Presidium meeting on 1 November, when Mikoyan (having just returned to Moscow) tried to undo the decision to invade, but also at the meetings held during the first few days of the invasion, on 4-6 November.<sup>172</sup> Molotov and Kaganovich disagreed with the others about the best way to handle the post-invasion regime in Hungary. Initially, Molotov had wanted the former prime minister Andras Hegedus, who had escaped to Moscow on 28 October, to be made the head of a new "Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government." Such a step, Molotov claimed, would simply amount to the reinstatement of Hegedus's government as the legitimate authority in Hungary.

(Hegedus had been prime minister in the government that immediately preceded Nagy's return to power in October 1956.) Molotov averred that Janos Kadar was still a furtive supporter of Nagy and should not be given any top post. Although Molotov eventually backed down on this issue, he continued to insist that it was improper for Kadar's new government to condemn the "Rakosi-Gero clique" and to give a new name to the revived Hungarian Communist party. These differences produced a number of acerbic exchanges with Khrushchev and other Presidium members. On 4 November, Khrushchev declared that he "simply cannot understand Cde. Molotov; he always comes up with the most pernicious [*vredneishie*] ideas." Molotov responded by telling Khrushchev that he "should keep quiet and stop being so overbearing."<sup>173</sup>

The exchanges became even more acrimonious at the session on 6 November, where Molotov brought a flood of criticism upon himself by declaring his "vehement objection" to Khrushchev's ideas about the regime that Janos Kadar was establishing in Hungary. Maksim Saburov accused Molotov and Kaganovich of being "rigid and dogmatic," and Mikoyan insisted that "Cde. Molotov is completely ignoring the concrete situation and is dragging us backward." Averki Aristov noted that "Cdes. Molotov and Kaganovich were always transfixed by Stalin's cult, and they are still transfixed by it." Severest of all were the criticisms that Khrushchev himself expressed, accusing Molotov and Kaganovich of wanting to indulge in "screeching and face-slapping." He expressed particular disdain for Kaganovich, asking him "when are you finally going to mend your ways and stop all this toadying [to Molotov]?"

In June 1957, when the leadership struggle reached its peak, the Hungarian crisis resurfaced. One of the accusations leveled by Molotov and other members of the "Anti-Party Group" against Khrushchev was what they described as his mismanagement of intra-bloc affairs. Molotov argued that Khrushchev had committed "dangerous zigzags" vis-a-vis Eastern Europe and

had "ignored the impact of [the Soviet Union's] actions on other socialist countries"—charges that were not entirely without merit.<sup>174</sup> Khrushchev managed to deflect those allegations and to oust his opponents, but the events in both Hungary and Poland in 1956 had highlighted the risks of allowing de-Stalinization in Eastern Europe to move too fast. Although Khrushchev cemented his status as the top leader in 1957, he pursued a much more cautious policy in Eastern Europe from then on.

### Consequences and Costs

By reestablishing military control over Hungary and by exposing—more dramatically than in 1953—the emptiness of the "roll-back" and "liberation" rhetoric in the West, the Soviet invasion in November 1956 stemmed any further loss of Soviet power in Eastern Europe. Shortly after the invasion, Khrushchev acknowledged that U.S.-Soviet relations were likely to deteriorate for a considerable time, but he indicated that he was ready to pay that price because the Soviet Union "had proved to the West that [it is] strong and resolute" while "the West is weak and divided."<sup>175</sup> U.S. officials, for their part, were even more aware than they had been in 1953 of how limited their options were in Eastern Europe. Senior members of the Eisenhower administration conceded that the most they could do in the future was "to encourage peaceful evolutionary changes" in the region, and they warned that the United States must avoid conveying any impression "either directly or by implication . . . that American military help will be forthcoming" to anti-Communist forces.<sup>176</sup> Any lingering U.S. hopes of directly challenging Moscow's sphere of influence in Eastern Europe thus effectively ended.

Despite these obvious benefits for Soviet policy, the revolts in both Poland and Hungary in 1956 had demonstrated serious weaknesses in the region that would continue to endanger Soviet control. The bloodiness of the three-day conflict in Hungary, in which roughly 22,000 Hungarians and nearly 2,300 Soviet soldiers died or were wounded,

underscored the extent of popular opposition both to the Communist regime and to the Soviet role in Eastern Europe.<sup>177</sup> Two years of intensive "normalization," including wholesale purges, arrests, deportations, and executions, culminating in the executions (by hanging) of Nagy and Pal Maleter in June 1958, were carried out to eliminate the most active opposition to Kadar's regime. By the time the process was completed, more than 100,000 people had been arrested, 35,000 had been tried for "counterrevolutionary acts," nearly 26,000 had been sentenced to prison, and as many as 600 had been executed.<sup>178</sup> Similarly, in Poland the Poznan riots and the mass protest rallies that preceded and accompanied Gomulka's return to power were indicative of widespread disaffection with the extant political system. That discontent merely festered in subsequent years, as Gomulka gradually abandoned the reformist mantle and reverted to an orthodox Communist approach. Ironically, it was Kadar, not Gomulka, who ended up pursuing a more relaxed political and economic line once he had consolidated his hold on power; and as a result, Hungary experienced no further instances of violent upheaval and mass disorder. By contrast, Gomulka's eschewal of genuine reform left Poland as politically unstable as ever by the time he was forced out in December 1970.

The events of 1956 also made Soviet leaders aware of the urgent need for improved economic conditions in Eastern Europe, insofar as the unrest in both Poland and Hungary—and in East Germany three years earlier—had stemmed, at least initially, from economic discontent. The danger of allowing "basic economic and social problems to go unresolved" was one of the main lessons that Khrushchev emphasized to his colleagues from the very start: "Ideological work alone will be of no avail if we do not ensure that living standards rise. It is no accident that Hungary and Poland are the countries in which unrest has occurred."<sup>179</sup> Khrushchev also concluded that the rectification of "certain inequalities in our economic relations with the fraternal

countries” would be “crucial to the process of normalization” in both Poland and Hungary.<sup>180</sup> Although Kadar was eventually able to redress some of the most acute economic grievances in Hungary through the adoption of a New Economic Mechanism in 1968 and other reforms in subsequent years, his retention of state ownership and centralized economic management thwarted any hope of genuine prosperity. This was even more the case in Poland, where, despite some leeway granted for private activity (especially in agriculture, retail trade, and light industry), the economic policies under Gomulka and his successors spawned periodic outbreaks of widespread public unrest. No matter how often the Polish authorities claimed that they would pursue drastic economic improvements, they always proved unwilling to accept the political price that such improvements would have necessitated.

From a purely military standpoint, the invasion in November 1956 achieved its immediate goals, but in the longer term it exacted significant costs. When the revolution was crushed by Soviet troops, the morale and fighting elan of the Hungarian armed forces were bound to dissolve as well. The remains of the Hungarian army were regarded by Soviet commanders (and by Kadar) as politically and militarily unreliable. More than 8,000 officers, including a large number who had attended Soviet military colleges and academies, were forced out of the Hungarian armed forces in late 1956 and 1957.<sup>181</sup> The country’s army thus essentially disintegrated and had to be rebuilt almost from scratch, leaving a gap in Warsaw Pact military planning and combat preparations for many years thereafter.

From a diplomatic standpoint as well, the invasion entailed significant costs, at least in the short term. The large-scale use of force in Hungary alienated numerous Third World countries that had been sedulously courted by the Soviet Union. A top-secret memorandum prepared in December 1956 by Igor Tugarinov, a senior official at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, acknowledged that there had been a “sig-

nificant increase in hostile statements about the Soviet Union” in key South Asian countries, including India, Pakistan, Burma, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), and Indonesia.<sup>182</sup> Tugarinov noted that the governments in these countries, and even many leftist commentators there, were publicly “drawing an analogy between the English-French-Israeli aggression in Egypt and the participation of Soviet troops in the suppression of the counterrevolutionary uprising in Hungary.” The report cited an official protest from the Indian government in mid-December which declared that “the events in Hungary have shattered the beliefs of millions who had begun to look upon the USSR as the defender of peace and of the rights of the weakest people.” What was even more disturbing, according to Tugarinov, was the “increased prestige that the United States had derived from recent events in Hungary and the Near East.” While Asian officials were condemning Soviet “aggression” in Hungary as “a direct violation of the spirit and letter of the Bandung Conference declaration,” they were making “extremely favorable” references to the “U.S. position in both Hungary and Suez.” Tugarinov reported that some Indian officials had even begun insisting that “it makes sense for India to reorient its foreign policy more closely toward the United States.” This raised the “distinct possibility,” in Tugarinov’s view, that “there will be a major improvement in Indo-American relations, with a detrimental impact on India’s relations with the USSR.” Although the adverse effects of the 1956 invasion on Soviet-Third World relations proved, for the most part, to be relatively ephemeral, the suppression of the uprising did cause at least temporary disruption in Khrushchev’s strategy vis-a-vis the Non-Aligned Movement.

Finally, the fact that an invasion had been necessary at all underscored the dangers of Moscow’s incoherent and drifting policy in Eastern Europe following Stalin’s death. Khrushchev was well aware of the potential for recriminations, as he indicated during his conversation with Tito in early November:

[If we had failed to take action], there are people in the Soviet Union who would say that as long as Stalin was in command, everyone obeyed and there were no great shocks, but now that [these new bastards] have come to power, Russia has suffered the defeat and loss of Hungary.<sup>183</sup>

This point was further highlighted by the acrimonious exchanges during the CPSU Presidium meetings in early November (see the previous section) and by the accusations which the Anti-Party Group lodged against Khrushchev in June 1957, as cited above. Ultimately, Khrushchev was able to overcome the political fallout from the two crises, but the events of 1956 clearly took their toll on the process of de-Stalinization in Eastern Europe. Even though Khrushchev suspected that the Warsaw Pact countries would remain vulnerable to recurrent crises unless the indigenous regimes became more “viable” and the Soviet Union forged a more equitable relationship, he was determined to proceed far more cautiously in the future.<sup>184</sup> Repressive leaders in Eastern Europe, such as Walter Ulbricht in East Germany, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej in Romania, Todor Zhivkov in Bulgaria, and Antonin Novotny in Czechoslovakia, were able to win even stronger backing from Khrushchev because they convinced him that their presence was the only safeguard against “unexpected developments” of the sort that occurred in Hungary and Poland. When faced with a tradeoff between the “viability” of the East European regimes and the “cohesion” of the Eastern bloc after 1956, Khrushchev consistently chose to emphasize cohesion, thus forestalling any real movement toward a more durable political order.<sup>185</sup>

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This brief review of some of the latest findings about the 1956 crises leaves numerous topics unaddressed, but it should be enough to indicate that the new archival evidence does not just confirm what everyone knew all along. More often than not, the new evidence undercuts long-established views and

reveals unknown events. Disagreements about how to interpret the past will persist even if all the archives are someday open, but the new documentation is enabling scholars to achieve a far more accurate and complete understanding not only of specific episodes (e.g., the Soviet Union's responses to the Polish and Hungarian crises) but of the entire course of the Cold War.

<sup>1</sup> "Zayavlenie rukovoditelei Bolgarii, Vengrii, GDR, Pol'shi, i Sovetskogo Soyuza" and "Zayavlenie Sovetskogo Soyuza," both in *Pravda* (Moscow), 5 December 1989, p. 2.

<sup>2</sup> F. Luk'yanov, "Vengriya privetsvuet zayavleniu Moskvu," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 24 October 1991, p. 4.

<sup>3</sup> See, e.g., Army-General A.D. Lizichev, "Oktyabr' i Leninskoe uchenie o zashchite revolyutsii," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 3 (February 1987), p. 96; Admiral A. I. Sorokin, ed., *Sovetskie vooruzhenye sily na strazhe mira i sotsializma* (Moscow: Nauka, 1988), p. 254; V. V. Semin, ed., *Voennopoliticheskoe sotrudnichestvo sotsialisticheskikh stran* (Moscow: Nauka, 1988), esp. pp. 127-141, 181-220; and the interview with Army-General V. N. Lobov in "I tol'ko pravda ko dvoru," *Izvestiya* (Moscow), 8 May 1989, pp. 1, 3.

<sup>4</sup> Colonel I.A. Klimov, "KPSS ob ukreplenii edinstva i boevogo sotrudnichestva vooruzhennykh sil sotsialisticheskikh stran," *Voennistoricheskii zhurnal* (Moscow), No. 5 (May 1987), p. 80.

<sup>5</sup> V.F. Khalipov, *Voennaya politika KPSS* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1988), esp. pp. 256-257.

<sup>6</sup> Army-General P. I. Lashchenko, "Vengriya, 1956 god," *Voennistoricheskii zhurnal* (Moscow), No. 9 (September 1989), pp. 42-50.

<sup>7</sup> Budapest Domestic Service, 28 January 1989.

<sup>8</sup> "TsK KPSS: Ob izuchenii arkhivov TsK KPSS, kasayushchikhsya sobytii 1956 g. v Vengrii," Report No. 06/2-513 (Secret), from R. Fedorov and P. Laptev, deputy heads of the CPSU CC International Department and CPSU CC General Department, respectively, 23 November 1990, in Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii (TsKhSD), Moscow, Fond (F.) 89, Opis' (Op.) 11, Delo (D.) 23, List (L.) 1. The memorandum warned that the "new Hungarian authorities" were "clearly intending to use this question [i.e., the 1956 invasion] as a means of pressure against us." For the article praising the invasion, see Lieut.-Colonel Jozsef Forigy, "O kontrrevolyutsii v Vengrii 1956 goda," *Voennistoricheskii zhurnal* (Moscow), No. 8 (August 1990), pp. 39-46. This article was explicitly intended to counter the "trai-

torous revisionists" in Hungary who had claimed that the events of 1956 were a "popular uprising" and who in 1989-90 were carrying out a second "counterrevolution." The article was unstinting in its denunciation of the "traitors" led by Imre Nagy and of the "new counterrevolutionaries in our midst today who regard themselves as the heirs of 1956." The chief editor of the Soviet journal, Major-General Viktor Filatov, endorsed the Hungarian author's arguments and warmly recommended the article to his readers. Filatov added that "upon reading the article, one cannot help but notice features of that [earlier] counterrevolutionary period that are similar to the changes occurring in the East European countries at the present time."

<sup>9</sup> *Jelcin-dosszje Szoviet dokumentumok 1956 rol*. Budapest: Dohany, 1993; and *Hianyzo Lapok: 1956 tortenetebol: Dokumentumok a volt SZKP KP Leveltarabol* (Budapest: Zenit Konyvek, 1993).

<sup>10</sup> "O sobyitiakh 1956 goda v Vengrii," *Diplomaticheskii vestnik* (Moscow), Nos. 19-20 (15-31 October 1992), pp. 52-56.

<sup>11</sup> "Vengriya, aprel'-oktyabr' 1956 goda: Informatsiya Yu. V. Andropova, A. I. Mikoyana i M. A. Suslova iz Budapeshta"; "Vengriya, oktyabr'-noyabr' 1956 goda: Iz arkhiva TsK KPSS"; and "Vengriya, noyabr' 1956-avgust 1957 g.," all in *Istoricheskii arkhiv* (Moscow), Nos. 4, 5, and 6 (1993), pp. 103-142, 132-160, and 131-144, respectively.

<sup>12</sup> See, in particular, the segment of Khrushchev's memoirs published in "Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha Khrushcheva," *Voprosy istorii* (Moscow), No. 4 (1995), pp. 68-84. Another extremely useful account is available in the memoir by the former Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow, Veljko Micunovic, *Moscow Diary*, trans. by David Floyd (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980). Because of his fluency in Russian and close ties with Tito, Micunovic regularly had direct contacts with Khrushchev and other senior figures. Less reliable, but potentially illuminating (if used with caution), are the relevant portions of the memoir by the police chief in Budapest during the revolution, Sandor Kopacsi, *Au nom de la classe ouvriere* (Paris: Editions Robert Laffont, 1979), which is also available in English translation under the same title (*In the Name of the Working Class*). Kopacsi ended up siding with the insurgents and was arrested in November 1956. He was sentenced to life imprisonment in June 1958, but was granted amnesty in 1963. In 1974 he was permitted to emigrate to Canada.

<sup>13</sup> A few well-connected Russians have had privileged access to Malin's notes from the Presidium

meetings dealing with Khrushchev's secret speech at the 20th CPSU Congress, but these notes have not been made more widely available. See V. P. Naumov, "K istorii sekretnogo doklada N. S. Khrushcheva na XX s'ezde KPSS," *Novaya i noveishaya istoriya* (Moscow), No. 4 (July-August 1996), pp. 147-168; Vladimir Naumov, "'Utverdit' dokladchikom tovarishcha,'" *Moskovskie Novosti*, No. 5 (4-11 February 1996), p. 34; and Aleksei Bogomolov, "K 40-letiyu XX s'ezda: Taina zakrytogo doklada," *Sovershenno sekretno* (Moscow), No. 1 (1996), pp. 3-4.

<sup>14</sup> Vyacheslav Sereda and Janos M. Rainer, eds., *Dontes a Kremlben, 1956: A szovjet partelnokseg vitai Magyarorszagrol* (Budapest: 1956-os Intezet, 1996).

<sup>15</sup> The notes about Hungary appeared in two parts under the title "Kak reshalis' 'voprosy Vengrii': Rabochie zapisi zasedanii Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, iyul'-noyabr' 1956 g.," *Istoricheskii arkhiv* (Moscow), Nos. 2 and 3 (1996), pp. 73-104 and 87-121, respectively. The notes about Poland appeared in Issue No. 5 of the same journal.

<sup>16</sup> See the assessment of this meeting and the annotated translation of the Czech notes by Mark Kramer, "Hungary and Poland, 1956: Khrushchev's CPSU CC Presidium Meeting on East European Crises, 24 October 1956," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, Issue No. 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1, 50-56. The Czech document, "Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. rijna 1956 k situaci v Polsku a Mad'arsku," 25 October 1956, in Statni Ustredni Archiv (Praha), Archiv Ustredniho Vyboru Komunisticke Strany Ceskoslovenska (Arch. UV KSC), Fond (F.) 07/16 — A. Novotny, Svazek (Sv.) 3, was compiled by Jan Svoboda, a senior aide to the then-leader of Czechoslovakia, Antonin Novotny, who attended the CPSU Presidium meeting.

<sup>17</sup> Lieut.-General E. I. Malashenko, "Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta," *Voennistoricheskii zhurnal* (Moscow), Nos. 10, 11, and 12 (October, November, and December 1993) and No. 1 (January 1994), pp. 22-30; 44-51, 33-37, and 30-36, respectively.

<sup>18</sup> See the analysis and valuable collection of declassified documents in Edward Jan Nalepa, *Pacyfikacja zbuntowanego miasta: Wojsko Polskie w Czerwcu 1956 r. w Poznaniu w swietle dokumentow wojskowych* (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Bellona, 1992). For broader overviews of the crisis, see Jan Ptasinski, *Wydarzenia poznanskie czerwiec 1956* (Warsaw: Krajowa Agencja Wydawnicza, 1986); Jaroslav Maciejewski and Zofia Trojanowicz, eds., *Poznanski Czerwiec 1956* (Poznan: Wydawnictwo Poznanskie, 1990); and Maciej

Roman Bombicki, *Poznan '56* (Poznan: Lawica, 1992).

19 "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 9 i 12 iyulya 1956 g.," 12 July 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, Ll. 2-20b.

20 "Pol'skii narod kleimit organizatorov provokatsii," *Pravda* (Moscow), 1 July 1956, p. 6.

21 The best overview of the events in Poland in 1956 is Pawel Machcewicz, *Polski rok 1956* (Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza, 1993). Leszek Gluchowski has done excellent work on the Soviet-Polish crisis; see, for example, his "Poland, 1956: Khrushchev, Gomulka, and the 'Polish October'," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, Issue No. 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1, 38-49. See also Jerzy Pokinski, "Wojsko Polskie w 1956 r. — problemy polityczne (1) i (2)," *Wojsko i Wychowanie* (Warsaw), Nos. 1-2 (1992), pp. 40-78; and Robert Los, *Pazdziernik 1956 roku w perspektywie stosunkow polsko-radzieckich*, Ph.D. Diss., University of Lodz, 1993. For a sample of other perspectives on the 1956 Polish crisis, see Zbyslaw Rykowski and Wieslaw Wladyka, *Polska proba Pazdziernik '56* (Krakow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1989), pp. 232-234; *Sprawozdanie z prac Komisii KC PZPR powolanej dla wyjasnienia przyczyn i przebiegu konfliktow spolecznuch w dziejach Polski Ludowej*, special issue of *Nowe Drogi* (Warsaw), September 1983, see esp. pp. 21-32; Benon Dymek, ed., *Pazdziernik 1956: Szkice historyczne* (Warsaw: Akademia Nauk Spolecznych, 1989); Bogdan Hillebrandt, ed., *Ideowopolityczne kontrowersje i konflikty lat 1956-1970* (Warsaw: Akademia Nauk Spolecznych, 1986); Grzegorz Matuszak, *Kryzysy spoleczno-polityczne w procesie budowy socjalizmu w Polsce Ludowej* (Warsaw: Akademia Nauk Spolecznych PZPR, 1986); and Antoni Czubinski, "Kryzys polityczny 1956 roku w Polsce," in Antoni Czubinski, ed., *Kryzysy spoleczno-polityczne w Polsce Ludowej* (Warsaw: Instytut Podstawowych Problemow Marksizmu-Leninizmu, 1983), pp. 80-114.

22 "Zapis' besedy N. S. Khrushcheva v Varshave," No. 233 (Special Dossier — Strictly Secret), notes by A. Mikoyan, 19-20 October 1956, in Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (APRF), F. 3, Op. 65, D. 2, Ll. 1-14. Further details about this meeting are contained in "Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. rijna 1956," Ll. 1-4.

23 *Ibid.*

24 *Ibid.* and "Zapis' besedy N. S. Khrushcheva v Varshave," L. 4.

25 At the time, there were still 79 Soviet officers, including 28 generals, serving in the Polish army. See Edward Jan Nalepa, *Oficerowie Radziecky w Wojsku Polskim w latach 1943-1968: Studium historyczno-wojskowe* (Warsaw: Wojskowy Instytut Historyczny, 1992), p. 43. For a valuable discussion of the military confrontation, see "Wojskowe aspekty pazdziernika 1956 r.," *Polska Zbrojna* (Warsaw), 18-20 October 1991, p. 3.

26 This account is based on documents recently declassified at the Internal Military Service Archive (*Archiwum Wojskowej Sluzby Wewnetrznej*, or AWSW) and the Central Military Archive (*Centralne Archiwum Wojskowe*, or CAW) in Warsaw, which were provided to the author by Leszek Gluchowski. See, in particular, the two reports compiled by Major Witold Osinski, deputy chief of the 2nd Section of the KBW's Military Counterintelligence Directorate, in AWSW, sygn. 2859/20/K and CAW, sygn. 1812/92/8. See also the invaluable first-hand account by Wlodzimierz Mus, the KBW commander at the time, "Spor generalow o Pazdziernik 1956: Czy grozila interwencja zbrojna?" *Polityka* (Warsaw), No. 42 (20 October 1990), p. 14.

27 "Zapis' besedy N. S. Khrushcheva v Varshave," L. 4.

28 Comments by Stefan Staszewski, former PZPR CC Secretary, in Teresa Toranska, ed., *Oni* (London: Aneks, 1985), p. 148.

29 "Komunikat o naradach Biura Politycznego KC PZPR i delegacji KC KPZR w Warszawie," *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), 20 October 1956, p. 1.

30 "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 20 oktyabrya 1956 g.," 20 October 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, Ll. 49-50.

31 This was evident, for example, when Ochab stopped in Moscow in September 1956 on his way back from Beijing. See "Priem Posla Pol'skoi Narodnoi Respubliki v SSSR tov. V. Levikovskogo, 10 sentyabrya 1956 g.," 11 September 1956 (Secret), memorandum from N. Patolichev, Soviet deputy foreign minister, in Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (AVPRF), F. Referentura po Pol'she, Op. 38, Por. 9, Papka, 126, D. 031, L. 1.

32 "Antisovetskaya kampaniya v pol'skoi presse," *Pravda* (Moscow), 20 October 1956, p. 1.

33 "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 21 oktyabrya 1956 g.," 21 October 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L. 2.

34 "Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. rijna 1956," L. 8.

35 Jacek Kuron, *Wiara i wina: Do i do*

*komunizmu* (Warsaw: BGW, 1990), p. 119.

36 Mus, "Czy grozila interwencja zbrojna?" p. 14.

37 "Przemowienie towarzysza Wladyslawa Gomulki," *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), 25 October 1956, p. 1, which appeared under the banner headline "Ponad 300 tysiecy warszawiakow na spotkaniu z nowym kierownictwem partii."

38 "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 26 oktyabrya 1956 g.," 26 October 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, L. 53.

39 "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 21 oktyabrya 1956 g.," L. 2.

40 "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 23 oktyabrya 1956 g.," 23 October 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. 4-40b.

41 Compare Khrushchev's account in "Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha Khrushcheva" with Molotov's less favorable reminiscences in Feliks Chuev, ed., *Sto sorok besed s Molotovym* (Moscow: Terra, 1991), p. 113.

42 Khrushchev's comments, as recorded in Micunovic, *Moscow Diary*, p. 139.

43 "Telefogramma po VCh," 15 November 1956 (Top Secret), from I. Maslennikov of the Soviet embassy in Warsaw, in AVPRF, F. Referentura po Pol'she, Op. 38, Por. 20, Pap. 127, D. 178, Ll. 32-33.

44 Quotations are from "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 23 oktyabrya 1956 g.," L. 4; and "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 28 oktyabrya 1956 g.," 28 October 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, L. 58.

45 For the full transcript of these sessions, see "Jegyzokonyv a Szovjet es a Magyar part-es allami vezetok targyalasairol," 13-16 June 1953 (Top Secret), in Magyar Orszagos Leveltar, 276, F. 102/65, oe. The document was declassified in 1991 and published the following year in the Hungarian journal *Multunk*. A preliminary translation by Monika Borbely was included in Christian F. Ostermann, ed., *The Post-Stalin Succession Struggle and the 17 June Uprising in East Germany: The Hidden History*, a compendium of documents prepared by the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) and the National Security Archive for a November 1996 international conference (hosted by the Center for Contemporary History Research in Potsdam) on "The Crisis Year 1953 and the Cold War in Europe."

46 "Plenum TsK KPSS — XIX Sozyv: Stenogramma chetyrnadsatogo zasedaniya 12 iyulya 1955 g. (utrennego)," July 1955 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 176, L. 143.

47 "Shifrtelgramma," Special Nos. 316-319/No. 16595 (Strictly Secret), from Yu. V. Andropov to the CPSU Presidium and CPSU Secretariat, 30 April 1956, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 45, D. 1, L. 2. 48 *Ibid.*, L. 5.

49 "Vypiska iz protokola zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 3 maya 1956 g.," No. P13/XXIII (Strictly Secret), 3 May 1956, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, L. 133.

50 "Telefonogramma iz Budapeshta v TsK KPSS," 13 June 1956 (Top Secret), from M. A. Suslov to the CPSU Presidium and Secretariat, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 146-149.

51 "Zapis' besedy N. S. Khrushcheva s kitaiskimi tovarishchami 2 oktyabrya 1959 g. v Pekine," 2 October 1959 (Top Secret/Special Dossier), in APRF, F. 3, Op. 65, D. 331, L. 12. For other disparaging remarks by Khrushchev about Rakosi, see Micunovic, *Moscow Diary*, pp. 135-136, 140.

52 See Janos Kadar's remarks to this effect in "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 3 noyabrya 1956 g.," 3 November 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. 31-33ob.

53 The resolution was broadcast on Hungarian domestic radio on 30 June and published in *Szabad Nep* the following day. For an English translation, see Paul E. Zinner, ed., *National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe: A Selection of Documents on Events in Poland and Hungary, February-November 1956* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), pp. 328-331.

54 "Shifrtelgramma," from Yu. V. Andropov to the CPSU Presidium and Secretariat, 9 July 1956 (Special Dossier — Strictly Secret), in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 151-162. All quotations in this paragraph are from Andropov's cable.

55 "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 9 i 12 iyulya 1956 g.," Ll. 2-2ob.

56 "TsK KPSS," 18 July 1956 (Strictly Secret — Urgent), Osobaya papka, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, L. 231.

57 *Ibid.*, L. 232.

58 "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 9 i 12 iyulya 1956 g.," L. 2.

59 "Vypiska iz Protokola No. 28 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 12 iyulya 1956 g.," 12 July 1956 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 14, D. 41, Ll. 1-2.

60 "Rastut i krepnut mezhdunarodnye sily mira, demokratii i sotsializma," *Pravda* (Moscow), 16 July 1956, pp. 2-3.

61 "Zapis' besedy A. I. Mikoyana s Matyashem Rakoshi, Andrashem Hegedushem, Erne Gere i Beloi Vegom, 13 iyulya 1956 g.," 17 July 1956

(Secret), compiled by Yu. V. Andropov, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 186-190.

62 "Zapis' vystuplenii na zasedaniya Politbyuro TsR VPT, 13 iyulya 1956 g.," 17 July 1956 (Secret), compiled by Yu. V. Andropov, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 191-205; and "TsK KPSS," 16 July 1956 (Strictly Secret — Urgent), Osobaya papka, APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 183-185. See also "Zapis' besedy A. I. Mikoyana s Yanoshem Kadarom, 14 iyulya 1956 g.," 17 July 1956 (Top Secret), compiled by Yu. V. Andropov, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 206-215.

63 "TsK KPSS," 18 July 1956 (Strictly Secret — Urgent), Osobaya papka, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 225-236. On the eve of the plenum, Mikoyan also held talks with key members of the HWP Central Leadership to ensure that Gero's candidacy would be supported.

64 Malashenko, "Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta" (Part 1), pp. 23-24.

65 "Plan deistvii Osobogo korpusa po vosstanovleniyu obshchestvennogo poriyadka na territorii Vengrii," 20 July 1956 (Strictly Secret), as recorded in Tsentral'nyi arkhiv Ministerstva oborony (TsAMO), F. 32, Op. 701291, D. 15, Ll. 130-131.

66 "TsK KPSS" (cited in Note 63 *supra*), L. 231.

67 "Zapis' besedy s Erno Gere, 2 sentyabrya 1956 g.," 27 September 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 28, D. 394, Ll. 254-256.

68 *Ibid.*, L. 256.

69 "Shifrtelgramma," 12 October 1956 (Strictly Secret — Urgent — Special Dossier), from Yu. V. Andropov to the CPSU Presidium, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, Ll. 64-75.

70 *Ibid.*, L. 71.

71 Countless books and articles about the Hungarian revolution have been published since 1956. For a vivid and well-researched account of the events of 23-24 October, see Bill Lomax, *Hungary 1956* (London: Allison & Busby, 1976), esp. pp. 106-123. For other useful perspectives, see Ferenc A. Vali, *Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism versus Communism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1961); Paul Kecskemeti, *The Unexpected Revolution: Social Forces in the Hungarian Uprising* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961); Charles Gati, *Hungary and the Soviet Bloc* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1986); and Paul E. Zinner, *Revolution in Hungary* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962). Until recently, reliable Hungarian-language accounts were relatively few in number, but that has changed dramatically since Communism ended. The large number of publications put out in Budapest by the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution are

a particularly rich source, as are some of the monographs sponsored by the Institute of History at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Reassessments of the 1956 crises, based on newly declassified materials and new memoirs, were presented at a landmark international "Conference on Hungary and the World, 1956: The New Archival Evidence," which was organized in Budapest on 26-29 September 1996 by the National Security Archive, the CWIHP, and the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution.

72 Malashenko, "Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta" (Part 1), pp. 24-25.

73 Other key sources are "Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. rijna 1956," Ll. 8-14; Malashenko, "Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta" (Part 1), pp. 22-30; and "TsK KPSS," Memorandum from Marshal Georgii Zhukov, Soviet minister of defense, and Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii, chief of the Soviet General Staff, 24 October 1956 (Strictly Secret — Special Dossier) to the CPSU Presidium, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, Ll. 85-87.

74 The written request, dated 24 October 1956 and signed by then-prime minister Andras Hegedus, was transmitted by Andropov in a ciphered telegram on 28 October. See "Shifrtelgramma" (Strictly Secret — Urgent), 28 October 1956, from Yu. V. Andropov, in AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, P. 6, D. 5, L. 12. [Ed. note: For an English translation, see *CWIHP Bulletin 5* (Spring 1995), p. 30.]

75 "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 23 oktyabrya 1956 g.," Ll. 4-4ob.

76 "Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. rijna 1956," L. 9.

77 Malashenko, "Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta" (Part 1), p. 27.

78 The preliminary directives are recorded in TsAMO, F. 32, Op. 701291, D. 15, Ll. 130-131.

79 "TsK KPSS," Memorandum from Marshal Georgii Zhukov, Soviet minister of defense, and Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii, chief of the Soviet General Staff, 24 October 1956 (Strictly Secret — Special Dossier) to the CPSU Presidium, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, Ll. 85-87. This memorandum lays out in detail the complexion and assignments of the Soviet ground and air forces.

80 "Shifrtelgramma iz Budapeshta," Cable from A. Mikoyan and M. Suslov to the CPSU Presidium, 24 October 1956 (Strictly Secret), in AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, Pap. 6, D. 5, L. 2. [Ed. note: For an English translation, see *CWIHP Bulletin 5* (Spring 1995), pp. 22-23, 29.]

81 The Soviet defense ministry's complete list of Hungarian army units that defected to the insur-

gents was recently declassified at the main Russian military archive, TsAMO, F. 32, Op. 701291, D. 17, Ll. 33-48.

82 "Shifrtelogramma iz Budapeshta," Cable from A. Mikoyan and M. Suslov to the CPSU Presidium, 25 October 1956 (Strictly Secret), in AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, Pap. 6, D. 5, L. 8.

83 Important samples of these messages, declassified in 1992, are available in "Vengriya, oktyabr'-noyabr' 1956 goda: Iz arkhiva TsK KPSS," *Istoricheskii arkhiv* (Moscow), No. 5 (1993), pp. 132-141.

84 "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 26 oktyabrya 1956 g.," Ll. 62-62ob.

85 Citations here are from "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 28 oktyabrya 1956 g.," Ll. 54-63.

86 "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 28 oktyabrya 1956," 28 October 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, Ll. 54-63.

87 "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 30 oktyabrya 1956 g.," 30 October 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. 6-14.

88 *Ibid.*, L. 14.

89 "Deklaratsiya o printsipakh razvitiya i dal'neishem ukreplenii druzhby i sotrudnichestva mezhdru SSSR i drugimi sotsialisticheskimi stranami," *Pravda* (Moscow), 31 October 1956, p. 1. For the CPSU Presidium decision to issue the declaration, see "Vypiska iz Protokola No. 49 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 30 oktyabrya 1956 g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii," No. P49/1 (Strictly Secret), 30 October 1956, in AVPRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, Ll. 25-30.

90 "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 30 oktyabrya 1956 g.," Ll. 9, 10.

91 "TsK KPSS," High-Frequency Transmission, 30 October 1956 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 45, D. 12, L. 2.

92 Kovacs's remarks, at a meeting of the Independent Smallholders Party in Pecs, were reported in the first issue of the revived party newspaper *Kis Ujsag* (Budapest), 1 November 1956, p. 2.

93 See the first-hand comments by Gyorgy G. Heltai, the Hungarian deputy foreign minister under Nagy's government, "International Aspects," in Bela K. Kiraly and Paul Jonas, *The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 in Retrospect*, East European Monograph No. XL (Boulder, Col.: East European Quarterly, 1978), esp. pp. 52-53. The negotiations are also briefly recounted in Tibor Meray, *Thirteen Days That Shook the Kremlin: Imre Nagy and the Hungarian Revolution*, trans. by Howard L. Katzander (London: Thames and Hudson, 1959), pp. 163-165; and "Szemtol-

szembe Mikojannal es Szuszloval," *Igazsag* (Budapest), 1 November 1956, p. 1.

94 The theme of Hungarian neutrality was emphasized in several of Nagy's essays in *On Communism: In Defense of the New Course* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1957). The Soviet Union's backing for Rakosi against Nagy in March-April 1955 was clearly one of the factors that prompted Nagy to consider the prospect of neutrality.

95 Khrushchev, "Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha Khrushcheva," pp. 73-74.

96 "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 31 oktyabrya 1956 g.," Ll. 15-18ob.

97 "Vypiska iz protokola No. 49 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 31 oktyabrya 1956 g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii," No. P49/VI (Strictly Secret), 31 October 1956, in AVPRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, L. 41.

98 For a detailed survey of the crisis as recorded in declassified U.S. documents, see U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957*, Vol. XVI: *Suez Crisis, July 26-December 31, 1956* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990).

99 "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 28 oktyabrya 1956 g.," Ll. 61.

100 "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 31 oktyabrya 1956 g.," 31 October 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. 15-18ob. If Khrushchev had been privy to secret U.S. deliberations, he would have realized that the United States had no intention of directly supporting the French-British-Israeli operation, either militarily or diplomatically. See, for example, "Memorandum of a Conference with the President, White House, Washington, 30 October 1956, 10:06-10:55 am," in *FRUS, 1955-57*, Vol. XVI, pp. 851-855.

101 "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 4 noyabrya 1956 g.," L. 34. On this same point, Sandor Kopasci recounts a very intriguing comment that Ivan Serov, the head of the Soviet KGB, allegedly made when he was arresting Kopasci just after the invasion: "Suez caught us [in Moscow] by surprise. We were compelled to resort to military measures in the Danube Basin because of that area's strategic importance to any operations we might conduct in the Near East." See Kopasci, *Au nom de la classe ouvriere*, p. 201. If Kopasci recorded Serov's statement accurately, and if—assuming the statement is accurate—Serov was being sincere, this passage sheds valuable light on Khrushchev's remarks.

102 Micunovic, *Moscow Diary*, p. 136.

103 *Ibid.*

104 Khrushchev, "Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha

Khrushcheva," p. 73.

105 "Protocol No. 54 al sedintei Biroului Politic al CC al PMR din 24 oct. 1956," 24 October 1956 (Top Secret), in Arhiva Comitetului Central al Partidului Comunist Roman (Arh. CCPCR), Bucharest, F. Biroul Politic, Dosar (Do.) 354/56, ff. 1-5. This document is included in the valuable new collection edited by Corneliu Mihai Lungu and Mihai Retegan, *1956 Explozia: Perceptii romane, iugoslave si sovietice asupra evenimentelor din Polonia si Ungaria* (Bucharest: Editura Univers Enciclopedic, 1996).

106 *Ibid.*

107 "Protocol No. 55 al sedintei Biroului Politic al CC al PMR din 26 oct. 1956," 26 October 1956 (Top Secret), in Arh. CCPCR, F. Biroul Politic, Do. 355/56, ff. 1-5.

108 "Protocol Nr. 58 al sedintei Biroului Politic al CC al PMR din 30 oct. 1956," 30 October 1956 (Top Secret), in Arh. CCPCR, F. Biroul Politic, Do. 358/56, ff. 3-5.

109 "Stenograma conferintei organizatiei regionale al CC al PMR," 23 November 1956 (Top Secret), in Arh. CCPCR, F. 85, Do. 84/56, Ff. 1-8. This report is not included in the Lungu/Retegan volume. I am grateful to Mihai Retegan for providing me with a copy of the document.

110 *Ibid.*

111 *Ibid.* See also Constantin Botoran, "National Interest in Romanian Politics During the Cold War" (Bucharest: Institute for Military Theory and History, Romanian Ministry of Defense, March 1994), pp. 7-8.

112 "Protocol Nr. 58 al sedintei Biroului Politic al CC al PMR din 30 oct. 1956," ff. 3-5.

113 "Stenograficky zapis ze zasedani UV KSC," 5-6 December 1956 (Top Secret), in SUA, Arch. UV KSC, F. 07, Sv. 14, Archivna jednotka (A.j.) 14.

114 "Zabezpeceni klidu na uzemi CSR a statnich hranic s Mad'arskem," Report from Col.-General Vaclav Kratochvil, chief of the Czechoslovak General Staff, and Lieut.-General Jaroslav Dockal, chief of operations, 29 October 1956 (Top Secret), in Vojensky historicky archiv (VHA) Praha, Fond Ministra narodni obrany (MNO) CSR, 1956, Operacni sprava Generalniho stabu cs. armady (GS/OS), 2/8-39b.

115 *Ibid.*, p. 5.

116 "Souhrn hlaseni operacniho dustojnika Generalniho stabu cs. armady," Notes from Col.-General Vaclav Kratochvil, chief of the Czechoslovak General Staff, to the KSC Central Committee (Top Secret), 27 October 1956, in VHA Praha, F. MNO, 1956, GS/OS, 2/8-49b.

117 "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 1 noyabrya 1956 g.," 1 November

1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L. 22.

118 Wilfried Otto, ed., "Ernst Wollweber: Aus Erinnerungen — Ein Portraet Walter Ulbrichts," *Beitraege zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung* (Berlin), No. 3 (1990), pp. 365-367.

119 Speech by Grotewohl to the CC plenum of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), 13 November 1956, in Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen im Bundesarchiv, Zentrales Parteiarchiv (Berlin), DY 30/IV 2/1/166, p. 247.

120 "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 4 noyabrya 1956 g.," L. 35ob. For illuminating analyses of the impact of the 1956 events on the East German authorities, see Hope M. Harrison, "The Effect of the 1956 Hungarian Uprising on the East German Leadership," and Christian F. Ostermann, "East Germany and the Hungarian Revolution, 1956," both presented at the "Conference on Hungary and the World, 1956."

121 For a detailed, top-secret account of the disorders, see "Zakrytoe pis'mo," 12 March 1956 (Top Secret), from S. Statnikov, Tbilisi correspondent for *Trud*, to the CPSU Central Committee, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 140, L. 53-67.

122 "Prikaz No. 14 Nachal'nika Tbilisskogo garnizona," from Major-General Gladkov, commander of the Tbilisi garrison, 9 March 1956, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 140, L. 68.

123 "O kul'te lichnosti i preodolenii ego posledstvii," in *KPSS v rezolyutsiyakh i resheniyakh s'ezdov, konferentsii i plenumov TsK*, 8th ed. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1978), Vol. 7, p. 212.

124 For a cogent analysis of this matter based on newly declassified materials, see M. R. Zezina, "Shokovaya terapiya: Ot 1953-go k 1956 godu," *Otechestvennaya istoriya* (Moscow), No. 2 (1995), esp. pp. 129-133.

125 See the first-hand account by the former KGB deputy director, Filipp Bobkov, *KGB i vlast'* (Moscow: Veteran MP, 1995), pp. 144-145.

126 "TsK KPSS: Informatsiya," 7 November 1956 (Top Secret), from regional KGB stations to the CPSU Presidium, in TsKhSD, F. 5, Op. 30, D. 141, L. 67.

127 "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 4 noyabrya 1956 g.," 4 November 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L. 36ob.

128 Bobkov, *KGB i vlast'*, p. 145. On the new arrests, see Zezina, "Shokovaya terapiya," p. 130.

129 Gati, *Hungary and the Soviet Bloc*, p. 153.

130 Khrushchev, "Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha Khrushcheva," p. 76.

131 *Ibid.*

132 "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 1 noyabrya 1956 g.," 1 November 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L. 19-22.

133 See, for example, Mikoyan's comments during the secret proceedings of the June 1957 CPSU CC plenum (which removed the Anti-Party Group), in "Plenum TsK KPSS, iyun' 1957 goda: Stenograficheskii otchet," No. P2500 (Strictly Secret), 22-29 June 1957, in TsKhSD, F. 2, Op. 1, D. 259, L. 27ob-28ob.

134 "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 2 noyabrya 1956 g.," 2 November 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L. 23-29; and "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 3 noyabrya 1956 g.," 3 November 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L. 31-33ob.

135 "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 2 noyabrya 1956 g.," L. 24ob.

136 "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 3 noyabrya 1956 g.," L. 32.

137 "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 2 noyabrya 1956 g.," L. 29.

138 "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 3 noyabrya 1956 g.," L. 31-33.

139 In addition to Kadar's account in "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 2 noyabrya 1956 g.," see the cable sent to Moscow by Andropov on 1 November—"Shifrtelgramma," 1 November 1956 (Strictly Secret), in AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, P. 6, D. 5, L. 17-19—which provides valuable corroboration of Kadar's remarks.

140 "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 31 oktyabrya 1956 g.," L. 15-18ob.

141 Khrushchev, "Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha Khrushcheva," pp. 74-75.

142 "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 30 oktyabrya 1956 g.," in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L. 6-14. The principles of Pancha Shila were endorsed in a joint statement by Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai and Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru in New Delhi on 28 June 1954. The five principles were intended to "guide relations between the two countries" as well as "relations with other countries in Asia and in other parts of the world." For the full text of the statement, see G. V. Ambekar and V. D. Divekar, eds., *Documents on China's Relations with South and South-East Asia (1949-1962)* (New York: Allied Publishers, 1964), pp. 7-8.

143 In addition to Khrushchev's account of the airport meeting, see the contemporary observations recorded by Micunovic in *Moscow Diary*,

pp. 132 and 138, which fully bear out Khrushchev's version. Unfortunately, all Chinese archives that might shed greater light on China's role in the 1956 events are still closed. For an assessment based on Chinese-language evidence that has surfaced to date—largely memoirs (whose reliability is questionable) and published compilations of documents selected and edited by Chinese authorities—see Chen Jian, "Beijing and the Hungarian Crisis of 1956," presented at the "Conference on Hungary and the World, 1956." Chen Jian and other scholars are seeking additional evidence on this matter, and their findings will appear in future CWHIP publications.

144 First-hand accounts of the meetings are available in Khrushchev, "Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha Khrushcheva," pp. 75-77, which have been well corroborated by other sources, including Khrushchev's observations at the time, as recorded in Micunovic, *Moscow Diary*, pp. 135, 138-139. Newly declassified documents pertaining to the meetings are cited below.

145 See "Zapis' telefonogrammy," c. 1 November 1956, in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, L. 66.

146 "Protokol Nr. 135 posiedzenia Biura Politycznego w dn. 1.XI.1956 r.," 1 November 1956 (Top Secret), in Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN), Warsaw, Archiwum Komitetu Centralnego Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej (Arch. KC PZPR), Paczka (Pa.) 15, Tom (T.) 58, Dokument (Dok.) 134. This protocol is included in the valuable collection of declassified Polish documents edited by Janos Tischler, *Rewolucja węgierska 1956 w polskich dokumentach*, Dokumenty do dziejów PRL No. 8 (Warsaw: Instytut Studiów Politycznych, 1995).

147 "Odezwa Komitetu Centralnego Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej do klasy robotniczej, do narodu polskiego," *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), 2 November 1956, p. 1.

148 "Rozmowy radziecko-węgierskie," *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), 3 November 1956, p. 1.

149 Gomulka's conflicting thoughts about the matter can be seen in "Stenogram Krajowej Narady Aktywu Partyjnego odbutego w dn. 4 listopada 1956 r.: Wystapenia W. Gomulki," 4 November 1956 (Top Secret), in AAN, Arch. KC PZPR, 237/V-241.

150 "Protokol Nr. 136 posiedzenia Biura Politycznego w dniu 4 listopada 1956 r.," 4 November 1956 (Top Secret), in AAN, Arch. KC PZPR, Pa. 15, T. 58, Dok. 135.

151 "Usneseni 151 schuze politickeho byra UV KSC k bodu 1: Udalosti v Mad'arsku," 2 November 1956 (Top Secret), in SUA Praha, Arch.

UV KSC, F. 02/2—Politické byro UV KSC 1954-1962, Sv. 120, A.j. 151.

<sup>152</sup> Khrushchev's account of this meeting tallies well with the much more detailed first-hand account in Micunovic, *Moscow Diary*, pp. 131-141. Micunovic's account is based on notes he compiled right after the negotiations, but unfortunately those notes have not yet turned up in the Yugoslav archives. (Another document in the former Yugoslav Central Committee archive refers to the notes, so it is possible that they still exist somewhere; but the location has not yet been pinpointed.) Newly declassified correspondence between Tito and Khrushchev in early 1957, now stored in the former CPSU Central Committee archive, bears out Khrushchev's and Micunovic's memoirs very well, but it also shows that the memoirs omit a few key details, which are mentioned below. See "Pis'mo Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza ot 10 yanvarya 1957 goda Tsentral'nomu Komitetu Soyuza Kommunistov Yugoslavii/Pis'mo Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Soyuza Kommunistov Yugoslavii ot 7 fevralya 1957 goda Tsentral'nomu Komitetu Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza," No. P295 (Top Secret), February 1957, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 45, D. 83, Ll. 1-12 and D. 84, Ll. 1-18. John Lampe, the director of the East European Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, reported at the "Conference on Hungary and the World, 1956," that he had recently obtained an official summary of the Brioni meeting from a colleague who had found it in the papers of Tito's biographer, the late Vladimir Dedijer, among materials evidently intended for a fourth, never-completed volume. An English translation of this Yugoslav record of the Brioni talks, with Lampe's commentary, is slated for publication in the next issue of the *CWIHP Bulletin*.

<sup>153</sup> For a very useful collection of newly declassified materials tracing Yugoslav-Hungarian relations in late October and early November 1956, see Jozsef Kiss, Zoltan Ripp, and Istvan Vida, eds., *Magyar-Jugoszlav Kapcsolatok 1956: Dokumentumok* (Budapest: MTA Jelenkor-kutató Bizottság, 1995), esp. pp. 125 ff.

<sup>154</sup> Until recently, this arrangement had not been disclosed, apart from a few vague references in Micunovic's memoirs (*Moscow Diary*, pp. 137-138). The first direct revelation of the deal came in the early 1990s when the top-secret correspondence between Tito and Khrushchev from early 1957 was declassified. See "Pis'mo Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza ot 10 yanvarya 1957 goda Tsentral'nomu Komitetu Soyuza

Kommunistov Yugoslavii," L. 4.

<sup>155</sup> For Tito's explanation of why the promise could not be fulfilled, see "Pis'mo Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Soyuza Kommunistov Yugoslavii ot 7 fevralya 1957 goda Tsentral'nomu Komitetu Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza," Ll. 17-18.

<sup>156</sup> Khrushchev, "Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha Khrushcheva," p. 75.

<sup>157</sup> See Imre Horvath's handwritten summary (in Hungarian) of Khrushchev's remarks, in Magyar Országos Levéltár, XIX J-1-K Horvath Imre külügyminiszter iratai, 55, doboz. For some reason, Malin did not record Khrushchev's speech in the notes from the full session ("Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 3 noyabrya 1956 g.," Ll. 31-33ob.

<sup>158</sup> A detailed first-hand account of the military operations can be found in Malashenko, "Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta" (Part 3), pp. 33-37 and (Part 4), pp. 30-36.

<sup>159</sup> See, e.g., "Zprava o opatrenich k zesileni bojove pohotovosti vojsk," Report from Col.-General Vaclav Kratochvil, chief of the Czechoslovak General Staff, and Lieut.-General Evzen Chlad, chief of the Main Logistical Directorate, to the MNO Collegium (Top Secret), 31 October 1956, in VHA Praha, F. MNO, 1956, GS/OS 2/8-49b. See also "Rozkaz k provedeni vojenskykh opatreni na hranicich s Mad'arskem," from Col.-General Vaclav Kratochvil, chief of the Czechoslovak General Staff, to the 2nd Military District in Trencin (Strictly Secret), 28 October 1956, in VHA Praha, F. MNO, 1956, GS/OS, 2/8-2b.

<sup>160</sup> "Usneseni 151 schuze politického byra UV KSC k bodu 1," pt. 1.

<sup>161</sup> Malashenko, "Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta" (Part 3), p. 33.

<sup>162</sup> Malashenko, "Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta" (Part 4), pp. 32-33.

<sup>163</sup> Nagy's cable to UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld can be found in UN Doc. A/3251. The appeal and declaration of neutrality were broadcast on Budapest radio on the evening of 1 November. According to Kadar's detailed explanation at a CPSU Presidium meeting on 2 November, Zoltan Tildy was the one who came up with the idea of a declaration of neutrality. All the members of the Hungarian cabinet ultimately voted in favor of it. See "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 2 noyabrya 1956 g.," Ll. 23-29.

<sup>164</sup> Micunovic, *Moscow Diary*, p. 156.

<sup>165</sup> "Stav Mad'arske lidove armady a priciny jejího rozkladu," Report compiled by KSC CC Department No. 14 for the KSC CC Politburo, 9 April 1957, in SUA, Arch. UV KSC, F. 100/3 —

Mezinárodní oddeleni UV KSC 1954-1962, Sv. 110, Ar. Jed. 371. For a thorough survey of the role of the Hungarian army in 1956, see Imre Okvath, "Magyar tisztikar a hidegháború időszakában, 1945-1956," *Új Honvédségi szemle* (Budapest), No. 1 (1994), pp. 14-27, which is based on documents from the 1956 collection (1956-os Gyűjtemény) of the Military History Archives of the Hungarian National Defense Ministry (*Hadtörténelmi Levéltár, Honvédelmi Minisztérium*). A recent volume by Miklós Horvath, *1956 katonai kronológiája* (Budapest: Magyar Honvédség Oktatási és Kulturális Anyagellátó Központ, 1993), also draws on these documents. For a useful first-hand account, see Béla Király, "Hungary's Army: Its Part in the Revolt," *East Europe*, Vol. 7, No. 6 (June 1958), pp. 3-16. Király, as commander of Hungarian troops in Budapest at the time, led the armed resistance against the invasion.

<sup>166</sup> On the preparations by Maleter, see Miklós Horvath, *Pal Maleter* (Budapest: Osiris/Századvég/1956-os Intézet, 1995), esp. pp. 223-228.

<sup>167</sup> "Stav Mad'arske lidove armady a priciny jejího rozkladu," Ll. 4-5. The quoted phrase is from "Shifrtelogramma iz Budapeshta," Cable from A. Mikoyan and M. Suslov to the CPSU Presidium, 24 October 1956 (Strictly Secret), in AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, Pap. 6, D. 5, L. 2.

<sup>168</sup> On the disarming operations, see "Informatsiya o polozhenii v Vengrii po sostoyaniyu na 21.00 4 noyabrya 1956 goda," Report No. 31613 (Top Secret), from Soviet defense minister G. Zhukov to the CPSU Presidium, and "Informatsiya o polozhenii v Vengrii po sostoyaniyu na 9.00 5 noyabrya 1956 goda," Report No. 31614 (Top Secret), from Soviet defense minister G. Zhukov to the CPSU Presidium, both in AVPRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, Ll. 102 and 103-104, respectively. See also Malashenko, "Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta" (Part 3), pp. 34, 37.

<sup>169</sup> "Informatsiya o polozhenii v Vengrii po sostoyaniyu na 21.00 6 noyabrya 1956 goda," Report No. 31618 (Top Secret), from Soviet defense minister G. K. Zhukov to the CPSU Presidium, in AVPRF, F. 0536, Op. 1, P. 5, D. 65, L. 63. Among the other cities in which Soviet troops encountered fierce resistance were Budaörsi, Csepel, Jászberényi, Kaposvár, Kecskemét, Kőbánya, Komló, Mezőkovesd, Miskolc, Óbuda, Pécs, Soroksár, Szolnok, Szombathely, Thokoly, Ulloi, and Veszprem.

<sup>170</sup> "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 2 noyabrya 1956 g.," L. 30.

<sup>171</sup> Khrushchev, "Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha Khrushcheva," pp. 77-78.

<sup>172</sup> Quotations here and in the following paragraph are from "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 4 noyabrya 1956 g.," LI. 34-36ob; and "Rabochaya zapis' zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 6 noyabrya 1956 g.," 6 November 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, LI. 41-45ob. This bickering was first described by Khrushchev in his memoirs ("Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha Khrushcheva," pp. 77-78), and a few additional details (not mentioned in Malin's notes) came to light in the recently declassified transcript of the June 1957 CPSU Central Committee plenum ("Plenum TsK KPSS, iyun' 1957 goda," LI. 27ob-28ob). The Malin notes confirm and add a great deal to these earlier sources.

<sup>173</sup> The Russian phrase that Molotov used (*odernut' nado, chtoby ne komandoval*) is slightly awkward in the original, but it can be roughly translated as it is here.

<sup>174</sup> See "Plenum TsK KPSS, iyun' 1957 goda," LI. 2, 25. The charge of "dangerous zigzags" was leveled by Molotov at a CPSU Presidium meet-

ing a few days before the Central Committee plenum.

<sup>175</sup> Micunovic, *Moscow Diary*, p. 156.

<sup>176</sup> "Memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence to the President," 20 November 1956 (Secret), in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957*, Vol. XXV: *Eastern Europe* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988), pp. 473, 475. This *FRUS* volume contains a large number of documents essential for understanding the U.S. government's response to the events in Poland and Hungary in 1956, although many other materials have since been declassified through the Freedom of Information Act. A collection of newly declassified materials is available to researchers at the National Security Archive in the Gelman Library of the George Washington University in Washington, D.C.

<sup>177</sup> Data on Hungarian and Soviet casualties come, respectively, from Peter Gosztonyi, "Az 1956-os forradalom szamokban," *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), 3 November 1990, p. 3; and

"Sobytiya v Vengrii 1956 g.," in Col.-General G. A. Krivosheev, ed., *Grif sekretnosti snyat: Poteri vooruzhenykh sil SSSR v voynakh, boevykh deistviyakh i voennykh konfliktakh: Statisticheskoe issledovanie* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1993), p. 397. The number of Soviet deaths was 720, the number of Soviet wounded was 1,540. The number of Hungarian deaths was 2,502, and the number of Hungarian wounded was 19,226.

<sup>178</sup> Attila Szakolczai, "A forradalmat koveto megtorlas soran kivegzettekrol," in *Evkonyv*, Vol. 3 (Budapest: 1956-os Intezet, 1994), pp. 237-256. Szakolczai provides a considerably lower figure (229) for the number of executions. The figure of 600 comes from Maria Ormos, "A konszolidacio problemai 1956 es 1958 kozott," *Tarsadalmi Szemle*, Vol. 44, Nos. 8-9 (1989), pp. 48-65. See also Janos Balassa et al., eds., *Halottaink*, 2 vols. (Budapest: Katalizator, 1989).

<sup>179</sup> "Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. rijna 1956," L. 12.

<sup>180</sup> Khrushchev, "Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha Khrushcheva," p. 81.

<sup>181</sup> Testimony of former national defense minister Lajos Czinege in Magyar Orszaggyules, *A Honvedelmi Bizottsag 1989 oktoberi ulesszakan letrhozott vizsgalobizottsag 1989 december 11-i, 1990 januar 3-i, 1990 januar 15-i, 1990 februar 6-i ulese jegyzokonyvenek nyilt reszlete*, 5 vols. (1994), Vol. 1, p. 261.

<sup>182</sup> "Tov. Orlovu A.L.," Memorandum No. 1869/2 (Top Secret), 28 December 1956, transmitting a report prepared by I. Tugarinov, deputy head of the Foreign Ministry's Information Committee, in AVPRF, F. Referentura po Vengrii, Op.36, Por.9, Pap.47a, D.110, LI.11-18. An English translation of this document, as well as an insightful commentary by James Hershberg, can be found in the *Cold War International History Bulletin*, Issue No.4 (Fall 1994), pp.61-64.

<sup>183</sup> Micunovic, *Moscow Diary*, p. 134.

<sup>184</sup> Khrushchev, "Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha Khrushcheva," pp. 80-82.

<sup>185</sup> The notion of a tradeoff between "cohesion" and "viability" is well presented in James F. Brown, *Relations Between the Soviet Union and Its East European Allies: A Survey*, R-1742-PR (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1975).

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## FUNDS SOUGHT TO PROCESS RADIO FREE EUROPE TAPES ON 1956 HUNGARIAN EVENTS

For forty years, various politicians, historians, and public figures have debated the existence of Radio Free Europe's tapes of broadcasts made during the Hungarian Revolution of 1956. In the summer of 1995, Mr. Gyorgy Vamos, Director of Documentation for Hungarian National Radio, and Judy Katona, M.A., A.B.D., researcher and journalist, found the recordings in Germany—over 500 hours of tape, which reveal what was broadcast and raise serious questions concerning policy and intent.

These holdings constitute a unique and invaluable record for the study of Hungarian history, the role of the United States and American radio in the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, and in general, the role of U.S. media abroad in promoting ideology, and internal divergencies which led broadcasters to convey messages about American intentions which were at odds with the actual intentions of top policy makers during this tense period of the Cold War.

We are seeking support of US

\$50,000 to finance critical research, involving processing of the tapes that were previously believed lost and/or missing, and acquisition of additional materials from other foreign radios and archives. The sources and the professional contacts are already established.

Processing the collection and complementing it with additional broadcast and recorded materials, will create a basis for a meaningful and objective analysis of the American and Western policies of the time. All materials, of course, would be made freely, equally, and openly available to researchers.

In the future, in a second phase of the research, a major English language source document can be published with content analysis of the broadcasts, footnotes, and detailed references.

In the first phase of the implementation of the project, money would be spent on researchers' stipends, translations, acquisition of materials, transcription, duplications, and travel.

For further information, contact Judy Katona at (703) 913-5824 (telephone) or katjud@mnsinc.com (e-mail).

# THE “MALIN NOTES” ON THE CRISES IN HUNGARY AND POLAND, 1956

*Translated and Annotated by Mark Kramer*

## TRANSLATOR’S NOTE:

The translated items below are in chronological order. They include Vladimir Malin’s notes of CPSU Presidium meetings that dealt with the events in Hungary and Poland in 1956. The notes are supplemented by several other newly released documents that shed direct light on portions of the notes. Most of the documents, including Malin’s notes, were translated from Russian, but two documents (both from the Hungarian National Archive) were translated from Hungarian.

Extensive annotations have been included because of the idiosyncratic style of the notes and the large number of references (to events, individuals, etc.) that may not be familiar to most readers. Rather than putting in separate annotations to identify specific persons, I have compiled an identification list of all individuals mentioned in the notes. This list and a list of abbreviations precede the notes and should be consulted whenever unfamiliar names or abbreviations turn up.

As best as possible, the flavor and style of the original have been preserved in the English translation, but in a few cases I have expanded Russian and Hungarian abbreviations and acronyms to avoid confusion. For example, there is no equivalent in English for the Russian abbreviation “m.b.,” short for *mozhet byt’*, meaning “perhaps” or “maybe.” Hence, in this particular instance the English word has been written out in full. In most cases, the translation seeks to replicate abbreviations and acronyms, but they have been used only when it does not cause confusion.

The English translation is not identical to the published Hungarian and Russian compilations of the Malin notes. Both of these earlier publications contain several errors, including a few that substantially alter the meaning of the original. The fact that mistakes cropped up is mainly a reflection of how difficult it is to work with the handwritten originals, which, aside from problems of legibility, are occasionally out of sequence in the archival folders. In some cases the mispagination is easy to correct, but in a few instances the reordering of pages necessitates very close textual analysis. I have corrected all these mistakes in the English translation, and have included details about the corrections in the annotations.

--Mark Kramer

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

APRF = *Arkhib Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii* (Archive of the President of the Russian Federation), Moscow  
 AVH = *Allam-Vedelmi Hatóság* (State Security Authority; name of Hungarian secret police agency after 1949)  
 AVO = *Allam-Vedelmi Osztály* (State Security Department; name of Hungarian secret police agency until 1949)  
 AVPRF = *Arkhib vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii* (Archive of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation), Moscow  
 CC = Central Committee  
 Cde. = Comrade  
 CPC = Communist Party of China  
 CPSU = Communist Party of the Soviet Union  
 GS/OS = General Staff/Operational Directorate  
 HCP = Hungarian Communist Party  
 HL/HM = *Hadtörténelmi Levéltár, Honvédelmi Minisztérium* (Hungarian Mili-

tary History Archive), Budapest  
 HWP = Hungarian Workers’ Party  
 HSWP = Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party  
 KGB = Committee for State Security  
 KSC = *Komunistická strana Československa* (Czechoslovak Communist Party)  
 MVD = Ministry of Internal Affairs  
 PKK = Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact  
 PZPR = *Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza* (Polish United Workers’ Party)  
 SUA = *Statni ustredni archiv* (Central State Archive), Prague  
 TsAMO = *Tsentrāl’nyi arkhiv Ministerstva oborony Rossiiskoi Federatsii* (Central Archive of the Ministry of Defense, Russian Federation)  
 TsKhSD = *Tsentr Khraneniya Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii* (Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation), Moscow  
 UV = Central Committee (of the KSC)  
 VHA = *Vojensky historicky archiv* (Military-Historical Archive), Prague

## INDIVIDUALS MENTIONED IN THE MALIN NOTES

Three points are worth mentioning about this list:

First, unless otherwise indicated, the positions listed for each person are those held during the 1956 crises.

Second, the entries for some Hungarian Communist party officials include as many as three titles for the party. The Communist party in Hungary was called the Hungarian Communist Party (*Magyar Kommunista Part*) until June 1948, when it compelled the Hungarian Social Democratic Party (*Magyar Szocial-Demokrata Part*) to merge with it. The combined party was renamed the Hungarian Workers’ Party (*Magyar Dolgozók Partja*). The Hungarian Workers’ Party was dissolved at the end of October 1956, and a new Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (*Magyar Szocialista Munkaspart*) was formed on 1 November 1956. The acronyms HCP, HWP, and

HSWP will be used in the listings to refer to the successive incarnations of the Hungarian Communist party.

Third, two Hungarian officials who played contrasting roles in 1956 were both named Istvan Kovacs. The identifications and the translator's annotations should prevent any confusion about which was which.

### CPSU CC PRESIDIUM

#### FULL MEMBERS: Nikolai

**BULGANIN** (prime minister), Kliment **VOROSHILOV** (chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet), Lazar' **KAGANOVICH** (first deputy prime minister), Aleksei **KIRICHENKO** (First Secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party), Georgii **MALENKOV** (deputy prime minister), Anastas **MIKOYAN**, Vyacheslav **MOLOTOV** (foreign minister until June 1956), Mikhail **PERVUKHIN**, Maksim **SABUROV** (first deputy prime minister), Mikhail **SUSLOV** (CPSU CC Secretary), and Nikita **KHRUSHCHEV** (CPSU CC First Secretary).

#### CANDIDATE MEMBERS: Leonid

**BREZHNEV** (CPSU CC Secretary), Georgii **ZHUKOV** (defense minister), Nurotdin **MUKHITDINOV**, Ekaterina **FURTSEVA** (CPSU CC Secretary), Nikolai **SHVERNIK** (chairman of CPSU Party Control Committee), and Dmitrii **SHEP-ILOV** (foreign minister after June 1956).

### CPSU CC SECRETARIES NOT ON THE CPSU CC PRESIDIUM

Averki **ARISTOV**, Nikolai **BEL-YAEV**, and Pyotr **POSPELOV**.

### OTHERS MENTIONED IN THE NOTES

**ANDICS**, Erzsebet: chief historian for the HWP until the autumn of 1956; fled to the Soviet Union with her husband, Andor Berei (see below), in late October 1956

**ANDROPOV**, Yuri: Soviet ambassador in Hungary

**APRO**, Antal: member of the HCP/HWP Politburo from 1946 to 1951 and 1953 to 1956; Hungarian deputy prime minister from November 1953 to 3 November 1956; member of the HWP Presidium from 28 October 1956; minister of industry after 4

November 1956; member of the HSWP Provisional Executive Committee; senior Hungarian state official until 1984

**BATA**, Istvan: Hungarian minister of national defense until 24 October 1956; fled to the Soviet Union on 28 October 1956

**BEREI**, Andor: head of the Hungarian state planning bureau from 1954 to 1956; fled to the Soviet Union with his wife, Erszsebet Andics (see above), in late October 1956

**BOLDOCZKI**, Janos: Hungarian ambassador in Moscow

**CHERNUKHA**, Vladimir: deputy head of the General Department of the CPSU Central Committee

**CYRANKIEWICZ**, Jozef: Polish prime minister

**DOBI**, Istvan: president of Hungary (a largely figurehead post)

**DOGEI**, Imre: appointed minister of agriculture in the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government formed on 4 November 1956

**DONATH**, Ferenc: well-known economist; leading supporter of Imre Nagy; appointed a Secretary of the HWP on 23-24 October 1956; appointed a member of the HSWP Executive Committee on 1 November 1956; took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy on 4 November 1956; arrested by Soviet troops on 22 November 1956 and transferred to Romania; sentenced to 12 years imprisonment in June 1958; amnestied in 1960

**DUDAS**, Jozsef: engineer; one of the most radical leaders of the Budapest rebel forces after 23 October 1956; took part in the armed resistance against the Soviet invasion; arrested by Soviet troops on 21 November 1956; executed in January 1957

**DULLES**, John Foster: U.S. Secretary of State

**EGRI**, Gyula: HWP Secretary from 1955 to 1956; fled to the Soviet Union at the beginning of November 1956; returned to Hungary in April 1957

**EISENHOWER**, Dwight: U.S. President

**ELYUTIN**, Vyacheslav: Soviet minister of higher education

**EPISHEV**, Aleksei: Soviet ambassador in Romania

**FARKAS**, Mihaly: Hungarian minister of national defense from 1948 to 1953; notorious organizer of mass repression in Hungary during the Rakosi era; expelled

from the HWP in mid-July 1956; arrested on 12 October 1956; sentenced to 16 years imprisonment in February 1957; amnestied in 1961

**FIRYUBIN**, Nikolai: Soviet ambassador in Yugoslavia

**GERO**, Erno: First Secretary of the HWP from 18 July 1956 to 25 October 1956; fled to the Soviet Union on 28 October 1956

**GHEORGHIU-DEJ**, Gheorghe: First Secretary of the Romanian Workers' Party

**GOMULKA**, Wladyslaw: First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR) from 20 October 1956 to December 1970

**GROMYKO**, Andrei: Soviet first deputy foreign minister

**GRYAZNOV**, Feodosii: counselor at the Soviet embassy in Yugoslavia

**HEGEDUS**, Andras: Hungarian prime minister from April 1955 to 24 October 1956; first deputy prime minister from 24 to 27 October 1956; fled to Soviet Union on 28 October 1956

**HIDAS**, Istvan: member of the HWP Politburo from June 1953 to 26 October 1956; deputy prime minister from 1954 to 26 October 1956

**HORTHY**, Admiral Nicolas de: final commander-in-chief of the Austro-Hungarian Navy; authoritarian leader (with the title of Regent) in Hungary during the interwar period and most of World War II (1920-1944)

**HORVATH**, Imre: Hungarian foreign minister from 30 July 1956 to 2 November 1956; foreign minister in Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government formed by Janos Kadar on 4 November 1956

**KADAR**, Janos: victim of Stalin-era purges; member of HWP Politburo after 18 July 1956; elected HWP First Secretary on 25 October 1956; chairman of HWP Presidium from 28 October 1956 until the formation of the HSWP on 1 November; member of the HSWP Executive Committee from 1 November; state minister in Imre Nagy's government from 1 to 4 November 1956; formed a "Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government" on 4 November 1956; top leader in Hungary until 1988

**KARDELJ**, Edvard: vice-president of Yugoslavia; top aide to Tito

**KIRALY**, General Bela: released from prison in September 1956; appointed head of the police and armed forces of the Revolutionary Committee for Public Order on 30

October 1956; appointed to the Revolutionary Defense Committee on 31 October 1956; appointed commander of the National Guard on 3 November 1956; one of the leaders of the armed resistance to the Soviet invasion

**KISS**, Karoly: member of the HWP Presidium from 28 October 1956; member of the HSWP Provisional Executive Committee after 4 November 1956; member of the HSWP Politburo from 1957 to 1962

**KONEV**, Marshal Ivan: commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces; appointed on 1 November as overall commander of Soviet troops that invaded Hungary on 4 November

**KOSSA**, Istvan: finance minister in the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government formed by Janos Kadar on 4 November 1956

**KOVACS**, Bela: Secretary General of the Independent Smallholders Party until February 1947; imprisoned in the Soviet Union from February 1947 until the autumn of 1955; member of Imre Nagy's cabinet from 27 October 1956 (and a state minister from 3 to 4 November 1956)

**KOVACS**, General Istvan: senior Hungarian army official; appointed chief of the Hungarian General Staff; arrested by Soviet KGB troops on 3 November; sentenced to six years imprisonment in 1958; amnestied in 1960

**KOVACS**, Istvan: senior official in HCP/HWP from 1945 on; member of the HWP Politburo from March 1955; HWP Secretary from November 1955; first secretary of the Budapest party committee from July 1954 to 29 October 1956; fled to the Soviet Union on 31 October 1956

**LIU** Shaoqi: Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee; deputy chairman of the Chinese Communist Party

**LOSONCZY**, Geza: victim of Stalin-era purges; rehabilitated in 1954; candidate member of the HWP Politburo from 23 October 1956; state minister in Imre Nagy's cabinet from 30 October 1956; member of the HSWP Executive Committee from 1 to 4 November 1956; took refuge in Yugoslav embassy on 4 November; arrested on 22 November and transferred to Romania; imprisoned in Hungary in April 1957; died in prison in December 1957 under mysterious circumstances

**MALETER**, Pal: colonel in the Hungarian People's Army who took the side of

the insurgents after the 1956 revolution began; appointed to Revolutionary Defense Committee and a first deputy minister of national defense on 31 October 1956; appointed national defense minister on 3 November 1956 and promoted to the rank of major-general; arrested on the evening of 3 November by Soviet KGB troops; executed by hanging along with Imre Nagy in June 1958

**MALIN**, Vladimir: head of the General Department of the CPSU Central Committee

**MALININ**, General Mikhail: first deputy chief of the Soviet General Staff; commanded Soviet forces during the initial intervention in Hungary on 23 October

**MALNASAN**, Aurel: Romanian deputy foreign minister

**MAO** Zedong: Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party

**MAROSAN**, Gyorgy: victim of Stalin-era purges; rehabilitated in 1956; member of the HWP Politburo from July to October 1956; state minister in the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government formed by Janos Kadar on 4 November 1956

**MICUNOVIC**, Veljko: Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow

**MILOVANOV**, Milenko: employee at the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest; killed by stray Soviet tankfire on 5 November 1956

**MINDSZENTY**, Cardinal Jozsef: Primate of the Hungarian Catholic Church; imprisoned from 1948 to July 1955; under house arrest from July 1955 until 30 October 1956, when he was freed by Hungarian soldiers; took refuge in the U.S. embassy on 4 November 1956 and remained there until 1971, when he was allowed to leave for Austria

**MUNNICH**, Ferenc: Hungarian ambassador in the Soviet Union from September 1954 to July 1956; Hungarian ambassador in Yugoslavia from July 1956 to 25 October 1956; member of the HWP Presidium from 28 to 31 October 1956; minister of internal affairs from 27 October 1956; deputy head of the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government formed by Janos Kadar on 4 November 1956

**NAGY**, Ferenc: leader of the Independent Smallholders Party from 1945 to mid-1947 and Hungarian prime minister from February 1946 to June 1947; emigrated to the United States after the Communists forced him to resign from his posts

**NAGY**, Imre: Hungarian prime minister from July 1953 to March 1955 and from 24 October 1956 to 4 November 1956; sought refuge in Yugoslav embassy on 4 November 1956; arrested by Soviet troops on 22 November 1956 and transferred to Romania; executed by hanging in June 1958

**NOVOTNY**, Antonin: First Secretary of Czechoslovak Communist Party

**OCHAB**, Edward: First Secretary of the PZPR from March 1956 to 20 October 1956

**PIROS**, Lajos: Hungarian minister of internal affairs from 1954 to 27 October 1956; fled to the Soviet Union on 28 October 1956

**PONOMARENKO**, Panteleimon: Soviet ambassador in Poland

**PONOMAREV**, Boris: head of the CPSU CC Department for Ties with Foreign Communist Parties

**POPOVIC**, Koca: Yugoslav foreign minister

**RAJK**, Laszlo: top Hungarian Communist official; sentenced to death on trumped-up charges in October 1949; posthumously rehabilitated in March 1956; reburied in October 1956

**RAKOSI**, Matyas: HWP First Secretary from June 1948 to July 1956; served simultaneously as Hungarian prime minister from 1952 to June 1953; fled to the Soviet Union on 26 July 1956, where he spent the rest of his life

**RANKOVIC**, Aleksander: Yugoslav minister of internal affairs; party secretary responsible for cadres; second most powerful figure in Yugoslavia and widely regarded at the time as the heir apparent to Tito

**ROKOSSOWSKI**, Marshal Konstantin: Soviet officer serving as Polish national defense minister, December 1949 to November 1956; removed from PZPR Politburo on 20 October 1956; recalled to the Soviet Union in mid-November 1956

**RONAI**, Sandor: former Social Democrat; member of HWP Politburo until June 1953; appointed minister of commerce in Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government formed by Janos Kadar on 4 November 1956; chairman of the Hungarian State Assembly (parliament) from 1952 to 1962

**SEROV**, Ivan: chairman of the KGB  
**SOBOLEV**, Arkadii: Soviet permanent representative at the United Nations

**SZANTO**, Zoltan: member of the

HWP Politburo from 24 October 1956 (and of the HWP Presidium from 28 October); member of the HSWP Executive Committee from 1 to 4 November 1956; took refuge along with Imre Nagy in the Yugoslav embassy on 4 November 1956; arrested by Soviet troops when he left the embassy on 18 November 1956; transferred to Romania along with Imre Nagy and other former officials five days later; permitted to return to Hungary in 1958

**TILDY**, Zoltan: one of the leaders of the Independent Smallholders Party until August 1948; under house arrest from August 1948 to April 1956; a state minister in Imre Nagy's government from 27 October 1956 to 4 November 1956; arrested in May 1957 and sentenced to six years in prison in June 1958; amnestied in 1960

**TITO**, Josip Broz: General Secretary of the Yugoslav League of Communists; president of Yugoslavia

**TOGLIATTI**, Palmiro: General Secretary of the Italian Communist Party

**ULBRICHT**, Walter: General Secretary of the (East) German Socialist Unity Party (SED)

**VAS**, Zoltan: top-ranking official in the HCP and HWP from 1945 on; served as chairman of the Government Commission on Consumer Supplies during the 1956 revolution; took refuge in the Yugoslav embassy on 4 November 1956; arrested when he left the embassy on 18 November 1956; transferred along with Nagy and other former officials to Romania five days later; allowed to return to Hungary at the end of 1958

**VEG**, Bela: HWP Secretary from 1953 to October 1956

**ZORIN**, Valerian: Soviet deputy foreign minister

## THE MALIN NOTES

### DOCUMENT No. 1

#### Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 9 and 12 July 1956

(Re: Point IV of Protocol No. 28)<sup>1</sup>

Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Molotov, Pervukhin, Khrushchev, Shepilov, Belyaev, Pospelov, Brezhnev, Zhukov

#### Ciph. Teleg. No. . . . from Budapest<sup>2</sup>

(Khrushchev, Voroshilov, Zhukov, Ponomarev)<sup>3</sup>

We should call Cde. Mikoyan so that he'll go take a vacation on Lake Balaton.<sup>4</sup>

An article should be prepared in our press about internationalist solidarity to rebuff the enemy.

The subversive activities of the imperialists—in Poznan and Hungary. They want to weaken internationalist ties; and in the name of independence of paths, they want to foment disunity and destroy [the socialist countries] one by one.

To Cdes. Pospelov, Shepilov, and Ponomarev.<sup>5</sup>

Perhaps the Italian cdes. could publish something in the press.

Perhaps Cde. Togliatti will write an article.<sup>6</sup>

On the Rajk affair<sup>7</sup>—there must be an easing of the situation

Rakosi<sup>8</sup>

(Malenkov, Khrushchev, Voroshilov).<sup>9</sup>

Cde. Mikoyan should confer with Kovacs, and he should speak firmly.<sup>10</sup>

[Source: *TsKhSD*, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, Ll. 2-2ob, compiled by V. N. Malin.]

### DOCUMENT No. 2

#### Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 20 October 1956

Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Molotov, Pervukhin, Saburov, Suslov, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Zhukov, Shepilov, Furtseva, Pospelov, Serov.

#### I. Briefing from the CPSU Delegation about the Trip to Warsaw.<sup>11</sup>

(Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Molotov, Kaganovich, Konev, Zhukov)

1. There's only one way out—put an end to what is in Poland.

If Rokossowski is kept, we won't have to press things for a while.<sup>12</sup>

Maneuvers.

Prepare a document.

Form a committee.<sup>13</sup>

2. The ambassador, Cde. Ponomarenko, was grossly mistaken in his assessment of Ochab and Gomulka.<sup>14</sup>

3. We should invite to Moscow representatives from the Communist parties of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, the GDR, and Bulgaria.<sup>15</sup> Perhaps we should send CC officials to China for informational purposes.<sup>16</sup>

4. Send information. Take notice of information. Think through the questions that have been raised.

### II. On Hungary.

We need to think it over, perhaps send Cde. Mikoyan.<sup>17</sup>

Cdes. Mikoyan and Zhukov must consider recalling soldiers to their units.<sup>18</sup>

Cde. Mikoyan is to draft information for the fraternal parties.<sup>19</sup>

Pull out the KGB advisers

[Source: *TsKhSD*, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, Ll. 49-50, compiled by V. N. Malin]

### DOCUMENT No. 3

#### Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 21 October 1956

#### On the Situation in Poland<sup>20</sup>

(Molotov, Serov, Zhukov, Mikoyan, Pervukhin, Saburov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Suslov, Furtseva, Malenkov)

Cde. Khrushchev:

Taking account of the circumstances, we should refrain from military intervention. We need to display patience. (Everyone agrees with this.)

[Source: *TsKhSD*, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, unnumbered page. Compiled by V. N. Malin.]

### DOCUMENT No. 4

#### Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 23 October 1956

Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Molotov, Pervukhin, Saburov, Khrushchev, Suslov, Brezhnev, Zhukov,

Furtseva, Shepilov

**On the Situation in Budapest and Overall in Hungary**<sup>21</sup>

(Cdes. Zhukov, Bulganin, Khrushchev)

Information of **Cde. Zhukov**.

A demonstration by 100 thous. in Budapest  
The radio station is on fire.<sup>22</sup>

In Debrecen the obkom [provincial party committee—trans.] and MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs—trans.] buildings were occupied.

**Cde. Khrushchev** speaks in favor of sending troops to Budapest.<sup>23</sup>

**Cde. Bulganin** believes Cde. Khrushchev's proposal to send troops is justified.

**Cde. Mikoyan:** Without Nagy they can't get control of the movement, and it's also cheaper for us. Expresses doubt about the sending of troops. What are we losing? The Hungarians themselves will restore order on their own. We should try political measures, and only then send troops.

**Cde. Molotov**—With Nagy left on his own, Hungary is coming apart. Favors the sending of troops.

**Cde. Kaganovich**—The government is being overthrown. There's no comparison with Poland. Favors the sending of troops.

**Cde. Pervukhin**—Troops must be sent.

**Cde. Zhukov**—There is indeed a difference with Poland. Troops must be sent. One of the members of the CC Presidium should travel there. Martial law should be declared in the country, and a curfew introduced.

**Cde. Suslov**—The situation in Poland is different. Troops must be sent.

**Cde. Saburov**—Troops must be sent to uphold order.

**Cde. Shepilov**—Favors the sending of troops

**Cde. Kirichenko**—Favors the sending of troops. Cdes. Malinin and Serov should be dispatched to Budapest.

**Cde. Khrushchev**—We should recruit Nagy for political action. But until then we shouldn't make a chairman of the government.

Cdes. Mikoyan and Suslov are to fly to Budapest.<sup>24</sup>

[Source: *TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. 4-4ob*, compiled by V. N. Malin.]

**DOCUMENT No. 5**

**Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 26 October 1956**

Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Molotov, Saburov, Brezhnev, Khrushchev, Zhukov, Shvernin, Furtseva, Pospelov, Yudin.  
From the CPC CC—Cdes. Liu Shaoqi,<sup>25</sup>

**Exchange of Opinions about the Situation in Poland and Hungary**

The point about Rokossowski is the central question.<sup>26</sup>

(Cde. Liu Shaoqi).

Gomulka is taking this to extremes.

Continuation of the session of 26/X at 8:00 p.m.<sup>27</sup>

Review of the information from Cdes. Mikoyan and Suslov.<sup>28</sup>

Cdes. Shepilov, Brezhnev, and Furtseva are to study it.

Hungarian party workers (126 cdes.) are studying at the Higher Party School.<sup>29</sup>

We should provide information to them.

Instruct them, carry out work. We mustn't turn them against the Directory and CC, but should say there are vacillations within the CC.<sup>30</sup>

Convene a meeting with them with participation of the Hungarian ambassador and military officers (in the school), and then send them back there (to Hungary).

Hold a meeting with the students and inform them (at the colleges) perhaps with the ambassador present.<sup>31</sup>

Perform the work.

Three copies  
for Cdes. Brezhnev,  
Shepilov,  
Furtseva.<sup>32</sup>

**On the Situation in Hungary**<sup>33</sup>

**Cde. Bulganin**—Cde. Mikoyan is maintaining an improper and ill-defined position, and is not helping the Hungarian leaders put an end to their flip-flops.

A firm line must be maintained.<sup>34</sup>

**Cde. Molotov**—endorses Cde. Bulganin's view.

We must set certain limits and instruct Cde.

Mikoyan how to act.

**Cde. Kaganovich**—the real correlation of forces is such that it does not support the conclusions of Cde. Mikoyan.

We must adopt a firm position.

A Military-Revol. Com'tee must be set up.<sup>35</sup>

**Cde. Malenkov**—we sent in troops, and the adversary began to recover.

We should tell Cde. Mikoyan that he must firmly press Nagy to restore order.

**Cde. Zhukov**—Cde. Mikoyan is acting improperly, he's pushing us toward capitulation.

We must insist on a firm position.

**Cde. Shepilov**—the step was extreme, but correct.

Real power is with the troops.

To make further concessions would be regarded as weakness.

**Cde. Furtseva**—Cde. Mikoyan, apparently, is mistaken about Nagy. They released 1,000 who had been arrested.<sup>36</sup>

**Cde. Khrushchev**—Mikoyan is acting as he said he would.

Cde. Mikoyan supported a position of non-intervention, but our troops are there.

A new stage—we don't agree with the government.

We should send reinforcements—Molotov, Zhukov, Malenkov.

Contact should be established with both Hegedus and the others.<sup>37</sup>

We must write an appeal to our troops.

Prepare a flight.

Reinforce the troops.

Cdes. Molotov, Zhukov, and Malenkov are to fly off.<sup>38</sup>

Later we can say definitively.

Regarding Cde. Mikoyan's trip to Austria—it should be deferred.<sup>39</sup>

[Source: *TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, Ll. 53-53ob, 62-62ob*, compiled by V. N. Malin.]

**DOCUMENT No. 6**

**Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 28 October 1956**<sup>40</sup>

Those Taking Part: Voroshilov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Molotov, Saburov, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Zhukov, Shvernik, Shepilov, Furtseva, Pospelov, Zorin

### **On the Situation in Hungary**

(Khrushchev)

**Cde. Khrushchev**—the matter is becoming more complicated.

They're planning a demonstration.<sup>41</sup>

Kadar is leaning toward holding negotiations with the centers of resistance.

We must set Sobolev right at the UN.<sup>42</sup>

The workers are supporting the uprising (therefore they want to reclassify it as something other than a "counterrevolutionary uprising").

**Cde. Zhukov** provides information.

They would refrain from stamping out one of the centers of resistance.<sup>43</sup>

An order was given not to permit a demonstration.

They're dismantling the railroad tracks in a number of localities.

In Debrecen power has passed to our troops.<sup>44</sup>

**Cde. Khrushchev** provides information.

The situation is complicated.

Cde. Suslov is to fly back to Moscow.

A Directory has not been declared.

They propose that Hegedus be removed from the Directory (4 in favor, and 6 against).<sup>45</sup>

The plenum is going on now.<sup>46</sup>

**Cde. Voroshilov**—they are poorly informed.

Cdes. Mikoyan and Suslov are behaving calmly, but are poorly informed.

We're in a bad situation. We must devise our own line and get a group of Hungarians to embrace it.

Cde. Mikoyan is not able to carry out this work.

What we intended to do (to send a group of comrades) must now be done.

We should not withdraw troops—we must act decisively.

Nagy is a liquidator.

**Cde. Molotov**—things are going badly.

The situation has deteriorated, and it is gradually moving toward capitulation.

Nagy is actually speaking against us.

Our cdes. are behaving diffidently.

It is agreed up to what limit we will permit concessions.

This pertains now to the composition of the government and to the Directory.

They are excluding Hegedus, and this means they're no longer showing regard for us.

The bare minimum is the question of friendship with the USSR and the assistance of our troops.

Cde. Mikoyan is reassuring them.

If they don't agree, we must consider what will happen with the troops.

**Cde. Kaganovich**—a counterrevolution is under way.

Indecisiveness of the Hungarian Communists.

Kadar should make certain concessions to the workers and peasants and thereby neutralize the movement.

Decisive action is needed against the centers of resistance; we cannot retreat.

**Cde. Bulganin**—the HWP is acting ambivalently.

Kadar kept lurching. The main thing is to demand greater decisiveness from Kadar.

We must act as follows—summon Mikoyan to the phone and say: The HWP Politburo must act decisively; otherwise, we will take action without you. Perhaps will have to appoint the gov't directly.<sup>47</sup>

**Cde. Malenkov**—we shouldn't lay blame for the situation on our comrades. They're firmly carrying out a line aimed at suppressing the uprising. Nagy from the government so he can put forth a program [sic—trans.].

**Cde. Zhukov**—regarding Cde. Mikoyan's role, it's unfair to condemn him right now. The situation has unfolded quite differently compared to when we decided to send in troops.

We must display political flexibility.

We must organize the CC for more flexible actions.

We must organize armed workers' brigades.

Our troops must be kept in full readiness.

The main center of resistance must be suppressed.<sup>48</sup>

**Cde. Saburov**—agrees with Cde. Zhukov.

They must take up their positions at large enterprises.

A program is needed.

**Cde. Khrushchev**—we will have a lot to answer for.

We must reckon with the facts.

Will we have a gov't that is with us, or will there be a gov't that is not with us and will request the withdrawal of troops?

What then?

Nagy said that if you act he will relinquish his powers.

Then the coalition will collapse.<sup>49</sup>

There is no firm leadership there, neither in the party nor in the government.

The uprising has spread into the provinces. The [Hungarian] troops might go over to the side of the insurgents.<sup>50</sup>

We can't persist on account of Hegedus.

Two options.

The gov't takes action, and we help.

This might soon be completed, or Nagy will turn against us.

He will demand a ceasefire and the withdrawal of troops, followed by capitulation.

What might the alternatives be?

1) The formation of a Committee, which takes power into its hands (this is the worst alternative), when we . . .<sup>51</sup>

2) This gov't is retained, and officials from the gov't are sent into the provinces.

A platform is needed.

Perhaps our Appeal to the population and to workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia should be prepared, or else we're just shooting.

3) Would it not be appropriate if the Chinese, Bulgarians, Poles, Czechs, and Yugoslavs appealed to the Hungarians?

4) Decisively suppress the armed forces of the insurgents.

Cdes. Brezhnev, Pospelov, Shepilov, and Furtseva are to prepare documents.

It is agreed: the fraternal parties should appeal to the Hungarians.

Do we support the present government once the declaration is issued?<sup>52</sup>

Yes, support it. There is no alternative.

**Cde. Bulganin:** . . .<sup>53</sup>

**Cde. Voroshilov:** We acted correctly when we sent in troops. We should be in no hurry to pull them out.

American secret services are more active there than Cdes. Suslov and Mikoyan are. A group of comrades should go there. Arrange to form a gov't and then withdraw the troops. We sent you there for nothing.<sup>54</sup> (Cdes. Khrushchev and Kaganovich object.)

**Cde. Bulganin:** We acted properly when we sent in troops, but I can't agree with the assessment offered by Cde. Voroshilov. We should endorse the actions taken by Cdes. Mikoyan and Suslov.

We must draw the right conclusion: In Budapest there are forces that want to get rid of Nagy's and Kadar's government. We should adopt a position of support for the current government.

Otherwise we'll have to undertake an occupation.

This will drag us into a dubious venture.

**Cde. Kaganovich:** Regarding the sending of troops, we acted properly in sending them.

There is no reason to attack Mikoyan and Suslov.

They acted properly. It's unfair to lay the blame on them.

If we don't offer support, there'll be an occupation of the country.

That will take us far afield.

We should do what is needed to support the gov't.

Changes shouldn't be made in the declaration regarding the withdrawal of troops.<sup>55</sup>

So that they speak about friendship.

The question is how to strengthen the party.

We don't need to send additional people there.

**Malenkov:**<sup>56</sup> The actions that were taken were correct.

There is no point at all in condemning Cdes. Mikoyan and Suslov.

We should support the new gov't.

We should keep troops there with the approval of the gov't.

**Cde. Malenkov:** So many people were involved there that there'll have to be a guarantee of an amnesty.

**Cde. Molotov:** We acted properly when we sent in troops. The initial messages from Cdes. Mikoyan and Suslov were reassuring about their view of the government.

The influence of the party on the masses is weak.

With regard to the new government, we should support it.

But regarding friendship with the USSR, they're talking about the withdrawal of troops. We must act cautiously.

**Cde. Zhukov:** We must support the new gov't.

The question of a troop withdrawal from Hungary—this question must be considered by the entire socialist camp.

The authority of the HWP CC must be raised.

We should appeal to the fraternal parties so that they, in turn, will issue appeals to the Hungarians.

In Budapest, we should pull troops off the streets in certain regions.

Perhaps we should release a statement from the military command.

With regard to the assessment of Cdes. Mikoyan and Suslov, it's inappropriate to say the things that Cde. Voroshilov did.

**Cde. Saburov:** We must support this gov't. The authority of the gov't must be increased in the eyes of the people.

We shouldn't protest their assessments of events, and we shouldn't protest about the withdrawal of troops, albeit not an immediate withdrawal.

**Cde. Khrushchev:** Agrees with the cdes.

We must support this gov't.

We must devise our tactics.

We must speak with Kadar and Nagy: We support you; the declaration—you evidently are not able to do more.<sup>57</sup>

We will declare a ceasefire.

We are ready to withdraw troops from Budapest.

We must make this conditional on a ceasefire by the centers of resistance.

**Cde. Molotov:** Second, we must look after the Hungarian Communists.<sup>58</sup>

**Cde. Bulganin**—the regime of people's democracy in the country has collapsed.

The HWP leadership no longer exists.

Power has been gained by . . .<sup>59</sup>

**Cde. Kaganovich**—we're not talking here about concessions, but about a war for the people.

The declaration must be adopted.<sup>60</sup>

A troop withdrawal from Budapest.

**Cde. Voroshilov:** If only a group could be formed there, we could leave our troops in place.

There's no one to rely on.

Otherwise there's war.

**Cde. Khrushchev**—I support the declaration.

Politically this is beneficial for us.<sup>61</sup>

The English and French are in a real mess in Egypt. We shouldn't get caught in the same company.<sup>62</sup>

But we must not foster illusions.

We are saving face.

Fundamentally, the declaration must be adopted.

But adopt it with corrections.<sup>63</sup>

Life in the city must be put right.

An appeal from the fraternal parties.<sup>64</sup>  
A ciphered cable to Yugoslavia.<sup>65</sup>

Cde. Pospelov is to be included in preparations of the report for 6.XI.<sup>56</sup>

If there is to be a leaflet from the military command, let . . .<sup>66</sup>

Hegedus

Gero

Piros

them to Bulgaria.<sup>67</sup>

### **On the Situation in Hungary**<sup>68</sup>

(Cde. Suslov)

**Cde. Suslov:** The situation is complicated. On 23 Oct. our troops entered.<sup>69</sup>

On 25 Oct. only one pocket of resistance was left; we found out about it on 26 Oct. It was in the "Corvin" cinema, a group headed by a colonel from the Horthyite army.<sup>70</sup>

Single gunshots are heard (often).

They're beating officers.

3,000 wounded, 350 dead (Hungarians).

Our losses are 600 dead.

The popular view of our troops now is bad (and has gotten worse). The reason is the dispersal of the demonstration on 24 Oct.

56.<sup>71</sup> Shooting began. 70 ordinary citizens were killed. Many flags were hung up on the sidewalk.

Workers are leaving their enterprises.

Councils are being formed (spontaneously) at enterprises (around various cities).<sup>72</sup>

There is an anti-Soviet trend in the demonstrations.

How can we regain control of the situation? The establishment of a relatively strong gov't.

Our line is not to protest the inclusion of several democrats in the gov't.

Yesterday a government was formed.

On the morning of 28 Oct., at 5:00, Kadar arrived and pointed out that the trade unions had demanded a reassessment of the insurgents, reclassifying the events as a national-democratic uprising.<sup>73</sup>

They want to classify it according to the example of the Poznan events.

Kadar reported that he had succeeded in agreeing with the trade unions to eliminate the formula of a national-democratic movement and about the organs of state security.

In his address, Nagy inserted a point about the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

They're also insisting on a ceasefire.

Our line now: this time the gov't is recommending a ceasefire, and the military command is devising an order for the withdrawal of troops from Budapest.<sup>74</sup>

Nagy and Szanto raised the question of removing Hegedus from the Directory.<sup>75</sup>

There's no need to hold elections.

[Source: *TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, LL. 54-63, compiled by V. N. Malin.*]

#### DOCUMENT No. 7

#### Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 30 October 1956<sup>76</sup>

(Re: Point 1 of Protocol No. 49)<sup>77</sup>

Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Voroshilov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Saburov, Brezhnev, Zhukov, Shepilov, Shvernik, Furtseva, Pospelov

#### On the Situation in Hungary

Information from Cdes. Mikoyan and Serov is read aloud.<sup>78</sup>

**Cde. Zhukov** provides information about the concentration of mil.-transport aircraft in the Vienna region.<sup>79</sup>

Nagy is playing a double game (in Malinin's opinion).

Cde. Konev is to be sent to Budapest.<sup>80</sup>

#### On Discussions with the Chinese comrades.<sup>81</sup>

(Khrushchev)

We should adopt a declaration today on the withdrawal of troops from the countries of people's democracy (and consider these matters at a session of the Warsaw Pact), taking account of the views of the countries in which our troops are based.

The entire CPC CC Politburo supports this position.

One document for the Hungarians, and another for the participants of the Warsaw Pact.

On Rokossowski—I said to Gomulka that this matter is for you (the Poles) to decide.<sup>82</sup>

**Cde. Bulganin**—The Chinese cdes. have an incorrect impression of our relations with the countries of people's democracy.

On our appeal to the Hungarians—we should prepare it.

A declaration should be prepared.

**Cde. Molotov**—Today an appeal must be written to the Hungarian people so that they promptly enter into negotiations about the withdrawal of troops.

There is the Warsaw Pact.

This must be considered with other countries.

On the view of the Chinese comrades—they suggest that relations with the countries of the socialist camp be built on the principles of Pancha Shila.<sup>83</sup>

Relations along interstate lines are on one basis and interstate relations on another.

**Cde. Voroshilov**: We must look ahead. Declarations must be composed so that we aren't placed into an onerous position. We must criticize ourselves—but justly.

**Cde. Kaganovich**—Pancha Shila, but I don't think they should propose that we build our relations on the principles of Pancha Shila.

Two documents—an appeal to the Hungarians and a Declaration.

In this document we don't need to provide self-criticism.

There's a difference between party and state relations.

**Cde. Shepilov**—The course of events reveals the crisis in our relations with the countries of people's democracy.

Anti-Soviet sentiments are widespread.

The underlying reasons must be revealed.

The foundations remain unshakable.

Eliminate the elements of diktat, not giving play in this situation to a number of measures to be considered in our relations.

The declaration is the first step.

There is no need for an appeal to the Hungarians.

On the armed forces: We support the principles of non-interference.

With the agreement of the government of Hungary, we are ready to withdraw troops.

We'll have to keep up a struggle with national-Communism for a long time.

**Cde. Zhukov**—Agrees with what Cde. Shepilov has said.

The main thing is to decide in Hungary.

Anti-Soviet sentiments are widespread.

We should withdraw troops from Budapest, and if necessary withdraw from Hungary as a whole.

This is a lesson for us in the military-political sphere.

**Cde. Zhukov**—With regard to troops in the GDR and in Poland, the question is more serious.

It must be considered at the Consultative Council.<sup>84</sup>

The Consultative Council is to be convened.

To persist further—it is unclear what will come of this.

A quick decision, the main thing is to declare it today.

**Cde. Furtseva**—We should adopt a general declaration, not an appeal to the Hungarians. Not a cumbersome declaration.

The second thing is important for the internal situation.

We must search for other modes of relations with the countries of people's democracy.

About meetings with leaders of the people's democracies (concerning relations).

We should convene a CC plenum (for informational purposes).<sup>85</sup>

**Cde. Saburov**: Agrees about the need for a Declaration and withdrawal of troops.

At the XX Congress we did the correct thing, but then did not keep control of the unleashed initiative of the masses.

It's impossible to lead against the will of the people.

We failed to stand for genuine Leninist principles of leadership.

We might end up lagging behind events.

Agrees with Cde. Furtseva. The ministers are asking; so are members of the CC.<sup>86</sup>

With regard to Romania—they owe us 5 billion rubles for property created by the people.<sup>87</sup>

We must reexamine our relations.

Relations must be built on an equal basis.

**Cde. Khrushchev**: We are unanimous.

As a first step we will issue a Declaration.

**Cde. Khrushchev**—informs the others about his conversation with Cde. Mikoyan.

Kadar is behaving well.

5 of the 6 are firmly hanging in there.<sup>88</sup>

A struggle is going on inside the [HWP—trans.] Presidium about the withdrawal of troops.

The minister of defense will issue a directive about the suppression of insurgents in the cinema, using the armed forces.

(Malinin, apparently, became nervous and left the session.)

Officers from the state security (Hungarian) are with our troops.<sup>89</sup>

#### **Consideration of the Draft Declaration** (Shepilov, Molotov, Bulganin)

**Cde. Bulganin**—we should say in what connection the question of a Declaration arose.

Page 2, Par. 2, don't soften the self-criticism. Mistakes were committed.

Much use should be made of "Leninist principles."

**Cde. Khrushchev**—expresses agreement. We should say we are guided by Leninist principles.

Page 2, Par. 5—we should say we are making a statement, not an explanation.

Page 3—we should speak about economic equity, make it the main thing.

We should say that no troops are stationed in the majority of countries.

We should say that on the territory of the Polish, Hungarian, and Romanian states the stationing of troops is done with the consent of their governments and in the interests of these gov'ts and peoples.<sup>90</sup>

We should express our view of the government of Hungary.

Measures to support them.

About support for the party and HWP CC and for the gov't. We should refer specifically to Nagy and Kadar.

**Cde. Kaganovich, Cde. Molotov, Cde. Zhukov:** We should mention the Potsdam agreement and the treaties with every country.<sup>91</sup>

**Cde. Zhukov**—We should express sympathy with the people. We should call for an end to the bloodshed.

Page 2, Par. 2: We should say the XX Congress condemned the disregard for principles of equality.

**Cde. Zhukov**—we should speak about economics.

Restructuring was thwarted after the XX Congress.

(**Cde. Khrushchev**)

We are turning to the member-states of the Warsaw Pact to consider the question of our advisers.<sup>92</sup> We are ready to withdraw them.

Further editing.<sup>93</sup>

Transmitted via high frequency to Cdes. Mikoyan and Suslov.

#### **Information from Cde. Yudin on Negotiations with the Chinese Comrades.**

What's the situation: Will Hungary leave our camp? Who is Nagy? Can he be trusted? About the advisers.

Those taking part: Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Molotov, Saburov, Khrushchev, Zhukov, Brezhnev, Shepilov, Shvernik, Furtseva, Pospelov, Yudin. Chinese comrades.

#### **On the Situation in Hungary**

(Cde. Khrushchev,

Cde. Liu Shaoqi)

Cde. Liu Shaoqi indicates on behalf of the CPC CC that troops must remain in Hungary and in Budapest.<sup>94</sup>

**Cde. Khrushchev**—there are two paths.

A military path—one of occupation.

A peaceful path—the withdrawal of troops, negotiations.

**Cde. Molotov**—the political situation has taken clearer shape. An anti-revol. gov't has been formed, a transitional gov't.<sup>95</sup> We should issue the Declaration and explain our position. We should clarify our relationship with the new gov't. We are entering into negotiations about the withdrawal of troops.

Nagy—the prime minister.

Kadar—a state minister.

Tildy Zoltan—

Kovacs Bela—

Losonczy—a Communist and a supporter of Nagy.<sup>96</sup>

[Source: *TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. 6-14, compiled by V. N. Malin.*]

#### **DOCUMENT No. 8**

#### **Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 31 October 1956<sup>97</sup>**

(Re: Point VI of Protocol No. 49)<sup>98</sup>

#### **Information about Discussions with Gomulka**

#### **Regarding the Situation in Poland and Hungary<sup>99</sup>**

(Khrushchev)

A meeting with Cde. Gomulka (in the Brest region) was proposed.

#### **On Hungary**

**Cde. Khrushchev** sets forth the various considerations.

We should reexamine our assessment and should not withdraw our troops from Hungary and Budapest.<sup>100</sup> We should take the initiative in restoring order in Hungary. If we depart from Hungary, it will give a great boost to the Americans, English, and French—the imperialists.

They will perceive it as weakness on our part and will go onto the offensive.

We would then be exposing the weakness of our positions.

Our party will not accept it if we do this.

To Egypt they will then add Hungary.<sup>101</sup>

We have no other choice.

If this point of view is supported and endorsed, let's consider what we should do.

Agreed: **Cdes. Zhukov, Bulganin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Saburov**<sup>102</sup>

We should say we tried to meet them halfway, but there is not now any government. What line are we now adopting?

We should create a Provisional Revol. Gov't (headed by Kadar).<sup>103</sup>

Best of all—a deputy.

Munnich—as premier and min. of defense and internal affairs.<sup>104</sup>

This government—we should invite them to negotiations about the withdrawal of troops and resolve the matter.

If Nagy agrees, bring him in as dep. premier.<sup>105</sup>

Munnich is appealing to us with a request for assistance. We are lending assistance and restoring order.

We should negotiate with Tito.

We should inform the Chinese comrades, the Czechs, the Romanians, and the Bulgarians.<sup>106</sup>

There will be no large-scale war.

**Cde. Saburov**—after yesterday's session this discussion is all pointless.

It will vindicate NATO.

**Cde. Molotov**—yesterday was only a compromise decision.

**Cdes. Zhukov, Voroshilov, Bulganin:** We should reject the view that we are reexamining our position.

**Cde. Furtseva**—What further should be done?

We showed patience, but now things have gone too far. We must act to ensure that

victory goes to our side.

**Cde. Pospelov**—we should use the argument that we will not let socialism in Hungary be strangled.

**Cde. Shvernik**—Cde. Khrushchev's proposal is correct.

**Cde. Molotov**—we should not defer the creation of organs in localities. We should act simultaneously in the center and in the localities.

Cde. Zhukov is instructed to work out a plan and report on it.<sup>107</sup>

Shepilov, Brezhnev, Furtseva, and Pospelov are to handle the propaganda side.<sup>108</sup>

An appeal to the people from the military command or the government.

An appeal to the people from the Prov. Revol. Gov't.

An order from Cde. Konev.<sup>109</sup>

We should send a group to the region of Cde. Konev's headquarters.<sup>110</sup>

Cde. Rakosi—favors Munnich (as premier)<sup>111</sup>

Cde. Hegedus— “

Cde. Gero— “

Apro<sup>112</sup>

Kadar

Kiss Karoly<sup>113</sup>

Boldoczki

Horvath

#### **On Negotiations with Tito**

(Cdes. Khrushchev, Molotov, Bulganin)

Draft a telegram to Tito about the meeting.<sup>114</sup>

To Brest: Khrushchev, Molotov, Malenkov.<sup>115</sup>

To Yugoslavia: Khrushchev, Malenkov.

To discuss with you the situation that has emerged in Hungary. What is your view of it? If you agree, our delegation will visit incognito from

1. XI in the evening to

2. XI in the morning your time.

Confirm the telegram to the Soviet ambassador in Belgrade.

[Source: *TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. 15-18ob, compiled by V. N. Malin.*]

#### **DOCUMENT No. 9**

#### **Notes of a Telephone Message from F. N. Gryaznov, a Counselor at the USSR Embassy in Yugoslavia, on 31 October 1956**

The message was transmitted through Kardelj.

Cde. Tito is at Brioni. Kardelj reported that Tito is prepared to meet with Cdes. Khrushchev and Malenkov on 1 November. However, because the doctors have forbidden him to leave his current premises in view of his illness, Tito requests that our delegation, if possible, come to Brioni.

As Kardelj further said, it would be desirable if the aircraft carrying the delegation arrived at the airport in Pula at roughly 5:00 p.m. Belgrade time so they can leave from the airport for Brioni with the approach of darkness.

Instructions about the flight path and the landing in Pula will be given in due course.

Kardelj requested that we let him know the time of departure for the aircraft and the time of arrival in Pula.

[Source: *TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, Ll. 64-65, compiled by V. N. Malin.*]

#### **DOCUMENT No. 10**

#### **Notes of a Telephone Message<sup>116</sup>**

There was a certain common understanding. The position is what we expected. This is an internal affair. There should not be interference.

Reaction is rearing its head.

8-10% at elections.

Arm the workers, let them keep the weapons.

[Source: *TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, Ll. 66, compiled by V. N. Malin.*]

#### **DOCUMENT NO. 11**

#### **Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 1 November 1956 (Re: Point I of Protocol No. 50)<sup>117</sup>**

Those Taking Part: Voroshilov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Saburov, Suslov, Brezhnev, Zhukov, Shvernik, Furtseva, Pospelov, Konev, Serov<sup>118</sup>

#### **On the Situation in Hungary.**

(Cdes. Mikoyan)

The demand for the withdrawal of troops became universal.

Anti-Soviet sentiments have intensified.

(Cde. Mikoyan)

In current circumstances it is better now to support the existing gov't.

Right now, the use of force will not help anything.

We should enter into negotiations. For 10-15 days.

If the regime slips away, we'll need to decide what to do. We simply cannot allow Hungary to be removed from our camp.

We shouldn't quarrel right now with the army.

If the situation stabilizes, we should decide at that point whether we'll withdraw the troops.

We should wait another 10-15 days and support this government.

If the situation stabilizes, everything will change for the better.

**Cde. Suslov:** The unstable polit. situation. The danger of a bourgeois restoration has reached its peak.

The situation will be clarified in the next few days.

Events are developing wildly, but without the control of the party.

A schism in the HWP—the intra-party struggle has spilled out onto the streets.

I don't believe that Nagy organized the uprising, but his name is being used.

If we back this gov't—there is no guarantee.

Only by means of an occupation can we have a government that supports us.

**Cde. Serov**—the demonstrations were meticulously prepared. Nagy was connected with the rebels.

We must take decisive measures.

We must occupy the country.

**Cde. Bulganin**—provides information about the decision taken on 31-X-56 and about the discussions with the Chinese comrades.<sup>119</sup>

**Cde. Bulganin:** The international situation has changed.<sup>120</sup>

If we don't take measures—we will lose Hungary.

**Cde. Konev**—Budapest is in the hands of the rebels.

Anarchy is spreading; reaction is triumphing.

The decision: occupation.

**Cde. Kaganovich:** The discussion was complicated.<sup>121</sup>

The Chinese said we should not withdraw troops.

Objectively—a sharp reactionary movement.

The party doesn't exist.

We can't wait long.

The reactionary forces are attacking, and we are attacking.<sup>122</sup>

**Cde. Furtseva**—reactions to the Declaration.

Are worried that we're giving away Hungary.<sup>123</sup>

**Cde. Zhukov**—there is no basis for reconsidering the decision of 31-X-56.

I don't agree with Cde. Mikoyan that we must support the current gov't.

Our actions must be decisive.

Remove all the unsavory elements.

Disarm the counterrevolution.

Delay the parliamentary delegation to France.

To the ambassador in Budapest—send the families.<sup>124</sup>

Reconsider sending a parliamentary delegation to Thailand.

**Cde. Bulganin**—everything is being done in the spirit of the decision of 31 X.

**Cde. Zhukov:** Everything will be restored to order.

We are acting on the basis of the Declaration—the redeployments will bring order.

**Cde. Suslov**—now the situation has become clearer.

Separate out the honest ones.<sup>125</sup>

Zhukov, Suslov, Konev, Serov, Brezhnev (the plan of measures).<sup>126</sup>

Those Taking Part: Voroshilov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Saburov, Suslov, Brezhnev, Zhukov, Shepilov, Shvernik, Furtseva, Pospelov, Konev, Serov

#### On the Situation in Hungary

(Mikoyan)

About our embassy in Hungary.

(Bulganin, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Zhukov, Shepilov)

So far, to keep the embassy.<sup>127</sup>

On the main question.

**Cde. Shepilov:** There were two paths: to reckon with the mass nature of the movement and not to intervene; or second, the military path; it turned out there was a third path: both that we intervened and that reaction triumphed.

The current situation: a counterrev. putsch has been carried out, and the state order has changed; the main trend is anti-Soviet; the chief orientation of forces is being orchestrated from outside.

If we don't embark on a decisive path, things in Czechoslovakia will collapse.<sup>128</sup>

We must establish order by the use of force.

**Cde. Mikoyan:** If Hungary becomes a base for imperialism, that's a different matter.

What we're talking about here is the current situation.

We should not tolerate a pedantic approach.

There are still 3 days to think it over; there'll be advice from the comrades.

The tactic: to maintain contacts with them.<sup>129</sup>

Cdes. Suslov, Brezhnev, + Hungarian comrades—

to prepare measures (on which cadres to rely and what we will do).

[Source: *TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. 19-22, compiled by V. N. Malin.*]

#### DOCUMENT No. 12

**Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 2 November 1956, with Participation by J. Kadar, F. Munnich, and I. Bata**<sup>130</sup>

Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Molotov, Saburov, Suslov, Brezhnev. Cdes. Munnich, Kadar, and Bata

#### Exchange of Opinions about the Situation in Hungary

An assessment.<sup>131</sup>

The intelligentsia is taking the lead; the oppositionists are supporters of Nagy; the armed groups are headed by party figures, including Dudas, an engineer.<sup>132</sup>

When the uprising ended, they spoke with the rebels; these were workers, the leaders of the group; they arrived at the coalition government; they didn't want this;

they're seeking the ouster of the Rakosi clique.

They fought for the withdrawal of troops and for the order of people's democracy.<sup>133</sup>

Mass demonstrations are taking place on the periphery; these didn't include any goal—to destroy the order of people's democracy; many demands about democratization, and social demands.

I personally took part in one meeting (of the conference), and no one wanted counter-revolution.

But when we spoke with the leaders of the armed groups, inside these groups—armed groups of a counterrevolutionary nature have emerged.

I have to say that everyone demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

We didn't clarify how the counterrevolutionaries managed to disseminate this counter-revolutionary propaganda.

The strike is a demand for the withdrawal of troops: we'll starve in the process, but the troops must be withdrawn.

Yesterday there was a conference.

They were speaking about the Declaration of the Soviet government and the Declaration of neutrality.<sup>134</sup>

Stated that we will go back to work.

But Soviet troops were being redeployed, and the news quickly spread.

The government will not be considered to have any authority because of the coalition nature of the government.

All forces are seeking the restoration of their parties. Each group wants to take power into its own hands. This undermines the authority of the government even further.

The Soc.-Democrats are especially distinctive in this regard.

In the inner cabinet the Soc.-Dems. were given one spot. But they haven't named a candidate; they don't want to act in solidarity with Nagy.<sup>135</sup>

Nagy's policy has counterrev. aspects to it. The soldiers freed Cardinal Mindszenty.<sup>136</sup>

The Austrians support a fascist organization (in West Germany—a Hungarian organization) 35 thous. people (Horthyites).

The weak link is the HWP; it has ceased to exist: some have been killed (workers), some were saved.

The leaders of 1/3 of the obkoms are taking part in revolutionary committees (for the region and province).  
Local bodies have been destroyed.

On 1 Nov. at noon—the point of view in the government is that it's necessary to hold discussions with the Soviet gov't and to have the troops withdrawn by a certain time. But this isn't accurate.<sup>137</sup>

The coalition parties don't want counterrev. Tildy and other cdes. are afraid of Ferenc Nagy.<sup>138</sup>

Those in the emigre community: they're afraid of them.

Tildy is afraid of Kovacs, but he's better than Tildy and is a smart man.

Kovacs gave a speech in Pecs:<sup>139</sup> we are creating a Smallholders party, but we can't struggle on the basis of the old program. He is against the return of the landowners and capitalists.

But they aren't putting forth demands that are popular in the nation.

Hour by hour the situation is moving rightward.

2 questions:

- 1) the gov't's decision about neutrality,
- 2) the party.

How did the decision about neutrality emerge?

The strong impression is that there's an organized departure of troops.

The Declaration—a good impression and a reassuring gesture.

But the masses are very stirred-up and are reacting harshly.

There were movements of Sov. troops, which alarmed the gov't and masses.<sup>140</sup>

The gov't is doing one thing, and the troops another.

They reported that Soviet troops had crossed the border in transport vehicles. Hungarian formations are entrenched.

What should be done—to shoot or not to shoot?

They summoned Andropov. Andropov said that these are railroad workers.

Hungarians at the border sent back telegrams saying that these definitely are not railroad workers.

Then they reported that Soviet tanks are

moving into Szolnok.

This was at noon. The government has been thrown into a nervous state.

They summoned Andropov. He responded: the withdrawal of wounded soldiers.

Nagy was convinced that a strike against Budapest is being prepared. Tildy requested that Hungarian tanks approach the parliament.

In the army—a Rev. Council, Maleter, Kovacs,<sup>141</sup> and Kiraly are not subordinate to the gov't.

They don't want bad ministers.

The whole gov't was inclined to the view that if the troops move toward Budapest, the city must be defended.

In this atmosphere the idea of neutrality arose.

The initiator of it was Zoltan Tildy.

Everyone supported it.

I was a supporter of the view that no sorts of steps should be taken without having spoken with Andropov.

The whole cabinet, other than Kadar, declared that the Sov. gov't is deceiving the Hungarian gov't.

They deferred it for two hours.

The Sov. gov't's explanation didn't satisfy them. They told Andropov that they'll be taking this step.<sup>142</sup>

When Andropov left, they took their step about neutrality and decided to issue an appeal to the UN.

If these are just maneuvers, they'll withdraw the question from the UN.

When Andropov left, Kadar voted for neutrality, too.

The renaming of the party: the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (a name used back in 1925).

The HWP has been compromised in the view of the overwhelming masses.

The peak of the HWP's authority was in 1948 (the alliance with the Soc.-Dems.).

The Rajk affair shattered its authority.

About the future.

Yesterday I voted for these two decisions of the government.

If they will withdraw Soviet troops in the near future (within two-three

months)—the decision on the withdrawal of troops is the important thing—our party and other parties would be able to fight against the counterrev.

But I'm not sure this will be successful.

There's no unity within the coalition.

My point of view is: if the Soc.-Dems. and the Smallholders party are going to operate on the basis of their old programs, they will be deceitful.

The people believe in nationalism and regard it as their affair.<sup>143</sup>

If the Communists declare that they support nationalism, the authority of the other parties will stop increasing.

The looming danger—the counterrevolution wouldn't embolden these coalition parties.

My view is that there's another path.

The armed forces could be deployed to support Hungary.

But then there will be skirmishes.

The use of military force will be destructive and lead to bloodshed.

What will happen then? The morale of the Communists will be reduced to zero.

The socialist countries will suffer losses.

Is there a guarantee that such circumstances will not arise in other countries?

The counterrev. forces are not meager.

But this is a matter of struggle.

If order is restored by force, the authority of the socialist countries will be eroded.

#### **Munnich:**

A gloomy situation.

Why did this situation arise?

The isolation of the leaders from the masses. Certainty that the regime exists and is preserved only through the support of the USSR.<sup>144</sup>

This is the source of anti-Soviet sentiments (facts: soccer, radio broadcasts).<sup>145</sup>

In Hungary: total chaos.

What would be the result if the troops are withdrawn—this would respond to the sentiment of the masses.

Counterrev. elements are receiving reinforcement, and their actions are not being stopped.

We have no more forces left.

On the military nature of the events.

Anti-Soviet sentiments are being spread by counterrev. elements.

**Cde. Kadar**—a concrete request: preserve the party cadres.

#### **Cde. Bata:**

The question is pointedly raised about the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

Everything all of them are doing will lead to a confrontation of Soviet and Hungarian troops.

I was a witness when a Hungarian unit opened fire on Soviet troops. The Soviets didn't respond. Further such restraint couldn't be expected from even the most disciplined army. Whether deliberately or not, the gov't is laying the groundwork for a confrontation of Soviet and Hungarian troops. Order must be restored through a military dictatorship. Change the policy of the government.

[Source: *TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L. 23-29, compiled by V. N. Malin.*]

### DOCUMENT No. 13

**Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 2 November 1956 (Re: point IV of Protocol No. 50)**<sup>146</sup>

#### On the Plan for Measures Concerning Hungary<sup>147</sup>

(Zhukov, Serov, Konev, Molotov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Voroshilov)

1) to speak about the threat of fascism posed by the Horthyites;<sup>148</sup>

the threat to our homeland,  
they want to use it as a base against  
our country;  
the workers and peasants support  
us.  
Adopt it with amendments.

2) send Cdes. Mikoyan and Brezhnev<sup>149</sup>  
(decide on 3 XI 56).

Approve the plan.<sup>150</sup>

[Source: *TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L. 30, compiled by V. N. Malin.*]

### DOCUMENT No. 14

**Notes of a Secure Phone Call from the USSR Ambassador in Romania, A. A. Epishev**<sup>151</sup>

3/XI/56

Bucharest, Cde. Epishev<sup>152</sup>

A message.

Late in the evening of 2 Nov. after a discussion with the Soviet ambassador, Imre Nagy summoned the Romanian ambassador and told him that he, Imre Nagy, has received verified information that Soviet troops are entering the country.

In this connection, he asks the ambas-

sador to transmit to Cde. Gheorghiu-Dej his request for advice on what to do.

This request to the ambassador has been transmitted to Cde. Gheorghiu-Dej.

Cde. Gheorghiu-Dej responded to the ambassador—in a message to be conveyed to Imre Nagy—that he received his appeal and stated, by way of reassurance, that for the life of the Hungarian working class and of the Hungarian Republic it is never too late, and I am sending Cde. Malnasan to you.<sup>153</sup>

The response has not yet been sent to Budapest.

3/XI/56

An LI-2 aircraft (a single one) will fly out of Bucharest at 10:20 Bucharest time for a trip into Budapest city airport. On board the aircraft is Malnasan.<sup>154</sup>

[Source: *TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, L. 67-69, compiled by V. N. Malin.*]

### DOCUMENT No. 15

**Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 3 November 1956, with Participation by J. Kadar, F. Munnich, and I. Horvath**

Those Taking Part: Voroshilov, Bulganin, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Molotov, Kirichenko, Saburov, Suslov, Brezhnev, Pospelov<sup>155</sup>

#### On the Preparation of Documents for Use in Hungary

(Khrushchev, Mikoyan)

The documents are poorly prepared.

Cdes. Suslov, Mikoyan, and Shepilov are to prepare the documents.<sup>156</sup>

#### On the Composition of the Hungarian Gov't

(Mikoyan)<sup>157</sup>

**Cde. Mikoyan:** At the head of the gov't is Kadar.

**Kadar**—it is worth speaking about mistakes, but for a long while there was no time. About one matter—why in the summer they chose Gero as secretary.

The Soviet comrades always helped, but there was one mistake: only 3-4 Hungarian cdes. enjoyed the full trust of the Soviet cdes.: Rakosi, Gero, Farkas.

But among others there are many orderly people.

3-4 individuals monopolized relations between Hungary and the USSR.

This is the source of many mistakes.

Rakosi would say "this is the view of the Soviet cdes.," and that would put an end to the debate.

On the exclusion of Nagy from the party: Rakosi said that the Soviet cdes. share his view.

**Cde. Kadar**—the decisions of the XX Congress were heartily welcomed.<sup>158</sup>

To criticize Rakosi means speaking out against the Soviet cdes.

The congratulatory telegram in Rakosi's name (caused confusion).<sup>159</sup>

For 12 years: the Soviet comrades were calm with Rakosi at the head and then Gero (they didn't raise objections to them).

What now?

On Nagy's behavior.

They're killing Communists.

The counterrev. are killing them, and premier Nagy provides a cover.

The government lacks the forces to put an end to it.

What must be done?

Surrendering a socialist country to counterrev. is impossible.

I agree with you.

The correct course of action is to form a rev. government.

I'd like to dwell on one point:

the whole nation is taking part in the movement.

The nation does not want to liquidate the peop.-dem. order.

The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary has great significance.

We are being strengthened in our military relationship, and are becoming weaker in the political.

National sentiments are offended (form, title).

**Cde. Kadar:**

This government must not be puppetlike, there must be a base for its activities and support among workers.

There must be an answer to the question of what sort of relationship we must have with

the USSR.

**Cde. Munnich:**

Believes that Cde. Kadar's assessment and conclusions are correct.

**Cde. Kadar**—the center of counterrev. is in the city of Gyor.<sup>160</sup>

If we declare Nagy's gov't counterrev., all parties will fall under this rubric.

The government does not want to struggle against the counterrev.

The position:

on the basis of defending the peop.-dem. order, socialist gains, and friendship with the USSR and with other socialist countries and cooperation with all peaceloving countries.

At the head of the gov't is Kadar.

To send: Malenkov, Mikoyan, Brezhnev.<sup>161</sup>

To fly off: (at 2:00-3:00) at 7:00 to 8:00 in the morning.

[Source: *TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L. 31-33ob, compiled by V. N. Malin.*]

**DOCUMENT No. 16**

**Imre Horvath's Notes of Khrushchev's Speech at the 3 November Session<sup>162</sup>**

Khrush., Bulg., Vorosh., Malen., Molot., Kagan., Mikoyan, Brezhnev

Khrush.: Organized counterrev.

Events are without letup.

From the north.

Mistakes of Rakosi, Gero, + others

Miskolc!<sup>163</sup>

We are doing a lot, but not everything!

This is no justification for the fact that

there are no Hungarian leaders!

Rakosi was paralyzed, but we didn't actively speak out. We were too late in requesting that he be replaced.

It's my fault and Mikoyan's that we proposed Gero rather than Kadar.<sup>164</sup> We gave in to Gero. Rak. and Gero are honorable and committed Communists. But they did many stupid things.

Rak. is hardline, and Gero hapless.

They criticized I. Nagy and regarded him as an opportunist, but he is also a traitor.

The exclusion of I. Nagy from the party was a mistake and a reflection of Rak.'s stupidity. We would have arrested I. Nagy. We were for admitting him back into the party.

Some of the rebels are not enemies! They were antagonized by the mistakes of the leadership. We welcome your (Kad.'s)

choice. We cannot regard I. Nagy as a Communist. Dulles needs someone just like I. Nagy. We uphold the Declaration. But with I. Nagy that's impossible!

Eng. + Fr. Egypt.<sup>165</sup> We consulted with other parties. Malen., Khr. Poland.

We can't be observers on the sidelines.

Yug., Rankovic, Kardelj, Micunovic, the ambassador in Mosc. + Malenk., Khrush. Alarm!

Revol. government. The traitors want to use Kadar as a screen. If I. Nagy is not forced into retirement, he'll be working for the enemy.

—Munnich — Apro | Hidas  
deputy, —Ronai | Berei  
internal affairs, Kiss | Andics  
defense —Marosan

—Kadar as chairman Kovacs

—Kossa at finance Egri

Veg

They want to isolate Kadar

—Doge

Miskolc |—> Budapest

Szolnok |

—Kossa at finance

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choice. We cannot regard I. Nagy as a Communist. Dulles needs someone just like I. Nagy. We uphold the Declaration. But with I. Nagy that's impossible!

Eng. + Fr. Egypt.<sup>165</sup> We consulted with other parties. Malen., Khr. Poland. We can't be observers on the sidelines. Yug., Rankovic, Kardelj, Micunovic, the ambassador in Mosc. + Malenk., Khrush. Alarm! Revol. government. The traitors want to use Kadar as a screen. If I. Nagy is not forced into retirement, he'll be working for the enemy.

[Source: *Magyar Orszagos Leveltar, XIX J-1-K Horvath Imre kulugyminiszter iratai, 55, doboz.*]

**DOCUMENT No. 17**

**Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 4 November 1956 (Re: Protocol No. 51)**

Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Molotov, Pervukhin, Saburov, Suslov, Khrushchev, Zhukov, Shepilov, Furtseva, Pospelov.

**On the Operations and Situation in Hungary<sup>166</sup>**

Cde. Kaganovich's ciphered cable from Cde. Malinin

at Cde. Khrushchev

(4 XI).<sup>167</sup>

1) Bring back Cdes. Mikoyan and Brezhnev.

2) Provide assistance to Hungary.<sup>168</sup>

3) More actively take part in the assistance to Egypt.<sup>169</sup>

Think through a number of measures (perhaps a demonstration at the English embassy).

More widely in the newspapers.

**Cde. Molotov**—think about Hungary.

Exert influence on Kadar so that Hungary does not go the route of Yugoslavia. They made changes in the Declaration—they now condemn the Rakosi-Gero clique—and this

might be dangerous.<sup>170</sup>

We must convince them that they should refrain from this reference to the Rakosi-Gero clique.

Kadar is calling (1 XI) for a condemnation of Stalinism.<sup>171</sup>

The title of Hungarian Workers' Party should be retained.

We should come to agreement with them and prevent them from shifting to Yugoslav positions.

**Cde. Molotov**—reinforce the military victory through political means.

**Cde. Khrushchev**—I don't understand Cde. Molotov. He comes up with the most pernicious ideas.

**Cde. Molotov**—you should keep quiet and stop being so overbearing.

**Cde. Bulganin**—we should condemn the incorrect line of Rakosi-Gero.

**Cde. Khrushchev**: The declaration is good—we must act honorably.

**Cde. Shepilov**—during the editing they added the phrase "the clique of Rakosi and Gero."

We are giving them legal opportunities to denigrate the entire 12-year period of the HWP's work.

**Cde. Shepilov**—is it really necessary to disparage cadres?

Tomorrow it will be the "clique of Ulbricht."<sup>172</sup>

**Cde. Saburov**—if they themselves don't comprehend their mistakes, we will deal at length with the matter.

Reward the military personnel.

Take care of the families of those who perished.<sup>173</sup>

**V. On Purging the Higher Educational Institutions of Unsavory Elements**

(Cdes. Zhukov, Khrushchev, Furtseva, Pervukhin, Voroshilov)

Furtseva, Pospelov, Shepilov, and Elyutin are to come up with recommendations for purging the higher educational institutions of unsavory elements.<sup>174</sup>

**IV. On the Response to Cde. Kardelj and the Telegram About Imre Nagy**

Affirm the text of the response.<sup>175</sup>

**On Instructions to the Soviet Ambassador in Hungary**

**On the Raising of the Question at the Gen. Assembly's Session on Hungary**

Cde. Kadar is to say that he will withdraw the question from the UN.<sup>176</sup>

[Source: *TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. 34-36ob, compiled by V. N. Malin.*]

**DOCUMENT No. 18**

**Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 5 November 1956 (Re: Point VIII of Protocol No. 52)**

**On the Party in Hungary**<sup>177</sup>  
(Khrushchev, Zhukov, Molotov)

Today this question need not be considered. The old name (HWP) will not be suitable. The name must be in accord with Marxist-Len. content.

**Cde. Zhukov**—consult with secretaries of the provincial party committees.

**Cde. Molotov**—it would be important to preserve the old name of the HWP.

**Cde. Voroshilov**—through the CC we should hold a conference of the party aktiv and consult about the name of the party.

**Cde. Malenkov**—we don't need to consider it right now.

**Cde. Kaganovich**—consider it organizationally, in essence.

[Source: *TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. 40-40ob. Compiled by V. N. Malin.*]

**DOCUMENT No. 19**

**Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 6 November 1956 (Re: Protocol No. 53)**

Those Taking Part: Bulganin, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Molotov, Kaganovich, Pervukhin, Saburov, Suslov, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Zhukov, Shepilov, Shvern timer, Furtseva, Aristov, Belyaev, Pospelov<sup>178</sup>

**I. On the Appeal of the Provisional CC of the Hungarian Socialist (Workers') Party**<sup>179</sup>

(The text is read aloud by Cde. Malenkov.)

**Cde. Mikoyan**—overall it should be adopted.

**Cde. Molotov**—in whose name is the document being issued (from the CC)? The composition of the CC is still unknown. It is unclear what entity is supporting democratization if there is still a CC of the HWP. In actuality, the dissolution of the party is being proposed.

A new party will be created on an unknown basis. Where will it lead?

In April 1956 there was an appeal from the CPSU CC. We sent greetings to the HWP CC (we acknowledged their services).<sup>180</sup>

They're talking about acknowledgment of Marxism-Leninism, but in reality everything can be acknowledged.

So far we have concurred in not resolving the question of the renaming of the party. We should not use the expression "the Rakosi clique."<sup>181</sup>

**Cde. Suslov**—the draft of the appeal is correct—no one is talking about the dissolution of the HWP. The party's basic principles are being preserved. We must support it. On the "clique"—the issue is not the name, but the mistakes that were made. The Hungarian comrades again will have suspicions; let's dispel them.

**Cde. Kaganovich**: This is a step forward. Having discreet influence on Kadar. Overall it should be adopted.

We should try to suggest not changing the name of the party. We should suggest they speak about friendship with the USSR. We should suggest they decline mentioning both the name and the Rakosi clique.

**Cde. Bulganin**—The Declaration is fine. Cde. Mikoyan's changes are correct. As for the statements by Cdes. Molotov and Kaganovich: no one is talking about the dissolution of the HWP. That's a misleading argument.

There is no principled basis for Cde. Molotov to couch the matter that way.

On friendship with the USSR, we shouldn't mention it. Leave it as they propose (spoken about friendship).

**Cde. Pervukhin**—a proper document. The HWP CC collapsed. It's not true that if we call something a "clique," we're condemning the whole party.

**Cde. Malenkov**—without harsh criticism of Rakosi we won't be able to strengthen the [Hungarian] leadership.

They're setting forth their own program. A CC plenum should not be convened (since Nagy is also a member of the CC).<sup>182</sup>

**Cde. Zhukov**—we must decisively support Cde. Kadar. Otherwise they won't understand us. Rakosi conducted an inappropriate policy, which must be condemned.

**Cde. Saburov**—I support Cde. Mikoyan.

**Cde. Molotov**—we must not forget that a change of names is a change of character. What's going on is the creation of a new Yugoslavia. We are responsible for Hungary (without Stalin).

I vehemently object.

**Cde. Furtseva**—raises the question: where were the leaders?

The people fully support them.

**Cde. Brezhnev**: The Declaration is appropriate. It's pointless to theorize about it.

**Cde. Saburov**: Cdes. Molotov and Kaganovich are simplistically and dogmatically approaching the question. The party will be better.

**Cde. Mikoyan**—Cde. Molotov is completely ignoring the concrete situation—Cde. Molotov is dragging us backward. Speak about Nagy.

**Cde. Voroshilov**—Cde. Molotov's statements are fundamentally correct. But in this case it's impossible to adopt.

**Cde. Aristov**—we must endorse and support Cde. Kadar. The statements by Cdes. Molotov and Kaganovich—they clung to the cult of Stalin, and they're still clinging to it.

**Cde. Shvern timer**—Cde. Molotov is incorrect. How can we not say something if Rakosi caused a great deal of harm?

**Cde. Shepilov**—the document is appropriate. Say—a condemnation of Nagy. On the "clique": we will leave a stain on the socialist past.

**Cde. Khrushchev**—a good draft. We should make changes. Indicate which group is presenting it. If the CC is convened, it should be said then that we have faith in Kadar.<sup>183</sup> For Cde. Molotov this is logical (Cde. Molotov doesn't come out and say it, but he's thinking of bringing back both

Hegedus and Rakosi).

Rakosi caused enormous damage, and for this he must be held accountable. He must be excluded from the party.<sup>184</sup>

#### Cde. Khrushchev:

Cde. Kaganovich, when will you mend your ways and stop all your toadying? Holding to some sort of hardened position. What Cde. Molotov and Kaganovich are proposing is the line of screeching and face-slapping. Speak about Nagy. About Losonczy and Donath.

Cdes. Mikoyan, Suslov, and Brezhnev are to transmit our changes and requests in a tactful manner.

#### II. Ciph. Tel. No. . . . from . . . . (Zhukov, Shepilov)<sup>185</sup>

Affirm as an unfortunate event.<sup>186</sup>

[Source: *TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, Ll. 41-45ob, compiled by V. N. Malin.*]

#### DOCUMENT No. 20

**Working Notes from the Session of the CPSU CC Presidium on 27 November 1956**  
(Re: Protocol No. 60)<sup>187</sup>

#### I. From Bucharest.

(Khr., Vorosh., Kagan., Mik., Mol., Perv., Bulg., Sab., Zhuk., Grom.)

It's not advisable.<sup>188</sup>

We should inform Dej that this is not to our advantage, and is not to the advantage of Hungary.

Cde. Bulg. is to negotiate with Cde. Dej.<sup>189</sup>

**Zhukov**—we should state our view of the position of the Yugoslavs.

**Khr.**—we don't need to enter into correspondence with Tito about Imre Nagy; that's a matter for Hungary to handle. It was a mistake for our officer to go into the bus.<sup>190</sup>

#### II.<sup>191</sup>

Instructions to:

The Foreign Ministry  
KGB, and

On the discrediting of Imre.<sup>192</sup>  
Konev

[Source: *TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L. 52, compiled by V. N. Chernukha.*]

#### TRANSLATOR'S NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Protocol No. 28 was the formal protocol drafted for this session, which is now stored in *Tsentral'noye Khraneniye Sovremennoi Dokumentatsii* (TsKhSD), Moscow, Fond (F.) 3, Opis' (Op.) 14, Delo (D.) 41, Listy (Ll.) 1-2. The session was held on both 9 and 12 July 1956, but the item covered here (Point IV) was discussed solely on the 12th.

<sup>2</sup> This refers to a ciphered telegram from the Soviet ambassador in Hungary, Yu. V. Andropov, on 9 July 1956. The lengthy telegram, stored in *Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii* (APRF), F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 151-162, recounts a discussion that Andropov had with the Hungarian leader, Erno Gero, three days earlier. Gero had spoken about the disarray within the Hungarian leadership and the growing ferment in Hungarian society.

<sup>3</sup> Here and elsewhere in Malin's notes, the listing of surnames in parentheses after the title of a session means that these individuals spoke, in the sequence indicated, about the given topic. The formal protocol for this session, as cited in Note 1 *supra*, reveals that Molotov, Kaganovich, and Bulganin also spoke about the subject.

<sup>4</sup> Mikoyan arrived in Budapest the following day (13 July) and was there until 21 July. The most important of the ciphered telegrams, secure phone messages, and reports that he and Andropov sent back from Budapest during this time were declassified in 1992 and published in "Vengriya, aprel'-oktyabr' 1956 goda: Informatsiya Yu. V. Andropova, A. I. Mikoyana i M. A. Suslova iz Budapeshta," *Istoricheskii arkhiv*, No. 4 (1993), pp. 110-128. Lake Balaton, the largest lake in Central Europe, is a popular Hungarian vacation site that was also favored by party and government leaders.

<sup>5</sup> This means that preparation of a lead editorial for *Pravda* was entrusted to Pospelov, Shepilov, and Ponomarev. (The formal protocol for the session, as cited in Note 1 *supra*, explicitly stated: "Instruct Cdes. Pospelov, Shepilov, and Ponomarev to prepare, on the basis of the exchange of opinions at the CPSU CC Presidium session, an article for publication in the press about the internationalist solidarity of workers in the countries of people's democracy and about the intrigues of imperialists who are carrying out their subversive work to weaken ties among the countries of the socialist camp.") The article, published on 16 July, denounced the "intrigues of imperialist agents" who were seeking to exploit the ferment in Eastern Europe after the 20th CPSU Congress. It claimed that members of the Petofi Circle in Hungary had "fallen under the influence of imperialist circles" and were "disseminating their anti-party views under the guise of a discussion club."

<sup>6</sup> Togliatti was indeed contacted by the Hungarian newspaper *Szabad Nep*, at Moscow's behest, on 12 July 1956 about the possibility of giving an interview to explain the "significance of proletarian internationalism" and how to "strengthen the positions of the popular-democratic order in Hungary." Before the interview could be conducted, however, Mikoyan informed the CPSU

Presidium, shortly after his arrival in Budapest on 13 July, that the situation in Hungary would never improve so long as Rakosi remained the leader of the Hungarian Workers' Party (HWP). Acting on behalf of the Soviet Presidium, Mikoyan engineered the dismissal of Rakosi from the HWP leadership and all other posts, a step that Rakosi's colleagues welcomed, but had not dared to pursue on their own in the absence of a direct Soviet initiative. The new information from Mikoyan caused the CPSU leadership to send a new cable to Togliatti on 13 July ("Shifrtelogramma," 13 July 1956, in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 14, D. 43/2, L. 2) urging him to be aware, in any interviews he might give about Hungary, that Rakosi would not be in power much longer. Moscow's willingness to rely on Togliatti is somewhat surprising because a recent interview with Togliatti, published in the Italian Communist daily *L'Unita* on 17 June 1956, had provoked dismay in certain quarters of the HWP leadership. The Soviet ambassador in Budapest, Yuri Andropov, had noted these misgivings in an important cable he sent to the CPSU Presidium on 9 July. See "Shifrtelogramma," from Yu. V. Andropov, 9 July 1956 (Strictly Secret—Special Dossier), in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 151-162. Andropov had recommended that newspapers in East Germany and Czechoslovakia be asked to publish articles in support of Rakosi, but he made no such recommendation about *L'Unita*.

<sup>7</sup> Laszlo Rajk was one of the leaders of the HWP until 1949, when he fell victim to the Stalinist purges. In October 1949 he was sentenced to death on trumped-up charges, a case that Rakosi helped mastermind. Following Stalin's death, rehabilitations of the "unjustly repressed" began in all the East-bloc countries, albeit at varying rates. This process moved rather slowly in Hungary and did not initially extend to Rajk and his associates, but calls for the rehabilitation of Rajk steadily increased. After Rakosi staged a comeback in March-April 1955, he tried, for obvious reasons, to deflect the growing pressure for Rajk's rehabilitation. In early 1956, however, the process of rehabilitation in Hungary gained greater momentum because of the limited "thaw" inspired by the 20th Soviet Party Congress. On 28 March 1956, Rakosi finally gave in and announced the formal rehabilitation of Rajk, though his announcement (published in *Szabad Nep* on 29 March) contained no admission of personal responsibility for the case. On 18 May, Rakosi did acknowledge a degree of personal culpability for the repressions of 1949-1952 (though not for the Rajk case), but this was not enough to curb political unrest in Hungary. Rakosi was dismissed from his posts as HWP First Secretary and an HWP Politburo member by the HWP Central Leadership (i.e., Central Committee) on 18 July 1956. (At Mikoyan's behest, the dismissal had been arranged by the HWP Politburo on 13 July and was then formally endorsed by a plenum of the HWP Central Leadership five days later.) Subsequently, Rakosi was stripped of all his other posts. On 26 July 1956, Rakosi fled to the Soviet Union, where he spent the remaining 25 years of his life in exile. Back in Hungary, Rajk and three other high-level victims of the purge trials in 1949 (Gyorgy Palffy, Tibor Szonyi, and Andras Szalai) were reinterrred in formal ceremonies on 6 Octo-

ber 1956, an event that contributed to the growing social unrest in Hungary.

<sup>8</sup> This passage in Malin's notes is ambiguous because Rakosi's surname, like other foreign surnames that end in vowels other than "a," does not decline in Russian. Most likely, Khrushchev was saying that "we must alleviate Rakosi's situation." It is possible, however, that Khrushchev was saying that "Rakosi must alleviate the situation," which would imply the need for Rakosi to step down. Unfortunately, there is no way to determine which of these two, very different interpretations is correct. The Hungarian edition of the Malin notes fails to take account of this ambiguity. See Vyacheslav Sereda and Janos M. Rainer, eds., *Dontes a Kremlben, 1956: A szovjet partelnokseg vitai Magyarorszagrol* (Budapest: 1956-os Intezet, 1996), p. 19. Sereda and Rainer opt for the former interpretation ("we must alleviate Rakosi's situation") without even considering the latter.

<sup>9</sup> Here and elsewhere in Malin's notes, the inclusion of surnames in parentheses after a statement or proposal means that these individuals supported the statement or proposal.

<sup>10</sup> The formal protocol for this session (see citation in Note 1 *supra*) contained the following point on this matter: "Instruct Cde. Mikoyan to travel to Hungary for discussions with the leadership of the Hungarian Workers' Party." The reference here is to Istvan Kovacs, a top Hungarian Communist official who fled to Moscow at the end of October 1956, not to Bela Kovacs, the former Secretary General of the Independent Smallholders' Party. Soviet leaders knew that Istvan Kovacs had long been dissatisfied with Rakosi's performance. See "Telefonogramma v TsK KPSS," from M. A. Suslov to the CPSU Presidium and Secretariat, 13 June 1956 (Top Secret), in AVPRF, F. 3, Op. 6, D. 483, Ll. 146-149.

<sup>11</sup> On 19 October 1956, the day before this Presidium meeting, Khrushchev led a top-level Soviet delegation on an unannounced visit to Warsaw. The Soviet delegates held tense negotiations with the Polish leader, Wladyslaw Gomulka, in an effort to prevent the removal of Marshal Konstantin Rokossowski and other officials from the Politburo of the Polish United Workers' Party (PZPR). The Soviet delegates were unsuccessful in their task, despite exerting strong military and political pressure on Gomulka. For a fuller account of the meeting, see the notes by one of the participants, Anastas Mikoyan, in "Zapis' besedy N. S. Khrushcheva v Varshave," October 1956, No. 233 (Strictly Secret—Special Dossier), in AVPRF, Osobaya papka, F. 3, Op. 65, D. 2, Ll. 1-14.

<sup>12</sup> Marshal Konstantin Rokossowski, a Polish-born officer who had lived most of his life in the Soviet Union and was a marshal in the Soviet army, was installed as defense minister and commander-in-chief in Poland in December 1949. He also was a full member of the PZPR Politburo. He was one of hundreds of high-ranking Soviet officers who were brought into the Polish army in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Not surprisingly, their presence caused widespread resentment. For a detailed account of this phenomenon, see Edward Jan Nalepa, *Oficerowie Radzieckiy w Wojsku Polskim w latach 1943-1968: Studium historyczno-wojskowe* (Warsaw: Wojskowy

Instytut Historyczny, 1992). Here and elsewhere in Malin's notes, Rokossowski's surname is misspelled as "Rokkosowski." The spelling has been corrected in the translation.

<sup>13</sup> It is not entirely clear from these brief points what the Soviet Presidium was intending to do. Most evidence suggests, however, that they planned to hold new military exercises in Poland and to form a "provisional revolutionary committee" of pro-Soviet Polish officials, who would then be installed in place of Gomulka. This is roughly what occurred with Hungary in early November, when a "revolutionary workers' and peasants' government" was formed in Moscow, with Janos Kadar and Ferenc Munnich at its head. Kadar's government was installed when Soviet troops moved in on 4 November.

<sup>14</sup> Khrushchev declined to mention that he himself—and the rest of the Soviet leadership—had "grossly" misjudged the situation in Poland over the previous few months. This was evident, for example, when Ochab stopped in Moscow in September 1956 on his way back from Beijing. See "Priem Posla Pol'skoi Narodnoi Respubliki v SSSR tov. V. Levikovskogo, 10 sentyabrya 1956 g.," 11 September 1956 (Secret), memorandum from N. Patolichev, Soviet deputy foreign minister, in Arkhiv Vneshnei Politiki Rossiiskoi Federatsii (AVPRF), F. Referentura po Pol'she, Op. 38, Por. 9, Papka, 126, D. 031, L. 1.

<sup>15</sup> This session of the CPSU CC Presidium was held on 24 October. See the assessment of the meeting and translation of handwritten Czech notes by Mark Kramer, "Hungary and Poland, 1956: Khrushchev's CPSU CC Presidium Meeting on East European Crises, 24 October 1956," *Cold War International History Project Bulletin*, Issue No. 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 1, 50-56.

<sup>16</sup> As it turned out, Khrushchev phoned Mao, and the Chinese leader decided to send a high-level delegation to Moscow for consultations. The delegation, led by Liu Shaoqi, arrived on 23 October and stayed until the 31st.

<sup>17</sup> Not until three days later would the uprising in Hungary begin, but Andropov's telegrams from Budapest on 12 and 14 October had kept the CPSU leadership apprised of the rapidly mounting crisis within the HWP and Hungarian society. The two telegrams were declassified in 1992 and published in "Vengriya, aprel'-oktyabr' 1956 g.," pp. 110-128.

<sup>18</sup> The reference here is to the large number of Soviet officers who were busy at the time helping out with the harvest. Although the uprising in Hungary had not yet begun, Soviet troops in that country had been preparing since mid-July to undertake large-scale operations aimed at "upholding and restoring public order." A full "Plan of Operations for the Special Corps to Restore Public Order on the Territory of Hungary," which received the codename "Volna" (Wave), was approved on 20 July 1956 by General Pyotr Lashchenko. See "Plan deistviy Osobogo korpusa po vosstanovleniyu obshchestvennogo poriadka na territorii Vengrii," in Tsentral'nyi arkhiv Ministerstva oborony Rossiiskoi Federatsii (TsAMO), F. 32, Op. 701291, D. 15, Ll. 130-131. See also the account by Lieut.-General E. I. Malashenko, "Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta" (Part 1), *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal*, No 10 (October 1993), pp. 24-25. The proposal to re-

call Soviet troops from their agricultural work was part of the "Volna" plan, which placed Soviet forces on increased alert in mid-October and brought them to full combat alert by 20-21 October at the behest of the Soviet General Staff. The full plan was due to be put into effect when a signal known as "Kompas" was received.

<sup>19</sup> No such informational report had actually been prepared by 21 October, when a meeting of East-bloc leaders was hastily arranged. But by the time the meeting was held on 24 October, the start of the uprising in Hungary on 23 October forced Khrushchev to cover the events in Hungary in some detail. See Kramer, "Hungary and Poland, 1956," pp. 1, 50-56.

<sup>20</sup> Unfortunately, only a small fragment of this session has been found. It is possible that missing pages will turn up in other parts of the Malin collection, but for now the brief (but important) section below is all that is available.

<sup>21</sup> The formal protocol for this session (Protocol No. 48) did not list the Hungarian question among the twelve other matters considered here. The most likely reason is that Mikoyan was opposed to the use of Soviet troops in Hungary, preferring instead to rely on political mediation (see below). The Presidium therefore had to adopt its decision without unanimity, an unprecedented step for such an important matter. As a result, no decree on this issue was included as an extract in the formal protocol.

<sup>22</sup> In fact, the radio station was not on fire, but heavy smoke from several nearby cars that had been set alight had created the impression that the building, too, was burning. Zhukov's reference to the storming of the radio building indicates that this CPSU Presidium meeting must have taken place shortly after 10 p.m. Moscow time. The storming of the building was sparked mainly by the broadcast of a headline speech by Erno Gero at precisely 10 p.m. Moscow time (8 p.m. Budapest time). It is clear that the CPSU Presidium meeting was over by around 11 p.m. (Moscow time), when orders were transmitted by Zhukov for the mobilization of five Soviet divisions. See "TsK KPSS," memorandum from Zhukov and Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii, chief of the Soviet General Staff, to the CPSU Presidium, 24 October 1956 (Strictly Secret—Special Dossier), in AVPRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, Ll. 85-87. Hence, the meeting must have been held between 10 p.m. and 11 p.m. It is remarkable that, for a session convened at such short notice, so many Presidium members were able to attend. Although a meeting had already been scheduled to discuss other matters, it was abruptly moved up to take account of the situation in Hungary.

<sup>23</sup> Khrushchev is referring here to the requests for military intervention he had received from Erno Gero. The request came initially via Yuri Andropov (who transmitted Gero's appeal to Moscow and followed up with an emergency phone call) and then was repeated during a phone call that Khrushchev placed to Gero. A written appeal from then-prime minister Andras Hegedus, supposedly delivered on the night of 23-24 October 1956, was transmitted by Andropov in a ciphered telegram on 28 October. See "Shifrtelogramma" (Strictly Secret—Urgent), 28 October 1956, in AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, P. 6, D. 5, L. 12.

<sup>24</sup> Mikoyan, Suslov, Malinin, and Serov arrived somewhat late in Budapest because inclement weather forced Mikoyan's and Suslov's plane to be diverted to an airport 90 kilometers north of the capital. A Soviet armored personnel carrier, accompanied by tanks, brought the four into Budapest, where they promptly began sending reports back to Moscow. See "Shifrtelgramma" from Mikoyan and Suslov to the CPSU Presidium, 24 October 1956 (Strictly Secret), in AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, P. 6, D. 5, Ll. 1-7. A retrospective account of Mikoyan's and Suslov's arrival in Budapest, by Vladimir Kryuchkov, who was a senior aide to Andropov in 1956 and who later followed in Andropov's footsteps at the KGB, claims that Mikoyan's and Suslov's plane was diverted northward because it came under fire and was struck by a machine gun. Kryuchkov also asserts that Mikoyan and the others had to walk for more than two hours to reach the embassy. See Vladimir Kryuchkov, *Lichnoe delo*, 2 vols. (Moscow: Olimp, 1996), vol. 1, p. 58. There is no evidence whatsoever to back up Kryuchkov's assertions. On the contrary, Mikoyan's and Suslov's contemporaneous report seems far more reliable than Kryuchkov's tendentious memoir.

<sup>25</sup> The notes provide no further names of members of the Chinese delegation, who were in Moscow for consultations between 23 and 31 October. The delegation, headed by Liu Shaoqi, included the CPC General Secretary, Deng Xiaoping, as well as three lower-ranking officials: Wang Jiaying, Hu Qiaomu, and Shi Zhe. Soviet leaders conferred with them several times about the events in Poland and Hungary.

<sup>26</sup> By this point, Rokossowski already had been removed from the PZPR CC Politburo. The only remaining question was whether he would be kept as Polish national defense minister.

<sup>27</sup> For the continuation of the session, see the portion below and the explanation in Note 33 *infra*.

<sup>28</sup> On 26 October, Mikoyan and Suslov sent four emergency messages via secure telephone to the CPSU Presidium. See the longest and most important of these messages, "Telefonogramma," 26 October 1956 (Top Secret—Deliver Immediately), in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 123-129.

<sup>29</sup> The reference here is slightly awry. The number given in parentheses (126) refers to the total number of Hungarians studying in Moscow, including party workers, military officers, state security officials, and others. See "Zapis' besedy s poslom Vengerskoi Narodnoi Respubliki tov. Yanoshe Boldotskim, 26 oktyabrya 1956 g.," Cable No. 597/AR (Secret) from A. A. Gromyko, Soviet deputy foreign minister, to the CPSU Presidium, 26 October 1956, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, Ll. 116-117. Malin's notes imply that the figure includes only HWP officials studying at the Higher Party School.

<sup>30</sup> A "Directory," which served as the highest HWP organ, had been created by this point under Soviet auspices, but its existence had not yet been officially announced. The existence of the Directory was acknowledged for the first time on 28 October (three days after it had been set up), when it was renamed the HWP Presidium and was formally granted supreme power by the HWP

Central Committee.

<sup>31</sup> The reference here is to young people from Hungary studying in the Soviet Union, who would not have been included in the 126 mentioned above.

<sup>32</sup> This annotation was in the bottom left-hand margin of Malin's notes. It refers to copies of the messages from Mikoyan and Suslov.

<sup>33</sup> According to Khrushchev's remarks above, the session on 26 October was to be reconvened at 8 p.m. to consider the latest information from Mikoyan and Suslov. The double-sided page of handwritten notes pertaining to the continuation of the session, which is provided here, was out of sequence in File 1005. In the earlier published versions of Malin's notes (the Hungarian translation and the original Russian), this fragment is incorrectly placed at the end of the 28 October session. Close analysis of the text reveals that the fragment must have come *before*, not after, the portions on the 28th. The fact that the 26 October session was due to be reconvened suggests that this is precisely what the fragment covers, rather than being part of a separate meeting on the 27th. (There is no evidence that the Presidium met on the 27th to discuss the situation in Hungary.)

<sup>34</sup> Bulganin is complaining about the long telegrams and secure phone messages that Mikoyan and Suslova had been sending to Moscow on 25 and 26 October. See Note 28 *supra*. See also "Shifrtelgramma," 25 October 1956 (Strictly Secret—Special Attention), in AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, P. 6, D. 5, Ll. 8-11.

<sup>35</sup> On 30 October a Revolutionary Military Council was set up within the Hungarian army, but it was not the type of body that Kaganovich had in mind. He was referring to an armed organization that would suppress the uprising, whereas the Revolutionary Military Council did just the opposite, expressing strong support for the resistance and demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary.

<sup>36</sup> Actually, of those who had been detained since the start of the uprising, more than 8,000 had been released by this time.

<sup>37</sup> Khrushchev evidently means that they should confer with the recently ousted prime minister Andras Hegedus and other Hungarian officials who had been removed from high-level party and state positions after 23 October.

<sup>38</sup> This trip never occurred, presumably because of time constraints as events in Hungary gathered pace.

<sup>39</sup> Mikoyan had planned to travel to Austria at the very end of October 1956, but his trip ended up being postponed until April 1957.

<sup>40</sup> Some of the pages from this session were out of sequence in the original file. The order has been corrected in the translation.

<sup>41</sup> Hundreds of demonstrations and meetings had been taking place in Hungary since 23 October, even after a curfew was imposed. Evidently, Khrushchev is referring here to a warning he received on 27 October in an emergency message from Mikoyan and Suslov (APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, Ll. 131-134). The message noted that posters had gone up in Budapest declaring Imre Nagy a traitor and demanding that Bela Kovacs, the former General Secretary of the Independent Smallholders Party, be instated as the new prime

minister. The posters called for a demonstration in support of Kovacs, who was in Pecs at the time recovering from nine years of imprisonment in the Soviet Union (between 1947 and 1955). When Kovacs was contacted by the Hungarian president, Istvan Dobi, on 27 October over the phone, he tentatively agreed to serve as agriculture minister in Nagy's reorganized government. But Kovacs did not actually participate in any government deliberations until he returned to Budapest on 1 November, by which time the situation had changed a great deal. [Ed. note: An English translation of the Mikoyan-Suslov report of 27 October 1956 cited above appears in *CWIHP Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995), pp. 29-30, from a copy of the document in TsKhSD, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 9. However, it contains a mistranslation of the passage referring to the posters which had gone up in Budapest declaring Nagy a traitor and supporting Bela Kovacs. The mistranslated portion notes that placards had appeared in Budapest at night, "in which Nagy was declared the chairman and Bela Kovacs was recommended as premier," and that a demonstration was planned "in their honor." It should have read that Nagy was called "a traitor" and that the demonstration was called on "his" (Bela Kovacs') behalf. The *Bulletin* regrets the error.]

<sup>42</sup> An emergency session of the UN Security Council was convened on 28 October in the mid-afternoon (New York time) to discuss the situation in Hungary. The Soviet Foreign Ministry originally had instructed Arkadii Sobolev, the Soviet representative at the Security Council, to depict the events in Hungary as being inspired solely by fascist, anti-democratic elements. See "Shifrtelgramma," 27 October 1956 (Strictly Secret—Special Dossier), in AVPRF, F. 0536, Op. 1, P. 5, D. 65, Ll. 24-28. Khrushchev's statement here suggests that the Presidium must issue new instructions to Sobolev, ordering him to take account of the latest developments in Hungary.

<sup>43</sup> Zhukov is referring here to the strongest center of resistance in the densely populated region around the Corvin film theater in downtown Budapest. Counterinsurgency operations against this area were supposed to commence on the morning of 28 October, but Nagy cancelled those plans because of the risk of heavy civilian casualties.

<sup>44</sup> For an illuminating account of events in Debrecen, where anti-Gero demonstrations preceded those in Budapest on 23 October, see Tibor A. Filep, *A debreceni forradalom, 1956 október: Tizenket nap kronikája* (Debrecen: Mozgaskorlatozottak Egyesülete, 1990).

<sup>45</sup> Here and elsewhere in Malin's notes, Hegedus's surname is mistakenly rendered as Hedegus. The spelling has been corrected in the translation.

<sup>46</sup> Mikoyan and Suslov were taking part in this HWP Central Committee plenum, which adjourned around 5:30 p.m. Budapest time. The HWP Central Committee endorsed the program of Nagy's new government and conferred supreme power on a new HWP Presidium consisting of Janos Kadar (as chair), Antal Apro, Ferenc Munnich, Imre Nagy, Zoltan Szanto, and Karoly Kiss. See the CC resolution in *Szabad Nep* (Budapest), 29 October 1956, p. 1.

<sup>47</sup> This sentence fragment is highly ambiguous

in Russian. The final word in the fragment, translated here as “directly,” is *samim*, which literally means “by itself” or “by himself.” The antecedent might be either the HWP Politburo or Mikoyan, or perhaps something or someone else. The ambiguity cannot be fully conveyed in English (which has separate words for “itself” and “himself”), but the translation tries to do so as best as possible.

<sup>48</sup> Here again, Zhukov is referring to the center of resistance around the Corvin cinema.

<sup>49</sup> Khrushchev is referring here to the coalition government that was formed (or actually reorganized) on 27 October. This government included, on an informal basis, representatives of parties from the pre-Communist era: Bela Kovacs, the former General Secretary of the Smallholders Party; Zoltan Tildy, the former leader of the Smallholders Party; and Ferenc Erdei, the former leader of the National Peasant Party. Not until 30 October, however, did Nagy announce the formal restoration of a multi-party state, with full participation by the Smallholders, the National Peasant Party (renamed the Petofi Party on 1 November), and the Social Democratic Party as well as the Communists. (Other non-Communist parties soon sprang up as well, including the Hungarian Independence Party, the People's Democratic Party, the Catholic People's Party, and the Catholic National Association.)

<sup>50</sup> Scattered defections of Hungarian troops to the insurgents had begun on the first day of the uprising, but Khrushchev was concerned that the whole army would switch sides. In later years, official Soviet accounts of the 1956 uprising acknowledged that “during the most trying days,” a substantial number of “soldiers and officers from the Hungarian People's Army” had joined the insurgents in fighting “against Soviet soldiers who had been called in to help.” See P. A. Zhilin, ed., *Stroitel'stvo armii evropeiskikh stran sotsialisticheskogo soдруzhestva, 1949-1980* (Moscow: Nauka, 1984), p. 93. Formerly secret documents in the main Russian military archive (TsAMO, F. 32, Op. 701291, D. 17, Ll. 33-48) include the Soviet defense ministry's complete list of Hungarian army units that took the side of the insurgents. Many other valuable documents about the role of the Hungarian army are now available in the 1956 Collection (*1956-os Gyujtemeny*) of the Hungarian Military History Archive, *Hadtörténelmi Levéltár, Honvédelmi Minisztérium* (HL/HM). For a useful volume drawing on these documents, see Miklos Horvath, *1956 katonai kronologiaja* (Budapest: Magyar Honvédség Oktatási és Kulturális Anyagellátó Központ, 1993). For an equally valuable survey of the Hungarian army's role in 1956 based on archival sources, see Imre Okvath, “Magyar tisztkar a hidegháború időszakában, 1945-1956,” *Uj Honvédségi szemle* (Budapest), No. 1 (1994), pp. 14-27. See also Bela Kiraly, “Hungary's Army: Its Part in the Revolt,” *East Europe*, Vol. 7, No. 6 (June 1958), pp. 3-16.

<sup>51</sup> This sentence is incomplete in the original.

<sup>52</sup> This refers to the new Hungarian government's declaration on 28 October, which Nagy would read over the radio at 5:20 p.m. that same afternoon. Among other things, the declaration called for the dissolution of the state security organs, amnesties for those involved in the uprising, the

restoration of the Kossuth emblem as the national emblem, and the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest as well as subsequent negotiations on a full withdrawal from Hungary. The statement also rejected previous characterizations of the uprising as a “counterrevolution,” saying that the events were representative of a “broad national-democratic movement” that was seeking to achieve “national independence and sovereignty” for Hungary. Unfortunately, the draft of this declaration that the CPSU CC Presidium was presumably considering at this meeting has not yet been located by scholars.

<sup>53</sup> Nothing follows Bulganin's name in the original.

<sup>54</sup> Most likely, the “you” (*Vas*) in this sentence should have been “them” (*ikh*), referring to Mikoyan and Suslov, the former of whom was still in Hungary. If so, Voroshilov was saying that their mission in Hungary had been worthless. It is also remotely possible that Voroshilov was claiming that Mikoyan himself had said these sorts of things about the Soviet troops who were sent to Budapest on the night of 23-24 October. Whatever the case may be, it is clear that Voroshilov was expressing strong disapproval of Mikoyan's performance in Budapest.

<sup>55</sup> Kaganovich and other speakers are referring to possible changes in the Hungarian government's draft statement, which was broadcast in final form at 5:20 p.m. on 28 October (see Note 52 *supra*).

<sup>56</sup> Malenkov's surname appears here without the standard title “Cde.” The full designation “Cde. Malenkov” appears a few lines further down in a continuation of Malenkov's remarks.

<sup>57</sup> This clearly refers to the Hungarian statement of 28 October (see Note 52 *supra*), not to the Soviet declaration of 30 October. At this point, Khrushchev and the others had seen the Hungarian statement only in draft form.

<sup>58</sup> Most likely, Molotov is referring here to Rakosi, who was already in Moscow, and other hard-line HWP officials who were about to be spirited to the Soviet Union. See below.

<sup>59</sup> This sentence is incomplete in the original.

<sup>60</sup> Kaganovich is referring to the draft Hungarian statement of 28 October, not to the declaration adopted by the Soviet authorities on 30 October (which was considered at the Presidium meeting that day; see Document No. 7 *infra*).

<sup>61</sup> Khrushchev is probably referring here to the benefits they hoped to gain for Soviet-Hungarian relations, and in international opinion generally, by announcing a ceasefire and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest.

<sup>62</sup> Khrushchev is referring to the political, not military, problems that the French and British governments had been encountering. At this point, military action in Suez was imminent, but had not yet begun. On 26 July 1956 the new Egyptian leader, Gamel Abdel Nasser, had nationalized the Suez Canal Company. He stuck by that decision despite coming under vigorous diplomatic pressure from Great Britain, France, and the United States. On 27 and 28 October, Israel mobilized its army for an operation that was broadly coordinated with France and Great Britain. On 29 October, Israeli troops moved rapidly into Egyptian territory. The French and British joined the Israeli incursions on 31 October by

launching air raids against Egyptian cities and imposing a naval blockade.

<sup>63</sup> Here again, Khrushchev is referring to proposed corrections in the draft Hungarian statement. It is doubtful there was enough time for most such changes to be included.

<sup>64</sup> In line with this decision, the CPSU Presidium sent a message to Gomulka and Cyrankiewicz expressing support for Nagy's new government and for the statement Nagy issued on 28 October. The Polish authorities followed up with an appeal to the HWP and the Hungarian people, published in the PZPR daily *Trybuna Ludu* on 29 October, which expressed “shock,” “pain,” and “deep disquiet” at “the tragic news coming from [Hungary]” and called for “an end to the bloodshed, destruction, and fratricidal struggle.”

<sup>65</sup> As a result of this decision, the CPSU Presidium dispatched a cable to Tito that was very similar to the cable sent to the Polish leadership. On 29 October the Yugoslav authorities published a message to the HWP, in the main Belgrade daily *Politika*, urging “an end to the fratricidal struggle” and warning that “further bloodshed would only harm the interests of the Hungarian working people and socialism, and would only promote the aims of reactionaries and bureaucratic deformation.”

<sup>66</sup> This sentence is incomplete in the original.

<sup>67</sup> This is what appears in the original. Perhaps initially there was some consideration given to bringing these three officials to Bulgaria. As things actually worked out, however, the three men and their families, as well as the former defense minister Istvan Bata and his family, were spirited to Moscow in a Soviet military aircraft on the evening of 28 October. Hegedus and Piros remained in Moscow until September 1958, and Gero stayed there until 1960. Only Rakosi was never able to return to Hungary. For an intriguing article about Rakosi's many years of exile in the USSR, drawing on recently declassified sources, see V. L. Musatov, “Istoriya odnoi ssylki: ‘Zhitie’ Matiasa Rakosi v SSSR (1956-1971 gg.),” *Kentavr* (Moscow), No. 6 (November-December 1993), pp. 72-81.

<sup>68</sup> Judging from some of the statements below (e.g., “yesterday a government was formed”) and from Suslov's presence (after he had flown back from Hungary), this portion of the meeting must have taken place either late in the evening on 28 October or early in the morning on 29 October. In either case, the CPSU Presidium members would already have heard about the statement that Nagy broadcast over the radio on 28 October.

<sup>69</sup> The chronology is slightly awry here. The decision to send in Soviet troops was adopted on the evening of 23 October (see above), but the troops did not actually arrive until the early morning hours of 24 October.

<sup>70</sup> The area around the Corvin cinema, on the corner of Jozsef Boulevard in downtown Pest (Budapest's 8th District), was the site of intense fighting that led to many casualties, both Soviet and Hungarian. For a useful account, see Bill Lomax, *Hungary 1956* (London: Allison and Busby, 1976), pp. 118-119, 126-127. On 26 October the fighters in the Corvin district elected Gergely Pongracz as their leader. Suslov presumably is referring to Pal Maleter when he mentions “a colonel from the Horthyite army.” Early on

the morning of 24 October, Maleter had been ordered by the then-defense minister Istvan Bata to move with five tanks against the insurgents in Budapest's 8th and 9th Districts, providing relief for the Kilian Barracks in the 9th District. When Maleter and his tank unit arrived on the scene, they decided to support the rebels' cause instead. Maleter then assumed command of insurgent forces in the Kilian barracks.

<sup>71</sup> The original reads the 24th, but this incident actually occurred on the 25th. A peaceful demonstration of some 25,000 people was held on 25 October outside the Parliament Building (where Nagy's office was located, though Nagy was not inside). The precise sequence of events cannot be conclusively determined, but most evidence suggests that Hungarian state security (AVH) forces suddenly opened fire on the unarmed crowd, with additional shots being fired by Soviet tanks deployed around the building. Roughly 200 people were killed and many more were injured. As news of the incident spread around Budapest, the reported scale of the bloodshed quickly became exaggerated and most of the blame for the deaths was attributed—erroneously, it seems—to the Soviet tanks. No Soviet or Hungarian officials were held accountable for the deaths, but Suslov's statement indicates that CPSU leaders were aware that their own troops were believed to be culpable.

<sup>72</sup> The last few parenthetical words of this sentence are ambiguous in Russian. A word has been omitted here for the sake of clarity in English, with no effect at all on the substance of the phrase. Suslov is referring to the formation of workers' councils, which had begun taking shape spontaneously on 26 October in Csepel and other industrial areas. The government formally condoned the establishment of workers' councils in instructions released on the evening of 26 October, which were then published in major Budapest newspapers the following day.

<sup>73</sup> As noted above, this is precisely what the Hungarian government's statement on 28 October did. It described the recent events as a "national-democratic uprising" and condemned those who had depicted the situation as a "counterrevolution."

<sup>74</sup> Nagy issued an order for a "general and immediate ceasefire" before his radio address on 28 October. Hungarian army units were ordered to "fire only if attacked."

<sup>75</sup> Hegedus was excluded from the six-member HWP Presidium that was formed on 28 October, and he was then spirited to Moscow aboard a Soviet military aircraft on the evening of 28 October.

<sup>76</sup> As with the previous session, the pages in the original file were slightly out of sequence. The order has been corrected in the translation.

<sup>77</sup> Protocol No. 49 encompasses both this session and the session on the following day (see Document No. 8) under the rubric "On the Situation in Hungary" (*O polozhenii v Vengrii*). Point 1 (from 30 October) covers the Soviet declaration on ties with socialist countries, whereas Point 6 (from 31 October) covers the decision to invade. The relevant extracts from Protocol No. 49 are now stored in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, Ll. 25-30 and APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, L. 41, respectively.

<sup>78</sup> Presumably, the reference here is to three docu-

ments: one that arrived on the morning of 30 October, and two that arrived late at night on 29 October. The item that arrived on the morning of 30 October was a secure, high-frequency telephone message from Mikoyan and Suslov, which gave a bleak portrayal of the latest events. See "TsK KPSS," 30 October 1956 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F.89, Op.45, D.12, Ll.1-3. Of the two documents that arrived late at night on the 29th, one was a ciphered telegram from Mikoyan and Suslov reporting that they had attended a session of the HWP Presidium earlier that evening. They also commented on the takeover of the *Szabad Nep* building by a group of unarmed students and writers. Mikoyan and Suslov asserted that the Hungarian "comrades have failed to win over the masses," and that "the anti-Communist elements are behaving impudently." In addition, they expressed concern about what would happen to former agents of the Hungarian State Security (AVH) forces in the wake of Nagy's decision to disband the AVH. See "Shifrtelgramma: TsK KPSS," 29 October 1956 (Strictly Secret-Urgent), from A. Mikoyan and M. Suslov, in AVPRF, F.059a, Op.4, P.6, D.5, Ll.13-14. The other document that arrived late on the 29th was a situation report from Ivan Serov, dated 29 October, which Mikoyan and Suslov ordered to be transmitted to Moscow via secure telephone. Serov's report gave an updated overview of the insurgency and expressed deep concern about the likely repercussions from the dissolution of the AVH. See "Telefonogramma," 29 October 1956, from A. Mikoyan and M. Suslov, relaying I. Serov's memorandum, in APRF, F.3, Op.64, D.484, Ll.158-161.

<sup>79</sup> British military transport aircraft were flying into the Vienna airport with supplies of humanitarian aid, which were then being conveyed to Budapest. It is unclear whether Zhukov knew why these planes were concentrated there. It is possible that he believed the aircraft were ferrying in military supplies or were preparing for a military operation.

<sup>80</sup> As commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact, Marshal Ivan Konev assumed direct command of Soviet military operations in Hungary in November 1956. In a telephone message on the morning of 30 October (see Note 78 *supra*), Mikoyan and Suslov had urged that Konev be dispatched to Hungary "immediately" as a precautionary step. One of Konev's top aides during the invasion was General Mikhail Malinin, a first deputy chief of the Soviet General Staff, who commanded Soviet troops during the initial intervention on 23 October. As indicated in the previous line, Soviet leaders frequently consulted Malinin in the leadup to the invasion.

<sup>81</sup> The "Chinese comrades" with whom Khrushchev had discussions were the members of the delegation headed by Liu Shaoqi (see Note 25 *supra*). Liu Shaoqi was in direct touch with Mao Zedong several times during the delegation's stay in Moscow, and thus he was able to keep Khrushchev apprised of the Chinese leader's views of the situation in Poland and Hungary.

<sup>82</sup> Rokossowski had been removed from the Polish Politburo on 19 October. On 13 November he was replaced as Polish national defense minister by a Polish officer, Marshal Marian Spychalski. Rokossowski was then recalled to

the Soviet Union, where he was appointed a deputy defense minister. Evidently, Khrushchev had spoken with Gomulka by phone that morning.

<sup>83</sup> The five principles of Pancha Shila—(1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, (2) non-aggression, (3) non-interference in internal affairs, (4) equality and mutual benefit, and (5) peaceful coexistence—were endorsed in a joint statement by Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai and Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru in New Delhi on 28 June 1954. The principles were intended to "guide relations between the two countries" as well as "relations with other countries in Asia and in other parts of the world." For the full text of the statement, see G. V. Ambekar and V. D. Divekar, eds., *Documents on China's Relations with South and South-East Asia (1949-1962)* (New York: Allied Publishers, 1964), pp. 7-8.

<sup>84</sup> Zhukov is referring here to the Political Consultative Committee (PKK) of the recently-created Warsaw Treaty Organization. The PKK convened only seven times between 1955 and 1966, despite its statutory requirement to meet at least twice a year.

<sup>85</sup> During major international crises in the post-Stalin period, the Soviet Presidium/Politburo occasionally would convene a Central Committee plenum to give the CC members a sense of involvement in decision-making and to ensure that the leadership's policies would be firmly obeyed at lower levels.

<sup>86</sup> Saburov is referring here to Furtseva's suggestion that a CPSU CC plenum be convened for informational purposes.

<sup>87</sup> This presumably refers to Soviet property transferred to Romania during World War II, rather than to Romania's war reparations, which by 1956 were no longer of great magnitude.

<sup>88</sup> Khrushchev is referring here to the six-member HWP Presidium. The only holdout was Nagy.

<sup>89</sup> The State Security Department (*Allam-Vedelmi Osztaly*, or AVO), which was reorganized in 1949 and renamed the State Security Authority (*Allam-Vedelmi Hatosag*, or AVH), was reincorporated into the Hungarian Internal Affairs Ministry in the autumn of 1953. Formally, the agency was given back its old name of AVO, but it was still almost always known as the AVH. One of the earliest and most vigorous demands of the protesters in October 1956 was for the dissolution of the AVH. On 28 October, Nagy promised to fulfill this demand, and the Hungarian government approved the dissolution of the state security organs the following day. Because the AVH had been instrumental in carrying out repression and terror in the late 1940s and 1950s, some state security agents became the targets of lynchings and other violent reprisals during the 1956 uprising. Hungarian state security officers would have joined up with Soviet troops mainly to seek protection, not to assist in counterinsurgency operations. On this matter, see the documents transmitted by Suslov and Mikoyan on 29 October, cited in Note 78 *supra*.

<sup>90</sup> It is interesting that, when referring to Soviet troops deployed in Eastern Europe, Khrushchev does not mention the Soviet troops in East Germany, implying that they were not necessarily there "with the consent of the [East German] gov-

ernment and in the interests of the [East German] government and people.”

<sup>91</sup> The final Declaration noted that “Soviet units are in the Hungarian and Romanian republics in accordance with the Warsaw Treaty and governmental agreements. Soviet military units are in the Polish republic on the basis of the Potsdam four-power agreement and the Warsaw Treaty.” The Declaration then claimed that “Soviet military units are not in the other people’s democracies,” omitting any mention of the hundreds of thousands of Soviet troops in East Germany.

<sup>92</sup> Khrushchev presumably is referring here to both the military advisers and the state security (KGB) advisers.

<sup>93</sup> When this editing was completed, the Presidium formally adopted Resolution No. P49/1 (“Vypiska iz protokola No. 49 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK ot 30 oktyabrya 1956 g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii,” 30 October 1956, in APRE, F.3, Op. 64, D.484, Ll. 25–30) stating that it would “approve the text, with changes made at the CPSU CC Presidium session, of a Declaration by the Government of the USSR on the foundations of development and the further strengthening of friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries.” The resolution ordered that the “text of the Declaration be broadcast on radio on 30 October and published in the press on 31 October 1956.” For the published text, see “Deklaratsiya o printsipakh razvitiya i dal’neishem ukreplenii družby i sotrudnichestva mezhdru SSSR i drugimi sotsialisticheskimi stranami,” *Pravda* (Moscow), 31 October 1956, p. 1.

<sup>94</sup> It is unclear precisely when the Chinese changed their position from non-interventionist to pro-intervention. The statement recorded here, if correctly transcribed, would suggest that the change occurred before the final Soviet decision on 31 October, but almost all other evidence (including subsequent Presidium meetings recorded by Malin) suggests that it came *after*, not before, the Soviet decision. In any case, if the change did occur before, it did not have any discernible effect on the Soviet decision at this meeting to eschew intervention.

<sup>95</sup> Molotov is referring here to major developments in Hungary. On 30 October, at 2:30 p.m. Budapest time, Nagy announced the formal restoration of a multi-party state and the establishment of an “inner cabinet” of the national government. The new cabinet consisted of Nagy, Zoltan Tildy, Bela Kovacs, Ferenc Erdei, Janos Kadar, Geza Losonczy, and Anna Kethly (from the Social Democratic Party). That same day, a “revolutionary national defense council” of the Hungarian armed forces was set up, which supported the demands of “the revolutionary councils of the working youth and intellectuals,” and called for the “immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest and their withdrawal from the entire territory of Hungary within the shortest possible time.” The new Council also promised to disarm all agents from Hungary’s disbanded state security forces (AVH), who had been notorious agents of repression during the Stalin era. A Revolutionary Armed Forces Committee also was formed on 31 October, and it was empowered by the government to create a new army.

<sup>96</sup> These are five of the seven members of Nagy’s

new “inner cabinet.” Anna Kethly’s name is not listed here because she had not yet been appointed. (Nagy mentioned in his speech on 30 October that “a person to be nominated by the Social Democratic Party” would be in the inner cabinet, and Kethly later turned out to be that person.) It is unclear why Malin did not list Ferenc Erdei’s name here.

<sup>97</sup> The pages for this session were in reverse order in the archival file. They have been put into correct order in the translation.

<sup>98</sup> In the formal protocol of this session (cited in Note 77 *supra*), Point VI was given the title of “On the Situation in Hungary” (*O polozhenii v Vengrii*), the same as the previous segment. Malin’s working notes do not provide a list of participants, but the following list is given in the formal protocol: Khrushchev, Zhukov, Bulganin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, and Saburov. It is also clear from Malin’s notes that Furtseva, Pospelov, and Shvernik took part at certain points.

<sup>99</sup> These “discussions with Gomulka” were conducted by Khrushchev over the telephone. The two leaders agreed that Khrushchev, Malenkov, and Molotov would meet the next day (1 November) in Brest with Gomulka and Cyrankiewicz. The formal protocol of the session (cited in Note 77 *supra*) notes that “in accordance with the exchange of opinions at the CPSU Presidium session, Cdes. Khrushchev, Molotov, and Malenkov are empowered to hold negotiations with representatives of the PZPR CC.”

<sup>100</sup> In a speech at a mass rally in front of the Parliament Building on 31 October, Nagy declared that his government had already “opened negotiations for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country and for the renunciation of our obligations under the Warsaw Treaty.” Clearly, he was referring to the negotiations he had been holding that morning with Mikoyan and Suslov, who had generally seemed receptive to Nagy’s demands. These negotiations are briefly recounted in Tibor Meray, *Thirteen Days That Shook the Kremlin: Imre Nagy and the Hungarian Revolution*, trans. by Howard L. Katzander (London: Thames and Hudson, 1959), pp. 163–165. See also the first-hand comments by Gyorgy G. Heltai, the Hungarian deputy foreign minister under Nagy’s government, “International Aspects,” in Bela K. Kiraly and Paul Jonas, *The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 in Retrospect*, East European Monograph No. XL (Boulder, Col.: East European Quarterly, 1978), esp. pp. 52–53. It is conceivable that Nagy’s expressed desire to renounce Hungarian membership in the Warsaw Pact, which was promptly transmitted to Moscow by telephone, was one of the factors that led to Khrushchev’s change of heart at this session. Although Nagy had spoken in earlier years (especially after he was ousted by Rakosi in 1955) about the desirability of neutrality for Hungary, his decision to raise the matter with Mikoyan and Suslov at this critical moment must have come as a jolt to Soviet leaders.

<sup>101</sup> Early on the morning of 31 October, the French and British launched bombing raids against Egyptian cities and imposed a naval blockade against Egypt, thus aiding Israeli’s ground incursions. By the time the Presidium met on the 31st, reports of the French and British operations were pouring in, conveying a greater impression

of “success” than later events warranted.

<sup>102</sup> The inclusion of Saburov’s name in this list is odd, as will become clear in his remarks below. Initially, he was disinclined to reverse the Presidium’s non-interventionist stance of the previous day.

<sup>103</sup> It is unclear at what point Soviet officials approached Kadar about becoming the head of a provisional government. Kadar’s statements at the CPSU Presidium meeting on 2 November (see Document No. 12 *infra*) suggest that he was not yet aware he had been chosen to perform this function.

<sup>104</sup> On the evening of 1 November, the day after this Presidium meeting, Kadar and Munnich were secretly flown to Moscow aboard a Soviet military aircraft. They were brought back to Hungary when Soviet troops launched Operation “Whirlwind” three days later.

<sup>105</sup> It is extraordinary that even as Khrushchev was calling for a full-scale invasion, he was still apparently willing to consider including Nagy in the soon-to-be-formed Revolutionary Workers’ and Peasants’ Government.

<sup>106</sup> It is interesting that Soviet leaders were concerned most of all about informing the Poles. As indicated above, a meeting with the Polish leadership had already been set up for the following day in Brest. Informing the leaders of these other countries was important, but not as high a priority. Soviet Presidium members informed the visiting Chinese delegation about the decision on 31 October, just before the Chinese officials flew back to Beijing. After the meetings in Brest on 1 November, Khrushchev and Malenkov continued on to Bucharest, where they met with Romanian, Bulgarian, and Czechoslovak leaders. The two Soviet officials then traveled to Brioni to confer with Tito on 2–3 November. Khrushchev and Malenkov returned to Moscow on the morning of the 3rd.

<sup>107</sup> The formal protocol for this session (cited in Note 77 *supra*) states that “taking account of the exchange of opinions at the CPSU CC Presidium session, Cde. Zhukov is instructed to devise an appropriate plan of measures connected with the events in Hungary, and to report on them to the CPSU CC.”

<sup>108</sup> The formal protocol from this session (cited in Note 77 *supra*) notes that “Cdes. Shepilov, Brezhnev, Furtseva, and Pospelov are instructed, on the basis of the exchange of opinions at the CPSU Presidium session, to prepare all necessary documents and submit them for the consideration of the CPSU CC.” Among the key documents they prepared over the next few days were: an “Appeal of the Hungarian Revolutionary Workers’ and Peasants’ Government to the Hungarian People,” which Kadar announced when he was installed in power on 4 November; an “Appeal by the Command of Soviet Troops in Hungary to the Hungarian People and the Officers and Men of the Hungarian Army,” which was broadcast in translation over Hungarian radio and distributed via leaflets at the outset of the invasion; and Order No. 1 issued by Marshal Konev (the supreme commander of the invasion) to all Soviet officers just before the start of Operation “Whirlwind.” The English-language texts of the first two items and other “propaganda documents” prepared in Moscow can be found in Paul E.

Zinner, ed., *National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe: A Selection of Documents on Events in Poland and Hungary, February–November 1956* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1956), pp. 473–481.

109 For the final text of this order, see “Prikaz Glavnokomanduyushchego Ob”edinennymi vooruzhennymi silami No. 1, 4 noyabrya 1956 goda,” reproduced in Lieut.-General E. I. Malashenko, “Osobyi korpus v ognе Budapeshta” (Part 3), *Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal* (Moscow), No. 12 (December 1993), p. 86.

110 It is unclear what “group,” if any, was actually sent. Presumably, the reference here is to a group of Presidium members.

111 The three former Hungarian officials listed here—Rakosi, Hegedus, and Gero—had fled to the Soviet Union within the past few days. No doubt, Khrushchev had solicited their views beforehand about the proper course to pursue in Hungary. It is also possible that the three were asked to take part in this phase of the CPSU Presidium meeting, and that they offered their views directly.

112 The five Hungarian officials listed here were among those who were slated to take part in a forthcoming “provisional revolutionary government.” The first three were still in Budapest (though Kadar was spirited out the next evening). Boldoczki was in Moscow (in his ambassadorial post), and Horvath, the foreign minister in Nagy’s government, was on his way to a UN General Assembly session, but was delayed in Prague.

113 Kiss’s name is incorrectly rendered in Malin’s notes as Kisskar.

114 The formal protocol for this session (cited in Note 77 *supra*) “affirms the text of the telegram to the Soviet ambassador in Belgrade for Cde. Tito.” A copy of the telegram is attached to the protocol, which further notes that “if the answer [from the Yugoslav side] is positive, Cdes. Khrushchev and Malenkov are authorized to hold negotiations with Cde. Tito.” For the Yugoslav response to the Soviet telegram, see Document No. 9 *infra*.

115 See Document No. 10 *infra*.

116 This telephone message is unattributed and undated. Presumably, the message came from Molotov just before he returned to Moscow from Brest on 1 November. It had been arranged beforehand that while Khrushchev and Malenkov would continue on to meet with other East European leaders, Molotov would return to Moscow and brief the CPSU Presidium on Gomulka’s position.

117 Protocol No. 50 (in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, L. 58) contains directives from the sessions on both 1 and 2 November (see Note 146 *infra*).

118 On the evening of 31 October–1 November, Mikoyan and Suslov returned to Moscow, presumably accompanied by Serov. This was the first Presidium meeting in which Mikoyan had taken part since 23 October. In Khrushchev’s absence, Bulganin presided over this session.

119 Other than Mikoyan and Suslov, who were still in Budapest, all the Presidium members took part in the 31 October decision and the subsequent discussions with the Chinese delegation. Hence, Bulganin provided this information for the benefit of Mikoyan and Suslov.

120 It is not entirely clear what Bulganin is refer-

ring to here, but he probably had in mind one or more of several developments: Hungary’s withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and demand for the removal of all Soviet troops from Hungary; the commencement of French and British military operations against Egypt (see Note 101 *supra*); China’s sudden decision to support rather than oppose Soviet military intervention in Hungary; new intelligence about the West’s position vis-à-vis Hungary; and the warnings coming in from neighboring East European countries, particularly Czechoslovakia (see below) and Romania.

121 Kaganovich uses a word here, *obsuzhdenie*, that is normally translated as “discussion,” but it could also mean “deliberations” in this context. Presumably, he is referring to the meeting that Soviet leaders had on 31 October with the Chinese delegation after the CPSU Presidium approved a full-scale invasion of Hungary.

122 This is how the sentence reads in the text. Presumably, Malin meant to say that “we are *not* attacking.”

123 It is unclear precisely who was “worried that we’re giving away Hungary.” Furtseva may have been referring to one of several groups: orthodox Hungarian Communists who had sought refuge in Moscow; neighboring East European (especially Czechoslovak and Romanian) leaders; Chinese officials; members of the CPSU Central Committee and the heads of union-republic Communist parties and of regional and local CPSU organizations; and employees of the Soviet embassy in Budapest. By this point in the crisis, all of these groups had expressed concerns very similar to the ones that Furtseva mentions.

124 Presumably this refers to the decision at the end of October to evacuate the families of Soviet embassy employees to the USSR. For a brief account of the evacuation, see the highly tendentious but occasionally useful memoir by Vladimir Kryuchkov, *Lichnoe delo*, vol. 1, p. 57.

125 Presumably, Suslov is referring to the plan to bring Janos Kadar and Ferenc Munnich to Moscow.

126 The formal protocol for the session, “Vypiska iz protokola No. 50 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK ot 2 noyabrya 1956 g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii,” in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, L. 58, states that “taking account of the exchange of views at the CC Presidium, Cdes. Zhukov, Suslov, Konev, Serov, and Brezhnev are to work out the necessary measures in connection with the events in Hungary and report their proposals to the CPSU CC.”

127 A passage from Kryuchkov’s memoir (*Lichnoe delo*, vol. 1, pp. 57–58) sheds light on what may have been discussed here: “At the end of October and beginning of November . . . the situation around Soviet buildings [in Budapest] deteriorated significantly; the embassy was under siege, and any attempt to exit the building was fraught with danger. The diplomats long ago had essentially shifted over to a barracks-type operation, spending the night in their offices and only rarely—once our troops had returned [to Budapest]—taking a half-hour ride home one by one in armored personnel carriers to see their families, who were holed up in living quarters several blocks from the embassy. . . . Ordinarily, knowledge of Hungarian allowed me to engage in conversations with Hungarians and to receive

fresh information directly from the center of events . . . but [by late October] attempts to strike up a conversation often caused me to have to flee, since they could tell by my accent that I was a Russian. The fulfillment of official instructions, which entailed visits to appropriate buildings and agencies, also was a difficult matter, both in somehow getting there and in then returning to the embassy while holding on to the needed documents. This did not pass off without a number of serious incidents.”

128 It is unclear precisely what Shelepin is referring to here, but this seems to be an indication of Moscow’s growing concerns about a spillover into the rest of Eastern Europe. Urgent warnings to this effect had been pouring in from the Czechoslovak authorities since late October. See, for example, “Stenograficky zapis ze zasedani UV KSC,” 5–6 December 1956 (Top Secret), in SUA, Arch. UV KSC, F. 07, Sv. 14, Archivna jednotka (A.j.) 14; “Zabezpeceni klidu na uzemi CSR a statnich hranic s Mad’arskem,” Report from Col.-General Vaclav Kratochvil, chief of the Czechoslovak General Staff, and Lieut.-General Jaroslav Dockal, chief of operations, 29 October 1956 (Top Secret), in Vojensky historicky archiv (VHA) Praha, Fond Ministra narodni obrany (MNO) CSR, 1956, Operacni sprava Generalniho stabu cs. armady (GS/OS), 2/8–39b; and “Souhrn hlaseni operacniho dustojnika Generalniho stabu cs. armady,” Notes from Col.-General Vaclav Kratochvil, chief of the Czechoslovak General Staff, to the KSC Central Committee (Top Secret), 27 October 1956, in VHA, F. MNO, 1956, GS/OS, 2/8–49b.

129 Mikoyan’s references here to “comrades” and “them” are to Nagy’s government. His mention of “three days” in the line above indicates that the timetable for the invasion (code-named “Whirlwind”) had already been set. Mikoyan was hoping that some last-ditch attempt could still be made to head off the military operation.

130 No formal protocol for this session has been found (unlike the other session on 2 November recorded in Document No. 13 *infra*).

131 These initial comments are not attributed to anyone in Malin’s notes, but it is clear that the speaker was Kadar. The notes of Kadar’s remarks contain a few third-person references to himself, but this is because Malin sometimes jotted down the speaker’s name rather than using the pronoun “I.”

132 Jozsef Dudas, a former Budapest city official who had been imprisoned during most of the Communist period, was one of the most radical leaders of the October–November uprising. He was in charge of the rebel forces headquartered in the *Szabad Nep* building. Dudas and other rebel leaders insisted that Nagy must meet the protesters’ demands. Dudas was detained by Hungarian police on 1 November. After Soviet troops intervened on 4 November, he took a leading part in the military resistance. He was arrested by Soviet troops on 21 November and was executed two months later. His name is incorrectly rendered as “Dusak” in Malin’s notes; the spelling is corrected in the translation.

133 Kadar is referring here to negotiations that he, Munnich, and others had held in the parliament with one of the insurgent groups headed by Istvan Angyal. Angyal was not as radical as most

of the other rebel leaders, but he was insistent on the need for far-reaching changes. Angyal was executed in November 1958. See Laszlo Eorsi, ed., "Angyal Istvan saját kezu vallomasa, 1956 december," *Multunk* (Budapest), Vol. 40, No. 4 (1995), pp. 133-182.

<sup>134</sup> The references here are to the Soviet declaration of 30 October and to the declaration of neutrality adopted by the Hungarian government on the evening of 1 November. Nagy announced the declaration in a nationwide radio address.

<sup>135</sup> On 3 November, Anna Kethly was named as the Social Democratic representative in the government. See Note 96 *supra*.

<sup>136</sup> On 31 October the Hungarian government announced that, on the previous evening, Cardinal Jozsef Mindszenty had been freed from house arrest in Felsopeteny. He had been detained there for some 15 months after his release from prison. As the Primate of the Hungarian Catholic Church, Mindszenty had been sentenced to life imprisonment during an anti-religious campaign in February 1949. Mindszenty's statements in the autumn of 1956 were restrained, but clearly supportive of the revolution. When Soviet troops intervened on 4 November, he sought refuge in the U.S. legation in Budapest. Subsequently, Kadar's government prohibited Mindszenty from performing clerical duties of any sort from the legation.

<sup>137</sup> It is unclear precisely what Kadar was saying here. (Malin inadvertently may have omitted some comments just before this line.) At the noontime meeting, the Hungarian government reached no final decision on whether to demand the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops and whether to issue the declaration of neutrality. Those decisions were not approved until the evening session, as Kadar explains below.

<sup>138</sup> Ferenc Nagy, one of the former leaders of the Independent Smallholders' Party who had been living in exile in the United States, came to Vienna in late October to display solidarity with the insurgents. On 31 October, however, the Austrian authorities forced him to leave the country on the grounds that his presence might be deemed incompatible with Austria's neutral status.

<sup>139</sup> Bela Kovacs had been recuperating in Pecs from his nine years of imprisonment. The government's evening session on 1 November was the first activity in which he took part in Budapest.

<sup>140</sup> On the alarm generated by the Soviet troop movements, see Andropov's ciphered telegrams from 30 October, 1 November, and 2 November in AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, P. 6, D. 5, Ll. 15-16, 17-19, and 20-22, respectively.

<sup>141</sup> The name "Kovacs" here refers to General Istvan Kovacs, not Bela Kovacs. General Kovacs had become chief of the Hungarian General Staff on 31 October and was also a member of the Revolutionary Defense Committee. He was arrested on 3 November along with the other members of the Hungarian delegation that were negotiating the withdrawal of Soviet troops. He was not released from prison until 1960.

<sup>142</sup> Andropov's own account of his attendance at the inner cabinet's evening session, which tallies very well with Kadar's version, is in "Shifttelegramma," 1 November 1956 (Strictly

Secret), in AVPRF, F. 059a, Op. 4, P. 6, D. 6, Ll. 17-19.

<sup>143</sup> The word used here for "nationalism" is *natsionalizatsiya*, which normally means "nationalization" (i.e., the assertion of state control over property), but Kadar seems to have in mind the notion of reasserting Hungarian national control over Hungary's internal affairs, rather than leaving important matters under Soviet control.

<sup>144</sup> This again is a telling indication that East European and Soviet leaders were fully aware of the popular resentment caused by Soviet preponderance in Eastern Europe.

<sup>145</sup> Presumably, Munnich is referring to nationalistic slogans that had been shouted during Soviet-Hungarian soccer matches and to the influence of Radio Free Europe and other Western broadcasts. The Hungarian scholar Janos M. Rainer adds the following explanation for the reference to "soccer": "It was widely believed at the time that the celebrated Hungarian [soccer] team of the period, the 'Golden Team', which won against nearly every country it played, was not allowed to beat the Soviet Union for political reasons. (Their matches usually ended in a draw.) In actual fact, the first Hungarian win against the Soviet team took place some weeks before the revolution." See Janos M. Rainer, "The Road to Budapest, 1956: New Documentation of the Kremlin's Decision To Intervene," pt. 2, in *The Hungarian Quarterly* Vol. 37, No. 143 (Autumn 1996), p. 31 n. 28; readers interested in following the exploits of a fictionalized Hungarian *baskeball* team of this era are advised to read Tibor Fischer's novel, *Under the Frog* (Penguin: London, 1993).

<sup>146</sup> The protocol in question is "Vypiska iz protokola No. 50 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK ot 2 noyabrya 1956 g.: O meropriyatiakh v svyazi s sobytiyami v Vengrii," in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, L. 58. It reads simply: "To approve the plan for measures concerning the events in Hungary."

<sup>147</sup> On 1 November, in accordance with Protocol No. P50/I ("Vypiska iz protokola No. 50 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK ot 1 noyabrya 1956 g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii," in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, L. 47), five Soviet officials (Zhukov, Suslov, Konev, Serov, and Brezhnev) had been instructed to "work out the necessary measures concerning the events in Hungary and present them to the CPSU CC." This session allowed them to complete the task.

<sup>148</sup> All four phrases in this point were incorporated (with modifications) into Order No. 1 issued by Marshal Konev in the name of the Warsaw Pact Joint Command (see Note 109 *supra*).

<sup>149</sup> Those sent to Hungary (at varying intervals) included Suslov, Averki Aristov, Serov, and Zhukov.

<sup>150</sup> The text of the plan has not yet been released from the former Soviet archives, but the directive here presumably refers to the military (as opposed to political and propaganda) steps needed to fulfill the decision of 31 October. On the same day of this meeting, Marshal Konev arrived at his command post in Szolnok and ordered the reinforced Special Corps in Hungary to be ready for full-scale combat operations by the following day.

<sup>151</sup> No source is specified for the information in

this telegram from Soviet ambassador Aleksei Epishev, but the content leaves little doubt that the Romanian embassy in Budapest was relying at the time on the Soviet embassies in Budapest and Bucharest to relay information.

<sup>152</sup> Aleksei Alekseevich Epishev had been a commissar in the Soviet army during World War II. After the war he served in a number of regional party posts, and from 1955 until 1962 he was the Soviet ambassador to Romania and then Yugoslavia. In 1962 he was given the military rank of army-general and appointed the head of the Soviet Army's Main Political Directorate, a post he retained until his death in 1985.

<sup>153</sup> The surname of Aurel Malnasan (who was then a deputy foreign minister in Romania) is correctly spelled in the original Malin notes, but for some reason the published versions of the notes (in both Hungarian and Russian) mistakenly render Malnasan's surname as Malnasanu. The editors of the published versions erroneously claim that Malin's notes misspelled the name.

<sup>154</sup> On 2 November in Bucharest, Khrushchev and Malenkov briefed the Romanian leader, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, and his Czechoslovak and Bulgarian counterparts about the forthcoming invasion. On the eve of the invasion, Malnasan held lengthy talks with Nagy. Gheorghiu-Dej's motivation in sending Malnasan to Budapest must have been to keep Nagy occupied and to prevent him from taking any steps to counter the imminent military operation. For brief reports by Malnasan on the talks, see the newly declassified cables from the Romanian Foreign Ministry archive in Corneliu Mihai Lungu and Mihai Retegan, eds., *1956 Explozia: Perceptii romane, iugoslave si sovietice asupra evenimentelor din Polonia si Unguria* (Bucharest: Editura Univers Enciclopedic, 1996), pp. 181-182.

<sup>155</sup> For some reason, Malin did not list Khrushchev's name among the participants. Also not listed here are Janos Kadar, Ferenc Munnich, and Imre Horvath, who took part in the segment on the formation of a new Hungarian government. This portion of the meeting began at 8:45 p.m., with Khrushchev and Malenkov in attendance after their return from Brioni.

<sup>156</sup> The reference here is to documents issued by the Kadar government after it was installed in power.

<sup>157</sup> A Hungarian scholar, Janos Rainer, recently found a document in the Hungarian National Archive that sheds important light on this part of the CPSU Presidium's deliberations. Notes taken by Imre Horvath, one of the Hungarian officials who were present, reveal that Khrushchev offered an opening statement here, which for some reason was not transcribed by Malin. The notes Horvath took of Khrushchev's speech are translated below (see Document No. 16) as a supplement to the Malin notes, but they may be worth reading at this point before finishing Malin's rendition of the meeting. Although Horvath's notes were written hurriedly in mixed Hungarian and Russian, they provide a good flavor of what Khrushchev said.

<sup>158</sup> A secret report from the Soviet ambassador in Hungary, Yurii Andropov, in May 1956 was much less positive, alleging that "the work of the

Hungarian press in illuminating the results of the XX CPSU Congress has been totally inadequate." See "I. O. Zaveduyushchego Evropeiskim Otdelom MID SSSR tov. Levychkinu K. D.," Cable No. 141 (Secret) from Yu. Andropov, 2 May 1956, in AVPRF, F. Referentura o Vengrii, Op. 36, Por. 15, Papka 48, D. 178, Ll. 22-33.

<sup>159</sup>This refers to a telegram published in major Soviet and Hungarian newspapers on 6 April 1956, shortly after the 20th Party Congress. The telegram, sent by Khrushchev (as party leader) and Bulganin (as prime minister) to their Hungarian counterparts, Rakosi and Hegedus, marked the 11th anniversary of the liberation of Hungary from Nazi occupation.

<sup>160</sup>The local authorities in Győr, including the security forces, had been supportive of the revolution from the outset. See *Győr-Sopron megyeiek emlékeznek az 1956-os forradalomra* (Budapest: Zrinyi, 1991).

<sup>161</sup>Judging from Malenkov's presence at Presidium sessions on 4 and 5 November, only Mikoyan and Brezhnev actually traveled to Budapest.

<sup>162</sup>See Note 157 *supra*. This document, located by Janos Rainer, was published in Hungary in 1996. See Vyacheslav Sereda and Janos M. Rainer, eds., *Dontes a Kremlben, 1956: A Szovjet Partelnökség Vitái Magyarországról* (Budapest: 1956-os Intezet, 1996), pp. 92-93. The document is in Hungarian interspersed with a few Russian phrases and names. Horvath's notes show that the deliberations about this matter began at 8:45 p.m. (see Note 155 *supra*).

<sup>163</sup>These three lines appeared in the far left column of Horvath's notes.

<sup>164</sup>This statement is a candid acknowledgment of the extent to which the Soviet Union still controlled leadership politics and successions in Eastern Europe after Stalin's death. Khrushchev's reference to Mikoyan concerns the steps that Mikoyan took when he was in Budapest from 13 to 21 July 1956 (see Document No. 1 *supra*). During a preliminary meeting with Rakosi, Erno Gero, Andras Hegedus, and Bela Veg, Mikoyan took the initiative in bringing about Rakosi's dismissal. (The other Hungarian officials had long wanted to proceed with this step, but were unwilling to act until the Soviet authorities themselves told Rakosi he would have to go.) Mikoyan then participated in a crucial meeting of the HWP Politburo on 13 July, which voted to remove Rakosi from his posts as HWP First Secretary and a member of the HWP Politburo. At Mikoyan's behest, the HWP Politburo also chose Gero as the new party leader. See "Zapis' besedy A. I. Mikoyana s Matyashem Rakoshi, Andrashem Hegedushem, Erne Gere i Beloi Begom, 13 iyulya 1956 g.," 17 July 1956 (Secret), compiled by Yu. V. Andropov; "Zapis' vystuplenii na zasedaniya Politbyuro TsR VPT, 13 iyulya 1956 g.," 13 July 1956 (Secret), compiled by Yu. V. Andropov; and "Zapis' besedy A. I. Mikoyana s Yanoshem Kadarom, 14 iyulya 1956 g.," 17 July 1956 (Top Secret), compiled by Yu. V. Andropov, all in AVPRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 186-190, 191-205, and 206-215, respectively. In ciphered telegrams on 16 and 18 July, Mikoyan explained in detail why he ended up supporting Gero to become the new HWP First Secretary. See "TsK KPSS," 16 July 1956 (Strictly Secret — Urgent),

Osobaya Papka; and "TsK KPSS," 18 July 1956 (Strictly Secret — Urgent), Osobaya papka, both in AVPRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 183-185 and 225-236, respectively.

<sup>165</sup>The nature of this statement is unclear (to say the least), but the mention of these countries at a time of escalating hostilities is another interesting indication of the role of the Suez Crisis in Soviet thinking about events in Hungary.

<sup>166</sup>This topic was not included in the formal protocol for the session ("Protokol No. 51 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS," in AVPRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 484, Ll. 60-61).

<sup>167</sup>Most likely, there is a mistake or omission in Malin's text. These phrases, as given in the original, do not make sense.

<sup>168</sup>The reference here is to financial, not military, assistance. A Soviet economic aid package for Hungary was approved on 5 November and announced the following day.

<sup>169</sup>These points about the Suez Crisis are intriguing in light of what happened the following day (5 November). During the first several days of the Suez Crisis, Moscow's response was limited to verbal protestations through the media and at the UN. On 5 November, the day before a ceasefire was arranged, Soviet prime minister Nikolai Bulganin sent letters to the U.S., French, British, and Israeli governments. His letter to President Eisenhower warned that "if this war is not halted, it will be fraught with danger and might escalate into a third world war." Bulganin proposed that the United States and Soviet Union move jointly to "crush the aggressors," an action he justified on the grounds that the two superpowers had "all modern types of arms, including nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, and bear particular responsibility for stopping the war." Not surprisingly, Eisenhower immediately rejected Bulganin's proposal. Bulganin's letters to France, Great Britain, and Israel were far more minatory, including thinly-veiled threats to use missiles if necessary to prevent Egypt's destruction. The letters to France and Britain contained identical passages: "In what position would [Britain and France] have found themselves if they had been attacked by more powerful states possessing all types of modern weapons of destruction? These more powerful states, instead of sending naval or air forces to the shores of [Britain or France], could use other means, such as missile technology." Bulganin's letter to Israel declared that "Israel is playing with the fate of peace and the fate of its own people in a criminal and irresponsible manner." This policy, Bulganin warned, "is raising doubts about the very existence of Israel as a state. We expect that the Government of Israel will come to its senses before it is too late and will halt its military operations against Egypt." For the texts of the letters and other Soviet statements during the crisis, see D. T. Shepilov, ed., *Suetskii krizis* (Moscow: Politizdat, 1956). Although the letters represented a much more forceful and conspicuous Soviet stance against the allied incursions, they came so belatedly that they had only a minor impact at best on efforts to achieve a ceasefire.

<sup>170</sup>This passage refers to the appeal to the nation that Kadar's government issued when it was installed in power on 4 November.

<sup>171</sup>Molotov is referring to Kadar's radio address

on 1 November, which was published in *Nepszabads* the following day.

<sup>172</sup>This in fact is precisely what Ulbricht himself feared; see the detailed account by the chief of the East German State Security forces in 1956, Ernst Wollweber, in Wilfriede Otto, ed., "Ernst Wollweber: Aus Erinnerungen — Ein Portrait Walter Ulbrichts," *Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung*, No. 3 (1990), esp. pp. 361-378. For more on the impact of the 1956 crises on the East German communist leadership, see the papers presented by Hope M. Harrison and Christian F. Ostermann at the "Conference on Hungary and the World, 1956: The New Archival Evidence," which took place in Budapest on 25-29 September 1996 and was organized by the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, the National Security Archive, and the Cold War International History Project. Copies of the papers, both of which draw extensively on the archives of the former Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED), are available from the conference organizers.

<sup>173</sup>Saburov is referring to the families of Soviet troops who were killed, not to the much larger number of Hungarians who died in the fighting.

<sup>174</sup>This illustrates how concerned CPSU leaders were that the crisis was spilling over into the Soviet Union. Both before and after 4 November, unrest and protests occurred at a number of higher educational institutions in the USSR, including Moscow State University (MGU). At MGU, "protests against Soviet military intervention" were accompanied by "anti-Soviet slogans and posters." Both students and faculty took part in the actions. The KGB quickly moved in and restored order, but the crackdown was not as vigorous and sweeping as some CPSU officials wanted. See the first-hand account by the long-time deputy director of the KGB, Filipp Bobkov, *KGB i vlast'* (Moscow: Veteran MP, 1995), pp. 144-145. Bobkov claims that Pyotr Pospelov and some other senior party officials, as well as a number of high-ranking personnel in the KGB, wanted to launch "mass repressions" to deter any further unrest, but their proposals were never formally adopted. Subsequently, a commission headed by Brezhnev issued secret orders and guidelines to all party organizations to tighten political controls.

<sup>175</sup>On 4 November, the Soviet ambassador in Yugoslavia, Nikolai Firubin, sent a telegram to Moscow with information provided by Kardelj (at Tito's behest) about the refuge granted to Imre Nagy and his aides in the Yugoslav embassy. The response, as approved by the CPSU Presidium, called on the Yugoslav authorities to turn over the Hungarian officials to Soviet troops. See "Vypiska iz protokola No. P51/IV zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 4 noyabrya 1956 g.," 4 November 1956 (Strictly Secret), in AVPRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, Ll. 103-104.

<sup>176</sup>Nagy had appealed to UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld on 1 November asking for support of Hungary's sovereignty and independence. The UN Security Council began considering the matter on 3 November. On 4 November, the UN Security Council took up the question of Soviet military intervention in Hungary, and the UN General Assembly voted to condemn the Soviet invasion. On 5 November, the CPSU

newspaper *Pravda* featured a letter purportedly sent by Kadar and Imre Horvath to Dag Hammarskjöld. The letter claimed that Nagy's submission of the Hungarian question to the UN had been illegal, and requested that all consideration of the issue cease.

<sup>177</sup>This brief session produced few results. The formal protocol for the session (in TsKhSD, F. 3, Op. 14, D. 73, L. 4) simply reads: "Defer consideration of the matter."

<sup>178</sup>Voroshilov's name is not listed among the participants, but the notes below indicate that he actively took part.

<sup>179</sup>Other documents recently declassified by the Russian government shed light on what occurred at this meeting. On 5 November an official from the CPSU CC international department, Vladimir Baikov, who had been sent to Budapest the previous day to maintain liaison with Kadar, sent a secure, high-frequency message back to Moscow along with the draft text of a statement prepared by Kadar. Baikov's message reads as follows: "At the request of Cde. Kadar, I am conveying the translation from Hungarian of an Appeal by the Provisional Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party 'To Hungarian Communists! To Loyal Members of the Hungarian Workers' Party!' Cde. Kadar requested that I transmit the views and observations of the Soviet comrades regarding the text of the Appeal by 10:00 a.m. on 6 November." (See "Po VCh," APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, L. 132.) The draft went to Mikoyan, who prepared a number of changes and suggestions before the Presidium meeting began. The most significant change was the addition of a reference to the "treacherous" activities of a "group of Imre Nagy, Losonczy, and Donath" after the condemnation of the "Rakosi clique." (See the marked-up draft in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, L. 136.) Kadar incorporated this change, though he dropped the mention of Ferenc Donath, referring simply to the "Nagy-Losonczy group," which he claimed had committed "treason" and inspired the "counterrevolution." Other proposed changes also were included. The final text was released as a leaflet in Hungary on 6 November. It was published in the Szolnok newspaper *Szabad Nep* on 7 November and in Russian translation in the CPSU daily *Pravda* that same day. On 8 November it was published in *Nepszabadsag*. This was the first major programmatic statement by Kadar's government.

<sup>180</sup>This is the same telegram that Kadar mentioned earlier. See Note 159 *supra*.

<sup>181</sup>The draft statement pledged that the HSWP would "make a decisive break with the harmful policy and criminal methods of the Rakosi clique, which shook the faith of the broad popular masses in our party." This was preserved in the final text along with other condemnations of "past mistakes."

<sup>182</sup>Malenkov obviously is referring to a CC plenum of the HWP, not of the CPSU.

<sup>183</sup>Again, the reference is to a CC plenum of the HWP, not of the CPSU.

<sup>184</sup>From exile in Moscow, Rakosi had made overtures about his possible readmission into the Hungarian Communist party.

<sup>185</sup>The topic discussed here was a telegram received on 5 November 1956 from the Soviet am-

bassador in Yugoslavia, Nikolai Firyubin, transmitting a formal protest by the Yugoslav government about the death of Milenko Milovanov, a Yugoslav embassy employee in Budapest who was struck by shots fired from a Soviet tank. The Yugoslav foreign minister, Koca Popovic, accused the Soviet tank of having deliberately opened fire on the embassy even though the compound was clearly marked and "the Soviet government had been informed by the Yugoslav side of who, other than Yugoslav diplomatic personnel, is in the Yugoslav embassy compound in Budapest." See "Shifrtelogramma," 5 November 1956 (Strictly Secret), in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, L. 143-144. To reinforce Popovic's complaint, a similar protest was delivered by the Yugoslav ambassador in Budapest, Dalibor Soldatic, to the Soviet ambassador in Budapest, Yurii Andropov. Soldatic requested that the Soviet military unit alongside the Yugoslav embassy be pulled back. Andropov relayed this message by telephone to the Soviet deputy foreign minister Valerian Zorin, warning that "the demand for the withdrawal of the Soviet military unit from the building of the mission is of a suspicious nature." See "Telefonogramma," 5 November 1956, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, L. 130. These messages were discussed at the Presidium meeting not only by Zhukov and Shepilov (as indicated by Malin), but also by Khrushchev, who presented the draft of a cable intended for the Yugoslav government. Subsequently, the cable was transmitted via Firyubin to Popovic.

<sup>186</sup>The formal protocol for this session ("Vypiska iz Protokola No. 53 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 6 noyabrya 1956 g.," in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, L. 141) indicates that the Presidium "affirmed the draft response to the Yugoslavs in connection with the unfortunate case of an employee at the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest." The telegram, signed by foreign minister Dmitrii Shepilov, was sent to the Yugoslav foreign minister, Koca Popovic, via the Yugoslav ambassador in Budapest, Veljko Micunovic. It stated that the Soviet military commander in Hungary had been ordered to make a careful study of how the incident happened. The telegram also conveyed the Soviet government's "deep condolences" regarding the death of Milenko Milovanov, and promised assistance in transporting Milanov's body to Yugoslavia. The telegram said that the Soviet military government would take "all necessary measures" to safeguard the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest, and in a follow-on conversation with Micunovic, Shepilov indicated that the Soviet military command would comply with the Yugoslav request to "pull back the military unit next to the [Yugoslav] embassy compound." See "O besede s poslom Yugoslavii v SSSR Michunovichem," No. 486 (Secret), from D. T. Shepilov to the CPSU Presidium, 7 November 1956, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 45, D. 29, L. 1-3. The investigation into the incident was completed by mid-day on 7 November. It concluded that the Soviet tank had come under fire from a house alongside the Yugoslav embassy. When the tank responded by firing back, one of the shots had strayed into the embassy, killing Milovanov. It is unclear whether this version of events is more accurate than the original Yugoslav account, but whatever the case may have been, steps were

taken to prevent further "unfortunate incidents."

<sup>187</sup>These notes were compiled by Malin's deputy, Vladimir Naumovich Chernukha, not by Malin himself. Hence, they are somewhat sketchier than other notes from this period. No list of participants in the session is given, but the formal protocol for the session ("Vypiska iz Protokola No. 60 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 27 noyabrya 1956 g.," in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 488, L. 181) indicates that, in addition to those listed here, the participants included Brezhnev, Shvernik, Furtseva, Belyaev, and Pospelov. The protocol does not mention Andrei Gromyko.

<sup>188</sup>The Presidium is discussing a telegram that was sent on 26 November by V. F. Nikolaev, an official at the Soviet embassy in Bucharest. The telegram indicated that the Romanian leader, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej intended to seek top-level negotiations with Yugoslavia as soon as possible to alleviate the dispute that Yugoslavia was having with the Soviet Union and Hungary about the fate of Imre Nagy. During negotiations with the Yugoslavs, Kadar's government had given assurances of safety for Nagy and his aides if they left the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest. When Nagy's group went outside on 22 November, they were immediately arrested by Soviet military personnel. Soon thereafter, they were transported as prisoners to Romania. A senior aide to Gheorghiu-Dej, Emil Bodnarus, told Nikolaev that the Romanians "hadn't expected that the Yugoslavs would raise a fuss about the transfer of Imre Nagy and his group to Romania. However, as you know, they presented a note of protest to the Soviet and Hungarian governments. It's possible that this question might be raised at the UN, etc. We believe that we must be ready for different speeches and discussions regarding Imre Nagy. But first of all we believe it is necessary to discuss this matter with the Yugoslavs." See "Shifrtelogramma," 26 November 1956 (Strictly Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. 5, L. 13-14.

<sup>189</sup>The formal protocol for this session ("Vypiska iz Protokola No. 60 zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS," 27 November 1956, in APRF, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 488, L. 177) stated that "on the basis of the exchange of opinions at the session of the CPSU CC Presidium, Cde. Bulganin is instructed to hold negotiations with Cde. Gheorghiu-Dej." Later that day, Bulganin had a telephone conversation with Gheorghiu-Dej, which he promptly recounted in writing for the other members of the CPSU Presidium: "I told Cde. Gheorghiu-Dej that, in our opinion, a meeting at the highest level with the Yugoslav leadership about Imre Nagy and his group will not produce a good solution, since the Yugoslavs have a set position on this matter, and such a meeting might complicate the situation. The Yugoslavs might demand a meeting with Imre Nagy and the others, which would hardly be worthwhile. . . . Cde. Gheorghiu-Dej asked that I let the CPSU CC Presidium know that they are working via plenipotentiaries with Imre Nagy and his group. They have set out to persuade Imre Nagy and his group to issue a statement in which they would acknowledge their criminal actions and indicate that the only correct course at present is to support and consolidate the Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government of Kadar, and to strengthen the re-

gime of people's democracy. In this way, said Gheorghiu-Dej, we want to test Imre Nagy." See "Informatsiya," 27 November 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. 5, Ll. 16-17.

<sup>190</sup>This refers to the manner in which Imre Nagy and his aides were arrested. A bus had been brought alongside the Yugoslav embassy, supposedly to transport the officials and their families to their apartments. It turned out that the bus was merely part of an elaborate plot devised by Ivan Serov and other senior KGB officials to lure Nagy from the embassy. A Soviet military officer was sitting in the bus, and others quickly approached. Two Yugoslav diplomats who were accompanying the Hungarians were forced out of the bus, and the remaining passengers were placed under arrest, contrary to the assurances that Kadar's government had given to the Yugoslavs. This episode is recounted in detail in the note of protest that Yugoslav foreign minister Koca Popovic sent to the Soviet and Hungarian embassies on 24 November 1956, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. 5, Ll. 19-26. See also "Telefonogramma," Secure High-Frequency Transmission, from Malenkov, Suslov, and Aristov, 23 November 1956, in APRE, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 488, Ll. 95-96.

<sup>191</sup>No title for this section is given, but the formal protocol for the session (No. 60, as cited in Note 187 *supra*) indicates that Point II dealt with "Questions of Hungary." According to the Protocol, "the USSR Foreign Ministry, the KGB, and the USSR Ministry of Defense [were] instructed to prepare materials about Imre Nagy and his group in accordance with the exchange of opinions at the CPSU CC Presidium's session."

<sup>192</sup>Nagy's surname is omitted in this line of Malin's notes.

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## RESEARCH NOTES:

### THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR DECLASSIFICATION PROJECT: SETTING UP THE A-BOMB EFFORT, 1946

by G. A. Goncharov, N. I. Komov,  
A. S. Stepanov

On 16 July 1945, the USA conducted the world's first test of an atomic bomb, and on 6 and 9 August 1945, it used the new weapon on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The world faced the fact of the USA's monopolistic possession of the new, unprecedentedly powerful device. The atomic bombardments of the Japanese cities, some believed, also constituted a demonstration by America's leaders of their readiness to employ these weapons later on as well.

The events of 1945 forced the Soviet leadership to undertake emergency measures to speed up the creation of the USSR's own nuclear weapons. It was clear that solving the problem of making the atomic bomb as soon as possible would require mobilization of all the country's resources, which had been entirely directed to securing the victory over fascist Germany and its allies.

Focusing all the country's forces on the solution of this complex problem called above all for the establishment of a new state management body endowed with appropriate power. Such a body, which was entrusted with practically unlimited authority, was the Special Committee, headed by L. P. Beria (a member of State Defense Committee and Vice Chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars) and was founded by the USSR State Defense Committee's Resolution No. GOKO-9887 of 20 August 1945. The Committee was founded under the State Defense Committee, but after the State Defense Committee was abolished in September 1945, the Special Committee functioned as a body of USSR Council of People's Commissars (and after March 1946 as a body of the USSR Council of Ministers).

In reality, the Special Committee was an independent state control body

directly subordinate to Soviet leader J.V. Stalin. It functioned for almost eight years until it was abolished in accordance with a CC CPSU Presidium Resolution of 26 June 1953—the same tumultuous meeting at which Beria was arrested. Thus, the Special Committee's activities covered a most important, formative period of the Soviet atomic project, that is, the establishment and growth of the USSR atomic-energy industry, the development and testing of the first Soviet atomic bomb (in 1949) and early improved atomic bomb designs, and the development and virtual completion of the first Soviet hydrogen bomb (RDS-6), which was first tested in August 1953.

Considering and resolving all the most basic issues which arose in the course of the early Soviet atomic project, the Special Committee was empowered to supervise

all work on the use of atomic energy of uranium:- the development of scientific research in this sphere;- the broad use of geological surveys and the establishment of a resource base for the USSR to obtain uranium...;- the organization of industry to process uranium and to produce special equipment and materials connected with the use of atomic energy; and the construction of atomic energy facilities, and the development and production of an atomic bomb.<sup>1</sup>

The Special Committee's decisions either were of unilaterally decisive character or were made to support draft resolutions and directions of the USSR Government previously submitted to Stalin for approval. Throughout the lifetime of the Special Committee, more than 140 sittings were held. The approximate volume of the Special Committee's protocols is 1000 typewritten pages. The complete work of the Special Committee fills about 1700 dossiers containing more than 300,000 typewritten pages. These materials are currently stored in the Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF).

These materials, documenting events from 1943 to 1953, constitute an invaluable treasure of early Soviet atomic project history.

gime of people's democracy. In this way, said Gheorghiu-Dej, we want to test Imre Nagy." See "Informatsiya," 27 November 1956 (Top Secret), in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. 5, Ll. 16-17.

<sup>190</sup>This refers to the manner in which Imre Nagy and his aides were arrested. A bus had been brought alongside the Yugoslav embassy, supposedly to transport the officials and their families to their apartments. It turned out that the bus was merely part of an elaborate plot devised by Ivan Serov and other senior KGB officials to lure Nagy from the embassy. A Soviet military officer was sitting in the bus, and others quickly approached. Two Yugoslav diplomats who were accompanying the Hungarians were forced out of the bus, and the remaining passengers were placed under arrest, contrary to the assurances that Kadar's government had given to the Yugoslavs. This episode is recounted in detail in the note of protest that Yugoslav foreign minister Koca Popovic sent to the Soviet and Hungarian embassies on 24 November 1956, in TsKhSD, F. 89, Op. 2, D. 5, Ll. 19-26. See also "Telefonogramma," Secure High-Frequency Transmission, from Malenkov, Suslov, and Aristov, 23 November 1956, in APRE, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 488, Ll. 95-96.

<sup>191</sup>No title for this section is given, but the formal protocol for the session (No. 60, as cited in Note 187 *supra*) indicates that Point II dealt with "Questions of Hungary." According to the Protocol, "the USSR Foreign Ministry, the KGB, and the USSR Ministry of Defense [were] instructed to prepare materials about Imre Nagy and his group in accordance with the exchange of opinions at the CPSU CC Presidium's session."

<sup>192</sup>Nagy's surname is omitted in this line of Malin's notes.

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## RESEARCH NOTES:

### THE RUSSIAN NUCLEAR DECLASSIFICATION PROJECT: SETTING UP THE A-BOMB EFFORT, 1946

by G. A. Goncharov, N. I. Komov,  
A. S. Stepanov

On 16 July 1945, the USA conducted the world's first test of an atomic bomb, and on 6 and 9 August 1945, it used the new weapon on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The world faced the fact of the USA's monopolistic possession of the new, unprecedentedly powerful device. The atomic bombardments of the Japanese cities, some believed, also constituted a demonstration by America's leaders of their readiness to employ these weapons later on as well.

The events of 1945 forced the Soviet leadership to undertake emergency measures to speed up the creation of the USSR's own nuclear weapons. It was clear that solving the problem of making the atomic bomb as soon as possible would require mobilization of all the country's resources, which had been entirely directed to securing the victory over fascist Germany and its allies.

Focusing all the country's forces on the solution of this complex problem called above all for the establishment of a new state management body endowed with appropriate power. Such a body, which was entrusted with practically unlimited authority, was the Special Committee, headed by L. P. Beria (a member of State Defense Committee and Vice Chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars) and was founded by the USSR State Defense Committee's Resolution No. GOKO-9887 of 20 August 1945. The Committee was founded under the State Defense Committee, but after the State Defense Committee was abolished in September 1945, the Special Committee functioned as a body of USSR Council of People's Commissars (and after March 1946 as a body of the USSR Council of Ministers).

In reality, the Special Committee was an independent state control body

directly subordinate to Soviet leader J.V. Stalin. It functioned for almost eight years until it was abolished in accordance with a CC CPSU Presidium Resolution of 26 June 1953—the same tumultuous meeting at which Beria was arrested. Thus, the Special Committee's activities covered a most important, formative period of the Soviet atomic project, that is, the establishment and growth of the USSR atomic-energy industry, the development and testing of the first Soviet atomic bomb (in 1949) and early improved atomic bomb designs, and the development and virtual completion of the first Soviet hydrogen bomb (RDS-6), which was first tested in August 1953.

Considering and resolving all the most basic issues which arose in the course of the early Soviet atomic project, the Special Committee was empowered to supervise

all work on the use of atomic energy of uranium:- the development of scientific research in this sphere;- the broad use of geological surveys and the establishment of a resource base for the USSR to obtain uranium...;- the organization of industry to process uranium and to produce special equipment and materials connected with the use of atomic energy; and the construction of atomic energy facilities, and the development and production of an atomic bomb.<sup>1</sup>

The Special Committee's decisions either were of unilaterally decisive character or were made to support draft resolutions and directions of the USSR Government previously submitted to Stalin for approval. Throughout the lifetime of the Special Committee, more than 140 sittings were held. The approximate volume of the Special Committee's protocols is 1000 typewritten pages. The complete work of the Special Committee fills about 1700 dossiers containing more than 300,000 typewritten pages. These materials are currently stored in the Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF).

These materials, documenting events from 1943 to 1953, constitute an invaluable treasure of early Soviet atomic project history.

Some particular items in the Special Committee's documentary collections deserve special mention. Besides the Committee's meeting protocols, these are protocols and related materials of meetings of the Technical (Scientific and Technical) and Engineering and Technical Councils which were active in 1945-1946 within the Special Committee and then within the First Main Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers; resolutions and orders of the USSR Council of People's Commissars Council of Ministers on the atomic issues; correspondence with First Main Directorate organizations and enterprises and other Ministries and agencies; and important documents of the First Main Directorate. Among the Special Committee's materials are unique documents signed by Stalin and Beria, and manuscripts by leading scientists and administrators in the Soviet atomic project, including its leader, physicist I. V. Kurchatov.

For more than 40 years since the Special Committee's abolishment, its documents have been practically inaccessible for research. But an important step toward the opening of these materials, as well as relevant documents of other agencies, was taken on 17 February 1995 with the issuance of Russian Federation Presidential Decree No.160, "On the Preparation and Publication of an Official Compilation of Archival Documents Pertaining to the History of the Development of Nuclear Weapons in the USSR."<sup>2</sup> To produce an objective account of domestic atomic-energy industry growth and USSR nuclear weapons development, this Decree provides for the preparation and publication of archival documents pertaining to the history of nuclear weapons development in the USSR up to 1954. To fulfill the decree's requirements, to study and compile the archival documents and develop proposals for their declassification, in accordance with Russian Federation Government's Direction No. 728-r of 24 May 1995, a Working Group chaired by Russian Deputy Federation Minister for Atomic Energy, was set up. The Working Group included representatives of the Ministry of Atomic Energy (L.D. Ryabev,

Minatom), the Russian archives, the Academy of Sciences, Ministry of Defense, Federal Security Service, Foreign Intelligence Service, and State Technology Commission of Russia.

Since its establishment, the Working Group has carried out a great amount of work. It has specified subjects of the collection sections and decided to focus initial efforts on two basic areas to complete the compilation sections as quickly as possible:

- on the history of the development of the first atomic bomb and improved atomic bomb designs (during the period through 1954) in the USSR;
- on Soviet efforts to develop the hydrogen bomb (during the period through 1954).

The compilation section devoted to documents pertaining to the early period of works on the Soviet atomic project (1942-1945) is being prepared for publication.

To prepare the compilation, documents are being studied and selected in various Russian archives. In addition to the Archive of the President, Russian Federation (APRF), great attention is paid to the archives of R. F. Minatom and Russian Federal Nuclear Center—All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics (RFNC-VNIIEF). Valuable materials are also located in the files of the Russia Foreign Intelligence Service which has indicated its readiness to present a large amount of intelligence materials for the commission.

In its activities the commission intends to be guided by the principle of maximum possible openness. The basic restriction remains only the provisions of the 1968 Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Treaty, which bars the disclosure of information which would facilitate the spread of nuclear weapons. These provisions hamper the commission's work as most documents are of a technical character and contain data whose review for publication requires thorough analysis.

Another difficulty is that thus far there is no special funding for the commission's activities. However, in

August 1996 the Russian Federation Government decided to approve some funding for preparing the compilations. Though the funding amount is not large, this decision will allow us to assure a more effective continuation of the commission's activities. By now the commission has reviewed the protocols of the Special Committee's meetings and basic resolutions and orders by State Defense Committee and USSR Government from 1943 to 1948.

Anticipating the publication of the historical documents pertaining to the Soviet atomic project history in the compilation, we present below the full texts of the two most important governmental resolutions of 1946 from the APRF: USSR Council of Ministers (CM) Resolution No. 805-327 of 9 April 1946 ("Issues of USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory No.2"), and USSR Council of Ministers Resolution No. 1286-525 of 21 June 1946 ("On the Plan of the Works for Design Bureau No.11 of USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory No.2"). The latter resolution is published with annexes No.1 and No.4 (annexes No. 2 and 3, of a narrow economic character, are omitted).

USSR CM Resolution No. 805-327 of 9 April 1946 is a historic act which established Design Bureau No.11 (KB-11), the Soviet analog of the secret wartime American nuclear weapons laboratory at Los Alamos, New Mexico. (Design Bureau No. 11 later became RFNC-VNIIEF.) USSR CM Resolution No. 1286-525 of 21 June 1946 specified the early missions of KB-11, i.e. development of atomic bombs, which were referred to in the resolution as "jet engines S," in two versions, S-1 and S-2 (abbreviated as RDS-1 and RDS-2). RDS-1 meant the analog of the first U.S. plutonium-239 implosion type atomic bomb tested on 16 July 1945 in New Mexico (and of the U.S. atomic bomb exploded over Nagasaki on 9 August 1945). This bomb was successfully tested in the USSR on 29 August 1949. RDS-2 signified the analog of the uranium-235 gun type bomb exploded over Hiroshima on 6 August 1945. This bomb passed a design verification in the USSR, but was not tested. Later the abbreviation RDS-2 was used

to denote the improved plutonium-239 implosion type atomic bomb tested in 1951. During the period through 1954 the USSR verified and tested three more types of improved atomic bombs: RDS-3, RDS-4, and RDS-5. The documents reflecting the development of the RDS-1, RDS-2, RDS-3, RDS-4 and RDS-5 atomic bombs that will constitute the first part of the compilation being prepared by the commission. The second part will be composed of documents reflecting the Soviet work on the hydrogen bomb, whose first version (referred to as RDS-6s) was successfully tested on 12 August 1953.

Returning to the USSR CM resolution of 21 June 1946, readers should note the extremely short duration of the work phases set by that resolution. Thus the technical task orders for the RDS-1 and RDS-2 designs had to be developed by 1 July 1946, the main unit designs by 1 July 1947. The work on the design development had to be conducted in parallel with the establishment of special laboratories at KB-11 and arrangement of the works of these laboratories (the first phase laboratories had to start functions in the period from September to December 1946, the second phase laboratories in the period from January to June 1947).

The short duration and arrangement of the parallel works became possible thanks to availability in the USSR of intelligence materials about the designs of the U.S. atomic bombs "Fat Man" and "Little Boy," prototypes of RDS-1 and RDS-2, Soviet atomic bombs, which the leaders of the USSR atomic project decided in 1946 should be copied as closely as possible from the American designs.

It should be emphasized that the availability of the intelligence materials could not substitute for independent experimental, theoretical, and design verification of the Soviet atomic bombs which were being prepared for testing. Owing to the extraordinary responsibility of the leaders of and participants in the Soviet atomic project, RDS-1 was tested only after thorough confirmation of the available information and a full cycle of experimental, theoretical, and design studies whose level corre-

sponded to the maximum capabilities of that time.

The 21 June 1946 resolution set stringent control over the KB-11 works. I. V. Kurchatov, the scientific leader of the Soviet atomic project, and P.M. Zernov and Yu. B. Khariton, leaders of KB-11, had to report to the Special Committee on the progress of KB-11 works on a monthly basis.

The annexes to the 21 June 1946 resolution contain detailed description of the measures on preparation, arrangement, and support of the KB-11 works. According to Annex No.1, for KB-11 construction in the Mordovia State reserve zone and Gorky (now Nizhni Novgorod) region a territory of roughly 100 square kilometers was taken from the settlement of Sarov. KB-11 was transferred to Plant No. 550 in Sarov which heretofore belonged to Ministry of Agricultural Machine Engineering. The plant's buildings and equipment became the base of the KB-11 production zone. When the USSR CM Resolutions of 9 April and 21 June 1946 were adopted, the settlement of Sarov disappeared from all geographic maps published in the USSR.

The KB-11 laboratory received special dispensations and privileges of many varieties. It was permitted to construct new buildings and facilities without previously approved projects and estimated costs and make payments for the works according to actual expenditures. Special attention was paid to social issues. KB-11 workers received high wages, and enhanced food-stuff norms given in Annex No.4\* (note that the ration card system existed in the USSR up until the end of 1947), and reserved high-quality residences. A library was created which automatically received copies of important literature on physics, chemistry, mathematics and fiction published in the USSR, and special allocations of additional funding in foreign currency to obtain foreign books and journals. Aircraft were allotted to KB-11, permitting regular aerial transport links with Moscow.

Under the hard post-war conditions, including severe shortages of resources, a great amount of materials and necessary equipment was directed for

KB-11 construction and arrangement of works.

The measures taken for KB-11's creation and development, alongside the huge complex of the measures to create an interconnected network of atomic-energy industry scientific research institutes and enterprises, allowed the USSR to solve the historic problem of domestic nuclear weapons development within a short time period.

Naturally, even a multi-volume compilation cannot contain all significant historical documents reflecting the immense work on the USSR atomic project, which was indeed a major exploit of Soviet science and industry. The document sets, such as a complete collection of protocols of the Special Committee, and of the Technical and Engineering and Technical Councils of the Special Committee, voluminous reports about the work of the First Main Directorate from 1945 to 1946 signed by B. L. Vannikov, A. P. Zavenyagin and I. V. Kurchatov, compilation of atomic intelligence materials, etc. are worthy of special attention and might be published individually. The obvious interest of Russia and the international public in such historical materials allows us to expect that eventually the problem of financial support of such publications can find a positive resolution.

**Document I: USSR Council of Ministers Resolution of 9 April 1946 Establishing Design Bureau No. 11**

Top Secret  
(Special dossier)

USSR Council of Ministers  
Order No. 805-327ss/op of 9 April 1946.  
Kremlin, Moscow

Issues of Laboratory No.2

1. Reorganize Sector No. 6 of USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory No. 2 to Design Bureau of USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory No.2 for jet engine [atomic weapon] design development and prototype manufacture.

2. Hereupon refer to the above Design Bureau as Design Bureau No. 11 (KB-11) of USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory No. 2.

## 3. Designate:

C[omra]de Zernov P.M., Transport Machine Building Deputy Minister, as KB-11 Chief with release from his current Ministry duties;

Professor Khariton Yu. B. as KB-11 Chief Designer on jet engine prototype designing and manufacture.

4. Adopt the proposal by Commission composed of Vannikov, Yakovlev, Zavenyagin, Goremykin, Meshik and Khariton on location of KB-11 on the base of Ministry of Agricultural Machine Building Plant No. 550 and adjoining territory.

## 5. Assume the following as necessary:

a) involve USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Chemical Physics (Director Academician Semenov N. N.) in computations on orders by Laboratory No. 2 (Academician Kurchatov) relating to designing of jet engines, measurements of needed constants, and preparation and conduct of principal jet engine tests;

b) arrange at USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Chemical Physics development of theoretical issues for nuclear explosion and combustion and their application in engineering.

In this connection transfer all main forces of USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Chemical Physics to accomplishment of the above tasks.

6. Charge the First Main Directorate of USSR Council of Ministers (Mr. Vannikov) with [responsibility for] material and technical support of KB-11 and USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Chemical Physics.

7. Entrust Mr. Vannikov with consideration and solution in conjunction with Mr. Zernov of all the issues relating to adjustment of Plant No. 550 for KB-11.

8. Entrust Messrs. Vannikov (convocation), Zernov, Kurchatov, Khariton, Semenov, Pervukhin, Ustinov, and Zavenyagin with consideration of Academician Semenov's proposals on the measures to support the works with which the Institute of Chemical Physics is charged and within 5 days to develop and submit the draft decision on this issue.

Stamp: USSR Council of Ministers General Office Management of USSR Council of Ministers Affairs.

[Source: Archive of the President, Russian

*Federation (APRF), Fond 3, Opis 47, Delo 29, Listy 105-106].*

**Document II: USSR Council of Ministers Resolution of 21 June 1946 on Development of Soviet Atomic Weapons**

Keep in cipher

Top Secret  
(Special dossier)

USSR Council of Ministers Resolution  
No. 1286-525ss/op of 21 June 1946.  
Kremlin, Moscow

On the plan of promoting the works of  
Design Bureau No. 11 (KB-11) of  
USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory  
No.2

USSR Council of Ministers ORDERS:  
Accept the following proposals submitted by Cdes. Kurchatov, Khariton, Vannikov, Pervukhin, and Zernov on the Orders for Design Bureau No. 11 of USSR Academy of Sciences and the plan of promoting the works of the above Bureau:

1. That Design Bureau No. 11 (Messrs. Khariton, Zernov) be charged with:

a) development of two versions of "Jet engine [atomic bomb] S" ("RDS" in abbreviated form) under the scientific leadership of USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory No.2 (Academician Kurchatov): with heavy fuel utilization (version S-1) and with light fuel utilization (version S-2);

b) submission of the first verified and manufactured S-1 and S-2 versions of RDS, 1 copy of each version, to state tests in stationary conditions: for the version S-1 by 1 January 1948, for the version S-2 by 1 June 1948;

c) submission of the first verified and manufactured S-1 and S-2 aerial design versions of RDS, 1 copy of each version, to state flight tests: for the version S-1 by 1 March 1948, for the version S-2 by 1 January 1949.

2. That to secure accomplishment of the tasks stated in item 1, entrust Design Bureau No. 11 (Cdes. Khariton and Zernov) to be empowered to carry out the following works: a) development of the tactical and technical task orders for versions S-1 and S-2 of the RDS design by 1 July 1946; b) development of the design of the main RDS units in versions S-1 and S-2 by 1 July 1947; c) manufacture of RDS prototypes without

fueling stated in item 1a in versions S-1 and S-2, 5 copies for each version, and submit them for testing by 1 September 1947.

3. That the following proposals of Cdes. Kurchatov, Khariton, Vannikov, Pervukhin, and Zernov to conduct the following preparatory works for RDS versions S-1 and S-2 according to the task orders of KB-11, at Ministry of Agricultural Machine Building NII-6, NII-504, KB-47, USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory No. 2, Ministry of Armaments KB-88, Ministry of Transport Machine Building Kirov Plant KB (Chelyabinsk) and USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Chemical Physics be accepted:

a) at the Ministry of Agricultural Machine Building Research Institute No. 6 (leader of the works Cde. Zakoshchikov, NII-6 chief):

- development of synchronous spark plug operation principles and design—by 1 October 1946;

- refinement of diesel fuel compound charge elements—by 1 October 1946;

- development basing on small-scale models of a technique for studying maximum compression of fuel mixture—by 1 January 1947;

- study basing on small-scale models of the compression rate—by 1 January 1947;

- development of the power supply system—by 1 March 1947.

b) at the Ministry of Agricultural Machine Building Research Institute N0.504 (leader of the works Cde. Rassushin, Chief Designer):

- development of the automatic height controller—by 1 January 1947;

- development of the spark plug power supply system—by 1 October 1946;

c) at the Ministry of Agricultural Machine Building Design Bureau No.47 (leader of the works Cde. Kulakov, Chief Designer):

- development of the RDS fairing and fastening case—by 1 October 1946;

d) at the Ministry of Transport Machine Building Kirov Plant Design, Chelyabinsk (leader of the works Cde. Dukhov, Chief Designer):

- development of the diesel fuel compound charge, fueling technique and automated system devices—by 1 October 1946;

e) at USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory No. 2 (leader of the works Academician Kurchatov):

- development of the power supply sys-

tem—by 1 March 1947;

- refinement of the timing issues as applied to the version S-2—by 1 January 1947;

- f) at the Ministry of Armaments Plant No. 38 Design Bureau (leader of the works Cde. Kostin, Chief Designer):

- development of the “gun” design—by 1 January 1947;

- refinement of the timing issues—by 1 January 1947;

- g) at USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Chemical Physics Special Sector (the leader of the works Academician Semenov):

- carrying out the theoretical and computational works on the task orders of USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory No. 2.

That Ministers: of Agricultural Machine Building Cde. Vannikov, of Armaments Cde. Ustinov, of Transport Machine Building Cde. Malyshev, Director of USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Chemical Physics Academician Semenov, [and] Chief of USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory No. 2 Academician Kurchatov be empowered to accomplish the works listed in item 3 within the stated dates and monthly report about the progress of works to the Special Committee of USSR Council of Ministers.

4. That Design Bureau No. 11 be authorized to establish the following laboratories within the Design Bureau (on the base of Plant No. 550 of the First Main Directorate of USSR Council of Ministers):

- primarily: Laboratory No. 1 (for fuel), Laboratory No. 2 (X-ray metering), Laboratory No. 3 (for studying strains), Laboratory No. 4 (for studying performance);

- secondarily: Laboratory No. 5 (for physics), Laboratory No. 6 (for plugs), Laboratory No. 7 (for metallurgy and treatment), Laboratory No. 8 (for studying physical and mechanical properties of fuel), Laboratory No. 9 (for quality control of initial materials), Laboratory No. 10 (for prevention of accidents).

That the dates be fixed for spreading the works of the primary laboratories from September to December 1946 and the secondary laboratories from January to June 1947.

5. That the measures be approved on preparation and organization of the works of KB-11 and measures for USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Building Directorate No.

88 in conformity with Annexes Nos. 1 and 2.

6. That Messrs. Kurchatov, Zernov and Khariton be entrusted with monthly reporting about the progress of works of Design Bureau No. 11 to the Special Committee of USSR Council of Ministers.

Stamp: USSR Council of Ministers General Office Management of USSR Council of Ministers Affairs..

[annexes:]

Top Secret  
(Special dossier)

USSR Council of Ministers Resolution  
No. 1286-525ss of 21 June 1946.  
Kremlin, Moscow

#### Annex No. 1

##### Measures

on preparation and arrangement of KB-11 works

USSR Council of Ministers ORDERS:

1. That USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (Cdes. Kruglov and Komarovskiy) be empowered to carry out the construction and assembling operations for Design Bureau No. 11 and that be USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs be empowered to complete by forces of Glavpromstroy the construction and assembling operations of the first series by 1 October 1946 and of the second series (all of the operations) by 1 May 1947.

That USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (Cde. Kruglov) be authorized to establish Building Directorate No. 880 within the Glavpromstroy system to accomplish the above task.

2. That the first series building amount for Design Bureau No. 11 proposed by Cdes. Vannikov, Pervukhin, Kurchatov, Zavenyagin, Khariton, and Zernov, a total of 30 million rubles, and the list of building over the facilities, according to Annex No. 3, be approved and that Cdes. Zernov and Komarovskiy be empowered to approve the priorities for building and restoration of the first phase facilities within the above list.

3. That Cde. Volkov V.V. be placed in charge of Deputy Chief of Design Bureau No. 11 of USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory No. 2 in building and Chief of USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs Building Direc-

torate No. 880 and that he be relieved of other work for Ministry of Military and Navy Building.

4. That GSPI-11 of the First Main Directorate of USSR Council of Ministers carry out the design operations on building for Design Bureau No. 11.

5. That the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs be empowered to occupy the area up to 100 square kilometers for Building Directorate No. 880 in the Mordovia State reserve and up to 10 square kilometers of land south of the Balykovo village, Gorky region.

That Cde. Rodionov, Chairman of RSFSR Council of Ministers, by agreement with Cdes. Zernov and Komarovskiy, be entrusted with determination of the alienation borders of the above lands within ten days.

6. That USSR Minister of Internal Affairs be empowered to carry out the construction and assembly operations for Building No. 880 without approved project and estimated costs. Payment due should be made on the basis of actual expenditures.

7. That Plant No. 550 be transferred to the First Main Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers from the Ministry of Agricultural Machine Building under Statement of assets and liabilities as of 1 May 1946.

8. That Cdes. Abakumov (convocation), Kruglov, Vannikov, and Zernov be obligated to develop within 2 weeks and approve the safeguard and security system for facility No. 550.

That their direction be reported to Special Committee.

9. That Cdes. Vannikov, Kurchatov, and Zernov be obligated to approve KB-11 staff.

That Cdes. Vannikov, Kurchatov, Zernov, and Komarovskiy be charged with submission of the amount of construction and schedule of the construction and assembly operations of the first phase for KB-11 for 1946: no later than on 15 August 1946 to be approved by USSR Council of Ministers.

10. That KB-11 be released from recording the staff in financial agencies.

That a total of 25 million rubles of advance allocations be approved for KB-11 for quarters II and III, 1946 for preparatory and building operations, materials, equipment and economy expenditures, including 200 thousand rubles as the person-free fund and 100 thousand rubles for special expendi-

tures.

That the USSR Ministry of Finance (Mr. Zernov) be charged with allocation of the above funds to the First Main Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers.

11. That the wages, salaries, and all types of food-stuffs and goods provision established for USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory No. 2 be extended to KB-11.

12. That the following be determined:

a) salary rates for the workers assigned to work at facility No. 550 should be increased during their stay at facility No. 550 from 75 to 100% and the persons performing multiple tasks of KB-11 should be paid additional salary amounting from 50 to 75% of relevant salary established for workers of KB-11 of Laboratory No. 2;

b) all leading, scientific, engineering, technical, administrative and economic workers of facility No. 550 should be provided on site with three meals a day in norms according to Annex No. 4 and ration according to the letter "A" limit for leading and scientific workers and to the letter "B" limit for other workers.

13. That the USSR Ministry of Trade (Cde. Lyubimov) be charged with:

a) allocation by request of Cde. Zernov of all needed foodstuffs for arrangement of three meals a day for all leading, scientific, engineering-technical, and administrative-technical workers of facility No. 550 in norms according to Annex No.4 and ration of letter "A" for leading and scientific workers, of letter "B" for other workers;

b) allocation to facility No. 550 beginning from June 1946 of 50 food-stuffs limits 300 rubles each monthly and 50 goods limits 750 each quarterly in addition to those allocated for scientific workers.

14. That 50 personal payments up to 3000 rubles for KB-11 be established.

15. That the following mechanism of provision and funding of KB-11 of USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory No. 2 be established:

a) all KB-11 provision and funding should be through the First Main Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers by requests of Cde. Zernov;

b) funding of all KB-11 works should be through the First Main Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers. The financial accounting for KB-11 should be submitted only personally to Chief of the First Main Directorate. The same person is authorized

to approve estimated costs and actual expenditures for KB-11;

c) authorize Chief of the First Main Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers and Chief of KB-11 to have a group of workers up to 5 persons at the First Main Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers for preparation of requests and realization of KB-11 material supply funds.

16. That KB-11 (Cde. Zernov) be empowered to arrange their library at Design bureau which should be later on referred to as Library No. 11.

In order to provide this:

a) charge RSFSR OGIZ (Cde. Yudin) with inclusion of Library No. 11 into the list for receiving of an obligatory paid copy of literature on physics, chemistry, mathematics, and fiction;

b) charge Committee on Cultural and Educational Establishments Affairs of USSR Council of Ministers (Mr. Zuyev) with allocation by 1 August 1946 of literature from the State Stock for Library No. 11 composed of up to 5000 books on physics, chemistry, engineering, and mathematics and organization of a movable technical and fiction library by request of Mr. Zernov;

c) allocate 5000 dollars additionally for years 1946-1947 to the First Main Directorate of USSR Council of Ministers for subscription of books, journals, and magazines for Library No. 11.

17. That Cdes. Kuznetsov A. A. (convocation), Vannikov, Zernov be entrusted with selection of staff for Design Bureau No. 11 within one month.

18. That in July 1946 by direction of the First Main Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers equipment, instruments and devices according to Annex No. 5 be allocated and shipped, the delivery being in the order established by Resolution of USSR Council of Ministers of 9 April 1946 No. 806-328ss.

19. That materials and equipment to the First Main Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers, according to Annex No. 6, be allocated at the expense of the First Main Directorate Mobilization Reserve provided for pursuant to USSR Council of Ministers Order of 23 March 1946 No. 3881-rs.

20. That Chief of the First Main Directorate of USSR Council of Ministers (Cde. Vannikov) be charged with:

a) forwarding the equipment, instruments, materials and devices stated in An-

nexes Nos. 5 and 6 to secure spreading the first phase works of KB-11;

b) allocation of needed materials and equipment additionally to KB-11 in June-July 1946 from the First Main Directorate resources.

21. That Cde. Akopov, Minister of Automobile Industry, be charged with shipment of 25 motor vehicles in June 1946 in accordance with the distribution list of Cde. Zernov P.M. from the Mobilization Reserve of the First Main Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers provided for the Mobilization Reserve pursuant to Order of the USSR Council of Ministers of 23 March 1946 No. 3881-rs, including:

8 motor vehicles ZIS-58 motor vehicles GAZ-AA2 motor vehicles GAZ-517 motor vehicles GAZ-67 and

in July 1946 8 motor vehicles at the expense of the funds "for special expenditures" for the First Main Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers, including:

2 motor vehicles ZIS-52 motor vehicles ZIS-421 motor vehicle "sanitary"

3 motor vehicles M-11-73.

22. That the First Main Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers be empowered to have additional fuel expenditures beginning from June 1946: limit-free for three cars; for 12 M-11-73 make cars 800 liters each; for four cars 600 liters each; and for four cars 400 liters each, of these three limit-free cars, four cars 800 liters each and three cars 600 liters each should be at disposal of Cde. Zernov P.M.

23. That the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs (Cde. Kruglov) be obligated to establish telephone communication "HF" with Building No. 860 and KB-11.

24. That the USSR Ministry of Textile Industry (Cde. Sedin) be obligated to deliver the following by the distribution list of Cde. Zernov P.M. in July 1946: 1.2 thousand meters of strips of carpet, 1000 meters of silk cloth; 1000 meters of chevron; 150 meters of woolen cloth at the expense of the funds of the First Main Directorate of USSR Council of Ministers for quarter III, 1946.

25. That Main Directorate of Civil Air Fleet (Mr. Astakhov) be obligated to allot the aircraft SI-47 and two aircraft PO-2 to Cde. Zernov P.M. to make missions by direction of Zernov P.M.

26. That Ministry of Transport (Cde. Kovalev) be obligated to allot one special car to USSR Academy of Sciences Labora-

tory No. 2 with the right of coupling to fast, passenger and other trains by requests of Cde. Zernov; the allotment duration should be agreed upon by Cde. Zernov.

27. That the USSR Ministry of Forest Industry (Mr. Saltykov) be obligated to fill the order for furniture at the expense of the market fund for the First Main Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers by the specification and distribution list of Cde. Zernov P.M. in quarters II and III, 1946, the sum total amounting to 800 thousand rubles, including 400 thousand rubles for individual suites, with delivery amount being 100 thousand rubles in the 2nd quarter and 700 thousand rubles in the 3d quarter.

28. That for the workers of Design Bureau No. 11 and Building No. 880 the dwelling space occupied by them and their families by the time of their going to work at Building No. 880 and KB-11 of USSR Academy of Sciences Laboratory No. 2 be reserved for them.

29. That the USSR Ministry of Foreign Trade (Cde. Mikoyan) be obligated to search for the possibility to deliver one precision drilling machine No. 3 or No. 4 (for KB-11), irrespective of its primary purpose, as a part of previous orders to the First Main Directorate of the USSR Council of Ministers in 1946.

Stamp: I. Stalin, Chairman of USSR Council of Ministers.

Protocol Division Ya. Chadayev, Manager of USSR Council of Office Ministers Affairs.

[Source: APRF, F. 3, Op. 47, D. 29, Ll. 169-178.]

[\* Annex 4 of the USSR Council of Ministers Resolution of 21 June 1946 is not printed due to space limitations, but is available from CWIHP—ed.]

<sup>1</sup> The full text of the State Defense Committee resolution on the establishment of the Special Committee is published in *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* 6/7 (Winter 1995/1996), 269-70.

<sup>2</sup> For an English translation of this decree, see *CWIHP Bulletin* 5 (Spring 1995), 57.

## KHRUSHCHEV'S 1960 TROOP CUT: NEW RUSSIAN EVIDENCE

by Vladislav M. Zubok

On 12 January 1960, the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Nikita S. Khrushchev, announced the most radical reduction in the level of Soviet military troops since 1924: the army was to be reduced by one-third in three years; several branches of military aviation and navy were to be drastically cut or even altogether abolished; and instead, the strategic missile forces were to become the backbone of the armed forces.

Analysts and scholars have long agreed that, unlike previous cuts designed to impress the West with the Soviets' "peace-loving" nature, this move was principally Khrushchev's radical attempt to replace the concept of a huge land army, which was in the foundation of the Soviet military buildup, with a technological force to ensure means of "retaliation." At the core of this idea was Khrushchev's desire to save resources for large-scale social and economic programs. But only recently have documents emerged to show how this remarkable initiative was born.

In autumn 1995, the Moscow archive containing the post-1952 records of the CC CPSU, the Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD), released transcripts of CC CPSU Plenums for the period 1941-1966 as well as supplementary material, often analogous to "special files" [*osobaya papki*], batches of highly important secret documents describing the rationale and preparations for crucial Politburo decisions. (CC CPSU Plenums and related materials for the period 1967-1991 have also reportedly been declassified by the Russian declassification commission, but as of late 1996 they had not yet been opened for scholarly research at TsKhSD.)

One document discovered in this newly-available collection at TsKhSD, and printed below, was Khrushchev's secret memorandum of 8 December 1959 to the CC CPSU Presidium (i.e.,

Politburo) proposing the radical and unilateral disarmament measures which would become visible to the world the following month. At the time, the Soviet leader was riding a crest of domestic and international authority achieved as a result of his widely-hailed trip to the United States and summit with U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower in September 1959. Even a testy meeting with Mao Zedong and the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in Beijing in early October, which indicated a wider than ever split between the leaderships of the two communist giants, could not dampen Khrushchev's optimism and desire to capitalize on what he saw as his political momentum. The disarmament initiative was a hallmark's of Khrushchev authority: as the unchallenged leader of the CPSU (since his victory over the "anti-party" faction in June 1957), he was determined to redefine in breathtaking fashion the parameters of Soviet security doctrine and military make-up.

The memorandum, found the supplementary file to the December 1959 CC CPSU Plenum, is clearly a draft, bearing all the traces of improvisation; probably Khrushchev dictated the text during a holiday on the Black Sea; some corrections and insertions are typed into it, and the phraseology in the Russian original is often awkward and unpolished, replete with colloquial "Khrushchevisms." What is unusual is the absence of a "final" version, which apparently did not exist, perhaps because Khrushchev did not want bureaucratic agencies, including the Ministry of Defense and the KGB, to elaborate or modify his arguments. He must have intended to keep it as it was: exclusively his personal initiative. Was this a case of the late authoritarian Khrushchev paying lip service to "party democracy," but actually taking no heed of his colleagues and party-state structures? Rather, in this case the authoritarianism was enlightened: Khrushchev knew that his proposal had to be imposed from the top and passed quickly, otherwise it would be resisted and bog down.

The documents reproduced below illuminate the process by which Khrushchev's proposal became official

Soviet policy. On 14 December 1959, six days after his memorandum was drafted, it was approved by the Presidium; four days later, on December 18, a conference of the military elite convened to work out practical measures to implement the proposal; and eight days after that, on December 26, the Plenum rubber-stamped it. Despite Khrushchev's strong position, he could not help worrying about the political fallout of such a radical revamping, which constituted a de facto replacing of the Soviet military machine; hence the memorandum's rather long and (for Khrushchev) elaborate argument. It is interesting that Khrushchev regarded his initiative as a direct follow-up to his proposal on General and Complete Disarmament which he made to the U.N. General Assembly on 18 September 1959. He presented his initiative to his colleagues as a means to boost the level of discussion at the specially-appointed United Nations "Committee of Ten" countries, set up to study disarmament questions, which was scheduled to start its deliberations in February 1960.

The memorandum reveals Khrushchev as a convert of the nuclear revolution; he was convinced that no power could threaten a Soviet Union armed with nuclear missiles. In the same breath the Soviet leader poses as an exuberant romantic and bluffer, this time not before the outside world, but in front of his own, much less informed colleagues. Most important, he boldly but falsely claims that "we are in an excellent position with [regard to] missile-building" and that the USSR has already set in motion assembly lines capable of serial production of "an assortment of rockets to serve any military purpose." In fact, as was known to the tiny group of military and missile designers who reported directly to Khrushchev as the head of the Defense Council, the production of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) had not yet begun and there were only four unwieldy R-7s on a launching pad near Plesetsk in northern Russia. The first test of the next-generation ICBM of the Yangel firm was still nine months away.

At the core of Khrushchev's reasoning was his belief that from then on

the Cold War would be decided by the outcome of economic competition between the United States and Soviet Union. With the great optimism characteristic of the times, he explained to the Politburo members that if the West did not reciprocate to Soviet cuts, so much worse for it, since the burden of military budgets would drag its economies down. And the romantic Khrushchev firmly believed that once "workers, but also peasants, petit bourgeois elements," saw the USSR's determination to disarm, they would shed their anti-Soviet fears and move "to neutral positions, and then would develop sympathies toward our country." Thus, Khrushchev repeated the disarmament dictum of the Soviet diplomacy of the 1920s and early 1930s, but, unlike his predecessors, did not intend to use it merely as a smoke-screen for Soviet build-up, but, on the contrary, as a rationale for a unilateral build-down.

The point where Khrushchev's imagination reached record-breaking heights was in plotting an army of the future. On one hand he was primarily moved by his conviction that the construction of communism would require maximum military demobilization. He was attracted by the reforms of the 1920s carried out by Mikhail Frunze, when more of the Red Army conscripts would be trained not in "the cadre army" but in territorial militia formations; this, in his mind, could keep young manpower in local economies instead of diverting it to unproductive military drills. He even spoke of keeping officers simultaneously in military schools and industrial jobs!

On the other hand, Khrushchev had no patience with or respect for the professional military. He lacked experience with military reform, but specifics did not bother him. Like many crucial turns in Soviet foreign policy in 1958-62, this disarmament initiative sprung full-blown from his mind. This is made clear by his own admission that he still needed to discuss the proposal with the Defense Ministry and General Staff, including how deep the proposed cuts should be ("perhaps a million or a million and half") and how quickly they should be carried out ("no more than

two years"). This perception, incidentally, was disastrously unrealistic and contradicted Khrushchev's avowed concern with the future of demobilized officers. What also catches the eye is Khrushchev's groping for a way to marry somehow the idea of rapid deployment with territorial forces, but without creating what one might call today a "rapid deployment force." He was careful to avoid the worrisome prospect of entrusting the country's security to an elite highly mobile force, a potential carrier of "Bonapartism."

The great disarmament initiative was as bold as it was ill-conceived: It was not part of comprehensive military reform. Khrushchev sacrificed quality for quantity, eager to ram down the throat of the reluctant military his enthusiasm for strategic missiles and determination to have a "no-frills" land army. There is still no available record of the conference with top military officials on December 18; but the signs of sharp disagreement and even protest were visible. Around that time Khrushchev and Defense Minister Rodion Malinovsky authorized a discussion in the new top secret publication *Military Thought* on a new military doctrine, with obvious intention to let off steam. The amount of steam was to be great indeed: in the period of several months after Khrushchev's announcement of the cuts, 250,000 Soviet officers were forced into premature retirement, many without adequate compensation, housing, or retraining. (For more on the tensions between Khrushchev and the Soviet military caused by such actions, see the forthcoming CWIHP Working Paper by Matthew A. Evangelista.)

The military were not the only group "ambushed" by Khrushchev's initiative. So were the party and state elites, many of whom later recalled this episode as "a hare-brained scheme" of Nikita Sergeevich. Also Khrushchev did not bother to ask for advice from other members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization: even the leadership of the GDR, the strategically vital country whose existence totally depended on the support of Soviet troops, was caught by surprise by Khrushchev's disarmament

move and East German leader Walter Ulbricht had to ask Soviet representatives what its implications would be for the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany.

A resurgence of tensions with the West would doom Khrushchev's dalliance with disarmament. Perhaps surprisingly, his proposals outlived the flare-up with the Eisenhower Administration surrounding the Soviet downing of an U.S. U-2 spy plane and the collapse of the East-West summit in Paris in May 1960. But they fell victim to another Khrushchev initiative: his determination to change the status of West Berlin and achieve a German settlement favorable to the Kremlin through an ultimatum to the West. The renewal of the Berlin Crisis in June 1961 (after Khrushchev told President John F. Kennedy in Vienna that Moscow intended to sign within six months a treaty with East Germany, thereby blocking Western access to West Berlin) led to a spiral of mutual hostility and mobilizational measures in Washington and Moscow. On July 25, Kennedy announced a call-up of U.S. reservists in his response to Khrushchev's belligerence. The next month the Soviet Chairman made it clear that the reductions of Soviet army would be "suspended." That ended his quixotic disarmament initiative, and, for almost three decades, the chance, however ephemeral, for the USSR to leave behind the mammoth land army it had inherited from the Second World War.

**Document 1: Khrushchev Memo to CC CPSU Presidium, 8 December 1959**

P. 2909

TO MEMBERS OF THE  
CC CPSU PRESIDUM  
TO ALTERNATE MEMBERS OF THE  
CC CPSU PRESIDUM

I would like to express some thoughts on our further steps in the struggle for reduction of international tension and on the resolution of the issues of reduction of armaments and of disarmament.

The Soviet Union today has seized good positions on the international arena. The trip to the United States of America

[and] our proposal in the United Nations Organization on general disarmament was well received in the world and cannot be simply rejected and neglected even by the reactionary circles of various countries. Even those who do not want a reduction of tension, much less disarmament, even they cannot oppose [it] openly in view of such a mood of broad circles of the public and desire for detente and reduction of armaments; they would probably use procrastination to find some arguments in order to turn this down, or in order to delay or disrupt decision-making on our proposals.

I believe that we today should take advantage of this opportunity [*konyunktura*], which we created in our favor, not to feel satisfied by our conquests, which we won, by positive recognition and our sound international position, and our leading role and initiative, which we retain consistently for several years.

I would think that we should now undertake a further reduction of armaments in our country, even without conditions of reciprocity on the part of other states, and a considerable reduction of personnel of the armed forces. I think that one could cut by perhaps a million or a million and half - one still must discuss it, study it with the Ministry of Defense. I believe that such a considerable reduction would not undermine our defense capabilities. Yet, if one comes forward with such a decision and implements it - this would have a large positive influence on the international situation and our prestige would grow enormously in the eyes of all nations. This would be an irresistible blow at the enemies of peace, and war-mongers, and advocates of the Cold War.

Why do I believe today that this would be feasible and not dangerous? My decision is based, first, on the fact that we have now reached a good position in the development of the economy of the Soviet Union; second, we are in an excellent position with [regard to] missile-building; indeed, we have an assortment of rockets to serve any military purpose, from long-range to close-combat range, "ground-to-ground" rockets as well as "air-to-ground" and "air-to-air" ones, atomic submarines and so on, and also in terms of the [explosive] yield we have a good variety. Besides, we worked out [*naladili*] the serial production of these rockets. I will not enumerate in this note all these rockets - those who are in charge, they know,

and when we start discussing it, - we will repeat - therefore I do not enumerate [them] in the note, but I can lay out in more detail, when we begin discussion.

We now have a broad range of rockets and in such quantity that can virtually shatter the world. One may ask - shall we have this terrible armament - atomic, rocket armament, and shall we have such a big army, which we have [today]? This does not make sense. Our assumption is that we do not seek war and we do not prepare for offensive [war], but we prepare defense. If one accepts this assumption, as we do, our army should be capable of defending the country, of repelling enemies that might try to attack our Motherland or our allies, when we have these powerful armaments, such as rockets. But that is what they are for. What country or group of countries in Europe would dare to attack us, when we can virtually erase these countries from the face of the Earth by our atomic and hydrogen weapons and by launching our rockets to every point of the globe?

Therefore, if we now fail to take steps toward reduction of armed forces, and transfer this all, as it is already the case, for decision-making in the Committee of Ten, while having advantageous and active positions on our side, that would mean reducing our possibilities. Because our proposals would then be transferred to the labyrinths of the Committee, there will be much talk, speeches, and pompous verbiage, exercises in glorification, and this would scale down our initiative in this question.

If we, for instance, pass now a decision to cut our armed forces by a million or a million and a half, and would put forth appropriate arguments, it would be a considerable step forward. I believe that the conditions are quite ripe for us to speak about it. Indeed, we already spoke about it: in my report, that I made, and in our other declarations. We have already said many times that our ideological debates with capitalism will be resolved not through war, but through economic competition. Therefore our proposals and measures on further reduction of our armed forces would allow us to further pressure our opponents - the imperialist countries. Some comrades might object that we would cut armaments, while the enemy would not. But it is debatable if the enemy would be doing the right thing. If we cut and say that we cut because our

hydrogen and rocket armament enable us to maintain defense capabilities at the necessary level, because we do not want war, therefore we want to cut the army, because we do not get ready for attack, the Soviet Union has never sought conquests, nor have socialist countries - then why we need such a huge army? To maintain this huge army would mean to reduce our economic potential. We have a chance to reduce the army. And if our enemies do not follow our example - one should not consider it as if it would cause us some damage. On the contrary, the countries which would maintain big armies, in the situation which emerges in socialist countries (i.e., their economic potential and, more importantly, powerful thermonuclear and rocket armament in their possession), these armies would, so to say, be sucking from their budgets, depleting national economies, and if one takes this in the light of struggle between communism and capitalism, they [i.e., the imperialist countries] would to a certain extent be our "ally," since they would devour their budgets, reduce the economic development of these countries, thereby contributing to the increasing advantages of our system.

I gave much thought to this issue, and decided before my arrival to Moscow to send such a note, so that the members and alternate members of the CC Presidium could read it, and, when I arrive, discuss it. If the comrades agree with me, then one could adopt necessary proposals. In my opinion, one could do the following: to convene a session of the Supreme Soviet, for instance, the session could be convened at the end of January or in February (one should select a time, but not delay) before the Committee of Ten starts, which is convened for February to discuss our proposals. So we should convene a session of the Supreme Soviet before this Committee starts its work, to approve a rapporteur, to report to the Supreme Soviet, to summon arguments and to take the decision, to accept an appeal that would say that, regardless of the reaction of other countries to our appeal, whether they would follow our example or not, we would abide by the decision of the Supreme Soviet.

I am confident that this would be a very powerful, fantastic [*potryasaiuxchii*] step. Moreover, this step would not in any way cause damage to our defenses, but would give us major political, moral, and economic

advantages. Therefore, if we fail to do this, then speaking in economic terms, it would mean failing to make a full use of the powerful capital our socialist policy and our socialist economy have accumulated. For our economy is prospering, developing fast. Our science has advanced to such an extent that it has given us advantages in creating means to defend our country. And there are not only discoveries of science, but skillfully implemented scientific discoveries for practical needs.

I think that it would not make sense now to have atomic and hydrogen bombs, rockets, and to maintain at the same time a large army.

In addition, one should keep in mind that since we possess modern armaments of the strongest kind, against which so far there is no defense, and [since] we maintain the largest army in the world, this indeed scares our enemies, and it scares even honest people among those who otherwise would welcome a fair disarmament, but who are afraid that perhaps this is just our tactical move. Their argument is the following: the Soviet Union introduced a proposal for a new reduction of armed forces, but does not make these reductions within its own territory. This might scare off some honest people, among those who seek disarmament; and the reactionary forces, who resist the reduction of international tension, these aggressive and militarist forces would of course use it for their ends.

If, however, we carry out a further reduction of our armed forces, then such a step would encourage those forces in bourgeois countries, those liberal bourgeois, capitalist circles who seek to improve the international situation, to live by the principles of peaceful coexistence. This would strengthen them and weaken the arguments of aggressive, militarist circles, who take advantage of our might and intimidate other countries.

How we could do it and all the details - for this one should already exchange opinions; we will give instructions to the Minister of Defense, to the General Staff so that they prepare [a proposal] in a concrete way.

Such a reduction, such a reduction (considerable) would be better extended over a year, year and half, or two. Thus during this time we would take a decision, would gradually start to reduce the army, because, while cutting such a number of

people in the army, one should accommodate them: officers, military officials (soldiers are easy to accommodate), so that they would be all set and accommodated. And then we would see in which direction it goes, because we are not cutting at once: it would take a year, year and a half, two (but no more than two years). It would be logical. If we introduced a proposal at the session of the [U.N.] General Assembly about general and complete disarmament in 4 years, then a partial, unilateral disarmament we might carry out within two years or less. This would also be logical and convincing. And besides, it would not be dangerous.

Presenting for deliberation of the Presidium these proposals that I have thoroughly thought through, I hope that we will discuss them well at the Presidium and will weigh all arguments for and against. Perhaps I cannot foresee everything. But it seems to me that these proposals of mine, if we implement them, would not cause any damage to our country and would not threaten our defense capabilities vis-a-vis the enemy forces, but would rather enhance our international prestige and strengthen our country.

I have some details in these proposals, but I do not outline them in the note. When we begin discussing them, I will explain my arguments in more detail than [I do] in this note. For instance, while reducing armed forces, at a certain time, to a certain degree, perhaps one should move to a territorial system (militia formations). In other words, there would be regiments and divisions built on a territorial principle (with citizens recruited to serve in them without leaving their industries). Of course, one should have an appropriate cadre of officers for such regiments and units, armament must be stored somewhere in warehouses. We must have transport aviation, because in case of emergency one must transfer these regiments quickly from one place to another. For instance, if one has to transfer several divisions to Germany, we must do it practically in a few days. Armament for these territorial divisions must be stored in a suitably reasonable variety near the sites of deployment of these formations. And these divisions, for instance from Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Kharkov, would get together right away, on alert, to a gathering point, would board planes and leave.

And there are other considerations we

should take into account so that the defense capabilities of our country would not diminish, but increase. The burden of maintaining armies would be smaller, and the political position domestically, as well as internationally, would grow stronger, since we would free the resources that are sapped by the maintenance of a huge army and armament. And we would conquer even more [ground] in our favorable position in the international arena in the struggle for peace, the prestige of our country would grow even further. And all this would promote our Marxist-Leninist ideas, our teaching, our struggle for peace, because not only workers, but also peasants, petit bourgeois elements would become more sympathetic to us with every new year. Their sympathies would grow. They would move first from fear to neutral positions, and then would develop sympathies toward our country. This I take to be natural, and we should work to achieve it.

When I am saying that one perhaps should have not only a cadre army, but also in part territorial, militia forces, in doing so we essentially, to some extent, repeat what Lenin did after the October [1917] revolution, but in a different situation and somewhat in another way, since back then we had no other option, we had no army; and today we have both resources and armaments, we have an army. And we cannot be left without an army and we do not want to be. But we should build this army in such a way, that it would be reasonable, without excessive frills [*bez izlishestv*], so that it would be combat-ready and meet the needs of national defense.

Of course, we would have to revise the system of military schools: their profile and number. Perhaps, if we switch to a new system, we should also establish such military schools where officers would be trained without leaving their jobs in industries. This is also of great importance.

All these measures will undoubtedly take the burden off the national budget. We have big opportunities for implementation of the proposals I have outlined on a unilateral reduction of our armed forces.

A couple of words about our military schools. When we created our multiple military schools, we did not have a sufficient number of trained people in our country. Today all young people have education, and therefore it is possible to enlist enough

people for military schools who will work, will train cadres without denying them to industrial economy, and will prepare officer cadres for all branches of the military. These commanders will be of the kind that will be even closer to the people, will be free of the so-called caste spirit that is emerging as a result of better material supply for students of military schools.

On the other hand, it would make sense and the costs would be less expensive.

These are the questions that I would consider necessary to offer for deliberation at the CC Presidium.

N. KHRUSHCHEV

8 December 1959

**Document 2: CC CPSU Presidium decision, 14 December 1959**

*Proletarians of all countries, unite!*  
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.  
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

#P253/P

Top Secret

To com. Khrushchev.

Excerpt from protocol no. 253 of meeting of the CC Presidium of 14 December 1959

About further steps in the struggle for reduction of international tension.

1. To approve the proposals laid out in the note of com. Khrushchev N.S. to the CC Presidium about the unilateral implementation by the Soviet Union of measures directed at the reduction of international tension.

The question about the unilateral implementation of measures directed at the reduction of international tension, should be put on the agenda of a session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

2. To commission the Ministry of Defense (com. [Rodion] Malinovsky) to introduce concrete proposals on this issue for deliberation of the CC CPSU, while taking into account the exchange of opinions that took place at the meeting of the CC Presidium.

3. To convene in the CC CPSU on 18 December this year a conference of commanders, chiefs of staffs, and members of

military councils of military districts for discussion of practical measures in the army, related to the proposals com. Khrushchev N.S. outlined in [his] note to the CC Presidium.

To entrust the chairmanship of the conference to com. Khrushchev N.S.

SECRETARY OF CC

4-ak

**Document 3: CC CPSU Plenum protocol, 26 December 1959**

*Proletarians of all countries, unite!*  
Communist Party of the Soviet Union.  
CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Top Secret  
# Pl. 15 Special Dossier

Excerpt from protocol no. 15 of meeting of Plenum CC of 26 December 1959

About the measures of the Soviet Government aimed at the reduction of international tension.

To approve the measures aimed at the reduction of international tension, outlined in the note of com. Khrushchev N.S. of 8 December 1959 and in his report to the CC Plenum.

SECRETARY OF CC

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[Source: *Center for the Storage of Contemporary Documentation (TsKhSD)*, f. 2, op. 1, d. 416, ll. 1-11; translation by Vladislav M. Zubok (*National Security Archive*).]

*Vladislav M. Zubok, a research fellow at the National Security Archive, is co-author (with Constantine V. Pleshakov) of Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996) and a frequent contributor to the CWHIP Bulletin.*